Department of Defense Linguist Charged with Espionage – A Spy Story

Special Operations Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve

A civilian Arabic linguist working as a contractor for the Department of Defense at a Special Operations Task Force facility in Irbil, northern Iraq, was arrested and charged with espionage.

Miriam Taha Thompson, 61, is accused of transmitting highly sensitive classified national defense information to a foreign national with apparent connections to the Lebanese terrorist group Hizballah.

For the legal types, the specific charge is Delivering Defense Information to Aid a Foreign Government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) and conspiring to do so in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 794(c).

The Department of Justice press release includes links to the criminal complaint and an affidavit detailing Thompson’s alleged activities. I am surprised at the level of detail in the affidavit – at times, it appears to be divulging what many of us intelligence professionals would consider sensitive information.

My compliments to FBI Special Agent Danielle Ray for her excellent recap of this alleged crime. She comments that the affidavit only includes enough information to support probable cause for Thompson’s arrest and that there is more information. As if this isn’t bad enough….

Thompson was arrested on February 27 in Irbil, Iraq. She held a Top Secret security clearance with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information as well as access to sensitive information on the true identity of human sources providing intelligence to American intelligence officers.

Thompson provided the names of a least four of these American intelligence sources to a Lebanese national with ties to Hizballah, as well as a warning to the individual about U.S. intelligence operations targeting Hizballah and the Amal Movement. Both Hizballah and Amal are Lebanese Shi’a groups designated by the State Department as foreign terrorist organizations.

I have read the affidavit and will detail some of the more pertinent information that shows how much damage a well-placed spy can do in a short period of time. It appears that Thompson committed these crimes between December 30, 2019 and February 19, 2020. It is interesting that she began these activities almost immediately after her arrival in Irbil in mid-December.

I will try to break this down into a more readable narrative, based on my analysis of the affidavit, press release, and media accounts. It reads like a spy novel. Granted, some of this is speculation, but I used to do this for a living.

Miriam Taha (a very Lebanese name) was either born in an Arabic-speaking country, or grew up in the United States the daughter of immigrants in an Arabic-speaking household. In any case, she possessed a useful and marketable skill – the ability to speak and understand Arabic at the native level.

Apparently, Miriam Taha married and became know by her husband’s surname, Thompson (we are unaware of her marital status). She took a job as an Arabic linguist for a government contractor. As part of her employment, she obtained a Top Secret clearance and was granted access to Special Compartmented Information, and operational intelligence information on human intelligence sources. This is among the most sensitive information in the intelligence community.

At some point, Thompson became romantically involved with a Lebanese national with ties to the Amal Movement. Amal is a Lebanese Shi’a organization at times affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah – both groups have been designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the U.S. State Department.

I suspect that her romantic involvement was a targeted recruitment by this Lebanese national, identified in the affidavit as “Co-conspirator.” This individual is what we in the intelligence community call a case officer – he was Thompson’s handler, and she was his asset. She admitted to her interrogators that “Co-conspirator” had a nephew working in the Lebanese Ministry of the Interior. Speaking as a professional, this was a well planned and executed recruitment.

The timing of what exactly happened leading up to the actual criminal activity is difficult to determine. We know that sometime around December 30, 2019, Thompson, now working at the Special Operations Task Force in the Kurdish city of Irbil in northern Iraq, began accessing files relating to American intelligence operations, specifically human intelligence penetrations, targeting both the Amal and Hizballah groups in Lebanon.

Evidently, this search of data bases for information outside the scope of Thompson’s need to know triggered some sort of alert or alarm. Although she was ultimately detected and stopped, she was able to do severe damage in the six weeks she was conducting this operation. Thompson compromised extremely sensitive information, including the identity of four American assets operating in Lebanon to the very people those assets were targeting.

Thompson, in essence, hit the jackpot. Her searches of the classified data bases at the Irbil facility – which may have been linked to centralized intelligence community data bases – yielded 57 files on the desired operations in Lebanon. Shockingly, these files contained the true names, background information, and even photographs of eight human sources working for U.S. intelligence.

Take a minute and think about that. “Eight human sources” translates to eight people who had agreed to work with/for U.S. intelligence officers for whatever reason – patriotism, greed, revenge, who knows? Exposure of these assets in a country like Lebanon would mean arrest, aggressive interrogation (read: torture), and either incarceration or more likely, an ugly death. It is believed that four identities were compromised to her case officer.

No matter how naïve Thompson tries to appear, her own words transmitted to her case officer indicate her level of involvement. She warned her case officer that at least four of these U.S. assets were operating in Lebanon, targeting the Amal organization among others, and suggesting that the assets’ telephones be tapped. That’s not just providing information, that’s actively participating in an operation of a hostile intelligence service against the United States.

Although she expressed her hatred for both Hizballah and Amal, she never explained her rationale for providing information on American intelligence operations against these designated terrorist groups.

As a former case officer, I am always interested in the why. Why did she agree to do this? What did she get out of it? She claims to hate the two groups she likely helped, but did it anyway, in fact, taking an interest in warning the targets of American intelligence operations. I guess she did it for her lover.

We still don’t know the results of Thompson’s treason. I suspect that if the four human assets were discovered and arrested, she may be responsible for their deaths. Unfortunately, the law limits her punishment to life imprisonment.

My question for the U.S. intelligence community writ large, and specifically the Special Operations Task Force in Irbil – why was this relatively low-level contract employee capable of gaining access to human source true identification data?

Inexcusable. Someone should be held accountable for that, but will they?

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ADDENDUM: Iranian Air Force or SAHA airlines - who really owns this aircraft?

ADDENDUM: In light of the September 15 Israeli airstrike on the cargo associated with this particular aircraft, I wanted to update this article with new information and photographs. The new information appears immediately following the original article.

Hard-to-catch track of this Iranian Boeing 747-200 freighter aircraft over Syria, here as civil registration EP-SHB. Note the Mode S (Hex) code 734D02 – this stays with the aircraft as it changes registration and owners. The Mode S and registration seem to agree on SAHA airlines.

This particular aircraft was delivered to the Imperial Iranian Air Force in 1977 as 5-8113. For 1984 and 1985, it was leased to then national civil flag carrier Iran Air, and then returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF). In 1991, it was “leased” to SAHA airlines, a wholly-owned company of the IRIAF. In the intelligence business, we call this a shell company.

In 2013, SAHA airlines suspended all operations, restarting again in 2017. At that time, EP-SHB was returned to the IRIAF, again as 5-8113. It appears to be in IRIAF service today, operating from Tehran/Mehrabad airport – home to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) aircraft fleet. How coincidental.

I first saw this aircraft in Syria in this livery. Note the Iranian flag on the tail, over the military airlift service logo, plus the IRIAF identification in Farsi on the front of the fuselage and IRIAF in Latin letters below. No question that this was an Iranian air force jet.

As Iranian support for terrorist groups became notorious, we saw the aircraft in this livery. Note the removal of the IRIAF identification in Farsi and the IRIAF letters. The flag and logo remained. Iranian, but whose? The logo alone tells me it's still IRIAF.

As Iran promoted the fiction that this and other aircraft were not part of the the Iranian air force or involved in support to terrorist groups - notably Hizballah - the military airlift service logo was removed, and the civilian registration EP-SHB was applied.

This is the 2018 livery of the aircraft. This is what we in the intelligence business call a “vanilla” airplane. Although in the color scheme of the IRIAF, there is no visible identification – it’s likely there, but so small it is virtually undetectable from more than 10 feet.

Recent flight history – note the numerous flights listed from Kermanshah to Tehran. Also note the dubious flight path – I am not buying it. I suspect this aircraft is part of the Iranian resupply effort to Syria dubbed the “Shi’a Express.”

Who really owns this aircraft?

Spoiler: That was a rhetorical question. We know.

ADDENDUM: Updated information begins here.

This image is a screen shot from the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting network showing this same aircraft. As I indicated above, its identification is there, but very small and not very descriptive. Note the numbers 113 on the lower fuselage. That is an abbreviated form of the IRIAF registration 5-8113. If you look closely at the earlier photograph in the original article, and now know where to look, you can make out the 113. This image is likely at the military ramp at Tehran's Mehrabad airport.

This image shows this IRIAF aircraft, using its false civilian registration EP-SHB en route from Tehran to Damascus on the evening of Saturday, July 15.

It landed later at the Syrian Air Force 29th Air Brigade ramp at Damascus International Airport.

After the cargo was unloaded Saturday night, it was struck by Israeli Air Force missiles, destroying the cargo, and likely damaging the aircraft. The image above, posted in a tweet from an imagery analyst, shows the aircraft on the military ramp with blackened tarmac where the cargo was struck.

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The deal to relocate ISIS fighters to eastern Syria actually makes sense

In a controversial agreement reached by the Syrian government, its close ally Lebanese Hizballah, and the Lebanese government, hundreds of fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have been guaranteed and provided safe passage from their besieged enclave in the Arsal district of northeastern Lebanon and the Qalamun area of western Syria to the city of Albu Kamal.

The agreement has been criticized by both the U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi government. Iraqi Prime Minister Haydar al-'Abadi remarked that while Iraqi troops are busy killing ISIS fighters, the Syrian government is busing other ISIS fighters to the Iraqi border.

In return for safe passage of over 300 of its disarmed fighters and their families, approximately 700 persons total, ISIS agreed to surrender its positions in Syrian-Lebanese border areas, repatriate the remains of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) member beheaded by ISIS as well as the remains of two Hizballah fighters, reveal the burial site of several Lebanese Army soldiers, and release a Hizballah fighter being held prisoner.

Although the deal was widely criticized, it follows a pattern of Syrian government agreements with various rebel groups. The terms are similar - a rebel group agrees to surrender territory in return for safe passage to another rebel-held area, usually in Idlib governorate.

These agreements have effectively closed pockets of resistance and allowed the Syrian government to re-establish control over cities and towns without having to forcibly evict entrenched and committed fighters, thus avoiding unnecessary civilian casualties and damage to the country's already severely damaged infrastructure.

(Click on image for larger view)

Albu Kamal sits on the Euphrates River on the Syrian-Iraq border opposite the Iraqi city of al-Qa'im. Both sides of the border are currently controlled by ISIS. As the Iraqis eliminate the ISIS pockets of resistance in Tal'Afar and al-Huwayjah, the Syrians reduce the ISIS pockets between Homs and Dayr al-Zawr, and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces eliminates the ISIS presence in al-Raqqah, virtually all of the remaining ISIS fighters will be located in the Euphrates Valley.

Taking an analytical look at this specific deal in the Lebanese-Syrian border area, it makes sense for all parties:

- The 300 or so ISIS fighters are allowed to relocate - and live to fight another day. As we have seen in the fighting in Mosul and now al-Raqqah and Tal'afar, small numbers of fanatical, willing-to-die ISIS fighters can be very effective in defending urban terrain.

- The Lebanese government has effectively removed ISIS from its territory, with minimal casualties to the Lebanese Army and minimal damage to the country's infrastructure.

- The Syrian government has reduced yet another enemy pocket, this time an ISIS enclave. They are effectively reducing ISIS pockets in central Syria as they move east towards the ISIS-surrounded major city of Dayr al-Zawr and its adjacent air base. These reduced pockets of resistance free up badly needed forces for fighting ISIS.

Combined with the Russian-Turkish-Iranian brokered ceasefires holding in many areas, the Syrians have been able to concentrate much more force on the campaign to relieve the city and garrison in Dayr al-Zawr - they are now within 40 miles of the city.

I would note that despite Syrian press reporting about the prowess of the "ISIS hunters," without Russian airpower and the presence of IRGC and Hizballah troops the Syrians would be hard pressed to move on Dayr al-Zawr.

The move of ISIS fighters into Dayr al-Zawr governorate is another phase in the fighting that will culminate in the Battle of the Euphrates. That final fight to eliminate ISIS will take place somewhere in the Euphrates Valley, possibly near Albu Kamal. See my earlier piece on this: The fight against the Islamic State grinds on….

The final battles may also involve coordinated Iraqi and Syrian military operations. If that happens, it will be interesting to see what roles the American and Russian forces will play to support their respective allies.

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American combat troops to Syria? Not so fast....

Click on image to view the clip (I am at the 4:10 time code)

Note: This article is my followup to an excellent piece written by fellow CNN military analyst Lieutenant General Mark Hertling, U.S. Army (Retired): Combat troops to Syria? Not so fast. In it, the general details very clearly the military planning process.

Here are some additional considerations that should be addressed when contemplating the introduction of American combat forces into Syria. The special operations forces now on the ground in Syria are technically in a "train, advise and assist" capacity - that is "Pentagon-speak" that there are no U.S. boots on the ground, no troops in combat.* What the report alludes to is the possible deployment of actual combat units - armor, artillery, infantry and the required support units - possibly a U.S. Army brigade combat team.

A key planning factor in developing a recommendation to be made to the Secretary of Defense and the President is the current political and military situation in Syria, in the region and how that affects the larger international landscape. Nothing in the Middle East happens in a vacuum - there are many competing interests that must be evaluated. Events in Syria are influenced by external events, just as external events are influenced by what happens in Syria. This also impacts the ever-important U.S.-Russia relationship as well.

I know this is complicated, so I will try to simplify it as best I can without sacrificing accuracy. Among a variety of assignments in the Middle East, I was the Air Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Damascus. In that position, I routinely traveled the entire country, observing and reporting on the political and military situation. That travel took me to all of the areas in which there is now fighting between all of the various factions, including the al-Raqqah area. I like to say that I have been on every paved road in Syria - not exactly true, but close.

President Trump has tasked the Department of Defense to provide options to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Given those instructions, I will focus solely on that objective, rather than trying to address the Obama Administration's bifurcated (and in my view somewhat unrealistic) policy of defeating ISIS and also removing the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad.

The two objectives are virtually incompatible, and became even more so with the deployment of Russian military forces to Syria in September 2015. Any window of opportunity for the removal of al-Asad regime, either militarily or politically, closed when the first Russian fighter-bombers landed at Humaymim air base in northwestern Syria.

Most Middle East military analysts would agree that ISIS's center of gravity in Syria - and thus the principal objective - is the group's self-proclaimed capital of al-Raqqah. It is analogous with the city of Mosul in Iraq, now under attack by Iraqi military, special operations and police units. It is only a matter of time before Mosul falls to Iraqi forces.

In Iraq, there is ISIS on one side and everyone else on the other. Those allied against ISIS include the various Iraqi security forces, Iranian-supported (and many of us believe, Iranian-led) Shi'a militias, the very effective Kurdish peshmerga forces, and a variety of U.S.-led coalition troops providing differing levels of support. That coalition support includes intelligence, logistics, training and advising, direct artillery and rocket fires, and constant air strikes.

The situation in Syria could not be more different. As in Iraq, ISIS is the common enemy, however, there is not a coordinated or even coherent effort to fight it.

Note that I am not addressing the ongoing fighting in the western and southern parts of Syria, as those areas are peripheral to the main efforts against ISIS. While important, they are primarily between Syrian regime forces backed by its allies and anti-regime rebel groups, be they secular or Islamist.

The area of operations to be considered in this analysis stretches from Aleppo to the Iraqi border, roughly along the Euphrates River, a distance of almost 250 miles (see map below). Al-Raqqah sits approximately in the middle. Most planners believe that taking al-Raqqah is the key to defeating ISIS in Syria.

In the coming battle for al-Raqqah, the major combatant groups in the fight against ISIS are:

* Syrian government and its allies. The Syrian armed forces are supported by the Russian armed forces, primarily through airpower, but also via missile strikes and rocket/field artillery. Additional ground forces are provided by the Iranian Army and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Lebanese Hizballah, Iraqi Shi'a militias, and a group of Afghan Shi'a fighters. These allies have effectively doubled the size of what remains of the Syrian Army. The Syrian military has been severely crippled by losses and defections to the point that without this external assistance, it would cease to be a viable force.

* Major elements of the Free Syrian Army, supported in this operation - dubbed Operation Euphrates Shield - by the Turkish military. One might question Turkey's motives for participating in the fighting. Although Ankara's stated reason is to fight ISIS - and they are doing that - many believe it is to ensure that the Syrian Kurds do not create some form of autonomous region in northern Syria as the Kurds have in Iraq, or worst case, attempt to merge the Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish areas into one political entity.

* U.S.-supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF is made up of about two thirds Kurdish fighters from a group known as the People's Protection Units, more commonly known by the Kurdish initials YPG. Turkey is concerned about American support for the YPG, since they regard the Kurdish militia as nothing more that an extension of the separatist Kurdish Workers' Party (more commonly known by its Kurdish initials, PKK). The PKK has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and NATO.

The other third of the SDF is made up of Syrian Arabs who are committed to combating ISIS in return for American support - money, weapons and training. American special operations forces have been embedded with the SDF to "advise and assist" in the fight against ISIS, which includes on-the-ground control of American airstrikes.

(For more detail on the political-military landscape in Syria, see my earlier article, The coming assault on al-Raqqah - a political minefield.)

The current military situation on the ground in this area is also a key planning factor. There are basically two concurrent operations underway. The first is concentrated around the ISIS stronghold of al-Bab. Al-Bab is located about 20 road miles northeast of the city of Aleppo, and - here is the key number - about 100 road miles northwest of al-Raqqah.

Black=ISIS / Red=Syrian regime / Green=FSA / Orange=SDF
(Click on image for larger view)

The fighting around al-Bab clearly illustrates the complicated nature of the political-military situation in Syria. ISIS still controls most of the city, which is under attack from both the Turkish-backed FSA as well as Russian/Iranian/Hizballah-backed Syrian regime forces. American-backed SDF forces are not far away.

All three of the groups are fighting not only ISIS, but each other. The Russians and Turks have tried to keep their respective clients focused on combating ISIS, with only limited success.

The fighting around al-Bab has been ongoing for months. Despite Russian, Syrian and Turkish air and ground support, ISIS has fought a deliberate and steady defense, basically slowing the advance of the opposing forces into ISIS-held territory. This keeps the front line of the Turkish-backed FSA about 85 miles (over 100 road miles) from al-Raqqah. If the past fighting is any indication, it will take months for the FSA or Syrian regime to be in a position to mount an attack on al-Raqqah.

Contrast the positions of the regime and FSA with that of the American-backed SDF near al-Raqqah. According to the latest situation map (below), SDF forces have approached the northeastern suburbs of the city itself. This culminates a three-month operation to isolate al-Raqqah from the west, north and now east.

The Euphrates River presents a natural southern obstacle for ISIS in the city. The coalition has destroyed the two bridges over the Euphrates, complicating movement between the northern and southern sections of the city.

Here is where politics on the international level and the military situation on the ground in Syria converge. Turkey - a key NATO ally - insists that its forces be in the vanguard of the effort to liberate al-Raqqah. They believe that the Syrian Arab FSA troops, supported by Turkish Army artillery, armor and special forces, as well as Turkish Air Force air strikes, should mount the assault on the city, as opposed to the majority Syrian Kurdish SDF.

The Turks' rationale is that to the residents of al-Raqqah, the SDF will be regarded as a Kurdish force despite the SDF name and only minor Arab participation. In essence, according to the Turks, the people will be trading one oppressor for another, saying that "one terrorist organization can not be used to fight another." This makes sense if you buy into the Turkish assertion that the YPG, the Kurdish militia participating in the SDF, is a terrorist organization. Personally, I don't.

Although I have no direct evidence to refute this, my reading of what little uncensored information leaks out of al-Raqqah seems to indicate that the people of al-Raqqah are totally terrified by ISIS and would welcome any relief, even a Kurdish-dominant liberating force, hoping that after the city is liberated from ISIS life would return to normal under a Syrian (read: Arab) government.

That said, the Turks have presented their arguments to the United States at the highest levels. In response, the nascent Trump Administration has put a hold on additional armor and heavy weapons to the SDF, pending a review of U.S. policy in Syria.

Knowing that the United States believes time is of the essence in moving on al-Raqaah (based on intelligence that ISIS cells in the city are planning attacks on the West), the Turks have advanced two proposals for an accelerated Turkish-backed FSA assault on the city. The nearest FSA units are still almost 100 miles from al-Raqqah and in a tough fight around al-Bab.

The Turks' preferred plan of action, which I will call "Plan A," proposes the Turkish and American special operations forces lead an FSA force via a corridor through Kurdish-held territory from the border town of Tal Abiyad south to al-Raqqah (indicated in white on the above map), a distance of about 60 miles. Turkey would need American help to persuade the Kurds to allow the Turks to enter this area - not a small feat while Turkish forces near al-Bab are fighting SDF/YPG units.

The second option, or what I am calling Plan B, is to continue the fight from al-Bab, moving east to the Euphrates and along the south bank of the river to al-Raqqah, a distance of over 100 road miles (indicated in blue on the map). That is essentially the status quo, but would require American assurances that the SDF will not mount a unilateral assault on al-Raqqah while the Turkish-backed FSA fights its way to the city. This will take months.

In my assessment, Plan B is a nonstarter. It will take too long - it will prolong the suffering of the people of al-Raqqah and if the intelligence on ISIS attack planning is correct, possibly facilitate a lethal ISIS operation against a Western target. As for Plan A, I doubt the Kurds will be amenable to allowing the Turks to traverse their territory with armor and artillery for fear that they will never leave, regardless of any American guarantee to the contrary.

The next step is for the Trump Administration to determine what our overall policy in Syria is to be, how much stake we place in maintaining a cooperative relationship with NATO ally Turkey, while adhering to the commitment to defeat ISIS.

If asked, I would advise the President to provide whatever support - armor, artillery, airstrikes, intelligence, etc. - the Department of Defense deems necessary to the SDF, understanding the risks of having what will be perceived as a Kurdish force liberate a Syrian Arab city. We cannot wait for the Turks and the FSA.

If the Defense planners determine that the SDF is incapable of taking al-Raqqah, even with increased U.S. support, then and only then should they recommend the insertion of American combat units into this political minefield. Or as General Hertling and I both say, not so fast.

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* In a refreshing change from the previous Administration's farcical rhetoric, Secretary of Defense James Mattis said of fighting in Mosul, U.S. troops "are very close to it, if not already engaged in that fight."

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Israeli air strike in Syria - no surprise

Israeli Air Force F-16

During the night of 29-30 November. Israeli Air Force aircraft conducted strikes against targets near Damascus, Syria. The target locations were identified in various media as a weapons storage area of the elite 4th Armor Division (a regime protection unit) and a convoy on the Beirut-Damascus highway. The specific targets in both cases were reported to be weapons destined for Hizballah in Lebanon.

The Israelis have for years conducted these types of operations when what they call "advanced weapons" are about to be transported from Syria to Lebanon's Biqa' Valley, where they become part of Hizballah's arsenal.

"Advanced weapons" to the Israelis include, but are not limited to, air defense weapons and surface-to-surface missiles (SSM). Although it is impossible to prevent the transfer of man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) to terrorist groups, the movement of larger, radar-guided air defense missile systems is easier to detect. The same applies to SSM launchers.

Some of these weapons come from Syrian stocks, but most were en route Lebanon from none other than the Islamic Republic of Iran - yes, Iran, the world's primary state sponsor of terrorism. After the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Syria's weapons were used against its own people. Since then, most of Hizballah's weapons have originated in Iran.

The Iranians make no secret of the fact that they support Hizballah with money, weapons and training. They routinely fly Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) Boeing 747 cargo aircraft or charter aircraft of IRGC-affiliated airlines laden with arms from Iran to the Damascus International Airport.

I know this from personal experience as the Air Attaché at the American embassy in Damascus - anyone could watch weapons crates from IRIAF aircraft being loaded onto trucks bearing the Hizballah emblem at the civilian cargo terminal at the airport.

One such flight took place on December 1 - here is an air traffic control plot of the IRIAF 747 freighter on its way to Syria.

Once the weapons, supplies and Hizballah fighters returning from training in Iran were loaded onto the Hizballah vehicles, the convoy would make the 35 mile trip to the Lebanese border (see map).

This Israeli strike was based on intelligence information that Hizballah was being provided the "Buk" air defense missile system. The Buk missile system is a family of self-propelled, medium-range surface-to-air missile systems designed to shoot down cruise missiles, aircraft and drones.

There are variants known in the West as the SA-11 and SA-17* - the exact variant believed to be in this shipment is unknown, but either version would represent a significant upgrade in Hizballah's ability to counter Israeli air operations. This crossed an Israeli "red line" and triggered the attack.

I suspect that if the Iranians, Syrians and Hizballah attempt this again, the Israelis will react the same way.

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* A Russian SA-17 was used to down Malaysian Flight MH17 over Ukraine in July 2014.

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Syria: The impending fall of Aleppo

The city of Aleppo will fall in the near future - the anti-regime rebels in the remaining contested areas of the city will not be able to hold out much longer.

The graphic (left) epitomizes the pessimism that pervades the rebel-controlled areas of the city.

It is titled "Aleppo is burning - under the auspices of international organizations." It is a direct criticism that the United Nations is doing nothing to stop the relentless air strikes being conducted by both the Syrian and Russian air forces.

The targets, according to the graphic, are civil defense (fire and rescue) services, hospitals, schools, markets and bakeries. The complaints are accurate - over the last two weeks, Syrian and Russian fighter-bombers have conducted a coordinated campaign against these target sets across northern Syria, particularly in Aleppo and Idlib governorates, areas in which the bulk of the anti-regime rebels are located.

The increased air attacks are being conducted in conjunction with increased pro-regime ground forces operations in these same areas - the troops are Syrian armed forces supported by units of both the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and now the regular Iranian Army, as well fighters from Lebanese Hizballah. Russian advisers are also on the ground with these forces, coordinating air attacks and artillery fires to great effect.

The timing of the renewed focus on Aleppo is somewhat surprising. Rather than press the attack on retreating forces of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) following the regime victory in the strategic city of Palmyra, most of the regime forces were re-tasked for an assault on Aleppo. Militarily, it does make sense - the regime needs to secure the Aleppo area and close off the ISIS resupply lines from Turkey that lie to the northeast of Aleppo.

The situation in Aleppo has changed dramatically since September 2015 - it was then that Russian forces entered the fight, while at the same time increased numbers of IRGC and Hizballah units were deployed to Syria. It was the liberal (some would say indiscriminate) application of Russian airpower to support the revitalized Syrian government operations on the ground, allowing the regime to virtually erase all of the recent gains of the anti-regime rebels.

Prior to the Russian intervention, Syrian forces were on the defensive, retreating south from Aleppo and much of Idlib governorate. Soon after Russian aircraft began providing direct air support, the rebels were pushed back into enclaves in and north of the city of Aleppo. It is those enclaves that are now under renewed - and increased - air attacks. The recent attack on the Médecins Sans Frontières hospital in the Sukkari district of Aleppo is symptomatic of the stepped-up air campaign.

The cessation of hostilities, by all accounts, has collapsed. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov are trying to revive the ceasefire, but it is doubtful that it will be any more effective than the previous failed agreement. In any case, the renewed ceasefire will exclude Aleppo - that is basically giving Bashar al-Asad the green light to press the attack and take the city.

It really does not matter if a new cessation of hostilities is enacted. Many observers, including me, believe any ceasefire is merely a ruse on the part of the Syrians (and Russians) to continue military operations, taking advantage of a loophole in the agreement that permits attacks on "terrorist" groups - specifically, but not limited to the al-Qa'idah affiliate in Syria known as Jabhat al-Nusrah (The Victory Front) and ISIS. The Syrian regime labels anyone in the opposition as terrorists, making them valid targets.

A look at the map above clearly shows the dire situation facing the opposition fighters in Aleppo. The regime has been able to pressure them from the west, south and east. It is obvious what the regime and its allies are attempting to do - continue the push on these same three axes and cut off the enclave, then pivot to the north and retake the entire city.

The fall of Aleppo will cripple much of the rebel activity in the northern part of Syria - it will also have significant psychological impact on both sides. The retaking of Aleppo will be a major morale booster for the regime, and a major blow to the opposition. It will be a hard fight - both sides realize the importance of controlling Syria's largest city.

With the regime in control of the capital of Damascus and Aleppo, the perception will grow that the forces supporting Bashar al-Asad are on the path to defeating the opposition. It is analogous to controlling both Washington, DC and New York City.

I see no good options for the opposition in Aleppo - their military situation is untenable. With the Russian Air Force bringing effective airpower to the fight, and the Syrian Army refocusing its efforts on the rebels in Aleppo rather than on ISIS to the north of Palmyra, it is too much force for the opposition to withstand.

The coming battle might not be a rout, but it is only a matter of time until an army with the resources of a state, willing allies on the ground (Iran and Hizballah) and a committed air force (the Russians) capable of massing a large number of sorties in a concentrated area, wear down any resistance.

What does this impending defeat mean for U.S. interests? Cynically, it clears the way for all parties to concentrate their efforts against ISIS. Thus far, the U.S. coalition has limited its operations to attacks on ISIS and occasionally al-Qa'idah elements in the country.

Ironically, coalition operations have indirectly assisted the Syrian regime by relieving pressure on the government from ISIS, allowing the Syrians and their allies to focus their efforts on the rebels. The bulk of American support in Syria has been to anti-ISIS groups, not anti-regime groups. While there has been some support to anti-regime groups, it has been too little to make a difference.

It does not appear that the U.S.-led coalition is willing to provide protection or support for the rebels in Aleppo. They are on their own, facing the Syrian Army and Air Force, the Russian Air Force, Iranian IRGC and Army troops and Hizballah fighters.

How long will it take? Hard to say exactly, but time is running out.

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The inevitable fall of Aleppo - a turning point?

It is only a matter of time. Aleppo, once Syria's largest city, will fall to the Syrian Army, reclaiming it from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) which has held it for almost four years. The Syrian Army is not capable of doing this alone - if they were, they would have done it long ago.

It is only with the indiscriminate bombing by the Russian Air Force and support on the ground by Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force fighters that the Syrians are in a position to reclaim Aleppo. There are reports of Hizballah and Iraqi Shi'a militias working with the Iranians, as well as unconfirmed reports of Russian combat forces on the ground in the area.

After years of ineffective operations and embarrassing setbacks at the hands of the FSA, Jabhat al-Nusrah (the al-Qa'idah affiliate in Syria), other rebel groups and occasionally the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Syrian Army has been able to make rather quick advances in Idlib and Aleppo provinces, as well as in the areas south of Damascus.

However, it is the push towards Aleppo in Idlib province, southwest of the city, and in the mountains northeast of the port of Latakia that the Syrian Army has had the most success. Idlib province had almost completely been taken by the rebels in 2015, forcing the Syrian regime forces to withdraw to the south. Note also that the Russian Air Force is operating out of Humaymim Air Base just south of Latakia.

What has changed in the last few months that has allowed the Syrians to be effective? Easy answer - Russian Air Force strikes and the increased deployment of Iranian fighters. Unlike the US-led coalition, the Russians do not exercise restraint when conducting air strikes - minimizing collateral damage (military-speak for civilian casualties) does not seem to be in the Russian lexicon. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Syrian civilians have been killed needlessly.

In addition to the Russian airpower and Iranian forces, the Syrians seem to be doing things in a more professional military manner - I have to assume the Russians are not only providing air support, but military advice and intelligence as well. The Russians have deployed their newest state-of-the-art TU-214R intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft (photo) to the Syrian theater.

As I said, I believe Aleppo will fall - given the recent change in Syrian Army momentum thanks to the Russians and Iranians, it is inconceivable to me that the rebels will be able to prevent the regime from gaining the upper hand. It does not help when the various rebel factions fight with each other rather than maintaining an alliance against the regime.

The big question - what happens after the Syrian Army takes Aleppo? Here are my thoughts, what I suspect the Russians will advise the Syrian leadership to do.

Red=regime / Green=rebel

If I were the Russians, I would advise operations on two axes, indicated by the blue and black arrows. Ideally, these could be done simultaneously, but if that is too difficult for the regime and its Russian and Iranian backers, I would recommend they focus on the black arrow. This indicates an offensive to regain control of the main Damascus-Aleppo highway, often called the International Highway. It is an excellent four-lane, limited access route - crucial to consolidating control of the northern part of the country. It also splits the rebel-controlled area.

Currently, the Syrian Army is using the route indicated in green as their main supply route from Hamah to Aleppo via Khanasir and al-Safirah. This indirect route uses a mediocre two-lane desert road that has areas of vulnerability to being cut by rebel attacks. The Syrians need to re-open the main highway to allow sufficient logistics to maintain control over Aleppo once the regime has taken it.

As for the axis indicated by the blue areas, this would re-open the Aleppo-Latakia highway, again splitting the rebel forces. The Syrian Army has been able to steadily push the rebels out of the mountains east of Latakia and edge closer to the Aleppo pocket. After the rebels have been split, the Syrian Army - with ample Russian air support - will likely be able to re-establish control over most of Idlib province.

Unless the situation changes, the Syrians have an excellent chance of regaining control of a major portion of the north central part of the country. I have no reason to believe that the situation will change - in fact, given the penchant for the US Administration to make concessions to the Russians, there may be an increase in the tempo of Russian air operations and a resultant increase in Syrian Army efficiency.

The tide of battle is shifting in favor of the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Asad. The Russian and Iranian support has proven to be decisive.

All that said, none of this changes the confusing situation involving the Turks, the Syrian Kurds and ISIS, not to mention the US-led coalition.

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The proxy war between the United States and Russia heats up

A new East-West proxy war has been heating up in Syria over the last three weeks, heralded by the deployment of more than three squadrons of Russian combat aircraft to an air base south of Syria's main port city of Latakia. The Russians wasted no time in commencing air operations against ground targets in the country.

Despite the Kremlin's insistence that the purpose of its air campaign is to fight the self-proclaimed Islamic State (also known as ISIS, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), the vast majority of its attacks have targeted rebels attempting to overthrow the regime of President Bashar al-Asad. Bashar, as was his father, the notorious president/dictator Hafiz al-Asad who ruled the country ruthlessly for three decades, is a client of the Russians.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is committed to the survival of the Syrian regime. The Russians have been incrementally pushed out of the Middle East since the Egyptians severed military ties with the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s. The only Russian military presence in the Middle East two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been limited to Syria.

Although the Russians maintained a small cadre of military advisors at a few Syrian bases, Putin is most concerned about the joint Syrian-Russian naval facility at the port of Tartus. His support for the Syrian regime is focused on continued access to this strategic base - it is Russia's sole foreign naval base.

Red dots indicate the Russian-used air base near Jablah
and the joint Syrian-Russian naval facility at Tartus

The naval facility at Tartus is located just 35 miles south of the Humaymim Air Base, formerly a sleepy naval helicopter base and small civilian airport used by the al-Asad family. The base is only five miles from the al-Asad familial home in al-Qardahah, and is now an expanding Russian joint operations base.

The Russians are flying daily combat sorties from the air base, striking targets mostly in the area northwest of Hamah and southwest of Aleppo (red box on map below) - some targets are as close as 20 miles from Humaymim.

This area in Idlib and Hamah provinces has been the venue of heavy fighting between the Syrian regime on one side and a loose alliance of moderate and Islamic rebel groups on the other. Some of the rebel groups being attacked by Russian pilots have been supplied with U.S.-manufactured TOW anti-tank missiles. Over the last few months, these missiles have taken a heavy toll on Syria's tanks and armored personnel carriers.

On the other side, the U.S. coalition continues its air strikes - by both manned and unmanned aircraft - against ISIS and elements of al-Qa'idah. An American armed drone (either a Predator or a Reaper) recently killed the leader of the al-Qa'idah element known as the Khorosan Group, a reputedly effective terrorist group located in the area west of Aleppo. The Khorosan Group has been accused of planning attacks on the United States - it was the perceived threat from this group that drove the timing of the initial American airstrikes in Syria last fall.

The city of Aleppo is about to become the venue of a new proxy war between the Russians and the Americans.

As the Syrian regime regains its momentum against the rebels under the umbrella of Russian airpower, the contradictory interests of the United States and the Russian Federation are about to collide. Although both countries are conducting bombing operations in Syria and have a common target in ISIS, their positions on the survival of the government of Bashar al-Asad are diametrically opposed.

The Russians and their allies are in Syria to support the al-Asad government. To that end, forces are converging on Aleppo, once Syria's largest city. Much of Aleppo, including several UNESCO World Heritage Sites, has been destroyed in the fighting, in some cases erasing thousands of years of history.

Forces moving into the Aleppo area to augment the re-energized Syrian Army and its associated loyalist militias (called the "shabihah" or ghosts in Arabic) include: additional Hizballah units from Lebanon (Hizballah websites report "two brigades" including armor, engineers and intelligence*), more Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force troops, other "elite" Iranian forces and interestingly, but not surprisingly, Iraqi Shi'a militias.

These additional non-Syrian forces will be under the leadership of well-known - and revered in Iranian, Syrian, Iraqi and Lebanese circles - Major General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force. The Iranian government has now acknowledged Iranian forces' involvement in the fighting in Syria. Just last week, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani publicly issued condolences over the death of a senior IRGC commander in the fighting near Aleppo.

Things appear to be growing more serious on the American side as well. Over the last few days, the U.S. Air Force has deployed at least 12 A-10 "Warthog" attack fighters (above photo) to Incirclik Air Base on southern Turkey, less than 100 miles from targets in Syria - that is just minutes in a fighter jet.

The "Warthog" attack aircraft augment the U.S. Air Force F-16 fighters and armed drones that have been operating from the Turkish air base since August. However, the Americans have decided not to attack Syrian military or militia targets, Iranian forces, Iraqi Shi'a militias or Lebanese Hizballah fighters on the ground in Syria, limiting their air strikes to ISIS facilities. By doing so, they have ceded control of much of the battle to the Russians.

At some point, senior officials in Washington must realize that the Russians are now players in the region. We are involved in a proxy war again, albeit on a smaller scale than we "Cold Warriors" remember - we chose sides and did virtual but not actual battle with each other. The problem with proxy wars is that you must make sure that the side you chose to support actually represents your position and it worthy of that support.

Is the United States willing to confront Russia? Are we willing to have American pilots confront Russian pilots in the skies over Syria? Are we willing to have American-Russian relations defined by confrontations in the Middle East?

Good questions. The Russians have been clear about their objectives. Have we?

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* For my Arabic-speaking readers, watch the video announcing the arrival of additional Hizballah units in Syria.




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Iraq and Syria - clarity and confusion (Part Two)

Jahbat al-Nusrah (al-Qa'idah in Syria) fighters in Syria

This is Part Two of a two part article. See Part One and the Addendum, which deals with the comparatively clear situation in Iraq. This part deals with the confusion in Syria.

Syria

The situation in Syria makes Iraq look like the model of clarity - there are myriad cooperating, competing and conflicting interests simultaneously at play in the country. These various interests make a solution to the political turmoil and civil war much more difficult, if even possible.

In Iraq, there is one enemy - the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) - and several parties all focused on defeating that enemy. In Syria, however, there is a multifaceted war that has created a situation which borders on anarchy. To simplify some of the confusion, in essence there is a three-way war being fought. The major antagonists are the Syrian regime, ISIS and the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

Some background is in order. A civil war erupted in Syria in March of 2011 as groups of young Syrians began to demand reforms of the Bashar al-Asad regime, following the example of their brothers and sisters in Tunisia and Egypt who were participating what the media dubbed as the "Arab Spring."

The al-Asad regime responded by ordering the Syrian armed forces to brutally crush the demonstrations. The resulting death and destruction caused revulsion among many in the ranks of the military - massive defections followed. Many of the defected officers and soldiers established the FSA.

In 2012, when the FSA failed to secure adequate assistance from Western or Arab nations, the group formerly known as al-Qa'idah in Iraq (AQI) sent fighters from Iraq to Syria to fill the power vacuum, creating an al-Qa'idah affiliate in Syria known as jabhat al-nusrah - tanzim al-qa'idah fi bilad al-sham (The Victory Front - Al-Qaidah in the land of Syria).

While nominally there to assist the FSA in the removal of Bashar al-Asad, Jabhat al-Nusrah began to fight the FSA as well - its goal was to set up an Islamic state - and seize territory, taking advantage of the lack of authority in many parts of the country. In 2013, the group merged with AQI and created the larger organization known as ISIS. ISIS rejected its ties to al-Qa'idah leadership, claiming instead that it had established the new caliphate.

The declaration of the creation of a caliphate caused Jabhat al-Nusrah to split from ISIS - to this day it maintains its status as the "authorized" al-Qa'idah element in Syria. In late 2014, ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah entered into a tactical alliance to fight both the al-Asad regime and the FSA - the future of that alliance is unknown.

The presence of Jabhat al-Nusrah in Syria and the emergence of ISIS created a three-way (and at times a four-way) war in the country. In addition, there are a host of unaffiliated armed groups who sometimes ally with the FSA and at other times act independently. These include local Islamist and secular groups, as well as the Syrian Kurds.

The Kurds are a special case. They have at times supported the al-Asad regime and other times opposed it, but are now locked in a major confrontation with ISIS along the Turkish border. The media has closely covered the intense fighting in the city of Kobani (Arabic: 'Ayn al-'Arab) between ISIS and the local Kurdish militia supported by coalition (almost exclusively American) airstrikes. American support of the Kurds is more about ISIS than supporting the Kurds.

It appears that the United States is attempting to support the removal of the al-Asad regime at the same time attempting to defeat ISIS. The attacks on ISIS began in response to ISIS successes in Iraq after its seizure of Mosul in June of this year - the U.S. led coalition is treating ISIS as one target set (correctly, in my opinion). The United States is trying to accomplish two separate and distinct foreign policy goals - either one of the goals is achievable, however, achieving both presents major challenges.

In its attempt to support the overthrow of Bashar al-Asad, the United States is providing money, weapons and training to the FSA. The recently introduced and much feared American TOW antitank missile has already taken a toll on Syrian Army armored vehicles.

The FSA has made no secret that its focus is and will remain the removal of the Bashar al-Asad government, but has been pragmatic enough to accept the materiel support from the west under the guise of being the Obama Administration's "boots on the ground" in the fight against ISIS. Although they are the sole designated recipients of the TOW missiles, these missiles have shown up in the hands of Jabhat al-Nusrah. There are numerous videos posted on social media of Jabhat al-Nusrah fighters using the weapons to devastating effect.

ISIS is being attacked by some members of the U.S.-led coalition - other coalition members have restricted their pilots to only operating in Iraq. The air situation has been complicated by the December 24 downing (cause as yet unknown) of a Royal Jordanian Air Force F-16 near the ISIS stronghold of al-Raqqah, and the continuing air operations of the Syrian Air Force, often in the same areas. While there is no coordination or cooperation between the coalition and Syrian forces, the coalition does notify the Syrians of impending air activity.

In some areas of central Syria, there appears to be if not cooperation between ISIS(with Jabhat al-Nusrah) and the FSA, at least a willingness to allow the other group to have freedom of operation. Jabhat al-Nusrah just recently was able to seize two key Syrian army garrisons near the city of Ma'arat al-Nu'aman, allowing the al-Qa'idah group to control a large section of the main highway linking the two major cities of Damascus and Aleppo. The group has also set up operations at a Syrian air base that the FSA had seized early last year. ISIS is currently engaged in a major assault of a Syrian airbase in Dayr al-Zawr on the Euphrates River - a target the FSA has been trying to seize for at least two years.

For its part, the Syrian regime is being supported by Iran and Iraq. There are fighters from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force, Iran's client/proxy Lebanese Hizballah, as well as Iraqi Shi'a militias currently fighting in Syria. If it was not for the introduction of Iranian special forces and Hizballah fighters in 2012, the Syrian regime may have fallen to the FSA.

Additional support is being provided by Russia with almost daily flights by Syrian Air Force IL-76 transports or Russian charter aircraft delivering weapons and supplies to the Syrian military. Russia continues to maintain and overhaul Syrian military equipment in Russia, and has committed to deliver a more capable jet trainer - the Yak-130 - with an excellent counterinsurgency capbility. (See my earlier article, Russia to deliver military trainer/attack aircraft to Syria.)

The takeaway

The situation in Iraq is relatively clear. ISIS is the enemy and everyone else, whether cooperating or not, is focused on the defeat of the Islamist group. The strategy is to use coalition airpower to stop ISIS's advance and hold it at bay while coalition advisers re-train and re-equip the Iraqi armed forces, who will then launch a counteroffensive and either destroy ISIS or force it to withdraw to Syria. If the Iraqis are up to the task, the strategy has a chance of success. If not, members of the coalition (read: the United States) will have to deploy combat forces to defeat ISIS.

The situation in Syria is chaos.

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Iraq and Syria - clarity and confusion (Part One)

CNN's Brooke Baldwin and Jim Sciutto*

There are two different wars ongoing in the Middle East, although nominally both of them are targeting the same enemy - the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria - ISIS, also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, or the Islamic State, or the Islamic Caliphate.

In a perfect military world, this would be one war being waged on two fronts, with coordinated operations and attacks aimed at defeating the single enemy across the entire theater of operations.

What we have in reality is one war against ISIS inside Iraq and another war against ISIS inside Syria - the former is rather straight forward while the other is almost hopelessly chaotic.

Iraq

Looking at Iraq, we have a war on ISIS conducted by the Iraqi armed forces and the Kurdish peshmerga ("those who confront death") supported by a U.S.-led coalition which includes Arab and non-Arab states, as well as Iranian special forces and fighter pilots, with some Russian advisory support. Although it might sound complicated, it seems to work as long as the Iranians and Russians realize they are minor players in this action and remain in the background.

It is a coalition in name only - the U.S. Air Force (overwhelmingly) and U.S. Navy are carrying the water (as much as 95 percent of the sorties), with limited support from the other members. To those of us who have served in coalitions or NATO before, this is business as usual - the United States is always the "big kid on the block" and provides the lion's share of the resources.

Coalition air forces are striking targets all over the country, sometimes in direct support of Iraqi army or Kurdish peshmerga forces, and at times hitting strategic ISIS targets far from the front lines. They are also striking targets in Syria - at least in the air, ISIS is being treated as a single target set.

There have also been a few independent airstrikes by the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) in Iraq's Diyala province near the Iranian border. These strikes were in support of Kurdish peshmerga forces attempting to oust ISIS from positions near the city of Jalula' and regain control of the important al-Hamrayn dam.

While the U.S. Central Command claims there is no coordination between the American-led coalition and the IRIAF, there is likely coordination via the Iraqi armed forces. It is inconceivable that American tactical air commanders would permit unidentified aircraft to operate in close proximity of U.S. aircraft or U.S. ground forces deployed to the country. The days of unknown/uncleared entities approaching American forces without challenge ended with the 2000 attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) in Aden harbor.

When ISIS routed the Iraqi Army and seized the second-largest city of Mosul earlier this year, the true state of Iraq's armed forces was laid bare for all to see. After the departure of American forces in 2011, Iraqi forces deteriorated into a corrupt army worthy of a third-world country.

When challenged in Mosul, Iraqi Army units collapsed. ISIS launched a series of attacks down the Tigris River valley coincident with attacks up the Euphrates valley from their strongholds in al-Ramadi and al-Fallujah. Yes, those are the same two cities in al-Anbar province taken by American forces just a decade earlier at great cost - in this context, "cost" means young American lives and blood. (See my earlier article, Where is the Iraqi Army?)

Now we have almost 3,000 American "advisers" in Iraq. Those advisers are in Iraq to train Iraqi Army units - the same units we spent millions of dollars training before the premature American withdrawal in 2011. There is a bright spot, however: President Barack Obama has realized that the re-introduction of American troops is in the best interests of the United States - better late than never.

The strategy in Iraq is simple, and has a chance of working. The coalition is going to re-train and re-equip the Iraqi armed forces, including the Kurdish peshmerga units. It will take time and a commitment from the newly elected Iraqi Prime Minister Haydar al-Abadi to allow merit and competence to determine senior officer appointments, not political connections.

If the coalition advisers can get the Iraqis back into fighting shape and continues to provide adequate air support, there is a chance that ISIS can be defeated in Iraq. That victory is defined as the destruction of ISIS units in Iraq or forcing their withdrawal back to Syria.

Recent actions show mixed results. In some cases, especially in and near the Kurdish areas in the north, ISIS seems to have been halted in its advances; in some areas, they have been pushed back. That is not always the case. For example, the city of Bayji, the location of the largest oil refinery in the country, has changed hands several times. Al-Anbar province in the western part of the country, remains the venue of fierce fighting as ISIS continues to advance in the Euphrates Valley.

A major battle appears to be on the horizon at an Iraqi military training facility at 'Ayn al-Asad air base. ISIS has been steadily moving toward the base for months. Last week, they attacked the base. However, the 200 American special operations troops assigned to the base as trainers engaged the attacking force, called in airstrikes and decimated the attackers. It was a stark reminder that there are American ground forces in harm's way.

ISIS will not give up easily - they will continue to attack the air base. This battle will be the bellwether of the future of the war in Iraq. If the Iraqis are not able to defend the base, the Obama Administration will be forced into a tough decision - do we pull out of al-Anbar province and leave the Iraqis to fend for themselves - which means almost certain defeat - or do we make a stand and deploy American combat units to the area - the dreaded "boots on the ground?"

Given the abysmal condition of the Iraqi armed forces, it may just come to that.


Part Two will deal with the confusion in Syria.

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* Disclosure: I am a paid military analyst for CNN. Brooke and Jim are two of my favorite colleagues at CNN.

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Iran - time to intervene in Syria?

The Syrian civil war has raged on for over two years - over 70,000 Syrians have been killed. Most of the world is merely watching events unfold, while a few nations are supporting the opposition with low levels of arms and money. Western nations are debating the possibility of imposing a no-fly zone over the country, wondering if their national interests require involvement in yet another country in the troublesome Middle East.

Each country is doing its own calculations on what happens if Bashar al-Asad remains in power or not. For one country, however, the stakes are abundantly clear. The removal of the regime will be a serious foreign policy setback for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Syria is the key to their access to Lebanon, home of a sizable population of Shi'a Muslims and, more importantly, their proxy paramilitary force, Hizballah. Hizballah was created by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) Syria/Lebanon contingent in 1982 - that contingent formed the basis for the now-infamous Qods Force, the IRGC's special operations and "dirty tricks" unit.

Hizballah is part of Iran's greater strategy to isolate and confront Israel, which it regards as its primary enemy in the region and second only to the United States worldwide. Access to - and many would argue, control over - Hizballah allows Iran to open a northern front against Israel, or conduct a low-level war against the Jewish state with virtually no overt Iranian involvement. The ability of Hizballah to tie up huge amounts of Israeli military resources was demonstrated in the Israel-Hizballah war of 2006.

Iran's ability to maintain Hizballah as an effective organization - it provides virtually all of its weaponry, training and funding - is dependent on access to Syrian territory. Virtually all of Hizballah's weapons are delivered by Iranian aircraft - Iranian air force cargo aircraft or state-owned charters. The primary entry point for these supply flights is Damascus International Airport, about half an hour from the Lebanese border and Hizballah's strongholds in the Biqa' Valley.

As far as Syria itself, having an alliance with Damascus allows the Iranians to put additional pressure on Israel. Not only does Israel have to concern itself with Hizballah on its northern border with Lebanon, it also must be prepared to defend itself from the national armed forces of Syria.

Although the Syrian armed forces have recently gained the upper hand against the combined opposition of the Free Syrian Army and the more troublesome Islamist group Jabhat al-Nusrah, it is mostly through control of the sky that allows the regime to make gains against the opposition. Imposition of a no-fly zone - which is a distinct possibility as talks between Western powers begin in earnest - might tip the balance towards the overthrow of the al-Asad regime.

Iran may intervene militarily to prevent that from happening, and we may be seeing the next steps of that intervention. There have been IRGC troops in Syria for some time, but this week, the Iranian leadership announced that it was dispatching 10,000 IRGC fighters and basiji (volunteer augmentees) to Syria. The ostensible reason for the deployment was to defend two shrines in the Damascus area holy to Shi'a Muslims, and to defend the Golan Heights. The last excuse is interesting, since the Israelis have occupied the Golan Heights since 1967.

The two holy sites are the shrines of Sayidat Zaynab (left) and Sayidat Zukaynah (right). The shrine of Sayidat Zaynab is located just south of Damascus in the city of the same name (33°26'39"N 36°20'27"E) - it is the tomb of Zaynab, daughter of 'Ali (the first imam, son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Muhammad) and Muhammad's daughter Fatimah, making her Muhammad's granddaughter, a woman revered among the Shi'a.

The shrine of Sayidat Zukaynah is located just a few miles southwest of Damascus in the suburb of Daraya (33°27'32"N 36°14'26"E) - a heavily contested area near an important air base (al-Mazzah). Zukaynah was the daughter of Husayn bin 'Ali (grandson of Muhammad), and thus the great granddaughter of the Prophet - she died in a Yazdi prison at age four.

There also is no need for Iranian IRGC or Basijis to guard either of the shrines. The Sayidat Zaynab shrine is in a heavily Shi'a area with plenty of Iranian guards already present, and the Zukayna shrine is in an area that the regime must hold; it has devoted a lot of resources to defend the entire area, not just the area of the shrine. It is a minor shrine - I lived close to this area and had never heard of it.

Defense of the Golan Heights? On the surface, one could make the case that since the Syrian regime has withdrawn much of its military force that was in the area between Damascus and the Golan Heights to bolster the defense of the capital, it is highly unlikely that Israel would move into southern Syria. Why interfere when one of your enemies is imploding on its own?

It appears to me this is just what the Iranians believe is a non-threatening means of deploying 10,000 troops to Syria. Once there, they can be used as needed to bolster one of Tehran's few allies. It might be the first step in a much larger intervention in the country, because if Bashar al-ASad falls, Hizballah will likely die on the vine.

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