Narrow escape of Van-Dorn
A letter to the Charleston Courier from Columbia, Tenn., gives an interesting account of a narrow escape made by Van-Dorn from the capture of himself and whole command.--It appears that on the 11th inst. he had taken an advantageous position to make a short opposition to the advance of a superior force of the enemy, and then retire across Duck river, over which a pontoon bridge was supposed to have been completed. Upon attempting to it, it was discovered to be impossible, is the river had overflowed its banks, and was sweeping on with the greatest rapidly, bearing on its bosom huge logs and drift wood, burled down with such velocity as to render the laying down of the pontoon an utter . To render matters still worse, the rope by means of which the ferry-boat was crossed, became submerged, and another one was with difficulty stretched across, by means of which they were enabled to cross a boat capable of carrying at each trip, occupying forty minutes, one wagon or eight or ten horses.--The letter says:‘ Placed in this unfortunate position, we were completely covered by Federal in heavy force in the front and upon both flanks, without having any means of retreat in case of a superior force, which was certain, and which it was sonly our intention to engage and retire. Several plans of escape were suggested, among which the most plausible was to swim the horses across the stream and cross the troops by the ferry; but it was found that even this was impracticable. Our position was at the head of the peninsula formed by the junction of Carter's creek and Duck river, while the enemy's position was upon another peninsula directly opposite, formed by the junction of Rutherford and Carter's creeks, all of which streams were unusually high and well nigh impassable. Our forces were disposed on the south side of Rutherford's creek, our centre resting upon the Nashville pike, our left extending to Carter's creek, and our right, under Forrest, extending a mile or two to the right of the pike, and upon the border of Rutherford's creek. The position was a very string and commanding one, and King's battery was put upon the highest hill commanding the approaches from the pike. In front of our position, upon the centre, open fields stretched from Rutherford's creek back a thousand yards to a wooded hill upon the left of the turnpike, upon which the enemy mounted their artillery, but which was perfectly commanded by King's excellent position.
From the top of this hill the movements of the enemy might plainly be described. On the 10th, three brigades were plainly visible, and large wagon trains were moving in all directions. It was feared, from what could be seen of the enemy's movements upon our right, that he was about driving wagons into Rutherford's creek, upon which to place plank and cross his infantry, as the creek was too deep and rapid to be at all fordable. It soon became known to our troops that the pontoon had proved a provoking failure, and being aware of the enemy large force and his so perfectly covering our front and flank, and deeming escape improbable, their lack of confidence was plainly exhibited, and hundreds of stragglers attempted to cross by means of the ferry-boats, but were prevented by the guard, who were ordered to permit none but couriers and ordnance wagons to cross. The night of the 10th was, indeed, a gloomy one, and the myriad camp fires of the enemy, seen through the rain and mist in the woods in front of our position, by no means reassured our disheartened forces. At 10 o'clock at night a council of war was held, of which Forrest, Jackson, Crosby and Van-Dorn were members, and the plan of escape adopted. In the morning our troops were ordered to make an unusual noise and keep up a cheering, while buglers were ordered to sound 'reveille' and 'forward' from many more points than where we had troops.
At 8 o'clock A. M., the enemy's battery upon the left of the turnpike opened fire upon King's battery, and gave that officer the much desired opportunity to return fire and convince them of his whereabouts just before his battery was withdrawn. Several shells which he had taken from the battle-field of Spring Hill were returned rapidly to the enemy, to whom they originally belonged, and our battery was then taken to the ferry and our battery was then taken to the ferry and crossed by the indefatigable exertions of the Captain, and the horses swam across. Upon the previous evening the Texas brigade sent word that they were upon the same side of Rutherford's Creek as the enemy, and were unable to cross. The next thing heard of them, the enemy commenced advancing, and it is said with a smile, that to see the Texas Rangers crossing the creek one would have thought that they were crossing a turnpike instead of a rapid stream, so hastily did they effect it. As 10 o'clock, A. M., this brigade and Crosby's, which had been upon our left, were withdrawn through the woods, so as to avoid being seen by the Yankee look-outs, leaving their usual out-posts behind, and started upon a by-road running along the Duck river in a northeasterly direction. Forrest's command were upon another road running parallel with it, and Armstrong brought up the rear, with Van Dorn and staff and escort immediately in the rear of Crosby, so as to be in a position to direct movements either in front or rear in case the enemy attempted to intercept us. Everything was now under way, the artillery and wagon trains having been crossed upon the ferry, and the animals swam, the position completely evacuated, save by the outposts and pickets, who were directed to withdraw so soon as we got fairly under way, or the enemy should advance.
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