[435c]
in his soul, and by
reason of identical affections of these with those in the city to receive
properly the same appellations.” “Inevitable,”
he said. “Goodness gracious,” said I, “here is
another trifling1 inquiry
into which we have plunged, the question whether the soul really contains
these three forms in itself or not.” “It does not seem
to me at all trifling,” he said, “for perhaps, Socrates,
the saying is true that 'fine things are difficult.'2” “Apparently,” said I;
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