Strange Reasoning.
A writer in a contemporary journal, who approves of the President's Message in that part relating to the conscription, says, in substance, that we have already men enough — that large armies are unwieldily, and therefore not apt to render so much service as small ones — that as a proof, Xerxes failed in Greece, and Napoleon in Russia. The general inference is, that we shall do better with a small army than with a large one. The philosopher who maintained that a half was greater than the whole, is not, it seems, without disciples.Xerxes failed with a great army, and Napoleon failed with a great army. Innumerable small armies were destroyed during the twenty-two centuries that elapsed between the death of the one and the birth of the other. Why the fate of these last should have been wholly overlooked in the construction of a general rule deduced from example of military failure, we are at a loss to imagine. But before we give our assent to the startling proposition that the larger the army the more certain the failure, it would be well to inquire a little into facts. How were the Northern barbarians enabled to break the Roman Empire into fragments? By their numbers unquestionably. Alaric marched a the head of half a million of men, and Attila lost 300,000 in a single, battle. What enabled the Saracens first, and the Ottoman Turks afterwards, to overrun Asia and Africa, plant the Crescent on the towers of St. Sophia, and shake Christendom to its centre? Their numbers, beyond all doubt. It was by their numbers again that the Tartars, under Genghis Khan, in the thirteenth, and Timour in the fourteenth century, swept over half the world.
But let us come down to that period in modern history which affords the best illustration of on subject; we mean the wars of the French Revolution. The Republic successfully withstood the assault of combined Europe. How? By virtue of her numbers. She had, at one time, nearly a motion of men under arms. Under the Empire, the military force was always enormous. In 1805, when the campaign of Austerlitz took place, it was computed at 651,000 men. In the campaign of Jens (1806) it was somewhat larger. In the campaign of Friedland (1807) the military strength of the Empire approached 800,000 men, and in the campaign of Wagram (1809) it quite came up to that figure.--All these campaigns were eminently successful.--That of Russia（1812) was a failure, from causes not at all dependent on the strength of the invading army. The distance from home, the climate, the rugged resistance of the Russians, the difficulty of procuring supplies — and other causes might be enumerated. Charles XII, one century before, failed quite as badly as Napoleon did in 1812, and his army was little more than one- tenth part as large as that of the latter.
Decisive battles are usually fought by a very small proportion of the entire force. At Austerlitz the French numbered 80,000 men, while the strength of the Empire was 651,000. At Jena, 126,000 French only were engaged. At Friedland 80,000 French decided the fate of the war. although there were in Poland nearly 300,000 French soldiers, while the strength of the Empire was double that figure, and more. At Wagram, 150,000 or 160,000 men fought, while Napoleon had certainly at least 800,000 men under arms on the whole. So difficult is the problem of concentration, even in the hands of the greatest genius.
The Allies overwhelmed Napoleon at last by the enormous forces they brought to bear on him. Such mighty armies as took the field in 1813 had never been seen in Europe. Besides the forces which marched directly on Paris, in 1814, Wellington was on one frontier with 150,000 men, and a much larger force was ready to advance from Italy. It is probable that France was occupied by at least a million of men at that time and there were countless reserves ready to march in Germany, in Russia, in Sweden, in Holland, &c. After the battle of Waterloo, France was a second time occupied by 1,100,000 men. Poland was overwhelmed in 1813 entirely by dint of numbers. There is a case directly in point. The Poles fought as gallantly as it was possible for men to fight, but their army was comparatively small, and they were conquered. It is extremely difficult to conquer a people thoroughly united and resolved to do their utmost. To conquer such a people as ours we hold to be impossible. Still it is best, we take it, to have as many troops in the field as can be maintained. If we can best the present force of the enemy, with the 600,000 added, very well. Still, we do not see that a force doubly as large as that we now possess would do us any harm. Had we had such a force last year we should not now be lamenting the ravages of the enemy in Virginia and elsewhere.--Physical strength, let it be underrated as it may, is a great thing in all wars — more especially in such a war as that in which we are engaged.
