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the institution within your own States.
Beat them at elections, as you have overwhelmingly done, and, nothing daunted, they still claim you as their own. You and I know what the lever of their power is. Break that lever before their faces, and they can shake you no more forever. . . . If the war continues long, as it must if the object be not sooner attained, the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion-by the mere incidents of the war. It will be gone, and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it. Much of its value is gone already.
How much better for you and for your people to take the step which at once shortens the war and secures substantial compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in any other event.
How much better to thus save the money which else we sink forever in the war. . . . Our common country is in great peril, demanding the loftiest views and boldest action to bring it speedy relief.
Once relieved, its form of government is saved to the world, its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated, and its happy future fully assured and rendered inconceivably grand.
To you, more than to any others, the privilege is given to assure that happiness and swell that grandeur, and to link your own names therewith forever.”
Even while the delegations listened, Mr. Lincoln could see that events had not yet ripened their minds to the acceptance of his proposition.
In their written replies, submitted a few days afterward, two thirds of them united in a qualified refusal, which, while recognizing the President's patriotism and reiterating their own loyalty, urged a number of rather unsubstantial excuses.
The minority replies promised to submit the proposal fairly to the people of their States, but could of course give no assurance that it would be welcored