Around Latin America - Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Honduras, Colombia, and Panama

-A high-ranking official in the Argentine government is saying that the country does not plan to invade the Malvinas/Falklands islands or go to war with England, but that it does want to negotiate with Great Britain over the issue of oil drilling (part of the islands' new economic boom) in the ocean near the islands.

-Bolivia has opened up its military archives from its dictatorship period of 1960-1980. This is a major gain for historians and scholars interested in the Bolivian dictatorship, and scholars of dictatorships in the Americas more generally, as the Bolivian dictatorship has remained relatively understudied. Access to archives should lead to a new boom in research and new insights into one of the "forgotten" dictatorships in South America.

-Justice in Peru's Amazonian basin continues to be lopsided, as two indigenous peoples cleared of the killing of police in 2009 remain behind bars even while police officers involved in the murder of 10 indigenous protesters remain free.

-Speaking of the Amazonian basin, this article does a great job of demonstrating the vulgar and violent abuse of power that politicians and elites use in getting land in northern Brazil, as well as some of the ways that the poor and small-landholders are fighting back against elites' land-grabs. Another article does an interesting job in suggesting the ways in which the Landless Movement (MST) in Brazil has been disappointed by Lula's policies, and the uphill battles the MST is facing. Meanwhile, Brazil's agricultural production is looking at a boom year for soybean farming in the wake of beneficial rainfall. Of course, accompanying that rainfall is an increase in the mosquito population, with the result that five states in Brazil already have had dengue outbreaks this year.

-Although most in the world associate Carnaval with partying and scantily-clad women, this article does a great job detailing the complicated and conflicting meanings behind Carnaval for women and homosexuals. The article comments on how the relatively free attitudes towards sexuality, women, and homosexuals during Carnaval highlights the often-repressive social context these groups are forced to endure during the majority of the year, an argument that James Green has demonstrated has a strong historical precedent.

-A report in Pravda is saying that Colombian paramilitaries killed 30,000 people between the early-1980s and 2003. Though I'd like to see more research into the numbers, there's no doubt paramilitary groups are responsible for a large number of the total deaths in Colombia's civil war.

-RNS has a great preview of a few of the members of the Honduran Truth Commission, and what their appointments mean for the process of chronicling the abuses of the coupist government last year. Among other things, RNS suggests that "human rights abuses might actually be on the agenda after all."

-As Venezuela's economy faces the possibility of recession, as well as electrical shortages, Colombia is turning to look for trade partners elsewhere, and has begun exploring the possibility of a free-trade agreement with Panama.

-Finally, I'm not terribly convinced by this article suggesting that slums offer insights into how to better plan cities and help "save the planet." Among other things, it really glosses over the economic and socio-political issues that many slum residents have to deal with, focusing on global slums more as planning models than as the result of very real inequalities and suffering.

Chile, Panama Lead Latin America in Incarceration Rates; Brazil Still Has Highest Total Number

While not as high as the U.S., a recent study has shown that Chile and Panama have the highest rates of imprisoned among their populations, with rates of 310 and 275 per 100,000, respectively. And I admit, I was somewhat surprised - I had expected Brazil to be higher (though it is fifth, with 226 per 100,000, behind El Salvador and Uruguay). On the other end of the spectrum, Bolivia has the lowest rates (85 per 100,000), followed by Guatemala (88), Paraguay (100), Ecuador (118), and Nicaragua (120).

Of course, extrapolating that data to actual population stats, Brazil's prison population is quantitatively higher than any other country in Latin America. What's more, statistics don't reveal the appalling conditions of Brazilian prisons (or elsewhere - I can't help but think that, with overcrowding going well above 120%, Panamanian prisons are also in bad shape). The report also makes several other observations that should be common sense, but still need to be said: that the crime rates are due to socio-economic factors like wide gaps between wealthy and poor, and not to a breakdown in societal morals; or that the death penalty (used in Guatemala and the U.S.) does not deter violent crime. I don't know if this report will accomplish any real change, but it does highlight the problems facing many countries in how to deal with crime, the appalling conditions many prisoners are facing, and the need to push hard for basic human rights for prisoners, too, no matter how heinous the crime.

From Colony to Superpower, Part XVIII

This is the eighteenth installment in the 20 part series Rob Farley and I have commenced to review George Herring's From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. See the Herring Review tag below for previous entries. Rob's discussion for the week is here.

This week, Herring discusses the Ford and Carter years. Not the greatest period in American history to be sure. Ford had to deal with the problems created by Nixon while Carter's efforts were undermined by the rise of conservatism that led to Reagan's election in 1980.

Ford comes across pretty good here. He started the process of bringing draft evaders home, he continued working toward detente with the Soviets and had a good personal relationship with Brezhnev, he wisely chose to let the South Vietnamese government fall without another U.S. intervention, and he acted decisively in the Mayaguez incident, when the Cambodian government took a U.S. ship and held its crew as hostages.

On the other hand, Ford faced an angry Congress. Conservatives were angry over Vietnam and despised detente. They wanted a tough foreign policy. Ford worried about a primary challenge from Reagan in 1976. The left was upset that Ford didn't do enough on human rights or reducing nuclear arsenals.

Meanwhile, there was Scoop Jackson, the good senator from Boeing. Jackson, a hero to neoconservatives, wanted to ride a wave of anti-Soviet feeling into the White House in 1976. Although a Democrat, he was as hawkish as one could be. He was also a captive of hard-line pro-Israel forces and pushed a pretty racist program for the Middle East. No one in this chapter comes across as more contemptible than Jackson, who would happily oppose a principle he once espoused if it would further his ambitions. Ford faced other challenges from Congress as well. Angry about executive abuses of power after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the secrecy of the Nixon years, Congress looked to reassert itself. Sometimes this was good, such as when Congress stopped Nixon and Kissinger from supporting a covert operation to undermine socialism in Angola. However, the ability of people like Jackson to demagogue foreign policy for their own personal gain certainly shows the downside of Congressional leadership on these issues. Rob also talks about Jackson in great detail.

Oddly, Herring doesn't mention the biggest black mark on the Ford years--East Timor. Ford and Kissinger acquiesced in Indonesia invading the newly freed nation of East Timor and subjecting its residents to terrible horrors. In fact, Indonesia is barely mentioned at all in the book. Given its important strategic location, that it is the largest Muslim country in the world, and its sordid and tangled post-war history with the United States, this is quite surprising.

Carter comes across a bit worse than Ford. To some extent, Herring's criticisms are true--Carter had no foreign policy experience and was very bad at selling tough foreign policy decisions to the American people. On the other hand, Carter also faced some very difficult situations--not only a low opinion of America throughout the world, but the rise of Reagan and conservatism, and the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Carter could have put together a more cohesive foreign policy team to be sure--Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski couldn't stand each other and this led to infighting throughout Carter's term.

Carter did some really good things. Naming Andrew Young as UN ambassador went a long way toward improving US-African relations. Carter continued trying to salvage detente in his early years in office. He rightly gave the Panama Canal back to Panama. His historic negotiations in the Middle East led to Egypt recognizing Israel's right to exist for the first time. He stood up, in the face of conservative opposition in Congress, to the white supremacists ruling Rhodesia and South Africa. He normalized relations with China, building upon Nixon's actions there, to help isolate the Soviet Union.

Looking at Panama, we can see the struggles Carter faced, not in spite of, but because of his accomplishments. The Canal clearly needed to go back to Panama. We stole the land from the nation in 1903 when we hewed it off of Colombia for our purposes. This split the new nation in two, causing consternation and anti-American feeling for decades. By the 1970s, large-scale protests against the United States were taking place in Panama. Controlling the Canal outright was more trouble than it was worth. But for conservatives, it was another example of the U.S. caving to the Third World and Carter was accused of betraying American foreign policy interests. Reagan used this issue as one where he differed from Carter and tapped into much resentment in the country over Panama in his election campaign. The more I read about Carter and America in the late 70s, the more respect I gain for Carter and the more I think he was simply facing a nation sick of anything resembling postwar liberalism. Complaints about Carter's weak leadership and ineffectiveness should properly be interpreted through this framework.

Of course, Carter's great failure was in Iran. Like every president since Eisenhower, Carter supported the Shah. By the mid 70s, it was clear that the Shah's regime was in shambles, but the U.S. didn't know what to do. When the Islamic Revolution succeeded, and especially when dozens of Americans were taken hostage in late 1979, Carter looked weak. Desperate by now to stop the rise of Reagan, Carter eventually decided to look tough. Without even consulting Secretary of State Vance, he ordered an air rescue operation. It completely failed when the planes were spotted, when a sandstorm forced them to turn back, and when a midair collision killed 8 US troops who had to be left behind. Vance resigned on principle. Carter looked weaker than ever and Reagan blew him away in the 1980 elections.

There's a whole lot more to say about these years, including about Afghanistan, Israel's failure to live up to the Camp David agreements, and Carter's relationship with the South American dictatorships, but I'll send it back to Rob for more on that.

More Evil Deeds from Banana Companies in Latin America

Following last year's lawsuit in Colombia, in which over 400 people sued Chiquita for supporting paramilitary troops, the families of 5 men in Panama have also sued Chiquita. They maintain that Chiquita paid the FARC to "protect its workers" (if you'll recall, Chiquita also admitted to paying AUC, the largest paramilitary group in Colombia, to "protect its workers"). The families maintain the FARC raided Panama, kidnapping 5 men and killing them. The lawsuit maintains that Chiquita should be held partially responsible, as they paid the FARC (which the United States government has categorized as a terrorist group) and the FARC was responsible for these deeds.

Given the recent ruling in favor of Dole, I find it unlikely Chiquita will be held responsible or have to pay anything. Chiquita already has been ordered to pay a $25 million (with an m) fine for supporting the AUC, but the lawsuit of the 400 families hasn't been settled yet. I wouldn't be the least bit surprised if a judge ruled that the evidence tying FARC's murder of these 5 men to the Chiquita payments was not enough or that Chiquita had already paid enough, but I could be wrong. The plaintiff's use of antiterrorism laws to try to prosecute Chiquita in the civil court is definitely an interesting approach that would probably not have existed in a pre-2001 context. Still, I imagine this will get thrown out, and once again, a banana company will not have to suffer the consequences for its unethical support of and payment to groups from both the left and right that commit crimes against the regular populations of multiple countries, all in the name of "protection" of its own interests.