Assessing AIPAC's Victories

Last night, Rep. Haley Stevens soundly defeated fellow incumbent Rep. Andy Levin in a D-on-D Michigan primary matchup. The race drew significant attention in the Jewish community because of the gobs of money AIPAC spent seeking to oust Levin and support Stevens. Levin earned AIPAC's ire because he is a vigorous proponent of America taking more robust steps to protect a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine -- including steps which entail places checks on Israeli government policies which place that solution in jeopardy. While I endorsed Levin, I want to be clear that I harbor no ill-will towards Haley Stevens, whom I also like and have zero qualms supporting in the 2022 general.

In any event, as the primary season nears its conclusion, it is fair to say that AIPAC's initial foray into direct candidate advocacy has been relatively successful. So far, it has notched ten victories against two defeats in the Democratic primaries it has substantially invested in. To be fair, that figure is a bit misleading, as in many of the races AIPAC either was backing a candidate who already came in as a favorite, or were in relatively low-salience open-seat races where AIPAC's firehose of cash swamped the field. For example, Stevens entered the race against Levin as the substantial favorite -- more of her old turf than Levin's was placed in the new district they both ran in, and she is generally regarded as a better and more natural campaigner than Levin. Indeed, my hot take was that Stevens probably would've bested Levin even without AIPAC's giant cash infusion. But certainly, AIPAC probably is relatively happy with its performance thus far.

What AIPAC bought with its investment into the Stevens campaign was the ability to write a narrative. It's hoping the political message taken from Stevens' victory includes lessons like "pro-Israel is good politics" or "supporting conditioning aid on Israel is a sucker's bet in Democratic politics." Needless to say, AIPAC's critics are hard at work resisting these narratives and trying to spin out others of their own ("AIPAC is a vector for letting GOP billionaires take over Democratic politics"). Meanwhile, as in nearly all races of this sort, the national attention on the race (centered on Israel/Palestine) almost certainly had relatively little impact on the local considerations that drive votes one way or another. At the end of the day, Stevens won her old turf, Levin won his old turf, but the new portions of the districts, formerly represented by Rep. Brenda Lawrence, went to Stevens -- who had Lawrence's endorsement. The actual lessons may not be much more complicated than that.

I want to do my best to separate wheat from chaff here. There are lessons to be drawn from AIPAC's victories this primary season. Though not every ecstatic claim of AIPAC supporters can be borne out, they have proven some lessons true.

At the most basic level, AIPAC's argument is that its primary victories show that Democratic voters support its version of "pro-Israel" politics. Yet this, I will suggest, remains unproven. As much as it has spent on these races, AIPAC has been notorious for virtually never speaking about Israel or Israel-policy in its advertisements or promotions of its preferred candidates. This suggests that it doesn't think that issue is necessarily a winner for them.

However, it does seem true that running against AIPAC's policies is not a winning strategy in most Democratic primaries. This is, perhaps, another "Twitter is not real-life" lesson -- the excitement and enthusiasm one sees online for a candidate who "stands up to the Israel Lobby" is not reflected in on-the-ground political performance. While it's unclear that voters affirmatively value AIPAC-style "pro-Israel" politics, it's quite evident that they don't find even Levin-style two-stateism to be a major political motivator. Similarly, it seems pretty clear that -- as of right now at least -- AIPAC has not faced any substantial backlash from Democratic voters for backing insurrectionist Republicans. A Democratic candidate who is viewed as "the pro-life candidate" is toxic in a 2022 Democratic primary. A Democratic candidate who is viewed as "the AIPAC candidate" isn't. This might change over time -- I suspect there is quite a bit of festering ill-will towards AIPAC amongst many Democratic Party actors that is waiting for an opportunity to burst forth -- but right now, AIPAC's position is secure.

It's also worth noting, in the context of right-wing Jews crowing about Levin's defeat to Stevens, that AIPAC's success does seem to decisively falsify the alarmist and opportunist narrative that the Democratic Party is being "taken over" by anti-Israel forces, that such positions are the new normal or mainstream in Democratic political life, and so on. To be clear, I find it repulsive to argue that Andy Levin in any way represents an "anti-Israel" position. But the point is one cannot simultaneously promote all of AIPAC's successes in Democratic primaries while also saying that the true soul of the Democratic Party is irreducibly hostile to Israel.

I also do think it's fair to say that AIPAC has reestablished some of its perhaps decayed deterrent effect. Democrats know that if they get on AIPAC's bad side, it can and will dump vast sums of money into ousting them from office. And by the same token, if they play ball with AIPAC they can access those same sums for themselves. That's a powerful inducement.

That said, the question of how AIPAC's interventions will affect political decision-making by prospective Democratic politicians on Israel is more complicated than might appear at first blush. I do think that, on average, a lesson that will be learned by many mainstream Democrats is "don't get on AIPAC's bad side", and to that end will result in more Democrats taking up AIPAC-friendly positions. Those positions include nominal support for a two-state solution -- AIPAC does that too -- so long as that support doesn't take the form of ever asking for any pressure on Israel or demands that America use its leverage to pushback against Israeli decisions that are destructive to the possibility of eventually establishing a Palestinian state. However, I also think that AIPAC has also paradoxically opened space for at least some Democrats to be more radical on the issue -- for example, in endorsing one-statism* -- because they'll internalize the lesson that more "moderate" approaches like Levin's robust two-stateism don't offer any political advantage.

Let's simplify potential Democratic Israel positions into three categories: (1) AIPAC-style status quo (represented by someone like Stevens), (2) The Andy Levin or J Street style two-stateism , or (3) Rashida Tlaib style one-stateism. Of course, some politicians have very strong feelings on this question and will choose based on those deeply-felt sentiments. However, my core model assumes that most politicians don't have hard-and-fast policy preferences on most issues. Rather, on most issues beyond the rarefied few they care deeply about, they will choose the political path-of-least-resistance amongst the set of choices which meet their basic criteria of moral tolerability, even if a different choice might be closer to their ideal ideological preference. So if we imagine a politician who really doesn't care one way or another about Israel/Palestine -- they are at least not repelled by any of the three forms of Israel positions above -- they won't adopt the position they "believe in" the most, they'll pick the position that is politically easiest and least likely to generate controversy or backlash. AIPAC's victories have strongly suggested that, in many contexts, that would be position #1 -- even in Democratic primaries. And to that extent, AIPAC probably will succeed in moving the Democratic needle towards its preferences.

However, we can also imagine a different sort of potential progressive candidate, one who does not find AIPAC-style status quo advocacy to be morally tolerable. For this candidate, the two viable choices for their Israel/Palestine positions are categories #2 and #3. Historically, many would have picked door #2, again, because it's the path of political least resistance. Indeed, if such a candidate a few years ago had asked me for advice -- had said that they had serious concerns about Israel's behavior and they simply couldn't endorse a position of total and unconditional support -- I'd have told them that, so long as they supported two states and opposed BDS, they'd probably be okay. They wouldn't necessarily be endeared to AIPAC or other like actors, but they wouldn't be seen as beyond the pale either. But endorse BDS, or oppose Israel's existence outright, and the full sound and fury would fall onto them.

But now AIPAC may have changed the calculus. By going scorched earth on Levin, it sends the message that it views categories #2 and #3 as equally destructive. Suddenly, door #2 is not a political "path of least resistance" compared to door #3. And if they're both going to bring AIPAC's full fury down upon the candidate, well, at that point you might as well choose based on your ideological preference. Some of these candidates, will sincerely prefer robust two-stateism over one-stateism (that characterizes me, for instance), so their behavior shouldn't change. But some will no doubt prefer one-stateism, and lacking any political rationale for tacking towards the center, they won't do it anymore.

I worry that this might be the lesson people draw from the Donna Edwards/Glenn Ivey race -- another where AIPAC dumped massive sums of money into the contest. Again, all politics is local and Ivey's victory likely reflects factors that overwhelmingly have nothing to do with AIPAC or Israel. But if one looks at Edwards' trajectory entering this race, and in particular how she tried to heal old suspicions held by Maryland's Jewish voters, it seems hard to argue that she is now (if she ever was) some sort of anti-Israel firebreather. She was never going to be AIPAC's poster girl, but she made a concerted effort to pinch towards the center and assuage Jewish concerns about her record. The result was less than nothing -- AIPAC spends eight figures on sinking her career. To be clear: I have no reason to think that Edwards' moves were anything other than sincere, or that she secretly harbors one-state sympathies. Nonetheless, there absolutely will be other politicians in Edwards' position who may decide "why bother?" There's no sense going through all this effort to listen and grow and build bridges and try and find common ground if they're going to go scorched earth regardless.

In short: there is likely a set of candidates who (a) find both one-stateism and robust two-stateism tolerable, (b) marginally prefer one-stateism over robust two-stateism, (c) would nonetheless back robust two-stateism if that was the path of political least resistance. If robust two-stateism no longer offers any political advantage, they're likely to begin promoting one-stateism. To be clear, these candidates are still likely to lose. AIPAC's hammer puts them at a decided disadvantage. But their logic will be "I'm likely to lose either way, so I might as well swing for the fences." Indeed, there's not just a moral but an instrumental logic here. Consider two strategies: One will have you lose by 10 points in 10/10 races. The second will have you lose by 30 points in 9/10 races, and win by 2 points in the tenth. The rational political actor should choose the second strategy, even if it is objectively less popular (a point I've made regarding the future of BDS in Democratic Party politics)!

Paradoxically, AIPAC may encourage some number of Democratic candidates in the more liberal tranche of the party to start supporting a one-state solution who otherwise would not have done so. And the odds are some of them will end up prevailing in their races (if only because of idiosyncratic local factors). There's a real chance that an upshot of AIPAC's intervention will be to strengthen the political power of the one-state caucus -- not because of some political backlash, but based on how it has altered the political calculus amongst more progressive-minded actors. In many ways, it is J Street that is more of a loser than AIPAC is a winner, and I expect J Street's influence to bleed out not just towards AIPAC, but also towards more radical and uncompromising anti-Israel actors and the far-left. For someone with my politics, that is perhaps the most depressing lesson of all.

So to sum up, here are the lessons I think can be validly drawn from AIPAC's performance this election cycle:

(1) While it isn't demonstrated that Democratic voters support AIPAC's brand of "pro-Israel" policies, it does seem clear that they aren't especially moved or motivated by major alternatives. The political energy behind any alternative to what AIPAC pushes -- whether it's Levin's robust two-state Zionism or explicit non- or anti-Zionist positions -- is vastly exaggerated and isn't translating to on-the-ground political power.

(2) AIPAC, and its affiliates, are not toxic brands in Democratic primaries.

(3) The Democratic Party, including its base, are not "anti-Israel" or sympathetic to "anti-Israel" positions in any meaningful respect.

(4) AIPAC has restored some "deterrent effect" against Democrats who might consider crossing them, at least in circumstances where the Democrat has other political vulnerabilities that can be leveraged (such as after redistricting). Likewise, AIPAC has credibly indicated it can and will substantially invest to support Democrats whom it feels favorable towards.

(5) The average Democratic politician who is not substantially invested in Israel/Palestine as an issue will likely move their position marginally closer to AIPAC's as "political path of least resistance".

(6) Left-wing Democrats who are sympathetic to one-stateism or other more radical anti-Israel positions, but who had been hewing to more J Street style stances because they thought they'd be more politically palatable, may reassess the utility of relative moderation and become more open in their anti-Israel declarations.

* Not the apartheid one-statism where Israel controls the entire territory and Palestinians are perpetual second-class citizens -- AIPAC is clearly fine with that.

Has AIPAC Invested Any Substantial Money in GOP Primaries?

Yesterday was a big primary day, and there are a lot of storylines being bandied about. One close to my neck of the political woods has been AIPAC's heavy investments in Democratic primaries attacking candidates it perceives as insufficiently pro-Israel. Their success rate was mixed -- two AIPAC-backed Democrats, Valerie Foushee and Don Davis, won in North Carolina, but in Pennsylvania Summer Lee looks to have narrowly defeated Steve Irwin for the Democratic nomination in a Pittsburgh-area seat where AIPAC dumped $2.7 million in on Irwin's behalf (AIPAC spent over $2 million on each of the North Carolina races).

Seven million dollars is quite a bit of cash on three Democratic primaries (in another race, AIPAC has backed Rep. Henry Cuellar in his primary run-off against Jessica Cisneros to the tune of $1.2 million). My question is whether there are any GOP races where AIPAC has spent equivalent sums seeking to ensure that its preferred candidate wins (or -- perhaps more saliently -- that a dispreferred candidate does not)?

I haven't heard of such expenditures, though I won't pretend I'm such an eagle eye that I'd necessarily spot them if they'd occurred -- that's why I'm asking! Still, my guess is that the answer is no, they haven't (this disclosure also suggests that AIPAC's United Democracy Project super PAC has only spent money on Democratic races). And the reason for my guess is that there aren't any credible Republican candidates whose positions AIPAC considers unacceptable on Israel. I could dimly imagine that they might have gone in against Thomas Massie, whom they've sparred with in the past over Iron Dome funding, but Massie cruised to victory last night with 75% of the vote.

What we're really seeing -- and this isn't a shocking revelation -- is that AIPAC has no meaningful "right-wing" boundary to what it considers acceptably pro-Israel. Absent David Duke style neo-Nazi anti-Zionism -- which actually is starting to nibble into the conservative mainstream but hasn't yet manifested on any national stage to my knowledge -- it is fine with literally any GOP position on Israel, no matter how conservative. One-stateism, pro-apartheid, pro-settlement -- nothing is off-limits to AIPAC. It may pay lip service to supporting a "two-state solution", but when it comes to things that actually get them off the couch and spending money, all the action occurs on the Democratic side of the aisle.

The Crime versus the Blunder: AIPAC's Insurrectionist Endorsements

A few months ago, AIPAC announced it was breaking with its longstanding tradition to directly endorse and fundraise on behalf of political candidates. Several more liberal Jewish groups immediately pressed AIPAC to refuse to endorse any candidate who supported the January 6 insurrection by trying to prevent certification of Joe Biden as President. AIPAC demurred, and now we know why: its initial endorsement list contains dozens of GOP insurrectionists. Among the 61 endorsed Republicans (alongside 59 Democrats) are such luminaries as Jim Jordan(!!!), Nicole Malliotakis, and Tom Emmer. Shared values!

This decision is so obviously disgraceful that one could almost overlook how stupid it is too. But in the annals of "obvious 'pro-Israel' lobbying own-goals" this may well surpass anything DMFI has done, and that's saying something. What's so amazing about AIPAC's blunder here is that it's not only indefensible on the merits, but even the second-order apologias for why "even if this wasn't the wisest move they were in a difficult position" don't work either.

Most obviously: AIPAC did not need to do this. Any observer (read: this observer) could have told them that this election cycle was an especially fraught time to initiate overtly wading into partisan politics. It'd be one thing if these candidates were ones it had been supporting for years and was now being asked to explicitly withdraw support previously extended. They still should have done it -- friends don't stay friends with insurrectionists -- but at least that'd be an actual dilemma. But here AIPAC made the affirmative choice to initiate this support right now; voluntarily and consciously jumping into a political thicket. It could have avoided all of this merely by sticking with its longstanding practice of not endorsing candidates. It chose not to, knowing this was the consequence.

Other attempted excuses that try to move AIPAC out of "bone-headed" into merely "indefensible" fare no better. Let's run through a few:

"AIPAC has to maintain relationships with both parties."

First of all, if AIPAC cannot find enough Republicans to endorse without wading into insurrectionist territory, that seems like it should be a GOP problem, not an AIPAC problem. But in principle, I agree that AIPAC cannot jettison either party outright. In particular, it makes sense to put both parties' leaders -- Pelosi and McCarthy -- on the list; if that was all that was happening here, I could at least understand the logic notwithstanding McCarthy's insurrectionist ballot.

But this logic cannot explain why, say, Jim Jordan (again -- !!!!) makes the list. Jim Jordan isn't on the foreign affairs committee, he's not known as a crucial player in international relations, he's not some necessary bigwig you have to cultivate if you're going to succeed in pro-Israel lobbying. When it comes to Israel, Jordan is basically indistinguishable from the next marginal Republican who is not directly implicated in trying to overthrow the government. He brings nothing to the table other than being a frothing right-wing extremist and budding authoritarian, and so every observer who sees his name on AIPAC's list will assume that he's on there because AIPAC wants to curry favor with a frothing right-wing extremist and budding authoritarian.

If you're doing the "keep relationships with both parties" thing, put down the congressional leaders plus a dozen or so uncontroversial figures from both parties to keep up a balance. AIPAC didn't make that choice -- they deliberately put down some of the most extreme and inflammatory figures, for no clear political gain.

"AIPAC is a single issue lobby -- the only criteria for inclusion is a politician's Israel policy."

This was AIPAC spokesman Marshall Wittman's argument, and it's bull. To begin, if you're going to tie support for Israel to "shared values", then you can't say its irrelevant whether a given politician rejects the principle of democratically-elected governance. If you can't be trusted to defend democracy in America, you certainly aren't going to do it in Israel.

But moreover, particularly on the Republican side there's no Israel policy thread that distinguishes the GOP politicians who are on the endorsement list from those who aren't. I defy anyone to tell me how Elise Stefanik's Israel views differ at all from Lauren Boebert's. The reason the latter isn't on AIPAC's list has nothing to do with her not having the "right" views on Israel (from AIPAC's vantage anyway), it's because she's a loon and AIPAC doesn't want to be associated with her. But once it makes that judgment, it's entirely reasonable to hold them accountable for their cheerful association with the insurrectionist caucus. AIPAC is choosing to tie itself to GOP insurrectionists; it could have very easily chosen not to, and absolutely deserves to take all the hell in the world as a consequence of its indefensible and eminently avoidable choice.

"Sometimes, you have to support the lesser-of-two-evils, and support unideal figures to prevent someone with overtly anti-Israel from occupying these seats."

Again, the logic is fine, but the application to AIPAC's actual conduct is nonexistent. Problem #1: The vast majority of these congresspersons are not running in competitive seats. I have no idea who Jim Jordan's Democratic opponent is, much less what his or her Israel views are, but (regrettably) said opponent stands no chance of dislodging Rep. Jordan. And as for competitive races, I guess I can understand why AIPAC felt compelled to endorse Nicole Malliotakis, notwithstanding her insurrection vote, if the alternative would be known anti-Israel zealot *checks notes* Max Rose. Seriously -- that endorsement might be the biggest slap in the face of all: Rose is a pro-Israel darling, exactly the sort of Democrat AIPAC claims to want to foster, and AIPAC won't even support him (hell, won't even stay neutral) in his race against a woman who tried to overturn the 2020 election? Screw you!

The most likely place where we're liable to see a contested race where one candidate has (from AIPAC's vantage) a much worse Israel record than their competitor is in Democratic primaries where a strong pro-Israel Democrat might face a challenge from their left that AIPAC would want to fend off (the reason this doesn't apply to Republican primaries is that I doubt there is any rightwing position on Israel -- at least that which nominally drapes itself as "pro-Israel" -- that is too extreme for AIPAC to accept. But remember, they support a two-state solution!). This probably explains the Haley Stevens endorsement in her intra-party match against Andy Levin -- an endorsement which I have no facial problem with even if the rhetoric could stand to be tamped down a notch. But it's far from clear that AIPAC's endorsement is even beneficial these days in a Democratic primary, and associating AIPAC with GOP insurrectionists makes the brand even more toxic. If the top priority is keeping pro-Israel Democrats secure against flanking attacks, the main effect of AIPAC's endorsement list is to kneecap their own credibility.

What was it De Talleyrand famously said? "It's worse than a crime, it's a blunder." AIPAC's decision to endorse politicians who are barely a year removed from trying to overturn American democracy is a grave crime against political decency. But its criminality is almost exceeded by its sheer stupidity. AIPAC did not have to endorse candidates in 2022; indeed, 2022 seems like the absolute worst time for an organization that seeks to straddle partisan divides to initiate wading into direct political campaigning. And once it made that decision, it did not have to endorse GOP insurrectionists -- it very easily could have limited itself to at least less controversial figures on both sides of the aisle and stayed out of the fray. Instead, for no discernible reason, it made the conscious choice to single out some of the most overtly extreme and toxic figures in American politics and a wrap them in a big ol' bear hug. The result is already proving catastrophic for AIPAC's brand. And if AIPAC ever did care about shoring up support for Israel among Democratic politics, it's made that task far harder to accomplish as well.

Nice work, guys.

AIPAC Starts PACking

The big money story in politics this week, literally, is that the famed pro-Israel lobby group AIPAC is starting a PAC. If that doesn't seem like much of a story, AIPAC has, for its entire existence, not actually been formally involved in donating to political candidates. It's one of the reasons why the notion that it "bought" Congress is so offensive. While AIPAC certainly was valuable in introducing members of Congress to prospective donors, the new AIPAC PAC (yes, that's the name) will be the first time the organization itself donates directly.

Yet this is a fraught time for AIPAC to join the donation game. AIPAC's political engagement strategy for as long as I've remembered has been characterized by one major rule: talk to everyone. It wants a pleasant relationship with as many members of Congress as possible. To that end, it has not -- contra some assumptions -- been all that aggressive in enforcing a hard party line on Israel. This has frustrated Republicans who think AIPAC should serve as a right-wing attack dog. But it also has provided cover for AIPAC in not speaking out on plenty of right-wing heresies too.

All of this works primarily because, what the exception of its big conference bash, most of what AIPAC does is quiet and private -- the slow, boring, but fruitful work of building relationships whenever and wherever it can. And I can't help but think that right now is a very difficult model to adjust to making donations, where AIPAC will be quite publicly making some tough choices and will unavoidably have to get loud on them.

The JTA article on the AIPAC PAC suggests that it is actually meant to be a vehicle for AIPAC to show more support for Democrats it likes, to counter allegations that it has gotten too snuggly with the GOP. I support the ambition, but I think this is a terrible way to get there. The more obvious way for AIPAC to restore diminished luster amongst Democrats would be to actually, you know, show its teeth in supporting the elements of Israel policy that Democrats actually like, such as a two-state solution. If money is their strategy for regaining Democratic warm-feeling, that suggests they're looking for a route that doesn't involve them actually shifting policy in any way, and that's a strategy with a very limited shelf life.

And even if we take the money front in isolation, I think it's a tactic doomed to fail. Let's assume that AIPAC will be less heavy-handed and self-defeating in its political interventions than DMFI, because, well, who couldn't be? (Answer: possibly AIPAC) Even still, AIPAC was already doing a perfectly serviceable job of introducing new Democratic politicians to potential donors; it was fine in the role of intermediary. Going in directly and, well, one needn't overstate the toxicity of the AIPAC brand amongst Democrats to say that it certainly is a ripe target for attack in some wings of the Democratic coalition. We already see plenty of calls for Democrats to skip AIPAC's conference due to its right-wing priorities. A world in which AIPAC donates directly is a world where we're going to hear a lot more calls to "reject AIPAC money" (just like rejecting "fossil fuel money" or "gun lobby money"), and that's a fight that AIPAC loses just by having. Notice how it again largely traverses this debate in the status quo by serving as a connection point: saying "reject AIPAC money" is a lot easier and pithier and tractable than "reject Sue Lowenstein's money" where Sue is the local Jewish donor that nobody has ever heard of but whom AIPAC set up with the fresh-faced state senator running for a new House seat.

At the same time, wading directly into the domestic political fray poses problems for AIPAC on the GOP side of things too. Shortly after AIPAC's announcement, J Street issued a call to all Jewish and pro-Israel organizations to commit to not donating to any politician who refused to endorse the validity of the 2020 election results. Seems like a no-brainer and the obvious right decision -- and it is -- but that also covers nearly 150 Republican members of Congress, because, and I can't emphasize this enough, rejecting the basic operation of American democracy is the mainstream Republican position. Yet it'd be pretty tough for AIPAC to maintain its vaunted "bipartisan" credibility while disavowing the bulk of the GOP. Whereas before it could easily traverse this issue because it doesn't donate to candidates, now its ducking has to be far more out in the open. AIPAC thus far hasn't commented (no kidding), but we'll all see the list of candidates it selects to donate to sooner rather than later. The ducking can only last so long (and while I'm at it, kudos to J Street for a pretty savvy political squeeze play).

Obviously, we'll see how all this shakes out soon enough. But I'm skeptical this is going to turn out well for AIPAC. I'm on the record as saying AIPAC desperately needed to mend fences with the Democratic Party if it wants to stay relevant as a bipartisan actor. If this is their gambit for doing so, it leaves a lot to be desired. More direct money is no substitute for a robust, realistic policy vision that Democrats who care about both Israeli and Palestinian security, safety, and equality can get behind without embarrassment.

How Trump and Bibi Have Changed the American-Israel Relationship Forever

There's change in the air.

The decision by the Israeli government to bar two Democratic congresswomen from Israel -- Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar -- has led to unprecedented pushback against Israel by Democratic Party politicians. Even representatives thought of as pro-Israel stalwarts are furious, and they're not making any effort to hide their ire.

Some people are attributing this change to fear, or more accurately, the removal of fear. Democrats aren't "afraid" to criticize Israel anymore. They're no longer "cowering" before the all-powerful Israel Lobby.

But this misunderstands what's happening, because it misunderstands how the Israel lobby has operated in Washington.

Contrary to popular belief, the Israel lobby does not generally rely on fear and intimidation. It secured its power through many years of relationship-building, gaining trust, and establishing channels of communication. It was very rare that AIPAC or anyone else had to play "bad cop" (and in fact, AIPAC is very ineffective when it tries to take on that role). Democrats were not "silenced" on Israel -- yearning to speak out, but cowed by threat and menace. Rather, Democrats were enmeshed in a dialogic relationship with the pro-Israel community that relied upon mutuality and reciprocity; the sense that each side would listen and by listened to in turn.

And that -- decades of hard, arduous work -- has been almost entirely torpedoed over the past few years.

“There’s concern with regard to the U.S. government official involved here for politicizing his role and using his diplomatic platform to behave in a way that for the past 2 1/2  years that has been very undiplomatic,” said Halie Soifer, the director of the Jewish Democratic Council of America, who served in the Obama State Department and as a Senate foreign relations staffer.

Dermer is especially despised among Jewish Democrats and pro-Israel Democrats for what they regard as partisan disrespect for their office and their pro-Israel bona fides. Jewish Democrats in Congress, who once looked forward to attending Israeli Embassy events, now are less likely to make an appearance.

Until the 2015 Iran speech by Netanyahu, Dermer maintained civil ties with Democrats. Especially galling for Democrats was that Dermer and Netanyahu agreed to a condition of then-Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, that the planning be kept a secret. (Planning for the speech started in late 2014, and Boehner surprised Democrats and the pro-Israel community with his announcement of Netanyahu’s speech the day after Obama delivered the State of the Union on Jan. 20, 2015.) 

Once Dermer worked with Republicans to ambush Democrats, he was seen as partisan.

[...] 

[Rep. Steny] Hoyer is especially infuriated because he extracted the commitment from Dermer to allow in Tlaib and Omar so that he could talk other lawmakers into joining a trip to Israel sponsored by the American Israel Education Foundation, an affiliate of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. Hoyer got 41 Democrats to go, which is believed to be the highest number ever. Hoyer has led the trip for decades. 

Hoyer took the group to Israel, talked up the alliance and declared it a success before he was blindsided by the decision on Tlaib and Omar. While conservative Jewish groups hailed the decision, saying Israel was in its rights to keep out two lawmakers who support the movement to boycott Israel, pro-Israel critics said it gave ammunition to those who accuse Israel of being anti-democratic and an unreliable ally. 

Aaron Keyak, a longtime Democratic Hill staffer who is now a consultant to Jewish and liberal groups, said the anger ran deep precisely because of the trust that Jewish and pro-Israel Democrats had long placed in Israel and its governments. 

“These are friends going back decades pleading with their friends in Jerusalem and at the embassy not to let this happen,” Keyak said in an interview. “What helps sustain the U.S.-Israel friendships are the person-to-person friendships between our two governments. It was not just the overall relationship that was damaged, it was those personal relationships that were also betrayed.” 

This is the big change. It's not newfound "courage", it's not the removal of "fear". There's nothing new now that would make Democrats less "fearful"; it's not like Mossad Hit Squads went on vacation this summer. What's new is a failure of trust; the knowledge that this relationship of mutuality and reciprocity now clearly flows entirely one way. Democrats have learned, in a very real and visceral way, that all those years of dialogue, all that time invested in building a relationship, counts for absolutely nothing. The Israeli government is happy to sell them all out for .5% boost in the Knesset poll and a pat on the back from Donald Trump.

This relationship took decades to develop. The damage that's been done just this week (to say nothing of the past few years) will take at least as long to undo -- if it ever can be.

America's Israel Policy is Primarily Dictated by Non-Jews. Therefore ... What?

Periodically, you see people on the internet take great pains to stress that America's Israel policy is primarily dictated by non-Jews -- usually (particularly if we're talking about conservative Israel policy) Evangelical Christians.

When this point is made, as it usually is, by Israel-critical sorts, it is often a means of stressing that opposing these conservative policies is not a case of being anti-Jewish, since it isn't Jews who are driving the policies to begin with.

It is a point often made in ragged fashion, without following through to its logical end-point. For example, people might use it to say "AIPAC drives the agenda in Washington on behalf of Christian donors" rather than "maybe AIPAC doesn't drive the agenda in Washington, it's now largely been surpassed by explicitly Christian 'pro-Israel' organizations whose agenda AIPAC is forced to react to, and our assumption that it's AIPAC that runs the show is a legacy of an antisemitic assumption of Jewish control."

Still, the broad point is correct. American policy towards Israel is mostly a function of what non-Jews want it to be. That doesn't mean that there aren't Jews who, fortuitously, happen to overlap with this or that Israel-policy agenda. But they're fundamentally epiphenomenal.

One might think that the next step in the analysis would be "so let's start asking: what do Jews want us to be thinking about regarding Israel?"

But more often, the next step instead is "so therefore, we don't have to listen to anyone but ourselves on this issue!"

Put differently, these actors might recognize -- correctly -- that American Jewish voices are actually relatively marginal to the state of American discourse about Israel (it's worth noting that Israel itself plays a part in this marginalization). But they don't actually mind that marginalization or seek to rectify it -- if anything, they exploit it so that they can engage in their own discourse about Israel in American without feeling guilty about stepping on the Jews. They're happy to keep on going as they always have, impervious to critical Jewish perspectives (though happily relying on the epiphenomenal Jews who happen to already agree with them).

Recognizing that Jews aren't running the show in Washington (on Israel or anything else) is step one. Step two is empowering Jewish voices -- not to the exclusion of other salient perspectives (most notably, Arab or Palestinian voices), but as part of a larger recalibration of the debate so that those with the most at stake have the most influence.

If you think step two is redundant because we already hear -- overhear, if anything -- Jewish perspectives, then you haven't actually absorbed the lesson of step one. And if you think step two is problematic because you're afraid that elevating actual Jewish perspectives might conflict with your pre-established political agenda, then you just approve of the political marginalization described by step one. Either way, no one should be fooled by the play.

What is Going on at Fresno State?

There's a brewing controversy at Fresno State, where the university has restarted a search for the Edward Said Professorship of Middle East Studies after determining that the current search -- which had already selected a series of finalists -- had various procedural defects in violation of university guidelines (all the finalists were invited to reapply in the new search). An emeritus professor of Linguistics at the university, Vida Samiian, has publicly alleged, however, that this is all a pretext and that the search was canceled due "a documented campaign of harassment and intimidation ... by Israel advocacy groups" seeking to "derail" the search.

That sounds pretty bad. The problem is that, as my friend Steven Lubet has observed, there is virtually no evidence backing up these allegations. The university administration flatly denies having even been contacted by, much less subjected to pressure from, any outside groups. And Ben Sales at JTA interviewed members of the (relatively small) Fresno-area Jewish community had found that nobody there had even heard of the search, much less agitated against it.

The closest thing to actual evidence that Samiian has in her letter is a few instances of relatively anodyne expressions of concern by Jewish faculty members about how the search was progressing. She histrionically labels these "harassment", but they deserve that label only if it expands to encompass "Jews saying words." And again, none of them speak to any sort of campaign or concerted effort by anyone to have the search canceled (there is one stray reference to "outside" concerns about the search, but again, nobody has presented any proof of any such outside pressure manifesting).

Of course, a complete lack of evidence didn't stop JVP from rapidly circulating a letter taking as fact that the search was canceled "in response to pressures from Israel advocacy groups" who "launched a campaign to cancel the search altogether". Abba Eban once famously quipped that "If Algeria introduced a resolution declaring that the earth was flat and that Israel had flattened it, it would pass by a vote of 164 to 13 with 26 abstentions." So too, it seems, that if JVP circulates a letter saying Fresno State was devoured by a hellmouth and Israel had summoned it, it would amass 500 signatures within the week.

Lubet uses this to coin the term "Occam's BDS razor": the simplest explanation, anytime anything on campus doesn't go precisely the way pro-Palestinian advocates would like, is the interference of nefarious pro-Israel lobbying. We can see how that mentality shook out at Fresno both "vertically" and "horizontally". "Vertically", a few offhand remarks that were critical of the search proceedings got elevated to cases of "harassment". And "horizontally", these few remarks were roped together to form the locus of an imagined conspiracy of intimidation against the entire search. The ease at which these jumps are made is itself illustrative of antisemitism in its structural dimension -- even the tiniest shreds of Jewish public or private  discourse immediately metastasize into dark threats of domineering power. Such moves, I have to think, wouldn't fly (or wouldn't fly as easily) were they not so easily slotted into the grooves of antisemitic discourse.

So underneath all of this sound and fury, is there any there, there? It seems supremely unlikely that there was any "pressure" or "campaign" from Israel advocacy groups with respect to this search. But if there is a bare kernel here, I suspect it's something like the following: the administration admits it was too slow to catch onto the procedural shortcomings of the search (lack of approval by a specific department, failure to form the search committee via departmental election, and unauthorized contact and participation by an external member -- likely Samiian). And I doubt that there are many faculty members at Fresno State or anywhere else who care about such things for their own sake. So, it is entirely plausible that the person who alerted the Fresno State administration to these irregularities did so not because of a deep, dispassionate commitment to the faculty handbook, but because of more, shall we say, substantive concerns about how the search was progressing.

One could say, then, that the irregularities were a "pretext", in that nobody would have cared about such procedural failings had the search not been independently controversial. However, it is also fair to observe that the whole reason we have requirements of procedure is precisely to create confidence in faculty searches in circumstances where controversy is expected. Procedures like these matter most in circumstances where one might worry about efforts to "stack" a search committee or otherwise buttonhole it into a particular ideological or political box -- efforts almost certainly made easier when one circumvents normal requirements of faculty election and oversight. More to the point: It is wholly unsurprising that nobody cares about procedural defaults in cases that nobody cares about. We have procedural rules precisely for the cases that people do care about.

My comments in no way should be taken to impugn those persons who were selected as finalists and have gotten caught up in the middle of this controversy. I know nothing about them, and they may well be superb candidates whose virtues would be recognized by a search committee which was operating entirely above board. But surely we can be concerned with the celerity with which a very inside-baseball procedural dispute was elevated -- on the basis of virtually no evidence -- into a grand conspiracy of Jewish intimidation, and the ease with which many bought into it.

Israel's Snuggles with Trump Threaten Israel

The most interesting thing about this article in Ha'aretz isn't the message, but who's allegedly delivering it:

In messages that have been conveyed to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, as well as to the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, these individuals have stressed that despite its desire to forge a close relationship with Trump, Israel must move cautiously and avoid making any moves that would distance the Democrats from the Israeli government and make it difficult for Israel’s friends in the party to come to its assistance.

No fewer than five senior officials in centrist American Jewish organizations that are known for their unequivocal support of Israel told Haaretz that they personally had conveyed messages of this nature to officials in the Israeli Embassy in Washington, to the Prime Minister’s Office and to the Foreign Ministry. 

One of the five — none of whom wanted to be named — said the response he got from his Israeli interlocutors was “a silent nod that expressed understanding, but not agreement.”

[...]

A senior Foreign Ministry official, who also asked not to be named, confirmed the messages, telling Haaretz that they had come from both representatives of Jewish organizations identified with the Democratic Party and from representatives of Jewish groups affiliated with the Republican Party and with the right.

The bolding is my own. And of course, it'd be interesting to know who these groups are -- it's hard to imagine ZOA or the RJC saying this, for instance. I suspect they are referring to mainline groups that lean more conservative (maybe AIPAC? maybe the Conference of Presidents?). In any event, whoever these groups are it's good that they recognize the threat, because it's a real one -- and one that, unfortunately, the American Jewish right has a vested interest in perpetuating rather than resolving.

Sadly, if the end of the third paragraph is any indicator, Israel will continue to ignore this advice outright and openly antagonize Democrats until they entire party hates them. Ron Dermer's speech at AIPAC expressing uncontained glee that Trump is the President instead of Obama would have been proof of this even if it hadn't come directly after the AIPAC President's plea to not to turn Israel into a partisan issue.

God Ron Dermer is the worst.

How AIPAC Works (and Doesn't)

This is a really great, in-depth piece by Armin Rosen on how AIPAC exercises influence in Washington -- and the limits of said influence. While many people think of AIPAC as this towering, 900 lbs monster which makes and destroys political careers, the organization actually has a very different mode of operation. It builds relationships. It makes sure that, whoever is in office of whichever party, they have a route to that person's office so that they can make their concerns known.

While this has been obviously effective, Rosen contends that the Iran Deal case shows the limits of the strategy. Because AIPAC is exceptionally cautious about building and maintaining relationships, it cannot and does not threaten any serious consequences for Congresspersons who flout their will. Representatives were willing to buck AIPAC because they knew AIPAC wasn't going to cut them loose for the apostasy. And that, in turn, has made certain other (generally rightward) forces on the "pro-Israel" community think that AIPAC's lost its edge. What good is it being the proverbially unstoppable "Israel Lobby" if you get stopped on the one issue you actually throw your entire weight behind?

There's a degree to which that's true, though I think Rosen understates the benefits of AIPAC's relationship model even in the wake of the Iran Deal. It's almost certainly true that AIPAC's model is ill-suited to a drawn out fight where a powerful political figure, like the President, digs in his heels and directly contravenes a core AIPAC policy objective. But there will inevitably be very few cases like that, because when it comes to foreign policy -- even Israel-related foreign policy -- it will not be that often that major political figures will have independent preferences strong enough to prompt such a knockdown fight. Where AIPAC's model shines is in greasing the path for the mundane, everyday bits of legislation and funding that only a very few people care about. In those circumstances, relationships and access rule the roost, and AIPAC works very, very well.

I'd also be curious as to Rosen's view on another of my hypothesis: that regarding the degree to which Jewish groups are comfortable publicly feuding with Democratic versus Republican politicians on Israel. Rosen observes that most of AIPAC's staff are Democrats (unsurprising -- it is a predominantly Jewish group, after all), and my argument has been that Jewish groups are willing to argue with Democratic politicians because they have the essential confidence that such arguments won't break the relationship entirely. They're "in the family", so to speak. Friends fight, but that doesn't mean they don't cease being friends. By contrast, there seems to be an implicit concern that any non-trivial attack on GOP policy initiatives by a Jewish group will see a swift and brutal excommunication by the Republicans. For a relationship-focused group like AIPAC, this is a harrowing proposition. Simply put, if the name of the game for AIPAC is relationships, then preserving Republican relationships requires a lot more hand-holding and obsequiousness compared to their more resilient Democratic counterparts (who can handle a tough period like the Iran negotiations and still come back to the table on matters of shared interest later on).

Could AIPAC Be Trump's Toughest Room Yet?

In a conference meant to convey unity in the pro-Israel community, nothing has been more divisive for AIPAC than Monday's scheduled speech by Republican front-runner Donald Trump. I don't necessarily fault AIPAC for extending the invitation (as it does to all significant presidential candidates), but I also agree that his speech cannot be an occasion for business as usual. And many in the Jewish community -- ranging from Jane Eisner to Liel Leibovitz to Todd Gitlin -- have been urging a forceful response by conference attendees to emphasize that Trump values are not Jewish values.

Which raises the question: Will AIPAC be the toughest venue Trump faces?

In a sense, it won't be simply because many AIPAC attendees will be walking out before or during his speech -- they won't be in the room at all.

But that reaction -- the breadth of it and the strength of it -- demonstrates the more general point. AIPAC is far less friendly terrain for someone like Trump than many imagine. Contrary to the tired stereotypes, AIPAC is not a particularly conservative organization -- liberal or liberal-leaning organizations are well represented among its membership and advisory council. What is fair to say is that these groups have often been too fragmented or passive to really make a mark; and more conservative voices have accordingly set the agenda with relative impunity. But Trump has, finally, unified progressive elements within the AIPAC tent and motivated them to plant their feet a bit. Among the groups that have directly or indirectly condemned Trump are the Reform Movement, the Reconstructionist Movement, the AJC, and the ADL. Together, those encompass a huge swath of the organized Jewish community. And if Donald Trump is what prompts these groups to finally unify and start insisting on a louder voice in determining what "pro-Israel" means, I'm all for it.

Much of these groups' antipathy stems from Trump's abhorrent rhetoric directed at Muslims, Latinos, and pretty much any other outgroup that he can blame for America's ills. But let's be clear --  Trump is not afraid to engage in Jew-baiting either (remember "You're Not Going To Support Me Because I Don't Want Your Money"?). In general, Donald Trump has been the best thing to happen to American anti-Semites in recent memory -- it's no accident they've rallied to his side.

Trump is used to friendly audiences who are there to go gaga over him, with a few protesters mixed in that he can bully out of the room. Whatever criticisms one has of AIPAC -- and there are plenty of grounds for criticism -- its conference is not on his home turf. And I both expect and hope that it is the Jewish community -- and the pro-Israel community no less -- that is the first to get the opportunity to show just how unwelcome he is up close and in person.

The Inevitability of the Jewish Lobby

Walter Russell Mead argues that the passage of the Iran Deal (indeed, the failure of opponents to even overcome a Senate filibuster) should signal the ned of the myth of the omnipotent and univocal "Israel Lobby". It won't, of course, because the myth is predicated on a series of anti-Semitic assumptions that ignore pluralism within the Jewish community, misattribute which positions are dominant, which are contestted, and which are marginal within the community, and ultimately lead to the "78% of Jews are very confused" problem.

Yet it was always obvious to me that the outcome of the Iran Deal debate would have precisely no impact on popular understandings of the Israel Lobby and/or Jewish power. For any issue which has a side coded in the public imagination as being supported by the "Israel Lobby", there are one of two possible outcomes:

(1) That side wins, thus demonstrating the impossibility of everyday Americans to overcome the overwhelming power of the Israel Lobby; or

(2) That side loses, thus demonstrating that the position is so obviously righteous that not even the overwhelming power of the Israel Lobby can stop it.

In the case of the Iran Deal, I ultimately came down in support of the agreement -- a position which puts me at odds with much (though not all) of the Jewish establishment but in line with a narrow majority of Jews overall. And it should be the case that Jews -- whether in our individual or institutional capacity -- should be able to advocate for their preferred positions without it being viewed as a form of domination.

The Cultural Cognition of Pro-Israel: Public Reactions

I want to thank the Tablet editors for hosting my posts on the threat partisanization poses to the pro-Israel consensus and what can be done to combat it. The reactions to the piece have been both gratifying and illuminating. Clearly, my diagnosis seems to have struck a chord with liberal Zionists in the Democratic Party -- unsurprising, since I count myself among their number. Equally interesting was the responses coming from the further reaches of the left and right -- both of whom celebrated the polarization trend because both were supremely confident that they'd win the resulting throwdown in a rout. 

Left-wing respondents were sure that polarizing the American community on Israel was a surefire way to break the back of the occupation once and for all. Their right-wing fellows were equally convinced that the trend would lead to a permanent conservative ascendency and rock-solid protection for Israel no matter how the winds of foreign policy blew. The highlight, then, was the person on twitter who said he supported polarization because it would finally lead to the "end of weapons shipments". I had to ask -- did he mean shipments of weapons from the US to Israel (that is, a total left-wing victory) or the shipment of weapons from Iran to Hamas (a sweeping conservative triumph)? Either one would have been perfectly compatible with the overall thrust of reactions. The real-time convergence of left and right-wing worldviews was fascinating to behold.

My prediction, though, is that neither of these outcomes are likely. Polarization instead is most likely to lead to stasis, instability, and poor decision-making as Israel policy becomes just another partisan squabble. And this is something that should concern conservatives and liberals alike who care about Israel and want matters of Israeli policy to be considered carefully and deliberately. As Kevin Drum observes, the wages of this strategy can be seen in the Iran Deal opposition, which he argues was doomed from the  start because of its partisan character:

Ever since 2009, [Republican] political strategy has been relentless and one-dimensional: oppose everything President Obama supports, instantly and unanimously. They certainly followed this playbook on Iran. Republicans were slamming the deal before the text was even released, and virtually none of them even pretended to be interested in the merits of the final agreement. Instead, they formed a united, knee-jerk front against the deal practically before the ink was dry.

[...]

[B]y forming so quickly, the Republican wall of opposition turned the Iran agreement into an obviously partisan matter. Once they did that, they made it much harder for Democrats to oppose a president of their own party. A more deliberate approach almost certainly would have helped them pick up more Democratic votes.

I noticed this as well -- I had to struggle against my first-blush reaction to the Iran Deal opposition, which was to simply slot it in as yet another Republican temper tantrum that characterized their entire political strategy since Obama was elected. Each move which elevated the partisan salience of the debate -- from the ill-fated invitation for Bibi to address Congress to the histrionic allegations of Obama as a deliberate appeaser of terrorism -- made it less likely that liberals would view conservative objections as anything other than cynical attempts to rev up the base. And even for persons who were trying to listen neutrally and dispassionately in order to appraise the merits of the deal, it was hard to find the seeds of valid criticisms amidst the overwhelming din of partisan hyperbole which quickly overtook the conversation.

The deal -- and matters of Israel policy generally -- deserves better deliberation than that. But partisanization prevents that from happening; the cultural formation of beliefs guarantees that once an issue is seen in primarily partisan terms, that character will dictate most of the resulting positions. The full-court political press against the deal made it so that nearly everyone's decision -- for or against -- became a function of political identity rather than independent judgment. And that's a cost to Israel no matter what one's views are on the merits of the deal.

The Cultural Cognition of the Pro-Israel Consensus, Continued

My follow-up column is now up on Tablet. It gives three recommendations to the pro-Israel movement to avoid a partisan schism where "pro-Israel" is equated with "right-wing". In a nutshell: First, don't treat someone as a permanent adversary just because they oppose you on one issue; second, take back control of the movement from partisan (often Evangelical) groups who have no interest in preserving the historical pro-Israel consensus, and three, eliminate the double-standard whereby liberal deviations from the pro-Israel orthodoxy are policed to the letter while conservative departures are treated with kid gloves.

The Cultural Cognition of the Pro-Israel Consensus

The first of a two-part series I wrote has been posted on Tablet. It explains the social psychology of "pro-Israel", the incentive for the conservative right (and anti-Israel left) to identify "pro-Israel" as a conservative position, and the potentially catastrophic consequences such an identification could pose for the future of pro-Israel advocacy.

The Tiger is Getting Hungry

Winston Churchill had a famous line about despots who ride about "on tigers from which they dare not dismount. And the tigers are getting hungry." I've often thought the same about the relationship between the Jewish pro-Israel establishment and conservative "Christian Zionist" organizations like Christians United for Israel (CUFI). This article on the Forward, detailing CUFI's newfound willingness to flex its political muscle in defiance of traditional pro-Israel groups like AIPAC, is a case in point.

CUFI has no interest in the bipartisan political strategy of the traditional pro-Israel groups -- it is a conservative right-wing outlet and wants "pro-Israel" to be thought of and take the form of a conservative, right-wing movement. To this end, it has adopted policy positions long thought of as an anathema to the pro-Israel community. The most obvious representation of this is CUFI's position on a one-state solution, where they basically mimic the stance of Jewish Voice for Peace: technically neutral, but functionally all in favor. But unlike fringe groups like the JVP who can be easily dismissed as non-players, groups like CUFI have heft to them. And the mainstream pro-Israel community therefore has not given them the pariah treatment -- even though one-stateism is supposed to be a redline issue that demarcates the borderline of "pro-Israel."

In addition to the substantive objections to this approach, it carries with it a more practical problem as well: it functionally represents the sidelining of the Jewish community from their position as leaders of the pro-Israel community. Groups like CUFI want to assert conservative Christian control over the narrative, and that necessarily means that Jews -- mostly liberal, mostly Democratic, mostly pro-two-states -- will be shunted aside.

Unfortunately, this is a problem that the mainline Jewish organizations brought upon themselves. They were happy to accept "support" from right-wing groups that had no interests in listening to Jewish perspectives and no interest in preserving the status quo where Jews took the lead in constructing the narrative of pro-Israel. They rode the tiger, allowing to gain more and more power until it became too dangerous to dismount it. At that point, its the tiger which calls the shots. And the old guard forced to hang on is little more than a figurehead.

Don't Say I Didn't Warn You

I think it is fair to say that Bibi's decision to come speak before Congress is the single most disastrous event for the state of pro-Israel sentiment in my lifetime. There's blame to go around, and one can make the case for (or rather, against) all sorts. Personally, I'm extremely skeptical of Ambassador Ron Dermer's influence given his background as a GOP political operative, but this ultimately falls on Bibi's head. Boehner, well, his job is to protect the interests of his caucus and he only cares about Israel insofar as it furthers that end, so I can't really "blame" him for playing politics.

But that's neither here nor there. I don't care who you blame, I don't care how you sequence the events -- the fact of the matter is that this seems to be the straw that broke the camels back for a lot of people, and there is no way that Bibi's speech could ever be sufficiently useful or influential regarding the Iran threat to justify that break. We should not be in a situation where a majority of Americans don't want to hear the Prime Minister speak. This is a full-blown catastrophe, and an avoidable one at that.

On that note, this Nathan Guttman article on anxieties at AIPAC is very well-taken. AIPAC, of course, was famously blind-sided by Bibi's speech decision. It announced its opposition to the address -- to no avail -- and has been on its heels ever since. It's easy to see why: AIPAC's MO from day one has been to cultivate bipartisan support for Israel without favor to either left or right. It takes positions on substantive issues, to be sure, but by far its most important priority is that Israel must not become a partisan issue.

And now? It is facing the teeth of that possibility. Because there is a significant cadre of conservative organizations that want to make it just that. And they are far more threatening to AIPAC's mission -- and the long-term security of Israel -- that left-ward critics like J Street ever could be.

A new reality of overt partisanship has now tinged the U.S.-Israel relationship.
The brawl set off by Netanyahu’s speech has also emboldened other Jewish groups to challenge AIPAC’s own longtime status as the strategic center for pro-Israel activism in Washington. As the lobby kicks off its three-day extravaganza in Washington’s Convention Center, it faces the need to now prove to members of Congress and to supporters that AIPAC is still the main voice of pro-Israel activism, despite increasing challenges coming mainly from a growing right-wing flank.

“Enough with this bipartisan nonsense,” Jeff Ballabon, an Orthodox GOP activist told members of Conservative Political Action Committee convened in Washington just days before the pro-Israel lobby’s conference. “The real base of support for Israel,” he argued, will not be found among Democrats and liberals, but rather “here, at CPAC.”

A full-page New York Times ad sponsored by Rabbi Shmuely Boteach demonstrated how fractured the pro-Israel community has become when discussing Netanyahu’s visit.

Boteach, whose 2012 congressional run was heavily supported by right-wing donor Sheldon Adelson, ran an ad accusing national security adviser Susan Rice of having a “blind spot” when it comes to genocide.
[...]
Threats to AIPAC’s hegemony in past years came mainly from the dovish end of the spectrum, particularly with the appearance of the lobby J Street. But now much stronger competition is emerging from hawkish groups, like The World, that are less interested in bipartisanship. An important funder for several of these groups is the Republican mega-donor Adelson — a former AIPAC backer, who angrily stopped giving to the lobby several years ago, when it decided to announce it supported a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

I don't want to say I told you so, but ... I did. Repeatedly. These groups were never invested in the mainstream pro-Israel consensus, and our broad communal organizations should have moved to isolate them from the "pro-Israel" community with just as much vigor as they give to isolating groups like the JVP. It's not entirely their fault -- left groups that are still pro-Israel made a major strategic error of their own in not affirmatively aligning with the center, being too committed to wrongfully portraying AIPAC as a pure tool of conservative interests.

But what's past is past. And the good news is that AIPAC, and the mainstream Jewish community generally, seems to be waking up as to where the real threat is. The objection to Bibi's speech is a good first step. The across-the-board condemnation of Boteach's ad is another good sign. Ditto the ADL speaking out against those who seek to cloak blatant Islamophobia in the guise of supporting Israel. Simply put, a world in which Americans associate "support for Israel" with "being a right-winger" is not a good world for Israel (even putting aside the fact that the manner in which right-wingers "support Israel" is ludicrously counterproductive). And, given the political proclivities of most Jews, it isn't a good world for Jews who want to retain influence over the state of pro-Israel discourse in America.

Now, I am more closely affiliated with the liberal Zionist groups than I am with AIPAC itself. And my advice to them is the same as my advice three years ago. Seize the center. Work with the more established Jewish and pro-Israel organizations, and leverage their dismay over how partisan right-wing hacks are damaging our crucial relationship. It was never the case that they were in the bag for the most irredentist wing of the Likud Party, and it's certainly and obviously not the case now. The great advantage the liberal Zionists have in America is that they really do represent the consensus Jewish position (not to mention the morally correct one). What divides them from the established organizations -- primarily matters of tone and focus -- are far less important than what they share in common. And what Ameinu and J Street share in common with AIPAC and the ADL and the AJC, and with the American people writ large, is that Israel must be preserved as a Jewish, democratic state in the context of two safe, secure, democratic states for two peoples. The right-wing critics do not share that vision, and so they do not belong in the tent.

AIPAC has been rattled by a threat that caught them unawares. Whether they should have seen it coming is now besides the point. It's time to stop cowering and to start fighting back. And the place to begin are those groups who care more about scoring a transient partisan advantage than they do about making sure that there is an Israel -- a Jewish, democratic Israel -- 30 years from now.

Riding Up and Down the "Criticism" Ladder

Discourse about discourse about Israel -- a play in four acts.

ACT I: PENN STUDENTS: Mr. Hedges, you write about the Middle East! We would love to have you speak at our conference on peace in the region.

ACT II: MR. HEDGES: Israel and ISIS are historical "mirrors."

ACT III: PENN STUDENTS: Mr. Hedges, we no longer think you'd be a great speaker at a conference on peace in the Middle East.

ACT IV: MR. HEDGES: Man, anytime someone suggests Israel should withdraw to '67 borders they are mercilessly silenced by the all-powerful Israel lobby.

Fin.

Silence and Salaita

I've pretty much said what I wanted to say about the case of Steven Salaita: Yes I think some of his statements were anti-Semitic; and no, that doesn't mean the withdrawal of his job offer isn't a violation of academic freedom. That's my position and I'm sticking to it.

But with the news that Salaita's appointment may in fact be forwarded to the Board, I got curious as to what major Jewish organizations were saying about that matter. After all, we all know that his un-hiring was the result of their devious influence and their reckless desire to squelch all dissent, right? Ready? Here we go:

ADL: Nothing.

AJC: Nothing.

AIPAC: Nothing.

ZOA (surely I can rely on them to be embarrassing): Nothing!

A whole lot of nothing.

Now, this doesn't mean that "pro-Israel" politics had nothing to do with Chancellor Wise's decision. It would hardly surprise me if some donor who considered him or herself to be pro-Israel made a fuss, and Wise thought that bringing Salaita on would be more headaches than it was worth. If that was her reasoning, of course, she gravely miscalculated. But even if she hadn't, the job of a Chancellor is to endure "headaches" such as that. Universities can survive a few loons on their faculty, but they can't survive donors interfering with their academic mission.

In any event, I bring up the silence of various prominent Jewish organizations not because they're owed any cookies -- maybe one thinks that they had an affirmative obligation to intercede on Salaita's behalf (though given that Salaita has queried whether the ADL should be labeled a hate group, it's doubtful whether he'd appreciate their backing). I only mention it because if Salaita's un-hiring stands, it won't be attributable to the "Israel Lobby" unleashing its terrible power. And by contrast if the decision is reversed, then it won't be a crippling blow to the previously indomitable Israel Lobby either. This is a fight that pro-Israel forces, at least in an institutional capacity, did not get involved in.

The Ruthless Suppression of All Dissent Continues

Bills have been introduced in Congress, as well as several state legislators, which would cut or strip funding to organizations (such as the American Studies Association) engaged in an academic boycott of Israel (the bills often have somewhat broader language than that, but nobody denies academic boycotts of Israel are the target. Though, to be fair, no other country is being targeted for an academic boycott). In any event, "merits" of the boycott aside (and I am of course on the record as viewing the BDS movement as fundamentally anti-Semitic in character -- David Hirsh makes the points far more eloquently), one can still view such bills as a serious threats to academic freedom -- a freedom which includes the freedom to take wrong, or even racist, positions.

But undoubtedly, I'm an exception, right? Those dreaded Jewish organizations who are ever-eager to crush the slightest dissonant voices on Israel -- why, they must be leading the charge for these laws? Or not:

Two of the major Jewish groups are not planning to back a new bill that seeks to pull federal funding from universities that boycott Israel, according to a source familiar with the situation.
“The legislation is almost certainly unconstitutional, it’s a bad law, and it reinforces stereotypes about Jewish influence,” said one pro-Israel Democratic strategist familiar with the groups’ thinking. “It’s so bad that AIPAC and ADL oppose it.”
“There’s no way they’ll say they support it,” the strategist said.
[...]
“We welcome any effort to challenge or fight the boycott, divestment and sanctions in colleges and universities,” said Abe Foxman, director of the ADL. “However well-intentioned, we are not sure that this bill would be the most effective means of recourse.”

AIPAC and Abe Foxman -- those are the typical bogeymen, aren't they? And while they aren't mentioned in the context of the proposed federal legislation, the AJC has come out against a similar bill proposed in New York. Together, AIPAC, the ADL, and the AJC comprise a fairly hefty chunk of the Jewish center, center-left, and center-right.

I predict this development to have precisely zero influence on how people speak about the contribution of Jewish groups to this debate.

AIPAC Shuns Settlement Org

JTA has an interesting article up on Jewish organizations which responded to Secretary of State John Kerry's call to support a two-state solution. These groups -- mainstreamers such as the AJC, ADL, and JCPA -- all have quite vocally denounced certain segments in the current Israeli government (primarily Naftali Bennett and his buddies) who oppose the creation of a Palestinian state.

But the more interesting tidbit, from my vantage point, was a bit buried. Often times, AIPAC is cast in these dramas as a pure malevolent force that completely kowtows to Israel's far-right. If you thought, the following might be a bit of a shocker:

Each of the groups that repudiated Bennett framed their statements in the context of Kerry’s bid to restart the peace process and come as Israeli settler leaders opposed to a two-state solution are making their case in Washington. Dani Dayan, a leader of the Yesha Council, the West Bank settlement umbrella body, met last week with top Republican lawmakers in Congress.

[...]

AIPAC, notably, declined an invitation to attend the meeting June 27 between Dayan and top Republicans, including Rep. Ed Royce (R-Calif.), the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.), the chairwoman of the committee’s Middle East subcommittee; and Rep. Pete Roskam (R-Ill.), the party’s chief deputy whip.

Instead, the Zionist Organization of America and the Republican Jewish Coalition led the Jewish contingent at the meeting. The ZOA has counter-rebuked the Jewish groups that criticized Bennett and Danon. Foxman, the ZOA said in a June 24 release, was “suppressing opposition to a Palestinian state.”

Not only is it important that the pro-settlement wing of "pro-Israel" be marginalized to crank groups like ZOA and the RJC, this also fits within my broader strategic vision of driving a wedge between AIPAC and its right-ward critics. The more centrist Jewish organizations, including AIPAC, view ZOA and its ilk as foes rather than friends, the more willing they'll be to work with center-left groups in order to protect Israel's longetivity as a Jewish, democratic state.