Appendix X: newspaper article, attack on General Meade; see page 186, Vol. II. (for reply by Col. Meade, see Appendix Y) (from the New York times, April 1st, 1883）
Meade at Gettysburg: his proposed retreat on the night of the 2nd of July; Gen. Doubleday's defense of his statement that Meade was overruled by the action of a council of War
By way of rebuttal, Mr. Swinton parades the following declaration of Gen. Meade. A very slight examination will show that it refers to a different period of the battle: to the morning of the 2nd, and not to the evening. Gen. Meade says: ‘I utterly deny, under the full solemnity and sanctity of my oath, and in the firm conviction that the day will come when the secrets of all men shall be made known — I utterly deny having intended or thought for one instant to withdraw that army, unless the military contingencies which the future should develope during the course of the day might render it a matter of necessity that the army should be withdrawn.’
The italics are mine.
I will now give the reason for this emphatic declaration on the part of Gen. Meade. On the morning of the 2nd he directed his Chief of Staff, Gen. Butterfield, to study and mark out the lines of retreat. It was subsequently asserted that this was a positive order for the army— which had just formed on the ridge—to withdraw before the enemy assailed it. Gen. Meade denies that it was anything of the kind: it was merely a necessary precaution to avoid confusion in case he lost the position and was driven back.
I did not make the statement that he intended to retreat at that time nor did I refer to his desire to do so in the evening of the 2nd in either a carping or accusing spirit. I am astonished that it should be criticised [398] so harshly. Mr. Swinton states that the only foundation which I have for asserting it is the evidence of Gen. Butterfield before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. He then assumes that Gen. Butterfield had a grievance: that he had been displaced as Chief of Staff to Gen. Meade, and had made up this story to injure the latter. Gen. Butterfield is fully capable of taking care of his own reputation. As, however, he is absent in South America, I will state for the information of nonmilitary readers that the office of Chief of Staff is not a permanent one. Whoever fills it must necessarily hold the most intimate and confidential relations to the commander of the army. Hence, a personal friend is always selected for the position. Gen. Butterfield, who had been chosen for this duty by Gen. Hooker, never for a moment supposed that he would be retained in the same capacity by Gen. Meade, and, therefore, offered his resignation at once. It was not accepted until the battle was over. It is as absurd to suppose that he cherished animosity on this account as it would be to imagine that an ex-Secretary of State would become bitterly hostile to a new Administration because he was not continued in office.
Mr. Swinton says that Butterfield's evidence is not confirmed by any other member of the council of war. The fact is, they were not questioned as to the specific language quoted by Gen. Butterfield, and no subordinate will volunteer information which may seem to reflect on his superiors. Facts of this kind are usually drawn out in cross-examination.
Gen. Slocum, who commanded the right wing of the army at Gettysburg, ought to be pretty good authority as to what occurred at the council. The following letter sustains Gen. Butterfield's statement in its essential particulars:
[399]
The statement of Gen. Meade's views does by no means rest solely upon the testimony quoted above. There is additional evidence to the same effect which I might give, but that several witnesses are averse to coming to the front and being pelted with partisan mud. I have no hesitation, however, to affirm that Gen. Birney, as he rode home from the council that night with his staff officer, Major J. B. Fassitt, commented upon Gen. Meade's statement that Gettysburg was no place to fight in. He subsequently made the same remark to Gen. Sickles when the latter was convalescing from his wound. Both Major Fassitt and Gen. Sickles reside in New York.
Mr. Swinton assumes that I am unable to write an impartial history owing to the hostile relations which he supposes to have existed between Gen. Meade and myself, founded on my criticism of the latter in my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. I freely admit that I was unnecessarily harsh in my language at that time. The fact is, that just before the battle of Gettysburg I was applied to by an officer of high rank, a confidential friend of Gen. Meade, to give him a list of such officers of my division as had made strong demonstrations when Gen. McClellan was removed from command. The object of the inquiry was to promote these men over the heads of others equally deserving. I looked upon this as a plot to change the army of the Union into a partisan force, which was to become the personal appanage of an individual. Believing Gen. Meade to be a party to this arrangement, I thought he intended to carry out this policy, and testified accordingly. I afterward ascertained that I was mistaken in this respect; that he had no intention of reorganizing the army in the interest of Gen. McClellan. Indeed, he could not have done so, without displacing himself. When I understood the circumstances I did not blame him for his action toward me at Gettysburg. Nor is it true that he was not willing that I should serve under him again. Indeed, I applied to go down to the army to resume command of a division, and I never would have done so if I had not been certain that I would be welcome. Gen. Meade frequently made friendly inquiries concerning me of a relative who was there. I also received a message which came through Lieut. Lambdin, formerly of my staff, to the effect that I would be well received by him in case I returned to the army. The War Department refused my application to go, on the ground that my services could not be spared from Washington at that time.
Mr. Swinton's rose-colored narrative of the war might appropriately be called the ‘History of the Army of Northern Virginia.’
