Later from the North.
New York papers of the 25th are received, but do not contain any late important news. Brigadier General J. G. Foster who telegraphed to Hal that he had achieved a regular series of victories in North Carolina, has arrived at Fortress Monroe and his army has gone bach to Newborns.--The New York Heraldhas a doleful article on the expense of the war, both in life and money. In life, It says 200,000 men have been lost; in money, the expense are $3,000,000 per day. It wants a convention of the States, and says:‘ Under the existing condition of things we can only answer that our prospects are gloomy enough. We have fought many bloody battiest; the Union forces have effected a lodgment here and there in every rebellions State several doubtful States, by hard fighting have been reclaimed, and yet we have hardly accomplished more than a break hero and there through the crust of the rebellion. Its heart only one hundred and twenty miles from Washington, remains untouched, and each succeeding effort to reach it has thus far only resulted in disappointment, disasters, and disgrace. The Solent and fanatical Abolition measures of the last Congress have fused all parties and all classes in the revolted States into the party of resistance to the last extremity, while the late repulse of the most powerful army of the Union has revived the hopes of the rebel leaders in the early settlement of the war in their favor through European intervention. There is very reason to apprehend too, unless we give some heavy and crushing blows to this rebellion before the return of spring, that Mr. Lincoln will have to meet Louis Napoleon as an active ally of the rebels, or submit to his suggest some of peace upon the basis of an independent Southern Confederacy. * * * *
Overwhelming as are the military forces, facilities, means, and resources of the loyal States we know that their people are becoming sick of this desolating vastly, promising war. Accordingly let Gov. Seymour throw out the proposition force Convention of all the loyal States, and a free invitation to the rebellious States to participate in said Convention, and who knows out that it may turn aside the destructive forces of this terrible war into the channels of an honorable and enduring peace, upon the broad platform of the Constitution of the United States ! At all events, we are fully impressed with the belief that Mr. Seymour, as our Governor less in view of the public sentiment at New York and the powerful central loyal states of which he is the most prominent representative occupies a most advantageous position for giving the proper shape and direction to the future policy of President Lincoln; and we hope, according that the opportunity which is thus presented for the good of the country and a lasting reputation of honor and usefulness will not be lost. Let Governor Seymour lead the way and an extra session of Congress, with a new conservation House of Representatives, may work out the actions deliverance.
’
Burnside on the Mourner's Bench — he Penitently Answers the Inquiries of the Congressional Committee--neither his officers not men would come to time on Sunday.
Perhaps the most interesting article in the New York capers is the report of Burnside's examination by the committee of the Abolition Congress on his failure to get to Richmond. He was requested by the committee before whom he appeared to make his statement his own and this is it.When after the battle of Antietam General McClellan decided to cross the Potomac, I said to him that, in my opinion, he would never be able to take this army on that route beyond the Rappahannock, unless he succeeded in fighting the enemy at some place on this side. That if he proposed to go to Richmond by land, he would have to go by way of Fredericksburg; and in that he partially agreed with me. After we had started, we had another conversation on that subject, and several other officers were present.
On the 6th of November, after this conversation, General McClellan gave an order to Capt. Drum, as Chief Engineer, to have all his pontoon bridges at Serith and in that neighborhood, that could be spared, taken up and sent down to Washington, with a view of getting them down to this point in little, in case he decided to go by way of Fredericksburg.
The letter conveying that order was written on the 6th of November. but, as I understand, was not received until the 12th of November.
On the 7th or 8th November, I received an order from the Frecident of the United States directing me to take command of the Army of the Petomas and also a copy of the order retrieving General McClellan from that command. This order was conveyed to me by General Buckingham, who was attached to the War Department.
After getting over my surprise — the shock — I told Gen. Buckingham that it was a matter that required very serious thought; that I did not want the command; that it had been offered to me twice before and I did not feel that I could take it. I with two of my staff officers in regard to it for. I should think, an hour and a half. They urged upon me that I had no right as a soldier, to disobey the order, and that I had already expressed to the Government my unwillingness to take the command. I told them what my views were with reference to my ability to exercise such command, which views were those I had already unreservedly expressed — that I was not competent to command such a large army as this. I had said the same thing over and over again to the President and Secretary of War; and also, that if matters could be satisfactorily arranged with Gen. McClellan, I thought he could command the Army of the Potomac better than any other General in it, but they had studied the subject more than I had, and knew about their obligations to Gen. McClellan I did. There had been some conversation regard to the removal of General McClellan when he was bringing his army from before Richmond.
The first of these conversations with the President and Secretary of War occurred at that time and then offer Gen. McClellan had got back to Washington, and before the commencement of the Maryland campaign there was another conversation of the same kind, and on both of these occasions I expressed to the President the opinion that I did not think there was any one who could do as much with that army as Gen. McClellan could, if matters could be so arranged as to remove their objections to him.
After I had conversed with my staff officers I went to see Gen. McClellan himself, and he agreed with them, that this was an order which I, as a soldier, had to obey. He said that he could not retain the command, for he, as a soldier, would have to obey the order directing him to give up that command.
In the midst of a violent snow storm with the army in a position that I knew little of, (I had previously commanded but one corps upon the extreme right, and had been upon the extreme right and in the advance since that campaign had begun.) I probably knew less than any other corps commander of the position and relative strength of the several corps of the army.
Gen. McClellan remained some two or three days to arrange his affairs, and came with me as far as Warrenton and then left, having given me all the information he could in reference to the army.
Gen. Halleck came down to see me on the 11th of November. On the 9th I made out a plan of operations in accordance with the order of General Halleck, which directed me not only to take command, but also to state what I proposed to do with it. That plan I wrote on the morning of the 9th of November, and see it by special messenger to Washington. I can furnish the committee a copy of the plan if they desire it. I do not have it here now.
Question.--State the substance of it, if you please?
Answer — I state in substance, that
I thought it advisable to concentrate the army in the neighborhood of Wassenton to make a small government across the Rappahannock as a feint, which a view to divert the attention of the enemy, and lead them to believe we were going to move in the direction of Gordonsville, and then to make a rapid movement of the whole army to Fredericksburg on this side of the Rappahannock. As my reasons for that, I stated that the further we got into the interior of Virginia, the longer would be our line of communication, and the greater would be the difficulty we would have in keeping them open, as the enemy had upon our right flank a corps that at almost any time could, by a rapid movement, seriously embarrass us. If we were caught by the elements so far from our bass of supplies, and at the same time in the enemy's country, where they had means of getting information that we had not, it might, I thought, prove to the army, as we had but one line of railway by which to supply it.
In moving upon Fredericksburg we would all the time be as near Washington as would the enemy, and after arriving at Fredericksburg we would be at a point nearer to Richmond than we would be even if we should take Gordonsville. On the Gordonsville line the enemy, in my opinion, would not give us a decisive battle at any place this side of Richmond. They would defend Gordonsville until such time as they had felt they had given us a check, and then, with so many lines of railroad open to them, they would move upon Richmond or upon Lynchburg, and in either case the difficulty of following them would be very great.
In connection with this movement I requested that barges, filled with provisions and forage, should be floated to Aquia Creek, where they could vastly be landed, materials be collected for the reconstruction of the wharves there, and that all the wagons in Washington that could possibly be spared be filled with hard bread and small commissary stores, and, with a large number of beef cattle, be started down to Fredericksburg on the road by way of Dumfries, and that this wagon train and hard of cattle should be preceded by a pontoon train large enough to span the Rappahannock twice.
I stated that this wagon train could move in perfect safety, because it would be all the time between our army and the Potomac or in other words our army and the Potomac; or in other words our army would be all the time between the enemy and that train. But, at the same time, I said that if a cavalry escort could not be furnished from Washington, I would send some of my cavalry to guard the train.
On the morning of the 14th of November, feeling uneasy in reference to the pontoons, as I had not heard of their starting, I directed my Chief Engineer to telegraph again with reference to them.
Question — To whom did he telegraph!
Answer.--He telegraphed to Gen. Woodbury or to Major Spanding. It subsequently appeared that that was the first they ever had heard of my wish to have the pontoon train started down for Fredericksburg, although the authorities in Washington bad had my pian sent to them on the 9th of November, and it had also been discovered by Gen. Halleck and Gen. Melgs at my headquarters on the night of the 11th and 12th of November, and after discussing it fully there, they sat down and sent telegrams to Washington, which, as I supposed, covered fully the case, and would secure the starting of the pontoon trains at once.
I supposed, of course, that those portions of the plan which required to be attended to in Washington would be carried out there at once. I could have sent my own officers there to attend to those matters, and perhaps I made a mistake in not doing so, as Gen. Halleck afterwards told me that I ought not to have trusted to them in Washington for the details.
In reply to the telegram I had ordered to be sent, Gen. Woodbury telegraphed back that the pontoons would start on Sunday morning, probably, and certainly on Monday morning, which would have been on the 16th or 17th of November, and would have been in time. They did not, however, start until the 19th, and on that day it commenced raining, which delayed them so much, and the roads became so bad, that when the train got to Dumfries they floated the pontoons off the wagons; sent to Washington for a steamer, and carried them down to Aquia Creek by water, sending the wagons around by land. The pontoon did not get here until the 22d or 23d of November.
On the 15th of November I started the column down the road to Fredericksburg, not knowing anything about the delay in the starting of the pontoons, because the telegram announcing the delay did not reach Warrenton Junction until I had left to come down here with the troops, and the telegram did not reach me until I arrived here on the morning of the 19th, when it was handed to me by an orderly who had brought it down to Warrenton Junction.
After reaching here, I saw at once that there was no chance for crossing the Rappahannock with the army at that time. It commenced raining, and the river began to rise, not to any great extent, but I did not know now much it might rise. There was no means of crossing, except by going up to the fords, and it would be impossible to do that because of the inability to supply the troops after they should cross.
Gen. Sumner, with his command, arrived here in advance. He sent to me, asking if he should cross the river. He was very much tempted to take his own corps across to Fredericksburg by a ford near Falmouth, as there was no enemy there except a very small force.
I did not think it advisable that he should cross at that time. The plan I had in contemplation was, if the stores and those bridges had come here, as I expected, to throw Sumner's whole corps across the Rappahannock Fill the wagons with as many small stores as we could, and having beef cattle along for meat, then to make a rapid movement down in the direction of Richmond, and try to meet the enemy and fight a battle before Jackson could make a junction there. He Knew that Jackson was in the Valley, and felt that there was force on the Upper Rappahannock to take care of him. He felt certain that as soon as the enemy knew of our crossing down here, the forces under Johnson would be recalled, and he wanted to meet this force and beat it before Jackson could make a Junction with them, or before Jackson could come down on our flank and perhaps cripple us.
I had recommended that some supplies should be rent to the month of the Rappahannock, with a view of establishing a depot at Port Royal after we had advanced.
Stores have been always in as great abundance as we could have expected, for, after the 19th of November, the weather and the roads were particularly bad. Horses and mules were sent down to us, so that our cavalry and teams were in very good condition.
After it was ascertained that there must be a delay, and that the enemy had concentrated in such force as to make it very difficult to cross except by a number of bridges, we commenced bringing up from Aquia Creek all the pontoons we could. After enough of them had been brought up to build the brings, I called several councils of War, to decide about crossing the Rappahannock. It was first decided to cross down at Snicker's Neck, about twelve miles below here. But our demonstration was simply for the purpose of drawing down there as large a force of the enemy as possible. I then decided to cross here, because, in the first place, I felt satisfied that they did not expect us to cross here, but down below, In the next place, I left satisfied that this was the place to fight the most decisive battle, because, if we could divide their forces by pressing their lines at one or two points, separating their left from their right, then a vigorous attach with the whole army would succeed in breaking their army in pieces.
The enemy had cut a road along the rear of the line of heights, where we made our attack, by means of which they connected the two wings of their army, and avoided a long detour round through a bad country.
I obtained, from a colored man from the other side of the town, information in regard to this new road which proved to be correct. I wanted to obtain possession of that new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left.--I did not intend to make the attack on the right until that position had been taken, which I supposed would stagger the enemy by cutting their line in two, and then I proposed to make a direct attack on their front and drive them out of the works.
I succeeded in building six bridges, and in taking the whole army across. The two attacks were made, and we were repulsed — still holding a portion of the ground we had fought upon, but not our extreme advance. That night I went all over the field on our right. In fact, I was with the officers and men until daylight. I found the feeling to be father against an attack the next morning. In fact it was decidedly against it.
I returned to my headquarters, and after conversation with Gen. Sumner, told him that I wanted him to order the 9th army corps, which was the corps I originally commanded, to form the next morning a column of attack by regiments. It consisted of some eighteen old regiments and some new ones, and desired the column to make a direct at tack upon the enemy's works. I thought that these regiments, by driving quickly up after each other, would be able to carry the stone wall and the batteries in front, forcing the enemy into their next line, and by joining in with them they would not be able to fire upon us to any great extent. I left General Sumner with that understanding, and directed him to give the order.
The order was given, and the order of attack was formed. On the next morning, just before the column was to have started Gen. Sumner came up to me and said, ‘"General, I hope you will desist from this attack. I do not know of any general officer who approves of it, and I think it will prove disastrous to the army."’ Advice of that kind from Gen. Sumner, who has always been in favor of our advance whenever it is possible, caused me to hesitate. I kept the column of attack formed, sent over for the division and corps command consulted with them. They unanimously voted against the attack. I then went over to see the officers of the command on the other side, and that the same opinion prevailed among them.
I then sent for Gen. Franklin, who was on the left, and he was of exactly the same opinion. This caused me to decide that I ought not to make the attack I had contemplated, and, besides, inasmuch as the President, of the U. States had told me not to be in haste in making this attack; that he would give me all the support he could, but he did not want the Army of the Potomac destroyed. I felt that I could not take the responsibility of ordering the attack, notwithstanding my own belief at the time that the works of the enemy could be carried.
In the afternoon of that day I again saw the officers, and told them that I had decided to withdraw to this side of the river all our forces except enough to hold the town and the bridge heads, but should keep the bridges there for future operations in case we wanted to cross again.
I accordingly ordered the withdrawal, leaving Gen. Hooker to conduct the withdrawal of our forces from the town, and Gen. Franklin to conduct it on our left. During that evening I received a note from Gen. Hooker, and about 10 o'clock at night Gen. Butterfield came over with a message from Gen. Hooker, stating that he (Gen. Hooker) felt it his duty to represent to me the condition in which I was leaving the town and the troops in it. After a long consultation on the subject with Gen. Butterfield, I felt that the troops I proposed to leave behind would not be able to hold the town. I then partially decided to withdraw the whole command, which was a still more perilous operation. It commenced raining, which to some extent was assistance to us, but a very bad thing in the moving of troops. I thought over the matter for about two hours, and about 1 o'clock I sent an order to withdraw the whole force, which was successfully no accomplished.
There had been a great deal of division of opinion among the corps commanders as to the place of crossing, but after all the discussion upon the subject, the decision to cross over here, I understood, was well received by all of them.
