A Yankee Criticism of Longstreet's campaign in East Tennessee.
A correspondent of the New York World, writing from Nashville on the 3d inst., gives a very intelligible review of Longstreet's campaign in East Tennessee. He says:‘ It is not reasonable to suppose that Longstreet, in his advance a week or two ago, had any serious intention of assailing Knoxville. He was placed in a position of great danger immediately after his withdrawal from the siege last December, and took refuge at points where he could have a series of lines of communication with his rear. His intention at that time was doubtless to take Knoxville if he could, but his plans were foiled by Gen. Grant, and when he was forced to do so he withdrew.
’ But his presence in East Tennessee had another object of far more importance than the capture of Knoxville, although his possession of that city would have greatly facilitated his plans for the winter. It was necessary that his army should be maintained without drawing upon the already self-exhausted depots in Virginia and Georgia. In the course of his military career in the former State he had exhibited much determination of purpose, and his selection by his superior for an arduous winter campaign in East Tennessee was probably the wisest that could be made. His plans, as now revealed, were to hold all the ground that he could, and to gain all new territory that it was possible for him to acquire. The passive nature of his army immediately after the abandonment of the siege of Knoxville deceived Gen. Burnside and his successor, Gen. Foster. Indeed, the maintenance of his army in the position into which it was believed that it had been driven after that event, was believed on all hands to be difficult, if not impossible. This idea possessed not only the popular mind, but inspired even our astute President with the belief that East Tennessee was indeed free.
Longstreet's plans, however, soon began to be developed. He selected a position in Northeastern Tennessee, where he could hold communication with his superiors at Richmond, and entrenching himself against all possibility of surprise, he proceeded to carry out his military plans. The Army of the Ohio was weak, and he knew it. It was strong enough to hold Knoxville, as he had learned by sad experience. The reinforcements which were sent from Chattanooga, in the hour of its peril, were withdrawn, whether wisely or not it would be unbecoming for me to say, and he saw that the field was open for whatever movements he might consider necessary during the winter months.
He, therefore, organized his forces for conquest, not necessarily of territory, but of material for the subsistence of his troops. The telegraph has informed you of the success with which he has met; how he has overrun the entire section of the State east of a line drawn from Cumberland Gap to Cleveland; how he had gathered within his lines all that was valuable in supplies of food; and how he has made his army quite self subsisting in a tract of country where it was thought it was impossible for him to remain without external aid. Longstreet has, in fact, completely shut the army of the Ohio within the narrow precincts of its early conquests; has cut off communication between it and Cumberland Gap, and only awaits the opening of spring to enter upon the campaign reinvigorated and supplied for active operations.
The Army of the Ohio has been unfortunate in its commanders Gen. Burnside tendered his resignation immediately after rescuing Knoxville and Cumberland Gap from the rebel rule. While he continued in command, after his resignation had been sent to Washington, he had no foe against which to contend until Longstreet besieged him, and then he withdrew his lines so as to take and resume the defensive entirely. After that event, until the time that he was relieved by Gen. Foster, he remained entirely upon the defensive, notwithstanding the fact that he had a wary foe in his front. Gen. Foster has not added to his laurels while he has been the department commander.--He, if all reports are true, has been careless of his men and neglectful of his position. His troops have been suffered to subsist upon quarter rations most of the time. But perhaps this is no fault of Gen. Foster. Until very recently he has not exercised himself in fighting the enemy, and then only because he was compelled to do so to maintain his position. Under his administration he has lost his lines of communication with Cumberland Gap, and barely maintained those with Chattanooga. Longstreet with his army, Isolated from all support, has out-manœuvered him in almost every instance; and Gen. Foster owes to the impregnable nature of the defences of Knoxville the security of his command. It is known that Gen. Foster labored under difficulties insurmountable — He could not make or maintain roads. He could not advance with deficient transportation; but he could have done more than he has done. If Longstreet could move consistently, Foster could have done so; and that he did not, will not conduce much to his merits as a military commander. It is true that in the engagement at Fair Garden on the 27th ult., that portion of his command under Gen. Sturgis did signal service. But I cannot see that Gen. Foster is entitled to credit for an accident.
The new commander, Gen. Schofield, has taken the reins, and it is hoped that he will infuse into the army some of that Western energy so essential to that command. He is Gen. Grant's choice, and will doubtless fulfill all that can reasonably be expected of him. There is one thing in his favor, and that is, that he is fresh from the field where his conduct has been such as to make him enemies, which it is desirable that he should punish. He has now an opportunity, not only to win the right to wear the double stars, but to bring confusion and shame upon those who have so persistently traduced him. His reputation is at stake. He is a man of indomitable energy, and I confidently believe that he will make his power felt as soon as he can get the reins of the military government in his own hands. I am confident that Longstreet will not remain in the peaceable possession of the garden of East Tennessee long.
