Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 35
Evan T. Sage, PhD professor of latin and head of the department of classics in the University of Pittsburgh, Ed.

13. And the kings, nevertheless, either were unmoved or were moved too slowly; Nabis at once sent agents around all the maritime towns to stir up seditions in them, and some of the leading men he won over to his side by gifts, others, who stubbornly adhered to the Roman alliance, lie put to death. [2] The Achaeans had been entrusted with the responsibility for all maritime affairs in Sparta by Titus Quinctius,¹ So immediately they sent [p. 39]ambassadors to the tyrant to remind him of the [3??] Roman² treaty and to warn him not to disturb the peace which he had so earnestly sought, and sent reinforcements to Gytheum, which was now being besieged by the tyrant, and ambassadors to Rome to report these doings.

[4] King Antiochus,³ having given his daughter in marriage to King Ptolemy of Egypt at Raphia in Phoenicia during that winter,⁴ when he had retired to Antioch, came by way of Cilicia, crossing the Taurus mountains well on towards the end of the winter, to Ephesus; [5] thence at the beginning of spring, sending his son Antiochus into Syria to guard the remotest parts of his kingdom, lest any disturbance behind him should occur in his absence, he himself set out with all his land forces to attack the Pisidae who dwell around Sida. [6] At that time the Roman commissioners, Publius Sulpicius and Publius Villius, who had been sent to Antiochus, as has already been stated,⁵ having been ordered to visit Eumenes⁶ first, came to Elaea; thence they climbed up to Pergamum, where Eumenes' capital was located. [7] Eumenes was anxious for war against Antiochus, believing that a king so much more powerful than himself was a dangerous neighbour, if there was peace, and also that, if war should be provoked, he was no more likely to be a match for the Romans than Philip had been, and that either he would be utterly destroyed or, if peace were granted him [8??] after he had been defeated, much that was [p. 41]taken from Antiochus would fall to his own lot, so⁷ that thenceforth he could easily defend himself against Antiochus without any Roman aid. [9] Even if some misfortune should befall, it was better, he thought, to endure whatever fate with the Romans as allies than by himself either to submit to the sovereignty of Antiochus or, if he refused, to be compelled to do so by force of arms; [10] for these reasons with all his prestige and all his diplomatic skill he urged the Romans to war.⁸