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Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy

Published: 06 May 2024 Publication History

Abstract

In liquid democracy, agents can either vote directly or delegate their vote to a different agent of their choice. This results in a power structure in which certain agents possess more voting weight than others. As a result, it opens up certain possibilities of vote manipulation, including control and bribery, that do not exist in standard voting scenarios of direct democracy. Here we formalize a certain kind of election control - in which an external agent may change certain delegation arcs - and study the computational complexity of the corresponding combinatorial problem.

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cover image ACM Conferences
AAMAS '24: Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
May 2024
2898 pages
ISBN:9798400704864

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International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Richland, SC

Publication History

Published: 06 May 2024

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Author Tags

  1. computational complexity
  2. computational social choice
  3. liquid democracy
  4. manipulation
  5. parameterized complexity
  6. proxy voting

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  • Research-article

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  • European Research Council (ERC) - European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
  • SERB-SUPRA

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AAMAS '23
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Overall Acceptance Rate 1,155 of 5,036 submissions, 23%

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