2.
But it was not long allowed them to consult in quiet re- [p. 393]garding the means of raising the city, after so grievous a fall.
[2]
On the one side their old enemies, the Volscians, had taken up arms, to extinguish the Roman name: on the other, some traders brought [intelligence] that a conspiracy of the leading men of Etruria from all the states had been formed at the temple of Voltumna.
[3]
A new cause of terror also had been added by the defection of the Latins and Hernicians, who, since the battle fought at the lake Regillus, had remained in friendship with the Roman people with fidelity not to be questioned.
[4]
Accordingly, when such great alarms surrounded them on every side, and it became apparent to all that the Roman name laboured not only under hatred with their enemies, but under contempt also with their allies;
[5]
it was resolved that the state should be defended under the same auspices, as those under which it had been recovered, and that Marcus Furius should be nominated dictator.
[6]
He, then dictator, nominated Caius Servilius Ahala master of the horse; and a suspension of all public business being proclaimed, he held a levy of the juniors, in such a manner as to divide them into centuries after they had sworn allegiance to him.
[7]
The army, when raised and equipped with arms, he divided into three parts. One part he opposed to Etruria in the Veientian territory; another he ordered to pitch their camp before the city.
[8]
A military tribune, Aulus Manlius, commanded the latter; those who were sent against the Etrurians, Lucius Aemilius commanded. The third part he led in person against the Volscians; and not far from Lanuvium, (the place is called ad Maecium,) he set about storming their camp.
[9]
Into these, who set out to the war from motives of contempt, because they thought that all the Roman youth were cut off by the Gauls, the fact of having heard that Camillus was appointed to the command struck such terror, that they fenced themselves with a rampart, and the rampart itself with trees piled up together, lest the enemy might by any means reach to the works.
[10]
When Camillus observed this, he ordered fire to be thrown into the fence opposed to him; and it so happened that a very strong wind was turned towards the enemy.
[11]
He therefore not only opened a passage by the fire, but the flames being directed against the camp, by the vapour also and the smoke, and by the crackling of the green timber as it burned, he so confounded the enemy that the Romans had less diffi- [p. 394]culty in passing the rampart into the camp of the Volscians, than they had experienced in climbing over the fence which had been consumed by the fire.
[12]
The enemy being routed and cut down, after the dictator had taken the camp by assault, he gave up the booty to the soldiers, which was so much the more agreeable, as it was less expected, the commander being by no means profusely generous.
[13]
Then having pursued them in their flight, after he had depopulated the entire Volscian land, he at length in the seventieth year forced the Volscians to a surrender.
[14]
After his victory he passed from the Volscians to the Aequans, who were also preparing for hostilities: he surprised their army at Bolae, and having attacked not only their camp, but their city also, he took them at the first onset.
Livy. History of Rome by Titus Livius, the first eight Books. literally translated, with notes and illustrations, by. D. Spillan. York Street, Covent Garden, London. Henry G. Bohn. John Child and son, printers. 1857. 1.
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