Government Contractor Facing Federal Indictment For Willful Retention Of National Defense Information

The U.S. Justice Department released the below information:

A federal grand jury returned an indictment today charging Harold Thomas Martin III, 52, of Glen Burnie, Maryland, with willful retention of national defense information.

The indictment was announced by Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security Mary McCord, U.S. Attorney Rod J. Rosenstein for the District of Maryland and Special Agent in Charge Gordon B. Johnson of the FBI’s Baltimore Field Office.

“As a private contractor who worked on classified programs at various U.S. government agencies, the defendant was entrusted with access to sensitive government materials," said Acting Assistant Attorney General McCord. “Martin allegedly violated the trust our nation put in him by stealing and retaining classified documents and other material relating to the national defense. Insider threats are a significant danger to our national security and we will continue to work relentlessly with our law enforcement and intelligence partners to identify, pursue and prosecute such individuals.”

“The indictment alleges that for as long as two decades, Harold Martin flagrantly abused the trust placed in him by the government by stealing documents containing highly classified information,” said U.S. Attorney Rosenstein.

"The FBI investigation and this indictment reveal a broken trust from a security clearance holder," said Special Agent Johnson. "Willfully retaining highly classified national defense information in a vulnerable setting is a violation of the security policy and the law, which weakens our national security and cannot be tolerated. The FBI is vigilant against such abuses of trust, and will vigorously investigate cases whenever classified information is not maintained in accordance with the law."

According to the indictment, from December 1993 through Aug. 27, 2016, Martin was employed by at least seven different private companies and assigned as a contractor to work at a number of government agencies. Martin was required to receive and maintain a security clearance in order to work at each of the government agencies to which he was assigned. Martin held security clearances up to Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) at various times, and worked on a number of highly classified, specialized projects where he had access to government computer systems, programs and information, including classified information. Over his many years of holding a security clearance, Martin received training regarding classified information and his duty to protect classified materials from unauthorized disclosure.

The indictment alleges that beginning no earlier than 1996 and continuing through Aug. 27, 2016, Martin stole and retained U.S. government property, including documents that bore markings indicating that they were property of the U.S. and contained highly classified information, including TOP SECRET/SCI. A Top Secret classification means that unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the U.S.

Martin allegedly retained stolen documents containing classified information relating to the national defense at his residence and in his vehicle. Martin knew that the stolen documents contained classified information that related to national defense and that he was never authorized to retain these documents at his residence or in his vehicle.

If convicted, Martin faces a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison for each of the 20 counts of willful retention of national defense information. Martin’s initial appearance is scheduled for 11:00 a.m. on Tuesday, February 14, before U.S. Magistrate Judge A. David Copperthite in U.S. District Court in Baltimore. Martin remains detained.

An indictment is not a finding of guilt. An individual charged by indictment is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty at some later criminal proceedings.

Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security McCord and U.S. Attorney Rosenstein commended the FBI for its work in the investigation and thanked the Maryland State Police for its assistance. Ms. McCord and Mr. Rosenstein thanked Assistant U.S. Attorneys Zachary A. Myers, Nicolas A. Mitchell and Harvey E. Eisenberg for the District of Maryland and Trial Attorney David Aaron of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section, who are prosecuting the case.

Florida Resident Sentenced For Accessing And Removing Classified Information From Military Computers

The U.S. Justice Department released the below information:

Christopher R. Glenn, 34, a South Florida Resident, was sentenced on July 31, 2015, to 120 months of imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release by U.S. District Judge Kenneth A. Marra of the Southern District of Florida following his guilty plea for willful retention of classified national defense information under the Espionage Act, computer intrusion under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and conspiracy to commit naturalization fraud.

Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P. Carlin, U.S. Attorney Wifredo A. Ferrer of the Southern District of Florida and Special Agent in Charge George L. Piro of the FBI’s Miami Field Office made the announcement.

“Christopher Glenn exploited his position as a cleared military contractor and systems administrator to steal classified U.S. military secrets,” said Assistant Attorney General Carlin. “In doing so, he violated the unique trust placed in him by the Department of Defense. Insider threats by trusted employees who exploit computer access are a significant danger to U.S. national security and this sentencing shows it will not be tolerated.”

“The defendant exploited and violated the special trust placed in him as a computer network system administrator working at a United States military base, in order to penetrate the computer system and steal classified materials,” said U.S. Attorney Ferrer. “We will continue to investigate and prosecute insider threats to national security and we will bring those violators to justice.”

According to court records, while working as a computer systems administrator at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras, Glenn accessed a classified Department of Defense network without authorization and removed classified national defense information from Department of Defense and U.S. Southern Command’s (SOUTHCOM’s) Joint Task Force-Bravo, including intelligence reports and military plans. Glenn proceeded to encrypt the files and place them on an Internet-accessible network storage device located in his residence in Honduras.

Glenn also conspired with his wife, Khadraa A. Glenn, 28, to commit naturalization fraud for her benefit by fabricating fraudulent documents and submitting false statements and the documents to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Khadraa A. Glenn previously pleaded guilty to naturalization fraud conspiracy and was sentenced on Oct. 7, 2014.

Assistant Attorney General Carlin and U.S. Attorney Ferrer commended the investigative efforts of the FBI, U.S. Army’s 470thMilitary Intelligence Brigade, U.S. Army’s Criminal Investigations Division, SOUTHCOM, USCIS, IRS-CI, the Department of Homeland Security and the South Florida Joint Terrorism Task Force. The case is being prosecuted by Assistant U.S. Attorney Ricardo Del Toro of the Southern District of Florida and Trial Attorney Christian Ford of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section. 

Naval Station Norfolk Shooting Leaves Sailor, Suspect Dead

 

The U.S. Naval Station Norfolk in Norfolk, Virginia offered the below news release:

 

NORFOLK, Va., Mar. 25, 2014 - A male sailor and a male civilian suspect are dead following a shooting here last night.

Naval security forces killed the suspect.

The incident occurred at about 11:20 p.m. at Pier 1 on board USS Mahan.

No other injuries have been reported. The naval station was put on lockdown as a precautionary measure. The lockdown lasted about 45 minutes.

With the exception of Pier 1, operations have returned to normal. Counselors from Navy Fleet and Family Service Center are on hand.

The shooting and the details surrounding it are under investigation.

Note: The above photos were released by the U.S. Navy.

Investigator Discusses Washington Navy Yard Findings, Insider Threat

Cheryl Pellerin at the American Forces Press Service offers the below piece:

WASHINGTON, Mar. 19, 2014 - The most significant findings of the Navy's own investigation into security, personnel and contracting factors related to the last year's Navy Yard killings involved the insider threat posed by the shooter, contractor Aaron Alexis, the Navy's lead investigator said.

The same findings led to the conclusion that "if appropriate procedures had been followed, they would have interrupted the chain of events that led to the Washington Navy Yard shootings," Navy Adm. John M. Richardson told American Forces Press Service during an interview yesterday.

Shortly after the tragic events that took place Sept. 16, 2013, at Naval Sea Systems Command headquarters, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus appointed Richardson to lead an official investigation in accordance with the Judge Advocate General Manual, or JAGMAN, into the shooting incident that killed 12 people and wounded four others.

Richardson delivered the final report Nov. 8, 2013.

"This report presents recommendations to improve Navy capability against all threats," the executive summary read, "with a focus on the insider threat."

Richardson said the report was organized along five general lines.

"One was the history of Aaron Alexis during his military service and his time as a contractor. Then there was a line of effort that described the personnel security program as it applied to him," he explained.

Other parts of the document discussed force-protection measures at the Navy Yard, physical security and law enforcement measures, incident response and emergency management plans, and the post-incident response to minimize damage and help families of the victims, the admiral added.

Of the report's 14 recommendations, Richardson said the most immediate involved heightening Navy and contractor workforce awareness of requirements for personnel security and physical security, and using the Washington Navy Yard incident and others as case studies in new training materials to help educate the workforce about insider threats.

"We also recommended that each command do a self-assessment of their compliance with existing recommendations. And we recommended that we ensure proper oversight of each command was in place," Richardson said.

For the longer term, he added, the report recommended that related programs be assessed for adequacy in light of new information from the Navy Yard incident, and that JAGMAN investigation findings be sent to the defense secretary for use in Defense Department reviews.

In the report, the admiral said, findings were grouped into three categories. Category A findings were those showing that "if appropriate procedures had been followed, they would have interrupted the chain of events that led to the Washington Navy Yard shootings," Richardson said.

Category B findings showed that if appropriate requirements had been met, it may have interrupted the chain, but it was not definitive, he added, and Category C findings, mostly associated with physical security and emergency response, would not have influenced the chain of events.

"The Category A findings primarily centered on the contractor requirement to report when they have concerns with their employees relative to their suitability to have access to our facilities and our information," Richardson said.

"Both Hewlett Packard and The Experts Inc. were required to make those reports," he added. "They had observed Alexis behave in ways that raised those concerns, but they did not make reports to the Navy or to the security service, and therefore, it was impossible to act on that information."

The Navy's lead investigator added, "Those are the ... the most proximate and relevant findings that, had appropriate procedures been followed, we feel the chain of events would have been interrupted."

The insider threat also was a focus of new actions DOD is taking to fill security gaps identified by internal and external review panels whose members also studied the Navy Yard shootings.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel announced the actions in a press briefing here yesterday.

"The reviews identified troubling gaps in DOD's ability to detect, prevent and respond to instances where someone working for us -– a government employee, a member of our military or a contractor –- decides to inflict harm on this institution and its people," Hagel said.

To close the gaps, DOD will implement a continuous evaluation program of DOD contractors and military and civilian personnel with access to DOD facilities or classified information.

The department also will establish an Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center that analyzes results of automated record checks for follow-up, centralize authority for physical and personnel security under a staff assistant in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, and accelerate development of the Defense Manpower Data Center's identity management enterprise services architecture, called IMESA.

IMESA allows DOD security officers to share access-control information and continuously vet individuals against U.S. government databases.

"The continuous evaluation and IMESA programs have been developmental and pilot programs for some period of time," Marcel Lettre, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for intelligence, said during an interview with American Forces Press Service, "and we recommended those be expanded into full-fledged programs."

The goal with continuous evaluation is over time to change the way the personnel security system runs, he added, "so that it will start with pilot programs on small test pools of DOD employees and over time will encompass the full cleared population of defense employees, about 2.5 million people."

There is a sense that such practices are something the whole of government should aspire to, Lettre said, adding that the director of national intelligence and directors of the Office of Personnel Management and the Office of Management and Budget are responsible for catalyzing that effort.

"The insider threat is complex and multifaceted," Lettre observed. "We've seen different instances of it, ... whether it's an incidence of workplace violence or of computer security or, even going back years, we've traditionally thought of the insider threat as encompassing espionage."

He added, "The tragic events of September 2013 reminded us that the insider threat can be one where a trusted insider enacts violence on his fellow workmates, and that's a dimension that we concluded through these various reviews needs a system that is strengthened to address it in the DOD context."

Navy and DOD reviews of the Navy Yard shootings, Lettre said, "looked at how to strengthen our response on insider threat and focused on a couple of different aspects. One is moving from a system of periodically reinvestigating cleared, trusted insiders to doing that on an appropriate continuous evaluation level."

Second, he said, is to better integrate and consolidate information relevant to identifying an insider threat by establishing a defense insider threat management and analysis center that collects information in one place for investigators and can catalyze training and education needed for the workforce.

The third piece, Lettre said, centralizes responsibility more effectively for security programs under the undersecretary of defense for intelligence, and the fourth establishes a more robust identity management enterprise services architecture that helps force providers address the insider threat.

"What that essentially would do is ensure that databases can talk to each other more effectively," he said, "so if you're a police officer or a security guard at the gate of an installation and a person comes through with an identity card, you'd be able to tell if there's [derogatory] information that would prevent that individual from coming into the base."

What the Navy's lead investigator said he took away from his team's probe of the Washington Navy Yard shootings is that the insider threat is a very difficult problem.

"It requires that all of us be very mindful of our responsibilities to be aware of our surroundings, be aware of the folks we're working with," Richardson said.

"If anything we see raises suspicions or concerns with respect to the security of our colleagues, the security of our equipment, the security of our information, we need to raise those concerns and inform somebody," he said, adding that it may be against human nature sometimes to want to take that step and report such concerns.

"But it will be a critical part of being effective against these types of threats, these insider threats," the admiral said, "so we're going to have to figure out a way to find that balancing point so we can make these concerns more visible."

Note: Navy Secretary Ray Mabus appears in the above DoD photo.

Naval Espionage: Stopping A Dangerous Insider Threat

The FBI web page offers a piece on the arrest and conviction of Robert Patrick Hoffman, an American sailor who attempted to commit espionage.

As a sailor with a top secret clearance, a sensitive job on a submarine, and 20 years of service in the Navy, Robert Hoffman possessed a tremendous amount of knowledge about the U.S. nuclear fleet and its operations—knowledge he was willing to sell to the Russians.

“It’s almost impossible to say why someone would become a spy,” said Special Agent James Dougherty, who investigated the case from our Norfolk Division, but Hoffman represents a classic example of the insider threat. “When a U.S. citizen with classified information threatens to betray his country,” Dougherty explained, “the resulting damage to national security and loss of American lives can be catastrophic.”

Investigators speculate that Hoffman may have blamed his divorce on the Navy, along with his failure to gain promotion. The FBI and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) became concerned in 2011 when, nearing retirement, Hoffman told friends he was going on a “man-cation” to Belarus to see Russian women he had previously met when he was stationed in Bahrain—even though he knew the women would not be there.

“He had some sort of motivation to travel to Belarus that didn’t seem logical,” said Dougherty. In addition, Hoffman ignored the requirement to alert military security officers that he would be traveling out of the country, and he failed to adhere to other security rules of reporting any suspicious incidents while overseas. However, Hoffman did post items on social media channels saying he met the president of Belarus. “All of that added to our suspicion,” Dougherty noted.

You can read the rest of the piece via the below link:

http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/march/naval-espionage-stopping-a-dangerous-insider-threat

You can also read an earlier post on Hoffman via the below link:

http://www.pauldavisoncrime.com/2014/02/former-sailor-sentenced-to-30-years-in.html 

FBI On The Insider Threat: U.S. Soldier Receives 16-year Sentence For Attempted Espionage

 

 The FBI offers a piece on the insider threat, spotlighting the case of a U.S. Army military policeman who was convicted of ettempted espionage.

A 22-year-old military police officer in Alaska has been sentenced to a 16-year jail term in connection with his efforts to sell classified documents to a person he believed was a Russian intelligence officer.

In 2011, William Millay was stationed at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson near Anchorage when he began to talk to—and solicit help from—other military members regarding selling classified national defense information to the Russians.

“This case really drives home the point that the insider threat is alive and well," said Special Agent Sam Johnson, who supervisies a national security squad in our Anchorage Division. “That’s why counterintelligence investigations continue to be a very high priority for the FBI.”

You can read the rest of the piece via the below link to the FBI web page:

http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2013/april/soldier-receives-16-year-sentence-for-attempted-espionage/soldier-receives-16-year-sentence-for-attempted-espionage

You can also read more about the Millay case via the below link:

http://www.pauldavisoncrime.com/2013/04/alaska-military-policeman-sentenced-to_18.html