We have had frequent intimations from Federal sources of the prospective junction of Grant's and Rosecranz's forces, for the purpose of moving on
Jackson and
Vicksburg from that direction.
This supposition may be well founded, but we do not fear its results.
It will be remembered that
Gen. Halleck, with an army of 150,000 men, never ventured to move from his river base into the interior to attack our forces, only as he could
ditch his way parallel by parallel; and the retrograde movement of
Gen. Beauregard left him perfectly helpless, and his ditching useless.
Our forces would then be concentrated, if necessary, and the enemy could never successfully penetrate the interior far from his river communications.
If he depend on railroads, these, we know, can be tapped and destroyed; while defeat would prove destruction to his army.
The impossible condition of subsisting a large army in an enemy's country, hundreds of miles from any adequate depot of supplies, without sure and speedy transportation, with a powerful and determined army in front, or flank, to contend with, must be complied with before such a scheme could be made effective.
