Europe's Hedge Funds

Deliberations among the nations of the European Union about a new level of regulations for hedge funds there have reached an impasse.

I wrote here 11 months ago that the draft directive circulating at that time was dead as written. There have been lots of developments since.

The U.K., where most of the Europe-headquartered funds actually are, has been working to water down the more draconian aspects of these proposals from within the EU system, and the U.S. has been exerting some pressure from without.

The Brits are worried that this will hurt London's status as one of the world's great financial hubs, while the U.S., and in particular Treasury Secretary Geithner, worries that the EU is going protectionist -- that it will put barriers in the path of any institutions and high net worth investors there who want to entrust their money to operations in New York.

Meanwhile, the French and the Germans are pulling in the other direction, to make the regulations tougher on the nasty hedge funds, whether of New York or London, than the drafts of the directive would have it.

There is an idea circulating in some quarters that hedge funds were at fault in the 2007-08 credit crunch. That is utter nonsense. Quite old-fashioned, supposedly conservative and stodgy, institutions like banks were the real trouble makers. The hedgers generally did a good job of keeping their head while bankers all around them were losing theirs.

At any rate: the news this week is that EU diplomats tried to push the process forward at a meeting Monday, the 27th, but they failed.

A big possible winner is Switzerland. A map will tell you that the Swiss are in Europe, but they don't act like it. They've stayed away from the EU, and if EU rules do become too onerous for HFs, we might see a lot of them developing a taste for Alpine air.

Sanofi and Genzyme: They'll do it the hard way

Negotiations for a friendly merger between Sanofi-Aventis and Genzyme, which I discussed here a month ago, now seem to have fallen apart.

Sanofi's CEO has written a "bear hug" letter in the first instance to the Genzyme CEO but in reality to the Genzyme shareholders. The idea is to get the shareholders ticked off that their management is standing between them and a nice pay-out.

Here's a discussion from two and a half years ago about the art of giving a bear hug.

A little history. Back in 2004, a company then called Sanofi-Synthélabo made a 47.8 bn euro for Aventis, a Strasbourg based concern. At first, Initially, Aventis spurned the bid, and a three-month battle resulted. The merger did in time come about, but the price increased, from the original 47.8 billion to 54.5 billion euros.

The French government played a big role in that imbroglio. The government was concerned that a Swiss company (Novartis) would step in as Aventis' white knight if Sanofi-Synthélabo didn't raise its bid. That would lead to Aventis falling under the control of foreigners. Indeed, non-EU foreigners! (The Swiss are only geographically part of Europe.)

The lesson: there is good reason, based on their fiduciary obligation to their shareholders, for the management of Genzyme to make this difficult for Sanofi. They shouldn't make it impossible, but they should make it difficult.

Today is Bloom's Day

In recognition of the day, let us talk about a work of fiction. But not Joyce's immortal re-write of Homer. That would be rather outside our remit. Let us talk, rather, about Jerome Kerviel's imaginary friend.

You remember Kerviel, surely. Back in January 2008, when subprime contagion was already a worry but before all the craziness for which 2008 will be remembered, Kerviel lost 4.9 billion euros belonging to his employer, Société Générale, placing allegedly unauthorized bets on European stock index futures. His superiors there apparently discovered his losses -- overcoming his best efforts to hide them -- on Saturday, January 19. On the following three trading days (Mon. through Wednesday), the bank closed out Kerviel's positions.

Now Kerviel is on trial, breach of trust, computer abuse, and forgery, and his defense is that his trading was not unauthorized after all, that he was no Leeson-style "rogue." Here's a discussion of the issue phrased in the language of the quants.

But now we get to the almost Joycean twist. Kerviel now says he invented an imaginary friend called "Matt," supposedly a rugby loving hedge fund guy. Kerviel would answer questions from a broker, Moussa Bakir, about his trading strategy by saying that the questioned trades were in response to pressure from client "Matt."

Which Matt did he have in mind when he made up that name, one wonders? Damon? Lauer? "Mon ami, Matt, du Spectacle d'Aujourd'hui ...." Anyway, this admission would seem to sink the defense that "my bosses knew it all along."
The Reuters' take is here.

What is left of the defense, I imagine, is the idea that they should have known, and implicitly authorized Kerviel's shenanigans by looking the other way, perhaps pretending to believe transparent lies in the process. Doesn't sound like much of a defense, but it may well continue to delight and instruct, the two great goals of art.

Jerome Kerviel

Société Générale hosted its shareholders' meeting yesterday, five months after the disclosure of $7.7 billion in trading losse, which it blamed on rogue trader Jerome Kerviel.

Shareholders weren't happy. Daniel Bouton, ther company chairman, was lustily booed while he stood impassively at the podium and one shareholder, Jean Richard, shouted, "Who do you take us for" to approval of the crowd. Or so the scene is captured in The New York Times' report.

When SocGen first reported the Kerviel losses, Bouton was both chairman and chief executive. Criticism of his captaincy has been intense -- some of it coming from President Sarkozy -- and Bouton has since given up the CEO post. But he does remain the chair.

Since the start of the year, the value of their shares has declined by 28%. It isn't surprising they're ticked off.

Back in February, it was Felix Salmon, of Portfolio, who put his finger on the key point. Kerviel's profit-and-loss balance for last year was a wild zig-zag on both sides of the zero line. Entering December, though, he found himself sitting on a pot, more than 1 billion euros in the black. He suddenly gets extremely conservative, as if sitting on that pot untilt he year's end. Either he stopped trading entirely or his hedging was perfect.

Then, comes January ... he starts trading again and almost immediately ends up below -4 billion euros.

More is happening than meets the eye if the eye is looking here.