Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 25
Frank Gardener Moore, Professor Emeritus in Columbia University, Ed.

27. The Carthaginian land-army having been destroyed, the Sicilians who had been Hippocrates' soldiers had occupied . . .,¹ not large towns, but defended both by situation and fortifications. One of them is three miles from Syracuse, the other fifteen miles. To these they were bringing supplies from their own communities and also summoning auxiliaries. [2] Meanwhile Bomilcar left for Carthage a second time with his fleet, and he set forth the situation of their allies in such terms as to inspire hope, not only that effectual aid could be lent to them, but also that the Romans could be captured in the virtually captured city. [3] He thus prevailed upon them to send with him as many transports as possible, laden with all kinds of supplies, and to enlarge his fleet. Accordingly, setting out from Carthage with a hundred and thirty warships and seven hundred transports, he had winds quite favourable for the [p. 447]crossing to Sicily. But the same winds did not allow² him to round Pachynum. [4] The report at first of Bomilcar's coming, and then its unexpected delay, brought rejoicing and fear by turns to Romans and Syracusans. [5] Upon that Epicydes, fearing that, if the same winds which were then holding should continue [6??] to blow from the east for several days, the Carthaginian fleet would make for Africa again, turned over Achradina to the commanders of the mercenaries and sailed to meet Bomilcar, who [7??] was keeping his fleet in a roadstead facing Africa. [8] He feared a naval battle, not so much because he was inferior in his forces and the number of his ships —in fact he had even more —as because the winds then blowing were more favourable to the Roman fleet than to his own. Nevertheless Epicydes gained his consent to try the fortune of a naval engagement. [9] And Marcellus too, seeing that a Sicilian army was being brought together from the entire island and at the same time a Carthaginian fleet was approaching with unlimited supplies, and fearing that he might be hard pressed by land and sea, being shut up within the enemies' city, decided, although he was inferior in the number of his ships, to prevent Bomilcar from reaching Syracuse. [10] The two opposing fleets lay on this side and that of the promontory of Pachynum, ready to engage as soon as calm weather should enable them to put to sea. [11] And so, as the southeast wind, which had been blowing hard for some days, was now dropping, Bomilcar was the first to get under weigh. And at first his fleet appeared to be heading out to sea, the more readily to round the promontory. [12] But on seeing that the Roman ships were steering towards [p. 449]him, Bomilcar, alarmed by something unforeseen,³ made sail for open water, and after sending messengers to Heraclea⁴ to command the transports to return thence to Africa, he himself sailed along the coast of Sicily and made for Tarentum. [13] Epicydes, suddenly bereft of a hope so high, in order not to return, only to share the siege of a city in large part captured, sailed to Agrigentum, intending to await the outcome, rather than to set anything in motion from there.