George H. Gordon, From Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain

Chapter 10: General Banks's orders and responsibility.

Let us briefly examine the testimony. What were General Pope's purposes and plans when he sent Banks's corps forward on the morning of the 9th? There can be no doubt that he neither authorized nor expected it to attack, single-handed, the whole of Jackson's army. Says Pope in his official report of that action, “My chief-of-staff, General Roberts, whom I sent forward early on the 9th to report to Banks and to advise freely with him as to operations of his corps, as well as Banks himself, were both fully advised of my wishes,--that I desired Banks merely to keep the enemy in check by occupying a strong position in his front, until the whole disposable force of my command should be concentrated in the neighborhood.”

General Pope addressed, Jan. 12, 1865, a letter to the Chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, replying to testimony which Banks, in the absence of Pope and all others who had any interest in denying the exparte statements volunteered before that committee, made at Washington, Dec. 14, 1864.

In General Pope's letter, which may be found in the second volume of the committee's report, he says: “To [339] make sure there could be no mistakes of my orders and intentions, at 9.30 A. M. I sent General Roberts with full and precise orders that he [Banks] should take up a strong position near where Crawford's brigade of his corps was posted, and if the enemy advanced upon him, that he [Banks] should push his skirmishers well to the front, and attack the enemy with them; explaining fully that the object was to keep back the enemy until Siegel's corps and Ricketts' division could be concentrated and brought forward to his support. Roberts was directed to remain with Banks until further orders; and he accordingly did remain with him until I reached the field in person, just before dark.¹ The object I had in view was so plain that no military.man could fail to see it. Roberts was authorized to communicate it to Banks and every one else. I conferred freely with McDowell about it, and refer to his official report in corroboration.”

And again, in the same letter: “The object in sending Banks's corps to the front to take and hold a strong position against the advancing enemy until Siegel's corps and Ricketts' division could be united in his rear, was so plain and so clearly understood by every man of ordinary intelligence, that I find it impossible to believe Banks did not understand it. It is clear to me that he did understand it.”

And yet again, before the McDowell Court of Inquiry, Pope testified under oath that “on the morning of August 9, in a personal interview at my headquarters at Culpeper, I gave Banks instructions. I told him if the enemy advanced to attack him, he should push his skirmishers well to the front, and notify me immediately,--it being my wish to gain all the time possible to concentrate our forces at Culpeper Court House.”

It would seem as if there could be no doubt of Pope's [340] intention: let us see if there is any doubt that he communicated them to Banks.

First, we have the above verbal communication from Pope to Banks, which, if correctly given (and it is sworn to), seems to make it clear that Banks was not ordered to attack Jackson, save with his skirmishers.

Second, we have the order communicated at 9.45 in the morning of the ninth of August by Colonel Lewis Marshall, Pope's adjutant-general, and reduced to writing by Major L. H. Pelouze, Banks's adjutant-general. This verbal order, as given by Banks before the committee, agrees in substance with Major Pelouze's version communicated to me under date of April 7, 1875, in reply to my letter, asking for the exact words. His answer is as follows :--

Though Pope denies that he sent Banks this order, I do not think the different version which Colonel Marshall gave of it from memory, Dec. 26, 1864, embodied in Pope's letter to the committee, should be allowed to weigh against Major Pelouze's statement, based as it is upon words taken as they fell from Colonel Marshall's lips when he communicated [341] it. I therefore believe that Banks received this order from Pope.

Third, we have the orders communicated to Banks through Roberts, Pope's chief-of-staff, now available to us in the form of sworn testimony before the McDowell Court of Inquiry. General Roberts testifies: “Early in the morning of the ninth of August I was sent to the front of the army with directions, when Banks should reach a position where the night before I had posted Crawford's brigade, that I should show to Banks positions for him to take to hold the enemy in check if he attempted to advance towards Culpeper. I had been to the front on the 7th and 8th, and had reported to Pope my impressions that a large force of General Jackson's would be at Cedar Mountain, or near there, on the 9th. . . . General Pope authorized me, before going to the front, to give any orders in his name in relation to holding the enemy there until his [Pope's] forces could come up, to any of the officers that might be in the field senior to me. I understood his object was to hold the enemy in check there that day, and not to attack until the other troops of his command should arrive and join General Banks.” ²

And again: “When I first came on the field, I met and went to the front with him [Banks], showing him positions where the enemy had batteries already posted, and showed him positions which his corps should take, to their advantage, and hold these positions, as I thought, if attacked. I then told him that General Pope wanted him to hold the enemy in check there until Siegel's forces could be brought up, which were expected that day, and all his other forces united to fight Jackson's forces.” ³ [342]

In the light of the subsequent orders from Pope, communicated through General Roberts to Banks while on the field, can the latter defend his interpretation of the written order, received through Colonel Marshall in Culpeper at 9.45 in the morning,--his interpretation given to the committee, “that he was ordered to attack Jackson's army with his corps” ? If that written order and Pope's verbal instructions to Banks, and the information which a corps commander ought to have of the intentions of the commanding general, and which the latter says Banks did have,--if these were not enough to instruct him as to his duty, could he not comprehend General Roberts's orders? I say nothing now of the exercise of that prudence which the most inexperienced of men, intrusted with the lives of his fellow-creatures, is bound to employ: I ask only, Did Banks know what he was ordered to do? Of this there is no doubt. The answer is plain, the proof irrefutable. It is found in the conferences, while on the field, between Banks and Roberts, and in the subsequent action of Banks, and the reasons he gave for such action; it is found in the words that fell from Banks's lips in his sworn testimony before the committee, when he says that “within an hour from 9.45 A. M. [the date of the order from Colonel Marshall], as his troops were on the march, he left the head of his column, went to Pope's headquarters, and asked him if he had any other orders, to which he said, ‘I have sent an officer acquainted with the country, who will designate the ground you are to hold, and will give you any instructions he may deem necessary.’ ” And if this is not enough to show that Roberts was authorized to act for Pope, and that Banks was to hold a position, and that Roberts would show him the one he was to hold, we have the additional evidence, given by Banks himself before the committee, once before quoted, that upon his arrival at the field he “[I] saw [343] General Roberts, and told him General Pope said that he would indicate the line I was to occupy. Said he, ‘ I have been over this ground thoroughly, and I believe this line [meaning the one which Crawford's brigade then held] is the best that can be taken.’ I concurred with him, and placed my command of about six thousand men there.”

Can any one doubt what would have been Banks's reply at that time to the question, “Are you ordered, sir, to advance your whole line from this position and attack the enemy?” Would it not have been, “No, sir; my orders, reduced to writing by my adjutant-general, from General Pope through Colonel Marshall, are to attack the enemy with my skirmishers, if he advances, and send for reinforcements. These orders were repeated to me by General Pope an hour later in a personal interview at his headquarters, in which, after telling me of his desire to concentrate his forces before fighting, he said that he had sent an officer to designate the ground I am to hold, and also to give me instructions; and this line where I am now stationed has been designated by General Pope's chief-of-staff as the one I am to hold” ?

If, then, after his attack and defeat, at the time I addressed Pope in Banks's presence with “This battle should not have been fought, sir,” Banks had attempted to defend himself, what would he have uttered? Could he have replied, “I was to obey General Roberts, your chief-of-staff, General Pope! and he ordered me to leave my strong position, and attack the enemy” ?

Turning to the sworn testimony of General Roberts, given before the McDowell Court of Inquiry, we find the following as his answer to this question from the court:--

Question. Was the battle of Cedar Mountain brought on by Banks or the enemy? [344]

Answer. In the early part of the day the artillery battle was brought on by the enemy's batteries opening from new positions on Crawford's artillery. I had been directed by General Pope to send information to him hourly of what was going on, and I had expressed my opinion about three o'clock in the afternoon to Banks that Jackson had arrived. The forces were very large. General Banks expressed a different opinion, saying that he thought he should attack the batteries before night. I stated to Banks then my reasons for believing that an attack would be dangerous; that I was convinced that the batteries on Cedar or Slaughter Mountain were supported by heavy forces of infantry massed in the woods. He expressed a different opinion; he told me he believed he could carry the field, that his men were in the best fighting condition, and he should undertake it.

Q. Why did Banks advance to make a division movement upon the enemy without aid of McDowell's troops?

A. After Banks was in position I went to the extreme right (position of Gordon's brigade), and was gone an hour or more. On returning, I found Banks had advanced his lines in order of battle considerably towards the enemy, so that very sharp musketry firing had already commenced. It was about 3.30 P. M. I expressed my opinion that the enemy was in very large force, and massed in the woods on his right. Banks replied that he did not believe the enemy was in any considerable force yet, and said he had resolved to attack their batteries, or to attack their main force: it was either one or the other. I immediately sent a despatch to General Pope (I think my despatch was dated 4.30 P. M.), telling him that a general battle would be fought before night, and that it was of the utmost importance, in my opinion, that General McDowell's corps should be at once sent to the field.

With such testimony of the instructions given by Roberts to Banks on the field, surely Pope would have replied, “General Roberts gave you no order to attack, but on the contrary endeavored to dissuade you from so doing.” [345]

“Well, sir,” Banks might have retorted, in the language used by him before the committee, “General Roberts, when he indicated the position, said to me in a tone that was hardly proper for one officer to use to another, ‘ There must be no backing out this day.’ He said this to me from six to twelve times. I made no reply to him at all, but I felt it keenly, because I knew that my command did not want to back out. We had backed out enough. He repeated this declaration a great many times,--‘There must be no backing out this day.’ At the crisis of the battle he left.”

Had General Pope then asked, “Did you think this justified you in disobeying my orders?”

“I was a little desperate, because I supposed that General Pope thought we did not want to fight,” Banks swore before the committee, and might, therefore, have so replied to Pope.

And had Pope continued, “Did you think your desperation justified you in precipitating a force, which you number as six thousand, upon an enemy whose strength you now affirm to have been twenty-three thousand, when, by waiting a few hours, I could have brought up a fresh corps and a division to your aid?”

“ I did n't know the enemy was in force, and I sent to you [Pope] every hour information of what was transpiring,” Banks swore before the committee, and might, therefore, have replied.

General Pope's retort, in this attempt to put the responsibility of Banks's conduct upon him, may be found in the former's official report, as follows:--

“ He [Banks] was in easy communication with me all day, and all day I received regular reports from him, and he on every occasion expressed the belief that the enemy did not intend to attack him, and he at no time intimated to me that [346] he intended to attack the enemy. At no time did he ask for reinforcements, nor intimate that he needed them. His last report, at 4.50 P. M., announced the artillery firing, that shots were exchanged by skirmishers, and that, at 5 p. M., opposing skirmishers were now approaching each other.⁴ This was the last despatch from Banks, and before I received it I was halfway to the field with Ricketts' division, believing, from rapid artillery firing, that an engagement was going on, or might be brought on.”

What excuse, then, is left for Banks? We have seen what he has to offer, which is all there is to offer; and it only adds to our heavy grief (without justifying him), that either to add the warrior's to the politician's fame, or to retrieve at Cedar Mountain what, in his ignorance, Banks fancied he had lost at Winchester, such sacrifices should have been made.

A writer, once on Banks's staff,⁵ echoes him in these words: “There was another motive underlying and probably controlling Banks's judgment: neither he nor the troops under his command were at all satisfied with the verdict of an exacting and ungenerous public upon the actions in the valley of the Shenandoah; they felt the injustice of that judgment, which, without regard to circumstances or contingencies, accepted success as the only test of merit, and were burning for an opportunity to wipe away unmerited opprobrium. They were consequently in no mood to discuss discretionary forms or prudential suggestions; and upon the first explicit order to attack, they burst upon the foe with a valor so splendid and devoted that cavilling criticism is silenced in admiration, and history will mark the day of Cedar Mountain as one of the proudest upon her illustrious record.” In Banks's words to the committee, “Our troops never fought better; they had been retreating [347] up to that time, and panted for a fight. Alexander's troops never fought better.”

In these lines, all but praise for the fighting is balderdash and nonsense. But one of the five brigades constituting Banks's corps at Cedar Mountain, and a part of another, composed the force that fought against the overwhelming numbers of the enemy in the valley of the Shenandoah. Our conduct in that fight everywhere met, as it merited, public approbation. The troops, therefore, that were with Banks did not “burn to wipe away unmerited opprobrium.” But did Banks burn for fame, and did he seek, by throwing his troops against the bayonets of Jackson's army at Cedar Mountain, to wipe out an “opprobrium” which he imagined his friends might feel for him because he did not achieve impossibilities at Winchester? This is much more probable. All of this rubbish, as well as Banks's defence for fighting this battle, was an afterthought. Banks was ignorant of the numbers of the enemy in his front; he hoped to win, but he lost. Then he set about finding excuses; and they are such that it had been better for him to have been impaled on the “bayonets of his enemies,” than to submit them to the world.

Says Pope, “I regret that Banks thought it expedient to depart from my instructions. He left the strong position which he had taken up, and advanced two miles to assault the enemy, believing they were not in considerable force, and that he would be able to crush their advance before their main body could come up. He accordingly threw forward his whole corps into action against superior forces of the enemy, strongly posted and sheltered by woods and ridges. His advance led him over the open ground, which was everywhere swept by the fire of the enemy concealed in woods and ravines beyond.” ⁶ [348]

On the thirteenth of August, only four days after the action, General Pope telegraphed to Halleck precisely what is stated in this quotation from the former's official report; and this, Pope says, “Banks must have seen, for it was published in all the newspapers. And now,” adds Pope, “at the end of two years, while he is on leave of absence, General Banks procures himself and one or two of his staffofficers, to be taken before your committee in relation to verbal orders which he says he received early in the morning of the 9th of August, 1862, before his corps had ever gone to the front. He seems to have interpreted this alleged order in the light of afterthought, without alluding to other orders received. ... I leave your committee to characterize such transaction as it merits.” ⁷ And again says Pope in the same letter, “Banks's interpretation of my orders is an afterthought, ingenious, but not creditable to his judgment; is absurd, and on its face is a contradiction, and requires strong personal motives to understand it as Banks says he did.” This is in reply to Banks's testimony, in which he says, “This battle was fought under orders. I am sorry General Pope says it was not.”

There can be no other conclusion in disinterested minds than that Banks, knowing he was not ordered to attack, ran the risk, hoping for a victory, which he believed would silence criticism. As he failed, he has endeavored to impute to others the fault which belongs to himself.

One word more may be added as to the manner in which Banks fought that battle,--“his remarkable arrangement,” as Pope calls it. To enlighten the committee upon this point, General Pope wished a number of officers to be called, whose names he gives, my own among the number. My testimony is found substantially in these pages. Others have spoken elsewhere. Says Strother, in his “Recollections [349] of a Virginia Campaign,” before referred to: “A Confederate officer said to me, ‘Your attack under the circumstances was rash and meaningless.’ ” And again, “With his feeble column,” ⁸ says the same writer, “Banks advanced upon an enemy twenty-five thousand strong, judiciously posted, and assailed him with a fury which for a brief moment seemed about to triumph over all odds and advantages, but which, without support or reserves, presently expended itself and fell back from the unequal contest exhausted and impotent.”

Says an officer⁹ of the Tenth Maine, in his history of that regiment at Cedar Mountain: “The fact still remains, that it was a shockingly mismanaged battle; and every man of us knows now, what General Gordon and Colonel Beals believed then, that the woods was our best position. The enemy poured regiment after regiment upon our lines. General Banks evidently had no idea of the immense number of Rebels in his front. They had a continuous line from the road up to Gordon's right, which they overlapped so far that it would seem as if Pender's (Rebel) brigade was out of musket-range.”

As further evidence of Banks's ignorance of the field, the forces, and the management of his troops, we find in General Pope's letter to the committee, that when he was hastening to the field, “supposing of course that the enemy had attacked Banks, and that he was still holding his position, I received, when near the field, word from him that he was driving the enemy, which information I at once communicated to Ricketts' division.” Instead of a victorious Banks, Pope found a thoroughly whipped and beaten corps,--not demoralized, it is true: no rout, no panic. “Sullen and defiant they retired,” says Strother, [350] “leaving nothing on the field but their dead, the graver cases of wounded, a couple of empty caissons, of which the horses had been killed, and a disabled gun spiked and overthrown.”

Of the engagement Pope says in his official report, “Notwithstanding these disadvantages [all the mistakes enumerated in this paper, that means] his [Banks's] corps gallantly responded to his orders, and assailed the enemy with great fury and determination. The action lasted about an hour and a half, and during that time our forces suffered heavy loss,¹⁰ and were gradually driven back to their former position, at which point Ricketts came up.” And again, “The Massachusetts regiments ¹¹ behaved with especial gallantry; and although I regret that Banks thought it expedient to depart from my instructions, it gives me pleasure to bear testimony to his gallant and intrepid conduct.” And again, “Williams, Geary, Augur, Carroll, Gordon, Crawford, and Greene behaved with distinguished gallantry.”

It may be asked why, after the severe language we have quoted from Pope, upon Banks's disobedience of his orders, there should have been so much mildness about it in Pope's first despatches to Halleck and in the former's official report upon this subject. Pope has answered the question in his letter to the committee, saying, “I endeavored in my official report to avoid the censure justly chargeable upon Banks for his management of that battle, though I was warned at the time, by officers of high rank, that it was misplaced generosity, and that my forbearance would assuredly be used against me therefor. I did not believe it possible, and felt disposed to deal with Banks with the utmost tenderness; . . . but from the course he has pursued, [351] it is now due that the whole subject should be fully and fairly presented to the country, and the measure of praise or censure be correctly fixed upon the parties concerned.”

To give Banks all the measure of praise we can, I am willing to admit here the following from Crawford,¹² in his attempt to defend Banks against Pope: “My positive orders were, when ordered out of Culpeper on the 8th, to resist the approach of the enemy at all hazards,--and this with one brigade of infantry, two batteries, and Bayard's cavalry.” It is apparent, however, that this order does not justify Banks directly or inferentially; for on the 8th Jackson's army was not at Cedar Mountain; on the 8th Banks had not gone to the front with orders to hold a position and be reinforced if attacked, nor had Roberts, as Pope's chief-of-staff, imparted to Banks the instructions given to him on the 9th. That Crawford, who says he was to resist the approach of the enemy on the 8th, should think and urge that Banks was therefore justified on the 9th in assuming the offensive, and attacking an enemy whom he believed not to be in full force, contrary to the expectations of the commander-in-chief, who had ordered him to act on the defensive and hold the enemy in check until the army could be concentrated, will not occasion comment or create surprise among the survivors of the Army of the Potomac.

The battle of Cedar Mountain was quickly known to the public through correspondents from the field, through private letters and Pope's despatches. Everywhere there was praise for the fighting, and it was deserved. As was to be expected, a few newspaper-generals puffed themselves at the expense of others. Banks, as usual, sought salvation [352] through condemnation of others. Conceive my astonishment at the announcement in our first paper from the North, that “General Banks attributed his loss of the battle of Cedar Mountain to General Gordon's failure to obey his orders.” The moment I saw this article I carried it to Banks's headquarters.

“General Banks, I do not know that you are responsible for this: newspaper correspondents publish much that is not authentic. Did you authorize it?” handing him the paper.

Banks looked at the paper, and returned it, remarking, “'T is true, sir, I did say I thought you were late in getting into action at Cedar Mountain.”

“Ah! did you? I am very glad, then, that this has become known to me now, while the evidence is at hand to show the absolute falseness of such a charge. Will you remain in your room, sir, for fifteen minutes?”

“I will,” replied Banks.

Galloping rapidly to the headquarters of General Williams, I greeted him with a brief extract from my conversation with Banks, the purport of which was that the latter accused me of not moving into the fight when ordered.

“Did he say that?” asked Williams.

“He did.”

“ Why-- ,¹³ you ran into the fight the moment you received the order,” uttered Williams in a breath.

“I know it,” I responded.

“I waved my handkerchief,” continued Williams, “and at the same time told Pittman to gallop to you with the order to move forward and support Crawford.”

“I know it; and I was ready, and moved instantly at the double-quick; and that is what I want you to go with me to tell Banks,” I replied. [353]

“I'll send Pittman,” answered Williams.

“I prefer you should go,” I urged. “It was your order I obeyed.”

But Williams for some reason or other did not seem to wish to meet Banks upon this subject, and ended the matter by calling Pittman, and directing him to return with me and tell Banks what he saw.

With Pittman, I again sought Banks, whom I addressed as follows:--

“ General Banks, I have seen General Williams, who, as division commander, gave me the order to move my brigade to Crawford's support. General Williams knows and acknowledges that I obeyed the instant I received the order; he saw me run my troops into the fight. And he prefers, instead of coming himself to tell you this, to send Captain Pittman, his aid, who has all the information that he has.”

“Yes!” said the Captain; “General Banks, I carried General Gordon the order to move forward his brigade into action. He moved instantly on the double-quick; when I returned to General Williams I said, ‘See how quick General Gordon has got into the fight.’ ” ¹⁴

“ I am very glad to hear it,” was Banks's reply.

“ Then, sir,” I said, “I presume you will correct the false impression you have given.”

Banks muttered that he would; at least such was my understanding as I left him.

But not only did Banks fail to correct then what he knew to be false, but he has since repeated the untruth, until impressed upon some of his followers, they too have spread the report. Even Crawford has repeated it, but with added blunders and misstatements. [354]

If I repeat here what will be found elsewhere in these pages, namely, that my command moved to support Crawford the instant the order was given, it being then in perfect readiness; that human effort could not have transferred it with more celerity to the edge of the field, across which and on our flank there was a larger force than was assailed by the regiments of Crawford's brigade; that some hundreds of yards before I got to this field the charge I was to support had failed, and the assaulting troops were retiring far to my left; that I picked up the broken companies of my Third Wisconsin Regiment, and carried them again into the fight; and finally that Crawford (who complains that I did not support him) was found and marked by me as being alone in the woods quite a distance from the front, to which we were hastening, while the single regiment of his own brigade that Banks had sent against Jackson's reserves, after manfully fighting in the open field, was about retiring into the woods,--if I repeat this again here and in this connection, it is that I may challenge proof to the contrary.

There is a mystery in connection with this which perhaps General Williams can explain. I was to support Crawford when Williams gave me the signal; and Williams did not give me the signal until the assault had been made and repulsed. But had it been otherwise, we now see that the two small regiments and four companies I should have added to the assaulting column would have been nothing to the six brigades of the enemy in reserve, and could not have given us the victory. Banks knows this now: possibly even Crawford understands it.

The fight we made against the overpowering numbers of the enemy was far more useful to Pope's army in the events that followed the night, than had we been ordered [355] up in time, to dash ourselves, with Crawford's brigade, uselessly against those of Winder's and Hill's divisions.

This is the first time I have publicly noticed this accusation by Banks, and should not now (believing it unworthy of notice) but for the part it bears in this history. In dismissing it, I should add that Banks affirms that he sent me “half-a-dozen times” an order to move to support Crawford. In his behalf I think it should be stated, that General Banks honestly thinks that if he sent me such orders, I am entirely responsible whether I received them or not. Did he send them? I challenge him to name a person, other than General Williams's aid, who brought me an order to move to Crawford's support on the 9th of August, 1862. It cannot be done; it never has been done. And the accusation of not moving when ordered, finally substituted for not moving quickly as first reported, must be regarded as an unworthy effort to escape merited censure. In Crawford's behalf there should be urged in extenuation his inexperience in the duties of a general officer.¹⁵

In conclusion, there can be among intelligent men, among fair-mindet men, but one opinion of the disaster, of the crime, of Cedar Mountain. Censure and condemnation must fall upon the commander who in the presence of all that transpired in his front from the morning of the ninth of August until his final fatal assault upon the enemy, made that assault, with the knowledge that in his rear, a distance of less than three miles, there was a whole division of troops resting leisurely by the road-side that he [356] could have for the asking; and if that was not enough, a corps that had probably found the road to Culpeper could be added. When Banks with this knowledge plunged into that abyss of horrors without calling for these reinforcements, he committed a blunder that even a politician might shudder at,--a crime that he cannot transfer to Pope.

On the eleventh of August we returned to the same spot, near Culpeper, from whence on the 9th we went out to fight the battle of Cedar Mountain. After a few days (on the 14th), my brigade, with reduced numbers, moved out of Culpeper, hurrying to confront the march of Lee's victorious army. .From the Peninsula and from North Carolina new divisions and corps were marching to our aid. The music of the band of the Second echoed as gayly through the streets, as we turned our backs on the town, as if no lives had been extinguished in our regiment, and no grief pressed heavily on our hearts. We marched onward to Alexandria, to the grave of the Army of Virginia.

I have endeavored to portray from my own notes written on the field, from my own memory of what I saw and did, from contemporaneous papers and from official reports the facts that make up the battle of Cedar Mountain. In carefully and candidly dealing with all these facts, I have so endeavored to enlighten the public upon the matters herein set forth, that truth, which is said to be mighty, shall at last prevail.

In this hope, let us pass to the record, in another volume,¹⁶ of the movements of the Army of Virginia, through the battles of the Second Manassas or Bull Run, and Chantilly, to the gathering at Alexandria on the eve of the battle of Antietam. [357] [358]