Chapter 11: War between the states
- Dana at Washington -- Stanton Secretary of War -- course of the tribune -- Auditor of accounts at Cairo -- visits Memphis -- makes acquaintance of Grant and Rawlins
The government, now in the throes of the great conflict, needed the services of every loyal man. The previous administration had been reinforced and encouraged by Black, Holt, and Stanton. These strong men had done much to revive the sinking spirits of the country, but as Stanton alone had found a place in Lincoln's cabinet much still needed to be done to restore order, promote efficiency, and re-establish confidence.
Fortunately, Dana's work in building up the Republican party and electing a president to carry out its policies was now at an end, but the war for the Union, although well under way, was not in a hopeful condition. Large armies had been raised, but the administration still needed men to direct and fight rather than to talk and write. Dana had made Lincoln's acquaintance, and was well known to most of the cabinet, especially to Seward and Chase. While Seward had but little reason to regard him or any other Tribune man as a personal friend, no one knew better than he that Dana was devoted heart and soul to the Union and was in every way qualified to represent the country abroad. Consequently, it was intimated that he could have a diplomatic position, but this he declined to consider. He felt that having taken such a prominent part in the discussions [183] which preceded the war he should not absent himself from the country under any pretext whatever, but should find a field nearer home in which he could more suitably display his patriotism. Chase wanted to employ him in connection with the Treasury, and suggested that it would be an important service to the country if he would interest himself in purchasing and bringing out cotton from such parts of the Mississippi Valley as had been occupied by the Federal army. England, having early thrown her influence against the Union, was undergoing a crisis in her textile trade for want of raw cotton, and our government thought it good policy to placate her by doing all it properly could to keep the market supplied with that staple. As our own mills were also constantly short, and cotton goods of every sort were rising rapidly in value, the supply of raw cotton was a question of great concern to the country. But Dana was reluctant to embark in the business, and declined to do so till he had discharged certain other important duties assigned to him by the Secretary of War.
Shortly after leaving the Tribune Dana made a trip to Washington with a party of friends, and while there had interviews with the President and several members of the cabinet in regard to the distribution of the political offices in New York. He had previously had some correspondence with Stanton, growing out of an editorial which he had written for the Tribune and sent by letter to Stanton on his appointment to the War Department. The letter called attention to certain facts which Dana thought the department ought to deal with, but as it has not been found I cannot give it in this narrative. The editorial was an important one, and may be summarized as follows:
Edwin M. Stanton yesterday (January 20, 1862) entered upon the full discharge of his duties as Secretary of War. He was formally presented to the army officers on duty in Washington, who received him with cordiality. They [184] shared the conviction that his appointment marked a new epoch for the Union, and would not be popular with the Confederates. No man ever entered upon the duties of his high office under more favorable auspices — in all the loyal States there was no dissent — the claim that it was a concession to the border States was unfounded. The simple truth is that he was appointed in the interest of no section or preconceived policy, and with no reference to his views on slavery, but solely for “the unqualified and uncompromising vindication of the authority and integrity of the Union.” It was confidently predicted that he would “walk straight on in the path of duty,” with “remarkable energy and vigor,” free from dictation “from the General-in-Chief,” that he would adopt “no hasty and ill-advised plans” for assuming the offensive, nor become “a harsh critic or lordly superior” to the commanders in the field. Special attention was called to “the treason which skulks and plots within our lines” --among the clerks and officers of the various departments, and especially in the patrician houses and social circles of both Washington and Baltimore, and among the clergy and people throughout the district east of Chesapeake Bay. While the nation might bear with the social and ecclesiastical exhibitions of disloyalty and spite which were of daily occurrence, it could no longer permit the open and clandestine communications with the enemy which had made known the government's most secret plans for the last year almost as soon as they had been formed. The article denounced such disloyal practices in unmeasured terms, and pointed out that it was specially the business of the new secretary to put a stop to such “flagrant treachery,” urged him to watch the officers who expressed their apprehensions that “the war for the Union was about to be perverted into a war upon slavery,” and to ferret out and arrest “the correspondents and counsellors of the rebel generals across the Potomac.” [185]
But not satisfied with this, it urged the new secretary to turn his attention next to such jobbers and peculators as might be suspected of robbing the government at this crisis in the sale of horses, arms, provisions, clothing, or military munitions, and in every case to visit the guilty rascal with the most summary punishment. It concluded with the statement:
... If Secretary Stanton can succeed in clearing Washington and its vicinity of rebel spies and contract-jobbers, we believe our generals will take care of the open and declared traitors in arms, and that we shall soon have the rebellion under foot. Heaven grant it!
While this and other editorials may appear, a half-century later, to have been unnecessarily harsh in their epithets and expressions, it can scarcely be denied that they were called for by a condition of affairs which seriously embarrassed the government and which fully justified the adoption of the most drastic measures. It is to be noted that this editorial was followed by remarkable results, brought about by the direction of Stanton. Almost immediately after his accession to office he organized a Secret Service force which became most efficient in the detection of frauds and disloyal practices against the government. When Dana later became Assistant Secretary of War he was charged, in addition to many other duties, with the general supervision of this force, and used it vigorously and impartially for the detection and punishment of rascally practices, on the part of delinquent purchasing quartermasters and contractors for fuel, forage, harness, tents, clothing, and horses. It is personally known to me that many important persons were involved directly or indirectly in these rascalities. A considerable number were tried by military commission, and punished by fine and imprisonment. Restitution was exacted with a firm hand, and large sums of [186] money were saved or recovered for the Treasury, but for obvious reasons these transactions were concealed from the public as far as possible. Whether daily records were kept, or what has become of them, I have no means of knowing, but in certain cases which came under my personal observation while in charge of the Cavalry Bureau, and to which I may refer more fully hereafter, Dana gave the authority and support of his office, and by the vigor and promptitude of his action in spite of powerful political influence brought a number of negligent and fraudulent contractors to the punishment prescribed by law.
The Tribune editorial and the accompanying letter called forth a reply from Stanton, dated January 24, 18621 in which he stated that the facts mentioned were new to him, that he feared they were true, and that they would be speedily corrected. Two days before he had written a letter which he did not send, expressing his thanks for the encouraging editorial, stating his position and purposes, and giving some of the circumstances of his unexpected appointment. He added that the Tribune's mission was as plain as his own, that he was not dismayed nor disheartened, that by God's blessing they should prevail, and that a deep, earnest feeling was growing up around him-that they had no jokes or trivialities, and that all were now in dead earnest. He concluded with the declaration that the army should move, and fight or run away, that “while men are striving nobly in the West, the champagne and oysters on the Potomac must stop.”
Dana with many others thought that Fremont, the first Republican candidate for the presidency, had been prevented by political intrigue from having a fair trial as a [187] department or field commander, and wrote a few days later asking the Secretary of War to give that general a chance in order that the great mass of the people who had supported him might not become dissatisfied. This brought the forcible declaration from the secretary: “If General Fremont has any fight in him he shall (so far as I am concerned) have a chance to show it, and I have told him so. The times require the help of every man according to his gifts; and having neither partialities nor grudges to indulge, it will be my aim to practise on the maxim: ‘the tools to him that can handle them.’ ” He realized from the first that it was far from easy to bring the War Department up to the task of working an army of five hundred thousand men with machinery adapted to twelve thousand. He asked for patience and a reasonable time, and expressed the fear that the pressure for army appointments might tempt him “to quit the helm in despair.”
In all this the great secretary had Dana's best help, personally as well as through the columns of the Tribune. The entire country credited Stanton at this time with a larger share of the new spirit than he thought himself fairly entitled to, and this brought from him a remarkable despatch, which Dana withheld till he could send a correspondent to inquire if the secretary meant to “repudiate” the Tribune. The secretary had declared that he could not suffer undue merit to be ascribed to his official actions, that the glory of our recent victories in the West belonged to the gallant officers and soldiers who had won them, and that no share of it belonged to him; that he heard such phrases as “organizing victory” with apprehension, that “they commenced with infidel France in the Italian campaign and ended with Waterloo” ; that we might well rejoice at our recent victories because they were won as such victories were always won by boldly pursuing and striking the foe-and finally, that “the true organization [188] of victory and military combination to end this war was declared in a few words by General Grant's message to General Buckner, ‘I propose to move immediately on your works.’ ”
Feeling that such a despatch might imply dissatisfaction with the course of the Tribune, if not a direct censure of those who were responsible for its management, Dana at once directed his Washington correspondent to ask for an explanation, with the result that the secretary made haste to reply by a personal letter now in my possession, dated February 19, 1862, and written in his well-known backhand. In this letter he pointed out that inasmuch as the Tribune's kind notice of himself might be regarded as a disparagement of the Western soldiers who had won the victory, and thus create antagonism between him and them, he had sent his despatch to prevent that misconstruction and not to repudiate anything the Tribune might say. He expressed the conviction that the despatch should not be published, but wisely, on this and future occasions, left the matter to Dana's judgment, with the declaration that they had “but one mind and heart in the great cause,” that upon many essential points Dana had a wider range of observation and clearer sight than himself, and that he was “therefore willing to be guided” by his wisdom.
The result of this exchange of views was that Stanton's despatch was published without further delay and did much to strengthen the confidence of the public in his good sense and his unselfish patriotism.
Moreover, it had another important result. It served to draw closer the friendly relations existing between the secretary and the editor. The latter had long since lost confidence in the aggressive qualities of General McClellan, who had been in command of all our armies as General-in-Chief for over six months without planning or striking an [189] important blow at the enemy. It was claimed by McClellan and his friends that it was necessary to perfect the organization and equipment of the army in order to render success certain. Notwithstanding its far greater resources and its free communication with the manufacturing countries of Europe, it was contended that the Federal government could not afford to move till everything was brought to the highest state of efficiency. The numbers, equipment, and warlike spirit of the enemy were greatly exaggerated. Our own people were becoming depressed, and it began to be widely feared that the war for the Union would be a failure. Fully appreciating the danger of the policy which McClellan had inaugurated, Dana showed his dissatisfaction with it by publishing Fitz-Henry Warren's article, “Forward to Richmond,” and reiterating the cry till Greeley put an end to it, as heretofore described.
In the midst of the lethargy which followed, Thomas won the battle of Mill Spring, and shortly afterwards Grant captured Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and the forces defending them. The country was electrified. McClellan's friends made haste to claim that these victories were due to his supervision and generalship, whereas he had but little if anything to do with them. They had been won by a policy exactly the reverse of that to which he seems to have been wedded, but his friends did their best to make good the claim that he had organized victory by his sublime military combinations. They even went so far as to send out through the associated press the statement that the secretary at a railroad convention in Washington, in complimenting his “young and gallant friend,” had given him credit for the gigantic and well-matured schemes which were now exhibited to the country for crushing out the unholy Rebellion.
Dana did not believe that Stanton had said anything of the kind, and made inquiry accordingly. This brought the [190] reply that it was a ridiculous and impertinent effort to puff the general by words he had never uttered; that there was a gang around the Federal Capitol organized for the purpose of magnifying their idol; that he had not been ill or absent from his duties as the Herald had reported, and that it was a “funny sight to see a certain military hero in the telegraphic office at Washington last Sunday organizing victory . . . and capturing Fort Donelson six hours after Grant and Smith had taken it sword in hand and had victorious possession.” ...
Dana, while still in charge of the Tribune, made haste to give this letter to the country, and this further strengthened his relations with the administration. His retirement from the Tribune was announced a few days later, whereupon Stanton at once asked him to enter the service of the War Department, and this he resolved to do as soon as he could arrange his private affairs for leaving home.
On June, 16, 1862, the secretary sent Dana an appointment as member of a commission to audit unsettled claims against the quartermaster's bureau, and directed him by wire to proceed at once to Cairo, Illinois. His compensation was fixed at eight dollars per day, with the usual allowance of mileage while travelling on duty. His associates were Judge Stephen T. Logan, a distinguished lawyer of Springfield, Illinois, an intimate friend of Lincoln, and George S. Boutwell, afterwards Governor of Massachusetts, Secretary of the Treasury, and United States Senator. Shortly after the first meeting, Judge Logan was forced by illness to resign, whereupon Shelby M. Cullom, afterwards Governor of Illinois and United States Senator, was appointed to the vacancy. Cairo, situated at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, and thrust well forward towards the heart of the Confederacy, early became a point of great strategic importance. [191] A large number of troops were concentrated there. Enormous quantities of supplies were forwarded through that place to the troops in the field, or were stored there for future use. Most of the quartermasters and commissaries were green volunteers, the government was short of money, and hence a large number of unpaid vouchers were soon set afloat. The greatest confusion prevailed in the accounts, and this made it necessary to give the commission supreme authority to audit, adjust, and settle all claims which might be presented. The work was complicated by the fact that the army in the field had impressed supplies from non-combatants whose loyalty was questioned. It had also been compelled to occupy the city levees and vacant lots for camping and embarking troops, and for storing and forwarding supplies. Sixteen hundred and ninety-six claims, aggregating $599,219.36, were examined and adjusted, and Dana delivered the report of the commission into the hands of the Secretary of War early in August. The service was a valuable one, and gave entire satisfaction to the government. It was besides personally interesting and instructive to Dana, not only because it familiarized him with an important branch of the military administration, but because it brought him into contact with many of the leading citizens and army officers of the Northwestern States.
The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, followed by the occupation of Island No.10, the battle of Shiloh, and the Corinth campaign, had given the Federal forces complete control of middle and west Tennessee. The army was well to the front, threatening central Mississippi and the Confederate stronghold at Vicksburg. Memphis, the principal commercial mart of the region, was occupied as an advanced base of operations, and during the lull in the campaign which followed the advent of winter and the transfer of Halleck to Washington as General-in-Chief, [192] became the chief point of interest in all that region. While not engaged in the actual work of the commission, Dana spent his time in riding up and down the levees at Cairo, in visiting the military camps, and in conferring with the leading generals. On July 4th he attended a celebration and dinner given by the officers at Memphis, where he had the pleasure of meeting, for the first time, General Grant and Major Rawlins, his adjutant-general. His impressions were favorable, for although he had heard Grant much discussed, and not always in the most complimentary terms, he had found him to be an exceedingly modest and unassuming man. Notwithstanding his great success, Grant had made many enemies, especially along the contractors and political generals, who did not hesitate to charge him with drunkenness and inefficiency. The newspapers had from the first been inimical to him, while several of the leading correspondents in the field had done all in their power to prejudice the government against him. Halleck, who should have been his friend, had virtually suspended him from command during the Shiloh campaign, and, before leaving for the East, had not only offered his command to another, but had actually arranged, in violation of all proper principles of military adiministration, to scatter the great army gathered in the field, because he doubted Grant's capacity to command it successfully. Under these adverse conditions, it is noteworthy that Grant produced a pleasant impression upon Dana as a man of simple, cordial, straightforward, and unpretending character. From that time forth, throughout the general's entire military career, this favorable impression suffered no diminution, but grew steadily both in depth and strength. The fact is that the acquaintance which began casually at Memphis developed into a cordial friendship during the Vicksburg campaign, and, as will be more fully shown in [193] the pages of this narrative, finally became the principal influence which secured the administration's, and especially Stanton's, cordial and unhesitating support for General Grant till the close of the war, and without which his extraordinary career must have come to an untimely end.
