Forbes magazine discusses my views on animal enhancement

Alex Knapp of Forbes magazine asks, "Is It Ethical to Make Animals As Smart As People?," and takes my position to task:

Dvorsky and other pro-uplift advocates have argued that we have a moral imperative to make other species as intelligent as we are once we have the means. However, given the above, one thing that should be abundantly clear is that even if we come up with a technique to create chimps, parrots, or dolphins with human-level intelligence, we are almost certainly not going to be take any current, adult animals and uplift them. Changes as profound as those needed to make those species intelligent, from the neurological to the biochemical, are going to have to be made to the embryo, if not even before that in the egg and sperm. So what happens to the animals that are left behind? They’re almost certainly not going to be able to produce offspring with their uplifted counterparts – there’ll be too many changes. Their uplifted counterparts are likely going to be a separate, reproductively-incompatible species.

So the adults will be just as they are, living lives as they did before. Which means procreating as they did before – and that leads to a problem for uplift advocates. Namely, for example, if we uplift chimps, do we let the adults procreate? Well, letting chimps continue in an “un-uplifted” state seems to defeat the purpose of uplifting them to begin with, right? On the other hand, if we sterilize them, we’re dooming a species to extinction for no reason other than we don’t think they’re smart enough. I’d argue that we wouldn’t have the right to to sterilize them and cause them to go extinct, and I can’t think of a good argument on the other side. So now we’re trapped in a bizarre ethical paradox that begs the question of why there’s a moral obligation to uplift in the first place. Given that the alternative is to essentially doom a species to extinction, I think it’s safe to argue that an “uplift imperative” doesn’t exist.

Absent that obligation to uplift other species, then I’d argue other ethical factors outweigh pursuing the project in the first place.

Read more.

Wired's unethical experiments: The Ape Man

Wired recently published an article titled, "Seven Creepy Experiments That Could Teach Us So Much (If They Weren’t So Wrong)." Among their picks is the creation of an "ape man" that would come about through cross-breeding a human with a chimpanzee:

The premise:
The great biologist Stephen Jay Gould called it “the most potentially interesting and ethically unacceptable experiment I can imagine.” The idea? Mating a human with a chimp. His interest in this monstrosity grew out of his work with snails, closely related species of which can display wide variation in shell architecture. Gould attributed this diversity to a few master genes, which turn on and off the shared genes responsible for constructing the shells. Perhaps, he speculated, the large visible differences between humans and apes were also a factor of developmental timing. He pointed out that adult humans have physical traits, such as larger craniums and wide-set eyes, that resemble infant chimpanzees, a phenomenon known as neoteny—the retention of juvenile traits in adults. Gould theorized that over the course of evolution, a tendency toward neoteny might have helped give rise to human beings. By watching the development of a half-human, half-chimp, researchers could explore this theory in a firsthand (and truly creepy) way.

How it works:
It would probably be frighteningly easy: The same techniques used for in vitro fertilization would likely yield a viable hybrid human-chimp embryo. (Researchers have already spanned a comparable genetic gap in breeding a rhesus monkey with a baboon.) Chimps have 24 pairs of chromosomes, and humans 23, but this is not an absolute barrier to breeding. The offspring would likely have an odd number of chromosomes, though, which might make them unable to reproduce themselves. As for the gestation and birth, it could be done the natural way. Chimpanzees are born slightly smaller than humans, on average—around 4 pounds—and so comparative anatomy would argue for growing the embryo in a human uterus.

The payoff:
Gould’s idea about neoteny remains controversial, to say the least. “It got a lot of scrutiny and has been disproved in many ways,” says Daniel Lieberman, a Harvard professor of human evolutionary biology. But Alexander Harcourt, professor emeritus of anthropology at UC Davis, regards neoteny as “still a viable concept.” This forbidden experiment would help to resolve that debate and, in a broader sense, illuminate how two species with such similar genomes could be so different. Its outcome would take biologists deep into the origin of the species we care about most: ourselves. Let’s just hope we can find a less disturbing route to get there.

Over 150 human-animal hybrids grown in UK in past three years

Wow, the Daily Mail is reporting that over 150 human-animal hybrids have been grown in UK labs since 2008, the same year the Brits passed the Human Fertilisation Embryology Act allowing for this kind of research. For some reason these transgenic embryos have been produced secretively for the past three years.

Specifically, the scientists produced animal eggs fertilised by a human sperm, ‘cybrids’, in which a human nucleus is implanted into an animal cell, and ‘chimeras’, in which human cells are mixed with animal embryos.

The purpose of the research is to develop embryonic stem cells which can be used to treat a range of incurable illnesses.

It's worth noting that human-animal hybrids are also created in other countries, many of which have little or no regulation.

Uplift fears: Scientists warn of 'Planet of the Apes' scenario

Wow, animal uplift just got a little bit more real: a recent report from the Academy of Medical Science suggests that action is needed now to prevent nightmarish "Planet Of The Apes" science ever turning from fiction to fact. The report calls for a new rules to supervise sensitive research that involves humanising animals:

One area of concern is "Category Three" experiments which may raise "very strong ethical concerns" and should be banned. An example given is the creation of primates with distinctly human characteristics, such as speech. Exactly the same scenario is portrayed in the new movie Rise Of The Planet Of The Apes, in which scientists searching for an Alzheimer's cure create a new breed of ape with human-like intelligence. The report also acknowledges the "Frankenstein fear" that humanising animals might lead to the creation of "monsters".

Currently research involving great apes, such as chimpanzees, is outlawed in the UK. But it continues in many other countries including the US, and British scientists are permitted to experiment on monkeys. Professor Thomas Baldwin, a member of the Academy of Medical Sciences working group that produced the report, said the possibility of humanised apes should be taken seriously.

"The fear is that if you start putting very large numbers of human brain cells into the brains of primates suddenly you might transform the primate into something that has some of the capacities that we regard as distinctively human.. speech, or other ways of being able to manipulate or relate to us," he told a news briefing in London.

"These possibilities that are at the moment largely explored in fiction we need to start thinking about now."

Prof Baldwin, professor of philosophy at the University of York, recommended applying the "Great Ape Test". If modified monkeys began to acquire abilities similar to those of chimpanzees, it was time to "hold off".

"If it's heading in that direction, red lights start flashing," said Prof Baldwin. "You really do not want to go down that road."

Okay,  I'm just as concerned as anyone about the potential for abuse, particularly when animals are used in scientific experiments. But setting that aside, and assuming that cognitive enhancement could be done safely on non-human primates, there's no reason why we should fear this. In fact, I take virtually the opposite stance to this report. I feel that humanity is obligated to uplift non-human animals as we simultaneously work to uplift ourselves (i.e. transhumanism).

Reading this report, I can't help but feel that human egocentricity is driving the discussion. I sincerely believe that animal welfare is not the real issue here, but rather, ensuring human dominance on the planet.

Ultimately, we have to ask ourselves, why wouldn't we wish to endow our primate cousins with the same cognitive gifts that we have? Human intelligence and complex language skills are our most prized attributes. The time is coming when we'll be ale to share these capacities with other animals.

Paul Root Wolpe: It's time to question bio-engineering [TED]

At TEDxPeachtree, bioethicist Paul Root Wolpe describes an astonishing series of recent bio-engineering experiments, from hybrid pets to mice that grow human ears. He asks: isn't it time to set some ground rules?

I hate talks like this. Wolpe spends the first 17 minutes treading on painfully familiar (and tired) territory and the last two minutes asking the wrong questions. And worst of all, he offers absolutely no answers or directions in terms of next steps. Weak.

Matt Lamkin says a ban on cognitive enhancers is not cool

Lawyer and bioethicist Matt Lamkin makes the case that a ban on brain-boosters is not the answer:

While rates of drinking among college students have been relatively steady in recent years, nontherapeutic use of prescription drugs has soared—now second only to marijuana as a form of illicit drug use. Research by Alan D. DeSantis, a professor of communication at the University of Kentucky who has studied ADHD-stimulant use in fraternities, suggests that 34 percent of the university's undergraduates have used stimulants like Ritalin and Adderall as study aids. According to DeSantis, that number rises the longer students are in college, and nearly 60 percent of Kentucky's juniors and seniors have used "neuroenhancers."

Concerned observers of this trend, most notably at Britain's Academy of Medical Sciences, have characterized the use of "study drugs" as a form of cheating, akin to the use of steroids in sports. Having diagnosed the problem as an issue of unfair competition, the academy has called on universities to consider banning the use of cognition-enhancing drugs by healthy students. This past October, Wesleyan University did just that, amending its student code of conduct to recognize "misuse" of prescription drugs as a violation of the college's prohibition against receiving "improper assistance" in completing academic work.

He concludes:

[C]olleges need to encourage students to engage in the practice of education rather than to seek shortcuts. Instead of ferreting out and punishing students, universities should focus on restoring a culture of deep engagement in education, rather than just competition for credentials...

...If universities instead choose to enact blanket prohibitions on the use of study drugs by healthy students, it would be more sensible to enforce such a policy through honor codes than through measures such as urine testing, as the Academy of Medical Sciences has proposed. Unlike a policing approach, honor codes ask students to internalize values that are important to education and to character in general. Although students who violate honor codes face sanctions, the primary aim is not to deter improper conduct with threats, but to persuade students that to breach the code is to betray themselves. If colleges believe that enhancing cognition with drugs deprives students of the true value of education, they must encourage students to adopt that value as their own.

Fertility clinics to be regulated by Canadian provinces

Important changes made today to Canadian biolegislation: It will now be up to individual provinces to draw up a new legislative scheme to regulate fertility treatments and embryonic research after the supreme court declared it a provincial, not a federal, responsibility. It will now be up to provinces to control the licensing of doctors and clinics and to regulate how they deal with donors and would-be parents, or with eggs, sperms or embryos for research purposes, including developing new genetic therapies for disease.

This is good news and will prove to be beneficial for fertility clinics and research specialists. Individual provinces will be able to focus on and promote more focused and specific lines of research. It will also reduce the need for Canadians to go about the "medical tourist" route.

That said, certain federal criminal bans still stand: It is still illegal to pay for surrogacy, and the federal government may limit reimbursements to donors and surrogates for expenses only, although the federal government has never defined an allowable expense. Ottawa may still legislate mandatory written consent of donors; a ban on extracting eggs or sperm from persons under 18 except to preserve their fertility; and a prohibition on human-animal hybrids.

Still, it's progress.

Not so superficial: Rethinking cosmetic enhancements

Are you superficial for wanting to look
like this? (Alessandra Ambrosio)

A few weeks ago at the Center for Inquiry's Transforming Humanity Conference, bioethicist Patrick Hopkins warned about the potential for cosmetic enhancements to take precedence over more meaningful morphological and cognitive modifications. Referring to this kind of human form as the "barbie body," Hopkins dismissed cosmetic enhancements as being merely surface level and superficial. These sorts of enhancements, argued Hopkins, were more about attaining a sexual ideal than escaping limitations of the human body. For those individuals overly concerned with aesthetic enhancements, said Hopkins, they have interpreted their bodies as objects that can be whipped into shape to conform to the mind's ideal so that they can feel a certain way about themselves. Hopkins called this a "shallow" human approach.

I took Hopkins to task on this position during the Q&A portion of his session. Specifically, I argued that cosmetic and aesthetic enhancements are no more or less legitimate than another sorts of modifications, including cognitive enhancements.

First, superficiality is in the eye of the beholder. As an example, our society fetishizes intelligence, which in turn legitimizes the collective desire for smarter people. While I realize that this sentiment is not universally shared, particularly the part about actually going about cognitive enhancements, we tend to celebrate those among us who have higher than average intelligence—and not necessarily for all the right reasons. The one-upmanship of intelligence and academic success can be just as superficial or pernicious as any beauty contest; the vanity of "I'm smarter than you" is no different than "I'm prettier than you."

Or this? (Ryan Reynolds)

Moreover, our society has, particularly over the past century, de-legitimized the concept of human beauty. We are told that looks don't matter–that what counts is on the inside. While we still celebrate beauty in the form of celebrity-worship, we are constantly reminded that at our own level beauty is only skin deep and that the overt quest to be more beautiful is misguided and shallow—hence the stigma against everything from fitness competitors through to plastic surgery.

There was once a time when beauty was celebrated for beauty's sake. Dostoyevsky noted that "Beauty will save the world." While he was likely referring to works of art and other achievements of humanity, this sentiment can be applied to any effort in which a person seeks to create aesthetic or functional beauty—including the desire to improve, if not perfect, one's outward physical appearance. In the same way that we appreciate a pretty melody, we also appreciate a pretty face; these are, at the root, psychological experiences that we value—subjective experiences that we actively work to refine and bring about.

Today, only a very few of us openly advocate for more physical beauty in the world—and often at considerable risk. Back in 2003, James Watson, the co-discoverer of DNA, caused an academic stir when he suggested that genetic engineering should be used to make all women beautiful. "People say it would be terrible if we made all girls pretty," he said, "I think it would be great." Watson is not alone, of course, as other thinkers, including futurist Natasha Vita-More, have suggested that we use our biotechnologies to reshape our bodies, including for the purposes of cosmetic enhancement.

Secondly, in addition to the more philosophical or aesthetic arguments in favour of legitimizing cosmetic enhancement, a strong case can be made that it also serves as a functional enhancement as well. Drawing from posthuman theory—the idea that the line separating the body from its environment is becoming increasingly blurred—it is clear that our outward appearance has a profound impact on our daily lives, including our ability to succeed and thrive in certain contexts.

Beauty, like intelligence, confers certain advantages in competitive spaces. Quite obviously, attractive people will be more successful in attracting other beautiful people. That's just the way it is. And if this is the extent to why a person desires to be more attractive, than so be it.

But beauty extends much further than mate selection. Certain jobs, for example, require specific physical attributes. Some employers are looking for smart people, others attractive people. For those who desire jobs in which their physical appearance is of the utmost importance, they should be allowed access to those tools that will help them achieve their goals—whether they be seeking a job as a model or as a salesperson.

Further, beauty has a deeper impact than just helping a person feel better about themselves or in getting a job. Attractive people have a profound impact on the psychologies of those around them. Recent studies have shown, for example, that the presence of pretty women cause men to make riskier decisions. If this isn't an advantage, I don't know what is; this 'power over people' is in no way qualitatively different than any other kind of cognitive or morphological attribute, and should thus be considered en par with any other kind of human capacity in terms of its ability to be augmented.

Lastly, a world in which everyone is "beautiful" could be a potentially wonderful thing (I use scare quotes because there could never really be such a thing given the subjective and cultural nature of physical beauty). I still believe there would be considerable variation in human appearance, but it would give everyone the opportunity to operate on a more level playing field. Ubiquitous access to safe and effective cosmetic enhancements would essentially eliminate the beauty gap—a gap that is currently created by the arbitrariness of the genetic lottery.  People who are "naturally" beautiful are in no way entitled to a monopoly.

And no matter how hard we try at convincing unattractive people that their looks don't matter, the brutal truth is that most of these people feel inadequate or unfulfilled in certain ways. This is potentially yet another way for us to eliminate individual suffering—the elimination of the unactualized physical self.

Consequently, in a world where everyone is beautiful, we will simultaneously be able to enjoy it and move past it so that we can get on with some of the more important and meaningful aspects of life and existence.

Maxwell Mehlman: "Extinction by Design: Genetic Engineering and the Future of Human Evolution" [transforming humanity conference]

Maxwell Mehlman presenting "Extinction by Design: Genetic Engineering and the Future of Human Evolution."

Can genetic engineering make things worse? Possibly. Think of unintended consequences visavis global warming. We have no idea if guided evolution would be any worse or better than unchecked evolution. Misguided evolutionary engineering could cause irrevocable harm. What would be worse would be the extinction of the human strain altogether.

The destruction of the human lineage would make it impossible for us to achieve our goals.

Some guidelines:

1. Do not harm children - Parents should not be allowed to genetically engineering their children so that they are exposed to serious risk, serious bodily or mental harm or impairment that is not outweighed by the potential benefit to the child
2. Do not permit state-sponsored, unethical genetic engineering (i.e. eugenics)
3. Do not terminate the human lineage (habitat loss, genetic drift, environmental catastrophe, inbreeding, extremely large body sizes, inability to reproduce, loss of genetic diversity, introduction of rival species)
4. Do not stifle progress toward understanding the universe

Katherine Drabiak-Syed: "Reining in the Psychopharmacological Enhancement Train" [transforming humanity conference]

Katherine Drabiak-Syed presenting "Reining in the Psychopharmacological Enhancement Train."

Off-label use of drugs like Modafinil is an increasing problem. The misappropriate of use for these drugs endangers the user. But the pressure for enhancement is ingrained. Our future population may be stuck in overdrive.

As the military  has shown, use of these sorts of stimulants is starting to become a job requirement. [What about truck drivers?] Modafinil has not been FDA approved for these sorts of stimulant off-label use purposes. It is not indicated for use for healthy individuals. The drug will produce side-effects, including some psychiatric problems. And then there's the whole issue of acquired dependancy.

Physicians are thus putting their patients at risk when prescribing these sorts of drugs for off-label use purposes. They should be working to alleviate recognized conditions, and not acquiescing to the lifestyle desires of their patient.

People have fallen prey to the rat-race mentality of society in their quest to be super productive.

Monika Piotrowska: "Causes that make a Moral Difference: Examining the moral status of the Human Neuron Mouse" [transforming humanity conference]

Monika Piotrowska presenting, "Causes that make a Moral Difference: Examining the moral status of the Human Neuron Mouse."

Should we be troubled by introduction of human traits into animals?

Mice should be judged based on their characteristics rather than on the types of cells, e.g. human or dolphin.

Another question is that, if we give a non-human animal a human trait (e.g. human DNA), do we change their moral standing?

The origins of the characteristic -- the causal history -- does matter to some people and their allocation of moral standing on an animal. The rejection of this premise is uncontroversial in ethics circles, but can influence the perspective of laypersons. E.g. a mouse has acquired an identical trait from a dolphin and from a human. Ethical discourse suggests the mouse's moral standing has not changed as the trait is identical and the source (ie causal history) doesn't matter.

That said, the law often does make distinctions between the status of things on the basis of their origins, even if they are identical.

Should we not ignore causal histories altogether? We may choose to do so based on an epistemological perspective.

Arguments by analogy: We can infer the existence of something. E.g. we can infer that rats can feel pain.

Consequently, if we endow/uplift a non-human animal with a particular human trait (one we can understand functionally), and we observe the animal exhibiting/utilizing that same trait, we have to infer (epistomologically) that it has acquired the human capacity.

These arguments are weaker than evidence-based arguments. It's a kind of intuitive best guess.

Morally relevant capacities: some are harder to test than others. Thus, we should be prepare to use both kind of deduction methods.

Ronald Lindsay: "The Ethics of Enhancements: Spurious Concerns and Genuine Uncertainties" [CFI conference on biomedical enhancements]

Ronald Lindsay now presenting: "The Ethics of Enhancements: Spurious Concerns and Genuine Uncertainties."

Enhancements augments an existing capacity, or introduces a new capacity altogether. Improvement responds to the statistically normal range for humans with that existing capacity.

Arguments against

Michael Sandel has argued that enhancements manifest a misguided quest for mastery and threaten to destroy an appreciated of the "gifted" character of life. "Giftedness" is the sense that we are limited, that who we are exceeds our control. Sandel is mistaken that enhancements would deprive us of that sense. Whether or not giftedness is a fundamental human good, enhancements will not eliminate contingencies. We will not be able to control events that affect us. We will not be able to control our initial conditions - no control over the circumstances of our birth. We are and always will be thrown into this world. Our existence will remain gifted by our existence.

Leon Kass has argued that enhancements will cause a loss of authenticity, a sense of achievement. "Accomplishments" will be meaningless. Short-cuts provided by enhancement will trivialize our accomplishments. This claim ignores the long history of (external) enhancements. They have not destroyed our sense of accomplishment. No matter what one's capabilities, one still has to apply one's knowledge. Changing the means to accomplish the goal does not diminish the goal. There will always be goals that will motivate us and prove challenging.

Fukuyama, McKibben: Enhancements are "unnatural" and threaten to destroy human nature. It is the "nature" of individuals, not the human race as a whole, which is most subject to change. Most enhancements will not implicate any change to the nature of an individual because improved capacities still will be recognizably human. What is wrong with changing our nature? Is our current mix of capacities the optimal mix? It is not immediately clear that the increase of a human capacity will alter what it means to be human or a person's nature. Why is chance so much better than choice such that the latter can be considered immoral? We don't like spinning the roulette wheel.

Can we survive the uncertain changes to society that enhancements may cause? What little experience we have with enhancements suggests we can. Take birth control for example. Moreover, the beneficial social consequences may be enormous.

These arguments fail to eliminate enhancements as a viable option.

Should internal/intrinsic enhancements be developed and regulated in the same was external enhancements are (external enhancements being things like iPads and other technological tools).

Arguments against

Case-by-case evaluation of enhancements is required. One problem: we have no substnative experience in evaluating enhancements qua enhancements. We are not even at first base in determining how they might be regulated.

Enhancements now available were developed and tested as therapies, but the therapy model may not work. Risk-benefit analysis for therapies assumes the therapy will help restore "normal" functioning. Enhancements are not needed for normal functioning, so arguably any risk is too great.

Private sector will not invest substantial resources in the development of enhancements until it is assured an appropriate regulatory framework is in place. Presumably this implies a regulatory framework that is not disease-centered.

Besides the possible toxicity of an enhancements, many other factors need to be considered in evaluating and enhancement has on other capacities, the consequences of using the enhancement....

In addition, various long-term effects need to be considered, such as effects on productivity, allocation of resources, social and political relations, individual rights, aggregate welfare, and future generations.

Does enhancement improve well-being? Not always the case.

Fears and concerns about social divisions and nightmare scenarios

Emergence of a class of super-enhanced individuals who dominate the unenhanced.

Two presumptions about the distribution of enhancements: first, enhancements should be made widely available; second, the fact that enhancements may not be available for all by itself does not provide a reason for denying enhancements to some. Beyond this, we can't say much with confidence.

It's been said the enhanced class poses a risk to liberal democracy.

Would domination of the unenhanced by posthumans be unjust? The relationship may lie outside the bounds of justice. To begin, a world with a stark division between unenhanced and posthuman beings is highly unlikely. However such a scenario arguably lies outside the bounds of justice. Consider: We are not required to form bonds of cooperation with nonhuman animals and treat them as equals. There may be no reason for posthumans to form relations with humans; doing so may be seen as a hindrance. Humans and posthumans are unlikely to have a shared perspective on justice and compel them to be members of the same community.

At the end of the day, sci-fi scenarios are of little use in the assessment of enhancements.

Ethicists have a constructive role to play provided they stick to real situations and overheated discussions.

Peter Caws: "What is Humanity, that We should be Worried about Transforming It?" [CFI conference on biomedical enhancement]

Peter Caws is presenting, "What is Humanity, that We should be Worried about Transforming It?"

Humans is what humans think it is. No one is human by right of nature, it's defined by us alone, our club alone. Humanity becomes an intentional object in the ontological sense.

Freud noted that, in our quest for omnipotence and omniscience, and as we work to become more god-like, we still find that we are unhappy, troubled and unfilfled. That said, argues Caws, we need to keep the deliberative process going. Reject the transhumanist and bioconservative extravagance and seek the middle path.

Dennis Weiss: "Transforming the Symbolic Animal" [CFI conference on biomedical enhancement]

Dennis Weiss reading from his paper, "Transforming the Symbolic Animal."

Modern man has become a problem to himself. What is the meaning of human existence? A growing suspicion that over the past few centuries man has misjudged his own nature and purpose.

The debate about transforming humanity is nothing new, but has been ramped up in the past twenty years. Central concepts in this debate: technology and human nature.

Addressing the issue of whether transforming humanity suggests a fantasy, dream, or nightmare presupposes a clear philosophical grasp of two terms central to the debate: human nature and technology. And yet this is lacking in the debate over the posthuman. Transhumanists and bioconservatives lack a sufficiently thick and rich framework in which to address these issues. This essay seeks to address this lack, suggesting that Ernst Cassirer's account of the human being as a symbolic animal provides a philosophy of culture, philosophical anthropology, and philosophy of technology that might serve as the building blocks of such a framework.

Key elements of Cassirer's philosophical anthropology and philosophy of technology

(1) Cassirer very explicitly situates the human being and culture in the organic realm.
(2) The distinguishing feature of the human being is not some new feature or property, not some metaphysical essence. The human being's distinctiveness is his work.
(3) Cassirer insists on the diversity of the symbolic forms.
(4) This multiplicity of forms does not denote discord or disharmony and it is precisely the task of philosophy to understand the sytem of culture as an organic whole
(5) Cassirer situates his analysis of technology in the context of his philosophy of symbolic forms and in such a way that it would be inappropriate to conclude that technology represents the alienation of either culture or our nature as symbolic animals
(6) Cassirer was concerned with developments in modern technology that he found antithetical to his analysis of symbolic forms (a) Cassirer worries about the power of technology to usurp other symbolic forms, (b) Cassirer worries about the emergence in the 20th century of new technique of rationalized myth

Cassirer, the symbolic animal and transforming humanity

In turning to Cassirer we gain an understanding of the broader historical framework of the debate over transforming humanity.

The lack of historical awareness in debates over transforming humanity results in completely inadequate accounts of human nature presupposed by bioconservatives and transhumanists alike

In both the bioconservative and transhumanist frameworks the characteristics of human nature are completely unmoored from any other discussion of human capacities or characteristics, any structure of needs and wants

In treating technology as a symbolic form, Cassirer implicitly rejects instrumental and substantive view of technology and points the way toward a critical theory of technology more nuanced than the views often presupposed in transhumanist and bioconservative frameworks.

Cassirer recognizes that the human being is a tool using animal but he doesn't privilege technology nor would he accept a culture that took as its dominant symbolic form technology.

Cassirer's framework provides a perspective from which to understand more precisely the dangers of a culture predicated on the dominance of technosciences such as genetics, cybernetics, and biotechnology; the danger of rationalized myth.

Cassirer's framework helps us to understand and appreciate the complex relationship between human nature, our ethical task, and the normative questions surrounding transforming humanity.

Martha Farah: "Cyborgs, Superminds, and Silliness: What are Real Ethical Challenges for Neural Prosthetics?" [CFI conference on biomedical enhancements]

Martha Farah is now presenting her paper, "Cyborgs, Superminds, and Silliness: What are Real Ethical Challenges for Neural Prosthetics?"

It's time for industries to look at non-pharmacological solutions to neural enhancement. "Gadgetry" as opposed to molecules.

Neural prostheses

Neural prostheses for various purposes.

Brain stimulation via deep brain stimulation, transcranial magnetic stimulation, etc. -- gets certain desired results that can be used for enhancement. Many of these procedures are therapeutic, for things like weight loss and mood control, but they can also be used for enhancements. For example, desired levels of concentration and stimulation.

Brain chips via cochlear implants, retinal prosthesis, motor system interfaces for robotic control, and (eventually) cognitive prostheses ('chippocampus' - the artificial hippocampus).

Ethical challenges

Long term: Transhumanism -- World Transhumanist Association / h+ crowd vs. Fukuyama "most dangerous idea" crowd; hard to anticipate the benefits or problems of these technologies before they're here. It's hard to predict the ways in which people will use them. Some predicted applications may look silly by today's standards, but may not seem so in the future.

Medium term: i.e. when the technologies are routinely used - access to therapeutic BCI and DBS; yuck factor and acceptance of BCI and DBS for less-than-dire conditions; control of inputs and outputs (patient autonomy, involuntary treatment, hackers), choice of applications to develop (e.g. games vs. orphan diseases); enhancement; risk:benefit, fairness, freedom/coercion, etc.

Short term: highly interconnected issues of funding, conflict of interest, IP law, regulation (of clinical trials and practice)

How can we proceed?

We are going to by necessity deal with these short to long term ethical issues in chronological order. We will establish platforms of greater perspective as we move from challenge to challenge. We will see what works and doesn't work.

Adrienne Asch and James Edward Block: "The Mechanization of Politics: Rethinking Human Transformation" [CFI conference on biomedical enhancement]

Adrienne Asch and James Edward Block are presenting: "The Mechanization of Politics: Rethinking Human Transformation."

{Adrienne presents first}

Enhancements are not value neutral; they will not improve society and will likely lead us in a negative direction. We may end up at a place that no one could have predicted.

Hyperparenting can happen outside the context of human enhancement -- but it will make the situation considerably worse.

The parent-child relationship will be altered when enhancement enters the picture because they will expect to see their child fulfill 'genetic' and other expectations. They will do what they can to get the result they aimed at. Asch and Block worry that parents won't love their children as unconditionally when enhancement is part of the equation.

Children need to feel that their achievements were the result of their efforts and individuality. This is jeopardized when kids know they've been enhanced. Children may feel that they've let down their parents if they haven't lived up to the expectations they set up through particular enhancements.

Choice and authenticity are weakened in a world with enhanced children. Genetics will predispose children to seek certain goals, bred for a certain role.

Enhancements endanger reasonable parent-child relationships.

Other values lost in the shuffle: cooperation, sharing, working well in groups. Exclusion and conformity, on the other hand, are the results of an enhanced future.

When it comes to enhanced traits, one thing we value one moment we may dis-value the next (e.g. perfect memory). And do we want a society of extroverts and speed demons? Shyness and constrain can also be seen as worthy traits. Could we fully get the message of a novel or poem if our personalities are constrained to a certain type? Society needs people with a list of many traits.

What is the problem the enhancers are trying to solve? They seem to want more of what we already have (life, physicality, etc.). But this will only work to increase disparities. Enhancement proponents do not see their agenda as part of a broader global social imperative to improve conditions for all people. It's too individualistic. How do we get from 'humans who don't need to sleep' to solving world problems?

Humans and posthumans will never be able to control all the variables of their lives. We will continue to find meaning without enhancement, and continue to help those truly in need without it.

In regards to moral enhancement, we are having difficultly coming to a consensus about what is moral behavior and how we could ever engineer that into human psychology. Moreover, empathy alone without the will to act on it is useless and potentially detrimental to the person. Social reform extends beyond mere empathy.

Don't see how James Hughes's democratic leftist transhumanism can be part of a progressive agenda when there are so many libertarian transhumanists. He hasn't made the case that a coherent and consistent transhumanism (or enhancement politics) is even possible.

{James Edward Block takes over the talk}

Asch and Block are concerned about the over-emphasis on meritocracy. In our quest for inner and outer mastery, we are losing out on relational experience. For example, our baby Einstein grows up to be an adult Einstein; where was the development and growth.

One loves others and the world by first learning to love and respect oneself. When we avoid the early stages we avoid the growth process. We become more vulnerable to falling into the traps of social compliance.

Culture of more is getting out of control, and now extending into the enhancement camp.

We are told that contemporary experience is the enemy of change. And is enhancement seen as a substitute for politics? It's a kind of magical thinking. Enhancement is a fall-back for 19th and 20th century social utopianism.

Our pursuit to control nature has stunted our ability to manage and refine social/political relations.

We are becoming excellent information processors, in tune with our technological environment; As a result we are dead emotionally and morally inside.

How are we so talented in our world, yet feel so inadequate? We need to find new skills and capacities within our existing social and physical bodies. Purpose, not functionality.

Rosemarie Tong: "Feminist Reflections on Looking Better and Living Longer" [CFI conference on biomedical enhancement]

Rosemarie Tong, Professor of Philosophy at UNC-Charlotte, discussing Feminist Reflections on Looking Better and Living Longer.

Betty Friedan's perspective: rejects the idea that to be old is to be spent. She instead presents an integrating process, an opportunity to live properly and make peace with oneself. No longer feeling the need to outdo others, to prove onself, "what does it really matter?"

Cosmetic anti-aging is big business and demand is through the roof.

But there are also biogerontologists. (1) They're working to prolong healthy lifespan; to extend quality of life until shortly before the moment of death, (2) They're looking to increase human lifespan significantly.

One practice is caloric restriction, but it's not likely to catch on. Another approach is in genetic manipulation.

A third group of biogerontologists are looking to halt the aging process altogether.

What do feminists have to say about this? But the problem of feminists is that they're are so many varieties. But for the most part they support the notion that we should improve and extend quality of life into old age. We should also work to ensure that the marginalized have access to these interventions, namely poor people, black people and aboriginals.

Any life-extension breakthrough that is not accompanied by attempts to improve socio-economic disparities is deficient. Also risk that women's caregiving responsibilities will only increase. Far fewer jobs for far fewer people. Perennial beauty trap.

Cosmetic surgery for women now has been so normalized that it's expected. Women are asked, "Why don't you want to look better?"

Tong makes the case that radical life extension may compel people to live indefinitely long lives for fear of what lies in the hereafter. [never heard that argument before]

Repudiation of the body is a repudiation of women. This especially holds true of women and childbirth. Thus, feminists are suspicious of transhumanism. They may "get lost in the translation."

Patrick Hopkins: "On the Variety of Future Bodies" [CFI conference on biomedical enhancement]

Patrick Hopkins is now discussing the variety of future bodies.

There are as of yet no posthumans. But these ideas are not new, nor are they exclusive to the realm of fantasy and sci-fi. We have long imagined ourselves transformed. Our visions and variations of a transformed humanity are voluminous and often informed by the environmental, social and physical conditions we find ourselves in. Thus, there will be differing and conflicting visions of what the human future can and should look like.

Hopkins presents four different visions of humanity's future: Transformations of the body:

• Barbie bodies: Cosmetic and aesthetic enhancements; attaining a sexual idea; often risky procedures; not to escape limitations of the body, but to create an ideal of the body; a superficial ideal of the transformed body; surface level, "about looks"; body seen as an object that one uses and whipped into shape to conform to the mind's ideal so that the person can feel a certain way about themselves; a shallow human approach; but they may also feel that they may succeed more given a certain type of physicality.
• (Francis) Bacon bodies: These transformations are about functionality; to do more human things more often and for a longer time; extends functionality of the body; mimicking what time and nature already do; function cleanly, clearly and effectively -- but not about appearance; a healthy and long-lived body. 
• Nietzsche bodies: A "super body" endowed with characteristics that "normal" humans do not have; man is something that needs to be surpassed; the body is transformed but not the mind; power to impose one's will on the world? Motivated by human emotions. The "super" human approach. 
• Plato bodies: Separation of 'soul' from the body; body seen as the source of all the trouble, something that chains our minds to the body; we want the mind to be free; we would live in a more noble condition if freed from the constraints and influence of the body; transhuman application is uploading or virtual reality; total disembodiment may not be possible, but something very close may be obtained; maybe a "transhuman" approach. 

Idea of transformation is not a unitary thing. 

John Shook: "Philosophical Challenges for a Neuroscience of Moral Enhancements" [CFI conference on biomedical enhancement]

John Shook of the Center for Inquiry is speaking about Philosophical Challenges for a Neuroscience of Moral Enhancements.

What would a moral enhancer do? May mean making a person more 'moral.' Or like a mood enhancer, changing one's inner sense of moral qualities. Or sensitivity to situations. Or wanting to do the right thing more often. But this doesn't necessarily imply a change to conduct. Other fears and desires can have similar effects on behavior.

Issue: Matching internal and external moral standards. Two different things: What I believe is moral, what someone else believes is moral.

Fine tuning of moral enhancers may be required, creating a "boutique" style of moral enhancers. May not represent genuine cases of moral enhancement. These are internal objective standards. We have to go outside to get better moral standards.

Objectivism is one path. Still people will pass their own judgement.

Should we adhere to the majority opinion? Where does culture agree on such things? Can we agree that certain conduct is impermissible? Cultural conventionalism as a way to inform morality.

But what about something like generosity? Do we really mean it?

So objectivism and cultural conventionalism are unsatisfactory.

Perhaps we need a combination of subjectivism and conventionalism.

But what items/subjects are worthy of moral consideration? Sports? Religion? Boutique modifications may not adhere to conventional opinions on what is morally acceptable.

Moral enhancement: How might it actually be done? Could be done in several ways.

1. get the right moral answer
2. enhance judgement of situations morally
3. enhance deliberation of doing the morally right thing
4. enhance the motivation choice to do what moral deliberation indicates
5. enhance volitional power to do the morally right thing
6. enhance the capacity of the act [external]

Problem, there may be no objective, definable moral judgments to begin with. Objective morality exists nowhere. And what are conscious intentions? Are they epiphenomenal? What mechanism in the brain executes the decision? Will and free will?

Brain science discovered will better inform and answer the objections. Outdated notions of decision and volition need to be discarded from the discussion.

Intentionality types; factors for free will:

1. Intentional causality (executive)
2. Deliberate intentionality
3. Thoughtful control (rational)

Do philosophers exaggerate the role that reason plays in decision making? Neuroscientific advances will improve our idea of this and what we mean to be moral agents.

Maya Sabatello: "Controlled Parenthood" [CFI conference on biomedical enhancements]

Maya Sabatello is presenting on controlled parenthood and asks: Are the rights and interests of children being considered when using reproductive technologies?

Sabatello includes such repro-tech as PGD, IVF, gender selection, and so on. The influence on the family institution is "tremendous." It has led to a real change in demographic patterns on family structure. A real boon to those couples who would have normally been infertile. Can also help single mothers, older parents, same-sex couples, and so on.

Assistive repro-tech decisions become a collective effort, and extends beyond the prospective mother and father.

Impact on children include an introduction to a world with increased pluralism. Also, genetic commonality varies depending on the type of repro-tech used (e.g. a child can have three genetic parents). The demography is changing, lots of twins and multiple-births. Children can be born to have specific genetically compatible tissue. Cloning may introduce other options and demographic shifts in the future.

Access to assistive repro-tech is based in specific laws and charters around the world. But what are the limits of using these technologies? Are part and parcel of one's right to found a family. A part of human identification and realization.

Also part of other sociological realities -- e.g. the mother who holds of having children while she establishes a career.

Because parents would have to bear the emotional, financial, and other burdens of raising a disabled child, they deserve the right to access these sorts of these technologies.

But opposition to such broad-strokes of parental freedom exists, including ideas of gender equality, access to healthcare, etc. Some believe that the state has no business ensuring that their citizens have access to repro-tech.

Sabatello feels that some courts are ignoring the interests of children in all this. We need to examine this.

A child-centered approach: There is very little information, unfortunately. Not much to go by, but we have to start investigating.

One argument is that a child deserves a right to an open future. They have some rights in trust, and deserve adult protection until they're of age. This can have an impact on non-traditional arrangements, such as gay parenting.

What about deafness and dwarfism by choice? Is the child better or worse off? Bit of grey area here.

Do some rulings put parental needs in opposition to children's needs? What about thinking of group rights and thinking about the needs of the family as a whole? International rights don't really dwell in this area, but perhaps they should perceive the family as a unit.

We need to figure out how the child's voice can inform the process. Thus, a child-center approach.

Has to start from pre-considerations:

• They don't have the capacity for informed consent
• We also need to take their web of relations into consideration (what's the context?)
• We need to re-conceptualize the notion of autonomy - children's autonomy in relation with others, and can exercise rights in relation to others (as a matter of identity); only space in which a child can express their interests and rights

Is the selection of genetic characteristics medically justified? Can they lead to greater risk of side-effects and defects? We need to educate parents about disability and suffering; inform them about difference between suffering and a disability. These are often social constructs of a specific society.

Unlike adults, children do not view disabilities as abnormal. What matters is how they are treated and the attitudes that are expressed towards them. Some children attribute their 'disability' as a part of their social background more than, say, ethnicity. 

Protection of identity is crucial, and is protected by charter of rights. 

Connection between genetic characteristics and genetic identity. Can this someone impact negatively on a child? E.g. disabled identity? Gender identity? Savior sibling? Is there a less sense of worth? Living in the shadow of the other siblings? 

But too many biological factors are being considered here. What about sociological factors? How are they being socialized and treated by society? Take savior siblings, for example, in which those children are just as loved as any other. 

Stats: No differences in identity were found among children raised by hetero or gay couples. 

Children are born into a reality--the only one they really know.

The genetic tie to the family is weak, and does not matter as much as other factors like ethnicity. 

A greater appreciation of the child's voice should be increasingly considered.