[
574]
Chapter 29:
Peace between the
United States and
Great Britain.
1782.
de Grasse, as he passed through
London on
parole, brought from
Shelburne to
Vergennes suggestions, which left
Spain as the only obstacle in the way of peace.
To conciliate that power,
Jay was invited to
Versailles, where, on the fourth of
Sep-
tember,
Rayneval sought to persuade him to resign for his country all pretensions to the eastern valley of the Mississippi, and with it the right to the navigation of that stream.
Jay was inflexible.
On the sixth,
Rayneval sent him a paper containing a long
argument against the pretensions of
America to touch the
Mississippi, or the great lakes; and on the next morning, after an interview with the
Spanish ambas-
sador, he set off for
England, to establish a good understanding with
Shelburne.
On the ninth, the departure of Rayneval came to
the knowledge of
Jay. On the tenth, a translation
of an intercepted despatch from
Marbois, the
French
[
575]
secretary of legation at
Philadelphia, against con-
ceding a share in the great fishery to the
Americans, was communicated to
Jay and
Franklin.
Jay was thrown from his equipoise.
Having excited the distrust of
Shelburne by peremptorily breaking off the negotiation, he now, through an English agent, sent to the
British minister, with whom he was wholly unacquainted, a personal request that he would for the present take no measures with
Rayneval; giving as the reason, that it was the obvious interest of Britain immediately to cut the cords which tied the
Americans to
France.
Franklin, who had vainly labored with his colleague to finish at once the treaty with
England, strove as ever before to defeat all intrigues by hastening its consummation; and to this end he urged on the
British government a compliance with the demand of a new commission for
Oswald.
Lord Grantham had assured him by letter that ‘the establishment of an honorable and lasting peace was the system of the ministers.’
‘I know it to be the sincere desire of the
United States,’
Franklin replied, on the day after reading the paper of
Marbois; ‘and with such dispositions on both sides there is reason to hope that the good work in its progress will meet with little difficulty.
A small one has occurred, with which
Mr. Oswald will acquaint you. I flatter myself that means will be found on your part for removing it, and my best endeavors in removing subsequent ones (if any should arise) may be relied on;’ but
Franklin neither criminated
France, nor compromised himself, nor his country, nor his colleague.
Rayneval passed through London directly to Bow
[576]
Wood, the country seat of Shelburne in the west of
England.
‘I trust what you say as much as if
Mr. de Vergennes himself were speaking to me,’ were the words with which he was welcomed.
‘
Gibraltar,’ observed
Rayneval, ‘is as dear to the king of
Spain as his life.’
Shelburne answered: ‘Its cession is impossible: I dare not propose it to the
British nation.’
‘
Spain wishes to become complete mistress of the
Gulf of Mexico,’ continued
Rayneval.
On this point,
Shelburne opened the way for concession, saying: ‘It is not by way of
Florida that we carry on our contraband trade, but by way of
Jamaica.’
Shelburne owned reluctantly the necessity of conceding independence to the
United States, but was resolved to concede it without any reservation.
‘As to the question of boundaries and fisheries,’ observed
Rayneval, ‘I do not doubt of the earnest purpose of the king to do everything in his power to restrain the
Americans within the limits of justice and reason.
Be their pretensions to the fisheries what they may, it seems to me that there is one sure principle to follow on that subject; namely, that the fishery on the high seas is
res nullius, the property of no one, and that the fishery on the coast belongs of right to the proprietaries of the coasts, unless there have been derogations founded upon treaties.
As to boundaries, the
British minister will find in the negotiations of 1754, relative to the
Ohio, the boundaries which
England, then the sovereign of the thirteen
United States, thought proper to assign them.’
To these insinuations,
Shelburne, true to his words to
Franklin, made no response.
With regard to the mediation offered by the
[577]
northern powers, he said: ‘We have no need of
them: they can know nothing about our affairs, since it is so hard for us to understand them ourselves; there is need of but three persons to make peace, myself, the
Count de Vergennes, and you.’
‘I shall be as pacific in negotiating as I shall be active for war, if war must be continued,’ he added, on
the fourteenth.
Rayneval replied: ‘
Count de Vergennes will, without ceasing, preach justice and moderation.
It is his own code, and it is that of the king.’
On the fifteenth, they both came up to Lon-
don, where, on the sixteenth,
Rayneval met
Lord Grantham. Nothing could be more decided than his refusal to treat about
Gibraltar.
On the seventeenth,
in bidding farewell to
Rayneval,
Shelburne said, in the most serious tone and the most courteous manner: ‘have been deeply touched by everything you have said to me about the character of the king of
France, his principles of justice and moderation, his love of peace.
I wish, not only to re-establish peace between the two nations and the two sovereigns, but to bring them to a cordiality which will constitute their reciprocal happiness.
Not only are they not natural enemies, as men have thought till now; but they have interests which ought to bring them nearer together.
We have each lost consideration in our furious desire to do each other harm.
Let us change principles that are so erroneous.
Let us reunite, and we shall stop all revolutions in
Europe.’
By revolutions he meant the division of
Poland, the encroachments on
Turkey, and the attempt of the court of Vienna to bring
Italy under its control by seizing the fine harbors of
Dalmatia.
[
578]
‘There is another object,’ continued Shelburne,
Chap. XXIX.} 1782. Sept. 17. |
‘which makes a part of my political views; and that is the destruction of monopoly in commerce.
I regard that monopoly as odious, though the
English nation, more than any other, is tainted with it. I flatter myself I shall be able to come to an understanding with your court upon this subject, as well as upon our political amalgamation.
I have spoken to the king on all these points.
I have reason to believe that when we shall have made peace the most frank cordiality will be established between the two princes.’
Rayneval reciprocated these views, and added: ‘Your principles on trade accord exactly with those of
France;
Count de Vergennes thinks that freedom is the soul of commerce.’
The British ministry were so much in earnest in their desire for peace with the United States, that a new commission was drafted for Oswald to conclude a peace or truce with commissioners of the thirteen United States of America, which were enumerated one by one.
This concession was made after consultation with Lord Ashburton, who held that it was a matter of indifference, whether the title chosen by the American commissioners should be accepted by Oswald under the king's authority, or directly by the king.
The acknowledgment of independence was still reserved to form the first article of the treaty of peace.
The change of form was grateful and honorable to the United States; but the king said: ‘I am so much agitated with a fear of sacrificing the interests of my country, by hurrying peace on too fast, that I am unable to add anything on that subject but the most frequent prayers to Heaven to guide me so
[579]
to act that posterity may not lay the downfall of
this once respectable empire to my door; and that if ruin should attend the measures that may be adopted, I may not long survive them.’
The delay had given time to British creditors and to the refugees to muster all their strength and embarrass the negotiation by their importunities.
On purely Spanish questions, Jay appears to the best advantage.
On the twenty-sixth of September,
Aranda, in company with
Lafayette, encountered him at
Versailles.
Aranda asked: ‘When shall we proceed to do business?’
Jay replied, ‘When you communicate your powers to treat.’
‘An exchange of commissions,’ said
Aranda, ‘cannot be expected, for
Spain has not acknowledged your independence.’
‘We have declared our independence,’ said
Jay; ‘and
France,
Holland, and
Britain have acknowledged it.’
Lafayette came to his aid, and told the ambassador that it was not consistent with the dignity of
France that an ally of hers like the
United States should treat otherwise than as independent.
Vergennes pressed upon
Jay a settlement of claims with
Spain.
Jay answered: ‘We shall be content with no boundaries short of the
Mississippi.’
So soon as Oswald received his new commission, the negotiation, after the loss of a month, moved forward easily and rapidly.
At the request of Franklin, Jay drew up the articles of peace.
They included the clauses relating to boundaries and fisheries, which Franklin had settled with Oswald in July; to these Jay added a clause for reciprocal freedom of commerce, which was equally grateful to Franklin and Oswald, and a concession to the British of the free
[580]
navigation of the Mississippi.
For himself, he re-
peatedly insisted with
Oswald, that
West Florida should not be left in the hands of the Spaniards, but should be restored to
England; and he pleaded ‘in favor of the future commerce of
England as if he had been of her council, and wished to make some reparation for her loss,’ not duly considering the dangers threatening the
United States, if
England should hold both
East and
West Florida and the
Bahama Islands.
Shelburne had hoped to make a distinction between the jurisdiction over the western country and property in its ungranted domain, so that the sales of wild lands might yield some compensation to the loyal refugees; but Jay insisted that no such right of property remained to the king.
Oswald urged upon him the restoration of the loyalists to their civil rights; but Jay answered that the subject of pardon was one with which ‘congress could not meddle.
The states being sovereigns, the parties in fault were answerable to them, and to them only.’
Oswald yielded on both points.
On sending over the draft of the treaty to the secretary of state, the British plenipotentiary wrote: ‘I look upon the treaty as now closed.’
Both Franklin and Jay had agreed that, if it should be approved, they would sign it immediately.
Towards the French minister, they continued their reserve, not even communicating to him the new commission of Oswald.1
[581]
After the capture of Minorca by the Duke de Crillon,
the
French and
Spanish fleets united under his command to reduce
Gibraltar; and
Count d'artois, the brother of the king, passed through
Madrid to be present at its surrender.
But danger inspired the
British garrison with an unconquerable intrepidity.
By showers of red-hot shot, and by a most heroic sortie under
General Elliot, the batteries which were thought to be fire-proof were blown up or consumed, and a fleet under Lord Howe was close at hand to replenish the stores of the fortress.
The news of the catastrophe made
Paris clamorous for peace.
France, it was said, is engaged in a useless war for thankless allies.
She has suffered disgrace in the
West Indies while undertaking to conquer
Jamaica for
Spain; and it now shares in the defeat before
Gibraltar.
Vergennes saw that
France needed and demanded repose.
To obtain a release from his engagement to
Spain, he was ready to make great sacrifices on the part of his own country, and to require them of
America.
Congress was meanwhile instructing
Franklin ‘to use his utmost endeavors to effect the loan of four millions of dollars through the kind and generous exertions of the king of
France;’ and on the third
of October it renewed its resolution to hearken to no propositions for peace except in confidence and in concert with him. On the fourteenth of the same
month,
Vergennes thus explained to the
French envoy at
Philadelphia the policy of
France: ‘If
[
582]
we are so happy as to make peace, the king must
then cease to subsidize the
American army, which will be as useless as it has been habitually inactive.
We are astonished at the demands which continue to be made upon us while the
Americans obstinately refuse the payment of taxes.
It seems to us much more natural for them to raise upon themselves, rather than upon the subjects of the king, the funds which the defence of their cause exacts.’
‘You know,’ continued
Vergennes, ‘our system with regard to
Canada.
Everything which shall prevent the conquest of that country will agree essentially with our views.
But this way of thinking ought to be an impenetrable secret for the
Americans.
Moreover, I do not see by what title the
Americans can form pretensions to lands on
Lake Ontario.
Those lands belong to the savages or are a dependency of
Canada.
In either case, the
United States have no right to them whatever.
It has been pretty nearly demonstrated, that to the south of the
Ohio their limits are the mountains following the shed of the waters, and that everything to the north of the mountain range, especially the lakes, formerly made a part of
Canada.
These notions are for you alone; you will take care not to appear to be informed about them, because we so much the less wish to intervene in the discussions between the
Count de Aranda and
Mr. Jay, as both parties claim countries to which neither of them has a right, and as it will be almost impossible to reconcile them.’
When the draft of the treaty with the United States, as agreed to by Oswald, came back to England, the offer of Jay of the free navigation of the
[583]
Mississippi was gladly accepted; but that for a reci-
Chap. XXIX.} 1782. Oct. 14. |
procity of navigation and commerce was reserved.
The great features of the treaty were left unchanged; but the cabinet complained of
Oswald for yielding everything, and gave him for an assistant
Henry Strachey,
Townshend's under-secretary of state.
On the twentieth of October, both of the secretaries of
state being present,
Shelburne gave
Strachey three points specially in charge: No concession of a right to dry fish on
Newfoundland; a recognition of the validity of debts to British subjects contracted by citizens of the
United States before the war; but, above all, adequate indemnity for the confiscated property of the loyal refugees.
This last demand touched alike the sympathy and the sense of honor of
England.
The previous answer that the commissioners had no power to treat on the business of the loyalists was regarded as an allegation that, though they claimed to have full powers, they were not plenipotentiaries; that they were acting under thirteen separate sovereignties, which had no common head.
To meet the exigence,
Shelburne proposed either an extension of
Nova Scotia to the
Penobscot or the
Kennebec or the
Saco, so that a province might be formed for the reception of the loyalists; or that a part of the money to be received from sales of the
Ohio lands might be applied to their subsistence.
To the ministry, it was clear that peace, if to be made at all, must be made before the coming together of parliament, which had been summoned for the twenty-fifth of November.
While the under-secretary of state was sent to re-enforce Oswald, the American commission was
[584]
recruited by the arrival of John Adams.
He had
Chap. XXIX.} 1782. Oct. 20. |
prevailed on the United Provinces to acknowledge the independence of the
United States, and to form with them a treaty of commerce.
He was greatly elated at his extraordinary success, and he loved to have it acknowledged; but flattery never turned him aside from public duty, for he looked upon the highest praise as no more than his due, and as investing him with new rights to stand up fearlessly for his country.
He left
Vergennes to find out his arrival through the police.
Franklin had hitherto warded off the demand that the treaty of peace should guarantee to English merchants the right to collect debts that had been due to them in the
United States, because the
British armies had themselves in many cases robbed the merchants of the very goods for which the debts were incurred; and had wantonly and contrary to the laws of war destroyed the property which could have furnished the means of payment.
The day after
Strachey's arrival in
Paris,
Adams, encountering him and
Oswald at the house of
Jay, to their surprise and delight blurted out his assent to the proposed stipulation for the payment of debts.
In the evening of the same day,
Adams called for the first time on
Franklin, who at once put him on his guard as to the
British demands relating to debts and compensation of tories; but he could not recall his word.
On the thirtieth, the American commissioners met
Oswald and
Strachey, and for four several days they discussed the unsettled points of the treaty.
Jay and
Franklin had left the north-eastern boundary to be settled by commissioners after the war. It is
[
585]
due to
John Adams, who had taken the precaution
Chap. XXIX.} 1782. Oct. 29. |
to obtain from the council of
Massachusetts authenticated copies of every document relating to the question, that it was definitively established in the treaty itself.
On the north-west it was agreed that the line should be drawn through the centre of the water communications of the great lakes to the
Lake of the Woods.
The British commissioners denied to the
Americans the right of drying fish on
Newfoundland.
This was, after a great deal of conversation, agreed to by
John Adams as well as his colleagues, upon condition that the
American fishermen should be allowed to dry their fish on any unsettled parts of the coast of
Nova Scotia.
Franklin said further: ‘I observe as to catching fish you mention only the banks of
Newfoundland.
Why not all other places, and among others the
gulf of St. Lawrence?
Are you afraid there is not fish enough, or that we should catch too many, at the same time that you know that we shall bring the greatest part of the money we get for that fish to
Great Britain to pay for your manufactures?’
2 And this advice was embodied in the new article on the fisheries.
On the fourth of November, Adams and Jay defin-
itively overruled the objections of
Franklin to the recognition by treaty of the validity of debts contracted before the war. Pluming himself exceedingly on having gained this concession,
Strachey wrote to the
secretary of state that
Jay and
Adams would likewise assent to the indemnification of the refugees rather than break off the treaty upon such a point.
3 On the other hand,
Franklin, in reply to
[
586]
a letter which he had received from the secretary,
Townshend, gave an earnest warning: ‘I am sensible you have ever been averse to the measures that brought on this unhappy war; I have, therefore, no doubt of the sincerity of your wishes for a return of peace.
Mine are equally earnest.
Nothing, therefore, except the beginning of the war, has given me more concern than to learn at the conclusion of our conferences that it is not likely to be soon ended.
Be assured no endeavors on my part would be wanting to remove any difficulties that may have arisen, or even if a peace were made to procure afterwards any changes in the treaty that might tend to render it more perfect and the peace more durable;’ and then, having in his mind the case of the refugees, he deprecated any instructions to the
British negotiators that would involve an irreconcilable conflict with those of
America.
At the same time, he persuaded
Adams and
Jay to join with him in letters to
Oswald and to
Strachey, expressing in conciliatory language their unanimous sentiments that an amnesty more extensive than what had already been agreed to could not be granted to the refugees.
Before Strachey reached London with the second set of articles for peace, the friends of Fox had forgotten their zeal for American independence.
All parties unanimously demanded amnesty and indemnity for the loyalists.
Within the cabinet itself, Camden and Grafton were ill at ease; Keppell and Richmond inclining to cut loose.
The king could not avoid mentioning ‘how sensibly he felt the dismemberment of America from the empire:’ ‘I should be miserable indeed,’ said he, ‘if I did not
[587]
feel that no blame on that account can be laid at my
door.’
Moreover, he thought so ill of its inhabitants, that ‘it may not,’ he said, ‘in the end be an evil that they will become aliens to this kingdom.’
In the general tremulousness among the ministers, Townshend and William Pitt remained true to Shelburne; and a third set of articles was prepared, to which these three alone gave their approval.
There was no cavilling about boundaries.
All the British posts on the Penobscot, at New York and in Carolina, at Niagara and at Detroit, were to be given up to the United States, and the country east of the Mississippi and north of Florida was acknowledged to be theirs.
The article on the fishery contained arbitrary restrictions copied from former treaties with France; so that the Americans were not to take fish within fifteen leagues of Cape Breton, or within three leagues of any other British isle on the coast in America.
Not only indemnity for the estates of the refugees, but for the proprietary rights and properties of the Penns and of the heirs of Lord Baltimore, was to be demanded.
‘If they insist in the plea of the want of power to treat of these subjects,’ said
Townshend, ‘you will intimate to them in a proper manner that they are driving us to a necessity of applying directly to those who are allowed to have the power.’
‘If the American commissioners think that they will gain by the whole coming before parliament, I do not imagine that the refugees will have any objections,’ added Shelburne.
Fitzherbert, the British minister in Paris, was instructed to take part in the American negotiations; and, with his approval
[588]
and that of Strachey, Oswald was empowered to sign
a treaty.
Authority was given to Fitzherbert to inyoke the influence of
France to bend the
Americans.
Vergennes had especially pleaded with them strongly in favor of the refugees.
In the hope of a settlement, parliament was prorogued to the fifth of December.
On the same day on which the final instructions to Oswald were written, Vergennes declared in a letter to Luzerne: ‘There exists in our treaties no condi-
tion which obliges the king to prolong the war in order to sustain the ambitious pretensions which the
United States may form in reference to the fishery or the extent of boundaries.’
4 ‘In spite of all the cajoleries which the
English ministers lavish on the
Americans, I do not promise myself they will show themselves ready to yield either in regard to the fisheries, or in regard to the boundaries as the
American commissioners understand them.
This last subject may be arranged by mutual sacrifices and compensations.
But as to the first, in order to form a settled judgment on its probable issue, it would be necessary to know what the
Americans understand by the fishery.
If it is the drift fishery on banks remote from the coast, it seems to me a natural right; but if they pretend to the fisheries as they exercised them by the title of English subjects, do they, in the name of justice, think to obtain rights attached to the condition of subjects which they renounce?’
[
589]
France would not prolong the war to secure to the
Chap. XXIX.} 1782. Nov. 25. |
Americans the back lands and the fisheries; the
Americans were still less bound to continue the war to obtain
Gibraltar for
Spain.
25.
Early in the morning of the twenty-fifth, the king was urging Shelburne to confide in Vergennes his ‘ideas concerning America,’ saying, ‘France must wish to assist us in keeping the Americans from a concurrent fishery, which the looseness of the article with that people as now drawn up gives but too much room to apprehend.’
Before Shelburne could have received the admonition, Adams, Franklin, and Jay met Oswald and Strachey at Oswald's lodgings.
Strachey opened the parley by an elaborate speech, in which he explained the changes in the article on the fisheries, and that ‘the restitution of the property of the loyalists was the grand point upon which a final settlement depended.
If the treaty should break off, the whole business must go loose, and take its chance in parliament.’
Jay wished to know if Oswald could now conclude the treaty; and
Strachey answered that he could, absolutely.
Jay desired to know if the propositions he had brought
were an ultimatum.
Strachey seemed loath to answer, but at last said, no. That day, and the three following ones, the discussion was continued.
On the twenty-ninth, Strachey, Oswald, and Fitzherbert, on the one side, and Jay, Franklin, Adams, and, for the first time, Laurens, on the other, came together for their last word, at the apartments of Jay. The American commissioners agreed that there should be no future confiscations nor prosecutions of loyalists; that all pending prosecutions should be
[590]
discontinued; and that congress should recommend
Chap. XXIX.} 1782. Nov. 25. |
to the several states and their legislatures, on behalf of the refugees, amnesty and the restitution of their confiscated property.
Strachey thought this article better than any of the modifications proposed in
England, and congratulated himself on his triumph.
The question of the fisheries more nearly concerned
Oswald.
Against the
British draft,
John Adams spoke with the more effect as it rested not on the principle of the law of nations, but created an arbitrary restriction; and, with the support of every one of his colleagues, he declared he would not set his hand to the treaty unless the limitations were stricken out. After long altercations the article was reduced to the form in which it appears in the treaty, granting to the
United States equal rights with British fishermen to take fish on the coast of
Newfoundland, and on the coasts, bays, and creeks of all other British dominions in
America.
At this stage, Strachey and Fitzherbert gave the opinion that it would be necessary to consult the government at home.
‘We can wait,’ answered Adams, ‘till a courier goes to London.’
The reference would have carried the whole matter into parliament, and so would have been fatal to the treaty.
Franklin saw the danger and interposed: ‘If any further delay should be made, the clause insuring to the subjects of Great Britain the right of recovering their debts in the United States must also be reconsidered.’
But on this article Strachey prided himself as his greatest success; and, rather than expose it to risk, he joined with Oswald.
Fitzherbert, now left alone, reflected that peace with the United States
[591]
would be the best means of forcing France and
Chap. XXIX.} 1782. Nov. 30. |
Spain to declare their ultimatum; and he, too, gave in his consent.
On the thirtieth, the commissioners of both countries signed and sealed fair copies of the convention.
Thus far no word in it had, except indirectly, indicated the existence of slavery in the United States.
On the demand of Laurens, a clause was interlined, prohibiting, on the British evacuation, the ‘carrying away any negroes or other property of the inhabitants.’
So the treaty of peace, which already contained a confession that the United States were not compacted into one nation, made known that in their confederacy men could be held as property; but it, as interpreted alike by American and English statesmen, included free negroes among the citizens of the United States.
In the hope of preventing the possibility of a future dispute about boundaries, they were marked interchangeably by a strong line on copies of the map of America by Mitchell.
The articles of peace, though entitled provisional, were made definitive by a declaration in the preamble.
Friends of Franklin gathered around him, and as the Duke of Rochefoucauld kissed him for joy, ‘My friend,’ said Franklin, ‘could I have hoped at such an age to have enjoyed so great happiness?’
The treaty was not a compromise, nor a compact imposed by force, but a free and perfect solution, and perpetual settlement of all that had been called in question.
By doing an act of justice to her former colonies, England rescued her own liberties at home from imminent danger, and opened the way for
[592]
their slow but certain development.
The narrowly
selfish colonial policy which had led to the cruel and unnatural war was cast aside and forever by
Great Britain, which was henceforward as the great colonizing power to sow all the oceans with the seed of republics.
For the
United States, the war, which began by an encounter with a few husbandmen embattled on Lexington Green, ended with their independence, and possession of all the country from the
St. Croix to the
south-western Mississippi, from the
Lake of the Woods to the
St. Mary.
In time past, republics had been confined to cities and their dependencies, or to small cantons; and the
United States avowed themselves able to fill a continental territory with commonwealths.
They possessed beyond any other portion of the world the great ideas of their age, and enjoyed the practice of them by individual man in uncontrolled faith and industry, thought and action.
For other communities, institutions had been built up by capitulations and acts of authoritative power; the
United States of America could shape their coming relations wisely only through the widest and most energetic exercise of the right inherent in humanity to deliberation, choice, and assent.
While the constitutions of their separate members, resting on the principle of self-direction, were, in most respects, the best in the world, they had no general government; and as they went forth upon untried paths, kings expected to see the confederacy fly into fragments, or lapse into helpless anarchy.
But, for all the want of a government, their solemn pledge to one another of mutual citizenship and perpetual union made them one
[
593]
people; and that people was superior to its institu-
tions, possessing the vital force which goes before organization, and gives to it strength and form.
Yet for success the liberty of the individual must know how to set to itself bounds; and the states, displaying the highest quality of greatness, must learn to temper their rule of themselves by their own moderation.
end.
