Showing posts with label social security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label social security. Show all posts

Saturday, 5 June 2021

Discriminating against families: Italian family benefits before the ECJ

 



 

Virginia Passalacqua, post-doctoral researcher in EU law, Utrecht University

 

In Italy, if you are a multimillionaire and you just had a baby, the State gives you 960 euros. However, if you are, say, the non-EU domestic employee of such a millionaire and you also just had a baby, the State gives you zero.

How is this possible? Thanks to Italian legislation that for 20 years has discriminated systematically against foreign families. No wonder, these families are also poorer compared to Italian ones: 25% of them were in absolute poverty in 2020, against 6% of Italian ones.

In July 2020, the issue of discriminatory criteria for access to family benefits arrived before the ECJ, thanks to a reference by the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC), currently pending (O.D. and others, C-350/20).

This is the fourth time that the ECJ is asked to assess Italian discriminatory criteria to access family benefits (after Martinez Silva, VR, and WS). But this time, the ECJ is called to interpret a new legal parameter: Art. 34.2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (the Charter). Can this be a game-changer?

The relevance of Art. 34.2 of the Charter has been questioned by commentators: admittedly, secondary norms are sufficient to declare the Italian law incompatible with EU law. Yet, it is argued that the ECJ should not miss this opportunity to clarify that migrants’ equal access to benefits is a fundamental right in the EU, providing guidance both to the Italian top Court and to the lawmaker.

 

The dispute before the ICC and the preliminary question

 

The facts of the case are rather simple. O.D. and seven other TCNs applied for family benefits, either assegno di maternità or bonus bebè, alias maternity and childbirth allowance.

The maternity allowance exists since 2001 and is granted to low-income women that do not receive a job-related maternity allowance. Instead, the childbirth allowance was introduced in 2014 to support families with a newborn. This was originally granted only to low-income families, but a 2019 amendment made all families eligible; still, the amount of the allowance varies according to their income (from 960 to 1920 euros p/y).

The Italian National Institute for Social Security (INPS) refused to grant O.D. and others the maternity and childbirth allowances because only Italian nationals, EU citizens, and TCN long-term residents are eligible under Italian law. Instead, the applicants are single permit holders: legally residing TCN workers whose status is regulated by the Single Permit Directive 2011/98/EU.

O.D and others challenged such refusal on the grounds that it entailed discrimination and was contrary to EU law. Indeed, Art. 12 of the Single Permit Directive imposes to Member States to grant single-permit holders equal treatment with nationals in several areas, including “branches of social security, as defined in Regulation (EC) No 883/2004”. They argued that the two allowances must be considered as social security and that they are equally entitled to them.

The applicants, supported by ASGI - a pro-migrant association, won all the proceedings against INPS before first and second-instance courts, until they reached the Italian Supreme Court. This decided to refer their cases to the ICC for a constitutionality assessment, which, in turn, decided to make a preliminary reference to the ECJ, under the consideration that this is an area “marked by the growing influence of EU law”.

The preliminary reference asks whether the childbirth and maternity allowances can be considered as branches of social security under Regulation 883/2004 so that they would fall in the scope of application of Art.12 Directive 2011/98 and Art. 34.2 of the Charter, which grants equal treatment to any legally resident person in matters of social security and social advantage.

I will tackle these issues in order.

 

Are the maternity and childbirth allowances to be considered as social security under Regulation 883/2004?

 

Arguably, EU law and case law leave little space for interpretation on this question. The ECJ has consistently held that to understand whether a benefit falls within the scope of Regulation 883/2004 we need to look at its “constituent elements”, i.e. “its purpose and the conditions for its grant, and not on whether it is classified as a social security benefit by national legislation” (UB C-447/18, at 22).

First, the benefit’s purpose must be related to one of the risks listed in Art. 3 of Regulation 883/2004, among which appear “maternity and equivalent paternity benefits” and “family benefits”, defined as “all benefits in kind or in cash intended to meet family expenses” (Art. 1).

Second, the benefit must be granted automatically on the basis of objective criteria, without any individual or discretionary evaluation of personal needs (Martinez Silva, at 22).

Both maternity and childbirth allowances are granted on the basis of objective criteria (i.e. income and the birth of a new child) and give economic support to families. They perfectly match the ECJ definition of social security, and this is why all first and second-instance Italian courts upheld the applicants’ view and granted them equal access to the allowances as required by Art. 12 of the Single Permit Directive.

INPS and the Italian government, however, advanced an exception in respect to the childbirth allowance. They argued that its goal is to incentivizing birthrate, rather than meeting family expenses; this would be confirmed by the fact that (from 2019) the childbirth allowance is a universal benefit, granted to all families and not only to low-income ones.

But this point too had already been addressed by the ECJ, in the case law on free movement of workers. In Reina, the Court assessed whether a German measure (“childbirth loan”) could be legitimately reserved to German nationals on the grounds that it was aimed “to make up the relative deficit in births among the German population in relation to the foreign population”.

Unsurprisingly, this chauvinistic argument did not convince the ECJ. The Court stated that the sole fact that a social measure pursues a demographic aim is not enough to exclude it from the scope of application of EU law and that social security and advantages must be granted equally to EU migrants (Reina at par 15; Commission v. Greece, C-185/96, at 34). Ironically enough, in the case of Reina the discriminated family was of Italian nationality.

 

Art. 34.2 of the Charter: a hollow hope or an added value?

 

As mentioned, the Italian Constitutional Court’s decision to invoke Art. 34.2 of the Charter was met with skepticism by commentators, who deemed it superfluous and of questionable relevance (Giubboni, 2021). This is because, as previously shown, secondary law is sufficient to declare unlawful the exclusion of single permit holders from the beneficiaries of the two allowances. So, does the Charter lack any added value?

Upon a closer look, the answer is no. Art. 34.2 of the Charter states:

Everyone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social security benefits and social advantages in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices.

This provision does present at least three important advantages. First, it refers to both social security and social advantages, while Art. 12 of the Single Permit Directive refers only to social security. Second, it grants equal treatment to all migrants residing legally, without making distinctions based on status. Third, it confers to the migrants’ right to equality a fundamental status in the EU.

The concreteness of the first two advantages is tempered by their limited scope of application (the Charter applies to Member States only when they implement EU law) and by their being subject to limitations under EU and national law. Instead, the third advantage, abstract as it is, is more significant.

In a context where even the European Social Charter grants migrants only limited access to social benefits (see Art. 19), the broad scope of Art. 34.2 sounds revolutionary. This confirms that, despite the (often valid) criticisms against the restrictive EU migration policy, fighting discrimination against migrants is a hallmark of the EU.

Indeed, the ECJ has fought discrimination against (EU and TCN) migrants for decades, pioneering the idea that equality is a necessary precondition for inclusion and integration (Kamberaj, at 90).

The case of O.D. and Others offers the ECJ the opportunity to clarify the fundamental nature of the principle of equal access to benefits for TCN migrants, which so far has been relegated to an ‘ordinary legislative function’ (Muir, 2020, at 121). This would pursue not only a rhetorical function, but it would provide guidance amidst a very confusing “polycentric” adjudication practice (Kilpatrick, 2014).

Especially in Italy, national courts have suffered from a lack of uniform interpretation when adjudicating migrants’ equal treatment (also because of the ‘dual preliminarity’ controversy, Lazzerini 2020). And the ICC denounced this situation in its reference: “The sheer number of pending disputes is testament to the serious uncertainty concerning the meaning to be ascribed to EU law.”

Moreover, Italian norms in many parts contain discriminatory provisions against migrants, and a current proposal to reform family benefits features again discriminatory selection criteria, despite a pending Commission infringement on the matter.

The ECJ evaded its obligation to interpret Art. 34.2 once (in the case of UB, C-447/18). This time, it should state clearly that migrants’ equal access to benefits is a fundamental principle of the Union, sending a powerful message to the Italian Constitutional Court and the Italian lawmaker.

 

Conclusion

 

The preliminary reference in the case of O.D. and Others speaks of an alarming phenomenon. In Italy, TCN families in need have been denied equal access to social benefits for decades, and the childbirth allowance reached a low point in this respect: it is universally granted to all but to TCN migrants.

Against this background, the preliminary reference in the case of O.D. and Others offers an important opportunity. The ECJ has a long tradition of fighting discrimination and constitutionalizing equality. In the case of O.D. and Others, its ruling can acquire erga omnes effect thanks to the follow-up ICC judgment.

The EU Court should not miss this opportunity for stating out and loud that equality is a fundamental principle of the EU also when it comes to TCN migrants, which cannot be disposed of by the erratic will of the government of the day.

 

Barnard & Peers: chapter 26

JHA4: chapter I:6

Photo Credit: Guiseppe Milo, via Wikimedia Commons

Tuesday, 29 December 2020

Analysis 1 of the Brexit deal: Healthcare entitlements in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement


 


 

Professor Tamara Hervey, University of Sheffield

 

What – if any – entitlements to healthcare are covered by the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, agreed in principle on 24 December 2020? (For an overview of the agreement as a whole, see Steve Peers’ Twitter thread and the overview on this blog). (Update: later blog posts cover human rightsdispute settlement and environment and climate change in the Brexit deal). (This blog post was updated April 28 2021 to refer also to the final Article numbers of the TCA; it also retains references to the original numbering for convenience).

 

Introduction

 

If there are any, they will be found in the provisions on social security coordination (Heading Four: Social security coordination and visas for short-term visits). This is the equivalent of – but, as we will see, in many respects a weak equivalent of – the provisions of EU law on social security coordination. On the other hand, these are not ‘ordinary trade agreement’ provisions: there’s nothing like this in CETA for instance.

 

Those provisions of EU law include access to healthcare for EU citizens, and their families (irrespective of citizenship), who are resident in a Member State other than the ‘competent state’ for the purposes of social security coverage, and also access to healthcare necessary during a ‘stay’ (a short-term visit, not establishing a new place of residence) in another Member State. It is this latter provision that is covered by the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) scheme.

 

Many people want to know whether the EHIC scheme or a version of it will continue. For many people, especially elderly people, private health insurance for travel is unaffordable (health insurance companies take EHIC into account when calculating premiums) and in some cases not available. For people who have been accustomed to regularly visiting family or friends in the EU or UK, EHIC or not will make a significant difference to how they live their lives after end December 2020.

 

But in order to answer that question, I need to work through the legal text methodically, and that is what this blog does. There are multiple parts of the legal text that apply to the coordination of social security: a chapter in the main text, a Protocol, and several Annexes. I am setting out my reasoning step by step so that others can check it.

 

Interpretation and enforcement

 

The wording of the parts of the Agreement on social security coordination is complex, hard to follow, and likely to be subject to disagreement. The analysis that follows is my best-attempt on a first take: I may be wrong. In some respects, the wording of the Agreement is also opaque: in part this is because the relevant equivalent provisions of EU law and of the Withdrawal Agreement, on which this part of the Agreement draws, are also opaque. (Remember that the Withdrawal Agreement remains in force separately, including its provisions on EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU, discussed here).  That is why I’m starting this analysis with some words on interpretation and enforcement of the parts of the Agreement on social security coordination.

 

The Preamble to the Agreement recognises that social security coordination is important to human beings, not just those who are migrating as ‘economic entities’ (providing services, for example), but also their families. The Preamble also recognises that social security coordination applies not just to people who move between the UK and the EU to reside, but also to stay:

 

Preamble: “RECOGNISING the importance of the coordination of social security rights enjoyed by persons moving between the Parties to work, to stay or to reside, as well as the rights enjoyed by their family members and survivors,”

 

Provisions of the Preamble of an international agreement are an important reference point when it comes to interpretation of that agreement. Interpretation of the EU-UK Trade Agreement (‘the Agreement’) is to be in accordance with international law (not EU or UK law). This approach includes taking account of the context of the legal text, and the ‘object and purpose’ of the Agreement as a whole. It is possible – and perhaps in the context of the social security coordination rules, likely – that the interpretation of the provisions of the Agreement on social security coordination will differ between the UK and the EU Member States. In the context of this Agreement, there is nothing like the Court of Justice of the EU, or the EFTA Court, to seek to prevent such divergent interpretation:

 

TITLE II: PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION AND DEFINITIONS

 

Article 4 (originally COMPROV.13): Public international law

 

1. The provisions of this Agreement and any supplementing agreement shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with their ordinary meaning in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law, including those codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna on 23 May 1969.

 

2. For greater certainty, neither this Agreement nor any supplementing agreement establishes an obligation to interpret their provisions in accordance with the domestic law of either Party.

 

3. For greater certainty, an interpretation of this Agreement or any supplementing agreement given by the courts of either Party shall not be binding on the courts of the other Party.

 

The agreement will, however, be interpreted by the courts in the UK and the EU separately, and is subject to the treaty’s dispute settlement process (as noted below).

 

The EU Member States and the UK are obliged to ‘coordinate’ their social security systems, in accordance with the Protocol on Social Security Coordination. The object and purpose of this coordination is ‘in order to secure the social security entitlements of the persons covered therein’ (Article 488, previously Ch.SSC.1).

 

This is one of the few parts of the Agreement that has individual human beings as its focus. In general, the Agreement does not confer rights or impose obligations on human beings or legal persons. There is no provision for directly invoking the Agreement in domestic law. The Agreement is an instrument of international law, conferring obligations on the Parties to the Agreement (the EU, its Member States and the UK). It is totally different to EU law in this regard. It is also totally different to the Withdrawal Agreement, which includes a significant number of citizens’ rights provisions, and special measures for its enforcement.

 

Article 5 (originally COMPROV.16): Private rights

 

1. Without prejudice to Article SSC.67 of the Protocol on social security coordination (originally MOBI.SSC.67) and with the exception, with regard to the Union, of Part Three of this Agreement, nothing in this Agreement or any supplementing agreement shall be construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations on persons other than those created between the Parties under public international law, nor as permitting this Agreement or any supplementing agreement to be directly invoked in the domestic legal systems of the Parties.

 

2. A Party shall not provide for a right of action under its law against the other Party on the ground that the other Party has acted in breach of this Agreement or any supplementing agreement.

 

The social security rights under the Agreement must be protected by each Party’s domestic legal order. The Parties have agreed that human beings (and companies) must be permitted, by domestic law (not by the Agreement itself) to invoke the provisions of the Agreement before domestic courts, tribunals and administrative authorities, and thus to seek ‘adequate and timely’ remedies for any breach. The word ‘and’ suggests that courts and tribunals must be included in the arrangements made for enforcing social security coordination rights under the Agreement, and that only providing for an administrative process, such as Ombudsman or other complaints process, would not be compliant with the Agreement.

 

TITLE V: FINAL PROVISIONS

 

Article SSC.67: Protection of individual rights

 

1. The Parties shall ensure in accordance with their domestic legal orders that the provisions of the Protocol on Social Security Coordination have the force of law, either directly or through domestic legislation giving effect to these provisions, so that legal or natural persons can invoke those provisions before domestic courts, tribunals and administrative authorities.

 

2. The Parties shall ensure the means for legal and natural persons to effectively protect their rights under this Protocol, such as the possibility to address complaints to administrative bodies or to bring legal action before a competent court or tribunal in an appropriate judicial procedure, in order to seek an adequate and timely remedy.

 

In the UK, such a process for protection of individual rights is likely to be through the Social Security and Child Support Tribunals, in the first instance, with appeal to the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber). Note that the draft UK bill giving effect to the TCA simply copies its social security provisions into domestic law (clause 26).

 

Who is covered?

 

The Protocol on Social Security Coordination applies only to ‘situations arising between one or more Member States of the Union and the United Kingdom’ (Article 490(1), previously Ch.SSC.3 (1)). People whose situations are confined in all respects to either the UK or the EU Member States fall outside the scope of the Protocol (Article 490(2), previously Ch.SSC.3 (2)). There is no further definition of this scope rule. Do I fall within the scope of the Protocol if I visit the EU from the UK? If I’m providing a service under the Agreement’s provisions on services (eg Articles 140-143, previously SERVIN 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, on performance of economic activities through the entry and temporary stay in the territory of the EU/UK of natural persons of the UK/EU, who are business visitors for establishment purposes, contractual service suppliers, independent professionals, intra-corporate transferees and short-term business visitors), then it would seem obvious that I fall within the scope of the Protocol. Equally, I would argue that if I am visiting the UK from the EU or the EU from the UK, as a tourist, or for other non-economic reason (eg to visit family or friends), on the basis of the visa-free travel provided for under the Agreement (Article 492, previously VSTV.1), I also fall within its scope.

 

But this looks suspiciously like a continuation of aspects of free movement of persons, an inseverable part of the disciplines of the internal market, according to the EU’s negotiating position. My counter-argument to that position is that the coordination of social security, while linked to the internal market as it supports free movement of persons in practice, is not an integral part of harmonised internal market law in the way that the EU law provisions on entry, residence or non-discrimination in employment or self-employment rights are. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the Agreement includes provisions on entitlement to social security benefits (healthcare under a national health system) during a stay in the UK/an EU Member State (see further below).

 

The definition of who is covered by the Protocol on Social Security Coordination is based on the EU law on coordination of social security: people who are ‘subject to’ the social security legislation of one or more States (the UK, EU Member States), their families and their survivors (Article SSC.2 of the Protocol). Curiously, ‘subject to’ is not further defined, either in this Agreement, or in the Withdrawal Agreement, or in EU Law. In many situations, being ‘subject to’ social security legislation will be obvious: if one is paying social security contributions (eg for a pension), or receiving benefits (eg for invalidity or unemployment), then one is obviously ‘subject to’ the legislation. But in other situations, it is less obvious. Is someone who contends that they fall within the scope of the relevant social security rules ‘subject to’ those rules? The Agreement includes some provision on what happens if there is disagreement about whether someone falls within its scope (see below).

 

The Agreement further specifies that, in principle, the Protocol on Social Security Coordination applies only to people who are lawful residents of the UK or an EU Member State (Article 489, previously Ch.SSC.2 in the main Agreement). But this rule does not affect ‘entitlements to cash benefits which relate to previous periods of legal residence of persons covered by Article SSC.2’). So someone might no longer be lawfully resident in the EU or UK, but still fall within the scope of who is covered by this part of the Agreement, for example if they are entitled to pension benefits under the Agreement, but live outside of the EU and UK.

 

What is covered?: General rules

 

The Protocol on Social Security Coordination covers all the main branches of social security that are covered by EU law and by the Withdrawal Agreement. These include ‘sickness benefits’ (Article SSC.3 (1) (a)) (in cash or in kind) – that is, medical treatment. Like in EU law and the Withdrawal Agreement, medical assistance is not covered (Article SSC.2 (4) (b)). Neither is voluntary social insurance, unless it is the only social insurance scheme for the particular branch of social security in the relevant State (Article SSC.13). Neither are ‘assisted conception services’ (Article SSC.3 (4) (e)), defined as ‘any medical, surgical or obstetric services provided for the purpose of assisting a person to carry a child’ (Article SSC.1 (c)). Just to be clear, Article SSC.5 explicitly excludes the matters listed in Article SSC.3 (4) from the general non-discrimination principle (Article SSC.5).

 

EU Member States and the UK may charge a health fee as part of an application to enter, stay, work or reside in that State (Ch.SSC.4). But given that, at least until due notification is given, and if possible at least 3 months before a requirement for visa for a a short-term visit take effect, visa-free travel for short term visits applies between the UK and EU Member States (Article VSTV.1), I think that this provision must apply in practice, at least in the short term, only to applications for residence or work permits, not for visitor entry or short-term visits.

 

The general rules (and there are exceptions) for the Protocol are that (Article SSC.4) social security coordination rules are on the basis of non-discrimination between Member States of the EU. However, this rule is without prejudice to the Common Travel Area arrangements between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. To access Irish state healthcare, UK nationals need show either an EHIC, or proof of their UK residence. This continuation of the existing rules from 1 January 2021 is confirmed in the UK government’s website.

 

In general (again there are exceptions), the people who are covered by the Protocol enjoy the same benefits (and are subject to the same obligations) as the nationals of the relevant State (Article SSC.5). In general, the Protocol applies a principle of ‘equal treatment of benefits, income, facts or events’ (Article SSC.6).

 

There are two key aspects to this. First, if receipt of social security benefits (or income) has certain legal effects in one State, that State must also recognise equivalent benefits (or income) acquired under the legislation of another state. Second, where legal effects flow from facts or events taking place in one State, that State must take into account ‘like facts or events’ taking place in another State, as if they had taken place on the territory of the first State (Article SSC.6 (a) and (b)). In general, the Protocol requires the aggregation of periods of social insurance, employment, self-employment or residence, completed in any of the States Parties to the Agreement (Article SSC.7). There is a whole section of ANNEX SSC-7: Implementing part on specifics of the aggregation rules (Article SSCI.11 and 12). In general, receipt of cash benefits under the Protocol must not be made conditional on residence (Article SSC.8). All of these provisions are similar to those in the Withdrawal Agreement (Article 31 WA) and in EU law (Regulation 883/2004/EC, Articles 4,5,6,7).

 

Again, as in the Withdrawal Agreement and in EU law, the ‘single state rule’ applies. In general, ‘persons to whom this Protocol applies shall be subject to the legislation of a single State only’ (Article SSC.10). The starting point here is employment or self-employment, and only if neither applies does residence become relevant. If someone is employed or self-employed in a State, that State is the State whose social security legislation they are ‘subject to’ (Article SSC.10 (3) (a) (b)). There are rules for people who normally are employed in both the UK and one or more EU Member States (Article SSC.12): basically if someone is resident where they perform a substantial part of their work, that is the relevant state; if not, the place in which the employer is registered; or the ‘centre of interest’ of the activities of a self-employed person is the relevant state. There is, obviously, lots of room for interpretation of these rules in specific situations.

 

If someone is neither employed nor self-employed, the general rule is that their residence (which means ‘where the person habitually resides’ Article SCC.1 (aa)) determines the relevant State. There is a whole section of the ANNEX SSC-7: Implementing part on the elements for determining residence (Article SSCI.10). There are special rules for people who work on ships and aircraft (Article SSC.10 (4) and (5)).  

 

Like many international agreements, the Protocol on Social Security Coordination allows for States Parties to derogate from its general terms in some respects. The Protocol allows Member States to derogate from the single state rule for ‘detached workers’ (Article SSC.11). ‘Detached workers’ are either employed by an employer in a State which normally carries out its activities there, and sent by their employer to another State to work on the behalf of that employer; or self-employed and normally pursuing a self-employed activity in one State, and who go to another State to pursue a similar activity (Article SSC.11 (1) (a) and (b)). There is no list of these Member States yet in the text (see p 1246). Article SSC.11 obliges the European Union to notify the UK, by the time the Agreement enters into force, whether each Member State falls into one of three categories: A: the Member State wishes to derogate from the general rules of the Protocol on which state is the state responsible for social security (Article SSC.10); B: the Member State does not wish to so derogate; or C: the Member State has not indicated either A or B. That list of three categories of Member States will become Annex SSC-8, when the Agreement enters into force. One month later, categories B and C will cease to exist. Member States in category C will be deemed to be in category A for one month. After that, such a Member State can join category A by the Union notifying the new Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination (see below) to that effect. A Member State can leave category A in the future by the same mechanism. For Member States in category A, transitional rules for ‘detached workers’ will apply for a 24 month transitional period.

 

This is one of a myriad of examples of Brexit not being ‘done’.

 

What is covered? ‘Sickness benefits’

 

Title III of the Protocol sets out special provisions for each category of benefits (pensions, unemployment benefit and so on). Chapter 1 concerns sickness benefits. Like in EU law, there is a set of rules for ‘insured persons’ (people ‘subject to’ social security legislation of the ‘competent state’, and members of their families) and a separate set of rules for pensioners and members of their families.

 

‘Insured persons’ and their families who are resident in a State other than the competent state, are entitled to receive in the State of residence ‘sickness benefits in kind’ provided by the ‘institution of the place of residence’, as though those people were insured under the legislation of the place of residence (Article SSC.15; Article SSC.21 (pensioners)). People in this category include frontier workers (who live in one state and work in another – special rules apply to them (Article SSC.16)); posted workers (who are sent by their employer to work in another state); and also people who return home for intervals longer than a week (the frontier worker definition).

 

So, if someone is ‘subject to’ UK social security legislation for the purposes of receiving healthcare in the UK, because under the UK legislation they are deemed ‘resident’ in the UK (that being the national rule determining access to the NHS), and they are employed or self-employed in the UK (see the single state rules above), but they are also deemed ‘resident’ in Spain by Spanish legislation, because they are in Spain sufficiently to count as ‘resident’ under Spanish legislation, this provision of the Protocol entitles them to access Spanish healthcare as if they were insured under the Spanish legislation. These provisions are almost identical to the equivalent provisions of EU law (Regulation 883/2004, Articles 17 and 18, 23-26).

 

Articles SSC.17 and SSC.25 (pensioners) cover ‘stay’ outside the competent State. This is the equivalent of the EHIC provision in EU law. It entitles an insured person, and members of their family, who are staying in a state other than the competent state, to healthcare which becomes necessary on medical grounds during their stay. The determination of necessity must take account of the nature of the healthcare or medical treatment and the length of the stay. It is the healthcare provider in the state providing the healthcare that determines necessity. The entitlement under Article SSC.17 or SSC.25 does not cover someone who travelled with the purpose of receiving the healthcare or medical treatment. (There is an exception for a passenger or someone working on a ship or aircraft, who became ill during the voyage or flight). These provisions are almost identical to the equivalent provisions of EU law (Regulation 883/2004, Articles 19 and 20, 27).

 

Healthcare provided under these provisions must be fully reimbursed by the competent State (Article SSC.30).

 

What is different from EU law is that a person seeking to receive healthcare or medical treatment during a stay outside the competent state must present a ‘valid entitlement document’. The entitlement document is covered in Appendix SSCI-2. For EU Member States, the valid document is essentially the EHIC: it has to comply with the technical specifications of the relevant EU law determining EHIC cards (Decision No S2 of 12 June 2009 of the Administrative Commission concerning the technical specifications of the European Health Insurance Card) (Appendix SSCI-2 1). For the UK, the entitlement document has to contain the following information (Appendix SSCI-2 2):

 

(a) surname and forename of the document holder;

(b) personal identification number of the document holder;

(c) date of birth of the document holder;

(d) expiry date of the document;

(e) the code “UK” in lieu of the ISO code of the United Kingdom;

(f) identification number and acronym of the United Kingdom institution issuing the document;

(g) logical number of the document;

(h) in the case of a provisional document, the date of issue and date of delivery of the document, and the signature and stamp of the United Kingdom institution.

 

The UK must notify the Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination ‘without delay’ of the technical specifications of the UK document (Appendix SSCI-2 3).

 

The UK government’s website explains that people who have valid EHICs will be able to continue to use them from 1 January 2021, to access necessary healthcare on a visit to an EU country. For Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland, a new GHIC (UK Global Health Insurance Card) is available. When someone’s EHIC expires, they will be able to apply for a GHIC for free.

 

Appendix SSCI-2 confirms that the entitlements under Article SSC.17 of the Protocol on Social Security Coordination include medical treatment for pre-existing illnesses and chronic conditions, as well as medical treatment in conjunction with pregnancy and childbirth, unless the purpose of the trip is to receive these treatments. But for vital medical treatment that is only available through a specialised medical unit, authorisation in advance is required before the trip. This includes (but is not limited to)

 

(a) kidney dialysis;

(b) oxygen therapy;

(c) special asthma treatment;

(d) echocardiography in case of chronic autoimmune diseases;

(e) chemotherapy.

 

So some medical treatments that used to be available under the EHIC scheme will after 31 December 2020 only be available if the relevant State (the UK or EU Member State) gives prior authorisation. This will be the case, for instance, for UK patients accessing kidney dialysis in EU Member States. As far as I am aware, the UK has not yet indicated whether it will authorise such treatments, or under what conditions.

 

As in EU law, there is scope for authorisation of medical treatment in another State under the Agreement. The UK used this provision infrequently when it was an EU Member State. Some Member States, eg Malta, rely on it significantly. If authorised, there is an obligation on the healthcare institution of the place to which the person authorised travels to provide the medical treatment authorised as if the person was insured in that State (Article SSC.18). There is also, as in EU law, in effect an obligation to grant authorisation ‘where the treatment in question is among the benefits provided for by the legislation in the State where the person concerned resides and where that person cannot be given such treatment within a time limit which is medically justifiable, taking into account their current state of health and the probable course of their illness’ (Article SSC.18). This provision also gives entitlements to family members of the ‘insured person’. There is provision for if the family members and the insured person reside in different States.

 

This provision (the ‘S2’ in EU law, Regulation 883/2004, Article 20) is used relatively infrequently between Great Britain and the EU, but several hundred people a year do rely on it to receive health care across the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The question of whether a time limit before which someone receives treatment is ‘medically justifiable’ is obviously contentious. When the UK was an EU Member State, EU law was used to seek judicial review of this question, and a number of English NHS Hospital Trusts reduced waiting times for elective procedures such as hip replacements in response. Apparently there is ongoing litigation in Northern Ireland which seeks judicial review of the NHS there for breaching waiting time limits, in part relying on EU law. Given the COVID-19 context, we might see further attempts to use litigation before domestic courts in a similar way in the future – reliant on the domestic legislation implementing the Agreement, rather than the Agreement itself.

 

Article SSC.19 makes provision for those States which provide cash benefits for healthcare, rather than benefits in kind. This is the direct equivalent to the relevant provision of EU law (Regulation 883/2004, Article 21).

 

Implementation, Administrative Arrangements and Dispute Settlement

 

Annex SSC-7: Implementing Part sets out significant detail on the practicalities of implementing the parts of the Agreement on Coordination of Social Security. There is an obligation on the UK and the EU Member States to ‘provide or exchange all data necessary for establishing and determining the rights and obligations of persons to whom the Protocol applies’ and to do so ‘without delay’ (Article SSCI.2). A Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination is empowered to authorize – if it so decides – the use of the EU’s Electronic Exchange of Social Security Information for exchange of information. If this decision is taken, the rules applying to that system (which are rules of EU law) will apply (Article SSCI.4 (2)).

 

There is an obligation to make sure necessary information is made available, so that people concerned are able to assert their rights under the Protocol and Annex (Article SSCI.3 (1). Information must be forwarded, and documents issued, ‘without delay’ and in accordance with any time limits specified in national legislation (Article SSCI.3 (3)).

 

If a decision is made to refuse benefits, reasons must be given, and information communicated about remedies and time periods for appeals (Article SSCI.3 (3)).

 

Where there is a difference of views between States on what is the applicable legislation or on which is the competent state which is responsible for providing cash benefits or benefits in kind (eg medical treatment), there is an obligation under the Agreement to provisionally apply the legislation of one State (Article SSCI.6 (1) and (2)). For determining applicable legislation, this State is the state where the person actually pursues employment or self-employment, if there is such a state; or the state of residence if the person concerned pursues employment or self-employment in two or more States and performs part of their activity or activities in the State of residence, or if the person concerned is neither employed nor self-employed. In all other cases, it is the State to which a claim was first made, if the person pursues an activity, or activities, in two or more States.  For determining the competent state, the legislation of the person’s place of residence applies or, if that person does not reside on the territory of one of the States concerned, that person is provisionally entitled to the benefits provided for by the legislation applied by the institution to which the request was first submitted.

 

These provisions mean that people should not be left in limbo while complex cases are decided.

 

There is provision for bilateral procedures between States to depart from those in the Annex, provided that they do not have an adverse effect on people’s rights (Article SSCI.8). The bilateral procedures have to be notified to the Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination and listed in the Appendix SSCI-1, thus securing (at least some) transparency. Any pre-existing bilaterals serving the same or similar purposes to the social security provisions in the Agreement will continue to apply, but they must also be listed in Appendix SSCI-1.

 

Finally, the Agreement includes provisions for a Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination, which addresses matters covered by Heading Four of Part Two and the Protocol on Social Security Coordination (Article 8(1)(p), previously INST.2 (p)); and for Parliamentary Cooperation and participation of civil society (Articles 11-14, previously INST.5 to INST.7).  These will be important sites for scrutiny of compliance with the Agreement, any future divergence in interpretation of obligations, and (given that the role for an over-seeing court is non-existent) for legal contestation. It will be important to ensure that the UK Parliament, and, where appropriate the Parliaments in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales exercise oversight over executive powers; and to ensure that relevant NGOs are represented in the civil society processes.

 

Article 8(4) (previously INST.2 (2)) provides that Specialised Committees shall have the power to: (a) monitor and review the implementation and ensure the proper functioning of this Agreement or any supplementing agreement; … (c) adopt decisions, including amendments, and recommendations in respect of all matters where this Agreement or any supplementing agreement so provides or for which the Partnership Council has delegated its powers to a Specialised Committee in accordance with point (f) of Article 7(4) (previously INST.1(4) [Partnership Council]); (d) discuss technical issues arising from the implementation of this Agreement or any supplementing agreement; (e) provide a forum for the Parties to exchange information, discuss best practices and share implementation experience; (f) establish, supervise, coordinate and dissolve Working Groups; and (g) provide a forum for consultation pursuant to Article 738(7) (previously INST.13(7) [Consultations], in the Dispute Settlement provisions of Part Six).

 

The Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination will have power to make recommendations (which have no binding force) and decisions, by mutual consent: Article 10 (previously INST.4). Decisions adopted by the Specialised Committee on Social Security Coordination will have binding force on the Parties to the Agreement. The Committee will make decisions, for instance, on ‘the structure, content and format of forms and documents issued on behalf of the States for the purposes of implementing the Protocol’ (Annex SSC-7, Article SSCI.4 (1)). The Committee is tasked with reconciling differing points of view on ‘information provided by the persons concerned, the validity of a document or supporting evidence or the accuracy of the facts on which the particulars contained therein are based’ (Article SSCI.5 (4).

 

The Agreement’s general provisions on dispute settlement also apply to the social security coordination provisions (Article 735, previously INST.10: Scope), although not in individual cases (Article 735(5), previously INST.10(5)). Note that it's not possible, in the event of a successful complaint by one party about breach of the treaty, to retaliate by suspending the social security provisions (Article 749(3)(a), previously INST.24(3)(b)). This also applies to successful complaints about breaches of the withdrawal agreement (Article 749(4), previously INST.24(4)).  Other people will already have written about this – but the basic message here is that this is international law, not anything like EU law.

 

Conclusion

 

In summary, this is a significantly better settlement than No Deal at the end of transition would have been, from the point of view of people who relied on EU law to receive healthcare and medical treatment in the UK or an EU Member State.

 

For UK/EU residents, in the EU/UK access to healthcare continues on the same basis as national residents, as before. For visitors, a form of EHIC entitlements are preserved going forward.

 

What is different is the legal basis on which these rights are enjoyed, with corresponding implications for how rights are enjoyed and enforced. All will be well so long as the parties to the Agreement comply with their obligations under it.

 

* This post was amended on January 1, 2021, to add details about the absence of a power to suspend the social security provisions pursuant to the dispute settlement rules, on January 2, 2021 to add a link to the overview of the trade and cooperation agreement published on this blog, and on April 28, 2021 to refer to the revised Article numbers of the final TCA.   


Barnard & Peers: chapter 27

Photo credit: Health Europa





Wednesday, 26 June 2019

More majority voting on EU social policy? Assessing the Commission proposal




Ane Aranguiz, PhD Candidate, University of Antwerp

On 16 April 2019 the Commission launched the discussion on how to render decision-making process at EU level more efficient in the social field by activating the passerelle clauses and moving from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) and from special to ordinary legislative procedure without undergoing an unwieldly process of Treaty reforms – although a unanimous vote of Member States is still necessary to approve this change.

The passerelle clauses are part of a number of ‘flexibility mechanisms’ introduced by the Lisbon Treaty that allow to simplify the decision-making process thereby enabling a more efficient exercise of EU competences where special legislative procedure and unanimity are maintained. The Lisbon Treaty provides for a general passerelle clause enshrined in Article 48(7) TEU that is applicable to all policy areas -with the exception of military or defence-related decisions-, as well as specific passerelle clauses that apply only in certain policy areas, namely, Article 32(3) TEU on Common Foreign and Security Policy, Article 82(3) TFEU on judicial cooperation in civil matters, Article 153(2) TFEU on social policy,  Article 192(2) TFEU on environmental policy and Article 312(2) TFEU on the Multiannual Financial Framework.

Background

This Communication is the last of a series of four aiming at reviewing the passerelle clauses provided for the EU Treaties as envisioned by President Juncker in his 2018 State of the Union address. In September 2018, the Commission presented the first proposal on common foreign and security policy, followed by a communication in January 2019 on taxation. In April 2019, the Commission presented the last two proposals first on energy and climate and later on social policy. (None of these proposals has been followed up by the Member States yet).

In social policy, most areas where the EU has competence to act are already subject to QMV and ordinary legislative procedure, which has allowed for an expansion of the social acquis at the EU level over the years. Yet, a reduced but significant number of areas of social policy still require unanimity among EU Member States and a special legislative procedure. These areas include measures relating to the protection against dismissal, social representation and defence of workers’ and employer’s interests, conditions of employment for third-country legal residents, non-discrimination (based on gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation) and social security and social protection for workers outside cross-border situations.

The specific passerelle clause under Article 153(2) would allow for the transition of the first three areas, whereas the general passerelle could further be applied to the latter two. Differences remain between the general and specific passerelle clauses regarding the procedural requirements for their activation. In order to activate the general clause, the European Council has to take the initiative and indicate the precise envisaged change in the decision-making procedure and notify national parliaments, which have up to six months to object to the proposal. After that, the European Council may, by unanimity and once consent by the European Parliament has been obtained, adopt the decision authorising the Council to act by QMV or enabling the adoption of the corresponding measures by ordinary legislative procedure. This procedure allows also for the half-way activation of the clause where they move from unanimity to QMV while maintaining the special legislative procedure. The activation of the specific passerelle clause, differently, is ‘only’ subject to unanimous agreement in the Council on the basis of a proposal by the Commission and after consultation with the Parliament.

According to the Commission, other than the fact that these policy areas might have major implications on the financial equilibrium of the national welfare systems, a limitation specifically provided for in Article 153(4)TFEU, there is seemingly no logical reasons that explain why these fields remain subject to unanimity and special legislative procedure. Consequently, in December 2018 the Commission presented its roadmap for the proposal for more efficient law-making in social policy and opened the feedback period that collected 27 opinions from different stakeholders.

The Communication

The Communication opens the debate on the enhanced use of QMV and ordinary legislative procedure with the aim of rendering the decision-making process more timely, flexible and efficient.

The Communication emphasizes that while the activation of the passerelle clause would change the decision-making method, it would not alter the overall EU legal framework and earmarked that EU measures are still subject to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the limitations under the social policy title Article 153 TFEU regarding, inter alia, defining fundamental principles of social security or the specifically excluded areas of the right to association, the right to strike and the right to impose lockouts.

Further in the Communication, the Commission discusses the possibility of activating the passerelle clause in the five areas where unanimity and special legislative procedure is still required. Yet, the Commission concludes that only in two out of the five areas the activation of the would passerelle clause have an added value. Firstly, the Commission argues in favour of the use of the passerelle clause in the field of non-discrimination to facilitate equal protection against discrimination that guarantees an effective redress mechanism for all. Particularly, the Commission states that while there is certain level of protection for gender and racial discrimination in employment, equal treatment on the grounds of belief, disability, age and sexual orientation remains protected only in employment and occupation. The Commission considers necessary to address the inconsistent and incoherent EU legal framework where some individuals are better protected than others. (Note that a Commission proposal in this field from 2008 has not yet been agreed).

The Commission also sees suitable to activate the general passerelle clause with regard to social security and social protection of workers for the adoption of recommendations in the near future. The Commission here recalls the recently politically agreed recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed which is still pending for final adoption, and considers that a more effective decision-making process is desired to support the process of modernisation and convergence of national social protection systems.

Nevertheless, as for the other three fields where unanimity and special legislative procedure is required, namely, protection against dismissals, employment conditions of third-country nationals and the representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, the Commission does not see fit to activate the passerelle clause due to either the limitations envisioned in the Treaty, the sufficiency of the existing legislation or the strong links and diversity between national social protection systems.

Commentary

The proposal put forward by the Commission should be given a cautious welcome. From a positive standpoint, the fact that most of social policy fields where the EU has competence require QMV and unanimity is required only in few domains leads to an uneven a fragmented development of the social acquis. Moving from unanimity to QMV in those limited areas allows for a swiftly and effective policy response in all areas of EU law and prevents one single Member State from vetoing social initiatives while still requiring a high degree of consensus. Secondly, transitioning to an ordinary legislative procedure allows for highlighting the role of the European Parliaments as a co-decision making. While the special legislative procedure relegates the role of the European Parliament to the subordinated position of a mere consultant, in ordinary legislative procedures the European Parliament becomes an equal to the Council and allows for a more democratic decision-making process where the direct beneficiaries are being represented. The activation of passerelle clauses in the social field would therefore not only avoid blockage by a single Member State, but also give the European Parliament a real co-legislator role. Considering the obstacles faced in the adoption of social policy legal instruments due to the lack of consensus in the Council, an active involvement of the usually more socially progressive European Parliament, is likely to free the decision-making process in social matters to a certain extent.

Yet, there are a number of points of concern. To begin with, the activation of the passerelle clause is only envisioned for two out of the five social policy areas that still require unanimity and the special legislative procedure. Moreover, these are the exact same two that cannot rely on the special passerelle clause under Article 153(2) but must be based on the general provision under Article 48(7) which, in turn, requires a much stricter procedural formula. On top of this, one of the two fields, namely social security and social protection of workers, is only contemplated with regard to the adoption of recommendations, thus disregarding the possibility to adopt binding instruments. This is particularly striking when considering the challenges faced recently by the Commission in the formulation of a measure for access to social protection of workers and self-employed, where the Commission inclined for a proposal for a recommendation due to the lack of political support to adopt a binding instrument by Member States.

The activation of the passerelle clause is clearly a positive development, yet, the fact that this is such a limited activation is highly regrettable. Continued fragmentation on social policy may moreover lead to the use of enhanced cooperation, where Member States might separately agree on social policy instruments for higher protection of their citizens. Yet, this will unquestionably result in a two-speed Europe between those Members within and out the enhanced cooperation framework.

The dynamism of the Commission in the context of the European Pillar of Social Rights provides the perfect platform to keep adapting, updating and adopting new social legislation at the EU level thus aligning EU law with the social priorities identified by Juncker’s Commission. If, and this is a big if, the discussion opened by the Commission leads to activating the passerelle clause (even if only limitedly), it will in all likelihood lead to new proposals by the Commission tackling non-discrimination in a more comprehensive manner that could be adopted in a more efficient manner. However, this will fundamentally depend on whether or not the next Commission resumes the enthusiastic social activism of the Juncker delegation.

Yet, if the Pillar is indeed the last chance for social Europe that many have claimed, this initiative represents a missed opportunity to render effectiveness in the decision-making process in social policy by closing the door to facilitating measures tackling clear gaps on the current EU legislation, most clearly with regard to protection against dismissals. It is equally regrettable the choice to limit the use of the passerelle clause to adopt a binding unified response to the inadequacies of our current social protection systems. In times of increased Euroscepticism and rising non-standard forms of employment, providing a response to concrete needs of citizens remains an imperative for future-proving the EU, therefore, it is in the best interest of the same to remove any obstructions of the use of Union competences that allow to move closer to an actual social market economy. At the very least, this initiative embodies the intention to partially unclog the ‘way’ when there is certain degree of ‘will’.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 20
Photo credit: The Independent

Monday, 17 June 2019

The European Labour Authority: a Brand New EU Agency in Bratislava




Bartłomiej Bednarowicz, PhD Researcher at the Faculty of Law of the University of Antwerp

Background

On Thursday, the Council decided that Bratislava will host the headquarters of a brand new EU agency: the European Labour Authority (ELA). The idea for the ELA was spelt out by President Juncker already in September 2017 in his annual State of the Union address. Juncker viewed ELA’s main mission to ensure EU labour mobility in a simple and effective manner and to strengthen fairness and trust in the internal market. Interestingly, the proposal to establish the ELA rolled out of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) and was presented as a part of the Social Fairness Package, together with a proposal for a Directive on transparent and predictable working conditions in the EU (adopted by the Council on the very same day as the Regulation establishing the ELA; see discussion of the Directive here), a proposal for a Council Recommendation for access to social protection for workers and the self-employed and a Commission Communication on the monitoring on the implementation of the EPSR.

In a speedy manner, in March 2018 the Commission put forward a legislative proposal to establish the European Labour Agency and on Valentine’s Day in 2019, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council reached a provisional agreement and changed the name from Agency to Authority. Finally, in June 2019, the Council adopted the proposal for a Regulation and selected Slovakia to host the Authority. The ELA is to start its operations in October 2019 already in Brussels and is expected to reach its full operational capacity in Bratislava by 2024. [Update: the Regulation was published in the EU Official Journal in July 2019]

Competences

Pursuant to the Regulation establishing the ELA, the main objective of the Authority is to assist the Member States and the Commission in their effective application and enforcement of EU law related to labour mobility across the EU and the coordination of social security systems. The ELA has the mandate to act only within the scope of selected EU acts in the framework of: posting of workers, free movement of workers, social security coordination, social aspects of road transport and cooperation between the Member States to tackle undeclared work. This catalogue remains closed but can be extended on a basis of any future acts that confer tasks on the Authority. More importantly, to maintain its mandate, the ELA is to neither affect any rights or obligations of individuals or employers that are granted by either EU or national laws, nor the mandate of national authorities responsible for enforcement in these fields.

Furthermore, in order to attain its primary objective, the ELA has been fitted with some additional tasks. Firstly, it is to facilitate access to information on rights and obligations regarding labour mobility across the EU as well as to relevant services. Secondly, it is to promote and enhance cooperation between the Member States in the enforcement of relevant EU law across the Union, including facilitating concerted and joint inspections. Thirdly, it is to mediate and help to look for a solution in cases of cross-border disputes between the Member States. Finally, it is to support cooperation in tackling undeclared work.

Organisation and the seat selection

The European Labour Authority will have a permanent structure comprising of a Management Board (including representatives of the Member States, Commission, European Parliament and social partners), an Executive Director and a Stakeholder Group with purely advisory functions (including representatives of the Commission and social partners). On top of that, the Authority aims at being made up of around 140 staff members, some of them seconded from the Member States. In addition, there will be one national liaison officer seconded from each Member State who will facilitate the cooperation and exchange of information between the Authority and her Member State. The Executive Director, on the other hand, will be appointed for a five-year term by the Management Board from a list of candidates proposed by the Commission, following an open and transparent selection procedure including a hearing before the European Parliament. Finally, the Commission is willing to secure approximately €50 million for the Authority’s annual budget.

As for its seat, 4 Member States competed in the selection process: Slovakia, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Latvia. The Council, in a rather transparent way, steered the selection process and published on its website all the offers prepared by the governments. Then, the European Commission assessed the offers based on the geographical balance, accessibility of the location, availability of the proposed premises and overall city’s readiness to accommodate the needs of international staff. At the Council meeting convoked on 13 June 2019, 23 Member States voted in favour of the Regulation establishing the Authority with its seat in Bratislava, 3 voted against (Austria, Hungary and Sweden) and 2 abstained (Czechia and Poland). Admittedly, it will be the very first EU agency to be located in Slovakia that advertised itself with a rather dull slogan ‘ELA in Slovakia, a good idea’. At least, the ELA’s staff will enjoy the state-of-the-art L12 building at the ‘Eurovea City’ in Bratislava and a stunning view on the Danube river.

Comments

An idea for a (pan)-European labour inspectorate has been considered for a long time as simply ‘the wishful thinking’ of some social partners, especially workers organisations. It also has never really attracted a lot of attention, as the Commission feared scoring an own goal due to a lack of the Member States’ support to set up such an agency in the first place. However, the Juncker Commission has finally put the social rights back at the EU agenda and proposed a rather breakthrough initiative in a dazzling form of the European Pillar of Social Rights. The Commission has already delivered quite plenty on the Pillar and mainstreamed many fruitful debates surrounding the social aspects of employment that under the years of austerity and flexicurity have been put aside. The Authority indeed emanates from the EPSR and aligns well with the accompanying proposals presented by the Commission within a broad framework of European Union cross-border employment and the Social Fairness Package.

The potential of the Authority cannot be surely underestimated. Its main advantages can be summarised in three aspects. Firstly, in the field of legal issues of international employment, it will provide the national authorities with some valid operational and technical support, mostly to exchange information, develop some best practices, carry out inspections and also to settle any disputes. Bridging the information and cooperation gap between the Member States is indeed a noble objective and quite a desired one as well. In practice, it is often the case that national authorities are unable to facilitate dialogue with each other and exchange information due to the complex and lengthy internal procedures and the language barrier. Having national liaison officers from all Member States designated to be at the ELA’s disposal will definitely plug that gap and speed things up. Moreover, some national authorities might not have even dreamed of an ability of concerted and joint inspections, which is now a powerful tool in the ELA’s arsenal, subject however, to reaching an agreement between the Authority and the concerned Member State(s).

Secondly, what the enforcement of EU employment and social security law often lacked at national level, were synergies with the already existing EU agencies that would allow to rely on their expertise in areas such as health and safety at work, the management of an undertaking that is being restructured, skills forecasting or tackling undeclared work. Therefore, it is the ELA’s task to facilitate it all to untap the available potential and to strengthen the enforcement levels.

Finally, the Authority will simplify cooperation by integrating a number of existing committees and networks amongst the Member States which will hopefully lead to eliminating fragmentation in that area.

On the other hand, the Authority will definitely not serve as a panacea for all the flaws in the system. The role it will play mostly depends on how active the ELA with its Executive Director decides to be. There is a considerable room to be claimed by the Authority with some space for manoeuvre, but there are some open-ended questions as well. Sceptics and pragmatics may wonder how willing some of the national authorities will be to cooperate within the ELA’s network and agree to, for example, conduct inspections on their territory, which can expose the flaws of their own systems on an EU scale. It is also unsure whether the Member States known for a rather lenient approach towards social security laws will deem it in their best interest to assist ELA with the fight against fraud and abuse on their territories, as no such obligation arises. For them, it could mean the end of their competitive advantage of providing a legal framework for cheaper labour through foxy constructions such as letterbox companies.

Examples from the field of social security coordination and the experience with the Administrative Commission, a body comprising of government representatives, capable of reviewing cases of social fraud between the Member States, do not necessarily instil optimism. The number of successful outcomes of such cases is rather scarce and some national authorities are giving up on the Administrative Commission and often try to take matters in their own hands. Essentially, they reach out on their behalf to the institutions in the other Member States mostly without any tangible end-effects. Moreover, the Authority’s tasks might overlap with those of the Administrative Commission, which was a major point of discussion during the negotiations about the ELA. The exact tasks division, despite indicated as ‘without prejudice’, might prove to be more problematic to delineate and can lead to duplication and competence battles. It is also doubtful how effective the Authority can really be and police the EU labour mobility market consisting of approximately 17 million EU-movers with rather modest resources of 140 staff.

To conclude, as for now, the Authority has baby teeth. It will be up to its adopted strategy, action plans and frankly, leadership to make sure that it will eventually get real teeth. The ELA has definitely promising potential but it remains to be seen how it will be utilised and how big of a dossier can it claim and handle. The expectations are high so we should all give the European Labour Authority a big leap of faith and wait for its very first results.

Barnard & Peers: chapter 20
Photo credit: www.landererova12.sk