We are by no means behind our contemporaries in our estimate of the important services rendered by General Hampton to the Confederacy since he has been in command of our mounted troops, and have expressed our sentiments in that respect on more than one occasion. Considering the character of the force with which he had to deal, he has, indeed, accomplished wonders. What might he not have done had that same force been drilled and disciplined, as we still maintain that it ought to be, and as we hope it yet will be? We have not the least doubt that General Hampton himself would be the first, were he consulted on the subject, to express himself decidedly in favor of that very system, the importance of which we are endeavoring to impress upon the public mind. Were he in command of a powerful body of highly disciplined cavalry, we should as soon expect him to become the Murat of the service as any man in it. But the circumstances which mar every attempt to introduce a regular system of discipline into the ranks of our horsemen are clearly beyond his control. It is sufficient for his glory, but not sufficient for the situation, that he has performed as much as he has done with such a force as he has. We are well aware that the cavalry of the Confederate army has rendered, on many occasions, great and valuable services, and that, generally, it has behaved well in presence of the enemy. The wonder, indeed, is that it has done so much, and fought so well, when all circumstances are taken into consideration. Still, it is evidently not on such a footing as it ought to be, when it is considered that it is composed of men who, without exception, are good riders, and, almost without exception, men of high personal courage and individual character. We are aware that they labor under great disadvantages — that they are, in some instances, without the means of repairing so much as the damage done to a horse-shoe, and that, from the wretched system in existence, they must furnish their own horses or take it on foot with the infantry. Now, we wish to see these things — as well as those before pointed out — changed radically; and it is for this very reason that we have agitated the subject.
How we are to have regular, highly-disciplined cavalry that will charge other cavalry really, or infantry when broken or breaking, we do not pretend to know, nor is it our business to decide. But of this we are certain, that until we have such cavalry we shall never be able to improve a victory, and we must continue to fight the same description of long, bloody and resultless battles that have distinguished this war above any of which we know anything. No man can point to a decisive victory within one hundred years in which the cavalry did not make the decision. A beaten enemy, unless pressed to the last extremity by the cavalry, will always rally and fight it out again. The principle of adhesion is so strong in disciplined bodies that they will always rally after defeat unless means be employed to keep them asunder; and the cavalry constitutes the means thus employed. We do not profess to be military men; but it is clear to us that without some change in the system we can never expect decided success, and that without decided success we cannot expect to end this war.
Many causes have conspired to destroy the discipline of our cavalry. To some of them we have already alluded, and others are so obvious that they do not require to be pointed out. But one we feel especially called on to notice, and that is the system of raiding. There is nothing so certain to destroy the discipline of an army as the habit of living at free quarters in an enemy's country and plundering and appropriating according to every man's discretion. We are in favor of retaliating upon the enemy for injuries done to us. But such retaliation should be systematically conducted, as the conflagration of Chambersburg was. We would destroy every bit of property, utterly and on the spot, but not suffer the soldiers to appropriate it. If that practice be allowed, the most highly-disciplined army that ever trod the field of battle will soon become a disorderly mob. It has been tried in hundreds of instances, and has never once failed, that we are aware of, to produce the effect we ascribed to it. Raids, as they are called, upon railroads have now been fully tried both by the enemy and by ourselves. They have failed to the uttermost. They have never interrupted a march for a day, never cut off communication for more than a week or a fortnight, and never induced the adverse party to change his plans in the very slightest particular. They have pretty generally succeeded in destroying the discipline of the troops engaged in them, and there their success begins and ends.--They have, we doubt not, greatly aided in destroying the discipline of our cavalry both here and in the Southwest.
