[276]
Chapter 35:
- Return of the enemy to Washington -- war transferred to the frontier -- condition of Maryland -- crossing the Potomac -- evacuation of Martinsburg -- advance into Maryland -- large force of the enemy -- resistance at Boonesboro -- surrender of Harpers Ferry -- our forces reach Sharpsburg -- letter of the President to General Lee -- address of General Lee to the people -- position of our forces at Sharpsburg -- battle of Sharpsburg -- our strength -- forces withdrawn -- casualties.
The enemy having retired to the protection of the fortifications around Washington and Alexandria, Lee's army marched, on September 3d, toward Leesburg. The armies of Generals McClellan and Pope had now been brought back to the point from which they set out on the campaign of the spring and summer. The objects of those campaigns had been frustrated, and the hostile designs against the coast of North Carolina and in western Virginia thwarted by the withdrawal of the main body of the forces from those regions.
Northeastern Virginia was freed from the presence of the invader. His forces had withdrawn to the entrenchments of Washington. Soon after the arrival of our army at Leesburg, information was received that the hostile troops which had occupied Winchester had retired to Harpers Ferry. The war was thus transferred from the interior to the frontier, and the supplies of rich and productive districts were made accessible to our army. To prolong a state of affairs in every way desirable, and not to permit the season for active operations to pass without endeavoring to impose further check on our assailant, the best course appeared to be the transfer of our army into Maryland. Although not properly equipped for invasion, lacking much of the material of war, and deficient in transportation, the troops poorly provided with clothing, and thousands of them without shoes, it was yet believed to be strong enough to detain the opposing army upon the northern frontier until the approach of winter should render its advance into Virginia difficult, if not impracticable.
The condition of Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, though numerically inferior to that of the North, would induce the Washington government to retain all its available force to provide against contingencies which its conduct toward the people of that state gave reason to apprehend. At the same time it was hoped that [277] military success might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they should be disposed to make to recover their liberty. The difficulties that surrounded them were fully appreciated, and we expected to derive more assistance in the attainment of our object from the just fears of the Washington government than from any active demonstration on the part of the people of Maryland, unless success should enable us to give them assurance of continued protection. Influenced by these considerations, the army was put in motion.
It was decided to cross the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, in order, by threatening Washington and Baltimore, to cause the enemy to withdraw from the south bank, where his presence endangered our communications and the safety of those engaged in the removal of our wounded and the captured property from the late battlefield. Having accomplished this result, it was proposed to move the army into western Maryland, establish our communication with Richmond through the Valley of the Shenandoah, and, by threatening Pennsylvania, induce the enemy to withdraw from our territory for the protection of his own.
General D. H. Hill's division, being in advance, crossed the Potomac, between September 4th and 7th, at the ford near Leesburg, and encamped in the vicinity of Frederick. It had been supposed that this advance would lead to the evacuation of Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry, thus opening the line of communication through the Shenandoah Valley. This not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge the garrisons from those positions before concentrating the army west of the mountains. For this purpose General Jackson marched very rapidly, crossed the Potomac near Williamsport on the 11th, sent Hill's division directly to Martinsburg, and disposed of the rest of the command so as to cut off retreat to the westward. The enemy evacuated Martinsburg and retired to Harpers Ferry on the night of the 11th, and Jackson entered the former on the 12th. Meanwhile General McLaws had been ordered to seize Maryland Heights on the north side of the Potomac, opposite Harpers Ferry, and General Waller took possession of Loudoun Heights, on the east side of the Shenandoah where it unites with the Potomac, and was in readiness to open fire upon Harpers Ferry. But McLaws found the heights in possession of the foe, with infantry and artillery protected by entrenchments. On the 13th he assailed the works, and after a spirited contest they were carried; the troops made good their retreat to Harpers Ferry, and on the next day its investment was complete.
At the same time that the march of these troops upon Harpers Ferry began, the remainder of General Longstreet's command and the [278] division of D. H. Hill crossed the South Mountain and moved toward Boonsboro. General Stuart with the cavalry remained east of the mountains to observe the enemy and retard his advance. Longstreet continued his march to Hagerstown, and Hill halted near Boonsboro to support the cavalry and to prevent the force invested at Harpers Ferry from escaping through Pleasant Valley. The advance of the hostile army was then so slow as to justify the belief that the reduction of Harpers Ferry would be accomplished and our troops concentrated before they would be called upon to meet the foe. In that event it had not been intended to oppose his passage through South Mountain, as it was desired to engage him as far as possible from his base. But a copy of Lee's order directing the movement of the army from Frederick, happening to fall into the hands of McClellan, disclosed to him the disposition of our forces. He immediately began to push forward rapidly, and on the afternon of the 13th was reported approaching the pass in South Mountain on the Boonsboro and Frederick road. General Stuart's cavalry impeded his progress, and time was thus gained for preparations to oppose his advance.
In Taylor's Four Years with General Lee some facts relative to this lost order are stated. An order of battle was issued, stating in detail the position and duty assigned to each command of the army:
It was the custom to send copies of such orders, marked ‘confidential,’ to the commanders of separate corps or divisions only, and to place the address of such separate commander in the bottom left-hand corner of the sheet containing the order. General D. H. Hill was in command of a division which had not been attached to nor incorporated with either of the two wings of the Army of Northern Virginia. A copy of the order was, therefore, in the usual course, sent to him. After the evacuation of Frederick City by our forces, a copy of General Lee's order was found in a deserted camp by a soldier, and was soon in the hands of General McClellan. The copy of the order, it was stated at the time, was addressed to ‘General D. H. Hill, commanding division.’ General Hill has assured me that it could not have been his copy, because he still has the original order received by him in his possession.1
General D. H. Hill guarded the Boonsboro Gap, and Longstreet was ordered to support him, in order to prevent a force from penetrating the mountains at this point, in the rear of McLaws, so as to relieve the [279] garrison at Harpers Ferry. Early on the 14th a large body of the enemy attempted to force its way to the rear of the position held by Hill, by a road south of the Boonsboro and Frederick turnpike. The small command of Hill, with Garland's brigade, repelled the repeated assaults of the army, and held it in check for five hours. Longstreet, leaving a brigade at Hagerstown, hurried to the assistance of Hill, and reached the scene of action between 3 and 4 P. M. The battle continued with great animation until night. On the south of the turnpike the assailant was driven back some distance, and his attack on the center repulsed with loss. Darkness put an end to the contest.
The effort to force the pass of the mountain had failed, but it was manifest that without reenforcements Lee could not hazard a renewal of the engagement; McClellan, by his great superiority of numbers, could easily turn either flank. Information was also received that another large body of his troops had, during the afternoon, forced its way through Crampton Gap, only five miles in rear of McLaws. Under these circumstances it was determined to retire to Sharpsburg, where we would be on the flank and rear of the enemy should he move against McLaws, and where we could more readily unite with the rest of our army. This movement, skillfully and efficiently covered by the cavalry brigade of General Fitzhugh Lee, was accomplished without interruption. The advance of McClellan's army did not appear on the west side of the pass at Boonsboro until about 8 A. M. on the following morning.
The resistance that our troops had offered there secured sufficient time to enable General Jackson to complete the reduction of Harpers Ferry. The attack on the garrison began at dawn on the 15th. A rapid and vigorous fire was opened by the batteries of General Jackson, in conjunction with those on Maryland and Loudoun Heights. In about two hours the garrison, consisting of more than eleven thousand men, surrendered. Seventy-three pieces of artillery, about thirteen thousand small arms, and a large quantity of military stores fell into our hands. General A. P. Hill remained formally to receive the surrender of the troops and to secure the captured property.
The commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill reached Sharpsburg on the morning of the 15th. General Jackson arrived early on the 16th, and General J. G. Walker came up in the afternoon. The movements of General McLaws were embarrased by the presence of the enemy in Crampton Gap. He retained his position until the 14th, when, finding that he was not to be attacked, he gradually withdrew his command toward the Potomac, then crossed at Harpers Ferry and marched by way of Shepardstown. His progress was slow, and he did not reach the [280] battle-field at Sharpsburg until some time after the engagement of the 17th began.
At this time the letter from which the following extract is made was addressed by me to General R. E. Lee, commanding our forces in Maryland:
Sir: It is deemed proper that you should, in accordance with established usage, announce, by proclamation, to the people of Maryland, the motives and purposes of your presence among them at the head of an invading army; and you are instructed in such proclamation to make known. . . .
In obedience to instructions, General Lee issued the following address:
The commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, on their arrival at Sharpsburg, were placed in position along the range of hills between the town and the Antietam, nearly parallel to the course of that stream, Longstreet on the right of the road to Boonsboro and Hill on the left. The advance of the enemy was delayed by the determined opposition he encountered from Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, and he did not appear on the opposite side of the Antietam until about 2 P. M. During the afternoon the batteries on each side were partially engaged. On the 16th the artillery fire became warm, and continued throughout the day. A column crossed the Antietam beyond the reach of our batteries and menaced our left. In anticipation of this movement Hood's two brigades had been transferred from the right and posted between D. H. Hill and the Hagerstown road. General Jackson was now directed to take position on Hood's left, and formed his line with his right resting on the Hagerstown road and his left extending toward the Potomac, protected by General Stuart with the cavalry and horse artillery. General Walker with his two brigades was stationed on Longstreet's right. As evening approached, the enemy fired more vigorously with his artillery and bore down heavily with his infantry upon Hood, but the attack was gallantly repulsed. At 10 P. M. Hood's troops were relieved by the brigades of Lawton and Trimble of Ewell's division, commanded by General Lawton. Jackson's own division, under General J. K. Jones, was on Lawton's left, supported by the remaining brigades of Ewell.
At early dawn on the 17th his artillery opened vigorously from both sides of the Antietam, the heaviest fire being directed against our left. Under cover of this fire a large force of infantry attacked General Jackson's division. They were met by his troops with the utmost resolution, and for several hours the conflict raged with intense fury and alternate success. Our troops advanced with great spirit; the enemy's lines were repeatedly broken and forced to retire. Fresh troops, however, soon replaced those that were beaten, and Jackson's men were in turn compelled to fall back. Nearly all the field officers, with a large proportion of the men, were killed or wounded. Our troops slowly yielded to overwhelming numbers, and fell back, obstinately disputing every point. General Early, in command of Ewell's division, was ordered with his brigade to take the place of Jackson's division, most of which was withdrawn, its ammunition being nearly exhausted and its numbers much reduced. The battle now raged with great violence, the small commands under Hood [282] and Early holding their ground against many times their own infantry force and under a tremendous fire of artillery. Hood was reenforced; then the enemy's lines were broken and driven back, but fresh numbers advanced to their support, and they began to gain ground. The desperate resistance they encountered, however, delayed their progress until the troops of McLaws arrived, and those of General J. G. Walker could be brought from the right. Hood's brigade, though it had suffered extraordinary loss, withdrew only to replenish their ammunition, their supply being entirely exhausted. They were relieved by Walker's command, who immediately attacked vigorously, driving his combatant back with much slaughter. Upon the arrival of the reenforcements under McLaws, General Early attacked resolutely the large force opposed to him. Mc-Laws advanced at the same time, and the forces before them were driven back in confusion, closely followed by our troops beyond the position occupied at the beginning of the engagement.
The attack on our left was speedily followed by one in heavy force on the center. This was met by part of Walker's division and the brigades of G. B. Anderson and Rodes, of D. H. Hill's command, assisted by a few pieces of artillery. General R. H. Anderson's division came to Hill's support, and formed in rear of his line. At this time, by a mistake of orders, Rodes's brigade was withdrawn from its position; during the absence of that command a column pressed through the gap thus created, and G. B. Anderson's brigade was broken and retired. The heavy masses moved forward, being opposed only by four pieces of artillery, supported by a few hundred of our men belonging to different brigades rallied by Hill and other officers, and parts of Walker's and R. H. Anderson's commands. Colonel Cooke, with the Twenty-seventh North Carolina Regiment, stood boldly in line without a cartridge. The firm front presented by this small force and the well-directed fire of the artillery checked the progress of the enemy, and in about an hour and a half he retired. Another attack was made soon afterward a little farther to the right, but was repulsed by Miller's guns of the Washington Artillery, which continued to hold the ground until the close of the engagement, supported by a part of R. H. Anderson's troops. The corps designated the Washington Artillery was composed of Louisiana batteries, organized at New Orleans in the beginning of the war under Colonel I. B. Walton. It was distinguished by its services in the first great battle of Manassas, and in nearly every important conflict, as well of the army of Virginia as that of Tennessee, to the close of the war. In the official reports and in the traditions of both armies the names of the batteries of the Washington Artillery have frequent and honorable mention. [283]
While the attack on the center and left was in progress, repeated efforts were made to force the passage of the bridge over the Antietam, opposite the right wing of Longstreet, commanded by Brigadier General D. R. Jones. The bridge was defended by General Toombs with two regiments of his brigade and the batteries of General Jones. This small command repulsed five different assaults, made by a greatly superior force. In the afternoon the enemy, in large numbers, having passed the stream, advanced against General Jones, who held the ridge with less than two thousand men. After a determined and brave resistance, he was forced to give way, and the summit was gained. General A. P. Hill, having arrived from Harpers Ferry, was now ordered to reenforce General Jones. He moved to his support and attacked the force now flushed with success. Hill's batteries were thrown forward and united their fire with those of Jones, and one of D. H. Hill's also opened with good effect from the left of the Boonsboro road. The progress of the enemy was immediately arrested, and his line began to waver. At this moment General Jones ordered Toombs to charge the flank, while Archer, supported by Branch and Gregg, moved on the front of the enemy's line. After a brief resistance, he broke and retreated in confusion toward the Antietam, pursued by the troops of Hill and Jones, until he reached the protection of the batteries on the opposite side of the river.
It was now nearly dark, and McClellan had massed a number of batteries to sweep the approach to the Antietam, on the opposite side of which the corps of General Porter, which had not been engaged, now appeared to dispute our advance. Our troops were much exhausted, and greatly reduced in numbers by fatigue and the casualties of battle. Under these circumstances it was deemed injudicious to push our advantage further in the face of these fresh troops added to an army previously much exceeding the number of our own. Ours were accordingly recalled, and formed on the line originally held by General Jones. The repulse on the right ended the engagement, a protracted and sanguinary conflict in which every effort to dislodge us from our position had been defeated with severe loss.
This great battle was fought by less than forty thousand men on our side, all of whom had undergone the greatest labors and hardships in the field and on the march. Nothing could surpass the determined valor with which they met the large army of the enemy, fully supplied and equipped, and the result reflected the highest credit on the officers and men engaged.2 [284]
On the 18th our forces occupied the position of the preceding day, except in the center, where our line was drawn in about two hundred yards. Our ranks were increased by the arrival of a number of troops who had not been engaged the day before, and, though still too weak to assume the offensive, Lee waited without apprehension a renewal of the attack. The day passed without any hostile demonstration. During the night of the 18th our army was withdrawn to the south side of the Potomac, crossing near Shepardstown, without loss or molestation. The enemy advanced on the next morning, but was held in check by General Fitzhugh Lee with his cavalry. The condition of our troops now demanded repose, and the army marched to the Opequon, near Martinsburg, where it remained several days, and then moved to the vicinity of Bunker Hill and Winchester. General McClellan seemed to be concentrating in and near Harpers Ferry, but made no forward movement.
The contest on our left in this battle was the most violent. This and the deprivation of our men are very forcibly shown in the following account of Major General Hood:3
On the morning of the 15th my forces were again in motion. My troops at this period were sorely in need of shoes, clothing, and food. We had had issued to us no meat for several days, and little or no bread; the men had been forced to subsist principally on green corn and green apples. Nevertheless, they were in high spirits and defiant as we contended with the advanced guard of McClellan on the 15th and forenoon of the 16th. During the afternoon of this day I was ordered, after great fatigue and hunger endured by my soldiers, to take position near the Hagerstown turnpike, in open field in front of the Dunkard church. General Hooker's corps crossed the Antietam, swung round with its front on the pike, and about an hour before sunset encountered my division. I had stationed one or two batteries on a hillock in a meadow, near the edge of a corn-field, and just by the pike. The Texas Brigade had been disposed on the left, and that of Law on the right. We opened fire, and a spirited action ensued, which lasted till a late hour in the night. When the firing had in a great measure ceased, we were so close to the enemy that we could distinctly hear him massing his heavy bodies in our immediate front.The extreme suffering of my troops for want of food induced me to ride back to General Lee, and request him to send two or more brigades to our relief, at least for the night, in order that the soldiers might have a chance to cook their meager rations. He said that he would cheerfully do so, but he knew of no command that could be spared for the purpose; he, however, suggested that I should see General Jackson, and endeavor to obtain assistance from him. After riding a long time in search of the latter, I finally discovered him alone, lying upon the ground asleep by the root of a tree. I aroused him, and made known the halfstarved condition of my troops; he immediately ordered Lawton's, Trimble's, and Hays's brigade to our relief. He exacted of me, however, a promise that I would [285] come to the support of these forces the moment I was called upon. I quickly rode off in search of my wagons that the men might prepare and cook their flour, as we were still without meat; unfortunately, the night was then far advanced, and although every effort was made in the darkness to get the wagons forward, dawn of the morning of the 17th broke upon us before many of the men had time to do more than prepare the dough. Soon, thereafter, an officer of Lawton's staff dashed up to me, saying, ‘General Lawton sends his compliments, with the request that you come at once to his support.’ ‘To arms!’ was instantly sounded, and quite a large number of my brave soldiers were again obliged to march to the front, leaving their uncooked rations in camp.
Not far distant in our front were drawn up, in close array, heavy columns of Federal infantry; not less than two corps were in sight to oppose my small command, numbering approximately two thousand effectives. However, with the trusty Law on my right, in the edge of the wood, and the gallant Colonel Wafford in command of the Texas Brigade on the left, near the pike, we moved forward to the assault. Notwithstanding the overwhelming odds of over ten to one against us, we drove the enemy from the wood and corn-field back upon his reserves, and forced him to abandon his guns on our left. This most deadly combat raged till our last round of ammunition was expended. The First Texas Regiment had lost in the corn-field fully two thirds of its number; and whole ranks of brave men, whose deeds were unrecorded save in the hearts of loved ones at home, were mowed down in heaps to the right and left. Never before was I so continually troubled with fear that my horse would further injure some wounded fellowsoldier lying helpless upon the ground. Our right flank, during this short but seemingly long space of time, was toward the main line of the Federals, and, after several ineffectual efforts to procure reenforcements and our last shot had been fired, I ordered my troops back to Dunkard church for the same reason which had previously compelled Lawton, Hays, and Trimble to retire (a want of cartridges). Upon the arrival of McLaw's division we marched to the rear, renewed our supply of ammunition, and returned to our position in the wood near the church, which ground we held till a late hour in the afternoon, when we moved somewhat farther to the right and bivouacked for the night. With the close of this bloody day ceased the hardest-fought battle of the war.
The following account of Colonel Taylor, in his Four Years with General Lee, is more comprehensive, embracing the other forces besides Hood's brigade:
On the afternoon of the 16th, General McClellan directed an attack by Hooker's corps on the Confederate left—Hood's two brigades—and during the whole of the 17th the battle was waged, with varying intensity, along the entire line. When the issue was first joined, on the afternoon of the 16th, General Lee had with him less than eighteen thousand men, consisting of the commands of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, the two divisions of Jackson, and two brigades under Walker. Couriers were sent to the rear to hurry up the divisions of A. P. Hill, Anderson, and McLaws, hastening from Harper's Ferry, and these several commands, as they reached the front at intervals during the day, on the 17th, were immediately deployed and put to work. Every man was engaged. We had no reserve. [286]The fighting was heaviest and most continuous on the Confederate left. It is established by Federal evidence that the three corps of Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner were completely shattered in the repeated but fruitless efforts to turn this flank, and two of these corps were rendered useless for further aggressive movements. The aggregate strength of the attacking column at this point reached forty thousand men, not counting the two divisions of Franklin's corps, sent at a late hour in the day to rescue the Federal right from the impending danger of being itself destroyed; while the Confederates, from first to last, had less than fourteen thousand men on this flank, consisting of Jackson's two divisions, McLaws's division, and the two small divisions, of two brigades each, under Hood and Walker, with which to resist their fierce and oft-repeated assaults. The disproportion in the center and on our right was as great as, or even more decided than, on our left.
In the ‘Report of Committee on the Conduct of the War,’ Part I, p. 368, General Sumner testifies as follows:
General Hooker's corps was dispersed; there is no question about that. I sent one of my staff-officers to find where they were, and General Ricket's, the only officer he could find, said that he could not raise three hundred men of the corps. There were troops lying down on the left, which I took to belong to Mansfield's command. In the mean time General Mansfield had been killed, and a portion of his corps had also been thrown into confusion.
The testimony of General McClellan in the same report, Part I, p. 441, is to the same effect:
The next morning (the 18th) I found that our loss had been so great, and there was so much disorganization in some of the commands, that I did not consider it proper to renew the attack that day, especially as I was sure of the arrival that day of two fresh divisions, amounting to about fifteen thousand men. As an instance of the condition of some of the troops that morning, I happen to recollect the returns of the First Corps, General Hooker's, made on the morning of the 18th, by which there were thirty-five hundred men reported present for duty. Four days after that, the returns of the same corps showed thirteen thousand five hundred.
On the night of the 19th our forces crossed the Potomac, and some brigades of the enemy followed. In the morning General A. P. Hill, who commanded the rear guard, was ordered to drive them back. Having disposed his forces, an attack was made, and as the foe massed in front of General Pender's brigade and endeavored to turn his flank, General Hill says, in his report:
A simultaneous daring charge was made, and the enemy driven pell-mell into the river. Then commenced the most terrible slaughter that this war has yet witnessed. The broad surface of the Potomac was blue with the floating bodies of our foe. But few escaped to tell the tale. By their own account, they lost three thousand men killed and drowned from one brigade alone. Some two hundred prisoners were taken.[287]
General McClellan states in his official report that he had in this battle, in action, 87,164 men of all arms.
The official reports of the commanding officers of our forces, made at the time, show our total effective infantry to have been 27,255. The estimate made for the cavalry and artillery, which is rather excessive, is 8,000. This would make General Lee's entire strength 35,255.
The official return of the Army of Northern Virginia, on September 22, 1862, after its return to Virginia, and when the stragglers had rejoined their commands, shows present for duty, 36,187 infantry and artillery; the cavalry, of which there is no report, would perhaps increase these figures to 40,000 of all arms.4
The return of the United States Army of the Potomac on September 20, 1862, shows present for duty, at that date, of the commands that participated in the battle of Sharpsburg, 85,930 of all arms.5
The loss of the enemy at Boonsboro and Sharpsburg was 14,794.6
