Duke Deluca - formerly of MNSTC-I J7

Saw the General Officer appointments this last week and its with pleasure that I noted the Col Peter "Duke" Deluca (USACE) was promoted to General Officer. Duke was the chief of the MNSTC-I J7 shop in Iraq in 2004-2005. He was a highly respected officer and motivator for his organization and he was amoung those active component members that recieved the 98th Division USAR soldiers and made them excell in their duties.

I have respect for Duke and know he will do well in his assignment at the Corp of Engineers. (I had a two month assignment with them for Hurricane Katrina and can vouch for the organization) Duke - congratulations to you - well deserved.

You can see his bio here

MNSTC-I cases its colors

My unit in Iraq has ceased operations – this information from Army describes the inactivation which occurred on New Year’s Day;

Lt. Gen. Michael D. Barbero, commander of Multi-National Security and Transition Command-Iraq commander rendered final honors and cased MNSTC-I’s colors, signifying the commands’ official inactivation.

“Though we are activating a new headquarters today,” said Odierno, USF-I commanding general, “the support we give our Iraqi partners will be no different than they received under MNF-I.”

MNF-I was established May 15, 2004, taking over command for Combined Joint Task Force 7 to handle all strategic-level operations for coalition forces contributing to OIF.

“Troops from 30 different countries served in the Multi-National Force-Iraq,” Air Force Maj. Dennis Kruse, master of ceremonies, said at the ceremony. The major subordinate commands included MNC-I, MNSTC-I, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq, and TF 38, he added.

Along with MNF-I, MNC-I was also activated May 15, 2004, as the operational-level headquarters overseeing multi-national divisions and forces in Iraq, which included Multi-National Divisions North, South, and Baghdad, Multi- National Force-West, 13th Expeditionary Support Command and Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, as well as 13 separate task forces, brigades and battalion-sized organizations.

To organize, train and equip Iraq’s military and police forces, MNSTC-I was established on June 28, 2004. Working closely with the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior, MNSTC-I assisted in forming more than 250 Army and police battalions throughout the country.

“We’ve made tremendous strides together since the dark days of 2006, 2007,” Petraeus said. “The number of attacks per day, including Iraqi data, has been reduced from well over 200 per day in 2007, to fewer than 15 per day in recent months.”

I guess that means the mission of those organizations is done. From the time we in the 98th Divisioin (USAR) arrived as the first staff and soldiers in MNSTC-I in September 2004 through inactivation in 2010 MNSTC-I accomplished a lot. A great share of the organization was staffed by Reserve soldiers throughout its history. I hope that the success of a bunch of individuals from the Army Reserve deploying to a wartime command and completing mission is not lost to time.

MNSTC-I is 5 years old

To think I was there nearly at the beginning … today I read that MNSTC-I “Minsticky” is 5 years old. I arrived at MNSTC-I in September 2004 just months after the LTG Petraeus took over the reins of the training effort for Iraq’s Military and Police forces. It was a tall order then and remains just as difficult as new requirements are born from the agreements with the Iraqi National Leadership. The article from MNSTC-I.

PHOENIX BASE, BAGHDAD - Coalition forces and NATO training mission military personnel gathered to celebrate the 234th birthday of the U. S. Army, established in June 1775; and the fifth anniversary of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, established this month in 2004.

The Command also pinned a streamer to its flag representing award by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, of the Joint Meritorious Unit Award. The JMU was presented to MNSTC-I for "exceptionally meritorious achievement" from May 1, 2007 to April 30, 2008.

MNSTC-I is the direct outgrowth of the need to create a new Iraqi Army. Subordinate to Multi-National Force - Iraq, the Command is responsible for assisting the Government of Iraq in providing for Iraq's internal security and external defense through the development of competent security ministries and professional, self-sufficient security forces that adhere to the rule of law.

I wish to congratulate MNSTC-I on 5 years, but don’t wish them many more…I’d love to hear the news that the mission is complete and the command’s flags are cased. So far the command has raised to the challenge, lets hope they are shortly successful in their task.

Reading History

I found this account of the 98th Division Action in support of MNSTC-I in 2004-2005. Its interesting to see how Historians have begun to record our actions in that period as well as see the perspective of what we knew was a significant challenge...I think we can take a sense of pride in the effort.

In the late summer and fall of 2004, the first group of advisors drawn from a US Army unit (as opposed to advisors drawn from individual volunteers or selectees) began to arrive in Iraq. Most of them were from the 98th Division (Institutional Training) or DIVIT, nicknamed the “Iroquois Warriors.”154 These Army Reserve Soldiers were cadres of senior NCOs and officers who in peacetime ran training schools and individual training programs for USAR and National Guard Soldiers. Major General James Helmly, chief of the USAR in 2003 and 2004, had begun studying the idea of deploying elements of a DIVIT in the late fall of 2003. Initially, the USAR, the Army G3, and the 98th Division discussed creating an organization known as the Foreign Army-Training Assistance Command (FA-TRAC) to conduct the mission. This organization would deploy to Iraq and provide the permanent command and control structure for other units and Soldiers involved in the ISF training program. Other Soldiers would form the ASTs that would conduct the training of Iraqi soldiers and mentoring of Iraqi units.

The training of foreign forces was not the designated mission for USAR institutional training divisions, and the Army never implemented the FA-TRAC concept because the establishment of MNSTC-I made it unnecessary. But Helmly tried hard to convince leaders on his own staff as well as those in the Department of the Army that the USAR could conduct the mission.155 The Army National Guard had assumed the mission of providing trainers for the Afghan Army training program in the summer of 2003, and Helmly admitted some institutional rivalry affected the process.156 To move the USAR closer to the point where it could play a major role in training the ISF, in May 2004 Helmly told Major General Bruce E. Robinson, commanding general of the 98th Division, to begin preparing for the mission.

The USAR proposed the concept of employing its units to man much of the new MNSTC-I organization to Lieutenant General Petraeus in the Pentagon on 2 June 2004, just days before he took command in Iraq. Petraeus approved the concept for further study. After a mission analysis by the 98th’s staff, a more complete plan was briefed to Major General Helmly on 15 June, and then to the Army G3, Lieutenant General Richard Cody, who approved it on 18 June 2004. Brigadier General Richard Sherlock, the assistant division commander of the 98th Division, and others in the USAR and 98th Division understood the mission to involve the establishment of training academies and individual training programs for the NIA at several locations. They also understood that the 98th would deploy a task-organized piece of the division that would be attached to MNSTC-I for the mission.157 The leaders of the 98th Division, however, found that more specific information about the details of the program was hard to come by in the Pentagon, especially because the inauguration of MNSTC-I focused attention and resources elsewhere.

Without a complete understanding of their mission, senior members of the division left for Iraq hoping to begin preparations for the arrival of their Soldiers. Colonel Frank Cipolla, a commander for an engineer basic training brigade in the division, led a three-man team to Iraq a week later as the advance party. Sherlock and nine others joined them for a reconnaissance and analysis of the mission from mid-July to early August. During their trip, the 98th’s leaders discovered that MNSTC-I already had a command and control structure in place and needed individuals, not units, to man that structure. They also learned that the 98th’s mission would begin with training new recruits and units, but that the division’s Soldiers assigned to the ASTs would stay with their Iraqi units after they graduated and became operational. This was a surprise and represented a dramatic increase in the scope of the mission for the 98th because it expanded their role from simply preparing new soldiers during their initial training to advising them in combat.158

Between late 2004 and late 2005 approximately 900 Soldiers of the 98th Division served in MNSTC-I as members of the command’s staff, as school instructors, and as advisors to Iraqi units. Iroquois Soldiers manned 31 of the first 39 ASTs envisioned for the initial three divisions of the Iraqi Army, the others were manned by the Marines and some by Coalition nations.159 Before deploying, these Reservists attended stateside training at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, to prepare for the mission. Many of them considered the training to be of limited value as the Army and the Atterbury trainers themselves were unfamiliar with the mission for which they were preparing the Iroquois Soldiers to perform. On arrival in Kuwait, they completed some theater-specific training before moving into Iraq; this training was more focused and useful.160 Once part of MNSTC-I, the members of the 98th Division worked through the growing pains of becoming comfortable with the enlarged scope of their mission. Some of them also endured open skepticism from Active Duty counterparts about their ability to do the advisory mission.161 The AST members met their new Iraqi recruits in basic training, trained with them to develop individual and unit skills, and then accompanied them after graduation on operational missions in 2005.

While they lacked the tactical experience of Soldiers from Active and National Guard combat units, Petraeus credited the Soldiers of the 98th Division with providing a much needed boost to MNSTC-I due to their expertise with building and operating the institutional training systems of a modern army. Although their experience was in training individual soldiers in a school setting, most Soldiers of the 98th Division made the transition to combat advisors successfully. They steadily developed tactical competence as they trained with their Iraqi units and then deployed with them into combat.162 For some in the division, it was obvious they had accepted a mission for which their previous experience had not prepared them, and a few had difficulty transitioning to the demands of advising units in combat. Still, the great majority adapted and felt they had shown how the USAR Soldier could meet the complex challenges posed by the Iraqi operational environment. Indeed, a large number of advisors from the 98th Division went into combat with their Iraqi units in major operations like AL FAJR in the city of Fallujah in November 2004.163 Command Sergeant Major Milt Newsome, who served in Iraq with the division in 2004–2005, expressed the pride felt by the Iroquois Warriors on their return, stating, “I’m very proud to be a member of the 98th Division because history will realize what the 98th Division and all those who supported us had to do, and did. . . . When all the ashes settle, you’ll see the silhouette of the 98th Division and you can say it was a job well done.164

As a result of the lessons learned in the fall of 2004, MNF-I and MNSTC-I began making major improvements to the advisor training and support programs. These changes took place outside the timeframe of this book, but they help highlight the challenges faced by the 98th Division and other Soldiers who were part of this initial wave of advisors. One of the first steps was to improve stateside mobilization training in early 2005. MNSTC-I also established the Phoenix Academy at Taji in early 2005 to provide a 10-day course conducted by members of the 98th Division focused on the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by existing advisor teams. In the spring of 2005 the Coalition also changed its term for unit advisor teams from AST to Military Transition Teams (MiTT) to better reflect their mission. Finally, MNSTC-I established the Iraqi Assistance Group in April 2005 to provide better command, control, and logistical support to US advisors working with Iraqi units after they transitioned from training under MNSTC-I control to the operational control of units in the MNC-I, the Coalition’s tactical command.

Soldiers in the next wave of advisors, for which the USAR’s 80th DIVIT formed the core, benefited from these improvements. But they too faced new challenges. The first wave of advisors had linked up with and trained their Iraqi units when they were first formed; thus, they were able to develop personal relationships with their Iraqi counterparts before conducting operations. Many advisors in the next wave reported to Iraqi units already in combat. Their learning curve was steep and time to build cohesion and trust was almost nonexistent. The Army continued in 2005 to find the right mix of training, personnel, techniques, and processes for advising the ISF.

MNSTC-I Life is different

Got a letter from a fellow soldier and Friend – “Sully” who remained in the Reserves and has subsequently been redeployed to Iraq. He sent me a note the other day with an update on the changes in Iraq and MNSTC-I sine we first arrived there in September 2004.

Hey Stan,

Talking about you yesterday so had to write. One of my teams found a few conex's full of electrical equipment, new construction stuff, so I contacted the local 20th Engineer Brigade, a fairly massive unit which is the MiTT for the Iraqi Engineers, and sent an email to their commander to find out if any of his Battalions could use the stuff before it gets destroyed. Turns out its Duke DeLuca!

Duke was the J-7 at MNSTC-I in 2004-2005 and a spectacular team builder. He is now the Commander of the 20th Engineer Brigade.

Sully discusses greetings from Duke and some details of events in MNSTC-I then goes on to say

I'm commanding a Task Force which consists entirely of 100 US Airforce personnel who go FOB to FOB cleaning up excess material, vehicles, supplies, weapons, and whatnot. It is simple command but pays two college tuitions, plus I'm at my leisure to travel as I wish, but only by air! Quite a different tour than our last.

Our last tour we traveled by unarmored SUV to start then gradually received armored HUMMVs. Sully and I were very well traveled in country due to our assignments. About MNSTC-I

Did you know MNSTC-I now has 15 general officers!!! Phoenix base is one of only two bases in the Green Zone by year's end (plus the new Embassy Complex) and has its own housing, mess hall, and every building is 2 stories plus! Hardly recognizable. The Phoenix base actually extends to include the liberty pool in its compound! Our old housing is all gone. The green zone should be no more by early next year. Life sure is different. Take care.

Yes life is different – We had 3 Generals in MNSTC-I when we were there. One being LTG Petreaus at the time now there are 15 billets…wow!! The Green Zone was pretty extensive and definitely rustic as compared to accommodations at Victory Base. We were the outpost in the middle of Baghdad at the time.

I have since retired after my return and a last assignment to Hurricane Katrina cleanup. I have a daughter over in Iraq now…I have taken a cheerleader/ armchair quarterback position now. In that light the note from Sully made me reflect that there are still thousands of individual contributions being made with little fanfare in Iraq and I’d thought I’d offer a glimpse into this one.

Old article about Wingnut and Stinky

Wingnut and Stinky were two soldiers assigned to the MNSTC-I J-7 convoy team that provided their services to the team doing missions throughout Iraq. This team and I spent a lot of time together going to virtually every corner of Iraq looking to put in place Iraqi military installations. I read this article when it was done by one of my fellow officers during our assignment to MNSTC-I. He was a published author before arriving in country and based on what I read, a hell of a writer - Bob Bateman.

I thought I'd share the article which reflects another person's observations of what a typical day in country was like for all of us... it is still fresh in my mind... but brings smiles in a silly kind of way when faced with the stress of civilian life

• April 25, 2005

Name: Maj. Bob Bateman
Dateline: Baghdad, Iraq

Riding with Wingnut and Stinky

“Whaddya see?! Whaddya SEE?!” shouted the driver of the HMMWV.

We were traveling at ‘best speed,’ which in this particular vehicle meant about 55 miles per hour. Not exactly a screaming top-end, but still about 5-10 mph faster than the majority of the cars around us. Ahead we could see traffic was at a standstill. On the highways of Iraq, for Americans, coming to a stop on the road can become permanent.

“Hey! Stinky! What do you SEE?!”

‘Stinky’ responds, “Looks like…looks like, yea, it’s a convoy or something. They’re stopping traffic.” The reply was barely audible. Shouted down through the gunner’s hatch in the roof of our gun-truck, it competed with the road noise of a fully-loaded HMMWV. Stinky’s head is a full nine feet above the roadway. He can see obstacles beyond what the driver can pick up from his seat at road level. Already we were slowing.

Speaking into the radio my driver checks behind us, “Wingnut, what do you see?” “Wingnut” is the gunner in the second gun-truck. He is in the Air Force.

“Nothing back here,” comes the reply over the hand-held.

Decision time.

Not just one decision, but a host of them, had to be made. In sequence. Fast.

Drive onto the median or push towards the center lane? Nudge that red car out of our way? Right or left? Force the car that has now reversed track and is heading towards us to the right or the left? Can he make it on the left? If we shove this next white car, will he be pinned against that truck beside him, or will he give way and create a hole for us to slip through? Doesn’t that guy hear us? Warning shot from the gunner’s M-4 or throw a rock? (The horns on HMMWVs are lame so sometimes drivers do not hear us coming up from behind. Stinky has a bag with small rocks up there on the roof for this purpose. We prefer not to shoot into the sky. What goes up, must come down after all.) Shit, that one was a wedding. Give them room. Give them that much. On and on. Another wedding caravan. Another rock thrown to get a black mini-van blocking us to move aside. Are they doing it on purpose? Are they running a ‘post’ on us for somebody else? Look left. Right. Rear. One thing overrides all. We must keep moving.

Our lead driver is aggressive. A few times I think about telling him to slow, to give these Iraqis all around us the chance to get out of our way, to stop if need be and let them make room. I think better of it.

The day before, a few miles from here, a friend of mine found himself in a similar situation. My friend is one of the best combat leaders I know, a soldier and a scholar. He is also one of the most intelligent, most humane and caring men that I know. He stopped his convoy. Seconds later the gunner of the HMMWV ahead of his was blown out of the hatch and into the roadway, bleeding to death from an IED planted to take advantage of exactly that situation. His Sergeant Major was wounded too.

I think of them and I keep my mouth, mostly, shut. This platoon I am riding with, a platoon nobody ever imagined might exist, is working just fine without the Major opening his big mouth. It is a platoon with a Marine Master Sergeant, and enlisted men from the Air Force and the Navy, as well as the Army. I am an Army officer, the senior officer on the patrol. Ultimately, if something goes wrong, the responsibility is mine. But this conglomerate platoon, created of necessity and welded by reality, works well as a team. We move. We do what we can to not to cause harm, but we move. I bite my tongue.

Sometimes, to be a good officer, all you need to know is when to shut up.

BAGHDAD WITHIN EARSHOT:

This past weekend the temperature was the end of what I think of as “human hot.” After this it becomes “animal hot.” Around about July we’ll hit “Satanic.” It was 105 degrees in the shade, and about 120 in the sun today.

A single mortar came in nearby as I went in to work the other day. Car bombs are obviously still climbing, but I read about most of them the same way that you do. I would personally very much appreciate it if the Iraqis would form a government. I am willing to be patient, however, since I realize how long it took our own first government to get its act together. Given that that process was measured in years, though it was done by men we consider today to be our nigh-unto-godlike “Founding Fathers,” I would be ungenerous to complain about the pace here.

Beanie Babies lead the way

I was amused to see the quote yesterday in the Army’s Stand-to E-Mail newsletter

SENIOR LEADERS ARE SAYING

“Relationships are what this is all about. I think, in truth, relationships are what everything is all about, whether our own home life or international relations. And all we are trying to do is, sort of, one handshake at a time or one smile at a time, one Beanie Baby at a time, to add a little joy and strength to this relationship.”

--Gen. David H. Petraeus, emphasizing the importance of relationships in achieving common goals in Iraq.

As a member of GEN Petraeus’s MNSTC-I staff I had the opportunity to develop relationships with many Iraqi people…at the Ministry level and out in the countryside. A tenet constantly reinforced in every transaction, meeting and event in MNSTC-I was the partnership aspect in creating conditions for success in Iraq.

I happened to receive a case of Beanie Babies from a co-worker stateside while in Iraq and took the opportunity to hand them out as I did to this little guy. It seemed natural to treat the Iraqi’s with respect and friendship in the environment at MNSTC-I. GEN Petraeus knew we often gave stuff out at the various sites…he demanded fairness and partnership with Iraqis and their Leadership for all members of the command.

If we could apply his model on a larger scale – the ability to add a little joy and strength to a relationship - we just may prevail.

U.S. Didn't Track Weapons

Once again there is the continued witch hunt regarding the accountability of weapons within MNSTC-I as noted in the Associated Press Report: U.S. Didn't Track Weapons For Iraqis written by By Richard Lardner. In the article the issue that has been known of the thousands of rifles, pistols, sets of body armor, vehicles and radios, along with millions of rounds of ammunition, had been delivered to Iraqis which could not be accounted for.

As I have said previously in this Blog that we were pushed to deliver an equipped Iraqi Army and security force from Scratch (thanks to decisions made in March 2004). In the headlong push to arm Iraqi forces we did not adequately keep good records. For what its worth, there still is no regulatory guidance for just what exactly is the prescribed standard for such accountability. What we know in hindsight is that an accountant today cannot reconstruct with the records what happened to 190,000 weapons according to one audit.

An October 2006 audit by the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction said there was "questionable accuracy" and "incomplete accountability" in the way MNSTC-I managed weapons. Again – the luxury of detailed recordkeeping in a war zone with a foreign military is not an easy task by any standard.

What I like is the response from Retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton

He expected the inspector general would find that there were too few people to handle the enormous influx of weapons and money into the country. One of the greatest irritants to me was watching the Pentagon cooking along at full strength while we in Iraq were running on a very thin personnel shoestring.

MG Eaton preceded Gen Petraeus and has made an accurate but overlooked observation.

I stated in my Blog previously that in MNSTC-I we were pressed to do many things quickly, not with quality…. Americans, Politicians and the Press all expected performance that continues to prove elusive. As MG Eaton says further in the article

There have never been enough people, and there has never been enough bureaucratic support and effort to do this thing properly

And I have noted before that Gen Petraeus said many times in country to those of us on his staff “this experience is like building an aircraft that is already in flight."

The 20-20 hindsight of those that were not there is not really in focus in my mind... It should be filtered through the effort and intent.

Iraqi Security Force Training

The News from Iraq reflects the reports from an independent Commission created by congress that estimates it will take at least 12-18 Months before Iraq’s Army and Police can take charge of their country.

A report by an independent commission created by Congress says that it will be at least 12 to 18 months before Iraq’s army and police can take charge of the country’s security. The 20-member commission, headed by Gen. James L. Jones of the Marines, now retired, found that the Iraqi armed forces, especially the army, were steadily improving but still suffering from “limited operational effectiveness, according to a copy of the panel’s report that was being circulated Wednesday in advance of its formal release. David Cloud, New York Times, September 6, 2007

In my mind, that assessment bears some correlation to my own observations that we continue to train countless Iraqis and don’t witness their effective utilization. MNSTC-I effectively trains candidates for these forces but there exists a revolving door in units for the soldiers who often do not last at duty locations in the field when placed under local (Iraqi) control. We don’t control implementation and retention of the number of Police and soldiers already trained in country. That remains under Iraqi control entirely. The losses and continued waste of trained Iraqi Soldiers and Police is due to continued sectarian purging of the ranks, corruption of the government and Interior Ministries and to a lesser extent the Ministry of Defense in Iraq.

Its easy to be critical of the senior Iraqi Military and its establishment until you realize that it was formed from absolutely nothing. What we take for granted – senior well experienced and seasoned officer and NCOs in our forces does not exist in large scale in Iraq in the Military or Police. The basic command and control functions, to include logistical planning and support were vaporized and will take time to re-establish. All of these tasks have been approached concurrent with the fight in Iraq by MNSTC-I. as quoted to many in MNSTC-I “its like building an airplane while in flight”

Couple the nascent infrastructure difficulties with a “less than capable and new government subjected to serious rifts and divides” and you have a significant challenge within any timeline.

Is the assessment correct? Probably understates the time required if Iraqi institutional issues are not resolved quickly. Replacing large blocks of the Iraqi security forces and retraining new will result in the same inefficiencies if the handover of newly trained forces continues to a government that is unable to resolve sectarian and corruption difficulties. That is the root of the issue that must be addressed to improve the effectiveness of the security forces in Iraq.

The book has come out

In August 2004 I was one of the 98th Division Iroquois soldiers call up to deploy to Iraq as part of MNSTC-I. I went to work with the soldiers mentioned in the book Iroquois Warriors in Iraq published by the Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The book was put together by Steven Clay. As noted in the forward to the book:

Prior to 2004, a US Army Reserve institutional training division had never deployed overseas to a theater of operations, nor were they designed to function as unit trainers and combat advisors. The author highlights the challenges faced by the 98th Division as it trained for and deployed to Iraq for this unusual mission. Among those challenges were how to train and prepare for the mission, who to send, how to integrate reservists into the new Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), and whether to deploy the 98th as a unit or as a collection of individual soldiers.
Throughout the turbulent period of 2004 and 2005 in Iraq, the soldiers of the 98th Division added to the proud legacy of the US Army Reserve. Iroquois Warriors in Iraq tells the story of the history of the 98th Division (IT), it is a compelling narrative of the earliest phases of the Army’s efforts to build the Iraqi armed forces,

Steve did a good job laying out the state of affairs that we as Reserve soldiers faced with the lack of information and a quick deployment to all manner of conditions and challenges. In the book he illustrates several individual 98th Division Soldier’s incredible contributions to the MNSTC-I mission with an honest and frank narrative that pulls no punches. The reading is focused on one Reserve Unit deployment, but provides some insight into the flexibilities and capabilities of a well led organization in a combat theater. I know many of the contributors and their stories are true and really encapsulate the year we spent in country.

Steve provides a fair analysis of the deployment and concludes the book with sound conclusions in chapter 8. He has some great ideas that he floats in this chapter. I particularly like the thoughts on greater infusion of the active and reserve component. As he notes many of today’s senior Active Duty Leadership has more knowledge of the Navy and Airforce as a result of joint assignments that they posess of 2/3rd of the Army in the Reserves and National Guard.

The last note here is the quote attributed to Gen Petraeus

I think they should be justly proud of what they did. In some cases they did missions for which they were completely suited; in other cases, just like everybody else in Iraq, they did missions that were not familiar to them and they responded admirably in each case. . . . To say we couldn’t have done it without . . . the 98th would be a huge understatement, so they ought to look on this episode in their history with pride.12

Yes, I’m proud of the work done by the 98th Division Reserve Soldiers and all those that preceeded and have served since – Thanks to Steve Clay – one story of Reserve Component success has been told.