Showing posts with label User-Generated Content. Show all posts
Showing posts with label User-Generated Content. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 24, 2019

Fair licensing terms for content to be focal point in transposition and application of EU Copyright Directive: statement by German government

On Monday of last week (April 15), the EU Council--the decision-making body in which the governments of the 28 EU member states cast their votes--adopted the arguably most controversial piece of EU legislation ever, the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, commonly referred to as the EU Copyright Directive. To do so about six weeks prior to EU Parliament elections was as arrorgant as it was unwise. While skepticism of the EU was traditionally more of a right-wing concern, the mostly left-leaning and mostly young people who opposed Article 13 (which became Article 17 and is generally known as the "upload filter" paragraph) could not have been more disappointed. They still say and write that they believe in "Europe," mostly because they fail to understand economic and other issues (see this Wall Street Journal article entitled "Incredible Shrinking Europe" on the EU's miserable economic failure), but they've lost a lot of their faith in the EU institutions.

If there had been a similar level of public debate and street protests across the EU as in Germany, Article 17 wouldn't have secured a qualified majority in the Council or a simple majority in the European Parliament. But for a mix of reasons I can't claim to have fully understood yet, concerns about overblocking of legitimate user-generated content were more of a luxury problem of the North than an issue that would also have mobilized people in the economically and technologically weaker South. Smartphone usage isn't lower in the South, but there are some discrepanices such as with respect to digital startup activity. Even France is far behind; Macron's "Startup Nation" is a case of all hat and no cattle, like pretty much everything he does and wants. He's a walking, talking failure, and the more he fails, the more he walks and talks. But he did get the Merkel administration to engage in a horse trade that also involved the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.

No political party will pay as dearly for this as the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). In EU elections polls, its support among 18- to 24-year-old first-time voters was cut in half just during the month of March (toward the end of which the European Parliament adopted the proposed directive). What affects the SPD's reputation more than anything else is that YouTubers and other Article 17 opponents rightly accuse the party of hypocrisy: on the one hand, the SPD spoke out against upload filters; on the other hand, it's part of the government coalition that ultimately voted for them in the EU Council, where Germany has several times more voting weight than what would have been required, on top of nine other countries that opposed (also including abstentions, which have the same effect there as voting against).

In a futile attempt--so futile it just serves to underscore the growing disconnect between career politicians and voters in the Internet era--to mitigate the impact on this, the SPD-led Federal Ministry of Justice insisted on attaching a long-winded, legally non-binding declaration to the EU Council decision. That declaration didn't change public sentiment in Germany. For an example, a leading YouTuber, Herr Newstime, said it wasn't worth the paper it's written on. However, the purpose of this post is to take a more analytical approach to that declaration since it will have some political weight and even potentially influence legal interpretations of the new directive going forward.

The EU Council's English translation of the German government's statement is the final part of this updated Council document. Such non-binding declarations can serve multiple purposes:

  • to voice dissent;

  • to apologize for doing something unpopular, such as by emphasizing one's good intentions in a bad context;

  • to make political demands and take positions that are indirectly related to the measure in question;

  • to propose certain aspects of national implementations of the directive (EU directives must be transposed into national law by the member states, giving them some--though limited-wiggle room); and

  • to influence the future interpretation of the text by courts of law.

The German government did a mix of all of that with its April 15 statement. What's most relevant here is that the German government makes multiple references to the need for copyright holders (without making a distinction there between collecting societes, which due to their market power often fall under antitrust rules, and individual right holders) to be cooperative and reasonable in their royalty demands. Otherwise, platforms would face a very difficult situation given the directive's utterly unreasonable "best efforts" requirement with respect to licensing--a term that reflects the unbalanced nature of what the EU institutions, under the negative influence of French thought leadership, came up with. The many U.S. lawyers reading this blog (a majority of the readership) would almost certainly advise their clients against ever committing to "best efforts" in any contractual provision...

We're now basically going to have to talk about FRAND (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) licensing terms in the copyright context. The "ND" part will be officially part of the equation whenever right holders have a dominant market position; in all other cases, it will effectively be considered as part of what terms are fair and reasonable.

These are the various references the German statement makes to fair and reasonable licensing terms and generally cooperative behavior by copyright holders:

  • In paragraph 9: "For all other uses platforms should acquire licences, if available relatively easily and for a fair tariff." (emphasis added)

  • In paragraph 10: "Workable solutions for obtaining licences must be found. Although requirements which are unreasonable in practice cannot be imposed on platforms, it is necessary to ensure that efforts to obtain licences are combined with fair offers of remuneration." (emphases added)

    The final part ("are combined with...") is an awkward wording for saying that right holders must also do their part and make fair offers, but to the EU Council's translators' credit, this is a context in which it's better to stay close to the original text than to take the libertie necessary to phrase it more elegantly.

  • In paragraph 11: "the obligation to conclude contracts on reasonable terms" (emphasis added)

Those are, effectively, references to a FRAND licensing framework. Note that it's not just about royalty amounts but also about the overall terms and conditions, including accessibility ("available relatively easily").

Instead of stressing this now, the German government should have blocked the directive in the Council until a FRAND licensing requirement would have been incorporated into Article 17 (formerly known as Article 13), but at least they're aware of the problem the EU has potentially created and they're trying to address it--better late than never.

Below I'll finally go over the statement paragraph by paragraph and analyze it from a political as well as a legal angle.

1. The German Federal Government agrees with the proposed Directive on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market (hereinafter: ‘the Directive’) in the version set out in the trilogue compromise of 13 February 2019, because the reform as a whole achieves urgently needed adjustments to the outdated European legal framework, such as the provisions on text and data mining, out-of-commerce works and contract law for performers.

COMMENT: This is just apologetic. It's another way of saying "we know Article 17 sucks, but everything else is so great and couldn't possibly have been delayed." The reference to provisions on text and data mining is ridiculous, given that the EU directive leaves a lot to be desired in that area, too (which like Article 17 will further weaken Europe in the digital economy, where the EU already is a big-time failure).

2. At the same time, the German Federal Government regrets that it was not possible to agree on a concept for the copyright responsibility of upload platforms that could be broadly supported by all parties. There is widespread consensus that creatives should participate in the exploitation of their content through upload platforms. However, in particular the obligation provided for in Article 17 of the Directive to ensure the permanent ‘stay down’ of protected content and the algorithm-based solutions (‘upload filters’) likely to be used in this context have met with serious reservations and widespread criticism from the German public. The vote in the European Parliament on 26 March 2019 also revealed the huge gulf between supporters and critics.

COMMENT: Here they acknowledge that it's an unpopular measure and seek to make the rest of Europe aware of the fact that this part is going to be problematic. But judges are unlikely to give consideration to public sentiment: their job is to interpret the text as it stands, not to legislate from the bench.

3. The focus of our efforts is on performers, authors and ultimately all creatives who naturally make use of the new tools that digitisation and connectivity provide for creative work. The German Federal Government is of course not questioning the need to protect creative work on the internet, and to ensure creatives receive appropriate remuneration for such work.

COMMENT: That third paragraph is meant to placate the lobbying entities representing artists and performers (though most of the time they actually represent publishers rather than individual creators).

4. Under Article 17(10), the European Commission is required to conduct a dialogue with all interest groups concerned in order to develop guidelines for the application of Article 17. The provision explicitly calls for a balance to be maintained between fundamental rights and the possibility of using protected content on upload platforms within the framework of legal authorisations. The German Federal Government therefore assumes that this dialogue is based on a spirit of guaranteeing appropriate remuneration for creatives, preventing ‘upload filters’ wherever possible, ensuring freedom of expression and safeguarding user rights. The German Federal Government assumes that uniform implementation throughout the Union will be agreed on in this dialogue, because fragmentary implementation with 27 national variants would not be compatible with the principles of a European Digital Single Market. On the basis of this declaration, the German Federal Government will participate in this dialogue.

COMMENT: The only positive aspect of that fourth paragraph is that the German government promises to go into the further EU process (working with the Commission to develop implementation guidelines) on the basis of its April 15 declaration. And by expressing concern over divergent national implementations they acknowledge that Article 17 is too vague (although it is, if one includes the relevant recitals, almost as long as the original version of the U.S. Constitution...). Other than that, that paragraph adds nothing new, nor does it influence future interpretation.

5. Where technical solutions are used at all in that connection, the data protection requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation must be adhered to and the EU should encourage the development of open-source technologies with open interfaces (APIs). Open-source software guarantees transparency, while open interfaces ensure interoperability andstandardisation. This can prevent market-dominant platforms from further consolidating their market power by means of their established filtering technology. At the same time, the EU must develop concepts that counteract a de facto copyright register in the hands of dominant platforms by means of public, transparent notification procedures.

COMMENT: The fifth paragraph was obviously inspired by a prior statement by Germany's Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, Ulrich Kelber. However, it's hard to see how this part of the government's statement would have any real-world impact. They can "encourage" platforms to use open-source software, but they won't be able to impose such a requirement--and Internet companies generally make their own technology choices (which quite often are open-source solutions) regardless of what some European governments "encourage" them to select. It's a pointless paragraph.

6. First of all, the requirements laid down in Article 2(6) of the Directive must be addressed and clarified, since the rules are aimed solely at those market-dominant platforms which make large quantities of copyright-protected uploads accessible and which base their commercial business model on such a practice, i.e. services such as YouTube or Facebook. At the same time, we will make it clear that services such as Wikipedia, university repositories, blogs and forums, software platforms such as Github, special-interest offers without any connection to the creative industry, messenger services such as WhatsApp, sales portals or cloud services are not platforms within the meaning of Article 17. In addition, we will ensure an exemption for start-ups.

COMMENT: That paragraph is the most nonsensical one in the whole statement. I wonder how anyone can write something so obviously stupid with a straight face. Exceptions like Wikipedia and Github are already in the directive, and the "exemption for start-ups" mentioned at the end of that sixth paragraph exists as well, but is far too narrow a carve-out to be useful.

7. Furthermore, it is clear that upload platforms should continue to be available as free, uncensored communication channels for civil society in the future. Article 17 (7) and (8) stipulate in that connection that protective measures for upload platforms must not impede the permitted use of protected content. We are particularly committed to this because upload platforms are also a springboard for creatives, enabling them to reach a worldwide audience without a publisher or a label.

COMMENT: This merely states a motivation for ensuring that overblocking of legitimate user-generated content should be prevented, without proposing any particular solution. Roughly as stupid and pointless as the previous paragraph.

8. The aim must be to make the ‘uploadfilter’ instrument largely superfluous. Each permanent ‘stay down’ mechanism (‘uploadfilter’) must comply with the principle of proportionality. Procedural guarantees, in particular, could be considered, for example when users notify that they are lawfully uploading content from third parties. In these cases the deletion could not be performed automatically, but only after a check by a person. At the same time, the proprietorship of any content that has to be removed should be sufficiently proven, unless the information comes from a ‘trusted flagger’. In all events the platforms must guarantee easy access to a complaint mechanism for solving contentious cases effectively and as rapidly as possible.

COMMENT: The idea of users being allowed to indicate that they are convinced of their content being lawful is not bad. However, the practical issue is going to be that platforms are rarely sued by users who wish to publish content (it does happen, particularly in Germany, but rarely) and face much more of a threat from right holders. The eighth paragraph makes a valid point, but a workable situation is not in sight.

9. In addition, the use of protected content on upload platforms for criticism or reviews, for caricatures, parodies or pastiches, or even in the context of the ‘quotation barrier’, is permitted and free of charge. In such cases the rightholder does not suffer any economic loss anyway. For all other uses platforms should acquire licences, if available relatively easily and for a fair tariff. We will examine how the fair participation of creatives in this licence revenue can be guaranteed through direct payment claims, including in those cases where the label, publisher or producer have the exclusive rights. It is also necessary to guarantee an appropriate remuneration for any new content created on upload platforms and used for commercial purposes. Above all, the proceeds from uses on upload platforms that are desired for political reasons must also reach the creatives themselves.

COMMENT: This is the first one of the three paragraphs that make reference to FRAND licensing terms. Most of the emphasis here is on how to ensure that payments reach individual creators as opposed to just their publishers. However, the EU Copyright Directive generally weakens creators vis-à-vis publishers. Also, it won't be easy to avoid double recovery in this context.

10. Article 17 aims to monetise the use of protected content on upload platforms and to ensure appropriate and fair remuneration for authors and performers. The German Federal Government shares this goal. In the European compromise, licensing is the method chosen to achieve this. Article 17(4) provides that, in order to fulfil their responsibilities, upload platforms must have ‘made best efforts’ to obtain licences. This will be crucial in the implementation of this provision. Workable solutions for obtaining licences must be found. Although requirements which are unreasonable in practice cannot be imposed on platforms, it is necessary to ensure that efforts to obtain licences are combined with fair offers of remuneration.

COMMENT: The tenth paragraph is the very best, most useful and most meaningful paragraph; maybe it would have been better if the German government had just made a short and focused statement consisting mostly of this one instead of hiding such a gem in a longwinded, mostly meaningless statement.

11. In order to resolve this issue – of how licences can, as far as possible, be concluded for all content on upload platforms – copyright law provides for many other mechanisms besides ‘traditional’ individual licensing (e.g. exceptions and limitations, possibly combined with remuneration rights; the option of converting exclusive rights into remuneration rights; the obligation to conclude contracts on reasonable terms; and the involvement of associations of creative artists such as collecting societies).

COMMMENT: The open-ended nature of this 11th paragraph shows that the German government either hasn't fully analyzed the feasibility of different approaches or hasn't been able to reach an internal agreement on which way to go. The reference to "exceptions and limitations" is consistent with a position paper put forward by the digital policy experts of the Christian Democratic Union (Merkel's party). However, the SPD appeared to be unconvinced of its compatibility with EU law, which is understandable since EU law provides for only a limited set of limitations to and exceptions from copyright law.

12. The Federal Government will examine all of these models. Should it appear that the implementation has led to a restriction of freedom of expression or should the guidelines set out above encounter obstacles in EU law, the Federal Government will work to ensure that the shortcomings identified in EU copyright law are corrected.

COMMENT: This vague promise of amending the directive reflects a significant degree of uncertainty as to what the ultimate impact will be. However, the EU is not particularly good at admitting mistakes. Typically, it just blames citizens. Nevertheless, the EU Copyright Directive could be an exception where a legislative initiative to amend the bill may be taken relatively soon. There are politicians who have spoken out in favor, including the Free Democratic Party's top-listed candidate Nicola Beer--and the FDP is reasonably likely to be part of a post-Merkel government. Also, Manfred Weber, a politician from the CDU' sister party (the Christian Social Union) and the European People Party's candidate for the presidency of the EU Commission, also stated in a recent TV interview that he, in his potential capacity as Commission president, would push for a legislative amendment should "censorship" occur as a result of Article 17.

All in all, the German government's statement isn't too bad. There's a lot of nonsense in it that just distracts from the more interesting and relevant parts. But I do like the references to fair and reasonable licensing terms and easy access to such licenses, as well as the commitment to look for ways to obviate upload filters to the greatest extent possible--and while I'm not too hopeful about that, I do appreciate the fact that the statement leaves the door open to a near-term amendment.

I do not plan to comment on the further process (transposition into national laws and subsequent litigation) on this blog. Since February I've blogged about the EU copyright reform process on various occasions because it was the most interesting and important legislative process concerning intellectual property in many years, but the focus of FOSS Patents will remain on patents and antitrust, and copyright only to the extent it is asserted against mobile device makers or app developers. I may, however, set up a separate copyright blog at some point.

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Tuesday, February 19, 2019

German government may oppose Article 13 of EU Copyright Directive in tomorrow's COREPER vote, according to tweet by MEP from coalition party

[Update on 02/20/2019] Merkel imposed her will and social democratic resistance was too little, too late, so the EU Council approved the "trilogue" outcome. [/Update]

The most problematic part of the proposed EU Directive on Copyright in the Single Market may be deleted tomorrow!

According to a tweet by Tiemo Woelken ("Wölken" in German), an MEP from the center-left Social Democratic Party of Germany (Merkel's coalition partner), Germany's minister of justice Katarina Barley (from the same party) is presently trying to persuade the chancellor, the minister of economic affairs (Peter Altmaier) and the chancellor's chief of staff (Helge Braun) to support this position. Here's the tweet (in German; this post continues below the tweet):

Translation:

"Update! #CopyrightDirective without #UploadFilter is a possibility. It won't be @katarinabarley's fault! She's presently trying to persuade @HBraun, @peteraltmaier and #Merkel to adopt the directive without #Article13. I hope @CDU [= Merkel's party] has understood how serious the situation is."

Mr. Woelken gave a great speech at today's JURI (Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament) debate. I particularly liked the fact that he emphasized, toward the end, the importance of user-generated content. That's what Article 13 is about; not "censorship."

About an hour before the tweet shown above, he encouraged the resistance movement to keep on fighting and said "you're being listened to." That may already have been based on some early indications of all the protests having an effect on the German government.

Eight countries opposed the directive in the past, while Germany voted in favor, though not enthusiastically. In order for a directive to be adopted, the Council (= where the Member States cast their votes) and the Parliament (= the elected representatives of the people) must agree, and in connection with directives the Council has a "qualified majority" voting system allowing two different options for a blocking minority: In order to be adopted, a bill needs to be supported by

  • 55% of the Member States (so any 13 countries, even the 13 smallest countries, can block) and

  • those Member States must also represent more than 65% of the total EU population (so any number of countries can block provided that they account for more than 35% of the EU's population).

Only if there is no blocking minority in place, a bill is adopted, so there are two bites at the apple: either get 13 countries or get fewer countries as long as they account for more than 35% of the total EU population. In the context of the EU Copyright Directive, a blocking minority based on the second criterion would be in place if the countries that previously opposed the bill hadn't changed their position (and there's no reason why they should) and Germany joined them: in that case the opposing countries would represent more than 35% of the total EU population. In fact, the total population size of Poland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Slovakia, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and Germany would be approximately 43%. They could threaten to vote against unless Article 13 is thrown out. That's how it often works in the Council.

Not only is Mr. Woelken a perfectly credible source but there are two factors that would actually make it a logical thing for the German government to do:

  • The coalition agreement between Merkel's party (CDU), its small regional sister party (CSU) and the SPD contains a clause according to which Germany would not support upload filters.

  • Well over one million of the 4.7 million signatures delivered to Minister Barley today were from German citizens--mostly young people, including countless first-time voters. The SPD has recently experienced some recovery in the polls after making some political demands appealing to its traditional voter base. The EU Copyright Directive is now about young voters, and if Merkel did what she indicated in a speech today and supported upload filters, her party would take all the blame, with significant potential consequences in a crucial election year (European Parliament elections plus various regional elections in Germany, particularly in the East, where Merkel is from but most unpopular).

A public affairs consulting firm, Chronos, already tweeted about a change of the German government's position before Mr Woelken did (this post continues below the tweet):

When I asked them to provide a source, they declined to do so (this post continues below the tweet):

But this suggests that they, too, have an inside track. In my experience, information often leaks from those diplomatic circles. COREPER, the committee of permanent representatives (= the Members States' ambassadors to the EU), doesn't meet in public, but there's always a number of people in Brussels who know where the other Member States stand. That's the idea of having permanent representatives in Brussels: they constantly communicate regarding these processes.

Tomorrow (Wednesday), there'll be a COREPER vote unless the latest developments result in a postponement, which would be more than just a crack in the shell for the directive.

COREPER votes aren't final: the decisive votes have to be cast by the heads of state and government at a European Council meeting, or by ministers (or the state secretaries representing them) at an EU Council of Ministers meeting. But COREPER votes are meant to prepare the formal votes, and as long as a bill doesn't have a qualified COREPER majority, there's normally no point in putting it to a vote in a formal Council meeting (absent some new backroom agreement between countries that would change everything, but even then they'd normally hold another COREPER vote first).

Should the bill fail to get a qualified majority (= a majority so solid that there's no blocking minority of any kind) in the Council, the European Parliament's JURI committee will probably have to postpone its own vote (scheduled for next Tuesday, and meant to prepare a plenary vote in late March). If the Council does adopt the bill, but without Article 13, JURI could speak out in favor of the Council's new version. It would be irrational for JURI not to do so: no other article in the bill depends on Article 13.

Theoretically, the EU could later try to amend the directive to the effect of reintroducing Article 13. However, the next European Parliament will be structurally different from the current one, with more anti-establishment MEPs than ever.

In today's JURI debate, Axel Voss MEP, the German conservative (note that politicians from Merkel's party aren't conservative by American standards) who's the Parliament's rapporteur and the leading proponent of this directive, said that Article 13 was merely consistent with the case law. If that were so (it obviously isn't, but that's what he says anyway), Mr. Voss shouldn't have a problem with just dropping it in order to have a deal and proceed.

Mr. Voss's speech today was in parts just as absurd as Article 13 itself. For an example, he argued that most online platforms wouldn't be affected because they don't provide large quantities of copyrighted content. However, even private photos uploaded to social networks as profile pictures are copyrighted, so Article 13 casts a wider net than Mr. Voss would have you believe.

It was really disappointing to see Tadeusz Zwiefka MEP, a Polish center-right politician with a communist past, support the directive in today's JURI debate. He was among the MEPs who strongly opposed software patents in 2004-2005.

All going well, Article 13's days are numbered. Not only its days. Even its hours.

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The best tweet ever on the EU Copyright Directive sums up the bloc's miserable failure and misguided approach

If I'm not mistaken, this is the first time--in almost ten years and after more than 2,000 posts--that a tweet gives rise to a FOSS Patents article. This is the one, and I'll comment below:

This is about the European Commission's offensive Medium post. Some IP radicals in the internal market commissioner's cabinet or the IP unit of the Commission's services had flown off the handle and referred to critics of a copyright bill, including (among others) numerous law professors and the inventor of the World Wide Web, as "the mob."

Prior to Dr. Schestowitz, no one had actually noticed the fact that the European Commission was using an American Internet platform--Medium--for this insult because it's so normal in a way, though it's an insanity if you actually think about it. It relates to why the whole mess that is the EU Copyright Directive is on the agenda, and to what's bound to go wrong in the future, especially with that bill being enacted into law.

The insanity here is that Medium is exactly an example of the blessings that user-generated content brings and that the EU Copyright Directive's Article 13 is designed to hamper.

As I explained yesterday, the EU institutions are now about to adopt a fake compromise. The companies opposing the directive have no one to blame but themselves because they didn't leverage those genuine grassroots activities out there in the right way. They failed to persuade politicians from the center to the right, and didn't even convince some left-wingers (even the German Greens). Blowing things out of proportion with terms like "censorship" gets you nowhere. Also, while I'm really happy about and impressed by the success of the savetheinternet.info online petition, it doesn't make sense to claim that the directive threatens the Internet in general. We're talking about specific issues and should define them precisely.

Sometimes there's a pretty clear left-right divide in European IP-related legislative processes. Ultimately the European Parliament near-unanimously rejected the software patents bill in 2005, but that was because of a procedural agreement. When it came to substance, it was basically a mix of left-wingers, euroskeptics (not as strong back then as they are now, but always my friends), and a progressive minority among center-right parties (such as Finnish MEP Piia-Noora Kauppi, former Polish prime minister Jerzy Buzek and Czech MEP Jaroslav Zverina) who sided with critics of the proposal.

With the proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, the problem is that politicians left and right have lost faith in market forces. They see the EU's failure in the digital-platform economy and believe overregulation is the right reponse. (With cars increasingly being digital devices on wheels, that failure may be Europe's industrial demise within a couple of decades.)

That digital failure is again illustrated by the fact that the European Commission has to take to an American digital platform to offend millions of European citizens just because they're dissidents in the copyright context.

What those politicians haven't understood yet (and there isn't much time remaining to explain it to them) is that overregulation won't solve the problem. It will exacerbate it because it will make it even harder for European companies to gain a foothold in that market. It will motivate entrepreneurial young Europeans to start their companies, or take jobs with startups, in the United States rather than in Europe.

Investment in digital-platform startups will be discouraged, and the carveout for companies younger than three, smaller than 10 million euros in annual revenues and with fewer than five million monthly users won't help in the slightest as I explained in my previous post.

Not only the European Commission but also the other institutions (and the national governments, which are represented in the Council) should ask themselves why the EU can't even use a European digital platform to insult voters and taxpayers. And they should realize that a focus on how to win, not an indulgence in envy, is the solution.

The European Union will only make things worse if it employs the methods of the old Soviet Union. You can't compete with the United States by restricting freedom. What has made China so successful? Freedom in the sense of capitalism (human rights are another topic).

To be clear, it's not just about platform companies. Europe's economy and society will suffer in general if European user-generated content will be less abundant than American or Asian user-generated content. User-generated content is used in so many sectors of the economy, and--which is extremely important--in education. And even in politics, as the Commission's post demonstrated in a negative sense.

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Saturday, February 16, 2019

EU Copyright Directive: rejection of entire bill or of Article 13 only realistic options for opponents of idiocy

I'm a copyright hardliner regarding the scope of copyrightable works, a reasonably narrow exception for fair use, and remedies. I can say so without fear of contradiction from those who read my postings on copyright on this blog, particularly on Oracle v. Google, or who debated the Blizzard v. bnetd DMCA case with me back in the day. Copyright has been the basis of my livelihood ever since I started writing articles for computer magazines first, then computer books, while in high school. Meanwhile I've spent a lot of time and money developing software, and I've written tens of thousands of trivia questions (even thousands in recent years).

It says something about the utter lunacy that is the EU's proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market ("EU Copyright Directive") when a staunchly pro-copyright blogger and creator of copyrightable works like me opposes it--obviously not every single word of it, but, at a minimum, Articles 11 ("link tax") and 13 ("upload filter"). The only other occasion on which I felt like this involved the EU as well: the CJEU's outrageous link liability decision.

The purpose of this post is to provide some unsolicited advice to the companies, industry bodies, NGOs and activist groups thinking about their strategy in a situation in which there's every reason to assume, based on the information available, that the "trilogue" (EU-style backroom negotiations between Commission, Council (= Member States), and Parliament) resulted in a very bad deal.

In 2005 and 2007, I emerged victorious from two very similar situations in the EU. I'm not sure anyone presently campaigning against the insane parts of the EU Copyright Directive can claim to have prevailed under such circumstances even once. So here's the experience from which I'm speaking, and I hope those war stories will encourage those in the trenches and serve as instructive examples. But after the war stories, I'll make some recommendations (based on this experience) that are specific to the EU Copyright Directive. So, first the old stories:

  • In 2004 and 2005, I ran a campaign named NoSoftwarePatents against the proposed EU Directive on the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions ("Software Patents Directive"). I was not the founder of that movement: Hartmut Pilch was. But my campaign got significant support from small and medium-sized U.S. and European companies, provided content in 17 European languages, and I advocated a "restart" motion (which the Parliament adopted and the Commission ignored) as well as, at a time when even our political allies were highly skeptical, outright rejection (without conciliation).

    For the first time in EU history (and possibly still the only time to date), the European Parliament threw out a bill at the second-reading stage, where it normally either adopts the Member States' position or goes into conciliation with the other institutions. This event was significant enough that the Economist Group handed me the Campaigner of the Year award (which had gone to a pope three years earlier and went to Governor Schwarzenegger two years later), though Bono was another nominee, and then-outgoing European Parliament President Josep Borrell mentioned it as one of the most significant events in the Parliament's history. It was widely seen as a move that strengthened the Parliament, especially since the hurdle is high (you need a majority of the members, but in that parliament you always have many absentees).

  • In 2007, the European Commission was preparing a White Paper on Sports. Helping my friends at Real Madrid, the world's most famous and most popular sports team, became the only non-IT project in my career. The problem was that left-wingers and conservatives in name only formed an unholy alliance with corrupt association officials and FC Bayern Munich (which just sought to harm rivals to have better chances of winning the most important title for club teams, the Champions League). They were trying to pressure the EU to turn competition law on its head and authorize an extreme case of tying that would have forced my client, but also our informal allies (on this issue) at FC Barcelona and AC Milan, to submit to a "collective selling" (of broadcasting rights) system that would have cost my client roughly 100 million euros per year (the amount they later paid for the transfer of Cristiano Ronaldo).

    I wasn't just a "lobbyist," but authored a 41-page paper that was an informal preemptive antitrust complaint with the Commission. It was the first time I made a FRAND argument.

    Due to delays on my client's side (soccer clubs are a bit chaotic and not too strategic), we missed the opportunity to influence the European Parliament's four committee votes on a resolution that was meant to influence the Commission. The committee votes had gone against us, with only JURI (Legal Affairs) having been close to reasonable and the other three taking ideological positions. It was pure socialism, but with support from the nominally conservative European People's Party.

    While I was comfortable with the Commission officials in charge at the time being far from pursuing a radical agenda, it was critical to show to the ultimate decision-makers that there was no parliamentary majority for radical proposals. A pro-Brexit UK conservative (then an MEP, now an MP), Chris Heaton-Harris, was less concerned about substance than about subsidiarity: he didn't want the EU to impose sports rules on national associations and leagues. During our first meeting, Chris signed a proposed deleting amendment: we just took aim at the one passage of the proposed resolution that was trying to build a (fake) pro-competitive justification for tying a team's participation in the Champions League to socialist redistribution in a national league.

    One of Chris's assistants and I immediately started collecting signatures from MEPs and reached the quorum (40 or so) only minutes before the deadline. I still remember us running (well, it was sports policy) down the corridors of the Parliament to the "Tabling Office" where you present bills and amendments, and we were a few minutes late, but the officials were generous. Then came the plenary vote. What continued to be a huge issue: the Parliament's rapporteur, Ivo Belet, was radically against us, but a member of the largest group in the Parliament, the aforementioned EPP, and parties rarely go against their own rapporteur. We narrowly won the EPP-internal vote, which shocked Belet, but when our deleting amendment came to the vote, he gave a thumbs-down sign, which could still have influenced some people. Nevertheless we secured a majority consisting of those preferring subsidiarity (obviously also including my UKIP friends and ODS from the Czech Republic), politicians interested in sane competition policy, and supporters of the wildly popular teams in my camp.

Apart from those two situations, I only got involved with one other "lobbying" effort: the 2006 resolution on EPLA, a predecessor to the Unified Patent Court (UPC). The outcome there was mixed, but the objective was primarily to delay that process (and as of today, there still is no European patent judiciary). At an EPLA conference in London in the summer of 2006, a Commission director said that "generations of students [would] be taught the story of [our anti-software-patent] campaign as an example of a perfect political campaign."

There still is a chance to defeat the craziest aspects of the EU Copyright Directive, but it will take an extremely forceful and focused push. It appears that things went wrong last time the Parliament decided. Now there's only one last chance, and besides the advice you could find between the lines of my summary of how I triumphed over EU idiocies a long time ago, I have some recommendations specific to the EU copyright situation:

  1. Make an institutional argument. In connection with the "restart" motion for the software patents directive (which paved the way for outright rejection as MEPs positioned it as retribution for the Commission's decision not to make a new proposal), the FFII's activists (all of them very idealistic) argued what's "right" while my position paper focused to a greater extent on what would make the Parliament "strong." It was like a forking situation in open source where we tried both, but when they showed both texts to MEPs, everyone preferred mine.

  2. Make a votes-focused argument. There are only two currencies in politics: votes and money (and money is often just a means to secure votes, though sometimes it's an end in its own right, especially in the EP, where numerous MEPs are on corporate payrolls). Tell MEPs (many of whom are seeking reelection this year) that it's the smartest thing for them to vote either the whole bill or at least Article 13 down just so no voters--especially young voters and, generally, Internet users--will be angry. More than at any other point in time, the political establishment fears that EU-skeptical parties may actually form the strongest bloc in the EP after this year's election. You must leverage those fears and sell them on killing the bill so they keep their seats! This will be their last major vote before the election.

  3. Focus on a simple message and demand for which there can be a broad consensus. I would ask MEPs to reject the entire bill because it's the clearest message (then the Commission will have to go back to the drawing board and a new EP, with many EU skeptics, will give them an even harder time) or, if they're hesitant to do what actually made sense in 2005 for the software patents bill, they should delete Article 13. The latter may be more achievable.

    Apparently, some modification was made to Article 11 ("link tax") that may make it more acceptable to Google. And ultimately, Article 11 directly impacts only Google. I absolutely agree with critics of Article 11, such as Berkeley professor Pamela Samuelson (here's a tax-free link to one of her writings on this issue). Article 11 is counterproductive and plain stupid. But if you now want to get the majority you failed to get last time, you need a simpler, clearer, more focused and more powerful message! Your attitude toward Article 11 should be: "This, too, shall pass." You can try to get it repealed after it's failed.

    Article 13 is the much better cause for campaigning purposes. It affects user-generated content (UGC), which is extremely important. Case in point, even my trivia app will sooner or later get UGC, and some other trivia apps already rely on it.

    With respect to Article 13, a strong case can be made for consumer harm as well as for this further weakening Europe. Most politicians don't understand economics, especially digital-era economics, well enough to figure it out themselves, but--apart from the issues raised in this Wall Street Journal op-ed that compares the eurozone's shrinking (since 2009) economy to growth in the U.S. and Asia and the ever lower performance of continental European students in math (in France and Germany, degeneration is mostly due to decades of unselective migration)--Europe's single biggest economic problem is that it doesn't have major digital platforms. There are only two significant European companies that can be considered digital platform companies: SAP (big by European standards but small compared to Silicon Valley and Seattle Sound giants) and Spotify, which loses the more money the more users it has and probably can't stay independent for too long. Successful digital platforms have enormous leverage and benefit from network effects, which makes it hard enough for Europe to catch up, but UGC is essential to digital platforms. The EU shouldn't cut off its nose in order to spite its case by complicating the creation and operation of UGC-centric platforms.

  4. Combat the idea of "compromise" being a virtue here. With the software patent directive we faced the problem that many politicians initially didn't like the idea of outright rejection because they argued politics is all about the ability to find a middle ground. That is, together with the high mathematical hurdle, the reason why the EP hadn't exercised its right to reject a bill at second reading (a right the EP had since the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s) before we came and won. But every once in a while, no deal is better than a bad deal. Blame it on the other institutions: the Commission and the Council. Blame it on Axel Voss, the EPP MEP who was appointed as the EP's chief negotiator, though his positions are far from balanced. Alleviate MEPs' concerns, and emphasize the benefits: it's the best shot for reelection.

  5. Appeal to center-right and right-of-center politicians. A large part of the reason why my NoSoftwarePatents campaign was started in parallel to the FFII's and various FOSS organizations' efforts was a positioning issue: the anti-software-patent movement was misperceived as the spearhead of a generally anti-IP movement that wanted "everything on the Internet to be free," as a still-influential German conservative MEP (thus I won't mention her name here) told me in a meeting. For the copyright debate it's very important that you emphasize not only consumers but also creators. This, again, will be easier when giving up on Article 11. With the greatest respect for an organization like EDRI, which is involved with the push against the EU Copyright Directive: they're so radical that even a staffer of the Greens/EFA group in the EP told me many years ago that the Greens didn't want to be seen as too closely associated with them.

    Many MEPs want to be seen as pro-business. You must reach out to them more effectively. Bring in app development companies and similar stakeholders who really want and depend on copyright, but oppose its most insane excesses. If you can't convince MEPs that one can be pro-copyright but against Article 13, and that it's actually good for copyright in general to oppose Article 13, then you probably won't build the majority you need. You'll only get much support from the left, and that's not enough.

  6. Better online mobilization. The NoSoftwarePatents effort was very much about mobilization. MEPs told us that they had never received so many messages (emails, letters, faxes) from voters until the FFII (and, later, my campaign) mobilized "the Internet." At the time, we had to rely on mailing lists. Nowadays, with social networks, there's better infrastructure. But I really don't think it makes sense to focus on the link tax. Focus on Article 13, user-generated content, digital platforms. That one affects far more people (not just Google, and Google can probably live with Article 11 now anyway, though again, it's crazy and I hope it will be repealed after a few years--when everyone knows with the benefit of hindsight that it's counterproductive).

    If you want to mobilize citizens to contact politicians, you need a simple and compelling message. SaveTheInternet.info did a great job collecting what will soon be 5 million signatures on change.org, but is not optimized for the final push for rejection. The numbers of signatories will basically impress only those MEPs who are already sympathetic to the cause. But what's key now is to send clearly organic and authentic messages to MEPs (so they can't claim these are just "bots," as some of them have incorrectly said), and to encourage people to request meetings with MEPs in Brussels, Strasbourg, and their constituencies.

    In late 2009 and early 2010, our "helpmysql" campaign (not about legislation, but related to Oracle's acquisition of Sun Micosystems) even broke the Commission's email servers, as we were told in a meeting with then-commissioner Neelie Kroes. We put it in place within only a couple of weeks, even during the Holiday Season.

    I strongly recommend either quickly optimizing SaveYourInternet.eu and/or SaveTheInternet.info for the name of the game at this stage or starting a complementary effort that will make a greater direct impact on MEPs.

  7. Attack mainstream media harder (if necessary). You have all those mainstream media companies--which President Trump often refers to as the "fake news media"--against you. We had a similar problem with our campaign against software patents, not because publishers wanted those patents but because, quite frankly, most news agency journalists were simply not smart enough to figure out that the claim "it's about software-powered devices like washing machines, not about patents on computer programs" was obviously a lie when SAP publicly stated that it wanted the proposed directive because it would protect SAP's "innovations" (which aren't washing machines). When the lie came from the Commission and national governments, the fake news media propagated it as if it were a truth and didn't believe us, just because they were brainless.

    If you give up on Article 11 now and focus on Article 13, maybe that will be a basis to get more reasonable mainstream media coverage of your efforts. I'm not sure because those traditional media companies probably also view UGC as a threat to their business model, but at least there's a chance. Time is not on your side, so you must find out quickly whether, after accepting Article 11, they'll give you a reasonably fair treatment. If not, don't shy away from bashing those publishers. They're backwards-oriented, they're rent-seeking losers, they don't innovate, they're the past and not the future. Make this a story of the winners of the digital age--and consumers are the winners when there's such an abundance of great original content--fighting against an evil scheme by the sore losers, for the sake of Europe's digital future, to the extent Europe has any digital future at all (Europe won't be able to compete with the U.S. and Asia with or without that EU Copyright Directive, but at least it shouldn't be self-destructive).

I haven't been to Brussels and Strasbourg (the two EP seats) in many years, and it's very unlikely, though depending on the circumstances not 100% inconceivable, that I'd go there in the build-up to the final "copywrong" vote to campaign for rejection/deletion. There are still some MEPs who remember the 2005 vote on software patents, and even many of those who weren't there yet in 2005 have meanwhile heard about it. The showdown in Strasbourg or Brussels could become a huge event, like the legendary July 2005 software patents vote, but it takes the right message and turnaround strategy to get a better outcome under even more difficult circumstances (where the strongest argument of the "copywrong" side will be that the result of a "trilogue" is sacrosanct and must be rubberstamped).

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