Showing posts with label Military History. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Military History. Show all posts

10 May 2010

Who Should We Believe? : Faisal Shahzad, and the Gulf of Tonkin

Gulf of Tonkin incident, off the coast of North Vietnam, August 2, 1964. Illustration by E.J. Fitzgerald (1980) / U.S. Navy Historical Center / Wikimedia Commons.

Who should we believe?
How foreign policy lies lead to war


By Harry Targ / The Rag Blog / May 10, 2010
Should we believe 'intelligence officials'? 'Western diplomats'? 'A senior intelligence official'? 'A senior military official'? Or 'the official who would speak of the investigation only on condition of anonymity'?
I was reading The New York Times accounts, Friday, May 7, of the ongoing investigation of the attempted Times Square bombing by suspect Faisal Shahzad. I was intrigued by a variety of stories that turned speculation by various anonymous informed sources into complex analyses of Shahzad’s international connections, the transformation of the Taliban from a political force in Afghanistan to one also in Pakistan, the emergence of a variety of other Islamic dissident groups in Pakistan and their connections with Taliban and perhaps Al Queda.

The lead in the front page story on May 7 headlined “Pakistani Taliban Are Said to Expand Alliances” stimulated my curiosity:
The Pakistani Taliban, which American investigators suspect were behind the attempt to bomb Times Square, have in recent years combined forces with Al Qaeda and other groups, threatening to extend their reach and ambitions, Western diplomats, intelligence officials and experts say.
The story indicates that the Pakistani Taliban have reached out to other militant groups, “splinter cells” (which sounds really scary), “foot soldiers,” and guns-for-hire.” The article continues with elaborations of nefarious early connections between the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al Qaeda, and increasing numbers of Pakistani Punjabi militants.

Faisal Shahzad may have received bomb training from one of these groups, a claim reiterated in another article quoting a senior military official who was not authorized to speak in public. The article reported that the leader of the Pakistani Taliban said that “the group had suicide bombers in the United States, who, he said would carry out their mission at an opportune time” while denying complicity in the Times Square bombing attempt.

Reading these stories and viewing a variety of claims about the causes and connections of the failed bombing reminded me of a short essay I wrote for an interesting volume of writings and graphic design images edited by Rebecca Targ titled “Lying,” in Fold: the Reader. I wrote:
Foreign policy lies lead to war

On August 2, 1964, North Vietnamese armed motor boats attacked two U.S. naval vessels off the coast of North Vietnam. The administration of Lyndon Johnson defined the attacks as an unprovoked act of North Vietnamese aggression. Two days later it was announced that another attack on U.S. ships in international waters had occurred and the U.S. responded with air attacks on North Vietnamese targets.

President Johnson then took a resolution he had already prepared to the Congress of the United States. The so-called Gulf of Tonkin resolution declared that the Congress authorizes the president to do what he deemed necessary to defend U.S. national security in Southeast Asia. Only two Senators voted “no.” Over the next three years the U.S. sent over 500,000 troops to Vietnam to carry out a massive air and ground war in both the South and North of the country.

Within a year of the so-called Gulf of Tonkin incidents, evidence began to appear indicating that the August 2 attack was provoked. The two U.S. naval vessels were in North Vietnamese coastal waters orchestrating acts of sabotage in the Northern part of Vietnam. More serious, evidence pointed to the inescapable conclusion that the second attack on August 4 never occurred.

President Johnson’s lies to the American people about the Gulf of Tonkin contributed to the devastating decisions to escalate a U.S. war in Vietnam that cost 57,000 U.S. troop deaths and upwards of three million Vietnamese deaths.

Forty years later, George W. Bush and his key aides put together a package of lies about Iraq imports of uranium from Niger, purchases of aluminum rods which supposedly could be used for constructing nuclear weapons, development of biological and chemical weapons, and connections between Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden.

As the Vietnamese and Iraqi cases show, foreign policies built on lies can lead to imperial wars, huge expenditures on the military, economic crises at home, and military casualties abroad.
Are there any lessons to learn from the Vietnam and Iraqi cases sited above? I think so.

Two of the most damaging, indeed murderous, foreign policies of the United States were built on lies.

The record indicates that key policy-makers in both the Vietnam and Iraq eras made decisions with almost no knowledge of the political cultures of the two countries. In the Vietnam era not more than a handful of Americans had knowledge of the Vietnamese language or history.

In both cases, foreign policy decisions were shaped by frames of reference, or ideologies, that bore little or no relationship to the political reality in the countries targeted for war. The frame shaping Vietnam was the war on international communism; for Iraq it was the war on terrorism.

In both cases, decisions were made based on recommendations of parties interested in war, from Pentagon officials, to military contractors and arms merchants, to academic and think tank “experts,” to media outlets with stories to create, to journalists seeking to establish their careers, to liberal and conservative politicians seeking issues to shape their own quests for power.

Returning to the Times Square incident, we may never learn the truth. But we can assume with confidence that military, economic, academic, and journalistic interests will promote a scenario of a Pakistani Taliban/Al Queda connection to the failed adventure in New York. And we can expect that all these interests will promote the idea that such attacks, perhaps successful next time, can occur anyplace in the United States. We must live in terror of the terrorists.

Finally, we can be sure that “the cure” for perpetual terrorism will not include economic development, a just and humane U.S. foreign policy, ending drone attacks on Pakistani citizens, and stopping the demonization of peoples of color, in this case, those who embrace the Muslim religion.

[Harry Tarq is a professor in American Studies who lives in West Lafayette, Indiana. He blogs at Diary of a Heartland Radical.]

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05 October 2009

The Afghan Quagmire : Considering the Options

"Smiling on Quicksand." © Gary Winters

A no-win situation?
An Afghan quagmire in the making

By Sherman DeBrosse / The Rag Blog / October 5, 2009

We are mourning the loss of eight American soldiers who died in a day-long battle near the Pakistan border. They were killed by a well armed force that dwarfed them in size. Their mission was to try to stem the flow of Pakistani Taliban fighters over the border to join their allies in the Afghan Taliban. Indeed, a number of the fighters were Pakistani Taliban expelled from the Swat Valley by Pakistan’s army.

The guerilla force that confronted the Americans numbered about 300. In Iraq, the guerilla forces seldom exceeded 30, with the possible exception of the fighting in Falluhah.

Now we are facing the decision of whether to send in many more troops to continue a policy of nation-building and providing population security. The situation in Afghanistan is enormously complex, and there clearly is no easy resolution or way out.

Lieutenant General Stanley McCrystal has warned Washington that we are losing in our battle against the Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan. He has called for an additional 10,000 to 40,000 troops, and he has the backing of his very popular boss, General David Petraeus. There is a parallel to the “clear and hold” strategy employed in Vietnam, but McCrystal would be more careful with firepower and more interested in economic development.

During the campaign, Barack Obama sought to show that he was strong on national security by saying that Afghanistan was the necessary war. Now those remarks are haunting him as he ponders the sad history of foreign involvement in Afghanistan and our unpromising situation there now. Much of latter was due to the policies of the Bush Administration, but voters have short memories, and Obama will pay for lack of success in Afghanistan.

For the moment, Obama is taking time to reconsider our objectives in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has become a NATO mission, and our president would be well advised to invite NATO to join in these deliberations. Otherwise, it will appear that we are continuing the Bush policy of dictating to others.

France, Germany, and Great Britain have asked for an international conference to discuss how NATO forces can be phased out in Afghanistan. In view of the growing sentiment in Europe against the Afghanistan operation, it would be wise to learn how much support we could count on if we ramp up the effort to provide population security.

Already some writers fear that extended involvement in Afghanistan could be the rock on which the NATO vessel breaks. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has endorsed Obama’s decision to review the policy and has said that it is more important to get the right strategy than to rely on putting in more troops.

Biden‘s approach

Vice President Joseph Biden, after much study and two unpleasant meetings with Hamid Karzai, has concluded that the current regime in Afghanistan will not be a reliable partner for an effort to establish security for the population in Afghanistan. Until recently, National Security Advisor James L. Jones appeared to agree. Biden’s view is that the U.S. needs to focus less on Afghanistan and more on Pakistan, where Al Qaeda is and where instability makes that nation’s nuclear weapons a potential problem.

Biden suggests ramping down the counter-insurgency effort and focusing on damaging Al Qaeda, partly through Predators and air power. Spies and Special Forces and other black ops would also be involved. The US will be able to continue its drone air strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, but it is doubtful that Pakistan can permit the U.S. to bomb Taliban sites in Quetta, capital of Baluchistan province. We can be of greater help to the Pakistanis as they are finally going against their own Taliban. At the moment, they are preparing an offensive in Waziristan.

Of course, the U.S. will need enough stability in some parts of Afghanistan so they can be used as bases to launch all manner of assaults against Al Qaeda. In the long run, it is doubtful that we can put Al Qaeda out of business, but we should make it our top priority to inflict as much damage as possible. There are signs that some of the insurgents are amenable to negotiations, and it is possible that money and diplomacy could accomplish with them what more troops may not.

Of course, the Biden plan would not stop the training and recruitment of Afghan soldiers and police. It should include giving the army better equipment.

Greater reliance on air power clearly suggests a willingness to repeat the carpet bombing of 2001. Should the Al Qaeda reenter Afghanistan, we would have no choice but to resume round-the-clock carpet bombing. Taliban leaders remember the bombing and realize that it would be repeated should they assist Al Qaeda establish camps and bases in their country.

Republicans demand escalation

With the remarkable exception of George Will, Republicans back the former Special Forces commander. They stand to gain no matter what Obama does in Afghanistan. If more troops are sent, and there is still failure or stalemate, they still win big time. Few will remember that John McCain and others beat the drums for more troops and a long war.

A common argument is that any backing away from an all-out effort will give Al Qaeda new energy and attract more recruits to their standard. In truth, American policy in Iraq and our tactics in Afghanistan, which harmed many civilians, were responsible for recruiting people for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Sami Yousafzai’s interviews of Taliban people in the current Newsweek demonstrates how Bush Administration tactics alienated many and strengthened the Taliban. It is unlikely that the salutary change in course under General McCrystal can reverse the damage. Moreover, his turn toward the exercise of soft power -- economic and social development -- is all to the good, but this policy will require more time than we have. It can be recalled that it took John Paul Vann many years to work economic and social miracles in the Mekong Delta.

We frequently hear that anything less than a ramped up war in Afghanistan will damage U.S. credibility abroad. There may be some truth to this. Certainly other nations will not doubt that we have the ability to go anywhere and bring about massive destruction when we do not get our way. The real question should be “Does our national interest require expenditure of a great deal of blood and treasure in Afghanistan?

A similarly weak argument is that we must prevent Afghanistan from becoming a failed state so that Al Qaeda will not use it as a base of operations. This wrongly assumes that there are no other failed states Al Qaeda can use as a base. Moreover, the terrorist organization appears to be unhampered in its operations in Pakistan. As General Jones has admitted, there is no reason why the Taliban would want to leave. He claims there are less than 100 Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

Republican columnist Michael Gerson eschews the most simplistic arguments and admits the complexity of the situation in Afghanistan. Still, he senses that Obama is in a no-win situation. Gerson redefines the civilian-military relationship a bit by insisting that suggesting that tradition demands that Obama select his best general and get out of the way.

He even mentions Harry S. Truman in this respect, though the use of that precedent can be debated. In the end, Abraham Lincoln accepted U.S. Grant’s meatgrinder approach, but he had been involved in many military decisions throughout the war. Another way to look at this is to recall that Lincoln bucked the popular George McClellan and that Truman sacked the very popular Douglas MacArthur.

One can only wonder if any of the critics are concerned that the US be in a position to construct the long-desired twin pipelines down through Afghanistan to carry Caspian gas and oil to Pakistan and, by ship, to India. This was the object of a great deal of diplomacy before 9/11, and the Bush administration even resorted to the threat of bombings. The pipelines are in our national interest but it is doubtful if soldiers should lose their lives to get them.

Another surge?

Those who insist that Obama bow to Petraeus and McCrystal think that copying the surge strategy in Afghanistan will work. The surge worked best in the urban areas of Iraq, and there are few urban areas in Afghanistan. The surge also worked in Iraq because the United States literally bought off its enemies, paying large amounts to tribal leaders and monthly stipends to their armed retainers. Only Bob Woodward has openly discussed another reason why the surge worked. Special Forces in Iraq, under McCrystal, carried out something like the Vietnam War’s Operation Phoenix and eliminated thousands of the insurgent cadre.

Repeating some version of Phoenix in Afghanistan does not require a huge increase in American forces there. Over seven years, we have spent $38 billion in Afghanistan, with few discernable positive results. Perhaps more of the money sent there should be used to buy off warlords and put their troops on retainer. It’s worth a try.

Should we bet on Karzai?

It still comes down to whether a large new commitment in human lives, money, and American prestige should be made in Afghanistan. Many Afghans believe that the present regime is hopelessly corrupt. The recent rigged election of August 20 is one indication of how weak the Karzai regime is. The UN found that one third of the votes cast for Karzai were fraudulent.

The resultant acrimony has been so great that it is unrealistic to believe that Afghans can be unified around Karzai -- no matter how many troops we send there. Karzai has not bothered to denounce those who rigged the election on his behalf. His reliance upon war lords and human rights abusers is not likely to win new grassroots supporters. Of course, policy makers recall that in Vietnam the elimination of the corrupt Ngo Dinh Diem resulted in even worse leaders.

The idea that we can, using soft power, somehow win over large numbers of Karzai opponents to support him is fanciful. The counter-insurgency strategy has been based upon the idea that we could eventually build a large and effective Afghan army and matching police force. The Afghan army stands at 94,000 and has had a little success in the north. It will take two years to increase it to 134,000. That is still far short of the 300 or 400 thousand that are needed.

Who can remember that there were 91,000 when George W. Bush began to rebuild the army. A rational person would look at these figures and conclude that either the Republican administration had done poorly or it was unrealistic to expect rapid growth of that force. Our problems began when the Bushies somehow bungled the effort to nab Osama and then pulled out our most effective people so they could begin their adventure in Iraq. Any way you look at U.S. policy there under Bush, it is impossible to conclude that anything was accomplished. Obama inherited a ticking time bomb but don’t look to any Republican politician or publicist to mention this. The truth is that it could be too late to do much there.

There is also the lesson of Vietnam, where we did build a large, well-equipped ARVIN force that was ineffective and heavily infiltrated by the enemy. There were also many “potted plants,” units that existed on paper but not in reality.

Unless Karzai abandons brutality and corrupt practices overnight and becomes a Boy Scout, the prospects of bringing much stability to Afghanistan are slim. The man is a Pashtun and that should have helped him with the nation’s largest ethnic group. Instead, the Taliban, also largely Pashtun, have been able to play on Pashtun nationalism to enlist support.

Effectively ending Taliban jihadism may be beyond our ability. The Afghan Taliban practices jihad but only locally. They would only be a threat to the United States if they could again provide Al Qaeda with a base of operations. However, there is no reason for Al Qaeda to leave the Waziristan area of Pakistan, where they have the run of things and even have located families there.

Though the Taliban previously sheltered Al Qaeda, many Taliban are not warm friends of the Arab-led terrorists, and it is possible that clever intelligence people could drive a wedge between them. It should also be remembered that many who call themselves Taliban in Afghanistan are simply insurgents capitalizing on that name. Many of them can be bought off.

The Pakis will play a double game

Pakistan will continue playing a double game -- doing enough to get aid while keeping the Afghan Taliban alive. The best we can do is to induce them to do more for us. Our primary goal there is to foster enough stability in Pakistan to keep the jihadists from getting their hands on the nation’s nuclear assets. That is no small job.

The Pakistani Army, though secular, long ago resorted to sponsoring Islamic jihadism as a means of countering Indian power. They built jihadist movements to threaten India in destabilizing Kashmir. In time, a jihadist opposition emerged in Pakistan itself, and the army officer corps now must deal with the fact that religious fanaticism has infected more than a few junior officers.

Because Pakistan needs to have a strong influence in Afghanistan, Pakistani intelligence, the ISI -- with the help of the United States in the late 1970s and eighties -- nurtured jihadism in Afghanistan. Many in Pakistan’s ISI -- once closely tied to the CIA -- are not inclined to do anything to injure the Afghanistan Taliban, and they believe that the United States will not be in Afghanistan indefinitely

Unless Pakistan can be induced to stop helping the Afghan Taliban, a U.S counter-insurgency program will require far more troops that McCrystal is now requesting. Afghans in the south and east already see the U.S. as an occupying power, and the presence of more troops is certain to deepen that impression in those places and possibly spread it to the rest of the country. The McCrystal strategy would be an occupation, and foreign occupations of that country since the time of Alexander the Great have been failures.

In retrospect, it appears that most of the billions poured into Afghanistan were a poor investment. One leading member of Karzai’s coalition said he will withdraw if more American troops are committed. This man is an American ally but thinks that more troops would mobilize more people against the government.

Too much was filtered through foreign contractors. The money would have been better spent buying off the Pakistan generals and ISI and bringing greater political stability to Pakistan. Fortunately, Congress has just tripled its appropriation for Pakistan; but the amount is still relatively small.

The farmers and the poppies

The Obama Administration wisely ended its war against the farmers growing poppies. It might be worthwhile to buy and destroy the Afghan opium crop. Using last year’s data, that might cost as much as $3.4 billion. This would not stop the Taliban from collecting taxes on it, but destruction of the whole crop would prevent the Taliban from moving large quantities of opium to the international market. That would cut their income by a third.

The situation in Afghanistan is very complex and unpromising. There are variables that the American public does not perceive. Do they know that many Afghans speak Persian and that they are strongly influenced by Iran. The latter could make things even worse for us but Iran has no reason now to want an unstable Afghanistan.

Our dealings with Iran can impact what goes on in Afghanistan. By appearing to be more reasonable than Bush, President Obama has obtained some important concessions from Iran and may be able to do more. If Israel were to move against Iran, we could expect Iran to use its influence against us among its Afghan clients.

Richard Holbrooke has given us an idea of how bad the situation in Afghanistan is: “Its worse than the Nam!” It is very important that the American people understand what is involved here because a decision to make a long term commitment to pacification and nation-building will require years of commitment, massive amounts of money, and far more troops than we are now contemplating.

Even with all that, there will be no guarantee that we can succeed in building a stable nation there. That is why House Minority Leader John Boehner is so angry that President Obama wants to take time making this decision. If thoughtful independents come to understand much of what is involved, they might support Obama in redefining the mission there. Information is, as usual, the enemy of Republican policy here. The more people understand, the less damage Afghanistan will inflict on Obama’s political future.

[Sherman DeBrosse is the pseudonym for a retired history teacher. Sherm spent seven years writing an analytical chronicle of what the Republicans have been up to since the 1970s. The New Republican Coalition : Its Rise and Impact, The Seventies to Present(Publish America) can be acquired by calling 301-695-1707. On line, go here.]

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05 September 2008

Flyboy McCain : Hero or Fraud?

Updated September 5, 2008

This provocative article by Thomas Cleaver, written for The Rag Blog, was originally posted on August 30, 2008. We are publishing it again today with some very interesting discussion added.

Thorne Dreyer / The Rag Blog
Flyboy McCain with mates.

A Rag Blog Special...

A NOUN, A VERB, AND POW: The Truth About John McCain
By Thomas McKelvey Cleaver / The Rag Blog / August 30, 2008

While all good Democrats were being wowed by Michelle Obama this past Monday night (For the record, this political junkie with a 48 year history of involvement has never ever seen a campaign speech to beat this one given by Michelle Obama - it's the greatest speech ever given by a political wife ever, for any office, period.), the sad fact is that about the same number of Americans watched John S. McCain III feed Jay Leno his patented barbecued baloney three hours later on "The Tonight Show."

Last question of Jay's interview: "How many houses do you have, Senator McCain?"

To which "the man who doesn't really want to speak at length about his Vietnam experience" said "Well, for five and a half years I didn't have a house, didn't have a kitchen table, didn't have a chair." Ah yes, John S. McCain III was a POW, so you can't ask him any question and you have to give him a lifetime pass on everything.

To which I call BULLSHIT!!!

Many of you reading this are among that overwhelming majority of Americans who don't know that the pointed end of an airplane goes in front, and you certainly don't know about the esoteric topic of "Naval Aviation."

Allow me to educate you, so far as the topic refers to a certain presidential candidate.

As background, I was personally involved in Naval Aviation in Vietnam (as en enlisted man), and I write about aviation history for Flight Journal. I have studied the subject since the first word I ever said was "O-pane" when an airplane flew over the park we were in, and I am a recognized "subject matter expert" on this topic.

Most of you haven't likely noticed this fact, but it's important: in all of John S. McCain III's political career, he has never had a Naval Aviator of his generation come out and publicly support him, publicly speak for him. Naval Aviation is a tight fraternity, and it is very judgmental of its members. If you don't have "the Right Stuff" (i.e., the ability to land an airplane on a ship in any weather, day or night - one of the hardest jobs there is for a human to do - and if you crash, get up and "ride the horse" at the next available opportunity, and be a "man of honor"), then you aren't really in the fraternity. You won't be thrown out publicly, but you will know you're out.

John S. McCain III has been "out" of the fraternity since before he became a POW.

The name McCain is lauded in naval history. The senator's grandfather was one of Bull Halsey's "fighting admirals" of the Third Fleet who defeated Japan in World War II. This is the American equivalent of being one of "Nelson's captains" at Trafalgar. His father commanded the naval air forces in the Pacific through most of the Vietnam War. John S. McCain and John S. McCain Jr.

Unfortunately - like his friend George W. Bush - John S. McCain III is living proof of the old saw "the first generation makes it, the second generation saves it, and the third generation loses it."

As has been noted by others, John S. McCain III graduated 494 in a class of 499 from Annapolis. Naval aviation is picky -- they pride themselves on taking the best and making it hard to pass the test to get in. Outside of John S. McCain III, all other Annapolis graduates who have received a Naval Aviation assignment upon receiving their commission graduated in the upper third of their class. Not Johnny. After having to repeat three sections of his pilot training, John S. McCain III managed to crash five airplanes. In three of those events, the crash investigators wanted to say it was "pilot error" (a career-ender for any pilot anywhere), but the Navy wasn't ready to give the boot to the progeny of two of its most famous commanders of the 20th Century.

Right wingers will tell you (and will send you to a You-Tube video they claim proves their case), that John McCain didn't kill 137 of his fellow sailors and wound over 300 of them in what is known in Navy History as "The Forrestfire." Unfortunately for the Righties, the bits of video are not conclusive proof. No time stamps, and the "map" of the flight deck of the USS Forrestal - and the position of McCain's airplane and his escape route from the explosion - is not proven by anything more than assertion. Unfortunately, the websites that have put forward the relevant information are far right/white supremacist sites, so it is easy for the McCain campaign to "tar" these facts with the rest of the site.

But take note, they only tar the sites for their bad politics, not for the inaccuracy of these facts.

On July 29, 1967, the USS Forrestal was at Yankee Station in the Tonkin Gulf, preparing to launch an "Alpha Strike" against North Vietnam: 12 A-4 Skyhawks with 12 F-4 Phantoms for fighter escort. LCDR John S. McCain III was a Skyhawk pilot. He had a reputation for "breaking the rules" (being son of an Admiral your superiors may have to answer to gives you "latitude"). This time, he decided on a "wet start." This is something against the rules; it involves feeding gas to the engine before lighting it off, and results in a flame shooting 6-12 feet out the tail of the jet. Everybody in the near vicinity "gets a shock." In some circles of Naval Aviation this is considered a "joke".

This time, the flame was more than 12 feet, and it caught the F-4 Phantom positioned right behind the Skyhawk, enveloping it in flame. The pilot and the "guy in back" didn't get out -- victims #1 and #2 -- and more importantly, the flames cooked off the 600-gallon drop tank the Phantom was carrying. The flames spread to the two Zuni rocket pods on the inboard pylons, which heated to the point where 10 rockets ignited and went flying into the 12 fully-fueled, fully-armed Skyhawks, which went off like the 12,000 lb. bombs each was.

Eight hours later, the USS Forrestal - first of today's supercarriers - was "hors de combat” with 137 dead, several hundred more injured, and damage to the ship sufficiently bad that this carrier would spend the rest of the Vietnam War in repair.

The righties say there's no proof John S. McCain III was responsible, but at the end of the day, the only unwounded man transferred from the Forrestal to the carrier USS Oriskany was LCDR John S. McCain III. Coincidence???

The next month -- August 1967 -- LCDR John S. MCain III was privately informed he had failed promotion to Commander (CDR) that coming November, for the third time. In the Navy it's "three strikes and you're out." This meant that LCDR John S. McCain III would never follow his father or grandfather to the heights of the Navy. If he wanted to stay in the Navy another nine years, that would be it. No more promotions and an involuntary retirement at 20 years' service. According to Admirals I have interviewed, when a junior officer fails to make the cut from Lieutenent (LT) to Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) of from Lieutenant Commander to Commander (CDR), the real reason -- according to a very senior Admiral -- is "lack of maturity, which the officer dropped will either quickly disprove as a civilian or spend the rest of their lives proving the judgment correct."

This brings us now to October, 1967. LCDR John S. McCain III gets shot down.

Rule #1 of Attack Aviation is: "Never turn around and fly over the target you just bombed low and slow when they're ready for you." LCDR John S. McCain III broke the rule as he has so many others, and he was shot down.

For most of us, becoming a POW would not be a "career-maker' but not for our Johnny-boy.

Once he's confirmed as a POW, he enters the armed services' "Joint POW fast-track promotion policy," i.e., the first time a POW is eligible for promotion, they get promoted.

So in November, 1967 -- rather than being drummed out of the Navy -- John S. McCain III gets a promotion to CDR. By the time he gets out of the Hanoi Hilton in 1973, he's a Captain (Navy equivalent of a Colonel). The incompetent who failed promotion to CDR gets an assignment for a Captain: commander of the Navy's Replacement Air Group for Attack Squadrons in the Atlantic Fleet. He flunks it.

Eighteen months later he's told there won't be a third Admiral McCain, but the Navy needs him in Washington, where they can use his "celebrity status" as a POW as a liaison with Congress, where his job is to keep congressmen well-laid and well-liquored up, so they'll vote for more Big Boys Toys for the boys in Navy Blue.

It's at a party in Hawaii thrown by the Naval Congressional Liason Office that soon-to-be-an-official-loser CAPT McCain meets the 24 year old daughter of a convicted Arizona bootlegger who is still considered an indicted participant in the assassination of investigative reporter Don Bolles in 1967 (Bolles' was investigating the Arizona crime syndicate that Cindy's dad was a capo regime in.)

And the rest is history.

As an aside about POWs, there have been Prisoners of War in every war America has ever fought. Those captured by our now-erstwhile allies the Brits during the Revolution suffered worse treatment than any other American POWs in any other war: 80% of them died in captivity. I have a good friend who survived the Bataan Death March and three and a half years' captivity in Japan -- no one ever made any sort of "big deal" out of his experience, which was only equaled by my own great-great-grandfather when he was imprisoned in Libby Prison in Richmond after being captured at Cold Harbor. (Historical note: 60% of American POWs in the Civil War - on both sides - starved to death). The Korean War POWs came home to be doubted by those for whom they had gone to war for possibly being "brainwashed."

The only time in American history that POWs were turned into "heroes" was the war in Vietnam , when LBJ and Nixon needed something to con the rubes with to continue "the good fight" as they searched for "peace with honor."

All hail John S. MCain III - product of "special treatment" from the day he was born, whether he had the competence to deserve it or not.

Discussion about this article by Ragbloggers, posted September 5, 2008.
Tom Cleaver would have it that McCain caused the US Forrestal fire with a childish prank.

See

NavSource Online: Aircraft Carrier Photo Archive,

and

Wikipedia: 1967 USS Forrestal fire.

These and other sources agree that an electric malfunction of a rocket loaded on a F-4 was the cause. McCain was in an A-4 Skyhawk.

The wikipedia article supplies 8 references and 8 external links.

Cleaver supplies no references.

The dead and wounded were transferred to the hospital ship USS Repose according to the logs of the Forrestal (reproduced on the top link above). Cleaver has the wounded transferred to the USS Oriskany which is an aircraft carrier.

You be the judge.

Michael Eisenstadt
Actually, the Wikipedia article is bullshit, being written by right-wingers. But we must always trust what we read on the internet, right? Particularly the stuff we find on sites that can be edited by anyone who stops by.

The facts as I laid them out are still facts. McCain was the only unwounded guy transferred to the Oriskany, and none of the "eividence" presented about the fire is conclusive of anything (I wish it was). And despite numerous FOIA requests, the Navy has never released the results of the investigation into the incident.

Thomas Cleaver
The logs of the USS Forrestal are available on line. The Wikipedia article and the logs for July 29 are in close agreement.

The planes on the deck that day were pointed inboard. Cleaver claims that McCain and his plane caused the fire by lighting off his engine prematurely as a prank.

In other words, Cleaver has the plane's position backwards. The spotting diagram of the planes is reproduced in the Wikipedia article. I forwarded the diagram in my initial email to show the impossibility of Cleaver's claim. Cleaver either borrowed this from another liar or made up the lie himself.

See attached diagram and read the caption on the bottom of the diagram explaining the accident.

McCain was apparently a total screwup during his navy career but he did not cause the fire on the USS Forrestal.

[Eisenstadt's own empirical evidence was a freaking Wikipedia piece, a source as unsubstantiated as they get.]

No, I looked for and found corroborative evidence. The logs for the USS Forrestal are on line and are maintained by a navy veteran who was aboard the Forrestal on July
29, 1967.

Check it out here.

Generally Wikipedia articles are quite good and do not freak.


Mike Eisenstadt
Michael,

I remain agnostic in regards to the specific debate
concerning McCain's responsibility for the fire on the USS Forrestal. I do believe that Thomas Cleaver is correct in asserting that McCain's military record contains ample evidence of his poor judgment and character. However, it is not appropriate for you to call Mr. Cleaver a liar. It is fine for you to argue that he is mistaken or ill informed, but to call him a liar is an inappropriate personal attack.

David Hamilton
David,

You cant remain agnostic
about an impossibility. The planes on the stern of aircraft carriers face inboard. The engine is at the back. The planes have to be turned in the right direction long before the engines are lighted off.

Whoever made up this lie, Cleaver or someone else, wasnt aware of how planes are spotted on an aircraft carrier. Case closed.

I adopt the role which conforms in my mind as best supporting the truth and morality.

Cleaver may not be a habitual liar but once one is caught doing it, it is bad for one's reputation.

Like Chomsky lying his head off in his reportage on the nighttime bombing of the pharmeceutical factory in the Sudan where the nightwatchman was killed.

Mike Eisenstadt
I see that M.E. wants to pour more jet fuel on the fire ...

So let me get this straight. The military can be trusted ABSOLUTELY to tell the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help me Admiral McCain.

Tell that to Pat Tillman's family.

Or more to what I suspect is Eisenstadt's underlying point, tell that to the families of the 34 seaman killed during Israel's June 8, 1967, aerial and torpedo-boat attack on NSA spyship USS Liberty on day four of the Six Day War. Many many many people think that Admiral Papa John McCain covered up that story:

New Details in Attack on American Spy Ship / Chicago Tribune / Oct. 3, 2007 / Military.com.

The Liberty incident was only six weeks before the admiral's son was involved in the Forrestal fire, and freelance journalist/cybersleuth Wayne Madsen smells a burning connection. In particular, he suggests that Bush-Cheney neocons may have found something in the Pentagon's classified files to hold over McCain's head -- he notes that they have had seven years to dig. Madsen's conjecture includes references to Forrestal survivors "and those who have investigated the case" who believed "that McCain deliberately 'wet-started' his A-4E" as a hotdog stunt. Madsen provides no names -- not itself especially surprising given the high profile of these allegations -- but in a later report he writes that "previous reports on McCain's direct involvement in causing the worst non-combat-related disaster in the history of the Navy has since been verified by a senior Naval officer who was assigned to the Naval War College."

See McCain's past makes him a Neocon puppet / Feb. 5, 2008 / Portland Indymedia.

As for the flight deck diagram cited by Eisenstadt as proof that a McCain wet-start could not have started the Forrestal's conflagration, I would point out that this sketch only shows how the planes were positioned before moving into launch position. The Forrestal fire broke out as pilots were firing up engines preparing for a mission over Vietnam. If the A-4s were moving into line for launch, McCain would have been in position to play a little prank.

All in all, Madsen provides interesting things to ponder about John McCain's glossy flyboy image -- and the five expensive aircraft he lost during his Navy service.

A final note: Madsen's conjecture shows up in a bizarrely twisted version on an anti-Zionist website called Judicial Inc, and this link provides interesting things to ponder about why Mike Eisenstadt might be so anxious to discredit Tom Cleaver as a liar. Judicial Inc features both the Forrestal and Liberty stories in a silly attempt to prove that the McCain family reputation is controlled by Zionists.

What do I take from all of this? Not much beyond the observation that whenever I see Michael Eisenstadt's name on an MDS post, I get ready for the Silly Season to commence.

Liar liar
pants on fire.

Jim Retherford

The fire broke out while planes were parked
at the stern before being moved. See attached diagram and read the accompanying caption.

This diagram published in the Naval Aviation News, October 1967, was described as follows:

Deck plan of the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Forrestal (CVA-59) on 29 July 1967 in the Gulf of Tonking during the Vietnam war, when an accidentially launched rocket led to a catastrophe that killed 134, and injured 62. 21 aircraft of Attack Carrier Air Wing
17 (CVW-17) (tail code "AA") were destroyed.

Perhaps we should now assume that the Naval Aviation News was lying in their role as agents of the Zionists.

Mike Eisenstadt
The Naval Aviation News was restating the military review findings, not doing any new groundbreaking reporting.

Mike, I can't decide whether you have an overall authority problem or a problem selecting authorities. If the Navy's own review of the Forrestal disaster was tainted by "orders from above" (ie, Admiral Johh McCain Jr. or others acting to protect his interests) -- as is believed by military journalist Bryant Jordan in the USS Liberty case and as was the case during the Pat Tillman cover-up (before overwhelming contravening evidence blew that fiction up) -- so then will all of the subsequent stories, including Naval Aviation News and Wikipedia, etc.

Such is how fiction often passes for history --until someone begins to poke at the myths or accidently stumbles onto the truth.

All you are proving to the readers of this group is that you cherrypick your sources, selecting only that which supports your own chiseled-in-stone belief system while discarding any countervailing opinions as lies.

I'll not call this lying. I'd call this lousy self-serving scholarship.

Jim Retherford

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09 August 2008

MEDIA : The Press and the Atomic Bomb

Mushroom cloud from the nuclear explosion over Nagasaki rising 60,000 feet into the air on the morning of Aug. 9, 2008.

63 Years Ago: Media Distortions Set Tone for Nuclear Age
By Greg Mitchell / August 6, 2008
At this time of year it is always important to look back at how the original "first-strike" was explained to the press, distorted, and then became part of the decades-long narrative of how, in this view, nuclear weapons can be used -- and used again.
Sixty-three years after the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, The Bomb is still very much with us. The U.S. retains over 5000 nuclear weapons -- does this surprise you? -- with better than 4000 said to be "operational." There are plans to reduce this number, but only by 15%. The Russians still have many of their nukes but these remnants of the "superpower" era -- and the lack of airtight security surrounding them -- get little play today. All we seem to hear about are alleged or possible Iranian or North Korean or freelance terrorist nuclear devices.

The fact is, our "first use" policy -- dating back to 1945 -- remains in effect and past Gallup polls have shown that large numbers of Americans would endorse using The Bomb against our enemies if need be. So at this time of year it is always important to look back at how the original "first-strike" was explained to the press, distorted, and then became part of the decades-long narrative of how, in this view, nuclear weapons can be used -- and used again.

The Truman announcement of the atomic bombing on Aug. 6, 1945, and the flood of material from the War Department, written by The New York Times' William L. Laurence the following day, firmly established the nuclear narrative. It would not take long, however, for breaks in the official story to appear.

At first, journalists had to follow where the Pentagon led. Wartime censorship remained in effect, and there was no way any reporter could reach Hiroshima for a look around. One of the few early stories that did not come directly from the military was a wire service report filed by a journalist traveling with the president on the Atlantic, returning from Europe. Approved by military censors, it went beyond, but not far beyond, the measured tone of the president's official statement. It depicted Truman, his voice "tense with excitement," personally informing his shipmates about the atomic attack. "The experiment," he announced, "has been an overwhelming success."

The sailors were said to be "uproarious" over the news. "I guess I'll get home sooner now," was a typical response. Nowhere in the story, however, was there a strong sense of Truman's reaction. Missing from this account was his exultant remark when the news of the bombing first reached the ship: "This is the greatest thing in history!"

On Aug. 7, military officials confirmed that Hiroshima had been devastated: at least 60% of the city wiped off the map. They offered no casualty estimates, emphasizing instead that the obliterated area housed major industrial targets. The Air Force provided the newspapers with an aerial photograph of Hiroshima. Significant targets were identified by name. For anyone paying close attention there was something troubling about this picture. Of the thirty targets, only four were specifically military in nature. "Industrial" sites consisted of three textile mills. (Indeed, a U.S. survey of the damage, not released to the press, found that residential areas bore the brunt of the bomb, with less than 10% of the city's manufacturing, transportation, and storage facilities damaged.)

On Guam, weaponeer William S. Parsons and Enola Gay pilot Paul Tibbets calmly answered reporters' questions, limiting their remarks to what they had observed after the bomb exploded. Asked how he felt about the people down below at the time of detonation, Parsons said that he experienced only relief that the bomb had worked and might be "worth so much in terms of shortening the war."

Almost without exception newspaper editorials endorsed the use of the bomb against Japan. Many of them sounded the theme of revenge first raised in the Truman announcement. Most of them emphasized that using the bomb was merely the logical culmination of war. "However much we deplore the necessity," The Washington Post observed, "a struggle to the death commits all combatants to inflicting a maximum amount of destruction on the enemy within the shortest span of time." The Post added that it was "unreservedly glad that science put this new weapon at our disposal before the end of the war."

Referring to American leaders, the Chicago Tribune commented: "Being merciless, they were merciful." A drawing in the same newspaper pictured a dove of peace flying over Japan, an atomic bomb in its beak.

At the same time, however, the first non-official news reports began to break into print, including graphic accounts of casualties, a subject ignored in the War Department's briefings.

Tokyo radio, according to a United Press report, called Hiroshima a city of the dead with corpses "too numerous to be counted ... literally seared to death." It was impossible to "distinguish between men and women." Medical aid was hampered by the fact that all the hospitals in the city were in ashes. The Associated Press carried the first eyewitness account, attributed to a Japanese soldier who had crudely described the victims (over Tokyo radio) as "bloated and scorched -- such an awesome sight -- their legs and bodies stripped of clothes and burned with a huge blister. ..."

Americans who came across these reports were thrust briefly into the reality of atomic warfare -- if this information could be believed; The New York Times observed that the Japanese were "trying to establish a propaganda point that the bombings should be stopped." The Hearst newspapers published a cartoon showing a hideous, apelike "Jap" rising out of the ruins of Hiroshima screaming at Americans, "They're Not Human!", with the caption, "Look who's talking."

But in quoting from Tokyo radio, newspapers did introduce their readers to a disturbing point of view: that the atomic bombing might not be an act of deliverance blessed by the Almighty but a "crime against God and man"; not a legitimate part of war but something "inhuman," a cruel "atrocity," and a violation of international law, specifically Article 22 of the Hague Convention which outlawed attacks on defenseless civilians. The Japanese also compared the bomb to the use of poison gas, a weapon generally considered taboo. It was this very analogy many American policy makers and scientists had feared as they contemplated using the bomb, which they knew would spread radiation.

Other condemnations appeared as the War Department's grip on the story weakened slightly. The New York Herald-Tribune found "no satisfaction in the thought that an American air crew had produced what must without doubt be the greatest simultaneous slaughter in the whole history of mankind," likening it to the "mass butcheries of the Nazis or of the ancients."

A leading religious body in America, the Federal Council of Churches, urged that the U.S. drop no more atomic bombs on Japan, in a statement issued by two of its leaders, G. Bromley Oxnam and John Foster Dulles, later President Eisenhower's chief adviser. America had won the race for the bomb but it "may yet reap the whirlwind," Hanson Baldwin, military analyst for the New York Times, declared.

Interest in Hiroshima, however, receded as other events in the Pacific war, as well as speculation about a Japanese surrender, took center stage. On Aug. 9, the top two headlines on the front page of The New York Times announced the Soviets' declaration of war against Japan (indeed, some historians would later write that it was this, not the atomic bombs, that primarily forced the Japanese surrender). Not until line three did this message appear: "ATOM BOMB LOOSED ON NAGASAKI." The target of the second attack, a city of 270,000 people, was described, variously, as a naval base, an industrial center, or a vital port for military shipments and troop embarkation, anything but a largely residential city. The bomb, in fact, exploded over the largest Catholic community in the Far East.

That night, President Truman told a national radio audience that the Hiroshima bomb had been dropped on a "military base,"not a large city, although he knew this was not true. "That was because we wished in the first attack to avoid, in so far as possible, the killing of civilians," he said. Yet 150,000 civilians had died or would soon perish from radiation disease.

[Greg Mitchell is co-author, with Robert Jay Lifton, of the book, "Hiroshima in America."]

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