Chapter 18: capture of Fort Fisher, Wilmington, and Goldsboroa.--Sherman's March through the Carolinas.--Stoneman's last raid.
- Further designs against Fort Fisher, 484. -- Second expedition against Fort Fisher, 485. -- bombardment of Fort Fisher, 486. -- Fort Fisher to be assaulted, 487. -- assault on the Fort by land and sea, 488. -- capture of the Fort. 489. -- preparations for attacking Wilmington, 490. -- a large force at Fort Fisher, 491. -- capture of [10] Wilmington, 492. -- advance on Goldsboroa, 493. -- Schofield enters Goldsboroa, 494. -- Sherman's marching orders, 495. -- March toward North Carolina, 496. -- the National Army at Fayetteville, 497. -- March on Goldsboroa, 498. -- battle of Averasboroa, 499. -- battle of Bentonsville, 500, 501, 502. -- junction of the armies of Sherman, Schofield, and Terry, 503. -- Stoneman's great raid in Virginia and the Carolinas, 504. -- Moderwell's expedition, 505.
General Grant was greatly disappointed by the resuit of the expedition against Fort Fisher, and in his General Report of the Operations of the Army,
July 22, 1865. |
Dec. 6, 1864. |
On being informed that the fleet had not left the vicinity of Fort Fisher, General Grant wrote to Admiral Porter,
Dec. 30. |
The new expedition left Hampton Roads on the 6th of January,
1865. |
Jan. 13. |
Terry first wisely provided against an attack in the rear, from the direction of Wilmington, by casting up intrenchments across the peninsula, and thus also securing its free use to Masonboroa Inlet, where, if necessary, troops and supplies might be landed in still water. This was done a short distance above the head of Myrtle Sound, and about four miles from Fort Fisher. The first line was completed at nine o'clock that evening; another was made a mile nearer the fort, and still another within about two miles of the works. At the latter, on the morning of the 14th,
January. |
The successful movement, thus far, against the fort, planned by General Terry, partook of all the elements of a siege, without some of its important operations on his part. He landed far up the beach, and made approaches without the necessity of zigzag intrenchments to protect his heavy guns, for none were needed, the batteries for that work being afloat in Porter's fleet. [486]
A careful reconnoissance determined Terry to make a grand assault there next morning,
Jan. 15, 1865. |
Bombardment of Fort Fisher.2 |
In the arrangement for the general attack by land and water, the fleet was to first concentrate its fire on the land face of Fort Fisher, for the purpose of disabling its guns and destroying the palisades upon its wings and front, when the army should make the assault at three o'clock in the afternoon. All night the monitors pounded the fort, and allowed the garrison no rest, nor opportunity to repair damages; and at eight o'clock in the morning,
Jan. 15, 1865. |
Ames's division had been selected for the assault. Paine was placed in command of the defensive line, having with him Abbott's brigade in addition to his own division. Ames's first brigade (N. M. Curtis's) was already at the outwork captured the day before, and in trenches close around it. His other two brigades (G. A. Pennybacker's and L. Bell's) were moved, at noon, to within supporting distance of him. At two o'clock, preparations for the assault were commenced. Sixty sharp-shooters from the Thirteenth Indiana, armed with the Spencer repeating carbine, and forty others, volunteers from Curtis's brigade, the whole under the command of Lieutenant Lent, of the Thirteenth Indiana, were thrown forward, at a run, to within less than two hundred yards of the work. They were provided with shovels, and soon dug pits for shelter, and commenced firing at the parapet, which, as the firing of the fleet at this point had ceased, was instantly manned, and a severe storm opened upon the assailants from musketry and cannon.6 [488]
As soon as the sharp-shooters were in position, the fleet changed the direction of its fire from the land face and the palisades of the fort, to its center and right, and Curtis's brigade moved forward at the double-quick into line less than five hundred yards from the works, and there laid down. The other two brigades were moved forward, Pennybacker's to the outwork left by Curtis, and Bell's to a point two hundred yards in the rear of it. Perceiving a good cover on the reverse of a slope, fifty yards in the rear of the sharp-shooters, Curtis moved his men to it, where they instantly covered themselves in trenches. At the same time, Pennybacker followed Curtis and occupied the ground he had just left, and Bell advanced to the outwork.
It was now about half-past 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Every thing was in readiness for the assault. The signal was given, when Curtis's brigade sprang from its cover and dashed forward in line, its left exposed to a severe enfilading fire. It obliqued to the right, so as to envelop the left of the land-face of the fort. Preparations had been made for destroying the palisades with powder7 and axes. But the fleet had done the work effectually. The axmen, however, accompanied Curtis's men. The palisades were soon passed, and a lodgment was made on the parapet, not far from the river. At the same time the sailors and marines, led by Fleet-Captain K. R. Breese, eager to be the first to enter the fort, advanced with great gallantry up the beach, and attacked the northeast bastion. There they were exposed to a murderous fire, and were unable to scale the parapet. After heavy loss of
Interior of Fort Fisher.8 |
With this assault commenced the terrible struggle. Up to this time the National loss had been trifling, for the navy had kept the garrison quiet. Now it was compelled to cease firing at that part of the fort, for its shells would be as hurtful to friends as foes. Instantly the garrison sprang to its guns, and musketeers swarmed upon the parapet. But Curtis held his ground until Pennybacker, sent by Ames, came to his support. The latter advanced rapidly to Curtis's right, drove the Confederates from the strong and almost unharmed palisades, extending from the west end of the landface [489] of the fort to the river (see sketch on page 488), and captured a number of prisoners. The brigade broke through the palisades and joined Curtis. At the same time Bell's brigade had been sent forward to occupy the space between that end of the fort and the river; and Terry sent for Abbott's brigade to move down from the north line, while Reese led the sailors and marines up to occupy that position. He also ordered General Paine to send down one of his best regiments, when the Twenty-seventh, negro troops, Brevet Brigadier-General A. M. Blackman, was forwarded. These arrived when the heaviest of the work was done. It had been performed by the troops already there, who fought hand to hand with the garrison, while the fleet kept up its fire further to the southward, to prevent re-enforcements reaching the fort from Mound Battery, or Battery Buchanan.
The Confederates used the huge traverses of the land front for breast-works, and over the tops of these the combatants fired in each other's faces. The struggle was desperate. The Confederates were steadily pushed back, until, at dusk, they had lost nine of these traverses. At that time Blackman reported to Ames. His troops were kept under fire for awhile, when they were withdrawn. At six o'clock Abbott entered the fort with his little brigade, and at nine o'clock, when two more traverses had been carried by the Nationals, the contest ceased. Abbott's brigade drove the garrison from its last stronghold, and the occupation of the work was complete. The Confederates fled toward Battery Buchanan, hotly pursued by Abbott, accompanied by Blackman's regiment; and then the whole of the garrison not already in the hands of Terry, were captured, including Colonel Lamb, the commander of the fort, and General Whiting, who was mortally wounded.
The fall of Fort Fisher rendered all the other works at the mouth of the Cape Fear River untenable, and during the nights of the 16th and 17th,
Jan., 1865. |
Bragg was in chief command of the Confederates in that region, but. seemed to have been paralyzed by the prompt establishment, by Terry, of an intrenched line across the peninsula and the rapid assault by land and water.10 Hoke, who was near, made some show on the afternoon of the assault, by Bragg's orders, but a peremptory command of the latter for the former to attack, was withdrawn, after the commander-in-chief had reconnoitered for himself.
Although a greater part of the guns of Fort Fisher were dismounted, or otherwise disabled, the work itself was so slightly damaged that it could be readily repaired. But the Nationals had no use for it. The port of Wilmington was closed to blockade-runners; and the town itself was to be the next object of visitation by Terry and Porter. The latter immediately ordered Lieutenant-Commander R. Chandler, commanding the Maumee, to buoy out the channel of New Inlet, when several of the lighter draught vessels went into the Cape Fear River. He also dispatched the gallant Cushing,11 who was then in command of the Monticello, to ascertain the state of affairs on the right bank of the river. Cushing soon reported success, by raising the National flag over Fort Caswell and Smithville,12 when preparations were made for taking up the torpedoes, and ascending the river in the lighter vessels, the heavier being excluded by the shallowness of the water. General Terry posted his troops at his intrenched line across the peninsula, two or three miles above Fort Fisher. But it was considered imprudent to attempt an advance until the army should be re-enforced, for Hoke was holding Fort Anderson, on the river, about half-way between Fort. Fisher and Wilmington, and had cast up a line of intrenchments across the peninsula, from Sugar Loaf Battery, nearly opposite that fort, on the east bank of the Cape Fear, to the ocean, thus strongly confronting Terry. Behind these Hoke had about six thousand men. Fort Anderson was an extensive earth-work, with a large number of guns, which commanded the approaches by land and water. Immediately under cover of its guns was. a large wharf; also various obstructions in the channel.
Re-enforcements were not long delayed. General Grant, as we have seen, had ordered General Schofield from Tennessee to the coast of North Carolina, with the Twenty-third Corps. Schofield received the command
January 14, 1865. |
January 23, 1865. |
The main object of the movement now to be undertaken was, as we have observed,14 the occupation of Goldsboroa,
J. M. Schofield. |
Jan. 21. |
Jan. 31. |
Two days after Schofield's arrival at Fort Fisher with General J. D. Cox's. division, Terry was pushed forward.
Feb. 11. |
Feb. 18. |
The garrison of Fort Anderson fled to intrenchments behind Old Town Creek, closely followed by General Cox, who crossed the little stream on a flat-boat, attacked
Feb. 20, 1865. |
The evacuation of Fort Anderson, and the defeat of the Confederates near Old Town Creek, caused the abandonment of all the defenses along the Cape Fear. Ames's division was sent to the east side to assist Terry, when Hoke, perceiving his peril, left his intrenchments and fell back toward Wilmington. The National troops pressed up both sides of the river, and the gun-boats, removing torpedoes, moved up the stream, silencing batteries on both banks. The most formidable of these were Fort Strong, on the east side, and Fort St. Philip, at the mouth of the Brunswick River.15 These made very slight resistance, and on the morning of the 21st,
February. |
Feb. 22. |
Schofield's next objective and final destination, in co-operation with Sherman, was Goldsboroa, on the railway, eighty-four miles north of Wilmington, toward which Hoke had fled. Having left his wagons in Tennessee, he lacked these and draft animals, and could not pursue Hoke directly. But he proceeded to put in motion five thousand troops at New Berne, whom General J. N. Palmer was directed to move on Kinston (a small town north of and near the Neuse River), as quickly as possible, to protect the work-men [493] there repairing the railway between New Berne and Goldsboroa, and to establish a depot of supplies at Kinston. Ruger's division of the Twenty-third Corps was sent from Fort Fisher to re-enforce him. Palmer was not ready to advance so soon as desired, and General Cox was sent from Wilmington to take the command, leaving his own division in charge of Brigadier-General Reilly. He arrived at New Berne on the 6th of March,
1865. |
March. |
Behind Southwest Creek lay Hoke's division, with a small body of reserves, ready to dispute the passage of Schofield's troops. The march in that direction, through swamps made miry by recent rains, had been very fatiguing, but the troops were in good spirits; and when the Fifteenth Connecticut and Twenty-seventh Massachusetts were ordered forward, under Colonel Upham, to seize the crossing of the creek on the Dover road, they marched with alacrity. Hoke watched the movement keenly. He had just been re-enforced by a remnant of Hood's army, under Cheatham, and feeling strong, he sent a force, under cover of the tangled swamp, around Upham's flank, to fall upon his rear and surprise him. This was done, and the Nationals were routed, with a loss of seven hundred men made prisoners. Elated by this success, Hoke advanced a larger force, and attempted to wedge it in between, and separate, the divisions of Generals Palmer and Carter, respectively, holding the railway and the Dover road. The Nationals were pressed back, but the timely arrival of Ruger's division interfered with Hoke's operations. The result was a moderate battle, with slight loss — a conflict not much more severe than Savage's Twelfth New York Cavalry had engaged in on their march out from New Berne on the Trent road.
Schofield perceived that Hoke's force was fully equal to his own, and he ordered Cox to form an intrenched line, stand on the defensive, and wait for the arrival of Couch with his own and Cox's division, then moving on from Richlands.
Cox's line was heavily pressed by Hoke, and on the 10th,
March. |
March, 1865. |
March, 15. |
Let us now resume the consideration of Sherman's march through the Carolinas.
We left Sherman and his army at the smoldering capital of South Carolina, on the 18th of February,20 and Charleston in possession of the National troops.21 There was no unnecessary tarrying at Columbia, for Sherman had fixed the time for reaching Goldsboroa. He spent the 18th and 19th
February. |
Feb. 8. |
Feb. 11. |
Feb. 17. |
Feb. 19. |
In the mean time, Sherman's army had marched due north, in the direction of Charlotte, leaving behind it a most desolate track. Sherman had determined to make the war so felt as a dreadful calamity, that those who had begun it might be induced to abandon it speedily. He issued precise instructions for the conduct of the troops in their passage through South Carolina. “The army,” he said, “will forage liberally on the country during the march;” and each brigade commander was directed to “organize a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet officers,” whose business it was to gather food for man and beast, “aiming at all times to keep in the wagon trains at least ten days provisions for the command, and three days forage.” Soldiers were forbidden to enter private houses or commit trespasses, but were permitted to forage for food, in the vicinity of a camp, or at a halt. He gave the corps commanders power to “destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins,” &c. Such destruction was not to be made in districts or neighborhoods where the army was not molested; but in those regions where guerrillas and bushwackers should infest the march, or the “inhabitants should burn bridges, or otherwise manifest local hostility, the corps commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility.” He permitted the cavalry to “appropriate, freely and without limit,” horses, mules, wagons, &c., belonging to the inhabitants, “discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly.” Foragers were also permitted to exchange their jaded animals for fresh ones. They were also directed to “leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance.”
The simple execution of the orders for the army to live off the country, must have produced an almost absolute peeling of the inhabitants in the track of that host, which devoured every thing in its way over a path of more than forty miles in width. And so universal was the hostility of the inhabitants, incited by Wade Hampton and his fellow-traitors of South Carolina, that the restrictive conditions concerning devastation were nowhere applicable.22 The feeling that South Carolina was the chief offender — the author of all the woes inflicted by the war, its politicians being the chief originators of treasonable designs, and the first to strike the intended deadly blow at the heart of the Republic — made many a soldier more relentless. The system of foraging allowed wide latitude, and afforded license for many outrages and cruelties on the part of unscrupulous soldiers, who always form a part of an army. Large numbers of these, called “bummers,” went in [496] advance of the columns, gathering up food according to instructions, and plundering for their private gain, in violation of instructions. Many of these were better marauders than fighters, and their conduct disgraced the army and the service. But the effect of Sherman's march through South Carolina was precisely what that leader desired and expected. War was made so terrible, that the offenders were glad to cry for mercy. A leading citizen of South Carolina said to the writer:--“Sherman's march was terrible, but it was merciful. It tended to a speedy ending of the war. We lost our property, but saved our sons. Had the war continued, we should have lost both.”
Sherman moved his whole army from Columbia to Winnsboroa, in the direction of Charlotte, and from that point, Slocum, who arrived there on the 21st of February with the Twentieth Corps, and the cavalry, caused the railway to be broken up as far as Blackstock's Station, well toward Chesterville. Then he turned suddenly eastward, toward Rocky Mount, on the Catawba, leaving to the left the Confederate forces which were concentrating for the purpose of disputing the expected march of the Nationals on Charlotte. The whole movement in that direction was a feint to deceive the foe, and was successful. The Confederate troops then in front of the Union army were the forces of Beauregard, and the cavalry of Hampton and Wheeler, which had fled from Columbia. Cheatham was near, earnestly striving to form a junction with Beauregard, at Charlotte.
Slocum crossed the Catawba on a pontoon bridge, at Rocky Mount, on the 23d, just as a heavy rain-storm set in, which flooded the country and swelled the streams. He pushed on to Hanging Rock,
Feb. 26. 1865. |
Sherman now pushed on toward Fayetteville, in North Carolina. The right wing of the army crossed the Pedee at Cheraw, and the left, with the cavalry, at Sneedsboroa, on the State line. They marched in parallel lines, within easy supporting distance, Kilpatrick well on the left of all, and skirmishing some with Wade Hampton's cavalry, which was covering the rear of Hardee's retreating army, burning the bridges behind them. The weather was inclement, but the Nationals made good time, and on the 11th of March Sherman's whole force was concentrated at Fayetteville, from which Hardee had also retreated. There, on the following day, Sherman received the cipher dispatch from Schofield, at Wilmington, already mentioned.24 On that morning the army-tug Davidson, commanded by the stalwart and fear-less Captain Ainsworth, after much peril in ascending the Cape Fear River, arrived from Wilmington, with intelligence of what had occurred there and at the mouth of the stream. Just before reaching Fayetteville, Sherman had sent two of his best scouts to Wilmington, with intelligence of his position and plans. By Captain Ainsworth, who returned the same day, he sent. dispatches to Terry and Schofield, informing them that he should move on Goldsboroa on the 15th, feigning Raleigh to deceive the foe.
Sherman had met with very little opposition in his march from the Catawba to the Cape Fear. The most serious encounter was by Kilpatrick with Hampton's cavalry. As the former was advancing on the extreme-left, by way of Rockingham, he struck the rear of Hardee's. column,
March 8, 1865. |
Feb. 11. |
The National army rested three days at Fayetteville, during which time the United States Arsenal there,25 with all the costly machinery which the Confederates brought to that place from Harper's Ferry, in the Spring of 1861,26 was utterly destroyed by the First Michigan Engineers, under the direction of Colonel Poe.
Sherman was satisfied that, thereafter, on his march toward Goldsboroa, he would have heavy and somewhat perilous work to do, for before him was now an army of about forty thousand veteran soldiers, under the able General Joseph E. Johnston. It was composed of the combined forces of Hardee, from Charleston; Beauregard, from Columbia; Cheatham, with Hood's men, and the garrison at Augusta; Hoke, with the forces which had been defending the seaboard of North Carolina, and the cavalry of Wheeler and Hampton. These, Sherman said, “made up an army superior to me in cavalry, and formidable enough in artillery and infantry to justify me in extreme caution in making the last step necessary to complete the march I had undertaken.” He made disposition of his army accordingly, and on the 15th of March crossed the Cape Fear on pontoon bridges, and pressed forward.
In accordance with his usual plan of distracting the attention of his antagonist, General Sherman sent Slocum, with four divisions of the left wing, preceded by the cavalry, toward Averasboroa, on the main road to Raleigh, feigning an advance upon the capital of the State, while the two remaining divisions of that wing, and the train, took the direct road to Goldsboroa. General Howard moved on roads to the right, holding four divisions light, ready to march to the assistance of the left wing, and sending his trains toward Faison's Station, on the Wilmington and Goldsboroa railway. Sher-man was with Slocum, on the left. Incessant rains had made quagmires of the roads, and the army was compelled to corduroy them continually.
Near Taylor's Hole Creek, a little beyond Kyle's Landing, to which Slocum had advanced, Kilpatrick skirmished heavily with Hardee's rear-guard, that evening, and captured some of them.27 On the following morning,
March 16, 1865. |
The ground was so soft that horses sunk deep at every step, and men traveled over the pine-barren only with difficulty. But obstacles were not to be thought of. General Williams, with the Twentieth Corps, took the lead. Ward's division was deployed in the advance, and very soon his skirmishers developed Rhett's brigade of heavy artillery, armed as infantry, holding a slightly intrenched line across the road, on the brow of a hill, skirted by a [499] ravine and creek, with a battery that enfiladed an open field over which the Nationals must advance. To avoid the perils of a direct attack under such circumstances, Williams sent Case's brigade to turn the left of the Confederate line. This was promptly done, and, by a quick charge upon their flank, he broke that wing into fragments, and drove it back upon a second and stronger line, under fire of Winnegar's battery, directed by Major Reynolds.
Ward's division was now rapidly advanced upon the retreating force, and captured three guns and two hundred and seventeen men. The Confederates, in their haste, left one hundred and eight of their dead on the field. Jackson's division was quickly brought upon Ward's right, and two divisions of the Fourteenth (Davis's) Corps were placed on his left, well toward the Cape Fear, while Kilpatrick, acting in concert farther to the right, was directed to secure a footing on the road leading to Bentonsville. He reached it with one brigade, when he was furiously attacked by McLaws's division, and, after a hard fight, was pushed back. Then the whole of Slocum's line advanced, drove Hardee within his entrenchments, and there pressed him so heavily, that during the dark and stormy night that succeeded, he retreated to Smithfield (where Johnston was concentrating his forces), over the most wretched roads. So ended the conflict
March 16, 1865. |
March 17. |
General Sherman felt satisfied that he should have no more serious strife with the Confederates, on his march to Goldsboroa. “All signs,” he said in his-report, “induced me to believe that the enemy would make no further opposition to our progress, and would not attempt to strike us in flank, while in motion.” In accordance with this impression he issued an order to the effect that further opposition being now past, corps commanders would march their troops in the easiest manner and by the nearest roads to Goldsboroa. That sense of security was almost fatal to Sherman's army, for at that moment, Johnston, who had come down from Smithfield in rapid but stealthy march, under cover of night, was hovering near in full force, ready to pounce upon his unsuspecting adversary at the earliest and most promising opportunity. He found the Union forces, under the assuring order of the commander-in-chief, in a favorable position for the execution of his designs. The Fourteenth (J. C. Davis's) Corps were encamped on the night of the 18th
March. |
Early on the morning of the 19th, Sherman was so assured of security, that he left Slocum's wing of the army, which was most exposed to the foe, and joined Howard's, farther to the right, which was scattered, and moving [500] as rapidly as the wretched state of the roads would admit. When only six miles on his journey, to overtake Howard, he heard cannonading at the northwest, but was assured that it was only a slight encounter between Carlin's division and Dibbrell's cavalry, and that the former was easily driving the latter. It was true that Carlin and Dibbrell had met, but the matter soon assumed a most serious aspect. The divisions of Carlin and Morgan, of the Fourteenth Corps, had moved that morning
March 19, 1865. |
By 12 o'clock the fighting had become stubborn; artillery was at work vigorously on both sides; and yet, up to this time, only cavalry and a battery of artillery, on the part of the assailants, had been developed. But an hour or two later, Morgan's division, deploying on Carlin's right, felt infantry in their front in the woods. By that time Buell, on the extreme left, had also struck infantry behind intrenchments. He outflanked them, but met with a most deplorable repulse. By this time the character and meaning of the severe pressure on Sherman's left was developed. A deserter, a “galvanized Yankee,” 28 had been brought to Generals Slocum and Davis, while they were in consultation, and in an excited manner he declared to them, what proved to be true, that the whole of Johnston's army, augmented by the commands of Hardee and Hoke, were in a fortified position immediately in front of the left wing, intending an immediate attack, and that Johnston had ridden along the column of his army, and assured them that victory over Sherman's entire force was now certain. It was a surprise.
It was now half-past 2 o'clock. Intelligence confirmatory of the deserter's declarations had come in from the right and left flanks of the Union forces engaged, and measures were immediately taken for the employment of all possible power to resist the expected overwhelming attack. A line of barricades was hastily thrown up. Orders had already been dispatched by Slocum to hurry up the two divisions of the Twentieth Corps, while Robinson's brigade, of that corps, which was much in advance of the rest of the troops, was put in to fill a gap between the divisions of Morgan and Carlin. Just then the Confederates dashed out of the woods, and fell with great fury mainly upon Carlin's division, already wearied and weakened by continual and severe fighting for hours. They were driven back at all points in much confusion. But Morgan's division on the right stood firm. The brigades of Mitchell and Vandevere were in line, and Fearing's was in reserve. It was now the crisis of battle. General Davis, who had thus far conducted his troops with great skill and coolness, seeing the mortal peril, arid only one way to escape from it, extricated himself from the broken column of Carlin's [501] division, rode rapidly to the right, faced Fearing's brigade to the left, and hurled them upon the flank of the Confederates, who were heavily pressing the broken center. The scene of conflict was in a densely wooded swamp, dark, and wet, and dismal. “Push right in the direction of that heaviest firing,” shouted Davis to Fearing, as he gave him the order to move, “and attack whatever is in that swamp! Fight them for the best that is in your brigade! You'll stop that advance, sir, and we'll whip them yet!” The men caught up the words “we'll whip them yet,” and dashed forward in an impetuous charge, under the immediate directions of Davis. That charge was a magnificent display of courage, discipline, and enthusiasm. The Confederates were staggered and paralyzed by this unexpected and stunning blow from a force hitherto unseen by them. They reeled and fell back in amazement, fearing they knew not what, and the attack was not renewed on that part of the field for more than an hour afterward. The army was saved! In that charge the gallant young General Fearing, the commander of the brigade, was disabled by a bullet, and hundreds of its dead and wounded strewed the field of conflict.
The check thus given to the Confederates was of infinite value to Sherman's army, for it gave an opportunity for re-forming the disordered left and center of Davis's line. It was drawn back and formed in open fields, half a mile in the rear of the old line. The artillery was massed on a commanding knoll, so as to sweep the whole space between the woods wherein the Confederates were stationed and the new line; and Kilpatrick massed his cavalry on the left. Meanwhile, the attack upon Morgan was terrible and unceasing. “Seldom have I heard such continuous and remorseless roar of musketry,” said an actor in the scene.29 “It seemed more than men could bear. Twice General Davis turned to me and said, ‘If Morgan's troops can stand this, all is right; if not, the day is lost. There is no reserve — not a regiment to move — they must fight it out.’ And fight it out they did. They were entirely surrounded. I, myself, trying to get to them from the rear, three times ran into heavy bodies of the enemy's troops. Two or three different times, after resisting attacks from the front, they were compelled to jump over their own works and fight to the rear. Soldiers in that command who have passed through their score of battles, will tell you they never saw any thing like the fighting at Bentonsville. In the midst of the hottest of it, at perhaps five o'clock, Coggswell's brigade of the Twentieth Corps, arrived to fill the gap between the new formation of Carlin's line and that of Morgan. They moved forward, and the roar of musketry resounded along that line as it did along Morgan's. They seized the position, and gallantly held it. Meanwhile, the enemy on the left moved to the attack several times, but the repulse they had already received seemed to have dispirited them, and the terrible havoc of our massed artillery drove them back almost before they reached the fire of the infantry, who were burning to avenge the morning's disaster.” The National forces received, Sherman said, “six distinct assaults by the combined forces of Hoke, Hardee, and Cheatham, under the immediate command of General Johnston himself, without giving an inch of ground, [502] and doing good execution on the enemy's ranks, especially with our artillery, the enemy having little or none.” 30
With the coming of darkness ended the conflict known as the battle of Bentonsville,31 which, in brilliancy of personal achievements, and in lasting advantage to the cause of the Republic, must ever be ranked among the most memorable and important contests of the war. Indeed, it seems
Sherman's March through the Carolinas. |
During the night after the battle
March 19-20. |
March 20, 1865. |
Meanwhile, Schofield and Terry, as we have seen,32 had been approaching Goldsboroa, and at the very time
March 21. |
March 22. |
On the 23d of March all the armies, in the aggregate about sixty thousand strong, were disposed in camps around Goldsboroa, there to rest and receive needed clothing. On the 25th, the railroad between Goldsboroa and New Berne was completed and in perfect order, by which a rapid channel of supply from the sea was opened. So ended, in complete triumph, and with small loss, Sherman's second great march through the interior of the enemy's country; and he was then in a desirable position of easy supply, to take an efficient part in the spring and summer campaign of 1865, if the war should continue. Considering it important to have a personal interview with the General-in-chief, Sherman placed Schofield temporarily in chief command of the army, and hastened by railway to Morehead City, and thence by water to Headquarters at City Point, where he arrived on the evening of the 27th of March. There he met Generals Grant, Meade, Ord, and other leading army commanders, and President Lincoln. He “learned,” he said, “the general state of the military world,” and then returned to New Berne in a navy steamer, and reached Goldsboroa on the night of the 30th.
March. |
After his winter campaign in Southwestern Virginia, already n<*>ed,33 General Stoneman returned to Knoxville, and was ordered
Feb. <*> 7 |
March 28, 1865. |
March 29. |
April 2. |
Having performed his prescribed duty, General Stoneman turned his face southward, and, on the 9th of April, struck the North Carolina railroad between Danville and Greensboroa. At Germantown several hundred negroes, who had joined the column, were sent back into East Tennessee. At the same time Colonel Palmer was sent to destroy the railroad between Salisbury and Greensboroa, and the factories at Salem, in North Carolina; while the main column moved on Salisbury, forcing the Yadkin at Huntsville,
April 11. |
Salisbury was a prisoner-depot, and a considerable Confederate force was stationed there, under General W. M. Gardiner. They were about three thousand strong. They were found at Grant's Creek, ten miles east of Salisbury, early on the 12th,
April. |
On the 17th of April, Stoneman started, with a part of his command, for East Tennessee, taking with him the prisoners, captured artillery, and thousands of negroes. On the following day, General Palmer, whose command was at Lincolnton, sent Major E. C. Moderwell, with two hundred and fifty men of the Twelfth Ohio Cavalry, to destroy the bridge of the Charlotte and South Carolina railroad,over the Catawba River. At that time, Jefferson Davis, having fled from Richmondi was at Charlotte with a very considerable force; and the mounted men of Vaughn and Duke, who had come down from the borders of Virginia, were on the Catawba. On that account it was necessary to move with great
Railway bridge over the Catawba River.35 |
April, 1865. |
During the raid just recorded, the National cavalry captured six thousand prisoners, twenty-five pieces of artillery taken in action, and twenty-one abandoned by the foe, and a large number of small-arms; and they destroyed an immense amount of public property.