Napoleon's Maxim's - VI, The Decision to Advance and the Sustained Offensive (Principles of War)

VI

"At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not to advance is a matter for grave consideration, but when once the offensive is assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity...."

To quote Chandler on this maxim

"This maxim illustrates Napoleon's conviction that a "rapid and skillful offensive" must grow out of a "careful and circumspect defensive". In other words an attack must be based on careful preparations and not be rashly entered upon without taking necessary preliminary precautions."

The principles, it seems behind this maxim is that the ability of a force to make a sustained and decisive offensive is based on a secure base of operations that has been created to pursue and sustain the planned offensive and that if not carefully planned can leave an attacking force stymied in front of a ever growing defender on extended and vulnerable lines of communication.

The pros and cons of the offensive vs the defensive can be a fine balance between the morale effects of retreat for the defender and the problems that can create (the retreat to Corunna and the retreat from Burgos are good examples), advance for the attacker (most armies morale increases with a sense of going forward), but with the needs to defend lengthening lines of communication (LOC) versus a defender falling back on depots and reserves and a shortening LOC and being able to take advantage of an interior LOC; only careful planning designed to tip that balance one way or the other will lead to success. In addition, once taken, the decision to attack must be pursued with speed and vigour until the defence is thoroughly beaten with  no opportunity to recover. Easily said than done, there are however classic examples of how and how not to run an offensive/defensive campaign.

Classic examples of the defence was Wellington's defence of Portugal in 1810 against Marshal Massena, which to use Napoleon's analysis displayed a higher level of consideration from the British general than his French counterpart, in that the strategy of British involvement in the Peninsular War was based on securing Portugal from French invasion, before any thought of an offensive to expel French forces from Spain. Indeed work on the Lines of Torres Vedras were began almost a full year before the French were able to amass a field army for the offensive and this preparation together with plans for a "scorched earth" defence coupled with the raising of Portuguese militia and partisan forces to harass the French line of communication were the key elements to tip the balance in favour of the defence. When this was coupled to a secure line of communication between England and Lisbon thanks to the Royal Navy, the defence became even more secure, even against the failure to hold the city, by having a withdrawal option to protect the small British army.

Wellington determined that the French would need a force of over 100,000 men to be able to overcome his defence and in the end they were only ever able to put 75,000 into the campaign. As the French advanced they were forced to detach garrisons along their route as they were shadowed ever deeper into the defensive network which coupled with the attrition brought on by the defensive measures, and the casualties suffered at the Battle of Bussaco severely depleted the force that finally ended up in front of the surprise Allied defensive line and stop point, setting up the inevitable Anglo Portuguese counter-offensive in 1811, against a French force barely able to muster 45,000 men towards the end of the campaign.

Wellington was also guilty of a lapse in his own planning for offensive operations in 1812, when the strategic situation was swinging in favour of the allies, but there was a need for a successful offensive to keep a wavering Spanish ally in the war. The planning for the offensive against Marmont's Army of Portugal was near faultless with the initiative grabbed by the swift, if costly captures of Cuidad Rodrigo and Badajoz and the blowing of the bridges on the Tagus between Soult and Marmont. This coupled with Royal Navy co-operation with partisans in the north east and south east of Spain to tie down the other French armies and the disruption of French communications by the guerrillas to almost keep King Joseph oblivious to the growing situation was a result of careful planning in the preceding winter. The British deciphering skills of Colonel George Scovell were giving Wellington much more insight and confirmation of French disarray and allowing for the judgement of when to bring Marmont to battle before he could expect succour.

The culmination of all this careful planning and activity was capped by probably Wellington's most brilliant victory at Salamanca only to see the offensive collapse due the inability of the Allied army to follow the last part of the maxim, to sustain the offensive to the last extremity that saw the remains of  the Army of Portugal escape to recombine with other forces and the offensive lose momentum with the casual liberation of Madrid and a half hearted attack on Burgos castle that was resisted with great determination that was followed up by a resurgent French counter offensive, led by the survivors of the Army of Portugal, that resulted in a retreat for Wellington's army that veterans reported was worse than that to Corunna in 1808/09.

British troops on the offensive at the Battle of Vittoria

Wellington can at least be forgiven, in that the campaign of 1812 reinvigorated Spanish and Allied commitment to the overthrow of Napoleon, liberated vast tracts of Spain as their armies withdrew from Estremadura and Granada, and was a lesson in planning that provided the foundation for the 1813 campaign that added in even greater speed of operations, by fast movements (a tactic developed by Wellesley early in his career in India) designed to pin the French to river lines whilst turning each position they selected with rapid flank moves through the mountains bordering the north coast of Spain and the support from the Royal Navy that movement allowed. Eventually this would lead to the creation of a new base of operations at Santander that would greatly shorten Wellington's LOC for operations against France in the following year and total victory at Vittoria when King Joseph made his final stand only to have his forces caught in an enveloping attack as the allies pinned his front and brought their flanking columns in from the mountains. The battle was decisive even though the pursuit was casual but did force French forces over the Franco Spanish border leaving stranded garrisons in their wake.

For an army on the receiving end of a well planned and thought through offensive that is fast and sustained, there is no coming back, as the soldiers on the ground and their generals quickly become "punch drunk" and unable to maintain a will to resist to, what seems to be, an irresistible momentum, and their only thought soon turns to self preservation and escape, rather than fight.

Napoleon's Maxim's - V, Forces to be Proportioned to Difficulties (War of Method)

V

"All wars should be governed by certain principles, for every war should have a definite object, and be conducted according to the rules of art. War should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the obstacles to be overcome."

Or perhaps in modern language, "Know what you want to do, know what will be the consequences of doing it, know what you are up against and know what you will need to get the job done". The principle of "beginning with the end in mind" and "employing economy of force" seems a simple and straight forward guide to conduct, but the clue is in the word "guide" in that that is what you have. There cannot be strict rules and directions when it comes to application of this principle because much of the "knowing what to do" comes down to judgement and an element of educated guess work.

However failure to apply even a modicum of forethought to this principle of military behaviour litter history with examples of often disastrous or near misses  of wars and campaigns that seem obviously ruinous to the all seeing "hindsight" but in many cases included a good helping of poor judgement and wishful thinking.

In general, Napoleon was probably one of the best practitioners of his own maxim and certainly in the early years was very precise and clear about his objectives and what he needed to do to bring them about; which usually included the grand battle of decision engineered with his careful preparation that made sure that he had most of the advantages on the day of battle. The campaigns of 1805, 1806 and 1807 shine out as the master at his best. However even the great man had is "off days" and the Egyptian Adventure, The Peninsular War, which he allowed to persist even when the facts pointed to adopting another policy and the invasion of Russia in 1812 are classical illustrations, with all the benefit of that all seeing hindsight, of not applying a thorough application of knowing what you want and how you are going to get it.

Even today modern military minds and governments struggle with this guiding principle and the war in Syria and the wider conflicts across the Middle East illustrate perfectly how complicated these situations can very quickly become.

For the wargamer, these ideas of force economy and objective setting mainly get tested on the tactical tabletop and less often on the campaign strategic level, that crops up more often in our board games.

The ability to assess a tabletop situation and decide what can be achieved with the resources at hand is what makes, for me, our hobby one of the most interesting of pastimes. If you then throw in the added fun of getting to know the personality and playing styles of your friends the fun gets multiplied. One of the best aspects I have discovered over time from playing C&G is that the rules allow the players to explore that often overlooked aspect in our wargames, that of keeping a reserve to either keep you from losing or for applying the Coup de Grace. The fatigue modelling in C&G that I have not seen done as well or at all in other rule sets means that the player who is able to apply the rules of force economy as discussed in this maxim can get the chance of recreating the "final blow attacks" that are the classic reward for the commander who is able to picture the end game. 

The War of Method is a principle we can strive to apply at all levels of wargaming and whether we are studying a campaign map and assessing our intelligence reports or looking across a tabletop vista and deciding where to launch our main attack, beginning with the end in mind should be our start point before working out what we need to do to achieve that ending.

Napoleon's Maxims I Frontiers

Napoleons Maxims II Plan of Campaign

Napoleon's Maxims III Flanks

Napoleons Maxims IV Marches of an Army

Napoleon's Maxims - IV, Marches of an Army

IV

"When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies, which have each their separate line of operation until they arrive at a point fixed upon for their concentration, it should be laid down as a principle, that the junction should never take place near the enemy, because the enemy, in uniting his forces, may not only prevent it, but beat the armies in detail."

The first point that came to mind when I read this was another of Napoleon's maxims "March dispersed, fight concentrated", and in turning the pages to see what Dr Chandler had to say on the matter I was chuffed to see that it was the first point that he highlighted as pertinent to this maxim.

The larger armies became, and the Napoleonic era saw armies massed on a much larger scale than in previous centuries, the greater the need for those armies to sub-divide to free up road space to allow units and support forces to manoeuvre across a country, without  causing them to be so strung out that the tail would be so far behind the head, and the lead units totally starved of supplies due to the roads in their rear being clogged up with follow up forces.

Napoleon's "Battalion Carre" or battalion square with four corps illustrated here and their cavalry screen easily able to change the direction of march with a right wheel, without losing formation.

Napoleon's major contribution to this principle was his development of the Corps d'Armee and the Battalion Carre march principles that enabled all arms formations (the Army Corps) to manoeuvre in support of each other (normally about a days march) and be able to fight and pin a much larger enemy as supporting corps joined it in battle. The formation also allowed the ease of changing direction without losing mutual support should an enemy be discovered in an unexpected area. This box formation allowed the separate lines of communication without becoming too dispersed.

The point Napoleon makes about the junction of forces and the proximity of the enemy preventing or interfering with that concentration is classically illustrated at Ligny, a battlefield I visited earlier this year.

The battle saw a race between both sides to get enough troops into position before the battle commenced. Napoleon had to delay the start of the action until 2.30pm to allow time to bring up Gerard's and the Guard Corp to join Vandamme. He just managed to beat Blucher to the punch who had Zeithen's I Corps in St Armand and Pirch's II Corps in Ligny but was only joined by Thielemann's III Corps at 3pm on his left flank and with Bulow's IV Corps unable to reach the battle in time. The late concentration of the Prussian troops forced Blucher to feed his men into the battle piecemeal and only the late start and close terrain together with the tenacity of the Prussian soldiers managed to allow him to hold until nightfall and this coupled with a tardy French pursuit allowed the Prussians to fight another day.

This aspect of the grand manoeuvre is probably one of the key aspects that attracted me to Napoleonic warfare. The combination of all arms capability without any one arm being dominant over the other two, together with this art of manoeuvre that requires obtaining knowledge of the enemy's position and preparation to bring ones own forces together at the right time in the right place. Above all other horse and musket periods  I think Napoleonics gives the best game featuring these aspects and I think the dream of most Napoleonic gamers is to play a campaign that recreates and captures these aspects.

Napoleon's Maxims I Frontiers

Napoleons Maxims II Plan of Campaign

Napoleon's Maxims III Flanks

Napoleon's Maxims - III, Flanks (Principles of War)

"An army which undertakes the conquest of a country has its two wings either resting on neutral territories or upon great natural obstacles, such as rivers or chains of mountains. It happens in some cases that only the wing is so supported, and in others that both are exposed. 

In the first instance cited, viz., where both wings are protected, a general has only to guard against being penetrated in front. In the second, where one wing only is supported, he should rest upon the supported wing. In the the third, where both wings are exposed, he should depend upon a central formation, and never allow the different corps under his command to depart from this; for it be difficult to contend with the disadvantage of having two flanks exposed, the inconvenience is doubled by having four, tripled if their be six; that is to say, if the army is divided into two or three different corps. In the first instance then, as above quoted, the line of operation may tend indifferently to the right or to the left. In the second, it should be directed towards the wing in support. In the third, it should be perpendicular to the centre of the army's line of march. But in all these cases it is necessary every five or six days to have a strong post, or an entrenched position, upon the line of march, in order to collect stores and provisions, to organise convoys, to form a centre of movement, and establish a point of defence, to shorten the line of operations." 

As Chandler points out in his comment on this general principle of operations, the choice of where to position an army's line of communication based on the situation it finds itself in is as important a consideration today as it was in Napoleon's time.

The idea was well illustrated with Napoleon's own invasion of Spain in 1808 where his centre of operations was established at the fortified city of Bayonne, close to the border of Spain in south west France and with the access into Spain flanked by the Bay of Biscay. The area around Bilbao up to the north coast was quickly secured against Blake's Spanish Army of the Left, with the corps of Victor (I Corps), Lefebvre (IV Corps) and Soult (II Corps). Thus  with his wing securely placed, Napoleon was able to manoeuvre against Castanos and his Spanish Army of the Centre, quickly taking Burgos and swinging Ney (VI Corps) in towards Soria and pinning and defeating the Spanish at Tudela (between Zaragoza and Logrono on the River Ebro) with Moncey (III Corps) holding the French side of the Ebro. This opened up the route to Madrid with a new forward base centred on Burgos.

Map illustrating the opening moves of Napoleon's invasion in November - December 1808 - West Point Dept of History Map

http://www.westpoint.edu/history/sitepages/napoleonic%20wars.aspx

With his northern wing securely anchored and Madrid taken Napoleon was very well placed to swing his reserve north from Madrid as he attempted to encircle Sir John Moore as he approached Burgos via Salamanca. Only the fortuitous capture of French orders revealing the plan, obtained from Spanish partisans alerted Moore in good time to enable him to get a days march on the fast approaching French forces and commence his retreat towards Lugo and Corunna. 

Moore was correct in selecting Burgos as a good point to strike, as it was the main bastion on the French line of communication (L.O.C.) back to Bayonne and its taking would have severely embarrassed Napoleon's forces in and around Madrid; however the French forces in the area were the anchor to the whole invasion with the rest of the army "resting" upon its supported wing. In addition when Moore made his move, the Spanish forces he hoped to cooperate with were no longer forces in being and the British army would have been putting their "head in the noose" with a continued advance.

Chandler highlights Napoleon's point that the security of the LOC is only enhanced by having it perpendicular to the armies line of march and clearly Napoleon was operating on this principle with his route from Burgos to Bayonne and on down to Madrid. The principle of placing depots and strong points at regular intervals would also be practised by Wellington during his own counter advances into Spain from Lisbon and Ciudad-Rodrigo, however Wellington took the principle one stage further by utilising the sea power of the Royal Navy to help him relocate his centre of operations from Lisbon to Santander in 1813 as he pursued French forces beyond the Spanish border, illustrating the flexibility of a naval power over a continental power.

Napoleon's Maxims I Frontiers

Napoleons Maxims II Plan of Campaign

Napoleon's Maxims - II, Plan of Campaign

II

"In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it.

Plans of campaign may be modified ad infinitum according to circumstances, the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the features of the country."

Perhaps the most classic illustration of this maxim in practice is the memorandum and subsequent plan of campaign as proposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley in 1808 to the British government in which he contradicted Sir John Moore's previous declaration that Portugal could not be held against French invasion, but went further to describe its role as a base to support ongoing operations, building up the Portuguese army and to aid the Spanish in ridding them of French occupation and eventual pursuit of French forces into France itself.

Following Wellesley's return to Portugal in 1809 with his plan accepted by British ministers he immediately set its principles into action by a fast campaign that ejected Soult from Oporto causing him to lose all his baggage and guns in the process, and then to turn south to link up with the Spanish Army of Estremadura to attack and destroy the next potential threat, namely, Victor's I Corps in the Tagus valley.

Whilst pursuing the objective of securing Portugal as a base of operations he had already predicted the likely victory of Napoleon over Austrian forces in the Danube campaign of that year and had given orders for work to commence on the construction of the lines of Torres Vedras, predicting that the Emperor would return in 1810 to deal with the British in Portugal once and for all.

The Lines of Torres Vedras - A master stroke in campaign planning

Of course Napoleon didn't lead the force, selecting Massena to command the army of 65,000 men later to be reinforced by a further 10,000 men as he methodically manoeuvred his force to and over the Portuguese border. The unlucky fall of Almeida was counteracted by the surprise ambush at Bussaco ridge which allowed his new Portuguese formations to gain confidence and battle experience whilst severely denting the morale of the enemy. Wellesley confidently predicted he could hold the line against 100,000 French troops but that with a maximum of 360,000 troops in the whole peninsula, the French would find it impossible to hold their gains whilst prosecuting their invasion.

The defence of Portugal in 1810-11 would become a model that was studied by the Russian General Staff and used to define their own plans to overcome a French invasion the following year, on a much larger scale. The campaign of 1812 would prove the turning point and directly influence events in the peninsula

All the points described in this maxim, foresight, preparatory counteractions, modifications due to circumstances, genius in the commanding general, making full use of the character of the troops and features of the country shine out in Wellesley's, later Wellington's plan of campaign and is a classic exemplar of why he ranks as one of the great captains

Napoleon's maxims I Frontiers

Napoleon's Maxims - I, Frontiers

"What then is a maxim? The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the term as coming from the Latin adjective maxima, "greatest": A general truth drawn from science or experience; principle, rule of conduct."
Dr David Chandler

Amongst other reading I am currently browsing through Dr David Chandler's "The Military Maxim's of Napoleon".

These gathered thoughts of the great man, complied by an unknown author, make fascinating reading for the Napoleonic enthusiast as much for the insight they give into the thinking of of one of the great captains of history. However, the forward written by Chandler makes clear that there is a danger of misunderstanding the meanings of these ideas, given the constraints of Napoleon's use of French and all its peculiarities of grammar with him being a Corsican and not a native speaker. The appropriate emphasis on a particular word or its precise meaning can mislead as much as inform.

In addition these maxims were not compiled by Napoleon, but taken from his writings and thus subject to contradictions, one to another, together with a lack of context. Napoleon was not a commander who used maxims to decide his conduct in one campaign or battle to another, rather he was more of an intuitive commander with a sound understanding of military principles and a thorough mathematical logic that underpinned his manoeuvres. Thus he did not write down his principles for his marshals, only tending to outline what he expected them to do from one situation to another. The letters sent to his step son, Prince Eugene, commanding on the Hungarian front against Archduke John during the 1809 campaign are an excellent illustration of his tutorial in military principles and likewise provide a window on the thinking of the man.

Prince Eugene at War 1809 by Robert M Epstein is a excellent read covering this period and the letters of instruction from Napoleon.

David Chandler illustrates the hazards of attempts by later military commanders to applying literally these ideas to later eras. This does not mean that the maxims are invalid with the advance of time and technology, more that they need to be considered in the context of the times they were written and considered taking into account the changes in capability that now apply that was not possible then.

The Napoleonic wargamer is not so constrained as we are trying to simulate the issues faced by commanders of the era and so it is a fun exercise to consider the application of these thoughts to our games and campaigns and look at the history of the Napoleonic wars and think of the occasions where these ideas applied or were miss-applied.

So I thought it might be fun to occasionally drop in a post on a Napoleon Maxim with some comment and an opportunity for discussion on its application from a wargamers slant. As these posts develop they will build into the collection of maxims with mine and hopefully your comments that will make an interesting reference for other gamers to browse and consider.

To get the ball rolling I present "Maxim I"  themed under Chandler's listing, "Frontiers".

I

The Frontiers of states are either large rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army, the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next, and large rivers occupy the third place.

My thoughts were that when reading how the Emperor directed his forces in the Peninsular War, very often dictating orders and grand strategy from Paris, Vienna and Moscow it seems to me that some of his marshals may have smiled reading this thought from their leader and mumbled to themselves "tell me about it!"

After deserts, of which you might include the vast sierras of Spain or vast open spaces in Russia, devoid of people and very often food stuffs when previously marched over, Napoleon lists the mountains of which Spain and Portugal in particular boasts multiple ranges splitting the country up with valleys occupied by mighty rivers swollen by seasonal rains and snow melt. The ideal country to defend against his legions.

Any Peninsular War campaign worth the name has to take these concepts into account when presenting challenges to the wargamer and Napoleon's pronouncement should be ringing in the ears as your troops have to deal with the depredations of guerillas or pesky Spanish armies regrouping to strike again from their mountain strongholds.

Not to just limit this idea to a Napoleonic theme, this categorising of terrain constraints would have been familiar to the ancients. One only has to think of the struggles the Romans had with the Parthian and latter Sassanid empires to see the truth in deserts and mountains being such a formidable barrier to invading forces. The latter campaigns of the Crusaders would again highlight these constraints and one only has to consider the build up of logistic support in the Gulf War of more recent times to appreciate the difficulty modern armies face when operating over these types of predominating terrain.

The current focus of this blog is the Talavera campaign and part of my current work has been to look at the history of the veteran French regiments that made up Victor's I Corps that spearheaded Napoleon's re-invasion in November 1808. A common theme has been to look at the plans made by Napoleon for the corps in its attempt to surround and destroy Blake's Spanish army south of Bilbao and then redirecting his forces at Madrid as the Spanish Army of the Centre was pushed aside.

Napoleon's maxim clearly illustrates the constraints placed on his campaign by the terrain on the frontier between France and Spain. Again and again his forces failed to surround and destroy the almost immobile Spanish army groups as they were able to disperse and escape his cavalry in the surrounding mountains, only to regroup later. The drive on Madrid was opposed by a scratch force of Spanish troops in the Somosierra Pass and to some extent Spain's mountainous terrain helped Sir John Moore evade Napoleon's clutches as he pulled the pursuing French forces off to the Galician coast.

It could be argued that the final decider on the complete success of Napoleon's re-invasion in 1808 was the Spanish terrain and that perhaps only Napoleon could have achieved the level of success that was achieved given those constraints.