Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 31.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

Battle of Winchester. [from the Baltimore, Md., sun, September 26, 1993.]

By James M. Garnett,

Ten days after the battle of Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864, General Lee detached General Early, commanding the Second Corps (Ewell's), to overtake General Hunter, who had marched up the Valley through Staunton and Lexington and Lynchburg. Early reached Lynchburg in time to prevent an attack on that city, and was about to attack Hunter the next morning, when he retreated during the night and was pursued for three days to Salem, from which point he was compelled to retreat through the mountains of West Virginia to the Ohio river. General Early moved down the Valley, across the Potomac, fought the battle of Monocacy, in which he defeated General Lew Wallace, and threatened Washington. The troops of Early were too much fatigued with their long and hot march to attack on the day of their arrival before Washington, and the next day there were two corps in the fortifications—the 6th, under General Wright, having been detached by General Grant from his own army, and the 19th, under General Emory, having been sent up the Potomac [62] from Fort Monroe, where it had arrived in the nick of time from New Orleans, and was still on its transports. Thus Washington was saved from capture by the opportune arrival of these two corps, for Early would have made little account of the heavy artillery and local troops then in the fortifications of that city.

Early withdrew to the lower Valley, followed by Wright and Emory, who were soon joined by General Crook, who had superseded Hunter after his disastrous return to Harper's Ferry from the Ohio river. This formed the Eighth Corps in the Army of the Shenandoah Valley. Soon Wright and Emory started back to Washington to reinforce Grant, when Early at once turned upon Crook, defeated him at Kernstown, July 24, and drove him through Winchester and across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry. This caused the return of the troops of Wright and Emory, and the whole force was concentrated at and near Harper's Ferry.

In casting around for a commander for this Army General Grant fixed upon his cavalry commander, General Sheridan, recently defeated by General Hampton, at Trevillian's Station, in his effort to join General Hunter, and compelled to return. Sheridan, in addition to his three corps of infantry, was supplied with three divisions of cavalry—Averill's, Merritt's and Wilson's—all under command of General Torbert, and numbering 11,000 men, as was shown by the rolls of the cavalry which were captured by the Confederates in this campaign.

The Second Corps of the Confederate Army consisted of the divisions of Rodes, Ramseur and Gordon, to which was added, after reaching Lynchburg, the small division of Breckinridge, commanded by General Wharton. Later, General Early was joined by General R. H. Anderson, with General Kershaw's division of infantry, and General Fitz. Lee's division of cavalry from General Lee's army.

There was much marching up and down the Valley and manoeuvering for position on the part of Generals Early and Sheridan. Notwithstanding his immense superiority of force, General Sheridan would not join battle. At last General Grant paid General Sheridan a visit, with a plan of battle in his pocket, and with the intention of urging him to fight, when he ascertained that Sheridan had just been informed by a female spy in Winchester that General Anderson, with Kershaw's Division, had been recalled to General Lee's army —such was the pressing need for reinforcements there-and Sheridan had already determined to attack, so Grant did not divulge his plan. The withdrawal of Kershaw's Division from General Early's [63] army was most unfortunate for the Confederates. Notwithstanding the presence of Sheridan's immense force at Berryville, ten miles from Winchester, General Early boldly, or rashly, marched to Martinsburg, twenty-two miles from Winchester, to put a stop to the relaying of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, with one division (Gordon's), leaving another (Rodes') at Bunker Hill (twelve miles）, a third (Wharton's) near Stephenson's (six miles) and only Ramseur's Division near Winchester, on the Berryville road, to watch Sheridan. This was tempting Providence, and on that very day (Sunday, September 18), Grant was holding his interview with Sheridan at Charlestown.

At last Sheridan determined to attack at daylight next morning, thinking to defeat Early's divisions in detail. This he might have done if he had moved more promptly, although Rodes had returned to Stephenson's and Gordon to Bunker Hill the night before. Ramseur, however, fought Wilson's cavalry division and Wright's leading infantry division with great persistency, retiring very slowly, and thus giving time for Gordon and Rodes to join him, Wharton having moved from Stephenson's out on the Brucetown road as far as the Opequon, to resist the advance of Merritt's Cavalry Division. At this point I may insert some extracts from a diary kept during a part of this campaign, which gives a more vivid account than reminiscences of nearly forty years standing:

It will be seen from this account, written two days after the battle, that there has been much exaggeration in Federal accounts of this battle. The actual facts were bad enough, and there was no need to make them worse. Ramseur retreated on the east side of Winchester, and so preserved his organization better than the troops that passed through the town, but these were re-formed on the south side. It was some time after the posting of our skirmish line, with artillery, on the south side of Winchester, before the enemy showed themselves, and our artillery fired until it was too dark to see anything but the flashes of the guns. I remained near this piece of artillery for some time and watched Ramseur's Division passing, and Lomax's Cavalry beyond, which had kept in check Wilson's Cavalry Division all day on our right, and was only forced to retire after the general retreat. Wilson should have burst through this handful of men and seized the Staunton pike long before. Even so intelligent a writer as General Merritt says (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Volume IV, page 510): ‘At the time of this last charge the Union infantry advanced along the entire line, and the enemy fled in disorder from the field, and night alone (for it was now dark) saved Early's army from capture.’ It was not dark, not even 5 o'clock, as I have shown above from my exact record of the time (5.07) when the Federal troops entered Winchester. Again he says (same page): ‘Early had not stopped on the night of the battle until he reached the shelter of Fisher's Hill.’ Now, I myself, with troops all around me in line of battle, spent the night at the headquarters of Rodes' Division, one mile south of Newtown, which is eight miles south of Winchester and twelve miles north of Fisher's Hill, to which place we did not retire until next morning. General Merritt did not come far enough to see for himself. No wonder General Early says in his ‘Memoir:’ ‘When I look back to this battle, I can but attribute my escape from utter annihilation to the incapacity of my opponent.’

Moreover, General Sheridan, in his telegram to General Grant on the evening of the battle, ‘September 19, 1864, 7.30 P. M.’. （War [67] Records, Volume XLVII, Part I, page 25), says: ‘The enemies were strong in number and very obstinate in their fighting,’ and (page 26) he gives Early's strength as ‘28,000 infantry!’

The obstinacy of their fighting was all right, but the strength of their numbers was all wrong. He attributes to Early in infantry alone at least double the number that he had of all arms-infantry, cavalry and artillery.

Let us see about this for a moment. In Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (Volume IV, page 524) there is given from a field return of General Early's army, August 31, 1864, excluding Kershaw's Division, as ‘present for duty, 1,076 officers, 9,570 men,’ an aggregate of 10,646. Early's Memoir gives Fitz Lee's Cavalry as ‘about 1,200,’ and Lomax's Cavalry as ‘about 1,700,’ or 2,900 all together, and the artillery as 39 officers, 818 men, 857 together. This would give an aggregate of a little more than 4,000; but in a note to the editors General Early states that at the time of the battle his force was reduced to 8,500 muskets, which would reduce this aggregate to 13,000. Rodes' Division was the largest in the corps, and a short time before the battle I reported between 2,600 and 2,700 muskets in the division. I remember distinctly that Colonel Allan, the chief of ordnance of the army, told me that there were then abont 9,500 muskets in the army. Perhaps this was the return of August 31, noted above, for I do not remember that we made any return of September 10, it being customary to make returns every ten days, when we were in camp.

Now, let us look at Sheridan's force. His field return for September 10, 1864, gives as “present for duty 43,284 men, 2,225 officers, a total of 45,509.” To this we must add Averill's Cavalry Division, 2,500, not included in the above, and we have a grand total of 48,000 troops of all arms. This gives to Sheridan three and two-thirds times as many men as Early had.

The Confederate losses were in round numbers about 4,000 men, of whom one-half were prisoners and missing; the Federal losses were about 5,000 men, of whom 600 were prisoners and missing. It is not surprising that General Early was defeated, but it is surprising that he should have risked a battle against such odds, and that he should have maintained his position as long as he did.

General Early has never received the credit that he deserves for his Valley campaign. With Kershaw's Division, which should never have been recalled in view of Sheridan's immense force, it is highly [68] probable that he would have gained the battle of Winchester even against such odds.

Wright and Emory had been fought out, and it was only with Crook's fresh corps and the two cavalry divisions of Merritt and Averill, which, with Wilson's, were equal in numbers to Early's Infantry, that Sheridan was enabled to gain the victory.

We may now see some ground for Early's opinion that, ‘instead of being promoted, Sheridan ought to have been cashiered for this battle.’

It was my intention to add some account of the battle of Fisher's Hill, which has been called ‘the aftermath’ of Winchester, but this article has already extended to too great length, and that battle, if noticed at all, must be reserved for some future occasion. Besides the references given above, the reader should add Pond's The Shenandoah Valley of 1861, an interesting book, but one containing the usual exaggerations of Confederate numbers, and Senator Daniel's address in Richmond, December 13, 1894, on General Early's Valley campaign.