You'll Miss It When It's Gone (Iran Deal Edition)

The UN Security Council today declined to extend an arms embargo against Iran, over furious protests by the United States, Israel, and Arab Gulf States. The main opponents of the arms embargo were, naturally, Russia and China. But several European nations -- France, Germany, and the UK -- expressed hesitation, claiming that the United States was no longer in a position to credibly push for sanctions on Iran after it withdrew from the JCPOA (aka "the Iran Deal").

Fancy that. And speaking of the JCPOA, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, in its own statement denouncing the UNSC's vote, urged that Security Council consider implementing the JCPOA's "snapback" provisions as an alternative means of blocking Iran from advancing its nuclear weapons program. An interesting idea -- if only a certain country hadn't detonated the JCPOA framework! It's almost like the Iran Deal contained important leverage and hard-won commitments even from countries not otherwise inclined to care about Iranian aggression, and when the United States unilaterally abandoned the deal we lost a ton of international credibility that we can't easily earn back.

Many, many people warned against the reckless decision to back out of the JCPOA, precisely on the grounds that doing so would ruin the ability of the United States to credibly pursue any sort of robust diplomatic containment strategy against Iran going forward. And now we're seeing the real fruits of the Trump administration's decision. Way back when the Iran Deal was initially being debated, I noted that one of the most persuasive arguments I read in its favor was the experts who observed that every time we reject or abandon an "Iran deal", the one we're able to get two or three years later is far worse than the one we left behind. The common cycle is a deal is proposed, conservatives say "how dare you give everything away to the terrorist regime of Iran", we abandon the deal, and then next time around ... we're in an even worse negotiating posture than we were before and what once looked like "giving everything away" now is an unattainable fantasy.

We are, as always, apparently doomed to keep reliving history. Heckuva job, Trumpie.

The West Coast is the Best (Target for a North Korean Nuclear Apocalypse) Coast

After many wonderful travels around the country to see family and friends -- in Fort Walton Beach, in Coral Gables, in Boca Raton, and in Chicago -- I'm now finally back home in Berkeley, California to begin the year 2018.

These travels make me miss my own time living in the middle of the country. Less because Chicago is so much better than the Bay Area (though it is), and more because Chicago is far less likely to be incinerated in an atomic holocaust after the President of the United States decided to get into a Twitter war with North Korea over who has a "bigger" nuclear button.

Anyway, Happy New Year!

I'm a Celebrity! Roundup

I've been busy basking in the glow of my status as a big magazine contributor. That means that I haven't had as much time to do regular blogging as I'd like, and that means it's time for a roundup.

* * *

* Kim Davis, the Kentucky clerk who refuses to issue marriage licenses to gay couples and has defied court orders requiring her to fulfill her official duties, has been jailed for contempt of court. Will any Republican candidate take a stand for the rule of law here? I can actually respect -- to some degree -- someone whose deeply-felt personal beliefs require them to abstain from certain public activities. But the right choice in such a circumstance is to resign from office, not to demand a public salary while obstructing the law.

* The ADL, incidentally, has just issued a statement that gets this issue 100% right. Good on them.

* Former Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin has a great column up on the threat post by extremist Jewish settlers. Unlike him, though, I'd rather we not "wait for it to get worse so that it might get better."

* Wouldn't it be hilarious if, after all the sound and fury on the American side, it was Iran's parliament that rejected the deal? Actually, that outcome would probably be the single best thing that could happen for the anti-deal conservatives here in America.

* Dan Drezner urges that Political Science not emulate Economics. Hear, hear (says the political theorist)!

* Local news, but semi-important: Rep. John Kline (R-MN) will not seek reelection. Kline was my representative during college (he represents the area south of the Twin Cities), and his district is trending towards the Democrats. But Kline himself was pretty well-entrenched, so his departure is a big boost to Democratic pickup chances.

* Oh, one more: Virginia Postrel on what's actually driving stressed over-achievers at elite universities. It's not crass desire for fame or materialism, and it's not pushy caricatured Tiger Parents.

* Fine, two more. Shorter PJ Media: If Hillary Clinton is elected, conservatives will break every law that they possibly can and possibly launched an armed revolution. This reflects poorly on Hillary Clinton.

King of the Ash

AIPAC chief Howard Kohr, who spearheaded the failed push to block the Iran Deal in Congress, visits a Maryland synagogue:

Kohr’s final appeal is for the activists to make the calls to their lawmakers not because they will win — but because they will be able to tell future generations that they did the right thing.

He praises congregants who brought their children to the event, as the kids scamper through the aisles. By making the calls to Congress, Kohl says, they can look into their children’s eyes now and for generations to come and say, “When American interests were jeopardized and when Israel’s existence was at stake, I did everything that I could to ensure that America, the greatest country on earth, stood at Israel’s side.”

There's some irony here, as if AIPAC is to be believed once this deal goes through there won't be a future generation of Jews to be told about "doing the right thing". The Israel and, perhaps, the entire western world will have dissolved in a cloud of Iranian-induced radioactive ash (thanks, Obama). By contrast, precisely because Kohl imagines we'll could be having this conversation in 20 years' time implies that the deal actually worked largely as its proponents promised.*

* Yes, yes, none of this is technically true -- not the least of which because Israel could be destroyed while American Jewry remained untouched. But in such a horrifying event, I'd hope that our main communal response wouldn't be to say "I told you so."

Second Blush Thoughts on the Iran Deal

On Facebook, I noted that I was working hard to not have an opinion on the Iran deal, because I knew nothing about it and shouldn't come to a conclusion simply via rote mimicry of ideological cohorts. It was observed by a friend, though, that one of my God-given rights as an American is to "have an opinion based on nothing and then broadcast it publicly through as many channels as possible". And as a blogger, I try my best to live by that credo.

I should start by saying that I have not read the deal itself. This is because the technical characteristics of the deal probably wouldn't mean that much to me, and in particular they'd mean nothing out of context (specifically, the context of feasible alternatives). The sources I read to educate myself include Tom Friedman's interview with the President, Jeffrey Goldberg, AIPAC, Marc Goldberg, David Adesnik, Max Fisher's interview with arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis (highly recommended), Douglas Murray, and of course the metric ton of commentary folks have been blasting all across Facebook for the past few days. Here, then, is where I'm at now.

(1) Obviously, the deal can't be evaluated against an ideal world where America stands steely-eyed and strong and Iran capitulates to everything our heart's desire. One makes deals with autocratic regimes pursuing nuclear weapons under less-than-ideal circumstances -- that comes with the territory. Likewise, we can't evaluate the deal based on what we could have gotten 10 years ago. Assessing this deal is a comparative exercise -- how does reaching this accord compare to either no deal or another deal that could be realistically obtained now?

(2) This deal clearly has its eye on one thing and one thing only: slowing down Iran getting a nuclear weapon. It doesn't care about ending Iranian terrorism. It doesn't care about liberalizing the country. It doesn't care about rectifying the nation's many, many human rights abuses. All of these things are important, but they're not the subject of this deal (and were not, realistically, going to be improved by any deal). I have heard the argument that lifting the sanctions will nudge Iran in a more conciliatory direction, but I'm highly dubious. I'm also inclined to agree that the cash flow it is about to see stemming from the sanctions relief will redound to the benefit of the various terrorist groups Iran likes to fund.

(3) I am unconvinced that there was a "better deal to be made". As far as I've seen there were essentially two mechanisms America supposedly had for exerting more leverage over Tehran: continuing the current regime of exceptionally tight sanctions, or military strikes. The former doesn't work: The current sanctions regime was unsustainable -- the only way we got countries like Russia and China (and arguably even the EU) onboard with tighter sanctions was in service of getting a deal. If no deal was in sight, most of our international allies would have walked away from the sanctions and we'd be left with nothing. The military option is risky for a host of reasons; it might not work, it definitely will prompt retaliation, it definitely would be a diplomatic catastrophe for the United States in forums far afield from Iran, and it definitely will result in blowback that we really don't need. Robert Farley has long convinced me that the ability of pure airpower to bend other countries to our will is overstated, and the more resources we invest in ensuring that the military operation is successful, the more we risk being mired in yet another intractable Middle Eastern conflict.

(4) Indeed, one thing that Lewis said in his piece -- which, again, is the most informative of all the ones I read -- really stuck out for me. It's that "[e]very six months, the deal we could have gotten six months before looks better. Every time we tried to hold out for a better deal, and every time we got in the position of a worse deal." That dates back to the Bush administration, so this isn't a case of weak Obama being weak and not leading with leadership. The fact is the trendlines haven't been good for awhile now, and experientially speaking trying to get a "better deal" has only made things worse. To quote Lewis again:

I was talking to a colleague who is unhappy [with the deal], and it's kind of fascinating. He's unhappy because, he said, "We spent eight years, and the deal we got is not better than the deal we could have gotten eight years ago." And it's like, oh, no kidding. That's not an indictment of the deal, my friend, it's an indictment of eight years of fucking around. [...]

I would give [this deal] an A....[Now, c]ompared to the deal we could have gotten 10 years ago, if the Bush administration hadn't had their heads up their butts? Not an A! That would have been a great deal!

I remember when they had 164 centrifuges, in one cascade, and I said, "You know what, we should let them keep it in warm standby. No uranium, just gas." And people were like, "You're givin' away the store!"

In short, I think opponents of this deal bear a heavy burden of persuasion as to why this time things will be different. And for me at least, they haven't met that burden. I agree with Jeffrey Goldberg that "The dirty little secret of this whole story is that it is very difficult to stop a large nation that possesses both natural resources and human talent, and a deep desire for power, from getting the bomb."

(5) On the particular metric of "slowing down Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon" -- which again, is clearly the only thing the deal is concerned about -- it seems likely to be a net positive over other feasible alternatives. Lewis certainly seems to think so (including ranking it higher than the alternative of bombing Iran). A lot of the technical details of course mean nothing to me, both on the science side (what are the risks of the technology Iran is allowed to keep) and on the logistical side (is 24 days lead time for inspections a lot or a little?). That said, I don't think the deal's efficacy depends on Iran suddenly not being a power-hungry illiberal reactionary autocracy. The "snapback" provisions seem pretty robust and offer ample opportunities for western states to punish Iran for cheating (or suspected cheating). And notably, these provisions can kick in without assent by China or Russia, who are the players whose commitment is most dodgy.

(6) All of that said, I still have a serious concern, although it's an idiosyncratic one that maybe is only shared by me. One way of thinking about this deal is that it trades reduced Iranian nuclear capabilities (via inspections, etc.) for increased Iranian ability to sponsor terror (because of the cash infusion it will get when the sanctions are lifted). And my quite unique position is that I always thought that Iran getting a nuclear weapon was always exaggerated on the threat scale. Nuclear weapons are and have been easily deterrable via conventional modes of statecraft. Even countries which hate each other (like the US and the USSR) pulled it off for decades. And even if one thinks Iran is so entirely suffused with millennarian impulses with respect to Israel that it would risk itself being wiped off the map via an Israeli nuclear counterstrike, it's difficult to imagine that it would risk harming its own holy sites in Jerusalem. By contrast, Iran's sponsorship of terror organizations like Hezbollah has been a thicket that normal diplomatic statecraft has not been able to satisfactorily resolve. Hence, a trade that reduces the former risk while amplifying the latter strikes me as exactly backwards. This may explain why all major elements of the Israeli polity -- including the liberal opposition -- don't like the deal. It strengthens Iran on pretty much all axes save nuclear weaponry (of course it does -- that's what makes it a deal. Iran gives something -- ability to quickly get a nuclear weapon -- to get something -- increased resource access. Outside fantasies where America Green Lanterns Iran into a total capitulation, that was always going to be the result), and Israel quite reasonably doesn't want to see Iran strengthened. And of course, Israel will bear the brunt of an Iran more capable to fund its proxies in Syria, Lebanon, and around the Middle East.

(7) So if I was to argue against the deal, that would be my point of attack: it weakens Iran along a threat dimension whose danger was overstated at the expense of strengthening Iran along a threat dimension whose danger is understated. Yet ultimately, that argument seems more of a general criticism of misplaced global priorities than it is a specific criticism of this deal. Assuming I'm right that the sanctions would have been unsustainable absent a deal, the choice was never "weakened terror Iran/strengthened nuclear Ian versus strengthened terror Iran/weakened nuclear Iran". The alternative to weakening Iran's nuclear capacities while relieving it of international sanctions was to strengthen Iran's nuclear capacities while relieving it of international sanctions. The lifting of sanctions was baked into the cake -- they knew it, and we knew it, and the only question was whether we could use the leverage we temporarily possessed to get a deal that accomplished the one, solitary goal it set out to accomplish. Based on my read, and what I've seen, I think that it did. The result is, to be sure, an Iran that will in many ways be more powerful and more dangerous in 2020 than it is in 2015. That's a security risk that will need to be dealt with in its own way. But it wasn't an eventuality that this deal, in these circumstances, was capable of forestalling.

Doing Anything for Iran

There is an old joke amongst academics, one that I guess is probably falling out of favor but which I still find funny, that goes as follows:

An attractive female student walks into her professor's office, closes the door, and walks suggestively toward him. "I'd do anything to get an A on the final exam," she says.

"Anything?" the professor asks, eyebrows raised.

"Anything." She replies.

"Would you even," the professor leans in, "study?"

I'm reminded of this joke when I think about Israel, Iran, and all those (Netanyahu being the most prominent) who insist that the Palestinian question is trivial and unimportant compared to the existential threat of a nuclear Iran. They keep saying how we need to do anything to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power. "Anything?" I want to ask. "Anything!" they thunder. "Would you even ... withdraw from settlements?" Of course not. That's a bridge too far.

The partisans in the crowd will no doubt insist the two issues should have nothing to do with one another. The President has, for his part, argued that Israel's continued settlement expansion is a major impediment in building global support for policies protective of Israel (such as, say, containing Iran). And he's made it quite clear that he could do a lot more for Israel vis-a-vis Iran if Israel did more for the Palestinians. Maybe he's being unfair. But if Iran really is the serious, eliminationist, existential threat that Netanyahu claims that it is (and I think there is ample reason to support that assessment), then it is more than a little unbecoming for him to put Israel at greater risk of utter annihilation to preserve a few outposts in a desert that everybody agrees should never have been built in the first place. It makes one think that maybe it's Israel that doesn't take the Iran threat as seriously as it should.

The other half of my frustration with conservative criticism of America's policy towards Iran is that I continue to have no sense about what alternative the conservatives think we should be pursuing (two years ago I mentioned how, just as the far-left has strained to figure out which side in the Syria conflict is "Zionist" so they know who to oppose, conservatives are straining to get a bead on what Obama's policy on Syria is so they can advocate the opposite). The Hudson Institute's Michael Doran penned a letter to my liberal Jewish friends that embodies the sin. Doran describes himself as a non-Jew who is an expert on middle east policy. His letter opens with a farcical claim that Obama suggests that his Jewish critics are exhibiting "dual loyalty"* and ends with an are-you-still-beating-your-wife question about whether Iran should "be the dominant power in the Middle East, and should we be helping it to become that power." In the middle is a lot of ventilation about how terrible America's policy has been towards Israel, Iran, and Syria, but not a hint about what we should be doing instead. Consider this passage:

The plain fact is that the United States is doing nothing to arrest the projection and expansion of Iranian power in the region; quite the contrary. In Lebanon, for example, Washington has cut funding for Shiite figures who remain independent of Iran’s proxy Hizballah. In Iraq, the United States, through the Iraqi armed forces, is actually coordinating with Iranian-backed militias and serving as their air force. Indeed, wherever one looks in the Middle East, one can observe an American bias in favor of, to say the least, non-confrontation with Iran and its allies.

The pattern is most glaring in Syria, where the president has repeatedly avoided conflict with Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s closest ally. The tendency surfaced again a few weeks ago in connection with mounting evidence that Assad has routinely attacked his own people with gas. If true, this fact should trigger a sharp American response in keeping with the president’s famous “red line” on the use of chemical weapons. But when questioned on this matter at a press conference, he contrived to find a loophole. Assad’s forces, he said, have been deploying chlorine gas, which “historically” has not been considered a chemical weapon.

We are "doing nothing to arrest" Iran's power projections. We have "avoided conflict" with Syria. We have a "bias" in favor of "non-confrontation." Well, how should we "confront" these countries? Missile strikes? Ground troops? A tactical nuclear strike? Something non-violent? Doran doesn't say. I leave Doran's article without even a smidgen of an idea of what alternative foreign policy he'd prefer, unless he really is just advocating an all-out regional war (I have to add here that complaining about Obama's ambivalent Syria policy without mentioning the complication that ISIS brings to the table is nothing short of shocking).

Ultimately, one suspects that the major factor determining whether the Iran deal is a success or a failure will be whether the international community is willing to put some teeth into enforcing it going forward. That, in turn, depends a lot about how willing the West is to go to the mat for Israel when the chips are down, and that no doubt depends on Israel's standing in the world. Which, to circle back, suggests that maybe Israel should trade what it claims to be the trivial, unimportant conflict to shore up its standing in the major, existential one. That's what one does if one really thinks all options should be on the table. One of those options is saying "in a world where we're on the cusp of having a hostile, nuclear armed regional power on our doorstep, we simply can't afford the diplomatic and security costs of occupying the West Bank anymore."

To be sure, I've read enough complaints about the Iran deal from enough parties I respect for me to believe that it is decidedly worse than ideal. If I could wave a magic wand, I'd no doubt craft a different deal. Of course, if I could wave a magic wand I'd convert Iran into a liberal pluralist democracy which respects all of its neighbors and is friends to all of the woodland creatures. One makes deals with autocratic regimes pursuing nuclear weapons under less-than-ideal circumstances -- that comes with the territory. What I haven't seen is any plan or proposal that would lead to a better deal (or any alternative to signing a deal that would lead to better results than not having one). The conservative refrain that we need to do "anything" to stop Iran from getting a bomb seems to boil down to either one thing (war) or nothing (if they reject war).

* The claim is farcical because Obama is quite adamant that he believes his policies are in Israel's interest and are reflective of Jewish values --as Doran concedes. We might disagree with Obama descriptively on both those points, but by framing the debate in that term he's obviously saying it is permissible and salutary for Jews to think in terms of their own values and sense of what is good for Israel, and that this is a permissible (indeed, valuable) form of deliberation. If anything, this is sterling refutation of the scurrilous dual loyalty charge.

Mushrooms Are Pretty

President Obama has issued a revision of when the US will use nuclear weaponry:

Mr. Obama’s strategy is a sharp shift from those of his predecessors and seeks to revamp the nation’s nuclear posture for a new age in which rogue states and terrorist organizations are greater threats than traditional powers like Russia and China. It eliminates much of the ambiguity that has deliberately existed in American nuclear policy since the opening days of the cold war. For the first time, the United States is explicitly committing not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, even if they attacked the United States with biological or chemical weapons or launched a crippling cyberattack. Those threats, Mr. Obama argued, could be deterred with “a series of graded options,” a combination of old and new conventional weapons. “I’m going to preserve all the tools that are necessary in order to make sure that the American people are safe and secure,” he said in the interview in the Oval Office.

For the past half-century, much of the world lived under the shadow of a nuclear threat -- the idea that we were a button-press away from global annihilation. The goal of many was to try and put the nuclear genie back in the bottle -- to forestall what to many seemed like an inevitable trek to self-imposed extinction. Basically, this new policy restricts (to the extent that a positivist statement of policy by an actor empowered to reverse that decision literally whenever he so choices can be a "restriction") the use of our nuclear arsenal to either (a) cases of nuclear attack or (b) states not a part of the NPT. But apparently, a substantial chunk of the population prefers a world where it is entirely unknown whether and when the US will unleash apocalyptic waves of destruction. The person who sent this to me said it made it wonder if Obama should be tried for "treason". Roger Simon inquires "Does he hate us? Does he hate this country?" Meanwhile, actual military policy expert Robert Farley notes that we are perfectly capable of projecting conventional deterrence through our massive conventional arms advantage. The threat to bring nukes to a chemical or biological weapons fight was never credible in the first place, both because of the difference in scale of destruction and because we can sufficiently deter through conventional means. Finally, as Whiskey Fire points out, the whole problem with the new form of threats we face (from terrorist organizations and other NGOs) is that we're skeptical of whether conventional deterrence postures work against them at all, dissipating the defensive force of nuclear weaponry.

Project Sapphire

The Washington Post reveals how the US got a half ton of highly enriched uranium out of Kazakhstan -- and away from nuclear proliferators.

It's one of those stories that puts some perspective on what really keeps America safe, day-to-day. It doesn't involve explosions, or Jack Bauer skull-cracking, or getting to put a terrorist's head on a pike. It's the subtler endeavors of recognizing a threat, and putting it to rest quietly, through communication, intelligence, and coordination.

It doesn't make headlines, but LGM is right: it's a classic example of a big foreign policy victory after the Cold War.

Time To See Who's Been Naughty....

...and who's been naughty!

Russia names its latest Nuclear Ballistic Missile sub the St. Nicholas.