Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 25
Frank Gardener Moore, Professor Emeritus in Columbia University, Ed.

38. But for fear an unexpected action, and alarm in the night and a plan no longer in keeping with his present situation, might bring confusion, he thought he must address his soldiers and encourage them, called an assembly and spoke as follows: [2] "Either my devotion to our commanders, living and dead, or the present situation of us all, soldiers, can convince any one that this high command, though a great honour as your tribute, is yet in fact a burden to me and an anxious care. [3] For at a time when, if fear did not paralyse grief, I should scarcely have such self-control as would enable me to find some comfort for distress of mind, I am compelled —a most difficult thing in sorrow —alone to plan for all of you. [4] And even when I must consider how I may be able to save these remnants of two armies [p. 485]for our country, I may not turn my thoughts away¹ from unremitting grief. [5] For a bitter memory is present with me, and both Scipios trouble me all day and all night with anxiety and loss of sleep, and often arouse me from slumber, bidding me not to allow either themselves or their soldiers, your comrades, undefeated in this land for eight years,² or the state, to go unavenged. [6] And they command me to follow their teachings and their methods, and, just as while they lived not a man was more obedient to their [7??] orders than I, so after their death to hold that to be the best course which in each case I am confident they would have done. As for you, soldiers, I would have you also honour them, not with lamentations and tears as though dead. [8] They live and work by the glory of their achievements. But whenever you shall remember them, just as if you saw them encouraging you and giving the signal, —in that spirit would I have you go into battle. [9] It was surely no other image which presented itself yesterday to your eyes and minds and brought about that notable battle, by which [10??] you gave the enemy proof that the Roman name has not been extinguished with the Scipios, and that the people whose might and courage were not overwhelmed by the disaster at Cannae will surely survive any cruelty of Fortune.

[11] “At present, because you have of your own accord shown such daring, I should like to find how much you have when your general gives the command. For yesterday, when I sounded the recall, as you in disorder were pursuing the routed enemy, it was not my wish to crush your boldness, but to reserve it for higher fame and a more favourable situation, that [p. 487]later, being [12??] well prepared and armed, you might be³ able, as opportunity offered, to attack the unprepared and unarmed, and even the sleeping. And not haphazard or at random do I cherish a hope of this opportunity, soldiers, but from the actual situation. [13] You too, if someone should ask how you, a few men, have defended your camp against many, the vanquished against the victors, would surely give no other answer than that, fearing just that, you had kept everything in a state of defence and also had been in readiness yourselves and inline. [14] And the fact is this: men are least protected against the thing which success leads them not to fear, since what one has made light of remains unguarded and uncovered. [15] There is nothing in the world which the enemy now fear less than that we, who have ourselves just been beset and attacked, may venture to attack their camp. Let us dare what it is incredible that we should dare; for the very reason that it appears most difficult it will be easier. In the third watch of the night I shall lead you in a silent column. [16] I am assured that there is no relieving of sentries, no regular outposts. The sound of a shout at the gate and a first assault will at once capture the camp. [17] Then, among men dazed with sleep and alarmed at the unexpected uproar and surprised unarmed in their beds, let there be the slaughter from which you were recalled yesterday under protest. I know it seems a bold plan. But in dangerous and desperate situations the bravest decisions are always the safest. [18] For if at the opportune moment, whose advantage swiftly passes, one hesitates even a little, it is vain for one to look later for the neglected opportunity. One army is near, two not far away. If we attack now there is [p. 489]no little hope, and already you have tried your strength⁴ and theirs. [19] If we put off the day and owing to the report of yesterday's sally come to be no longer despised, there is danger that all the generals and all the forces may combine. [20] Shall we then withstand the enemy's three generals, three armies, which Gnaeus Scipio with his army still undiminished did not withstand? Just as through dividing their forces our generals perished, so the enemy, if divided and in different places, can be overpowered. [21] There is no other way of conducting the war. Therefore let us wait for nothing beyond the favourable moment to-night. [22] Go with the kind aid of the gods, put yourselves in condition, that, sound and strong, you may burst into the camp of the enemy with the same spirit with which you defended yours.”

With joy they heard of the new plan from their new commander, and the bolder it was the more it pleased them. [23] The rest of the day was spent in putting their arms in order and themselves in condition; and the larger part of the night was given to rest. At the fourth watch they started.