This will be another of my more ruminating
posts – asking a pile of questions, and offering very little in the way of
answers. There’s something I can’t quite put my finger on – definitely some
idea which is just out of reach. You might well be able to explain it to me, or
even convince me that the matter can be safely forgotten about. This is not
going to be a competent review of the Huzzah! wargames rules, though it might encourage you to have a look at them.
There were quite a few starting points this
time – some probably more obviously significant than others:
(1) I was telling someone about one of my
favourite daft moments in a military book – in Frederick E Smith’s screenplay
paperback of Waterloo (from the 1970
Bondarchuk movie) there is an episode during the Battle of Ligny where Smith
states that “suddenly a shot rang out”, and – of course – Blücher’s horse is hit, and the old bugger is pinned
underneath. History notwithstanding, think about it for a moment – suddenly a shot rang out? – and,
presumably, it broke the complete silence in which the Battle of Ligny had been
enacted prior to that point? Yes, this is silly, but somehow it encapsulates
what we expect military dramas to say – more significantly, there is maybe something
here which reflects the way we think of battles.
Certainly, my wargames are a bit like this. Because of the tricks we play with time and activation to make the game playable, the tabletop action consists of a series of isolated volleys, separated by periods of measuring and calculation (and whatever else it is you do during your games). Sad person that I am, I sometimes play a background soundtrack of a horse-&-musket battle during my wargames, which is fun, but it is very obvious that the activity on the audio is not very like my battle, which seems much more like a series of shots suddenly ringing out, as it were, in an otherwise silent and mathematical context, in a style which Frederick E Smith would recognize immediately.
Certainly, my wargames are a bit like this. Because of the tricks we play with time and activation to make the game playable, the tabletop action consists of a series of isolated volleys, separated by periods of measuring and calculation (and whatever else it is you do during your games). Sad person that I am, I sometimes play a background soundtrack of a horse-&-musket battle during my wargames, which is fun, but it is very obvious that the activity on the audio is not very like my battle, which seems much more like a series of shots suddenly ringing out, as it were, in an otherwise silent and mathematical context, in a style which Frederick E Smith would recognize immediately.
(2) In a comment about a recent blog post,
I mentioned that I suspected that – certainly at the time of the ECW – the
proportion of people killed by an aimed shot intended for them was small. If
someone dispatched you while holding the other end of a sword, or if he fired at
short range to stop you attacking him, then there was some personal malice
involved, but otherwise casualties must have been men who were hit by a passing
ball – if there are enough bullets flying about, someone is definitely going to
get hurt. It’s like running with scissors – you just know it’s going to happen.
(3) I remembered a minor (low wattage)
lightbulb moment I had a couple of years ago when working on Grand Tactical
rules; I realized that the tedium of answering the same, repetitious questions
about the tactical situation of an artillery target fired on by more than one
battery in the same turn could be simplified by considering the total effect on
the target unit in one go, rather than as a series of separate shots from the
firers. In other words, turn the thing back to front and think about it from
the target’s viewpoint. Topsy Turvy, in fact.
(4) As part of an ongoing pastime I have of
reading wargames rules, I recently came back to Huzzah!, published by Oozlum Games, which is a ruleset I have never
really played with, but which interests me greatly. It is, so to speak, back-to-front
in that it focuses on the risks to, and demoralization of, a unit in a combat
situation rather than studying individual volleys and the reaction to them.
(5) (This is the last one, I promise) – I
was reading someone else’s ECW rules, and was surprised at how effective
musketry at long range (100 to 200 paces) was. I can see that someone coming
within 200 paces of a musket-armed unit is getting into a stressful situation,
but somehow the risk doesn’t seem to me to be simply that of being hit by an
aimed volley at such long range.
OK – that’s all the inputs. This left me
thinking: what is it that a musket armed ECW unit does to an enemy unit 200
paces away? I think what they do mostly is they frighten them. The potential
damage and pain that is implied is more significant than the loss occasioned by
the aimed balls at this range. How the recipient unit reacts to this is
dependant on a familiar list of things such as their training, fatigue level
and so on – the Morale shopping list.
The important point here is that a
battlefield is an appalling place, filled with noise, horror and flying metal.
Any unit coming within firing range of the enemy is, first and foremost,
entering a very dangerous place – an area of high risk. The Huzzah! approach seems appropriate. A
commander’s view of one his regiments is not how many have been killed, it is
are they still in action, and can they still hurt the enemy? Inability to hurt
the enemy any longer could certainly be explained by their all being struck
down, but I think there is a general agreement now that what mostly happened was
that the effects (physical and mental) of being in a very dangerous and
stressful place for a period reduced the effectiveness of a unit to a point
where they no longer contributed to the army’s effort.
My battlefield soundtrack seems to portray
complete mayhem – a whole pile of firing going on throughout – yet we know that
units would try to conserve their ammunition, and that there would be little
point in firing blind at distant targets. The Topsy-Turvy approach (courtesy of
Huzzah!) is that we consider the
situation of a unit which is such-and-such a distance from various threats, and
is thus stressed by the sum of the various hazards – as currently experienced
and also the expectation of what could happen next. There is a whole pile of lethal
material flying about – the nearer you are to the source of the firing, the
more discouraging (and damaging) this will be.
The emphasis shifts to examining each
unit’s exposure – how far are they from each potential threat? Never mind the
individual firers and their activity, assume they will be keeping busy, making
things unpleasant, and consider instead the state of each unit exposed to fire.
I have no draft rules to sum this up, and
no firm ideas yet, other than an itch which needs scratching, though you might
be interested to read the Huzzah! rules.
Topsy Turvy. Interesting. Maybe?