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Wednesday, December 12, 2012
Hacking The Brain: The Next Domain Of Warfare
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Monday, December 10, 2012
The NASA - ESA InterPlanetary Internet
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Astronaut On ISS Uses InterPlanetary Internet To Control Robot In Germany
Saturday, June 09, 2012
Understanding Cyberspace Key To Defending Against Attacks
Published: June 2, 2012
Courtesy Of "The Washington Post"
Charlie Miller prepared his cyberattack in a bedroom office at his Midwestern suburban home.
Brilliant and boyish-looking, Miller has a PhD in math from the University of Notre Dame and spent five years at the National Security Agency, where he secretly hacked into foreign computer systems for the U.S. government. Now, he was turning his attention to the Apple iPhone.
At just 5 ounces and 4 1/2 inches long, the iPhone is an elegant computing powerhouse. Its microscopic transistors and millions of lines of code enable owners to make calls, send e-mail, take photos, listen to music, play games and conduct business, almost simultaneously. Nearly 200 million iPhones have been sold around the world.
The idea of a former cyberwarrior using his talents to hack a wildly popular consumer device might seem like a lark. But his campaign, aimed at winning a little-known hacker contest last year, points to a paradox of our digital age. The same code that unleashed a communications revolution has also created profound vulnerabilities for societies that depend on code for national security and economic survival.
Miller’s iPhone offensive showed how anything connected to networks these days can be a target.
He began by connecting his computer to another laptop holding the same software used by the iPhone. Then he typed a command to launch a program that randomly changed data in a file being processed by the software.
The alteration might be as mundane as inserting 58 for F0 in a string of data such as “0F 00 04 F0.” His plan was to constantly launch such random changes, cause the software to crash, then figure out why the substitutions triggered a problem. A software flaw could open a door and let him inside.
“I know I can do it,” Miller, now a cybersecurity consultant, told himself. “I can hack anything.”
After weeks of searching, he found what he was looking for: a “zero day,” a vulnerability in the software that has never been made public and for which there is no known fix.
The door was open, and Miller was about to walk through.
Holes In The System
The words “zero day” strike fear in military, intelligence and corporate leaders. The term is used by hackers and security specialists to describe a flaw discovered for the first time by a hacker that can be exploited to break into a system.
In recent years, there has been one stunning revelation after the next about how such unknown vulnerabilities were used to break into systems that were assumed to be secure.
One came in 2009, targeting Google, Northrop Grumman, Dow Chemical and hundreds of other firms.
Hackers from China took advantage of a flaw in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer browser and used it to penetrate the targeted computer systems. Over several months, the hackers siphoned off oceans of data, including the source code that runs Google’s systems.
Another attack last year took aim at cybersecurity giant RSA, which protects most of the Fortune 500 companies. That vulnerability involved Microsoft Excel, a spreadsheet program. The outcome was the same:
A zero-day exploit enabled hackers to secretly infiltrate RSA’s computers and crack the security it sold. The firmhad to pay $66 million in the following months to remediate client problems.
The most sensational zero-day attack became public in the summer of 2010. It occurred at Iran’s nuclear processing facility in Natanz. Known as Stuxnet, the attack involved a computer “worm” — a kind of code designed to move throughout the Internet while replicating itself. Last week, the New York Times reported that President Obama had approved the operation as part of a secret U.S.-Israeli cyberwar campaign against Iran begun under the Bush administration.
Among other things, the worm was built to infect thumb drives. Investigators think that when one of the infected drives was inserted into a computer at the Natanz plant, its code quickly found its target: It made hundreds of centrifuges designed to refine uranium run too fast and self-destruct, while sending signals to monitors that all was well.
To complete its mission, the Stuxnet worm relied on four zero days.
Just days ago, researchers released information about Flame, another cyberattack. It appears to be designed as a massive espionage and surveillance tool, also aimed at Iran, that can steal data and listen in on phone calls.
Some researchers believe it exploits zero-day vulnerabilities similar to those in Stuxnet.
The Vastness Of Cyberspace
Miller and his kind are masters of code. At a fundamental level, there is almost nothing simpler than the stuff of their obsessions. There is software, which is writtencomputer language. Computers transform software into machine code, which is simply 0’s and 1’s. Those “binary digits,” or bits, organized in trillions of combinations, serve as both the DNA and digital blood of our modern electronic world.
Bits guide the electrical impulses that tell the world’s computers what to do. They enable the seemingly magical applications that computer and smartphone users take for granted. Bits have also given life to the most dynamic man-made environment on Earth: cyberspace.
Not too long ago, “cyberspace” was pure fiction. The word appeared in “Neuromancer,” a 1984 novel that described a digital realm in which people, properly jacked in, could navigate with their minds. Author William Gibson described it as a “consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators.”
Now cyberspace is a vital reality that includes billions of people, computers and machines. Almost anything that relies on code and has a link to a network could be a part of cyberspace. That includes smartphones, such as the iPhone and devices running Android, home computers and, of course, the Internet. Growing numbers of other kinds of machines and “smart” devices are also linked in: security cameras, elevators and CT scan machines; global positioning systems and satellites; jet fighters and global banking networks; commuter trains and the computers that control power grids and water systems.
So much of the world’s activity takes place in cyberspace — including military communications and operations — that the Pentagon last year declared it a domain of war.
All of it is shot through with zero days.
“We have built our future upon a capability that we have not learned how to protect,” former CIA director George J. Tenet has said.
Researchers and hackers, the good guys and bad, are racing to understand the fundamental nature of cyberspace. For clues about how to improve security — or to mount better attacks — they have turned to physics, mathematics, economics and even agriculture. Some researchers consider cyberspace akin to an organism, its security analogous to a public health issue.
One of the things they know for sure is that the problem begins with code and involves what “Neuromancer” described as the “unthinkable complexity” of humans and machines interacting online.
“The truth is that the cyber-universe is complex well beyond anyone’s understanding and exhibits behavior that no one predicted, and sometimes can’t even be explained well,” concluded JASON, an independent advisory group of the nation’s top scientists, in a November 2010 report to the Pentagon. “Our current security approaches have had limited success and have become an arms race with our adversaries.”
Hacker Life
To picture the scale of cyberspace and the scope of the cybersecurity problem, think of the flow of electronic data around the world as filaments of light. Those virtual threads form a vast, brilliant cocoon around the globe.
The electronic impulses that carry the data move at lightning speed. A round-trip between Washington and Beijing online typically occurs in less time than it takes for a major leaguer’s fastball to cross home plate.
Blink, and you miss it.
It almost doesn’t matter where hackers work. In the physics governing cyberspace, hackers, terrorists and cyberwarriors can operate virtually next door to regular people browsing the World Wide Web or sending e-mails or phone texts.
Charlie Miller works in suburban St. Louis, in a room that has a small desk, a laptop, a large monitor and power cords that snake across the floor. A wooden bookshelf holds technical manuals alongside his kids’ plastic toys and stuffed animals.
The main clue about what he does for a living is a wall poster for the movie “Hackers.” “Their Crime Is Curiosity,” it says.
The 39-year-old Miller is regarded by some as among the best hackers in the world, but he does not fit the stereotype of an alienated outsider. For starters, he is one of the good guys, a white-hat hacker. He is a security consultant, and he hunts zero days as a hobby. A father of two, trim and balding, he is deceptively modest about his special talents. But his résuméentry about his NSA experience speaks volumes:
“Performed computer network scanning and reconnaissance. Identified weaknesses and vulnerabilities in computer networks. Executed numerous computer network exploitations against foreign targets.”
Apple would not be happy about his plan to attack the iPhone. Like other technology companies, Apple does not want questions about security to taint its products. The company has a well-deserved reputation for developing strong software systems. (Apple officials declined to comment for this article.)
But Miller wasn’t being malicious. He wanted to have fun, prove that it could be done and let the attack serve as a warning about the insecurity of the networked world.
Most of all, he wanted to win a prestigious annual contest where hackers convene to show off the skills that they generally keep to themselves. To win the contest,known as “Pwn2Own,” Miller had to discover a zero day and exploit it. (Pwn is hacker lingo for taking control of a computer.)
If he won, he would receive $15,000, the device he had pwned and a white blazer (modeled on the green jacket worn by winners of the Masters golf tournament). He had won the prize before for hacking Apple products, but it was getting harder.
As he settled into a large black swivel chair in his office, Miller knew he had a challenge on his hands. He did not doubt whether he would find a flaw. He only wondered how bad it would be.
Cracking The iPhone
In December 2010, Miller reached out to a friend and security colleague, Dionysus Blazakis.
Blazakis, 30, started hacking in 1994 and has been breaking code ever since. But instead of breaking the law, he decided to become a software developer. He and Miller worked for the same computer security firm in Baltimore, Independent Security Evaluators. He’s also a zero-day hunter.
In instant chat messages, the two bantered about the technical details of the iPhone’s software. Like hackers everywhere, they wanted to find the easiest route to a vulnerability that would let them take control. Unlike most hackers, they had a deadline: The contest began on March 9, 2011.
“Where do you start? . . . What do you focus on?” Miller recalled asking himself. “The hard part is figuring out the soft part to go after.”
Reading through all the software instructions was out of the question. That might have worked two decades ago, when computer systems were simpler and the Web was still a novelty. A desktop computer then might have a million lines of software. Today, the software in a desktop computer could have 80 million lines or more. Finding the zero days by hand would be like searching a beach for a grain of sand of a particular shade of tan.
Miller and Blazakis decided to rely on a hacker technique known as “fuzzing” — inserting random data into applications and trying to force them to crash.
Making systems crash is easier than it might seem. Software programs are miracles of human ingenuity, veritable cathedrals made of letters and digits. But unlike Notre Dame in Paris or the Duomo in Milan — which took lifetimes to build and remain sturdy to this day — digital architecture is constantly evolving and can be made to crumble with the right push at the wrong spot.
Miller attributes that fragility to companies that place sales and novel applications over computer security.
“Companies want to make money,” he said. “They don’t want to sit around and make their software perfect.”
Many of those vulnerabilities are related to errors in code designed to parse, or sort through, data files sent over the Internet. A typical computer has hundreds of parser codes in its operating system. One good example is an image parser. It identifies the information that makes up a digital photo, processes it and then sends the file to the part of the machine designed to display the image.
Hackers will insert corrupted data in the photo’s code to disrupt the parser software, cause it to crash and open the way for it to be hijacked.
“If an application has never been fuzzed, any form of fuzzing is likely to find bugs,” Microsoft researchers said in a recent paper on the use of fuzzing to improve security.
No human being fuzzing by hand could cause a sufficient number of crashes to routinely allow a hacker to identify a zero day. So Miller and others write programs to do it. Miller’s fuzzing program enables him to connect to a variety of computers and keep track of thousands of crashes, including where in the software the crash took place.
“99.999 percent of the time, nothing bad happens,” Miller explained. “But I do it a billion times, and it happens enough times it’s interesting.”
The heart of his program is a function that randomly substitutes data in a targeted software program. He called the 200 lines of code that make up this function his “special sauce.”
To begin his iPhone hack, he took four Apple computers, one a laptop borrowed from his wife, and connected them to another computer holding the iPhone’s software, the entire amalgamation spread over the benchlike desks of his home office. The homey set-up, complete with an overstuffed bookcase crowned by a bowling pin, looked like the lair of a graduate student pursuing a science project.
Miller ran the mini-network 24 hours a day for weeks. One machine served as the quarterback, launching and coordinating the fuzz attacks, tracking the crashes and collecting the details. Before 7 most mornings, he woke up, went into the office, signed into the quarterback computer and checked on the progress, like a kid hoping for snow.
He was on the lookout in particular for failures that involved computer memory management — a serious flaw that could offer the way in.
“The memory manager keeps track of where things are, where new things should go, et cetera,” Miller recalled. “If a program crashes in the memory manager, it means the computer is confused about what things are located where. This is pretty serious, because it means it is in a state where it might be persuaded to think my data is something it thinks is entirely something else.”
For now, most of the crashes were trivial. February was approaching, and time was short. Miller and Blazakis still did not have their zero day.
The Hunt For Flaws
Zero days have become the stuff of digital legend. In the 1996 science-
fiction movie “Independence Day,” characters played by Will Smith and Jeff Goldblum launched a “virus” that took advantage of a zero-day vulnerability, crashed the computer system of an alien mothership and saved the world.
But they have always been more than just science fiction. For decades, hackers and security specialists have known about the existence of zero days. And as software proliferated, along with computers and networks, so have zero days. The researchers who found them often had no incentive to share their finds with the affected companies. Sometimes the researchers simply released the vulnerabilities publicly on the Internet to warn the public at large.
Government agencies that secretly engaged in hacking operations, along with some affected software makers, bought information on zero days from a thriving gray market, according to interviews with hackers and security specialists.
In 2005, a security firm called TippingPoint began offering bounties to researchers. Executives of the Austin-based firm reasoned that they could learn much for their own use while spurring the industry to fix threats by creating a master list. They called their effort the Zero Day Initiative.
Since then, more than 1,600 researchers have been paid for reporting almost 5,000 zero days. Starting at hundreds of dollars, the bounties soar into the tens of thousands. A hacker in Shanghai named Wu Shi has earned close to $300,000 for reporting more than 100 flaws in Web browsers.
The system seemed ideal, except for one thing: The software makers often failed to heed the warnings.
Some vulnerabilities remained for two years or more.
In 2007, TippingPoint, now owned by Hewlett-Packard, decided to underscore the problem by holding a high-profile event. The Pwn2Own contest would require hackers to not only find zero days but to put them into action in what is known as an “exploit” or attack.
Getting Closer
On Jan. 24, 2011, Miller and Blazakis saw a glimmer of hope. An especially promising crash appeared ripe for exploitation.
“Figuring out what to look at,” Miller wrote to his partner, “so we’re ready to rock.”
They had found it inside the part of the browser software that enables iPhone users to view PowerPoint presentations. It involved portions of the file that stored information about the location and size of shapes, such as a circle, square or triangle that would appear on a page of a presentation.
“Really, it was just bytes in a file. It just happened that it had something to do with a shape. We didn’t really care,” Miller said later. “As long as it was doing something wrong with the data.”
This could be their zero day, but more testing was required to see if they could exploit it.
Both men dived back into the technical details of the iPhone’s PowerPoint software. It was hard labor, even for highly skilled hackers. Blazakis stopped shaving and grew a “hacker’s beard.” He put in 18-hour days as he tried to reverse engineer the PowerPoint application in order to take control of it without causing too much disruption.
Bit by bit, they began mastering the layout of the PowerPoint software. They developed an understanding of it that rivaled those who designed it.
Finally, they found a way to insert their malicious code into the application and take control of a part of the iPhone.
“I think it’s under control now,” Miller wrote during an instant-message exchange on Jan. 27. “Sweet.”
Now they had to complete the exploit by figuring out a way to insert that code into an iPhone and ensuring that they could consistently hijack the device. Unlike the movies, where hackers are portrayed as breaking into computers as if they were cracking into digital safes, successful hacks often require deception and the unwitting complicity of the victim.
On Feb. 3, Miller joked to his friend about their struggle: “Looking for bugs fame money girls glory.”
Miller and Blazakis decided to create a way to lure an iPhone user to a bogus Web page. They would set up the page and trick a user into downloading a PowerPoint file. The file would appear normal, but it would contain their malicious code. (Known as “social engineering,” it’s the same technique used in the Google and RSA attacks.)
With the deadline looming, they began having video conference calls. They linked their computers in cyberspace and worked in tandem. They were a tired but formidable pair, cutting corners on their day jobs as security researchers as they closed in on the elusive exploit.
“The last two days were chaotic,” Blazakis said. “I stayed up most of the night doing this.”
On March 8, Miller flew to the contest, which was part of a security conference in Vancouver, B.C. But they still were not sure of the exploit. They continued fiddling with it right up to the eve of the event, including during Miller’s stopover in Seattle.
Their chance came on March 10. As he sat with judges and other hackers in a narrow conference room set up in the hotel, Miller had lingering fears that the hack still might not work on demand. Under the contest rules, he had just five tries to make it work.
When Miller’s turn arrived, he went behind a long table at one end of the room, where the judges sat with their own computers. Yellow cables snaked through the area (the hackers use cables instead of wireless to prevent other hackers from swiping the zero days in play). Miller connected his old white Apple laptop and looked out at other hackers, spectators and some reporters milling about.
A judge played the role of the unwitting iPhone user. The test phone was placed in an aluminum box to block unwanted wireless signals as an additional measure against any attempted theft of a zero-day exploit by other hackers. Miller told him to browse to the phony Web page holding a PowerPoint presentation that Miller had created. Hidden in the presentation’s data was the malicious code.
The image of the phone’s browser was projected onto a large screen. The judge typed in an address for the Web page, but the presentation never appeared. Instead, the image on the screen jumped back to the home page of the phone.
Miller, sitting with his own computer, knew just what had happened. In that moment, he had gained access to all the names and other information on the phone’s address book. He had found a way to strip privacy protections from a key part of the device.
He nudged one of the judges sitting near him and pointed to his screen, which was displaying the iPhone’s address book. He and Blazakis, who was looking on via a video feed to an iPhone he was holding in Baltimore, had won.
The next day, Miller received an oversize check worth $15,000 and beamed as he put on the white winner’s jacket.
Several weeks later, Apple acknowledged the exploit indirectly when the company issued a “patch.” As a result of the hackers’ work, the flaw they found and exploited was no longer a zero day.
Miller and Blazakis knew that behind the contest’s irreverent fun was a sobering reality.
“We’re smart and have skills and such, but we’re not that extraordinary,” Miller said later. “Imagine if you were a government or a Russian mob or a criminal syndicate and you could get 100 guys like us or 1,000 guys?”
Monday, June 20, 2011
Cyberspace, The Battlefield Of The Future
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Pentagon Ramps-Up Cyberwar Plans
By Tom Burghardt
Source: "Anti-Fascist Calling"
June 13, 2011
Courtesy Of "Global Research"
As the Obama administration expands Bush-era surveillance programs over the nation's electronic communications' infrastructure, recent media reports provide tantalizing hints of Pentagon plans for waging cyberwar against imperialism's geopolitical rivals. On May 31, The Wall Street Journal disclosed that the Pentagon now asserts "that computer sabotage coming from another country can constitute an act of war, a finding that for the first time opens the door for the U.S. to respond using traditional military force." One sound bite savvy wag told journalist Siobhan Gorman, "if you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks." Also on May 31, The Washington Post reported that America's shadow warriors have "developed a list of cyber-weapons and -tools, including viruses that can sabotage an adversary's critical networks, to streamline how the United States engages in computer warfare." That "classified list of capabilities has been in use for several months," with the approval of "other agencies, including the CIA." Post reporter Ellen Nakashima informed us that this "sensitive program ... forms part of the Pentagon's set of approved weapons or 'fires' that can be employed against an enemy." Not to be left in the dust by their U.S. and Israeli allies, The Guardian reported that the "UK is developing a cyber-weapons programme that will give ministers an attacking capability to help counter growing threats to national security from cyberspace." Armed Forces Minister Nick Harvey told The Guardian that "action in cyberspace will form part of the future battlefield" and will become "an integral part of the country's armoury." It appears that Western military establishments are in the grips of a full-blown cyber panic or, more likely, beating the war drums as they roll out new product lines with encouragement from corporate partners eager to make billions developing new weapons systems for their respective political masters. And why not? As Bloomberg News reported back in 2008, both Lockheed Martin and Boeing "are deploying forces and resources to a new battlefield: cyberspace." Bloomberg averred that military contractors and the wider defense industry are "eager to capture a share of a market that may reach $11 billion in 2013," and "have formed new business units to tap increased spending to protect U.S. government computers from attack." Linda Gooden, executive vice president of Lockheed's Information Systems & Global Services unit told Bloomberg, "The whole area of cyber is probably one of the faster-growing areas" of the U.S. budget. "It's something that we're very focused on." As part of the new strategy to be released later this month, the Post reports that the military needs "presidential authorization to penetrate a foreign computer network and leave a cyber-virus that can be activated later." However, when it comes to espionage or other activities loudly denounced as illegal intrusions into the sacrosanct world of government and corporate crime and corruption, the "military does not need such approval." We're told such "benign" activities "include studying the cyber-capabilities of adversaries or examining how power plants or other networks operate." "Military cyber-warriors," Nakashima writes, "can also, without presidential authorization, leave beacons to mark spots for later targeting by viruses," an "unnamed military official" told the Post. But wait, aren't those precisely the types of covert actions decried by politicians, media commentators and assorted experts when they're directed against the heimat? Is there a double standard here? Well, of course there is! Along with a flurry of Defense Department leaks designed to ratchet-up the fear factor and lay the groundwork for billions more from Congress for giant defense firms servicing the Pentagon's unquenchable thirst for ever-deadlier weapons systems--cyber, or otherwise--"threat inflation" scaremongering described by researchers Jerry Brito and Tate Watkins in their essential paper, Loving the Cyber Bomb?, take center stage. Just last week, former Democratic party congressional hack, current CIA Director and Obama's nominee to lead the Defense Department, Leon Panetta, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that "the next Pearl Harbor that we confront could very well be a cyberattack that cripples America's electrical grid and its security and financial systems," The Christian Science Monitor reported. Cripple the financial system? Why greedy banksters and corporate bottom-feeders seem to be doing a splendid job of it on their own without an assist from shadowy Russian hackers, the People's Liberation Army or LulzSecpranksters! However, the Pentagon's propaganda blitz (courtesy of a gullible or complicitous corporate media, take your pick) is neither meant to inform nor educate the public but rather, to conceal an essential fact: the United States is alreadyengaged in hostile cyber operations against their geopolitical rivals--and allies--and have been doing so since the 1990s, if not earlier, as journalist Nicky Hager revealed when he blew the lid off NSA's Echelon program in a 1997 piece for CovertAction Quarterly. Botnets and Root Kits: What The HBGary Hack Revealed When The Wall Street Journal informed readers that the "Pentagon's first formal cyber strategy ... represents an early attempt to grapple with a changing world in which a hacker could pose as significant a threat to U.S. nuclear reactors, subways or pipelines as a hostile country's military," what the Journal didn't disclose is that the Defense Department is seeking the technological means to do just that. Implying that hacking might soon constitute an "act of war" worthy of a "shock and awe" campaign, never mind that attributing an attack by a criminal or a state is no simple matter, where would the Pentagon draw the line? After all as The Guardian reported, with the "underground world of computer hackers ... so thoroughly infiltrated in the US by the FBI and secret service," will some enterprising criminal acting as a catspaw for his/her U.S. handlers, gin-up an incident thereby creating Panetta's "cyber Pearl Harbor" as a pretext for a new resource war? While fanciful perhaps, if recent history is any guide to future American actions (can you say "Iraq" and "weapons of mass destruction"), such fabrications would have very deadly consequences for those on the wrong side of this, or some future, U.S. administration. But we needn't speculate on what the Pentagon might do; let's turn our attention instead to what we know they're doing already. Back in February, The Tech Herald revealed that the private security firms HBGary Federal, HBGary, Palantir Technologies and Berico Technologies were contacted by the white shoe law firm Hunton & Williams on behalf of corporate clients, Bank of America and the U.S. Chamber on Commerce, to "develop a strategic plan of attack against Wikileaks." The scheme concocted by "Team Themis" was to have included a dirty tricks campaign targeting journalists, WikiLeaks supporters, their families and the whistleblowing group itself through "cyber attacks, disinformation, and other potential proactive tactics." But when the CEO of HBGary Federal boasted to the Financial Times that he had penetrated the cyber-guerrilla collective Anonymous, the group struck back and pwned ("owned") HBGary's allegedly "secure" servers, seizing a treasure trove of some 70,000 internal emails and other documents, posting them on the internet. As I reported earlier this year, Team Themis looked like a smart bet. After all, HBGary and the other firms touted themselves as "experts in threat intelligence and open source analysis" with a focus on "Information Operations (INFOOPS); influence operations, social media exploitation, new media development." Palantir, which was fronted millions of dollars by the CIA's venture capitalist arm, In-Q-Tel, bragged that they could deliver "the only platform that can be used at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels within the US Intelligence, Defense, and Law Enforcement Communities," and that they can draw "in any type of data, such as unstructured message traffic, structured identity data, link charts, spreadsheets, SIGINT, ELINT, IMINT and documents." In other words, these firms subsisted almost entirely on U.S. government contracts and, in close partnership with mega-giant defense companies such as General Dynamics, SRA International, ManTech International and QinetiQ North America, were actively building cyber weapons for the Defense Department. In the aftermath of the HBGary sting, investigative journalist Nate Anderson published an essential piece for Ars Technica which described how HBGary and other firms were writing "backdoors for the government." "In 2009," Anderson wrote, "HBGary had partnered with the Advanced Information Systems group of defense contractor General Dynamics to work on a project euphemistically known as 'Task B.' The team had a simple mission: slip a piece of stealth software onto a target laptop without the owner's knowledge." HBGary's CEO Greg Hoglund's "special interest," Anderson reported, "was in all-but-undetectable computer 'rootkits,' programs that provide privileged access to a computer's innermost workings while cloaking themselves even from standard operating system functions. A good rootkit can be almost impossible to remove from a running machine--if you could even find it in the first place." The secret-shredding web site Public Intelligence published HBGary's 2008 paper, Windows Rootkit Analysis Report. Amongst the nuggets buried within its 243 pages we learned that Hoglund suggested to his secret state and corporate clients that "combining deployment of a rootkit with a BOT makes for a very stealth piece of malicious software." Readers should recall that back in 2008, an article published in the influential Armed Forces Journal advocated precisely that. Col. Charles W. Williamson III's piece, "Carpet Bombing in Cyberspace," advocated "building an af.mil robot network (botnet) that can direct such massive amounts of traffic to target computers that they can no longer communicate and become no more useful to our adversaries than hunks of metal and plastic." It would appear that the project envisioned by HBGary and General Dynamics would combine the stealthy features of a rootkit along with the destructive capabilities of a botnet. One can only presume that defense firms are building malware and other attack tools for the Defense Department, the CIA, the National Security Agency and USCYBERCOM, and that they constitute the short list of "approved weapons or 'fires'" alluded to by The Washington Post. A 2009 HBGary contract proposal released by Public Intelligence, DoD Cyber Warfare Support Work Statement, disclosed that the "contract will include efforts to examine the architecture, engineering, functionality, interface and interoperability of Cyber Warfare systems, services and capabilities at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, to include all enabling technologies." The firm proposed an "operational exercise design and construction," as well as "operations and requirements analysis, concept formulation and development, feasibility demonstrations and operational support." "This will include," the proposal averred, "efforts to analyze and engineer operational, functional and system requirements in order to establish national, theater and force level architecture and engineering plans, interface and systems specifications and definitions, implementation, including hardware acquisition for turnkey systems." Under terms of the contract, the company will "perform analyses of existing and emerging Operational and Functional Requirements at the force, theater, Combatant Commands (COCOM) and national levels to support the formulation, development and assessment of doctrine, strategy, plans, concepts of operations, and tactics, techniques and procedures in order to provide the full spectrum of Cyber Warfare and enabling capabilities to the warfighter." In fact, during an early roll-out of the Pentagon's cyber panic product line five years ago, Dr. Lani Kass, a former Israeli Air Force major and acolyte of neocon war criminals Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, and who directs the Air Force Cyber Space Task Force under Bush and Obama, submitted a provocative proposal. During a 2006 presentation titled, A Warfighting Domain: Cyberspace, Kass asserted that "the electromagnetic spectrum is the maneuver space. Cyber is the United States' Center of Gravity--the hub of all power and movement, upon which everything else depends. It is the Nation's neural network." Kass averred that "Cyber superiority is the prerequisite to effective operations across all strategic and operational domains--securing freedom from attack and freedom to attack." Accordingly, she informed her Air Force audience that "Cyber favors the offensive," and that the transformation of a militarized internet into a "warfighting domain" will be accomplished by "Strategic Attack directly at enemy centers of gravity; Suppression of Enemy Cyber Defenses; Offensive Counter Cyber; Defensive Counter Cyber; Interdiction." In the years since that presentation such plans are well underway. In another leaked file, Public Intelligence disclosed that HBGary, again in partnership with General Dynamics, are developing "a software tool, which provides the user a command line interface, that will enable single file, or full directory exfiltration over TCP/IP." Called "Task Z," General Dynamics "requested multiple protocols to be scoped as viable options, and this quote contains options for VoIP (Skype) protocol, BitTorrent protocol, video over HTTP (port 80), and HTTPS (port 443)." As I reported last year, the Obama administration will soon be seeking legislation that would force telecommunications companies to redesign their system and information networks to more readily facilitate internet spying. And, as the administration builds upon and quietly expands previous government programs that monitor the private communications of the American people, The New York Times revealed that our "change" regime will demand that software and communication providers build backdoors accessible to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Such "backdoors" will enable spooks trolling "encrypted e-mail transmitters like BlackBerry, social networking Web sites like Facebook and software that allows direct 'peer to peer' messaging like Skype" the means "to intercept and unscramble encrypted messages." These are precisely the technological "fixes" which firms like HBGary, General Dynamics and presumably other defense contractors are actively building for their secret state security partners. The Fire This Time While denouncing China, Russia and other capitalist rivals over cyber espionage and alleged hacking escapades, the deployment of digital weapons of mass destruction against selected adversaries, Iran for one, is an essential feature of Pentagon targeting profiles and has now been fully integrated into overall U.S. strategic military doctrine. This is hardly the stuff of wild speculation considering that evidence suggests that last year's attack on Iran's civilian nuclear program via the highly-destructive Stuxnet worm was in all probability a joint U.S.-Israeli operation as The New York Times disclosed. Nor should we forget, that U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), the Pentagon satrapy directed by NSA Director, Gen. Keith Alexander, is "a sub-unified command subordinate to U. S. Strategic Command," the lead agency charged with running space operations, information warfare, missile defense, global command, control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), global strike and strategic deterrence; the trigger finger on America's first-strike nuclear arsenal. Will the next crisis trigger an onslaught against an adversary's civilian infrastructure? The Washington Post informs us that an unnamed U.S. official acknowledged that "'the United States is actively developing and implementing' cyber-capabilities 'to deter or deny a potential adversary the ability to use its computer systems' to attack the United States." However, while the "collateral effects" of such an attack are claimed to be "unpredictable," one can be sure that civilian populations on the receiving end of a Pentagon cyber attack will suffer mass casualties as water and electrical systems go offline, disease and panic spreads and social infrastructures collapse. Welcome to America's brave new world of high-tech war crimes coming soon to a theater near you (3D glasses optional). Tom Burghardt is a researcher and activist based in the San Francisco Bay Area. In addition to publishing in Covert Action Quarterly and Global Research, , he is a Contributing Editor with Cyrano's Journal Today. His articles can be read on Dissident Voice, The Intelligence Daily, Pacific Free Press, Uncommon Thought Journal, and the whistleblowing website WikiLeaks. He is the editor of Police State America: U.S. Military "Civil Disturbance" Planning, distributed by AK Press and has contributed to the new book from Global Research, The Global Economic Crisis: The Great Depression of the XXI Century. | |
Tom Burghardt is a frequent contributor to Global Research. Global Research Articles by Tom Burghardt | |
Saturday, May 30, 2009
Cyber Weapons Of Mass Destruction
By Tom Burghardt
Source: Antifascist Calling...
May 27, 2009
Courtesy Of Global Research
A quintessential hallmark of an authoritarian regime, particularly one that operates within highly-militarized, though nominally democratic states such as ours, is the maintenance of a system of internal control; a seamless panopticon where dissent is equated with criminality and the rule of law derided as a luxury ill-afforded "during a time of war." In this context, the deployment of new offensive technologies which can wreck havoc on human populations deemed expendable by the state, are always couched in a defensive rhetoric by militarist aggressors and their apologists. While the al-Qaeda brand may no longer elicit a compelling response in terms of mobilizing the population for new imperial adventures, novel threats--and panics--are required to marshal public support for the upward transfer of wealth into the corporate trough. Today, "cyber terror" functions as the "new Osama." And with Congress poised to pass the Cybersecurity Act of 2009, an Orwellian bill that would give the president the power to "declare a cybersecurity emergency" and shut down or limit Internet traffic in any "critical" information network "in the interest of national security" of course, the spaces left for the free flow of information--and meaningful dissent--slowly contract. DARPA--and Cybersecurity Grifters--to the Rescue But protecting critical infrastructure from hackers, criminals and terrorists isn't the only game in town. The Pentagon is planning to kick-start a new office, Cyber Command, armed with the capacity to launch devastating attacks against any nation or group deemed an official enemy by Washington. As Antifascist Calling reported last year, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Pentagon's "geek squad," is building a National Cyber Range (NCR). As Cyber Command's research arm, the agency's Strategic Technology Office (STO) describes NCR as
According to a January 2009 press release, the agency announced that NCR "will accelerate government research and development in high-risk, high-return areas and work in close cooperation with private-sector partners to jump-start technical cyber transformation." Given the Pentagon's proclivity to frame debates over defense and security-related issues as one of "dominating the adversary" and discovering vulnerabilities that can be "exploited" by war planners, one can hypothesize that NCR is a testing range for the creation of new offensive weapons. Amongst the "private-sector partners" chosen by the agency to "develop, field, and test new 'leap ahead' concepts and capabilities" are: BAE Systems, Information and Electronic Systems Integration Inc., Wayne, N.J. , General Dynamics, Advanced Information Systems, San Antonio, Texas; Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel Md.; Lockheed Martin Corp., Simulation, Training and Support, Orlando, Fla.; Northrop Grumman, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Systems Division, Columbia, Md.; Science Applications International Corp., San Diego, Calif.; SPARTA, Columbia, Md. While little-known outside the defense and intelligence establishment, SPARTA describes its "core business areas" as "strategic defense and offense systems, tactical weapons systems, space systems." Its security and intelligence brief includes "intelligence production, computer network operations, and information assurance." Investigative journalist James Bamford wrote in The Shadow Factory that SPARTA "hired Maureen Baginski, the NSA's powerful signals intelligence director, in October 2006, as president of its National Security Systems Sector." According to Bamford, the firm, like others in the netherworld of corporate spying are always on the prowl for intelligence analysts "to pursue access and exploitation of targets of interest." Given their spooky resume, information on SPARTA's contracts are hard to come by. Indeed, the firm claims that under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act they are exempt from providing the public with information because their products involve "the operation, or use of... intelligence activities... related to national security, command and control of military forces, equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system, or systems which are critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions." How's that for openness and transparency! One can only hazard a guess as to the firm's role in devising DARPA's "leap-ahead" National Cyber Range. While the initial outlay of defense funds for NCR may appear to be a substantial amount of boodle for enterprising contractors, it is merely a down payment on Phase I of the project. Melissa Hathaway, the Obama administration's director of the Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force said, "I don't believe that this is a single-year or even a multi-year investment--it's a multi-decade approach."Â Hathaway, a former consultant at the spooky Booz Allen Hamilton corporation, told the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) in April,
That Hathaway chose INSA as a forum is hardly surprising. Describing itself as a "non-profit professional association created to improve our nation's security through an alliance of intelligence and national security leaders in the private and public sectors," INSA was created by and for contractors in the heavily-outsourced shadow world of U.S. intelligence. Founded by BAE Systems, Booz Allen Hamilton, Computer Sciences Corporation, General Dynamics, Hewlett-Packard, Lockheed Martin, ManTech International, Microsoft, the Potomac Institute and Science Applications International Corporation, The Washington Post characterized INSA as "a gathering place for spies and their business associates." "Partners" who benefit directly from the launch of DARPA's National Cyber Range. No doubt, Hathaway's remarks are music to the ears of "beltway bandits" who reap hundreds of billions annually to fund taxpayer-fueled "national security priorities." That the Pentagon is richly rewarding INSA-connected firms with documented track records of "misconduct such as contract fraud and environmental, ethics, and labor violations," according to the Project on Government Oversight's (POGO) Federal Contractor Misconduct Database (FCMD) hardly elicits a yawn from Congress. Among the corporations selected by the agency to construct the National Cyber Range, Lockheed Martin leads the pack in "Misconduct $ since 1995" according to POGO, having been fined $577.2 million (No. 1); Northrop Grumman, $790.4 million (No. 3); General Dynamics, $63.2 million (No. 4); BAE Systems, $1.3 million (No. 6); Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), $14.5 million (No. 9); Johns Hopkins University, $4.6 million, (No. 81) But as disturbing as these figures are, representing corporate grifting on a massive scale, equally troubling is the nature of the project itself. As Aviation Week reports, "Devices to launch and control cyber, electronic and information attacks are being tested and refined by the U.S. military and industry in preparation for moving out of the laboratory and into the warfighter's backpack." High-Tech Tools for Aggressive War The American defense establishment is devising tools that can wreck havoc with a keystroke. DARPA is currently designing "future attack devices" that can be deployed across the imperialist "battlespace" by the "non-expert," that is by America's army of robosoldiers. According to Aviation Week, one such device "combines cybersleuthing, technology analysis and tracking of information flow. It then offers suggestions to the operator on how best to mount an attack and, finally, reports on success of the effort."
As can be expected, the Pentagon's rhetorical mise-en-scene is always a purely "defensive" response to future depredations by nefarious and shadowy forces threatening the heimat. In fact, the United States has systematically employed battlefield tactics that target civilian infrastructure as a means of breaking the enemy's will to fight. Stretching across the decades, from Southeast Asia to Iraq to Yugoslavia, imperialist strategists have committed war crimes by targeting the electrical grid, water supply and transportation- and manufacturing infrastructure of their adversaries. The NCR will potentially serve as a new and improved means to bring America's rivals to their knees. Imagine the capacity for death and destruction implicit in a tool that can, for example, at the push of a button cause an adversary's chemical plant to suddenly release methyl isocynate (the Bhopal effect) on a sleeping city, or a nuclear power plant to go supercritical, releasing tens of billions of curies of radioactive death into the atmosphere? During NATO's 1999 "liberation" of the narco-state Kosovo from the former Yugoslavia, American warplanes dropped what was described as a graphite "blackout bomb," the BLU-114/B "soft bomb" on Belgrade and other Serbian cities during its war of aggression. As the World Socialist Web Site reported at the time, A particularly dangerous consequence of the long-term power blackout is the damage to the water systems in many Yugoslav cities, which are dependent on pumping stations run by electrical power. Novi Sad, a city of 300,000 which is the capital of the Vojvodina province of Serbia, has been without running water for eight days, according to residents. Families have been compelled to get water from the Danube river to wash and operate the toilet, and a handful of wells to provide drinking water.
With technological advances courtesy of DARPA's National Cyber Range and their "private-sector partners," the potential for utterly devastating societies ripe for resource extraction by American corporatist war criminals will increase exponentially. As Wired reported,
Initiatives such as the National Cyber Range are fully theorized as one facet of "network-centric warfare," the Rumsfeldian "Revolution in Military Affairs." Durham University geographer Stephen Graham describes the Pentagon notion that dominance can be achieved through "increasingly omnipotent surveillance and 'situational awareness', devastating and precisely-targeted aerial firepower, and the suppression and degradation of the communications and fighting ability of any opposing forces." Indeed, these are integrated approaches that draw from corporate management theory to create "continuous, always-on support for military operations in urban terrain," an imperialist battlespace where Wal-Mart seamlessly morphs into The Terminator. According to Aviation Week, the device currently being field tested will "capture expert knowledge but keep humans in the loop." As a battlefield weapon, simplicity and ease of operation is the key to successfully deploying this monstrous suite of tools. And Pentagon "experts" are designing a console that will "quantify results so that the operator can put a number against a choice," "enhance execution by creating a tool for the nonexpert that puts material together and keeps track of it" and finally, "create great visuals so missions can be executed more intuitively."
A tunable device for increased destructive capabilities; what are these if not a prescription for mass murder on a post-industrial scale? Additionally, DARPA sorcerers are combining "digital tools that even an inexperienced operator can bring into play. In the unclassified arena there are algorithms dubbed Mad WiFi, Air Crack and Beach. For classified work, industry developers also have a toolbox of proprietary cyberexploitation algorithms." What has been dubbed "Air Crack" deploys "open source tools to crack the encryption key for a wireless network." Cryptoattacks on the other hand, "use more sophisticated techniques to cut through the password hash." One means to "penetrate" an adversary's protective cyber locks is referred to as a "de-authorization capability." According to Aviation Week, the attack operator "can kick all the nodes off a network temporarily so that the attack system can watch them reconnect. This provides information needed to quickly penetrate the network."Â As The Register reported in January when the ink on the DARPA contracts had barely dried,
Rance Walleston, the head of BAE's cyber warfare division told Aviation Week in late 2008, "We want to change cyber attack from an art to a science." And as The Register averred, the Pentagon's "simulated cyber warzone" should be up and running next year, "ready to pass under the harrow of BAE's new electronic pestilences, digital megabombs and tailored computer plagues." | |
Tom Burghardt is a frequent contributor to Global Research. Global Research Articles by Tom Burghardt | |