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what the enemy is constantly doing?
Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess and act upon the claim?’
McClellan had called for the rebuilding of the road from
Harper's Ferry to
Winchester, in order to supply his army if he moved against
Lee, then at
Winchester.
Mr. Lincoln reminded him that
Lee was subsisting his army without a railroad, hauling his supplies twice the distance from
Harper's Ferry to
Winchester.
The President rallied his general for not operating on
Lee's communications and for being so anxious about his own, and said: ‘Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with
Richmond in the next twenty-four hours? . . . You are now nearer
Richmond than the enemy is, by the route that you can and he must take.
Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march?
His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord.
The roads are as good on yours as on his.’
The President was for aggressive action, and urged his general to strike at
Lee directly, through the gaps in the mountains, on his communications, in any way, so he fought and beat him. ‘I would press closely to him; fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to
Richmond on the inside track.
I say “try;” if we never “try,” we shall never succeed. . . . We should not so operate as merely to drive him away.
As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away.
If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is [at or about
Winchester], we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of
Richmond.’
This letter, written on the 13th of October, did not have the effect of either breaking up General Lee's wagon communications, or beating him in direct battle.
The first week of November found the Federal army cautiously concentrating about Warrenton, and on the 5th of November, President Lincoln issued an order relieving Mc-
