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Browsing named entities in a specific section of The Daily Dispatch: December 11, 1863., [Electronic resource]. Search the whole document.

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Charleston Harbor (South Carolina, United States) (search for this): article 13
The delays that have ensued since Sumter was deprived of its teeth seem to indicate that the future gives no promise of better fruition than the past. Let it be repeated — we doubt whether the monitors will attempt to run the gauntlet into Charleston harbor. All they can accomplish will be to burn Charleston; they cannot destroy the batteries that defend it, but they can burn the city — and Gen. Gillmore can certainly do that from Cummings's Point, without exposing our Iron-clads to the prospect of loss. In fact, the blockade of Charleston harbor being perfect, any other game is not worth the powder, and the public may as well cease to expect any news of any such success as it has been led to hope for. And why should Charleston be burned? What military advantage would we gain by burning that abominable rebel city? Unless we can take possession of the ground on which it stands, we achieve or acquire nothing by its destruction. For assuredly in no case could we be guilty of
Sullivan's Island (South Carolina, United States) (search for this): article 13
could not well be transported to the ruin and mounted, under the fire of the numerous rebel batteries that line Sullivan's Island and Fort Johnson. Even if guns were successfully placed in position, we should be but five hundred yards nigher the city than now; and Parrott rifles throw into it with perfect ease from Cummings's Point, where they are already established. Nor does it seem that Sumter can be so easily taken as some have thought.--Not only are Port Johnson and the works on Sullivan's Island armed with very heavy batteries, but the shores of the city and even its wharves are mounted with the heaviest guns in possession of the Confederates. Against these the army has no power whatever to act. One assault has already been made upon the ruin with very unsatisfactory results — the whole party fell into a decided trap, and any other would probably share the same fate. Although harmless for the offence, it still has resistive power of a very strong character. The lower tier o
Port Johnson (Alaska, United States) (search for this): article 13
perate upon Charleston; for they could not well be transported to the ruin and mounted, under the fire of the numerous rebel batteries that line Sullivan's Island and Fort Johnson. Even if guns were successfully placed in position, we should be but five hundred yards nigher the city than now; and Parrott rifles throw into it with perfect ease from Cummings's Point, where they are already established. Nor does it seem that Sumter can be so easily taken as some have thought.--Not only are Port Johnson and the works on Sullivan's Island armed with very heavy batteries, but the shores of the city and even its wharves are mounted with the heaviest guns in possession of the Confederates. Against these the army has no power whatever to act. One assault has already been made upon the ruin with very unsatisfactory results — the whole party fell into a decided trap, and any other would probably share the same fate. Although harmless for the offence, it still has resistive power of a very str
Cumming's Point (South Carolina, United States) (search for this): article 13
it no better were Sumter in our possession. Nor, if captured, would it be practicable to put there the heavy guns that would be needed to operate upon Charleston; for they could not well be transported to the ruin and mounted, under the fire of the numerous rebel batteries that line Sullivan's Island and Fort Johnson. Even if guns were successfully placed in position, we should be but five hundred yards nigher the city than now; and Parrott rifles throw into it with perfect ease from Cummings's Point, where they are already established. Nor does it seem that Sumter can be so easily taken as some have thought.--Not only are Port Johnson and the works on Sullivan's Island armed with very heavy batteries, but the shores of the city and even its wharves are mounted with the heaviest guns in possession of the Confederates. Against these the army has no power whatever to act. One assault has already been made upon the ruin with very unsatisfactory results — the whole party fell into a d
Cummings (search for this): article 13
o not believe that the monitors will undertake this task. The delays that have ensued since Sumter was deprived of its teeth seem to indicate that the future gives no promise of better fruition than the past. Let it be repeated — we doubt whether the monitors will attempt to run the gauntlet into Charleston harbor. All they can accomplish will be to burn Charleston; they cannot destroy the batteries that defend it, but they can burn the city — and Gen. Gillmore can certainly do that from Cummings's Point, without exposing our Iron-clads to the prospect of loss. In fact, the blockade of Charleston harbor being perfect, any other game is not worth the powder, and the public may as well cease to expect any news of any such success as it has been led to hope for. And why should Charleston be burned? What military advantage would we gain by burning that abominable rebel city? Unless we can take possession of the ground on which it stands, we achieve or acquire nothing by its dest
Sullivan (search for this): article 13
approach and mode of operation. And what military object is to be gained by its capture? We already perfectly command the entrance to the harbor, so that blockade-running has entirely ceased; we could command it no better were Sumter in our possession. Nor, if captured, would it be practicable to put there the heavy guns that would be needed to operate upon Charleston; for they could not well be transported to the ruin and mounted, under the fire of the numerous rebel batteries that line Sullivan's Island and Fort Johnson. Even if guns were successfully placed in position, we should be but five hundred yards nigher the city than now; and Parrott rifles throw into it with perfect ease from Cummings's Point, where they are already established. Nor does it seem that Sumter can be so easily taken as some have thought.--Not only are Port Johnson and the works on Sullivan's Island armed with very heavy batteries, but the shores of the city and even its wharves are mounted with the heavi
Gillmore (search for this): article 13
ly to lead to grief. The further progress of operations in the harbor is now, as before, a question for the monitors. It was intended that they should pass these batteries — If they have not done so, certainly no fault can be found with Gen. Gillmore for the failure.--And we do not believe that the monitors will undertake this task. The delays that have ensued since Sumter was deprived of its teeth seem to indicate that the future gives no promise of better fruition than the past. Let it be repeated — we doubt whether the monitors will attempt to run the gauntlet into Charleston harbor. All they can accomplish will be to burn Charleston; they cannot destroy the batteries that defend it, but they can burn the city — and Gen. Gillmore can certainly do that from Cummings's Point, without exposing our Iron-clads to the prospect of loss. In fact, the blockade of Charleston harbor being perfect, any other game is not worth the powder, and the public may as well cease to expect an<