Chapter 6:
Spain and the United States.1778.
early in the year, Juan de Miralez, a SpanishChap. VI.} 1778. |
Of all the European powers, Spain was the most consistently and perseveringly hostile to the United States. With a true instinct she saw in their success the quickening example which was to break down the barriers of her own colonial system; and her [158] dread of their coming influence shaped her policy
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Count Montmorin, the successor of d'ossun as French ambassador at Madrid, had in his childhood been a playmate of the king of France, whose friendship he retained, so that his position was one of independence and dignity. As a man of honor, he desired to deal fairly with the United States, and he observed with impartiality the politics of the Spanish court. On receiving a communication of the despatch, which embodied the separate determination of France to support the United States, Florida Blanca quivered [159] in every limb and could hardly utter a reply.4 Sus-
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When, therefore, in April, the French ambassador
April. |
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Baffled in her policy by France, Spain next thought to use Great Britain as her instrument for repressing the growth of the United States. Her first wish was to prevent their self-existence, and, as mediator, to dictate the terms of their accommodation with their mother country; but, as this was no longer possible after the intervention of France, she hoped at the peace to concert with England how to narrow their domain, and secure the most chances for an early dissolution of their inchoate union.
No sooner had Louis the Sixteenth and his council resolved to brave England, than the system which had led to the family compact of the Bourbons recovered its normal influence; for it was through the Spanish alliance that they hoped to bring the conflict to a brilliant issue. Swayed by the advice of d'ossun, they made it their paramount object to reconcile the Spanish government to their measures. In this way doubt arrested their action at the moment of beginning hostilities. If it was to be waged by France alone, they held it prudent to risk everything and make haste to gain advantages in a first campaign, before the English could bring out all their strength; but, if Spain was determined not to stand aloof, they would put the least possible at hazard till it should declare itself.6 Moreover, this persistent deference to the younger branch of the Bourbons brought with it obstinate contrarieties, both as to the place of the United States in the conduct of the war, and still more so in settling the ultimate conditions of peace. [161]
In the conflict between fears and desires, the king of
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Avoiding an immediate choice between peace and war, Florida Blanca disdained the proposal of an alliance with the United States, and he demanded the postponement of active hostilities in European waters, that he might gain free scope for offering mediation. The establishments of Britain in all parts of the world were weakly garrisoned; its homeward-bound commerce was inadequately protected; its navy was unprepared. The ships of the French, on the contrary, were ready for immediate action; yet they [162] consented to wait indefinitely for the co-operation of
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All this while British armed vessels preyed upon the commerce of France. To ascertain the strength of the fleet at Brest, a British fleet of twenty ships of the line put to sea under Admiral Keppel, so well known to posterity by the pencil of Reynolds and the prose of Burke. On the seventeenth of June,
June 17. |
The French government, no longer able to remain inactive, authorized the capture of British merchantmen; and early in July its great fleet sailed out of
July |
27. |
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The deeds of the French army for the year consisted in seeming to menace England with an invasion, by forming a camp in Normandy under the Count de Broglie, and wasting the season in cabals, indiscipline, and ruinous luxury. In India, Chandernagor on the Hoogley surrendered to the English without a blow; the governor of Pondicherry, with a feeble garrison and weak defences, maintained a siege of seventy days in the vain hope of relief. The flag of the Bourbons was suffered to disappear from the gulf and sea of Bengal, and from the coast of Malabar. To meet the extraordinary expenses of this frivolous campaign, the kingdom was brought nearer to bankruptcy [164] by straining the public credit without corre-
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The diplomacy of Spain during the year proved still less effective. Florida Blanca began with the British minister at Madrid, by affecting ignorance of the measures of the French cabinet, and assuring him ‘that his Catholic Majesty neither condemned nor justified the steps taken by France; but that, as they had been entered upon without the least concert with him, he thought himself perfectly free from all engagements concerning them.’8 After these assertions, which were made so directly and so solemnly that they were believed, he explained that the independence of the United States would overturn the balance of power on the continent of America; and he proposed, through the mediation of his court,9 to obtain a cessation of hostilities in order to establish and perpetuate an equilibrium. The offer of mediation was an offer of the influence of the Bourbon family to secure to England the basin of the St. Lawrence, with the territory north-west of the Ohio, and to bound the United States by the Alleghanies. But Lord Weymouth held it ignoble to purchase from the wreckers of British colonial power the part that they might be willing to restore; and he answered, ‘that while France supported the colonies in rebellion no negotiation could be entered into.’10 But, as both Great Britain and Spain were interested in preserving colonial dependency, he invited a closer union between them, and even proposed an alliance. [165]
At this point in the negotiation, Florida Blanca,
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Vergennes, while now more sure than ever of the co-operation of Spain, replied: ‘The idea of making a war on England, like that of the Romans on the Carthaginians, does honor to the minister's elevation of soul; but the attempt would require at least seventy ships of the line, and at least seventy thousand effective troops, of which ten thousand should be cavalry, beside transport ships and proportionate artillery, provisions, and ammunition.’13
To the British proposal of an alliance, Florida Blanca returned a still more formal offer of mediation between the two belligerents; excusing his wish to take part in the settlement of England with its insurgent colonies by his desire that their ambition should be checked and tied down to fixed limits through the union of the three nations. Then, under [166] pretence of seeking guidance in framing the plan
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Indifferent to threats, Weymouth in October gave warning of the fatal consequence to the Spanish monarchy of American independence; and from a well-considered policy refused in any event to concert with other governments the relations of his country to its colonies.15 Meantime Florida Blanca continued to fill the courts of Europe with declarations that Spain would never precede England in recognising the separate existence of her colonies.
During this confused state of the relations between the three great powers, the United States fell upon a wise measure. Franklin, from the first, had advised his country against wooing Spain: but the confidence reposed in him by the French cabinet was not impaired by his caution; and they transacted all American business with him alone. Tired of the dissensions of rival commissioners, congress, on the fourteenth of September, abolished the joint commission of which he had been a member, and appointed him their minister plenipotentiary at the court of France. It illustrates the patriotism of John Adams, that, though he was one of those to be removed from office, he approved alike the terminating of the commission [167] and the selection of Franklin as sole envoy. In him
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