The revised EU visa code: controlling EU borders from a distance

Professor Steve Peers, University of Essex

Today, the European Parliament is due to approve a revision of the law on the EU visa code, which sets out the basic rules on how to get a short-term visa to visit Schengen countries. (Update: the EP has voted in favour of the law.) Since this law was previously agreed with the EU Council, it is likely to be finally adopted by the Council in the near future. [Update: the law was adopted soon after, and published in the EU Official Journal in July 2019.] This law simplifies the visa application process a little, in return for increased application fees. But more significantly, it integrates EU visa policy even more closely with the EU’s external migration control policy, providing for incentives and sanctions for non-EU countries which respectively cooperate or fail to cooperate on readmission. (Parts of this blog post build on my previous post on the visa code proposal, before the recent agreement on the final text).  

Background

The rules for issuing short-term visas are set out in the Visa Code, adopted in 2009. The CJEU has clarified some key points of the Code, ruling that: in effect it creates a right to a visa if the conditions are satisfied, although Member States have flexibility over how to apply those conditions (Koushkaki, discussed here); there must be a possibility of judicial review as part of the appeal process (El-Hassani); and “safe passage” visas for refugees in need of protection are not covered by the Code (X and X).

The Code concerns “Schengen visas”, ie visas which allow travel across the entire Schengen area. As such it applies to the EU countries fully applying the Schengen rules (all Member States except the UK, Ireland, Croatia, Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria) as well as the non-EU Schengen associates: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein.

The list of non-EU countries whose citizens do (or do not) need a visa to visit the Schengen area is set out in a separate visa list Regulation, which was recently amended to waive visas for UK citizens after Brexit, as I discussed here. (Note that proposals for visa waivers for Turkey and Kosovo are on hold). In practice, visa requirements are waived for most of the Americas, most neighbouring European countries, higher-income countries in Asia/Pacific and a couple of Middle Eastern States (Israel and the United Arab Emirates). Conversely, visas are required for visitors from lower-income Asian and Pacific States, the rest of the Middle East, most of Africa and the Caribbean (except for some smaller islands), a few Latin American countries and the bulk of the former USSR (most notably Russia).

There is also separate EU legislation to set up a “travel authorisation” system (see discussion here), which will apply to all non-EU countries with a visa waiver but without a free movement agreement with the EU. As things stand, this law will apply to the UK, unless some special exemption is requested and agreed. A travel authorisation is similar to a visa in that it requires a prior authorisation to travel, but will cost less and be valid for much longer.

The visa code is also separate from (but closely linked to) the EU law setting up a Visa Information System, a database of information on applicants for Schengen visas. Although the Commission also suggested a revision of this law in 2018, and the EP and the Council adopted their positions on this text, the two institutions did not agree between themselves before the end of the EP’s five-year session. So they will negotiate on this in the next EP session. (The proposal would, among other things, provide for fingerprinting 6-year-old visa applicants, and extend that system to apply to long-stay visas and residence permits). 

2014 proposals

The law approved by the EP today is the second attempt to revise the visa code. The first proposal  dates to 2014, and focussed on economic issues, in particular aiming to facilitate tourism. A parallel proposal for a “touring visa” would have provided for an extended stay for those visiting multiple Member States for a longer period, as part of an orchestra or circus, for instance. (I discussed the details of both proposals here). The 2014 proposal also included provisions on facilitating the travel of EU citizens’ non-EU family members (discussed here), and, as noted already, it was an opportunity to argue for explicit “safe passage” visas to be added to the rules (as discussed here). However, it ultimately failed, because the EU Parliament and Council could not agree on whether it should include those “safe passage” visas. In light of the perceived “refugee crisis” of 2015-16 in the meantime, the 2018 proposal focussed instead time on security concerns, rather than economic growth.

2018 proposal

The Commission withdrew both 2014 proposals in light of the negotiation deadlock, and tabled a revised visa code proposal in March 2018. (It did not try to revive the “touring visa” proposal). This was met with much interest in the Council, which adopted a negotiation position on the proposal already by June 2018. I discussed the Council’s position further in a previous blog post. The European Parliament adopted its position in December 2018.

The Commission’s 2018 communication on visa policy is a good overview of the purposes of the proposal. In addition to the main focus on security – which takes the form of penalties for non-EU countries that do not cooperate with the EU on readmission policy – it contains a limited number of simplifications for legitimate travellers. The Commission dropped the proposals to simplify travel for EU citizens’ family members, and made more suggestions to simplify the rules on multiple entry visas as compared to 2018.

The agreed amendments

One key feature of the new law is the power to punish countries that do not cooperate with the EU on readmission (by raising visa fees, requiring more documents, slowing down processing times, and limiting the issue of multiple-entry visas), following a diplomatic process in which the EU will threaten these sanctions if no cooperation is forthcoming. (It’s already EU policy to link treaties simplifying the issue of visas to readmission treaties, but this policy will now become unilateral). At the behest of the EP, it will also be possible to offer carrots as well as sticks: lowering visa fees, speeding up processing times, and issuing multiple-entry visas with longer validity, where the country concerned is ‘cooperating sufficiently’ on readmission.

On other issues, it will be possible for travellers to apply for a visa six months in advance, rather than three, although they should also apply (except in cases of urgency) at least 15 days before they plan to travel. Professional, sporting, cultural or educational bodies can now apply for visas on behalf of their staff. The requirement to appear in person (usually subject to a waiver in practice) will only apply when registering fingerprints, although they might also be submitted electronically.

Visa application fees will rise from €60 to €80, and from €35 to €40 for 6-12 year olds, and the Commission will now have the power to revise the fee every three years. The mandatory fee waiver for researchers is extended to apply not only where they are carrying out research, but also when they are attending seminars or conferences. (Other mandatory fee waivers, for children under six, pupils and students, and NGO representatives at youth conferences or events, are retained.) The optional fee waivers for diplomats and youth attendees at conferences or events are retained, and the optional fee waiver for children is extended, to apply to children up to 18 years old (not just 12 as in the current code). The new “punishment” clause will raise the visa application fee to €120 or €160 for travellers from countries that are judged not to cooperate on migration. Service providers will be able to charge higher fees than they do now in some cases.

The current rule on deciding on a visa application within 15 days will be kept (the Commission had proposed to reduce it to 10 days), although the length of the extended period in certain cases will be cut (45 days, instead of 60).

Streamlining the current rules on multiple entry visas, such visas will be available lasting for one, two or five years will be available, based on prior lawful use of a visa. The final text dropped the Commission’s proposal to refer to judicial review in the event of an appeal against refusal of a visa, but this cannot change the legal obligation to provide for such a review, since the CJEU ruling on this issue (El-Hassani, noted above) based this obligation on EU primary law: the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Commission proposal to issue visas at the border in order to encourage tourism was also dropped, as was the current law’s possibilities of having “co-location” and “common application centres”, as they have been overtaken by events – the trend of outsourcing the visa application process to private entities. As a partial substitute, the revisions will simplify the rules which apply when one Member State represents another one for visa applications.

Comments

The European Parliament has ultimately gone along with the bulk of the Commission proposal and Council amendments, giving up on the simplification of travel rules which the Commission initially proposed in 2014, including for EU citizens’ family members, as well as the “safe passage” issue (on which the EP has passed a non-binding resolution). There are some modest facilitations of travel, in particular as regards multiple-entry visas and some additional fee waivers, in particular as an option for older children.

The readmission punishment and incentive clauses form part of the EU arsenal of stricter migration control policies, such as arrangements with Turkey and Libya and with greater internal and external border checks, including the expanded powers for Frontex also approved by the EP today. Whether these changes will be effective remains to be seen; there will presumably still be juicier carrots offered via the EU-Africa funds offered to States which cooperate with the EU’s increasing attempts at “remote control” of migration. Whether the new policy will work in practice, or – even if it does work – satisfy those voters who remain angry despite reduced migration flows, equally remains to be seen. 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

JHA4: chapter II:4

Photo credit: eturbonews

Travelling to the EU after Brexit: Schengen visa waivers for UK citizens

Professor Steve Peers, University of Essex*

*Supported by an ESRC Priority Brexit Grant on 'Brexit and UK and EU Immigration Policy'.

Yesterday, the European Parliament (EP) and EU Council finally agreed on a proposal to waive visa requirements for UK citizens travelling to the EU after Brexit, whether the UK leaves the EU with a deal or not. This still needs to go through the formal steps of approval by the European Parliament and Council, but it’s unlikely that the law will be rejected at this point. (An EP committee has already voted for it. Update: so has the EP plenary and the Council, and the law was published in the EU Official Journal on April 12).

The final version of the law, which will amend the main EU Regulation setting out which countries’ nationals do and don’t need a visa to travel to the Schengen States, is straightforward. It will add the UK to the so-called ‘white list’ of countries whose nationals don’t need a visa to travel to the Schengen States, for a period of 90 out of 180 days. It will also put travel documents issued by the Gibraltar authorities on the whitelist, with a footnote asserting that Gibraltar is a ‘colony’ of the UK.  (Update: see the UK statement on this). Any Brexit supporters upset about this perceived injustice to Gibraltar may wish to consider that it is only happening in the first place because the UK is pursuing a policy which the vast majority of Gibraltarians voted against.

The footnote on Gibraltar differs from the European Parliament’s position on the proposal. However, during negotiations, the EP agreed with the Council’s position on this point, while in return the Council agreed with the EP position inserting slightly stronger language on the requirement of reciprocity (ie, the UK is expected, like every other country on the visa whitelist, not to impose a visa requirement for any EU country. This is unproblematic, as it’s UK government policy not to impose visas for these States).

The law will apply to all EU countries except Ireland, which has a common travel area with the UK and opts out of EU visa policy and related laws. While several other EU countries are not fully part of the Schengen area yet (Cyprus, Croatia, Romania, and Bulgaria), these countries apply the Schengen rules on visa lists. The law will also apply to non-EU countries associated with Schengen (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein).

It should be noted that a short-term visa waiver is for visits only: it does not constitute free movement of people between the UK and EU. The EU’s visa Regulation leaves it up to each Member State to decide on whether to require a visa for ‘paid activity’, a term which is not further defined in the legislation or in CJEU case law. The rules of the World Trade Organisation equally leave it up to each WTO Member whether to impose a visa requirement for provision of services. So UK citizens carrying out paid activity in the EU after Brexit – or vice versa – may face further hurdles, depending on the national law of the EU Member States on the one hand and the UK on the other (the EU has not harmonised Member States’ immigration laws on non-EU citizens on this issue).

Longer-term residence by UK citizens in the EU (leaving aside Ireland) will not be impossible after Brexit, but nor will it be as easy as under the free movement rules. Rather it will be subject to the national law of EU Member States, as partly harmonised by EU law (on issues such as single work/residence permits, highly-skilled workers (Blue Card), family reunion, intra-corporate transferees, seasonal workers, students and researchers, and long-term residence).

Also, the visa waiver will not exempt UK citizens from the full application of other border control laws of the EU. This means that in principle UK citizens will be subject to going through the slower lanes at passport controls, to the EU’s entry-exit and travel authorisation systems when operational, and to UK citizens potentially being listed for refusal of entry in the Schengen Information System due to previous criminal convictions, security concerns or breaches of immigration law. Note that the travel authorisation system is not technically a visa as such: although it is a form of advance control of entry, the cost, length of validity and simplicity of application is easier than for a travel visa.

It’s sometimes argued that applying the ordinary border controls rules to UK citizens is a form of ‘punishment’ by the EU, but this is not remotely a serious argument: unless otherwise agreed, the UK will be treated the same as any other non-EU country with a visa waiver and without a free movement arrangement with the EU, which is what the UK government chose to define the Brexit vote as meaning. It is the obvious corollary of the ‘take back control of borders’ slogan used by Leave campaigners. The real punishment is suffered by those who have to listen to the whining of people who are unable to take responsibility for the obvious and predictable consequences of their own decisions.    

Note that if the withdrawal agreement is ratified, free movement will still apply between the UK and the EU until the end of 2020, although this transition period might be extended by a single period of one or two years. In this scenario, the visa waiver will only really be relevant after that point, when (contrary to some false claims) free movement of people will end, unless the UK decides that, contrary to current UK government policy, it is willing to agree to a free movement system after all. The withdrawal agreement will also protect the status of UK citizens in the EU living there before the end of the transition period, which will otherwise primarily be left to national law of the Member States, as discussed here.

Finally, it should be noted that like other EU legislation on Brexit, this legislation is unilateral. Sometimes the EU agrees visa waiver treaties with non-EU States (for instance, with several Commonwealth States or Brazil), and sometimes it doesn’t, but exempts them on its own initiative, subject to an expectation of reciprocity (for instance, the USA, Canada and Japan). This isn’t a visa waiver treaty, so it’s not up to the UK to agree. And the UK does not have a vote on the law while a Member State either, because it opts out of Schengen visa policies.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26, chapter 27

JHA4: chapter I:4

Photo credit: ETIAS.com

Revising EU visa policy

Professor Steve Peers

Back in 2014, the Commission proposed a revamp of EU visa policy (concerning short-term visit visas), in the form of a proposal to revise the EU’s visa code. This proposal ultimately failed, because the EU Parliament and Council could not agree on whether it should include “safe passage” visas for those needing protection or not. Now the Commission is trying again, focussing this time on security concerns, rather than economic growth.

Background

The rules for issuing short-term visas are set out in the Visa Code, adopted in 2009. The CJEU has clarified some key points of the Code, ruling that: in effect it creates a right to a visa if the conditions are satisfied, although Member States have flexibility over how to apply those conditions (Koushkaki, discussed here); there must be a possibility of judicial review as part of the appeal process (El-Hassani); and “safe passage” visas are not covered by the Code (X and X).

The Code concerns “Schengen visas”, ie visas which allow travel across the entire Schengen area. As such it applies to the EU countries fully applying the Schengen rules (all Member States except the UK, Ireland, Croatia, Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria) as well as the non-EU Schengen associates: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein.

The list of non-EU countries whose citizens do (or do not) need a visa to visit the Schengen area is set out in a separate visa list Regulation (the plans for visa waivers for Turkey and Kosovo are on hold). EU policy is to waive visa requirements for nearby countries, subject to a (loosely-enforced) requirement for reciprocity, so it is likely that UK citizens will not need a visa to visit the EU after Brexit. However, EU legislation to set up a “travel authorisation” system, about to be adopted (see discussion here), will apply to all non-EU countries with a visa waiver but without a free movement agreement with the EU. As things stand, this law will apply to the UK, unless some special exemption is requested and agreed. A travel authorisation is similar to a visa in that it requires a prior authorisation to travel, but will cost less and be valid for much longer.

2014 proposals

As noted above, the ill-fated 2014 proposal to amend the visa code was focussed on economic issues, in particular aiming to facilitate tourism. A parallel proposal for a “touring visa” would have provided for an extended stay for those visiting multiple Member States for a longer period, as part of an orchestra or circus, for instance. (I discussed the details of both proposals here). The 2014 proposal also included provisions on facilitating the travel of EU citizens’ non-EU family members (discussed here), and, as noted already, it was an opportunity to argue for explicit “safe passage” rules to be added to the rules (as discussed here).

2018 proposal

The Commission withdrew both 2014 proposals in light of the negotiation deadlock, and tabled a revised visa code proposal in March 2018. (It did not try to revive the “touring visa” proposal). This was met with much interest in the Council, which adopted a negotiation position on the proposal already by June 2018. The European Parliament is taking a more leisurely approach, so has no position yet. (Note that the Commission has also suggested a revision of the law governing the related database, the Visa Information System, which would, among other things, provide for fingerprinting 6-year-old visa applicants, and extend that system to apply to long-stay visas and residence permits). 

The Commission’s 2018 communication on visa policy is a good overview of the purposes of the recent proposal. In addition to the main focus on security – which takes the form of penalties for non-EU countries that do not cooperate with the EU on readmission policy – it contains a limited number of simplifications for legitimate travellers. The Commission has dropped the proposals to simplify travel for EU citizens’ family members, and has made more suggestions to simplify the rules on multiple entry visas as compared to 2018.

The Council’s position

Compared to the Commission’s proposal, the Council has reserved for itself the power to punish countries that do not cooperate with the EU on readmission (by raising visa fees, requiring more documents, and slowing down processing times), following a diplomatic process in which the EU will threaten these sanctions if no cooperation is forthcoming. (It’s already EU policy to link treaties simplifying the issue of visas to readmission treaties, but this policy will now become unilateral, and take the form of sticks, rather than carrots).

On other issues, it will be possible for travellers to apply for a visa six months in advance, rather than three. The Council rejected the Commission’s proposal to let NGOs apply for visas on behalf of their staff. The visa application fee will rise from €60 to €80, and from €35 to €40 for 6-12 year olds. The Commission will have the power to revise the fee every three years. Member States’ option to waive the fee for diplomats is dropped. The new “punishment” clause will raise the visa application fee to €120 or €160 for travellers from countries that are judged not to cooperate on migration.

Multiple entry visas lasting for one, two or five years will be available, based on prior lawful use of a visa. The Council dropped the Commission’s proposal to refer to judicial review in the event of an appeal against refusal of a visa, but this cannot change the legal obligation to provide for such a review, since the CJEU ruling on this issue (El-Hassani, noted above) based this obligation on EU primary law: the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  The Commission proposal to issue visas at the border in order to encourage tourism has been dropped by the Council, and the current law’s possibilities of having “co-location” and “common application centres” are dropped, as they have been overtaken by events – the trend of outsourcing the visa application process to private entities. As a partial substitute, the revisions will simplify the rules which apply when one Member State represents another one for visa applications.

Comments

It remains to be seen whether the European Parliament will go along with these amendments, or whether it will seek to retain some of the simplification of travel rules which the Commission initially proposed in 2014, for instance for EU citizens’ family members. (Such rules, if agreed, will only briefly be helpful for UK citizens’ non-EU family members, before the end of the post-Brexit transition period).  The Parliament might also try to address the “safe passage” issue again, and it has traditional concerns about limiting fee increases for vulnerable groups like children. The visa code amendments might be linked in practice to the proposals to turn the Visa Information System into an even bigger Panopticon.

However, some version of the readmission punishment clauses are likely to go through, as they are part of the EU arsenal of stricter migration control policies (along with greater internal and external border checks, an expanded Frontex border control body, and agreements with countries like Turkey to control and take back asylum seekers and migrants). Whether they will be effective remains to be seen; there will presumably still be ‘carrots’ from the EU-Africa funds offered to States which cooperate with the EU’s increasing attempts at “remote control” of migration. Whether the new policy will work in practice, or – even if they do work – satisfy those voters who already remain angry despite hugely reduced migration flows, equally remains to be seen. 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

JHA4: chapter II:4

Photo credit: schengenvisainfo.com

Brave new world? the new EU law on travel authorisation for non-EU citizens

Professor Steve Peers, University of Essex

Introduction

Yesterday it was announced that a new EU law on travel authorisation for non-EU citizens to visit the EU had been agreed. This will affect millions of travellers a year, probably including British citizens after Brexit. In fact, as a UK citizen who often travels to the continent, it’s the first EU law on non-EU immigration that will have a direct impact on me. The law won’t apply for awhile, but in light of its future significant impact and some public confusion about who it will apply to and how it works, it’s worth explaining in detail. (Update: the final version of the law was published in the EU Official Journal in September 2018).

Basics of the system

First of all, a travel authorisation is not a visa. While it is similar to a short-term travel visa in the sense that it is a process for deciding in advance whether a person can enter the territory, it will be much simpler and less costly to apply, and be valid for much longer.

The second key issue is: which countries are covered? This has two dimensions: the countries which will apply the travel authorisation law and the countries whose citizens will be subject to travel authorisation.

Taking these points in turn, the countries which will apply the travel authorisation law are the countries fully applying the Schengen system. This means all the EU Member States except the UK, Ireland, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia – although those States all except the UK and Ireland are obliged to take part in Schengen eventually. It also means non-EU countries associated with Schengen: Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

As for the countries whose citizens will be subject to travel authorisation, that’s all non-EU countries which are a) not subject to a visa obligation for their citizens to visit the EU and b) do not have a free movement arrangement with the EU. So it follows that the new travel authorisation law will apply to British citizens who visit the EU after Brexit – unless they are visiting Ireland or the other EU countries not yet fully applying the Schengen rules. As an exception, though, the law will not apply (even if the new system is ready) to the UK during the post-Brexit transition period, because (as discussed here) it will be applying free movement with the EU during that time.  (Despite the weird claim in one newspaper, this has nothing to do with whether the UK has some form of customs union with the eU).

This new development fits into the broader framework of UK/EU immigration arrangements after Brexit, as I discussed in an earlier post. While UK citizens will very likely not be subject to short-term travel visas (that would be inconsistent with EU visa policy on wealthy and/or nearby countries), they will be conversely (on the basis of the law as it stands) be subject to the new travel authorisation law and other EU border control laws as non-EU citizens without free movement rights, including the loss of fast-track lanes at external borders. It would be possible for the UK and EU to negotiate a reciprocal exception to this, but that depends on the willingness of both sides to do so. It’s not clear if the UK is interested yet, or whether the EU would be willing to talk if it were.

It is absurd to argue that the application of the new law to UK citizens is a form of “punishment” by the EU. The UK government wants the UK to be a non-EU country without a free movement relationship, and the EU (as it stands) will therefore treat the UK like any other non-EU country without a free movement relationship. In fact the UK will be treated better than the many non-EU countries whose citizens are subjected to a visa requirement. Some Leavers should apologise for previously claiming that the likely application of the ETIAS to the UK after Brexit was “scaremongering”; likewise some Remainers should retract their assertion that tourist visas will definitely be required for UK citizens after Brexit. (Spoiler: neither will).

Remember, though, that the new law is not just relevant to the UK, but also to many other non-EU countries, including the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and many States in the Caribbean, Latin America and neighbouring the EU to the east. A full list of non-visa countries can be found in Annex II to the EU visa list Regulation.

The new law will also apply to non-EU citizens subject to an optional visa exemption by Member States, namely re school pupils, refugees and armed forces’ members under certain conditions, along with non-EU family members of EU citizens who do not have residence cards on the basis of EU free movement law.

On the other hand, it will not apply to some other non-EU citizens:  refugees and stateless persons in a Member State; non-EU family members of EU citizens with a residence card; persons with residence permits from a Schengen state, uniform (Schengen) visas or national long-stay visas; nationals of European micro-states (Andorra, Monaco and San Marino and holders of a passport issued by the Vatican State or the Holy See); those who hold a border traffic permit subject to EU law when they travel within the local border traffic area; those subject to the optional visa requirement or exemption for holders of diplomatic or other official passports or travel documents issued by international organisations or certain international transport or emergency workers; those subject to the optional visa requirement because they are carrying out paid work; and non-EU citizens moving between Member States on the basis of EU law on intra-corporate transferees (discussed here) or on students and researchers (discussed here).

For UK citizens living in the EU27 states before Brexit, their rights on the basis of the Brexit withdrawal agreement (discussed here) will need to be evidenced by a residence permit from a Schengen states if they want to take advantage of these exemptions when coming back to the Schengen countries.

When will the new travel authorisation system apply?

The new Regulation will likely be formally adopted in a couple of months’ time.  While it will technically come into force twenty days after its formal adoption, the database needed to run the system take time to set up. So it will only begin operations when the Commission decides that other proposed EU laws on the interoperability of databases have entered into force, various implementing measures have been adopted, and there has been a successful comprehensive test of the system. It’s too early to say when this will be, but experience shows that several years may be necessary.

For the first six months after the system starts operations, its use will be optional and there will be no need to have a travel authorisation. The Commission may extend that for a further period of six months, renewable once. After that point, there will be a six months’ grace period when border guards may exceptionally allow people to enter without a valid travel authorisation. The Commission may extend this for another six months.

Process for the applicant

An applicant for travel authorisation must apply via a website or a mobile app “sufficiently in advance of any intended travel”, or, if they are already present in a Schengen State, “before the expiry of the validity of the travel authorisation”. If they already have a valid travel authorisation, they can apply for the next such authorisation as from 120 days (about four months) before it expires.  The system must “automatically inform” holders of travel authorisation via e-mail about the upcoming expiry of their authorisation, and the prospect of applying for a new one. Applications won’t have to be lodged by the potential traveller, but can instead be lodged by a company authorised to act on his or her behalf.

The application form has to include the applicant’s name, date of birth, place and country of birth, sex, nationality, parents’ names, travel document information, home address, e-mail and phone number, education level, occupation (which may be followed by a further request for information about an employer or where a student is studying), and Member State of first intended stay. Applicants must also answer whether they have: been convicted of a specified criminal offence over the last ten years (or the last twenty years, in the case of terrorist offences), and in which country; or “stayed in a specific war or conflict zone over the previous ten years and the reasons for the stay”; or been required to leave the territory of a Member State or any country on the EU visa whitelist over the last ten years.  If they answer yes to any of those questions, they will have to answer a further set of questions (yet to be determined). Each application will cost €7, but that fee will be waived for those under 18 or over 70, and applicants who are family members of EU citizens.

After the application is made, the data will be compared automatically to data in databases including the Schengen Information System (SIS), the planned Entry/Exit System (EES), the Visa Information System (VIS), the Eurodac database (which concerns asylum seekers and some irregular migrants), Europol data, and Interpol databases. The purpose of these checks is to determine whether: the travel document has been stolen, lost, misappropriated or invalidated; the person is listed in the SIS to be denied entry or wanted for arrest for extradition or as a missing person, potential witness or person subject to surveillance; a travel authorisation has been refused, revoked or annulled or there is a refusal based on the EES or the VIS; the travel document matches an application with different identity data; the applicant is a current or previous overstayer (ie did not leave on time when the permitted period of stay expired); there are matching data in Interpol, Europol or Eurodac files; or whether there are extradition or entry refusal data on the parent of a minor.  The application will also be checked against a watchlist and risk indicators. A number of these rules are waived for family members of EU citizens, in light of their rights under free movement law.

If this process does not result in any “hit”, then the travel authorisation will be issued automatically. If there is a hit, then the application is further examined to see if the hit was false. If it was genuine, then national authorities must examine the application further and decide on whether to issue the travel authorisation. This might entail asking the applicant further questions or consulting other Member States or Europol. The deadline for deciding on each application is 96 hours (four days), unless further information or an interview is required; in that case the deadline is extended to 96 hours after the further information is provided, or 48 hours after the interview is held.

When assessing applications, there will be profiling of applicants based on screening rules to be determined, which will be based on statistics indicating: “abnormal rates of overstayers and refusals of entry for a specific group of travellers”; “abnormal rates of refusals of travel authorisations due to a security, illegal immigration or high epidemic risk associated with a specific group of travellers”; “correlations between information collected through the application form and overstay or refusals of entry”; “specific security risk indicators or threats identified by” or “abnormal rates of overstayers and refusals of entry for a specific group of travellers” concerning a Member State, which must be “substantiated by factual and evidence-based elements”; or “information concerning specific high epidemic risks provided by Member States” along with “epidemiological surveillance information and risk assessments” produced by the WHO or the EU disease prevention agency.

These rules will be set out in Commission acts implemented by Frontex, which shall then “establish the specific risk indicators” based on: age range, sex, nationality; country and city of residence; level of education; and current occupation. However, these “specific risk indicators” must be “targeted and proportionate”, never based solely on sex or age nor on “information revealing a person’s colour, race, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, political or any other opinion, religion or philosophical belief, trade union membership, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability or sexual orientation”.

Furthermore, there will be a “watchlist” of those “who are suspected of having committed or taken part in a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence” or of those who may commit such offences in future, where there are “factual indications or reasonable grounds, based on an overall assessment of a person”, to believe that. (Note that “serious criminal offences” is defined as the 32 crimes listed in the EU law establishing the European Arrest Warrant, if they could be punished by at least three years in jail). The watchlist information shall be entered by either Europol or Member States, and shall consist of names, birth date, travel documents, home address, e-mail address, phone number, information on an organisation, or IP address. Listings in the watchlist cannot duplicate an alert that has already been issued in the SIS. The listings must be reviewed at least once a year.

Granting or refusing a travel authorisation

If there are “no factual indications or reasonable grounds based on factual indications” to believe that the applicant “poses a security, illegal immigration or high epidemic risk”, then a travel authorisation will have to be issued. It will be possible to issue an authorisation but with a flag to recommend that the traveller is interviewed by border guards at the border. The travel authorisation will be valid for three years, unless the travel document expires before that date.

Conversely, a travel authorisation application will have to be refused if the applicant: “used a travel document which is reported as lost, stolen, misappropriated or invalidated in the SIS”; “poses a security risk”; “poses an illegal immigration risk”; “poses a high epidemic risk”; is subject to a SIS alert to refuse entry; failed to reply to a request for additional information or attend an interview. It will also have to be refused if “there are reasonable and serious doubts as to the authenticity of the data, the reliability of the statements made by the applicant, the supporting documents provided by the applicant or the veracity of their contents”.

In that case, applicants will have the right to appeal, against the Member State that decided on their application in accordance with its national law. Furthermore, a previous refusal will not necessarily lead to a refusal of the next application, which will have to be considered separately on its own merits.

In either case, the applicant must be notified of either the positive or negative decision on the application, with information on either the conditions for travel to the EU or the grounds for refusal and information on the appeal process. Details of the decision will be added to the ETIAS database.

It will be possible to annul or revoke a travel authorisation. The basis for annulment is that “it becomes evident that the conditions for issuing it were not met at the time it was issued”, while an authorisation must be revoked “where it becomes evident that the conditions for issuing it are no longer met”. In either case, the decision must be taken on the basis of the usual grounds for refusal, the applicant must be notified of the grounds, there will again be an appeal right for the person concerned, and details will be added to the ETIAS database. An applicant may also ask for the authorisation to be revoked.

As with Schengen visas, there will be a possibility to issue a a travel authorisation with limited territorial validity, “when that Member State considers it necessary on humanitarian grounds in accordance with national law, for reasons of national interest or because of international obligations” even if the travel authorisation has not yet finished or has been refused, annulled or revoked. It will only be valid for 90 days, not the usual three years.

Given that transport companies have obligations if they carry passengers without immigration authorisation, the new law will give them the power to check the ETIAS database, to see if their passengers who need it have a valid travel authorisation. The database will also be available to border guards, to immigration authorities, national law enforcement bodies and Europol.

The ETIAS data will be kept in the database for the period of validity if an authorisation is granted, or five years from the last failed application if not. An applicant can consent to another three years of retaining the data in order to facilitate later applications. The general EU rules on data protection will apply to the processing of personal data in the system. Data cannot be transferred to non-EU countries, except to Interpol or for the purposes of facilitation of expulsion or where there is an imminent security risk, subject to detailed conditions.  

Comments

The new law will, if applied as planned, become a regular feature in the lives of those travelling to the EU, from the UK and many other States besides. For those who spend ten or twenty minutes making an application every three years and get travel authorisation after paying a €7 fee, there is limited hassle factor.  For those who fail to apply on time, or whose application is rejected, the hassle will be vastly greater, particularly if the refusal complicates their family or professional life.

On that point, the grounds for refusal are rather murky. The refusal of travel authorisation due to prior convictions for serious crimes, well-evidenced security risks or prior significant breaches of immigration law is reasonable, but the new law also refers vaguely to several levels of algorithms and profiling which have yet to be developed.  Recent events have called into question such use of “big data” more than ever; and “computer says nah” is not a good enough answer to an applicant, in particular for citizens of the UK or other neighbouring States who are more likely to have strong personal and professional links with the EU.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26, chapter 27

Photo credit: GTP headlines

*This blog post was supported by an ESRC Priority Brexit Grant on 'Brexit and UK and EU Immigration Policy'

Beyond Blue Passports: UK/EU immigration after Brexit

Professor Steve Peers, University of Essex

In the last few days, there has been much debate about the UK government’s intention to ‘return’ to blue British passports after Brexit. It’s unfortunate that there have been false statements on both sides of the argument – that the change in passports will cost extra money (the contract was due for renewal anyway) and that the EU forced the UK to apply the burgundy colour (there’s only a non-binding Resolution on this issue).

Some prefer the idea of a change in colour due to Brexit, but the issue isn’t about ‘sneering’ at people who might prefer one passport colour to another. In fact, aesthetically I prefer my previous UK passport colour (which was black, not blue). But a passport should be judged not by the colour of its cover but by the content of the rights it confers.

In that light, it’s a good moment to review the rules on visits and long-term immigration to the EU that will likely apply to UK citizens after Brexit. This is an update of a previous post from 2014 on this issue, except it should be noted that there will likely be separate rules on UK citizens who already live in the EU27 states on Brexit Day – on the basis of the withdrawal agreement, as partly agreed earlier this month. I have discussed that partial deal separately and so I won’t discuss that category of people further again here. My focus is on UK citizens who are still in the UK on that point (and who do not also have the citizenship of an EU27 country).

There are several general points at the outset. First, it seems likely that a transition period will be agreed as part of the withdrawal agreement (see discussion here). This may well mean that EU free movement law continues for a short period longer to apply between the UK and the EU after Brexit Day. Those who move during the transition period will likely be treated the same as those who moved before Brexit Day, although this has yet to be confirmed.

Secondly, EU immigration law (by which I mean the EU laws generally governing the immigration status of non-EU citizens) does not apply to all Member States. In particular, the rules relating to short-term visas and borders (and aspects of irregular migration) deriving originally from the Schengen open borders agreement don’t apply to the UK or Ireland. They only partly apply to Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Croatia (although those States are meant to join in future) and have been extended outside the EU, to Schengen associates: Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. The rules relating to longer-term legal migration and asylum apply to all Member States except Ireland and Denmark, but not to any non-EU countries (other than the Dublin rules on which State to apply for asylum in, which apply to the Schengen associates). 

Crucially, this means that immigration between the UK and Ireland after Brexit isn’t directly affected by any of the laws discussed in this blog post. Also EU free movement law will still apply to UK citizens who are family members of EU citizens who move to another Member State. 

Thirdly, the following analysis is based on EU law as it currently stands, as it is applied to countries like the UK post-Brexit: ie, relatively wealthy non-EU countries which do not have free movement with the EU. I’ll indicate where the law is currently being revised. It’s possible that some special post-Brexit deal on some or all aspects of immigration, falling short of free movement, might be agreed between the EU and UK after Brexit. While this prospect can’t be discussed in detail, since the UK government has not indicated whether it would even wish to seek such an agreement and so there’s no indication of what the content might be (or whether the EU would agree to it), I’ll discuss this prospect generally in a final section.

Finally, while some might try to argue that any new difficulty for UK citizens moving or travelling to the EU after Brexit would constitute some form of ‘punishment’ by the EU, this would be profoundly dishonest. The UK government seeks – as most Leave voters supported – to become a non-EU country without free movement after Brexit. Ending free movement law necessarily means that it’s not only harder for EU citizens to visit and stay in the UK, but also the other way around: the clue is in the words ‘free movement’. It should not be too much to hope that people have the integrity to accept the responsibility for the consequences of the outcome which they advocated.

Visas and border controls

‘Visas’ are an issue for both longer-term immigration and short-term travel; here I’ll discuss short-term travel, which (like border controls) has been fully harmonised by the EU as part of the Schengen process. While it’s sometimes argued that UK citizens will face short-term visa requirements to visit the EU after Brexit, the current law of the EU (the visa list Regulation) suggests that they will not (as I discuss in more detail here). That’s because it’s EU policy not to apply visa requirements to fairly wealthy non-EU countries, or to most neighbouring EU states, provided that the countries concerned reciprocate by not imposing visa requirements on EU citizens.

However, the EU is planning to set up an electronic travel advance authorisation system (ETIAS). I previously discussed this idea here; in the meantime, the legislation to establish ETIAS has been proposed by the Commission, agreed by the Council and is now under negotiation with the European Parliament. The text as agreed by the Council (and the most recent EP/Council negotiation text) would apply the ETIAS to all non-EU countries without free movement, therefore including the UK. Some in the UK would like to do set up a parallel system after Brexit, which would apply to EU citizens in return. (Note: I assume that during any transition period in the withdrawal agreement, the UK will temporarily be defined as a non-EU country which does apply free movement. The focus here is on what happens after that).

What about queues at border controls? At present, the Schengen borders code sets up a fast track solely for those with EU citizenship or nationality of a state with a free movement deal (see Articles 8 and 10). So UK citizens will no longer be fast-tracked at those borders after the end of free movement rules, unless the UK and EU negotiate an unprecedented special arrangement. Those who assert with certainty – like this MP – that nothing will change as regards longer border queues are therefore misstating the legal position. The comparison with Switzerland by the same MP is even more bizarre, given that Switzerland has signed up not only to free movement but also to the Schengen system.

UK citizens will also be subject to the planned EU entry-exit system, on the basis of newly adopted legislation, once that system is set up.  Again, that system, which will take records of all those entering and leaving the EU, will apply to all non-EU countries without a free movement agreement.  Similarly, UK citizens who have a record of criminal offences or immigration law breaches will be subject to entry bans for the entire EU enforced by means of the Schengen Information System (which is being revised), for the same reasons.  (The UK currently participates in other aspects of that System, as regards exchanges of criminal law and policing information, but it remains to be seen if this remains the case after Brexit: see further discussion here).

Long-term migration

Of course there will still be some UK citizens moving to EU countries on a long-term basis after Brexit. The point is that they (like EU citizens moving in the other direction) will no longer have the right to do so on the very liberal terms set out in free movement law, but instead will be moving on the basis of more restrictive rules set out in national law. On the EU side, those national laws have been partly harmonised by EU law. (Retirement of UK citizens in the EU will be entirely subject to the national laws of Member States).

First of all, as regards moving for work, there is EU legislation on highly-skilled non-EU migrants (the ‘Blue Card’ Directive, currently being revised as discussed here); the single permit Directive, which sets out common rules for equal treatment of non-EU migrants allowed to work; the Directive on seasonal workers (discussed here); and the Directive on intra-corporate transferees (discussed here). To some extent, this legislation sets only minimum standards or allows Member States to set up parallel national regimes.  

As regards students and researchers, a revised EU law (discussed here) will apply from 2018 (so before Brexit). UK students will lose the right to equal treatment as regards tuition fees and admission in EU universities that they currently enjoy as EU citizens (unless otherwise agreed). However, according to ECJ case law (discussed here) non-EU students must be admitted if the (more stringent) standards in the current version of the EU legislation on non-EU students are met. (There’s no reason to think that case law won’t apply to the newer version of the law).

Family reunion for UK citizens who move to the EU will also be harder after Brexit, whether their family are UK citizens or citizens of other non-EU countries, on the basis of the standards in the EU’s family reunion Directive. While Member States can set higher standards than the Directive, they often do not do so.

Finally, what about asylum? EU citizens are all but banned from applying for asylum in other Member States (the exception is discussed here), but UK citizens will no longer be EU citizens after Brexit. Like the UN Refugee Convention, EU refugee law (which is currently being revised: see discussion here) defines a refugee as person who is outside their country of origin due to a genuine fear of persecution by reason of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or particular social group. Persecution is defined as entailing some form of violence or other severe restriction on human rights. As things stand, despite obnoxious headlines from the UK’s most toxic newspapers, those calling for murder of Remain supporters are a tiny extreme fringe and there is no sign that the UK government is unable or unwilling to respond to any further violence which they might commit. Nor is there any move to lock up or ban the free speech of Remain supporters. Let’s hope this always remains the case.

Irregular migration

Finally, it should be noted that UK citizens who breach the immigration law of the EU and/or its Member States – which would obviously be more likely after Brexit as less liberal rules would apply – would be subject to the EU’s Returns Directive, which governs many aspects of the process of removing non-EU citizens who are not legally resident. This Directive has been subject to a relatively liberal interpretation by the ECJ, as I discuss here), but nevertheless it is rather more restrictive than the rules on expulsion or detention as set out in EU free movement law.

Special deal?

Could the EU and UK sign as special deal on immigration after Brexit? (I am leaving aside the likely transition period in the withdrawal agreement). As regards visas and borders, this would likely be an agreement with the entire EU, since the degree of harmonisation in this field means that the ECJ would likely rule that the EU has exclusive competence. In practice, the EU has been willing to sign treaties with non-EU countries on links with the border agency Frontex, and on visa waiver and readmission treaties. Would the EU be willing to go further, and (for instance) agree reciprocal non-application of the electronic travel authorisation rules on each side?

On legal migration, the EU has harmonised the law less and the Treaties reserve a national competence regarding the numbers of non-EU citizens admitted to work. Moreover, EU legislation in this field usually expressly states that Member States can enter into bilateral treaties with non-EU countries.  So any agreement would either be ‘mixed’ (needing ratification by the EU and its Member States), or purely bilateral between the UK and individual Member States. In some cases the EU has been willing to sign an association agreement with non-EU countries which contains limited rules on immigration.

More broadly, the issue of whether the UK and EU should sign a special immigration deal after Brexit may form part of the broader talks, with some in the UK willing to offer a trade of limited preferential labour market access in return for bigger access to the EU services market, for instance. Others might be unwilling on principle to offer any commitment regarding immigration. One factor that shouldn’t be overlooked is that such a deal would be reciprocal – preserving equally some possibility of facilitated immigration for UK citizens to the EU, not only the other way around.

*This blog post was supported by an ESRC priority grant on "Brexit and UK/EU immigration policy"

Barnard & Peers: chapter 27, chapter 26

JHA4: chapter I:3, I:4, I:5, I:6, I:7

Photo credit: Telegraph

The Orbanisation of EU asylum law: the latest EU asylum proposals

Steve Peers

There have been a number of EU proposals to deal with the perceived ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe over the last year. The latest batch, issued this week, are perhaps the most significant to date. They concern three related issues: visas (notably a short-term Schengen visa waiver for Turkish nationals); Schengen (partly suspending the open borders rules for six months); and asylum (changing the Dublin system on responsibility for asylum seekers, and creating a new EU asylum agency). Further proposals on legal migration and other EU asylum laws are coming in the months ahead.

Essentially, these proposals amount to the ‘Orbanisation’ of EU asylum law. They copy and entrench across the EU the key elements of the Hungarian government’s policy, which was initially criticized: refusing essentially all asylum-seekers at the external border and treating them as harshly as possible so as to maintain the Schengen open borders system. 

Background

The surge in the number of refugees and migrants coming into the EU since 2014 led initially to a discordant response from Member States, with Germany and Sweden initially welcoming the arrivals and Hungary trying to stop them. Last September, in a bid to modestly assist the ‘frontline’ border states of Greece and Italy with the large numbers of asylum-seekers, the EU adopted two Decisions on ‘relocation’ (discussed here), in principle taking up to 160,000 asylum-seekers off those countries’ hands and distributing them among other Member States. However, this ‘Plan A’ was ineffective, as some Member States refused to cooperate (even launching legal action) and the remainder relocated very few people.

So ‘Plan B’ was developed: an EU/Turkey deal whereby Turkey either prevented the large number of refugees on its territory from leaving, or readmitted them back from the EU if they did reach EU territory (which in practice usually means the Greek islands). To implement this, Greece agreed to treat Turkey as a ‘safe third country’ or a ‘first country of asylum’ under EU asylum law, with the result that claims were treated as inadmissible. As discussed earlier on this blog, this is a highly dubious interpretation of the law. To induce Turkey to cooperate, the EU agreed to spend money on the welfare of Syrian refugees in Turkey, and to drop the short-term visa requirement for Turkish citizens to visit the EU countries in the Schengen system. (It also agreed to open one more ‘negotiating chapter’ relating to Turkish accession to the EU, but this is a trivial concession: only one of these 35 chapters has been agreed to date, in 11 years of accession negotiations).

In the meantime, many Member States became concerned about the numbers of migrants and refugees reaching their territories, and so resumed checks on the previously open borders between Schengen states. However, under the relevant Schengen rules dating from 2013 (on which, see my thinktank report on the Schengen system here), the authority to do this will soon expire, unless the EU as a whole agrees to suspend the Schengen system for one or more periods of six months. This prospect has been mooted since December 2015 (as discussed in detail here).

So this week’s proposals aim to implement and entrench these policy developments: waiving the visa requirement for Turkey; allowing a limited suspension of Schengen; and amending the Dublin system to reflect the EU/Turkey agreement, to deter asylum-seekers from moving between Member States (allowing Schengen to be fully reinstated) and to incorporate a new version of the failing relocation rules.  All of these measures are related, but I will examine each of them in turn. 

Visas

There are three separate proposals to amend the EU visa list. All of them need to be agreed by the European Parliament, as well as a qualified majority of participating Member States in the EU Council.  The proposals, if adopted, would not apply to the UK and Ireland, which have their own laws on visa requirements (or waivers) for non-EU countries, due to an opt-out from the EU’s visa laws. That opt-out forms part of those countries’ overall opt-out from the Schengen system, which allows the UK to check people at its borders and refuse entry to non-EU citizens based (mostly) on UK law. It is therefore dishonest to suggest that the proposals would lead to an increased migrant influx into the UK. Indeed the UK’s withdrawal from the EU would not change the rules at all as regards non-EU citizens seeking to enter the UK from (the rest of) the EU – other than the small minority who apply for asylum or who are family members of EU citizens.

These proposals would, in turn: a) waive visa requirements for Turkish citizens; b) waive visa requirements for Kosovo; and c) make it easier to reimpose visa requirements in the event of immigration control issues. It should be noted that the Commission also recently proposed to waive visa requirements for Ukraine and Georgia; those proposals are still under discussion. All these proposals would, if adopted, amend the EU’s main law on visa lists, which dates initially from 2001. That law has been amended many times since, without any official codification of those amendments, but I have codified it unofficially here. Note that the visa waiver would apply to Turkish citizens, not to Turkish residents like the refugees from other countries living there.

The visa waiver for Kosovo is not linked to the overall refugee crisis, but rather to the policy of strengthening relations with EU neighbours, in part as an incentive for them to settle their own disputes. The Commission report on Kosovo fulfilling the requirements for visa waivers refers in particular to a recent border agreement between Kosovo and Montenegro. It also refers to meeting the requirements as regards readmission, reintegration, document security and organised crime.

As for Turkey, there is obviously a direct link with the EU/Turkey refugee deal. A fast-track visa waiver was promised to Turkey as part of that deal. But it is still subject to Turkey meeting the EU’s conditions. According to the Commission’s report, Turkey meets all but 7 of 72 requirements: the exceptions relate to issues like readmission, corruption, terrorism and document security, and the Commission believes that they will be fulfilled by the time the visa waiver is granted. In any event, the document security point is addressed by limiting the visa waiver to those with biometric passports. 

A longer staff working document elaborates on this assessment, but it is not convincing on several points. As regards asylum issues, it states that the obligation to lift the geographical limitation on the Geneva Refugee Convention (which means that Turkey only fully recognises Europeans as refugees) is met by Turkey because that country treats non-Europeans just as well as if they are refugees. But it skips over the lack of work permits for refugees who are not Syrians. It also concludes that Turkey does not refoule refugees to dangerous countries (as alleged by NGOs) simply by accepting Turkey’s word to the contrary. The Commission also waives the obligation for Turkey to ratify Protocol 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights, on the grounds that its national law offers equivalent protection. But if so, why be afraid of the supervision of the European Court of Human Rights on these issues? And it is only clear reading the staff working document that the (unresolved) concerns about ‘terrorism’ laws are actually concerns about misuse of terrorism law to crack down on freedom of expression. The main report does not even flag this as one of the most significant concerns. And the existence of these concerns gives the lie to the Commission’s argument (in an earlier proposal, still under discussion) that human rights in Turkey are so well protected as to classify Turkey as a ‘safe country of origin’ for asylum purposes.

The proposal to reimpose visa requirements more easily is implicitly linked to the Turkish visa waiver proposal, although in fact it could apply to any State on the visa waiver list (the ‘white list’). The current rules, dating from 2013, allow ‘emergency’ reimposition of a visa requirement by the EU Commission for a six-month period, renewable for another six months if the Commission proposes to amend the law to make this permanent. This temporary Commission decision can be blocked by Member States, but does not need the approval of the European Parliament. The grounds for it are ‘sudden and substantial’ increases in irregular migration, rejected asylum applications or rejected readmission applications from the country concerned.

There are some further details of these rules in the preamble to the 2013 law.  A ‘substantial’ increase is an increase above 50%, and a low rate of recognition of asylum applications constitutes 3% or 4%, although in either the Commission could choose to use a different number.  Reimposition of visas is not automatic: there is a diplomatic phase during which the Commission talks to the officials of the other country and warns them to take action in light of the impending threat.  The Commission will only propose reimposition if it is not satisfied with the outcome of these talks. So far it has not done so.

Basically the new proposal would make it easier to reimpose visas in several ways. First of all, it would no longer be an ‘emergency’ or ‘last resort’ decision, and the increases in irregular migration, rejected asylum applications or rejected readmission applications would no longer have to be ‘sudden’. Secondly, the reference period for examining the increased irregular migration, etc would no longer be over six months, but over two months. Third, the increase in asylum applications would no longer have to lead to ‘specific pressure’ on asylum systems; so there would need not be a large absolute number of asylum applicants from the country concerned, just a large relative increase in the number of applications.

Fourth, the rejected readmission applications would relate not only to citizens of the country concerned, but also to citizens of other countries who transited through that State’s territory. This is obviously aimed at enforcing the key feature of the EU/Turkey plan: the readmission of refugees to Turkey. Fifth, the possibility of triggering reimposition of visas as compared to the period before the visa requirement was dropped would now apply indefinitely, and would no longer expire after seven years. The immediate impact of this change would be on Western Balkans countries, where (apart from Kosovo) the EU waived visa requirements in 2009 and 2010. Sixth, the Commission can trigger the clause, not just Member States. It could act on the same grounds plus an additional ground of failure to apply a readmission deal with the EU as a whole.

Again, the final point aims at enforcing the EU/Turkey refugee deal. If Turkey does stop readmitting refugees, the EU can swiftly react by reimposing visa requirements. This works both ways, of course: if the EU threatens to reimpose visas on Turkish citizens on some other ground, such as an increase in Turkish citizens overstaying without authorization, then Turkey will likely refuse to take back refugees. Indeed, as discussed above, Turkey is threatening to do this if the EU does not waive the visa requirements in the first place – which accounts for the EU’s haste on this point.

Finally, a side issue (relating only to Turkey) is worth discussing. The EU/Turkey association agreement has a Protocol, signed in 1970, that sets a standstill on the free movement of services and freedom of establishment. That means the EU and its Member States can’t make the rules on these issues stricter than they were when the Protocol was signed. The CJEU has also ruled that if the rules are made more liberal than when the Protocol was signed, they can’t be made less liberal after that point without violating the standstill (Toprak and Oguz). While the standstill rule doesn’t apply to tourist visas (Demirkan), it does apply to visas for short-term economic activity (Soysal). 

So would the standstill rule in the association agreement prevent the EU from reimposing visas for economic activity by Turkish citizens? In its case law (see most recently Genc, discussed here), the CJEU has said that the standstill rule can be overridden on public interest grounds. So far the case law on this point has concerned integration of family members, although it could also be argued that the objective of preventing irregular migration is also a valid ground to override the standstill. In fact, the CJEU has been asked whether migration control objectives can override it, in the pending case of Tekdemir. However, this case won’t be decided until well after June (when Turkey wants the visa waiver in place); and like the earlier cases, it concerns legal migration. 

Schengen

The idea of suspending Schengen for up to two years was originally mooted back in December – as I discussed in detail at the time. The mechanics of the process, as I detailed there, have been grinding away for some time. Now we have nearly reached the final stage: a Commission Recommendation for a Council Recommendation to suspend Schengen. Once the Council adopts this (by a qualified majority of Schengen states), the suspension can go ahead.

However, the Commission has tried to limit this suspension in time and in space. It would only apply to Germany, Austria, Sweden, Denmark and Norway (where the unilateral authority to suspend border controls is about to expire), and only for an initial period of six months. The Commission argues that the tightening of EU immigration and asylum law should have had sufficient effect by then, so a further suspension would not be justified. Time will tell if this is true: the Schengen rules allow for three six-month extensions of the initial suspension.

For legal reasons, as I discussed in the earlier blog post, the suspension has to be based on blaming a Member State for insufficient control of its external borders. Obviously, the Commission has named Greece. But it has warm words for Greece’s efforts in the last few months, and flights to and from Greece to the Schengen zone will not be affected. This rather measured and proportionate approach contrasts with the Commission's asylum proposals - to which we now turn.

Asylum

Again, there are three separate proposals, all of which need to be agreed by the European Parliament, as well as a qualified majority of participating Member States in the EU Council.  First of all, the current Dublin III Regulation, which sets out rules determining which Member State is responsible for an asylum application, would be replaced by a new Regulation – which I will call ‘Dublin IV’. Secondly, the current Eurodac Regulation, which supplements the Dublin Regulation by providing for the storage and comparison fingerprints of asylum-seekers and those who crossed the border irregularly, will also be replaced by a new Eurodac Regulation. Thirdly, the current law establishing an EU agency known as EASO (the European Asylum Support Office), would be replaced by a new law creating an EU Agency for Asylum (the ‘EU Asylum Agency’).

This is just one batch of proposals: as the previous Commission communication from April (discussed here) set out, it will also soon propose new laws to amend the existing laws on qualification (definition) of refugees and people needing subsidiary protection status, asylum procedures, and reception conditions for asylum-seekers. In effect, this will amount to a third phase of the Common European Asylum System.

Currently, the UK and Ireland have opted in to the EU laws regarding Dublin, Eurodac and EASO. They opted out of the second-phase asylum Directives, but are covered by the first-phase Directives (except Ireland never opted in to the first-phase reception conditions Directive). Denmark and the Schengen associates (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein) participate in these laws on the basis of treaties with the EU. It would be up to the UK and Ireland to decide whether to participate in the new proposals; if not, the current Regulations continue to apply. If they opt out of the discussions on the proposals, they could still opt in later after adoption of the legislation, if they find that the final result is more to their liking than they had feared at the outset. Denmark and the Schengen associates could refuse to participate, but in that case their treaties with the EU will automatically terminate.

In the event of Brexit, the UK would no longer be subject to any of the EU asylum laws it is now participating in, unless the EU and the UK negotiate an agreement to that effect. It should be noted that the EU has in practice only ever been willing to extend the Dublin rules to non-EU States if those States are also Schengen associates. (Indeed in some cases, the Dublin and Schengen association treaties have been negotiated as a package).

The EU Asylum Agency

I will start with the least contentious of the new proposals.

Currently, EASO has a number of practical cooperation tasks. In particular, it must: ‘organise, promote and coordinate’ the exchange of information and identify and pool good practice, as well as activities relating to country-of-origin information (ie, information about conditions in asylum seekers’ countries of origin), including gathering and analysis of that information and drafting reports on that information; assist with the voluntary transfer of persons granted international protection status within the EU; support training for national administrations and courts, including the development of an EU asylum curriculum; and coordinate and exchange information on the operation of EU external asylum measures. For Member States under ‘particular pressure’, the Office must gather information concerning possible emergency measures, set up an early warning system to alert Member States to mass influxes of asylum seekers, help such Member States to analyse asylum applications and establish reception conditions, and set up ‘asylum teams’.

For its contribution to the implementation of the Common European Asylum System, the Office gathers information on national authorities’ application of EU asylum law, as well as national legislation and case law on asylum issues. It also draws up an annual report on the situation regarding asylum in the EU. At the request of the Commission, the Office may draw up ‘technical documents on the implementation of the asylum instruments of the Union, including guidelines and operating manuals.’ The Office can also deploy ‘asylum support teams’ on the territory of a requesting Member State, in order to provide ‘in particular expertise in relation to interpreting services, information on countries of origin and knowledge of the handling and management of asylum cases’.

How would the EU Asylum Agency be different? As with the parallel proposal for a European Border Guard (discussed here), the Agency would not replace national administrations, but play a bigger role coordinating them.  The main changes are: an obligation to exchange information with the Agency; a stronger role in analysis of the situation of countries of origin, including advice on alleged ‘safe countries of origin’; the development of guidance on applying EU asylum law; monitoring of the Common European Asylum System, including the capacity of Member States to apply it; and increased operational and technical assistance for Member States. An indication of the bigger role for the Agency as compared to EASO will be the planned increase in staff – from about 150 to around 500.

Eurodac

The current Regulation requires Member States to take the fingerprints of all asylum-seekers and irregular border crossers over 14 years old. This information is then stored in the Eurodac computer system. Every asylum-seeker’s fingerprints are compared with those already in the system, to see if he or she has either applied for asylum already or crossed the border irregularly. This is taken as evidence as regards which Member State is responsible for the asylum application under the Dublin rules.

Eurodac can also be used for other purposes. In 2013, the Eurodac law was revised to give police forces and the EU police agency, Europol, limited access to the fingerprint data for the purposes of criminal investigations. Member States may choose to check the fingerprints of an irregular migrant against the system, for the purposes of identification, without storing that data.

The proposed new Regulation would make some key changes to these rules. First of all, it would significantly enlarge the amount of personal data that will be taken and stored. Member States will have to take information on children from the age of six (rather than fourteen), and facial images as well as fingerprints. Eurodac will also now store data on the names, nationalities, place and date of birth, travel document information. For asylum-seekers, it will store the EU asylum application number (see the Dublin IV proposal), as well as information on the allocated Member State under the Dublin rules, for the first time. For irregular border crossers and irregular migrants, it will store the date of the removal from the territory.

There will no longer be an option merely to check data on irregular migrants; rather Member States will be obliged to take and store this information. While the rules on police and Europol access to Eurodac data will not be changed as such (although the Commission will review those rules soon), there will be more personal data for them to access: they will be able to get facial image information, and more individuals will have their personal data recorded in Eurodac in the first place.

Secondly, it will be possible for fingerprint data to be taken not only by national officials, but also (as regards asylum-seekers and irregular border crossers) by the new EU Border Guard and EU Asylum agencies. Thirdly, while asylum-seekers’ data will still be retained for ten years, data on irregular border crossers will now be retained for five years – up from 18 months at present. Data on irregular migrants will also be retained for five years. The data will be marked if a Member State gives a residence permit to an irregular migrant. Finally, Eurodac data will now be made available to third countries for the purposes of return, on certain conditions, including a refusal to disclose if the person who has applied for asylum. But the non-EU country might guess that the person has applied for asylum; in fact the EU’s procedures Directive requires that country to be informed of this in some cases.

The Commission justifies these changes by the need to strengthen the EU’s return policy as regards irregular migrants, and to keep track of them if they make movements across the EU. It believes that taking fingerprints and photos of young children is justified for child protection reasons. Collecting personal data on facial images is justified because some persons refuse to have their fingerprints taken.

This proposal obviously raises huge data protection issues, and it will be important to see what concerns are raised by national data protection authorities, as well as the EU’s Data Protection Supervisor. The arguments about child safety should be independently assessed by child protection experts. It is conceivable that taking facial images would avoid the need to insist upon taking fingerprints coercively, but it’s not clear why the Commission believes that storing data on names, birthdates et al is justified. The use of Eurodac to underpin EU return policy obviates much need to use or expand the Schengen Information System (which currently contains data on non-EU citizens who are meant to be refused entry) for similar purposes, and raises the question of whether there need to be two different databases addressing the same issue. The choice between the two databases is particularly significant for the UK, since it will have access to the Eurodac returns data (if it opts in to the new proposal), but doesn’t have access to the immigration alerts in the Schengen Information System, and indeed can’t have access to those alerts unless (rather improbably) it fully joins Schengen. (However, the UK does have access to the criminal law alerts in the Schengen Information System, such as alerts on suspected terrorists: see my further discussion here. It could lose that access after Brexit, as I discuss here).

Dublin IV

As noted at the outset, the amendments to the Dublin Regulation essentially aim to entrench the EU/Turkey deal and to save Schengen by deterring secondary movements of asylum-seekers, while also making a fresh attempt to establish relocation rules. To accomplish each of these objectives, the Commission proposes an extreme solution which is probably legally and/or politically unfeasible.

Let’s examine each element in turn. In order to entrench the EU/Turkey deal (and possibly future heinous deals with countries like Libya), the proposal transforms a current rule which gives Member States an option to apply to state that a non-EU state is a ‘safe third country’ for an asylum applicant in accordance with the asylum procedures Directive, rather than send the applicant to another Member State or consider the application after a transfer from another Member State under the Dublin rules. The CJEU recently took a permissive view of this provision (Mirza). In place of this option, there would be an obligation to assess the inadmissibility of an application on ‘safe third country’ or ‘first country of asylum’ grounds before applying any of the rules on responsibility for applications. This confirms the current practice as regards asylum-seekers coming from Turkey to Greece, which aims to return as many of them as possible to Greece despite the dubious designation of Turkey as a ‘safe’ country for asylum-seekers.

This doesn’t matter much in cases where Greece would anyway be responsible for considering the application under the Dublin rules, because it was the first country where the applicants entered. (Moreover, due to recent closure of the Greece/Macedonia border and other controls and fences on internal and external Schengen borders, it’s now very difficult to leave Greece even for those asylum-seekers not in detention). But contrary to popular belief, that is not the only ground for assigning responsibility under the Dublin rules. There’s also an obligation to bring family members together, where one of the family members has status as a refugee or asylum-seeker or otherwise has legal residence in another Member State.

The Mirza judgment did not address whether these family rules take priority over the ‘safe third country’ option, but the Dublin IV proposal is clear.  If a case is inadmissible on the dubious ‘safe third country’ or ‘first country of asylum’ rules, then the Member State in question is responsible, regardless of the family or humanitarian clauses in the Regulation. It’s arguable that this is a breach of the right to family life set out in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. But it’s certain that this change completely undercuts the broadening of the definition of ‘family member’ contained in the Regulation – extending it to cover siblings and families formed after leaving the country of origin (while Syrians were living in Turkey, for instance). Those changes therefore amount to a legal ‘Potemkin village’ – a cynical façade intending to mislead a naive onlooker.

It might be argued that family members should not be encouraged to pay smugglers and take unsafe routes to reach their loved ones who are already in the EU. Fair enough – but in that case, the EU should take steps to ensure their safe passage (note that the EU’s family reunion Directive requires Member States to admit family members of refugees). There’s nothing in this week’s batch of proposals to do that. The EU’s informal arrangements with Turkey do provide for ‘nuclear family’ members as one category of Syrian refugees to resettle. But these arrangements are not binding and (at time of writing) not even officially published (see this entry in the Council register of documents). They only apply to the ‘nuclear’ family, and only for Syrians.

Next: the attempt to deter secondary movements of asylum-seekers, in order to reinstate the Schengen system. Most notably, there will be punishments for asylum-seekers who do not stay in the responsible Member State. In that case the asylum procedure will be accelerated, and they will lose all benefits (health, education, welfare and accommodation) except for emergency health care. (However, the grounds for detention of asylum-seekers in the Dublin Regulation will not change – though the future proposal to amend the reception conditions Directive might seek to amend the detention rules there instead.) This will overturn the CJEU ruling in CIMADE and GISTI, which was based on the right to dignity in the EU Charter. Let’s put it plainly: asylum-seekers who flout the Dublin rules will be left to starve in the streets – even children, torture victims and other vulnerable people. And fast-tracking their asylum application implicitly aims at refouling them to their country of origin, with only limited suspensive effect of any appeal to the courts.

The violations of the Charter don’t stop there. According to the CJEU case law on the current Regulation, unaccompanied minors can move to another Member State and apply there. This ruling (MA) is also based on the Charter (rights of the child), but the Commission wants to overturn that too – in the process trashing its own proposal dating from 2014. Again, any attempt to argue that this aims to protect children by deterring them from moving is undercut by the prioritisation of inadmissibility rules over family reunion rules (even for unaccompanied children), as well as the failure to insert rules to ensure that the Dublin family rules are actually applied (such as the recent UK ruling on a requirement for DNA tests). If the EU and its Member States care so much about asylum-seeking children, why have they detained so many in Greece in poor conditions, and shrugged as so many suffered in northern Greece – shirking the legal obligations which they accepted to relocate them?

Furthermore, the proposal limits both the substantive and procedural remedies for applicants. They will only be able to challenge a decision on the responsible Member State on the grounds that the asylum system has broken down, or that they should be with their family member. This overturns the opinion in the pending cases of Karim and Ghezelbash (although it is possible that the Court will not follow this opinion). Also, they will only have seven days to appeal: this risks a breach of the Charter right to an effective remedy, given that in the Diouf case the CJEU found that a 14-day time to appeal was acceptable.

The proposal doesn’t only aim to restrict asylum-seekers in order to ensure that Dublin works effectively; it will also restrict Member States to the same end. The essentially unlimited discretionary ‘sovereignty’ and ‘humanitarian’ clauses will be amended to severely limit the circumstances in which a Member State can examine an application that is not its responsibility. If Angela Merkel (improbably) wanted to repeat her open-door policy of summer 2015 in future, the proposal would make that illegal. Various deadlines for Member States to act would be speeded up (although Member States have said before that this is impractical). Conversely, other rules which limit Member States’ obligations will be dropped: there will be longer periods of responsibility after issuing a visa or residence permit, and responsibility for those who cross a border without authorisation, or who abscond or who leave the EU and then come back, will be endless.

This brings us to the relocation rules. These will be triggered once a Member State is responsible for more than 50% of the asylum applications which objective criteria (based on income and population) indicate that it ‘should’ be responsible for. In other words, if Greece ‘should’ be responsible for 50,00 asylum applications under those criteria, other Member States would be obliged to relocate asylum-seekers from Greece once it was responsible for 75,000 applications. But Member States can't relocate asylum seekers whose applications are inadmissible under the new rules discussed above, so this may have little impact on Greece anyway. Indeed, if the EU/Turkey deal breaks down, the combination of these rules would in principle put Greece in a worse position than it is currently. A new emergency relocation Decision would have to derogate from the Dublin rules again.

Then the proposal becomes truly surreal. The Commission suggests that Member States may opt out of relocating asylum-seekers, but they will have to pay €250,000 per asylum-seeker if they wish to do this. This is a fantasy on top of a fantasy. Member States have already shown that they are unwilling to apply the relocation Decisions of last September, or to adopt the proposal to amend the Dublin rules to this end that was tabled at that time. The idea of financial contributions in place of accepting individuals, whatever its merits, is perceived to be a ‘fine’ and was already rejected by Member States last year. That idea will not suddenly appear more attractive to Member States by doubling down on it, and suggesting a contribution set at an obviously absurd and disproportionate level, which the Commission does not even try to justify.

So why did the Commission jump the shark here? Perhaps someone in the Commission lost a bet. Or perhaps this is a legislative homage to the Belgian surrealist tradition of Magritte, et al. More seriously, it might be intended as a negotiating position. But such a ridiculous position will just backfire: it’s as if management started the latest pay talks with the unions by arguing that the workers should start paying the company for the privilege of working there. Or perhaps it’s a subtle way of addressing Greece’s debt problems: rejecting the relocation of a mere 10,000 asylum-seekers from Greece would transfer €2.5 billion to the Greek treasury – where it would rest briefly on its route to Germany. 

I have another theory, well known to followers of British politics. Maybe the €250,000/person proposal is the Commission’s equivalent of ‘throwing a dead cat on the table’. The phrase is borrowed – like the EU’s current asylum policy – from Australia. It means that if the political conversation is particularly damaging to a certain politician, an ally of that politician suddenly does or says something outrageous. Everyone will start talking about that outrageous thing, just as they would be talking about the unfortunate feline; which means that no-one is talking about the original issue any more.  In this case, it means that everyone is talking about the €250,000 – and no-one is talking about the suspension of Schengen, or of the families who would be split up, or the people who would be made hungry and homeless, by the Commission’s Dublin IV proposal.

Conclusion

The Commission’s proposals are not a done deal, of course. Some Member States and Members of the European Parliament have misgiving about a visa waiver for Turkey, on migration control or human rights grounds. MEPs fought for years for many of the provisions in the Dublin III Regulation (on family members and unaccompanied minors in particular) which the Commission now seeks to overturn. As I pointed out above, some of the proposed changes to the Dublin rules are highly vulnerable to challenge in the CJEU, if adopted. The red herring of a €250,000 sanction is already floating on the surface of the pond. And the whole EU/Turkey deal might anyway be overturned at the whim of Turkish President Erdogan – the only politician whose ego makes Donald Trump’s look small by comparison. Nevertheless, EU asylum policy is already becoming more Orbanised in practice, and I would expect at least some elements of the further Orbanisation proposed by the Commission to be adopted.

For over twenty-five years now, the EU and its Member States have been attempting to get the Dublin system to work. The continued abject failures of those attempts to get this pig to fly never seem to deter the next attempt to launch its aviation career.  With this week’s proposals, the Commission is in effect trying to get the poor beast airborne by sticking a rocket up its backside. It might be best to stand back.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

JHA4: chapter I:3, chapter I:4, chapter I:5, chapter I:7

Photo credit: JapanTimes.co.jp