With house in order, Hariri seeks to build on talks

[Originally posted at NOW]

Future leader has reasserted control over the Sunni community, but it’s unclear how much more can be achieved for now.

When Future Movement leader MP Saad Hariri made a surprise return to Lebanon on Friday after a more than three-year absence, one of his close allies, Interior Minister Ashraf Rifi, declared that Lebanon thereafter would be markedly different from Lebanon thitherto.

Five days later, Future officials claim that transformation is already well underway, telling NOW the former prime minister has rapidly and tangibly reasserted his grip on both his party and his broader Sunni Muslim support base, fringes of which had, in his absence, drifted away from Future’s brand of religious moderation toward hardline Islamist and even jihadist rivals.

“I think he did a lot of things in a very brief period of time,” said Future MP Bassem al-Shab. “First of which was putting the house in order. What happened in Arsal threatened to create a Sunni-Sunni rift […] and he wanted to take care of this and I think he did to a large extent.”

Referring to Future hardliners such as MP Muhammad Kabbara, who were initially critical of the Lebanese Army’s conduct in fighting jihadist militants in the border town of Arsal last week, but later expressed support for the military, Shab told NOW, “The dissonant voices […] who criticized the army were quickly silenced, and in the [internal] meeting when [Hariri] said we should support the army unconditionally, there were no [objections].”

In tandem with this political move, said Shab, was a shakeup within the Sunni religious establishment, effected by the election Sunday of a new grand mufti – the community’s top cleric – in place of a predecessor who for years had been at odds with allies of the Future Movement.

“The election of the new mufti,” Shab told NOW, and the presence of both his predecessor and leading non-Future Sunni figures such as former Prime Minister Najib Miqati, furthered “Sunni harmony,” attaining a degree of “reconciliation with the people who opposed him while he was away.”

This double victory, on both the political and religious fronts, puts Hariri in a stronger position within the Sunni community than had been the case just a week ago, analysts told NOW. “Hariri proved that he is the only zaeem [chief] of the Sunnis,” said commentator Mustafa Fahs.

In terms of practical steps going forward, sources told NOW that in addition to overseeing the Saudi Arabian donation of $1bn to the Lebanese Army – his officially-stated reason for returning – Hariri will also implement an economic regeneration program for underdeveloped and marginalized regions that have in the past been susceptible to extremist currents.

“He will provide political and financial support to regions in need, as has already happened in Arsal,” said Future MP Ahmad Fatfat, referring to Hariri’s $15m donation Monday to the war-damaged town.

Hariri himself also pledged Tuesday to “spare no effort to rehabilitate prisons,” in a presumed reference to the notorious Roumieh prison, where dozens of Islamist militants are held, and which has seen numerous inmate escapes in recent years. In June, members of the jihadist Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) faction reportedly called for the release of Islamist prisoners from Roumieh.

Beyond these initiatives, Hariri’s principal next move will be to “continue negotiations with all Lebanese parties” on resolving key domestic issues ranging from presidential and parliamentary elections to the public sector wage increase debate, according to Fatfat and Shab.

Indeed, Hariri’s return is aimed more at creating a conciliatory and functional political environment in the country than implementing any specific, point-by-point action plan, according to a ministerial source who has met Hariri since his arrival and requested anonymity as he is not authorized to speak to the press.

“I didn’t hear of a specific action plan,” said the source. “For the time being it’s more ‘macro’ politics than ‘micro’ politics.”

Either way, for his part, the ministerial source told NOW he expected little of much significance to result from Hariri’s efforts, owing to obstinacy from Future’s rivals in the ‘March 8’ bloc.

“From what I’m seeing and hearing, I don’t think much will happen,” he told NOW. “The status quo is still the same […] The question is, did the comeback generate enough momentum for other parties to move on, to meet Hariri in the middle? Until now, I don’t see this.”

“And prolonging the mandate of parliament is a bad sign that nothing is expected in the near future,” he added, referring to proposals earlier this week – now effectively backed by Hariri – to once again extend parliamentarians’ terms beyond their constitutional expiry dates.

However, Shab, by contrast, told NOW he saw room for progress in a subtle but substantial shift in Iran’s stance vis-à-vis Lebanon.

“Hariri’s return comes also in [a time] of Iranian flexibility,” said Shab, claiming Tehran has lately sought to defuse sectarian tensions inside the country. “Everybody made sure that [Hariri’s] return was welcome.”

“There is something that has changed not only on this side [i.e. March 14] but also on the other side.”

Myra Abdallah contributed reporting.

The battle for Rifi's successor

[Originally posted at NOW]

That former Prime Minister Najib Miqati brought down his own cabinet on Friday over a failure to agree on the leadership of Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces (ISF) is testament to the extraordinary political significance of the position. As NOW reported last week, MPs from the March 14 coalition as well as the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) had urged cabinet to extend the term of current director-general Major General Ashraf Rifi, who is seen as a political ally of theirs. When the cabinet majority loyal to March 14’s rivals Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement opposed the idea in a session last Friday, Miqati announced his resignation.

March 14 is still attempting to extend Rifi’s term, presenting parliament speaker Nabih Berri with a proposed draft law Wednesday that would put the issue to parliament in its next session. But in the event that such efforts fail – as Rifi himself has suggested they will – then a fierce battle over Rifi’s successor may follow.

In the wake of Miqati’s resignation, allegations emerged from sources including PSP leader Walid Jumblatt that the March 8 coalition had pushed for controversial former ISF head Gen. Ali al-Hajj to replace Rifi. Indeed, al-Hajj himself proclaimed his entitlement to the position on Saturday. ISF sources, by contrast, told NOW that, according to internal procedure, the post would go to Rifi’s deputy, Inspector Gen. Roger Salem.

From March 14’s perspective, few candidates could be less welcome than al-Hajj, whose tensions with the Future Movement date back over more than a decade. Head of security for former PM Rafiq Hariri since 1992, Hajj had come to be distrusted by Hariri over time due to his close ties with Syrian military intelligence. He was thus fired in 2000, after which Syria appointed him head of the ISF in the Beqaa. By 2004, he had risen to the ISF premiership, and incurred Hariri’s further suspicions by reducing his personal protection unit from 40 officers to 8. When Hariri was assassinated in a car bomb the following year, al-Hajj was accused of tampering with evidence at the crime scene, and was arrested in a pre-dawn raid on the orders of Detlev Mehlis, commissioner of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) into Hariri’s killing. Though he was eventually released from prison in 2009 due to lack of evidence, there remains a conviction in March 14 and other circles that he was not fully innocent, with Walid Jumblatt saying Friday that he continues to “consider him politically involved in [Hariri’s] assassination.”

Accordingly, should al-Hajj secure nomination to the post, it would likely provoke major objections from March 14. “Al-Hajj cannot take over this position,” Future MP Ahmad Fatfat told NOW. “If we imagine the scenario of al-Hajj coming back to power, we are imagining the return of the Syrian intelligence dominance era.”

On the same question, Democratic Renewal (Tajaddod) Movement former MP Mosbah al-Ahdab – who, as an early opponent of Syria’s occupation of Lebanon, has had his own run-ins with the Damascus regime – told NOW that, “unfortunately, March 8 is trying to put their hands on all the security institutions in Lebanon, and this is not correct and not viable.”

Without a cabinet currently in place, however, it’s unclear how al-Hajj would actually obtain nomination. On Wednesday, NOW met with former judicial police commander Gen. Anwar Yehya at the ISF’s military beach club in Ras Beirut, who said ISF rules clearly dictate that, as the next-highest ranking official after Rifi, Inspector Gen. Roger Salem will take over as director-general when Rifi steps down on April 1st, until Salem himself reaches the maximum age of 59 on June 13th. Al-Hajj’s claims that he outranks Salem, Yehya added, were invalidated by an April 13th, 2005 decree to cancel al-Hajj’s ISF position and move him to the Interior Ministry.

“The only way for al-Hajj to become director-general is if a cabinet is formed and it meets and agrees to appoint him by a two-thirds majority,” Yehya told NOW. By implication, the March 8 coalition would need to make up at least two-thirds of the next cabinet – a prospect that looks improbable amid the various current proposals for non-partisan “unity,” “salvation,” and technocratic cabinets.

Assuming al-Hajj is not appointed, there remains the question of who will replace Salem in June. Yehya told NOW that, as next-highest in rank, the post would go to Brigadier Gen. Ibrahim Basbous, who will remain eligible for office for another year at his current rank, and two more if he is promoted to Major General.

While Yehya declined to discuss the political leanings of Salem and Basbous, he remarked that Rifi is unlikely to have appointed successors to whom he is personally opposed.

If this is the case, the ISF may well remain amicable to March 14 for the foreseeable future after all.

Yara Chehayed contributed reporting.

March 14 scrambles to keep top security ally

[Originally posted at NOW]

In an abrupt departure from wrangling over electoral laws, MPs from the Future Movement along with their March 14 allies and Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party have made urgent attempts this week to pass a draft law that would raise the mandatory retirement age for top security officials, several of whom would otherwise be forced to step down later this year.

These officials include 59-year-old army chief General Jean Qahwaji and Internal Security Forces (ISF) head Major General Ashraf Rifi, who will turn 59 in April – the maximum age for the post. The draft law would extend both men’s terms for another three years.

President Michel Suleiman submitted the bill to cabinet on Thursday. Rifi himself expressed doubts Friday that it would pass cabinet, saying it “needs the approval of two thirds of the ministers and this is not possible because more than half of them object to an extension of my term.” Both Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), who collectively occupy 9 out of 30 seats, have explicitly opposed the proposal, arguing the government should appoint successors to the posts. Should Rifi’s extension be rejected and a successor not appointed, Rifi indicated his deputy Brigadier General Roger Salem would replace him – though Salem, himself, is due to reach retirement age this year. Rifi could not be reached for comment.

The loss of Rifi would be taken by March 14 as a significant setback. Though the movement’s leaders have officially touted the draft law as a non-partisan move to preserve national stability, few observers are in doubt that their priority is keeping Rifi in place, and indeed one Future MP admitted as much to NOW.

“After the [October 19, 2012] assassination of [ISF Information Branch head Brigadier General] Wissam al-Hassan, our security is exposed to many factors and parties, and Rifi is bravely filling his station,” said MP Ahmad Fatfat. “We trust Rifi and need him in this position. If someone is trying to move Rifi away, then he is definitely part of the assassination process, and he wants us as March 14 to be exposed,” he added, in a likely reference to Hezbollah and the FPM.

“Even Jumblatt is feeling the need for this extension,” added Fatfat, referring to the former March 14 firebrand (and long-rumored assassination target) whose party now has three ministers in the March 8-aligned cabinet. Echoing the official March 14 line, Jumblatt says his support for Rifi’s extension derives from general security concerns.

Rifi’s close ties to March 14, and the Future Movement in particular, have long been something of an open secret. “There’s a certain balance in security, based on the fact that some institutions are controlled by March 8 and others are controlled by March 14,” said former Tripoli MP Mosbah al-Ahdab of the Democratic Renewal (Tajaddod) Movement. “[Rifi] is one of the main people representing [March 14].”

This is further borne out in the US embassy cables leaked in 2010, which generally portray Rifi as a determined opponent of the Syrian regime and its key Lebanese ally, Hezbollah. The cables also make clear that sees himself and the ISF he helped build as locked in a “race against time” to neutralize the threats he believes these parties pose to Lebanon. Former US ambassador Jeffrey Feltman wrote of the ISF’s “connections to [Future Movement leader] Saad Hariri and its heavily Sunni (i.e., essentially anti-Hizballah [sic]) officer ranks.” Such ‘connections’ may even be military – one cable from 2008 quotes Jumblatt claiming that Rifi was assisting Hariri in amassing a 15,000-strong militia. In the same year, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea also reportedly told former US chargé d’affaires Michele Sison that both he and Jumblatt were trying to buy ammunition from Rifi for their own militias.

Whatever the exact nature of Rifi’s ties to March 14, the bloc evidently deems him an invaluable asset – a fact which analysts say reflects the top-heavy structure of Lebanese security institutions in general.

“This demonstrates the continuing importance of individual authorities within the Lebanese security architecture,” said Elias Muhanna, assistant professor at Brown University and author of the Qifa Nabki blog. “There is no such thing as institutional memory in these intelligence branches; the inner circle is extremely small and therefore extremely valuable.”

Indeed, this heavy reliance on individuals is a key weakness of the system that requires reform, according to Ahdab.

“I think this all needs to be reviewed,” he told NOW. “Because prolonging the mandate for Rifi also means maintaining the same security structure and renewing other [security] positions. So the question is do we want to renew this, or would we like to change it?”

“Of course, we’d like to change it. Perhaps the timing is not right. But definitely this is not the solution; this is prolonging a situation where the state is absolutely losing ground and not controlling what is happening.”

“We saw that starting in Tripoli, and now it’s spreading all over Lebanon.”

Yara Chehayed contributed reporting.