After a lengthy sentencing hearing on Thursday, January 14, Joseph Collins was consigned to seven years in prison in a connection with a scheme to help executives at the defunct commodities broker Refco conceal its financial troubles. He had been convicted of his part in that scheme in July.
After the eight week trial, a mistrial was declared on some of the counts, but the jury did convict on conspiracy, two counts of securities fraud, and two counts of wire fraud.
The federal district court judge involved, Robert P. Paterson, sentenced Collins, formerly of Mayer Brown LLP partner, to the seven-year term to be followed by three years of supervised release, saying, "I think this is a case of excessive loyalty to his client," the judge said. Collins' lawyer, William J. Schwartz, vowed an appeal.
The jury deliberations appear to have been quite contentious (hence the partial mistrial). In particular, a male juror identified as "Kevin" told that court that a female juror "Abigail," had threatened to cut off his finger and to have her husband come after him (to cut off other bits?). Separately, security personnel reported having heard jurors screaming at each other.
All this passion, even to the point of threats, may have somethig to do with the idea and idealof a lawyer as a zealous advocate -- a notion deeply engrained in the culture in the U.S. Perhaps so deeply engrained that the idea that a lawyer could be too zealous in Collins' situation itself offended either Kevin or Abigail -- I don't know which.
Showing posts with label commodities. Show all posts
Showing posts with label commodities. Show all posts
Monday, January 18, 2010
Sunday, October 25, 2009
Renewed Argentinian Excitement
A little more than a month ago (on September 21), the Wall Street Journal reported that there was a deal in the works in which Argentina would re-open a debt exchange deal that the country had closed in 2005.
Among public-finance wonks this caused a flurry of excitement. But then various parties noticed that the markets weren't reflecting any such optimism, and talk waned. See this blog's contribution to that discussion, two days after the WSJ report here.
The excitement was a tad premature, but the WSJ did not have the story wrong. On Thursday, Oct. 22, Argentine Economy Minister Amado Boudou announced a debt swap plan. The plan will seem quite niggardly to those who have held on to the old 2001 instruments all thse years -- more so even than the deal they rejected in 2005. Still, it is important, because it requires the country to change its laws, amendingt he official position that the 2005 offer was the last ever offer.
A law enacted in 2005 in the wake of that earlier swap prohibited the country from ever offering a new swap to investors who had refused that one. The executive branch has asked Congress to repeal that law.
What does all this mean? Those of us who don't have a vested interest in the 2001 instruments are of course free to look at it all dispassionately. What it means is that Argentina has ridden a commodity price bull market since 2005. It didn't need to worry about the fact that its credit in the international markets was lousy -- it had stuff to sell the rest of the world wanted to buy. Now, times are tight, and the Argentines want access to international credit once again, so they have to do something conciliatory.
Among public-finance wonks this caused a flurry of excitement. But then various parties noticed that the markets weren't reflecting any such optimism, and talk waned. See this blog's contribution to that discussion, two days after the WSJ report here.
The excitement was a tad premature, but the WSJ did not have the story wrong. On Thursday, Oct. 22, Argentine Economy Minister Amado Boudou announced a debt swap plan. The plan will seem quite niggardly to those who have held on to the old 2001 instruments all thse years -- more so even than the deal they rejected in 2005. Still, it is important, because it requires the country to change its laws, amendingt he official position that the 2005 offer was the last ever offer.
A law enacted in 2005 in the wake of that earlier swap prohibited the country from ever offering a new swap to investors who had refused that one. The executive branch has asked Congress to repeal that law.
What does all this mean? Those of us who don't have a vested interest in the 2001 instruments are of course free to look at it all dispassionately. What it means is that Argentina has ridden a commodity price bull market since 2005. It didn't need to worry about the fact that its credit in the international markets was lousy -- it had stuff to sell the rest of the world wanted to buy. Now, times are tight, and the Argentines want access to international credit once again, so they have to do something conciliatory.
Sunday, August 10, 2008
CME/Nymex
The proposed CME/Nymex deal continues to roll happily along.
Personally, I'm surprised at how easily this is going. But I've said that before.
What I ought to add today is that Cataldo Capozza now says he won't seek an injunction against the upcoming votes.
Mr. Capozza is an original member and thus a stockholder in Nymex who believes that exchange is worth a good deal more than the CME is paying. But of course that belief isn't enough to get an injunction.
He had apparently planned to seek an injunction on the basis that the CME wasn't making adequate disclosures in its proxy materials. But in Friday's statement he congratulates CME on its latest disclosures, which clear this hurdle.
The latest disclosures don't seem like much of a ticking timebomb to me. They include the following: "In the summer of 2007, representatives of one potential acquiror indicated to the management of NYMEX Holdings that, subject to approval of such acquiror’s board of directors, the acquiror might be interested in acquiring NYMEX Holdings for cash and stock with a combined value of $142 per share of NYMEX Holdings’ common stock, based on then-current stock prices. However, no bid was ever received."
Fine. But what's on the table is what's on the table.
"At the conclusion of the meetings on January 24, 2008, Mr. Schaeffer and Dr. Newsome concluded that further attempts to negotiate price terms would create a significant risk that a deal would not be struck. At the Board meeting the next day, Mr. Schaeffer and Dr. Newsome explained their opinion to the Board and recommended that the Board not engage in further attempts to negotiate price at that time."
And so forth.
Mr. Capozza seems resigned (and I'm reading between the lines a bit here) to the likelihood that the deal will be approved by the voters and will close. What is more explicit in his statement is his contingency plan: "If the shareholders approve the sale, we will seek damages to compensate the shareholders for billions of dollars NYMEX management left on the table."
That might prove interesting. But in the meantime the consolidation of exchanges will have rolled forward.
Personally, I'm surprised at how easily this is going. But I've said that before.
What I ought to add today is that Cataldo Capozza now says he won't seek an injunction against the upcoming votes.
Mr. Capozza is an original member and thus a stockholder in Nymex who believes that exchange is worth a good deal more than the CME is paying. But of course that belief isn't enough to get an injunction.
He had apparently planned to seek an injunction on the basis that the CME wasn't making adequate disclosures in its proxy materials. But in Friday's statement he congratulates CME on its latest disclosures, which clear this hurdle.
The latest disclosures don't seem like much of a ticking timebomb to me. They include the following: "In the summer of 2007, representatives of one potential acquiror indicated to the management of NYMEX Holdings that, subject to approval of such acquiror’s board of directors, the acquiror might be interested in acquiring NYMEX Holdings for cash and stock with a combined value of $142 per share of NYMEX Holdings’ common stock, based on then-current stock prices. However, no bid was ever received."
Fine. But what's on the table is what's on the table.
"At the conclusion of the meetings on January 24, 2008, Mr. Schaeffer and Dr. Newsome concluded that further attempts to negotiate price terms would create a significant risk that a deal would not be struck. At the Board meeting the next day, Mr. Schaeffer and Dr. Newsome explained their opinion to the Board and recommended that the Board not engage in further attempts to negotiate price at that time."
And so forth.
Mr. Capozza seems resigned (and I'm reading between the lines a bit here) to the likelihood that the deal will be approved by the voters and will close. What is more explicit in his statement is his contingency plan: "If the shareholders approve the sale, we will seek damages to compensate the shareholders for billions of dollars NYMEX management left on the table."
That might prove interesting. But in the meantime the consolidation of exchanges will have rolled forward.
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