THERE IS NOTHING WRONG WITH TAX HAVENS

One of the most interesting discussions among the economists and policy experts is a debate about the role of tax havens and offshore destinations that compete with other nations in the areas of taxes, regulation and investor protection. The opponents of tax havens believe that tax havens cause an enormous damage to the economies on the other side of the world since (in their opinion), tax havens are the fundamental reason for the lack of reinvestment and capital flight in onshore economies. The real reason why tax havens are prosecuted by governments is that governement agents seek the highest possible utility from tax revenues in the form of rent-seeking that would yield more power and revenue.

Taxes and Regulation

There are two reasons for high tax rates. One is that in case of high government spending, the structure of tax rates must be high enough to avoid excessive deficit spending that could impair domestic macroeconomic stability. First, the real threat to macroeconomic stability is not deficit but the size of government spending. Also, excessive deficit spending is a threat to domestic macroeconomic stability because of the so called crowding-out effect where high government spending crowds out investment in the private sector. The net outcome is higher interest rate that arises from an increased scarcity of investment that is caused by budget deficit and high government spending. Second, the basic assertion of the Laffer curve is that high tax rates produce a bulk of negative effect. For example, when Sweden had the highest marginal tax rate in the world excessing 80 percent, the net result had been a decreasing tax revenue and when marginal tax rate were reduced, tax revenue soared. However, the real aim of tax rate reduction is not the growth of government revenue but welfare and the right of taxpayers to use the disposable income they earn. Empirical evidence suggests that prudent macroeconomic discipline such as principles of low tax burden, limited spending and adherence of price stability by the central bank result in the improvement of conditions for economic growth and stabilization process regardless of asymmetric shocks. What about regulation? Government regulate for two reasons. First, to remove the negative effects of market imperfections and second, to insure public goods. However, predatory tax rates, the growth of tax burden and the regulation of the private sector are designed seek monopoly rents in an unregulated way. While sound regulation can certainly offset the sideblocks of negative externalities such as free-riding, excessive regulation is hampering the growth of real productivity which is essential to the standard of living and the quality of life.

Tax Havens

Dan Mitchell recently explained (link) the positive role of tax havens in a global economy. From a basic perspective, minimal tax burden in tax havens is a liberalizing force in the world economy since, given capital mobility and the fluidity of knowledge, destinations with higher corporate and personal income tax burden have no choice but to reduce tax rates on productive behavior. Flat tax revolution, that was initiated by Estonia in early 1990s, also helped reduce corporate tax rates in continental Europe and Scandinavia. Given the lack of data, there are hardly any empirical studies researching the impact of tax rate reductions on tax revenue. When Swedish economy faced an onerous macroeconomic instability marred by high inflation, low output growth, declining productivity growth and a sudden dramatic increase in the interest rate (to 500 percent overnight) by Riksbank, top marginal tax rate was 84 percent. Consequently, economic growth decline and public spending grew and shrank into deficit, pushing the real interest rate up, as explained by crowding-out effect (link). When the economy is on the line of potential output, expansionary fiscal policy boosted money demand which, in turn, induced the increase in the real and nominal interest rate. As a consequence, Swedish economy faced a declining investment. Firstly, because corporate tax rate was excessive and secondly, because crowding-out effect took place. Regarding tax havens, supply-side economic and tax policies induced the trend of lowering tax rates on all sources of productivity ranging from investment, savings and entrepreneurship to labor supply. Concerning regulation, high corporate tax rate and excessive regulation usually go hand in hand since the regulation of the private sector is mostly an implicit insurance against the loss of control and - hence - the loss of tax revenue that is needed to finance government spending.
Empirical observation

I took a closer view on the comparative analysis of tax havens and onshore jurisdictions that impose higher mandatory tax rates on corporate and personal income tax as well as more excessive regulation. I downloaded the data from World Bank's Governance (link) and used a correlation analysis tool to analyze related motions of corporate tax rate, the rule of law and regulatory quality on each of these variables. An important note is that it depends on what is meant by 'regulatory quality' since World Bank oftenly criticizes tax havens. Concerning governance, tax havens scored lower than Germany and Austria - countries with high and almost punitive corporate tax rate. Despite a shaddy and imperialist fiscal agression on Liechtenstein, Germany still enjoys an enormously high score on the rule of law and regulation. However, I did not take a detailed look at methodological details even though I can say that there are extreme bias towards what regulatory quality really is.

This chart, for instance, shows a log-linear relationship between corporate income tax and regulatory quality. Considering trend line - estimated by a polynomial of second degree, countries with higher corporate income tax also have sounder regulation. But, if you take a closer look, it can be seen that trend line declines slightly in the area where there is a high concentration of countries (France, Spain, Belgium, Germany...). From WB's data, a curious reasearcher would conclude that higher taxes are good and tax havens have a tighter regulatory quality. However, the relationship in the chart is intuitive since R-square is 0,0436 which means that the variation of the independent variable explains only 4,36 of the variation of the dependent variable.


This chart(log-linearization of the relationship between corporate tax rate and the rule of law) shows that countries with high corporate income tax rate also have comparatively decreased rule of law. Again, it all depends on what is meant under the rule of law. For example, if offshore services are legally recognized in Cayman Islands, and if World Bank's governance methodology treats that as irresponsible, then Caymans will receive a lower score on the rule of law. As you can see, Iceland has the highest rule of law and a modest corporate tax rate (16 percent down from 18 percent). Interestingly, Netherlands Antilles are a tax haven more in terms of regulation and information disclosure than in terms of taxes since 34 percent corporate tax rate seems to be highly sensitive to the rule of law. In fact, many so-called tax havens have a higher rule of law than continental countries. For instance, Cayman Islands have a higher rule of law than Spain, Singapore has a higher rule of law than Germany, Belgium and France etc.

As a conclusion, tax havens are the force of liberalization in the global economy and when surveys (such as WB's) are conducted, it's good to review the methodology and measurement of particular indicators. There are bias everywhere.

Rok Spruk is an economist.

IRELAND'S HIGH PERSONAL TAX RATES

Despite an attractive corporate tax scheme, Ireland suffers from punitive taxation of personal income. Indeed, throughout the years of pro-growth reforms that turned a lagging economy into a high-growing Celtic tiger, Irish policymakers reduced top personal income tax from 65 percent to 42 percent. Despite a significant reduction in top personal income tax rates, Ireland's personal tax regime remains quite unfavorable. Sunday Business Post recently reported how low-tax jurisdictions such as Portugal where no capital gains tax is charged, Bermuda, Monaco, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands attract successful individuals, tax exiles and lure direct investment.

AUSTRALIA - TAX HAVEN?

Here is an article from The Age describing the systemic intentions to turn Australia into fund management tax haven. As a jurisdiction with the enforcement of tax competition, Australia could attract a singificant inflow of foreign direct investment into various investment funds, depending on the legal requirements set-up by the legislation.

The negative comments on international and intranational tax competition include distorting views hardly matched by contemporary findings and conclusions from research on these particular issues. Lower public expenditure are not inefficient. In fact, numerous empirical and evident studies have confirmed the positive correlation between lower spending and higher growth of output.

On the revenue side, lower tax rates on corporate income significantly affect the amount of collected tax revenue. The evidence has shown, that lower tax rate on corporate income as a source of productive behavior, leads to higher tax revenue in the share of the GDP. In addition, many members of the OECD have significantly lowered tax rates on corporate and also individual income and none of the negatively asserted consequences occured. Ireland lower the corporate tax to 12,5 percent, and tax revenue jumped to record highs. It also had a positive implication on the inflow of foreign direct investment.

A research by US economists Mihit Desai, Fritz Foley, and James Hines (here, here and here) has shown that the relocation of investment capital into low-tax jursidictions actively stimulates the investment level in nearby high-tax jurisdictions. As firms located into tax havens retain higher relative after-tax return, they can maintain a significantly higher level of direct investment than otherwise.

INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION

International tax competition occurs when individuals and firms can reduce tax burden by shifting the supply of labor and capital from high-tax destination to low-tax jurisdiction. Fiscal rivalry encourages individuals and companies to move to the destination that penalizes effort and entrepreneurship less than high-tax jursidictions, leading to greater efficiency in work, savings and investment. Low tax burden, perceived as a percentage of the GDP, enhances economic performance and competitive pressures significantly improve the allocation of productive resources and thus promote efficiency and generate higher standard of living.

Selected reading:
Bermuda 'A Top Five Financial Centre, Tax-news, London 02 May 2007 (link)
Daniel Mitchell: The Economics of Tax Competition: Harmonization vs. Liberalization, 2004 (link)
Richard Teather: The Benefits of Tax Competition, 2005 (link)

MULTINATIONALS, TAXES AND COMPETITIVENESS

Here is a report from Financial Times:

"Multinational companies with US subsidiaries could face huge new tax bills under a law passing through the US Congress. The new measure, known as the Doggett law after the Texas Democrat who proposed it, aims to prevent international companies avoiding US tax when they transfer funds from the US to parent groups via countries with favourable tax treaties, such as the UK and the Netherlands. At present, companies with headquarters in countries that have no US tax treaty, such as Taiwan and Singapore, can avoid a 30 per cent tax on funds transferred from US subsidiaries by setting up a unit in countries with favourable treaties. Congressional Democrats say the legislation is focused on “tax haven hideaways”."

Source: US tax bill set to hit multinationals, Financial Times, August 19 2007 (link)

A new tax hike on multinationals introduced by the U.S. Congressman could seriously hurt job creation and force multinationals to leave the U.S. despite some of the particular competitive advantages of the business environment in the U.S. such as sound access to venture capital. The performance of multinational companies in areas such as value-added and venture formation crucially depends on tax rates hiking capital gains, corporate income and savings. In fact, net direct investment and capital inflows into low-tax and offshore jurisdictions reflect the attractiveness of particular locations to invest and transfer investment funds into the most favorable place with regard to corporate strategies undertaken by multinational companies.

Penalities levied on setting up business units in jurisdictions with non-punitive tax regime, would certainly force capital and investment managers to avoid taxes through unfavorable results such as less job creation as a measure to fight resisting cost pressures caused by the introducing particular tax bills on companies seeking to maximize growth and output in jurisdictions with lower statutory rates on corporate income and private equity.

Nevertheless, taxation of private equity has distorting effects on decision-making where and how to allocate investment resources in particular to maximize the output and return on equity. In fact, there is a numerous evidence that outsourcing benefits outward company performance and provides opportunities to investors and offshore/onshore service supply. Obviously politicians do not know that multinational companies frequently run several business units and that particular domestic markets do not neccessarily offer suitable or attractive access to particular capital and investment funds and that restricting access to international markets could result in a lack-luster performance of multinationals and consequently, in the loss of gains from competitiveness and access to provide liqudity and additional funds to fuel growth and perform the business strategy.