Showing posts with label DIME. Show all posts
Showing posts with label DIME. Show all posts

19 March 2010

Hitting the target, but missing the mark

Or: Something President Obama is doing right, but not fully.

From Hot Air came a post on Leon Panetta talking about how Predator strikes are damaging al Qaeda and that al Qaeda may have to go to a 'lone gunman' form of terrorism.  Part of the  problem with al Qaeda is that it is not a highly centralized system for terror attacks: Hambali, as an example, didn't need bin Laden or Zawahiri to approve his operations which have killed many in Indonesia.  The highly integrated, top-down directed attacks are a hallmark of al Qaeda, but so are car bomb factories set up by purely local operatives in Iraq.  For every Red Mosque in Pakistan you get a no-name, small mosque in the Caribbean or South America generating small amounts of income and recruits.  al Qaeda went from core group systems, in the early 1990's, that had to work with other groups to stage attacks (like the 1993 WTC bombing) and then took a page from Aum Shin Rikyo's Sarin Gas Attack in Tokyo to plan and execute tighter and nastier plans.  Yet their small scale capability inside Afghanistan, Pakistan and Kashmir demonstrate purely local terrorism and their branching out to Hambali and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines shows the affiliate/franchise type of operation, with the attacks in Madrid being of that type and hard to directly trace to anyone.

Keeping that in mind, I responded at HA thusly, all spelling and syntax errors kept intact for the amusement of the audience:

It is damned good that the Predator strikes are happening in coordination with the Pakistani take-downs. These are not unrelated as someone realizes that you cannot win a ground war from the air: you need ground forces for clean-up and to take advantage of a disorganized foe.

That is a strategy, the Predator strikes are tactics for the Af-Pak theater.

Of greater worry in Af-Pak is the non-al Qaeda, non-Taliban, cross-functional ‘Shadow Army’ that is becoming a cross-terrorist organization able to garner support from local groups and regional operators, like Gulbudden Hekmatyar. In targeting aQ/Talibe we are letting this new cross-group go unmolested as it has diverse means of support beyond the external. It is good that some of the most capable of the aQ/Talibe/Mehsud organizations are being taken down and out. I have heard nothing on Hekmatyar’s organization that stretches from China to London.

In Yemen we also have some on-the-ground support from the government, but it has proven to be an incompetent government willing to let known terrorists go either officially or unofficially through not following up prison escapes. Like the leader of the USS Cole attack. Again that is trying to use the air assets to enable the ground assets, but the coordination is not so hot there.

Then there is the slow return of al Qaeda to Somalia via the Islamic Courts Union. They seem to have gotten help from terrorists coming from… the US, Minnesota in particular. When we worked with the Ethiopians on getting the ICU chased out by utilizing air and naval assets, we unfortunately left open the quick jaunt to KSA where many ICU members fled to. Too bad we couldn’t get KSA’s cooperation on doing anything about that. Additionally the Somali minority in places like Northern Kenya have proven to have good hiding places and recruiting agents for the ICU/al Qaeda.

The ‘lone gunman’ strategy is not new to al Qaeda, either. Part of my looking at low-level activities when many low-level operatives were caught before doing anything is seeing why these who are not ‘professional’ can be quite dangerous with a minimal amount of help. And not via high value items or training, either. President Bush did a good job going after some of the most noxious enablers and helping others to do so, like Victor Bout and Monzer al Kassar, both extremely able supporters for the right cash or cause. They are just examples of the big ticket traffickers, and for each of those there are ten or so at the next rung who might not be able to get you SAMs but can get you Chinese attack helicopters.

After that things get dicey in the Caribbean as al Qaeda, Muslim Brotherhood (often working together), KSA radical clerics, Iranian clerics and some splinter groups have targeted that area for recruitment and new ‘lone gunman’ style operations in the past. While they may seem more comical than effective, stopping a small splinter group planning on hijacking a LNG carrier and detonating it in Hartford or possibly Boston is not only chilling but a typical ’small unit’ operation of under 5 people with only a few weapons and modicum of explosives necessary to rupture the containment of the LNG. Be a nasty thing to wake up to, a few square blocks of waterfront Hartford or Boston gone flat.

‘Lone gunman’ does not mean low casualty and does mean much more inventive, if less well skilled. They don’t have to be ‘Professionals’, just able and effective… once. It is not al Qaeda’s preferred mode of operations, but they have done with it in the past to ‘lie low’. They really do mean to wage war upon us, and all of civilization so as to get their way. They declare themselves enemy of mankind and want to be its rulers. Never forget these things.

al Qaeda does not operate alone and while it contributes some functionality to the terror organizations in Pakistan, it is not their leader.  The 'Shadow Army' has stood up from components of the Taliban, al Qaeda, Mehsud family fighters (or Lashkars), Lashkar e Toiba (or whatever their current name is), plus parts of Gulbudden Hekmatyar's Hizbi-i-Islami being run out of a refugee camp in Pakistan.  Together they offer cross-functional cooperation for operations, training, personnel and funding.  Saudi funds that used to go directly to al Qaeda now see a number of other, smaller groups, getting funding as well as that heading to al Qaeda (usually in the form of supplies, not direct cash).  When any group can offer 'suicide bombers for hire', which the 'Shadow Army' can do, for commercial venues (such as attacking the guy who owns a competing business across town) you are no longer in the great and lovely world of top-down, leader led terrorism.  You are now in local, retail terrorism.

You can go after the chain, but the links reassemble into different chains when the main one is attacked.  It doesn't matter if it is cocaine smuggling from S. America, Heroin smuggling from China, emeralds from Kashmir, murder for hire in Pakistan, car bombs to go in Iraq, radical Mosques in London, or sending supplies to Mexican Syndicates and Gangs to get favor and entrance to the US: these are not indicative of a large-scale, big operation organization but one that can capably shift from wholesale to retail warfare.  What's worse is that you can't dry up their supply houses as it is 'Just In Time' production.

Who said these guys couldn't learn anything from the West?

Stopping terrorism is a local affair, done through Counter Insurgency (COIN), and that has been successfully applied in Iraq, Colombia, Philippines, and Sri Lanka.  Although terror operations are not kaput in ANY of those Nations, the forces of the nation states involved have the upper hand.  Pakistan is starting its bloody attacks on terror groups, but the question is: from what angle?  Is it the 'end all this terrorism' angle or the 'lets get rid of groups we can't control to empower those we can'?  For the past 50+ years it has always been the latter, and nothing going on contradicts that view today.  The attacks on Kashmir and India have not stopped nor have their Pakistani support bases been attacked, and since many of those groups operate in BOTH Afghanistan and Kashmir/India, the idea of stopping some near border facilities close to Afghanistan and not addressing those in the rest of the Nation puts the question in doubt. 

Afghanistan is starting to realize that the US may just 'cut and run' and hang everyone in the region out to dry, which will be the case until a long-term accommodation with the Pashtuns can be done.  That will require the generally ungovernable border provinces of Pakistan plus some of the family/clan lineages in Afghanistan to finally come to an agreement on either having the Pashtuns:  a) settle as a Pakistani Province, b) settle as an Afghan province, or, c) become their own mini-state.  This is as full provinces or a Nation State, no more of this 'tribal lands' deal and being able to foster and get away with murder whenever you please.  That border is not written in stone, but in an old British document that put a 100 year timeframe on solving the problems of the Pashtuns.  The Pashtuns ran out the clock on the British Empire.

Predator attacks are all well and good: I applaud them as one of the very few laudable things that President Obama has done.  It is, unfortunately, minimum compared to his campaign rhetoric.  You cannot win a ground war from the air, and we are not intent on breaking up the entire terror complex of which al Qaeda is one section and not even the largest section nor even the largest section involved in Afghanistan.  The most virulent, yes, the largest, no.

And the further away you get from semi-competent ground support, going from Pakistan to Yemen, the further away you get from effectiveness.  In case it has been missed, drone attacks and missile attacks without ground forces is seen as weakness by terrorists as you are unwilling to get your hands dirty to stop them.  Friends and allies can be a great help in that, doing some of the dirty work that needs to be done... and it would be a damned good idea to stop talking them down in Europe and elsewhere and implore them to get in the fight a bit more.  Say, by removing our bases in Nations with overly restrictive ROEs or ones with the population unhappy that the US wants to go after these international war criminals.

As a side-light, when did war crimes get trumped by mere civil criminality?

That didn't work up to 2001 and the only thing that has worked since then is pulling terrorists out of the general human population.  KSM even dared us to do our duty under the Geneva Conventions, which is not to get him a nice life-time cell, but to execute him for waging war and being part of no army and accountable to no nation state.  When these beasts can taunt us to do our duty as they are not afraid of it, and we are afraid of doing our duty, we are no longer civilized but decadent.

Using Hellfire missiles to wipe out a few terrorists, here and there, is great retail COIN, semi-functional on the strategic scale and pretty damned useless on the global scale given how these operations morph when attacked.  So far we don't have a global COIN strategy.  Bush didn't have one and Obama is clueless on what the concept means.  Breaking al Qaeda is necessary but not sufficient to the job we are getting handed, as al Qaeda as it was is no longer the way it is.  Its next structure to replace the current one is already in-place... and working very well at the retail level and ready to go wholesale in a different form.  Losing top-level effectiveness will not help when low-level diversity, spread and ability to cross-work shows up.

Its already done that in the 'Shadow Army'.

It can easily do that for groups with joint aims, if different goals.

The aim of al Qaeda has always been on the United States.

And the shadow of the US falls stronger the closer you get to home... look for conflict nearby and you just may see a new 'Shadow Army' arise of different form but with the same virulence and aims, which is to bring war and disorder to the US so as to bring it down, not in a Statist grip, but in the fullness of blood from our bodies.  They seek not to crush our souls, but our very lives from this Earth.

And Predator strikes aren't stopping that any time soon.

17 March 2008

DIME, COIN and the National toolkit: Global COIN - pt. 3

The following is considered a 'rough draft' or 'working paper'.

From the Field Manual FM3-24 Counterinsurgency manual:

1-1. Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of warfare. Globalization, technological advancement, urbanization, and extremists who conduct suicide attacks for their cause have certainly influenced contemporary conflict; however, warfare in the 21st century retains many of the characteristics it has exhibited since ancient times. Warfare remains a violent clash of interests between organized groups characterized by the use of force. Achieving victory still depends on a group’s ability to mobilize support for its political interests (often religiously or ethnically based) and to generate enough violence to achieve political consequences. Means to achieve these goals are not limited to conventional forces employed by nation-states.

1-2. Insurgency and its tactics are as old as warfare itself. Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1- 02). These definitions are a good starting point, but they do not properly highlight a key paradox: though insurgency and COIN are two sides of a phenomenon that has been called revolutionary war or internal war, they are distinctly different types of operations. In addition, insurgency and COIN are included within a broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare.
These outlooks give us a context for local insurgency on a localized scale, but does it offer a paradigm for translating modern events into a global scale?

To examine and define this the concept of 'constituted government' is a main stumbling block as there is no constituted global government at the global scale with anything like a constitution. What there is, however, is a set of systems that arise from having States, be they City States or Nation States, especially when there is contact between States. If 'constituted government' is the idea of government formed to meet a set of needs by those under it, then that constitution (be it written or unwritten) is the description of the means of how such government is allowed to act. Thus 'constituted government' is a description of that process of running affairs at that higher level of the State as opposed to purely local or municipal government interested in sub-State affairs. This is not only not unknown, but has been regularized in the 9th through 18th centuries via a concept known as the law of nations. What is the law of nations?

By having States and having to address both sub-State and State-to-State concerns there arises a need for functions to address these concerns. We are typically used to the form of State government that addresses us, as individuals, on the internal side of things as the State represents those within it, no matter what form of government it has. Thus from absolute dictatorship or totalitarian government all the way to representative democracy or direct democracy are the internal limits for how States may run their internal affairs. Externally, however, things are not as wide ranging as attempts to shift ruling government beyond the borders of a State bring that State into contact with other States who are often hostile to such changes. By the very act of having such a State and having contact the law of nations arises as the means to create such contact and regularize it. While the law of nations is 'voluntary law' on the actual citation of it as a ruling internal concept or for creating civil law, it is less than voluntary on the external side as other States are working to ensure that any any other State adheres to its agreements.

With that understanding it is very possible to instantiate that there is 'constituted government' at an international scale, and that it is a flat or non-hierarchical form of government: there is no higher law to appeal to than the law of nations. One could, in theory, have a State in absolute isolation and never need the law of nations as a concept, but the moment a State meets up with another State the law of nations appears. A State may not like nor want such a law of nations, but by being a State that is what it gets as part of its make-up. Just as individuals are born with inalienable rights, so are States and the work to define that took centuries and was instituted via a series of views and reviews of philosophy that slowly moved into legal and diplomatic context until a well established law of nations was finally written down and discussed deeply for decades thereafter.

The actual book Law of Nations, by Emmerich de Vattel, is a deeply interesting text as it precedes the formation of the US and was utilized by William Blackstone to examine the English Common Law in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. I have examined the import of these texts in overview previously (here for a look at those plus the Black Book of the Admiralty) and how they influenced the creation of the US (article here), and were discussed by Federalists and the so-called 'Anti-Federalists' during the 1787-89 period. Emmerich de Vattel was, himself, working on the views of others, particularly Hugo Grotius, who had done On the Laws of War and Peace with the then understood law of nations. From these we can then look at Law of Nations and examine just what a Sovereign State is:

§ 1. Of the state, and of sovereignty

A NATION or a state is, as has been said at the beginning of this work, a body politic, or a society of men united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by their combined strength.

From the very design that induces a number of men to form a society which has its common interests, and which is to act in concert, it is necessary that there should be established a Public Authority, to order and direct what is to be done by each in relation to the end of the association. This political authority is the Sovereignty; and he or they who are invested with it are the Sovereign. (10)

§ 2. Authority of the body politic over the members.

It is evident, that, by the very act of the civil or political association, each citizen subjects himself to the authority of the entire body, in every thing that relates to the common welfare. The authority of all over each member, therefore, essentially belongs to the body politic, or state; but the exercise of that authority may be placed in different hands, according as the society may have ordained.

That re-cap is necessary to remind individuals that a State is created by society and the people within it, and not the other way around. States do not suddenly form and gather people to them, and are, instead, an organic arising of creating a society in need of self-defense and mutual support. Any necessarily large society, and this has differed in history from few thousands to multiple millions, that seeks mutual support, accord and safety will then form a State to help direct that larger set of needs. Indeed, the system of Nations is the most liberal ever devised as it allows each and every society to give rise to its defense and self-government to its greater ends, something which no larger government than that society, commonly known as Empire, can do.

What is exemplary about Law of Nations is that it spends its time defining just what Sovereignty is, what government is, and what it should set about doing in a general way for its Nation. Almost the entirety of the first book is spent on this *alone* including the duty and obligations of the government to its people and the people to its government and the necessity of piety. Not left out are federal states or elective states, each of which are seen as legitimate though each having differing ways to mete out Sovereign powers that are in accord with the society under it. It is rigorous in this view because the basic and understood internal mechanisms of States were quite visible by that time, and the necessity of stating them so that governments could have understanding of what other governments (and their own) were doing and why gave insight into exactly how interactions could take place between States.

In that way Law of Nations, both in the written form and in the lower case form of common understanding of State to State contact, is 'voluntary' but the necessities of having a State make it descriptive of all States and how they work. If a State does not do these things then it is on its way to not being a State any longer. Thus, when looking at globalized insurgency against the Nation State concept, the key things it will attack are those systems of understanding both inside and amongst Nation States. To break down States any insurgency must attack the Law of Nations so as to remove its understanding from the body politic of Nations and from individuals. When that understanding is undermined, then States will begin to falter without internal knowledge and accountability for their actions. And those actions may be internal or external to the State, and the lack of accountability may likewise be internal, external or both, simultaneously.

From this attacking the Nation State system via COIN, as seen in FM3-24 can be seen in as a politico-military struggle consists of a set of political and military views that work in concert, they fall into categories of political, military, and fused politico-military. These are, in actuality, three separate axes that intersect at the common insurgency point of weakening or destabilizing the current ruling system. Each of these axes can work independently, as in political views that do not coincide with direct action military views, and yet aim at the same end, or together so that there is outright coordination between military and political activities, as in the various 'armed wings' of insurgent organizations.

When taken in the military realm, the original view of law of nations was to differentiate between Public War and Private War. Here Law of Nations is a touchstone for the international system of treaties, as it properly defines these two things as separate spheres of warfare in Book III:

§ 1. Definition of war.(136)

WAR is that state in which we prosecute our right by force. We also understand, by this term, the act itself, or the manner of prosecuting our right by force: but it is more conformable to general usage, and more proper in a treatise on the law of war, to understand this term in the sense we have annexed to it.

§ 2. Public war.(136)

Public war is that which takes place between nations or sovereigns, and which is carried on in the name of the public power, and by its order. This is the war we are here to consider: — private war, or that which is carried on between private individuals, belongs to the law of nature properly so called.

§ 3. Right of making war.(136)

In treating of the right to security (Book II. Chap. IV.), we have shown that nature gives men a right to employ force, when it is necessary for their defence, and for the preservation of their rights. This principle is generally acknowledged: reason demonstrates it; and nature herself has engraved it on the heart of man. Some fanatics indeed, taking in a literal sense the moderation recommended in the gospel, have adopted the strange fancy of suffering themselves to be massacred or plundered, rather than oppose force to violence. But we need not fear that this error will make any great progress. The generality of mankind will, of themselves, guard against its contagion — happy, if they as well knew how to keep within the just bounds which nature has set to a right that is granted only through necessity! To mark those just bounds, — and, by the rules of justice, equity, and humanity, to moderate the exercise of that harsh, though too often necessary right — is the intention of this third book.

§ 4. It belongs only to the sovereign power.(137)

As nature has given men no right to employ force, unless when it becomes necessary for self defence and the preservation of their rights (Book II. § 49, &c.), the inference is manifest, that, since the establishment of political societies, a right, so dangerous in its exercise, no longer remains with private persons except in those encounters where society cannot protect or defend them. In the bosom of society, the public authority decides all the disputes of the citizens, represses violence, and checks every attempt to do ourselves justice with our own hands. If a private person intends to prosecute his right against the subject of a foreign power, he may apply to the sovereign of his adversary, or to the magistrates invested with the public authority: and if he is denied justice by them, he must have recourse to his own sovereign, who is obliged to protect him. It would be too dangerous to allow every citizen the liberty of doing himself justice against foreigners; as, in that case, there would not be a single member of the state who might not involve it in war. And how could peace be preserved between nations, if it were in the power of every private individual to disturb it? A right of so momentous a nature, — the right of judging whether the nation has real grounds of complaint, whether she is authorized to employ force, and justifiable in taking up arms, whether prudence will admit of such a step, and whether the welfare of the state requires it, — that right, I say, can belong only to the body of the nation, or to the sovereign, her representative. It is doubtless one of those rights, without which there can be no salutary government, and which are therefore called rights of majesty (Book I. § 45).

Thus the sovereign power alone is possessed of authority to make war. But, as the different rights which constitute this power, originally resident in the body of the nation, may be separated or limited according to the will of the nation (Book I. § 31 and 45), it is from the particular constitution of each state, that we are to learn where the power resides, that is authorized to make war in the name of the society at large. The kings of England, whose power is in other respects so limited, have the right of making war and peace.1 Those of Sweden have lost it. The brilliant but ruinous exploits of Charles XII. sufficiently warranted the states of that kingdom to reserve to themselves a right of such importance to their safety.

A lengthy piece, but necessary, as it sets the bounds and limits for who can and cannot make war. Do note the relegation of those making Private War to the law of nature, which is a much rougher play of liberty that is only given when one is attacked. Those that operate outside of the Public sphere of State to State intercourse and diplomacy in this area are practicing Private War, not Public War, as they consider themselves to be beholden to no one in their assaults on Nations. No matter what the perceived foul, the perceived transgression, the perceived slight by an individual or people, waging war outside the Public sphere is Private War. Self-defense of communities is one, thing, but proceeding, from there, to counter-attack, unless all other forms of civilized protection are no longer available, is something that cannot be done.

This high right of a State is, actually, allowed to the States of the United States if the federal government cannot or will not respond to invasion or threat that will not brook delay as seen in Article I, Section 10 of the US Constitution:

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

This language is a basic restatement of the autonomy of the States within the Union having given to the National government those things to protect the whole of the Union, but still giving those States the right to protect themselves during times of duress or federal neglect. At that point, when National government cannot or will not do its duty, that duty then devolves to the State(s) involved to defend themselves.

In the US system of government, the ability to distinguish between those making Public War and Private War has devolved upon the Commander in Chief with the input of the Congress on the treatment of those waging Public War. In Private War, however, the Laws of War break down as those waging it have no right to do so and are, thusly, outside of the framework of the Nation State system of interaction. This, too, is part of the law of nations view, again from Book III, here distinguishing lawful from unlawful war:

§ 67. It is to be distinguished from informal and unlawful war.

Legitimate and formal warfare must be carefully distinguished from those illegitimate and informal wars, or rather predatory expeditions, undertaken either without lawful authority or without apparent cause, as likewise without the usual formalities, and solely with a view to plunder. Grotius relates several instances of the latter.5 Such were the enterprises of the grandes compagnies which had assembled in France during the wars with the English, — armies of banditti, who ranged about Europe, purely for spoil and plunder: such were the cruises of the buccaneers, without commission, and in time of peace; and such in general are the depredations of pirates. To the same class belong almost all the expeditions of the Barbary corsairs: though authorized by a sovereign, they are undertaken without any apparent cause, and from no other motive than the lust of plunder. These two species of war, I say, — the lawful and the illegitimate, — are to be carefully distinguished, as the effects and the rights arising from each are very different.

§ 68. Grounds of this distinction.

In order fully to conceive the grounds of this distinction, it is necessary to recollect the nature and object of lawful war. It is only as the last remedy against obstinate injustice that the law of nature allows of war. Hence arise the rights which it gives, as we shall explain in the sequel: hence, likewise, the rules to be observed in it. Since it is equally possible that either of the parties may have right on his side, — and since, in consequence of the independence of nations, that point is not to be decided by others (§ 40), — the condition of the two enemies is the same, while the war lasts. Thus, when a nation, or a sovereign, has declared war against another sovereign on account of a difference arisen between them, their war is what among nations is called a lawful and formal war; and its effects are, by the voluntary law of nations, the same on both sides, independently of the justice of the cause, as we shall more fully show in the sequel.6 Nothing of this kind is the case in an informal and illegitimate war, which is more properly called depredation. Undertaken without any right, without even an apparent cause, it can be productive of no lawful effect, nor give any right to the author of it. A nation attacked by such sort of enemies is not under any obligation to observe towards them the rules prescribed in formal warfare. She may treat them as robbers,(146a) The inhabitants of Geneva, after defeating the famous attempt to take their city by escalade,7 caused all the prisoners whom they took from the Savoyards on that occasion to be hanged up as robbers, who had come to attack them without cause and without a declaration of war. Nor were the Genevese censured for this proceeding, which would have been detested in a formal war.

This, one would think, is obvious about Nation State conduct and those individuals who move outside of the protection of the law of nations and into the law of nature: they have brought their ends upon themselves willingly. On the battlefield no Congress can or should attempt to break with this view, that those fighting, actively in combat or otherwise attempting to do so and then pass themselves off as mere civilians, are due to any recompense on the battlefield. Their ends are left up to the Commander of the Armies and the Navies, that being the Commander in Chief of the US forces. That singular individual is given play, here, as the Sovereign right of a Nation to deal with such outlaws is paramount for the protection of those soldiers operating by the formal rules of war. This is not only the view of the law of nations but has precedent in the United States. The following is exactly how Abraham Lincoln authorized the US Army to deal with things in the Field Manual - 100, of 1863-81, last reprinted in 1898:

Art. 82.

Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or inroads for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commission, without being part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war, but who do so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or with the occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers - such men, or squads of men, are not public enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates.

Do note the language used to distinguish between normal soldiers, due the full treatment of lawful war, and those committing unlawful war. As President Lincoln established this as the law of nations instantiation by his powers of the Admiralty (to distinguish piracy from normal lawful raiders) and that of the Army, he is given the full panoply of determination on land and sea just who is and who is not legitimately waging war against the US. And the summary treatment of highway robbers or pirates, in those days, was no different than the Genevese visited upon those that attacked them unlawfully.

Also note that it is a perfect description of 'terrorist'.

With this we can now form the distinction between those who are 'Revolutionaries' and put on uniform, create government, and are accountable to their activities, from those that are mere insurgents who feel no compunction to be held accountable for anything they do and see themselves as above and beyond all law of man. Congress can create civil law to deal with these individuals, if they are caught outside of the battlefield after joining an organization actively waging Private War on the US. This hard and fast distinction between civil and military law has lasted for centuries and with good reason: it is needed to remove human predators from endangering society.

These definitions now help to define global insurgency as to what its activities will be:

  1. The attacking of any State via means of Private War.
  2. The attempt to remove the distinction between Public and Private War so as to return mankind to the Law of Nature.
  3. Aid given by donation, acquiescence, harboring, aiding, trading or in any way supporting in a physical or monetary way those waging Private War.

This covers immediate military concerns, in point 1, political concerns, in point 2, and their fusion in point 3. These are immediate insurgent views necessary for direct assault on the State system as described by law of nations views. There are also, however, the indirect assaults to weaken or delegitimize the State, and those are usually not just or only military in nature. Also the sorts of attacks are not limited to just externals of States but to the internal workings of them, as in classical insurgency against a State, but carried out as a systemic attack on the law of nations system.

Here the useful paradigm to think about is that promulgated by the 'Greens' groups and parties: "Think Global - Act Local".

The shift to push political systems to direct action is one that is militaristic in bent, if not in direct military support. Indeed, the actual push of 'agendas' may be to weaken or delegitimize State based military groups so as to weaken the defenses of the State for its people. Internally to Nation States, this is a process that seeks to polarize, delegitimize and then shift the power of the State from its normal, accountable, State based system to one that is amenable to the 'action' sought. Normal political based attacks against traditional State military systems then serves the wider purpose of State-to-State intercourse becoming less accountable by the weakening of States, themselves. That shift away from classically described State based systems to one that is pushed to direct action and control by those who have caused the polarization is then one of authoritarianism: by utilizing the push to action to circumvent normal accountability within the State, those seeking to undermine the Nation State system under the law of nations are furthering a non-State, authoritarian system as their outcome.

Classically, these are described as Empires in which a ruling individual or body has direct control over the lives of those within the State and allow only minor and usually ineffective means of feedback. That said, Empires are usually not alone in the world and have other States that they need to act with, thus the basic structure of law of nations re-asserts itself unless that Empire has overwhelming power or capability to over-run or absorb surrounding States. Those forces that seek to delegitimize internal order and accountability to create such an Empire often do not realize that this outcome, in which they will be forced by circumstances to either over-reach or recreate those structures, then puts in charge those least able or capable of shifting that chaos in the position of having to do so.

Classical Empires of Greece, Rome, Egypt, Babylon, and the multiple ones of China, all found that to keep the Empire stable amongst surrounding States (even barbaric ones with rudimentary State concepts) required the creation of internal systems to sustain the Empire, that tended towards direct action and cruelty. No matter how benign the group causing the problems may consider themselves to be, the actual need for a State is to utilize common power to restrict the excesses of society. Those in charge of Empires tend to see even modest dissent as an 'excess' and thus punishable by the State. To create a 'perfect Empire' requires near perfect isolation and no other meaningful State based contacts.

This has only been achieved in a meaningful way in the instances of the Greek Empire under Alexander, multiple instances in China, and Japan during its withdrawal from the world until the arrival of Perry. China, due to its geography, has been able to stage different forms of isolation and create long-lived bureaucracies that then become the true source of sustainment, no matter how much the Sun Emperor is worshipped. After the successful insurgency of post-WWII, China supplanted its traditional, Imperial based system with one that was Communist in name, but Fascistic in design. That traditional bureaucratic State re-asserted itself near instantaneously, and even with the charismatic Mao, it was the bureaucracy that continued on and is now the controlling organization of the State, no matter what the Party itself does. While China has had multiple internal revolts, it has normally taken exterior forces to remove one ruling elite and install another, and no matter who that elite *is* the bureaucratic necessities of the State shift the power from the Elite to the bureaucrat.

The Greek Empire lasted fleetingly under Alexander and, with his death, quickly decayed back to its constituent States. Here the military commanders quickly found themselves overwhelmed by culture and personal power, and those diplomats who had been put aside under Alexander (when not just eliminated) soon found their roles re-instated after his death. The Nations re-arose even if they all did speak Greek for a time, as their ethnic outlooks caused the welds formed by successful military campaigns to fracture under competition between the inheritors of the Empire. Alexander did not have the time nor foresight to create the bureaucracy that China found as necessary to establish internal control and cohesion over varying ethnic groups, so the actual time that the Greek Empire lasted was measured in years, not decades or centuries.

Japan, being an island State, found that its aristocratic class formed a powerful minority far larger in proportion to the peasant population than in Europe. While that class may only have been 1% or so in Europe, in Japan it was approximately 10% and swung that weight around heavily as the aristocracy was greatly militarized to start with. Japan's problem was in the adoption of gunpowder based weapons, and the democratizing effect of them as it takes far less skill to load, aim, shoot, clean and reload a firearm of that era than it did to wield a sword. When the commander of a military expedition in Korea called for more peasantry armed with muskets and no more Bushido, the campaign, itself, was brought back and Japan outlawed firearms as they were far too dangerous to the ruling class to have around. When a barely trained youngster can take down a veteran Bushido with one shot, the power shift had gone unpleasantly against the aristocracy and they would not, as in Europe, accede to this new reality. The centuries of isolation that followed could only happen with an island State able to enforce that isolation and ban trade.

None of these offer useful goals for the modern insurgent, anti-law of nations view, as they each are demonstrably delimiting by events (Alexander's unpreparedness and Geography in the cases of China and Japan) to allow useful replication in an outright form. Thus the modern insurgent must aim to create a global Empire with the necessity of a hard and powerful bureaucracy that, again, shifts control from the hands of the Elite that comes to power to the actual daily functionaries that wield this power. The pathways of computers, robotics and automation do not offer easy solutions to those seeking insurgent ends as these are all labor savings devices in a situation where having too much labor available is a problem. They may try to rely on the Orwellian concept of continual warfare, but they have so delegitimized that in their rise to power, that the actual functioning of the military, itself, comes into question. A shifting to the need of military force during their rise would obviate that, but would also destroy the facade of 'peaceful' and anti-military stances taken during that rise and cause a backlash. The last thing an insurgency wants when it is rising is a new insurgency against *it*, while battling against the COIN of the State(s) involved in trying to retain power.

State based backers of political insurgency against the law of nations and States, then, will garner the following characteristics:

  1. They will attack the legitimate use of arms and traditional military systems of the State. In doing this they will utilize any means necessary to counter support for States and claim that support, itself, to be Fascistic in nature even when it is adhering to classical, liberal State based needs.
  2. They will attack the legitimate functions of the State in areas relegated to the State at the National level. This will include such things as: diplomacy, commerce, immigration, and defense of the Nation.
  3. They will create a 'crisis atmosphere' about problems that cannot be solved, and yet they will call for them to be solved by the State. Thus, in any economic system which has any competition, the outcome is that there will be poor. To end that competition must be ended in the name of 'fairness' and 'equality'. As was done in Soviet Russia and modern China, so, too, will these insurgents call for the increase in State control to meet the exigencies of these 'crises' until the State, itself, becomes the only power allowed to deal with anything, and personal choice and accountability of the State is removed.
  4. On State-to-State functions of diplomacy, these insurgents will demand that treaties be seen either as 'worthless' or 'unequal' or that they must be adhered to when they go against the survival of the State. By changing views on the utility of diplomacy to fit immediate needs and 'crises' created by political views, these insurgents wish to demean and eliminate all normal State-to-State means of diplomatic recourse and normalization.
  5. On any military attempts to reign in other States, this will be depicted as 'imperialistic', 'fascistic', or 'totalitarian', even when all necessary law of nation safeguards have been satisfied. Because the organizing capacity of the military is both admired and feared, it must be destroyed by these insurgent views so as to remove the only effective organ of State-to-State accountability and engender more 'crises' and then claim that either military solutions are always in need, for those things that cannot be solved by military means, or openly attack those instances where all law of nations views are actually performed and to undermine them at every turn.
  6. In matters of trade, no ability of the State to leverage control over trade is supported and all attempts to make trade 'free' of any burdens of the State is supported. In this manner the normal classical liberal means of the State to express societal displeasure or gratitude is ended or undermined, so that trade will no longer serve as a function of State-to-State reciprocity and will always be open to any State no matter how bad or destructive it is.
  7. Insurgents will utilize ethnicity as trumping society and Nation, so that the needs of ethnic enclaves, even within States, are seen as 'more legitimate' than the States they are in. This is generally known as 'Balkanization' to fracture and remove traditional State means for societal adherence to a common ethos. By claiming this both within and amongst States, ethnicity is given as the only deciding factor, unless that actually supports a State or set of States, in which case it is decried as 'isolationism' or 'segregationist'.
  8. Immigration as the function of States is decried as 'discriminatory' and undermined by both State and international groups seeking to delegitimize the classical, western concepts of the State having power to enforce societal views on who can be naturalized into society and who cannot be accepted. By removing that legitimacy and forcing acceptance, the State is further weakened as a concept, until it can no longer control these things and is seen as illegitimate due to that lack of control.
  9. Religion, which as part of the Westphalian view is not to be controlled by the State, is then made into either a controlling State-based view. This is done either by trying to fuse religion with the State or supplanting traditional religions with the State, so that any religious view is automatically a political view. With this no aspect of religious life is outside the purview of the State to control.
  10. In all cases where the State is not given control over society, the political view is that the State must have this for general, nebulous 'good reasons' that fit certain 'crises' that are generated ad nauseam so as to justify the authoritarian views of those involved with promoting such 'crises' and views. Thus the 'ends' become the 'means' so that the activity, itself, is the justification for action and nothing higher is seen as legitimate for justifying action.

This listing is not and cannot be exhaustive, as any insurgency is to take up any means necessary to de-legitimize the State based system and the law of nations itself. Treaties are then put as something 'above the State' instead of merely being the contractual acceptance between States that can be broken by any State for classical, western law of nations reasons. In doing this the claim will be that such views are *supporting* these classical views, but then no actual tracing to such things as the law of nation, the laws of war or other such documents will be done and, instead, mere treaties or doctrinal works secondary to these founding works will be seen as primary.

A long-term insurgent campaign must remove these very works from normal public reading and understanding so that the public has little or no understanding of what classical western culture actually is, and can thus be swayed by rhetoric or hyperbole. By only being able to utilize secondary sources or claiming that there is some 'universal' set of rights that is not founded in the law of nature, laws of war and peace, laws of the admiralty, or the law of nations, can an insurgent campaign hope to be successful in the long run.

Further, science is seen as a tool to create society instead as a system of inquiry into the workings of nature. By trying to misplace the tools of physics, biology, chemistry and geology and fitting them into the non-scientific areas of sociology, psychology and politics, can these basic tools of creating a better world be corrupted and seen, then, as a source of ill instead of the creations of man able to ameliorate the problems of nature. Technology, then, becomes something to be decried as harming 'nature' even when the data will show otherwise. By using pseudo-scientific views of 'nature' and society that have no foundation in science but that have the trappings of science, can the insurgency have any hope of removing the few tools of technology and science available to the State for the betterment of its citizens. Here energy generation, in all cases save those supplied by nature directly, be seen as antithetical to the common use of ordinary citizens and any and all attempts to end such utilization must be pushed as ongoing 'crises'. Actual science, itself, is only used as trappings where it supports such views and then politically attacked when it does not do so.

These, then, are the forms of modern insurgency being waged against the classical, law of nations, Nation State system. It contains military parts (Private War going by the concepts of terrorism and piracy), political parts in support of removal of the legitimate State uses to uphold society (via political views such as Communism, Fascism, Progressivism, or anything which generally supports ideology over discourse and action over accountability), and the fusion of the two via 'political wings' of terror groups and 'action wings' of political groups.

This insurgency against the classical, western law of nations system has been brewing in forms of nihilism and totalitarianism for over a century and are now reaching fruition across the board to delegitimize the entirety of the Nation State system and call for global Empire. Those doing such calling have many voices: IslamoFascists, Progressivists of all stripes, those that promote economics as the only end to liberty, and those seeking to push ethnicity and its fusion with identity politics above the commonality of society to have a State. Be it Caliphate, Transnationalist, or Globalist in views, the concept of these being insurgents to the law of nations State based system are just the same. They will distort any text, any idea to reach their goal of a global Empire that will destroy individuality and put a single, ruling view in place of individual views and common accord amongst individuals.

To counter this requires a COIN campaign that counters it in particulars and changes the outlook of society to one that supports accountability and individualism along with the regularity of Nations as upholding the true diversity of societies on the planet.

That will be upcoming in future works.

22 December 2007

The other form of war and the National toolkit - part 2

Part of the problem that America has with trying to deal with things that are relatively chaotic is the utilization of the 'Ivory Tower' approach to things. This leads to strange disassociations between the Academia, Pundit class and the People as a whole. One of these I looked at is in The Military, The Elites and You and I will pick it out as it is very, very telling about this subject. Before venturing into new military ventures, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had a number of essays on Strategy written as part of a competition. One of them was particularly interesting in showing the disparity between the understanding of the cost of war between the Miliarty, the Elite pundit class and the American People, and some of it was a bit surprising because it looked at the expectation of what the American People would support in the way of casualties:

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Strategy Essay Competition Essays 2000

Casualty Aversion: Implications for Policymakers and Senior Military Officers by Charles K. Hyde

Citation: Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, “A Look at Casualty Aversion: How Many Deaths Are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer,” The Washington Post, November 7, 1999, B3.


Mission NameMilitary EliteCivilian EliteMass Public
Stabilize Congo2844846,861
Prevent Iraqi WMD6,01619,04529,853
Defend Taiwan17,42517,55420,172
Just like with Socialists there is a Theory and Practice Conundrum at work here. The most striking example is that in each of the three proposed military ventures, the American People expected casualties and LOTS of them to accomplish anything. The most conservative in viewing what the American People would support was *not* the Civilian Elite pundits but the Military Elite pundits. Even so it is only be the most serious venture, that of Defending Taiwan, that the actual acceptable deaths in expectation of a venture gets somewhere in the vicinity of the Mass Public view by the two Elite classes. Even then they are hitting at 85% or so of the expectations of the Mass Public. Even more surprising in 1999 is that the acceptable casualties in removing WMD capabilities from Iraq by the Elites come nowhere close (20% and 65% Military and Civilian Elites respectively) to what the Mass Public expected. That number of nearly 30,000 dead in Iraq is not only beyond what was actually seen by a full order of magnitude but well WITHIN what the Military and Civilian Elites expected the US Public to handle. Something has gone seriously wrong when the supposed 'Elites' no longer can even understand what the meaning of 'sacrifice' IS to the American Public.

Obviously something has seriously impacted the 'Theories' of the Elites when tested against the litmus test of the Public. This is not all single source derived: there is more than one set of factors involved, but how they are involved and why they show up like this is most disturbing. America used to have better leadership that was more in-tune with the general population and knew how to understand these things. Just like the Socialist problem, our own Elites have picked up this problem and finding out where that started and why looks to become a very important issue if we wish to remain a Nation.

In part this is due to the shift, over the last 40 years, from the West being manufacturing Nations to becoming service Nations, where the service sector accounts for as much or more than the manufacturing sector of the economy. This is not something seen since the era of State based slavery where the service sector consisted of slaves and very few 'freemen' or 'yeomen' that would work in such areas competitively. The shift after the age of enlightenment to removing slavery and its dehumanizing effects and shifting such jobs to the socially poor and uneducated created an underclass of those that were barely above the position of slave but below that of the 'middle class'. Industrialization before the 20th century would start the shift from agrarian based economies with numerous poor to manufacturing based economies with individuals being better off in terms of wealth and longevity than their agrarian counterparts, but still considered to be in the 'lower class'. That economic pressure and requirement for large amounts of unskilled labor at factories that would garner higher cost per unit of work input would be an underlying cause of the US Civil War, beyond the societal differences and outlook of the humanity of those held as slaves. After the Civil War the shift from agrarian to industrial jobs would transform the Nation in less than 70 years to the point where manufacturing was the predominant driving force of the US economy.

While the US had experienced the first industrialized war in the US Civil War, our views on warfare would remain more rooted in the Antebellum period than in the Industrialized until WWI. That transformation to industry backed warfare on a mass scale did not shift into the diplomatic arena, either, which lagged even behind the political arena. The Philippine-American war by being, essentially, a COIN conflict after the relatively short war that preceded it, would also change our views on warfare, but only in the negative stance of anti-Imperialism. The writers of that era that were against that conflict, amongst them was Mark Twain, would rail against it as Imperialist in nature and view and Congress would reflect that on the pressure to shift civil affairs to local populations. Cuba and Puerto Rico, being geographically closer, would look towards that and US protection in the hemisphere, while the Philippines would gain independence while still having a US presence there. None of that greater Spanish-American war, however, was fought with the full industrial backing of the Nations involved, and so the world would blissfully ignore that shift seen in the Civil War until 1914. That war of mass production would yield mass deaths on the battlefield and yet also shift the emphasis of warfare from the actual battlefield to the sources of sustaining such wars: resources and populations.

To many this seemed a permanent shift in how warfare should be viewed, away from small, professional armies and to mass armies via conscription. Those mass armies, which could be fielded but not well supplied during the Napoleonic era of war, could now be continuously supplied during the industrialized era. The US would move back to its pre-WWI size for armed forces, and be lucky to continue on with a number of veterans from that war that would be able to adapt to new forms of warfare that would show up between the wars. Societies, however, remained like many generals, stuck in the 1914-18 mode of war, which properly horrified them as warfare had shifted its stance as a martial way to determine borders or put down uprisings, to something that could endanger entire Nations and societies. Smaller conflicts would continue and only the very poorly thought out US intervention in Haiti from 1915-34 would remind the Nation of these mid-sized wars and leave a bad taste in everyone's mouth for its utter failure. Before Vietnam there was Haiti, and that experience is one that the Nation did not learn from as it was mainly forgotten during that inter-war period. That was the second, major COIN conflict the US was involved in and it failed due to politics and shifting priorities and a basic misunderstanding of what needed to be done, if it could be done at all.

WWII would bring mechanized industrial war that would lead to Total War and the specter of that changing into Nuclear War. After it the US was confronted by the existential threat of Communism which would expend its economy endlessly on arms but offer very little to its own people in return. To confront that the US only partially demobilized after WWII but retained the Draft so as to have an expanded military that could increase in volume at need. Small wars suddenly became 'brushfire wars' that could threaten the polar stability of geopolitics, and each side worked to make sure that they did not expand beyond limited scope. South Korea would put the Communist Bloc of China and the USSR against a UN coalition that could be created once the USSR and China walked out of the Security Council. That war was a direct polar confrontation using the proxies of North and South Korea backed by arms and personnel from the two polar sides. Not only did the Chinese military get involved, but the Soviet air force as well, creating the first opportunity for a relatively minor war, that would have been a COIN war at any time before 1940, suddenly expand into a global confrontation. China was unwilling to allow a Western client state to be on its borders and responded to make that a very real possibility and all sides were satisfied with an unsatisfactory ceasefire and the original borders to add into a Cold War stalemate.

The US would also be having its first troops going into Vietnam which would prove out to be a traditional war started by unconventional means that shifted to conventional and then back to unconventional and finally lost by withdrawal of the US. That shift from guerrilla war as proxy for the USSR and then to direct backing via North Vietnamese arms went unnoticed by the US population until the realization hit home that there was fighting and killing going on with a good size of US forces and the US was not pressing this home to victory. When that shift to NVA military forces hit, the US was well equipped to respond and still practice COIN work, but the media that reported on it had been blinded by WWII and the Korean War into thinking that all wars that did not involve direct Large Power conflicts would be easily won via conventional means. Between 1934 and the final failure in Haiti and 1967, almost two generations of reporters had passed through the media without ever experiencing such a conflict and from 1910, that would shift to being nearly four generations since the last successful mid-scale US COIN conflict. No one could properly report on it from the US media as no one knew what a COIN war actually looked like when fought by the US. The US media was crying 'defeat' when both the COIN war against the Viet Cong and the major conventional war against the NVA had been broken in the favor of the US and South Vietnam. US interdiction to stop re-supply of insurgents and to end conventional build-up was seen as a 'never ending' war while, in fact, it had the effect of breaking North Vietnamese morale. Only once the US media turned on the war did that interior support in North Vietnam shift to one of thinking that the US could be forced to leave just by continued low-level fighting.

While the US public had never seen the means of post-WWII conventional war until Vietnam and were horrified by it, they also were used to thinking in the Napoleonic terms and Law of Nations terms about how to conduct such wars. This is, partially, a reflexive action to the brutality of Total War and an attempt to bring some civilized outlook back into warfare. That outlook served well in WWII, even when relatively civilized but highly industrialized enemies acted in brutal fashion towards POWs, as was the case with Japan. Against enemies that had almost NO industrial capability and that were supplied by Large Power Nations, the US population would not make the mental shift to call such activities as they had been known by in previous eras: Privateering by Nations.

When one supports a military organization composed of self-guiding private citizens under their own means to fight wars for you, that is Privateering even without capture and prizes involved. Mercenaries will fight only for money and shift sides based on payment, not based on ideology. Privateers adhere to ideology and their Nation but require payment to 'join in the fighting' or for them to volunteer services and then fight under the banner of their Nation in uniform and be identified as such a fighter. North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba all served in that role for the USSR and each received direct payment in cash, weapons and training to confront Western powers. As each of these was ideologically aligned with the USSR (or at least anti-US or anti-Western) and would fight given money and arms, they did so. Before the modern era this concept of Privateering would generally relate to groups below the Nation State level in the form of citizen-privateers that would be for high seas work or in small companies for ground combat. Going back into history this is not unknown, but it was never the main mode of warfare. This goes beyond the 'mutual defense pact' form of foreign policy that Nations used prior to WWI (and which would, ultimately, drag in large Nations when their smaller allies, that they swore to defend, were attacked) to the utilization of paid-for ideologically oriented small Nation proxies to front a war by the larger Nation. This is an inexact analogy, at best, but does offer some insights into how war is seen by National leaders and by populations.

As seen during the Cold War with Privateer-Proxy Nations fighting for their Large Nation backers on a frequent basis this concept would grow to include Nations who not only have sovereign right to wage war but that could require actual payment and material to join in such a conflict. By putting ideology first and believing that this was the single driving force amongst Communist regimes, the hard cash and material payments went unnoticed and unregarded by most, and yet such wars would have been absolutely impossible without them. This is not just alignment by treaty for 'self-protection', but a movement from war fought for Nationalist reasons to one purely based on ideological ones. When Nations cannot sustain a large, indigenous military capacity and can find a Large Nation backer willing to pay for that smaller Nation to fight in a 'proxy war', one is no longer talking about standard Nationalist warfare, but to paid-for warfare that became Transnationalist in scope, with the Privateering organization size shifting up beyond companies to that of Nations. By not having employed Privateers for nearly a century by the point of Vietnam, the media and the US public couldn't even define what that meant and lumped it in with 'piracy' being unable to see the defining elements of a different form of warfare.

Still does, come to think of it.

Privateering is 'the other way of war' that the US Constitution gives to Congress in Article I, Section 8. It is the direct Congressional Authorization to US citizens to be armed with the weapons of war, be held accountable to the laws of war and to fight as the Nation needs you to as directed by the President. Congress authorizes Privateers and gives the bonus of their being able to capture enemy ships, equipment and stores for auction as a form of 'profit' to those individuals and companies that take up such work. That is a 'pay for performance' concept along with 'bonus' for successfully capturing those things designated as needing interdiction along with their means of conveyance. It is, inherently, economic warfare and the one means of directly confronting Nations economically that is handed to Congress along with the major force warfare power.

In previous eras Privateers have tended to turn into Pirates due to lack of direct accountability: ships that had months of sailing time were very hard to keep in-line and when they turned Pirate the very information might take a year or more to get back to the home Nation so that it can respond. Privateers who did turn Pirate had a limited lifespan as they were no longer practicing State sanctioned war, but were International Outlaws waging war to their own ends. With mass armies, industrialized warfare and swift communication, the need for Privateers diminished to near nothing, although Pirates still, to this day, exist and threaten commerce not only on the high seas, but on land as well.

That was the 'civilizing' effect of the 20th century by shifting away from Privateering and towards Nation state war as the only means of war: making wars larger, bloodier, nastier, and creating higher death tolls via the use of weaponry refined enough so that a handful of individuals could kill tens if not hundreds of individuals in minutes. The Cold War would center on large-scale Nation State based warfare and, at the same time, due to the killing scope of thermonuclear weapons, make it extremely deadly and unlikely that either side would want to wage such a conflict. By centralizing National thoughts on such things, and worrying about them, and in attempting to push ALL conflicts under that rubric, citizens of Nations started to level out warfare in their minds so that all combat became equal, no matter who waged it or why.

Because Privateering in its older sense, not the Communist 'pay off ideological friends to fight for you so if anyone gets nuked they will be the first and not me' sort of deal, involved the Congress utilizing its international commerce regulation powers, it falls directly under DIME as a tool. That is because the main elements of it are: Information, Military and Economic. The President, put in charge of their utilization for the Nation puts in: Diplomatic. This completes the entire suite of associational elements to make this a DIME tool. Yes, before the modern, industrialized age one can put such a thing into the 18th century context of the power of a Nation and find that a DIME tool for warfare existed and was acknowledged as a legitimate form of warfare.

Without this form of warfare being made available via Congress, these 'medium sized' conflicts would embroil the armed forces of the United States and our Allies to confront the third-world Nations fronting for the Soviet Union. By supplying such Nations with arms, equipment and other war material, the basis of starting those conflicts went unaddressed. The logic of total war requires removing the source of war material supplies by attacking them, thus seeing the population of a Nation that is in the manufacturing sector as a legitimate target. That could not be done in the cases of Vietnam or Korea as the backing was via this thing known as 'commerce'. To unlimber the armed forces of the United States requires a declaration of war or other major commitment by Congress which gives sweeping power in all areas of warfare, thus making the bloodiest, nastiest and most brutal form of warfare the ONLY option in the DIME toolkit. Training, supplying and supporting an ally under attack is all well and good, but when Congress is unwilling to give its full commitment to war and the foreign policy set by the President is to still do something more than supply and train, Congress must give some view on its sole part of foreign policy and that is via trade regularization with foreign nations. That is the commerce form of warfare and the tool for that is not, of necessity, the armed forces of the Union but the citizenry that is willing to take up arms to end such commerce of enemies that threaten our allies and our trade with allies. By authorizing such citizens to fight under the banner of the Union in recognizable uniform the President then gains the ability to set tasks to those citizens with set pay and/or prize capture.

America's primary COIN form, to be utilized overseas when the larger armed forces of the Union are not needed are Privateers. A President that delineates the trade that is harming our allies or attacks upon US commercial interest overseas can succinctly name groups, individuals and even Nations as having an adverse effect upon the US and its allies in specific areas and that the US will utilize its Privateering ability to counter that. Via this spectrum of warfare view, two conflicts seen as relatively equivalent soon fall into different categories: Nation state warfare and Privateering warfare.

South Korea's defense required the troops of the Union to counter North Korea and its Chinese and Soviet backers - thus that was a prime form of Nation State warfare.

South Vietnam facing insurgents at the start in the late 1950's and early 1960's was one in which the Viet Cong (and similar allies) were supplied by trade. The response of the US is to supply, arm and train South Vietnamese by our armed forces and to seek Privateering groups to do the small forces work to knock out the supply lines. To counter small forces you use small forces given ability to be independent operators to go after specific types and goods of trade and the US gets to see who is supplying such goods and where their origin is. That evidence becomes a primary tool in DIME to hold the source Nations accountable, and ask them to end it as this is breaking the sovereignty of the Nation being attacked and that is an ally of the United States.

Supplying Nations to fight Public War, above board, is the goal of the concept of Nation states, so that such views are Publicly stated and held by Nations so that other Nations can understand what is going on.

Supplying 'insurgents', 'terrorists', 'freedom fighters' or any other group that has NOT declared themselves to be a sovereign Nation (by having been recognized as such by at least on other power or having put up government and accountability structures during their Public Civil War) is creating a Private War.

The guiding rules of how to assign reciprocity of punishment are set up in this part of Article I, Section 8 of the US Constitution:
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

[..]

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

[..]

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
These powers are specifically to address not only warfare but to give the Union ability to respond to lesser offenses against the Nation that are not a cause to directly go to war. Utilizing Law of Nations, which gets specific mention in the US Constitution, we can then get a view as to what these things actually are and how our Nation is to be guided by the forthright concept of being a Nation. Here then are the opening paragraphs in Book 2, Ch. 4 of that work:
§ 49. Right to security.
IN vain does nature prescribe to nations, as well as to individuals, the care of self-preservation, and of advancing their own perfection and happiness, if she does not give them a right to preserve themselves from every thing that might render this care ineffectual. This right is nothing more than a moral power of acting, that is, the power of doing what is morally possible — what is proper and conformable to our duties. We have, then, in general, a right to do whatever is necessary to the discharge of our duties. Every nation, as well as every man, has, therefore, a right to prevent other nations from obstructing her preservation, her perfection, and happiness, — that is, to preserve herself from all injuries (§ 18): and this right is a perfect one, since it is given to satisfy a natural and indispensable obligation: for, when we cannot use constraint in order to cause our rights to be respected, their effects are very uncertain. It is this right to preserve herself from all injury that is called the right to security.

§ 50. It produces the right of resistance;
It is safest to prevent the evil when it can be prevented. A nation has a right to resist an injurious attempt, and to make use of force and every honourable expedient against whosoever is actually engaged in opposition to her, and even to anticipate his machinations, observing, however, not to attack him upon vague and uncertain suspicions, lest she should incur the imputation of becoming herself an unjust aggressor.

§ 51. and that of obtaining reparation;
When the evil is done, the same right to security authorizes the offended party to endeavour to obtain a complete reparation, and to employ force for that purpose if necessary.

§ 52. and the right of punishing.
Finally, the offended party have a right to provide for their future security, and to chastise the offender, by inflicting upon him a punishment capable of deterring him thenceforward from similar aggressions, and of intimidating those who might be tempted to imitate him. They may even, if necessary, disable the aggressor from doing further injury. They only make use of their right in all these measures, which they adopt with good reason: and if evil thence results to him who has reduced them to the necessity of taking such steps, he must impute the consequences only to his own injustice.

§ 53. Right of all nations against a mischievous people.
If, then, there is anywhere a nation of a restless and mischievous disposition, ever ready to injure others, to traverse their designs and to excite domestic disturbances in their dominions, — it is not to be doubted that all the others have a right to form a coalition in order to repress and chastise that nation, and to put it for ever after out of her power to injure them. Such would be the just fruits of the policy which Machiavel praises in Cæsar Borgia. The conduct followed by Philip II. king of Spain, was calculated to unite all Europe against him; and it was from just reasons that Henry the Great formed the design of humbling a power whose strength was formidable, and whose maxims were pernicious.

The three preceding propositions are so many principles that furnish the various foundations for a just war, as we shall see in the proper place.

§ 54. No nation has a right to interfere in the government of another state.
It is an evident consequence of the liberty and independence of nations, that all have a right to be governed as they think proper, and that no state has the smallest right to interfere in the government of another. Of all the rights that can belong to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious, and that which other nations ought the most scrupulously to respect, if they would not do her an injury.(105)

[..]

§ 57. Right of opposing the interference of foreign powers in the affairs of government.
After having established the position that foreign nations have no right to interfere in the government of an independent state, it is not difficult to prove that the latter has a right to oppose such interference. To govern herself according to her own pleasure, is a necessary part of her independence. A sovereign state cannot be constrained in this respect, except it be from a particular right which she has herself given to other states by her treaties; and, even if she has given them such a right, yet it cannot, in an affair of so delicate a nature as that of government, be extended beyond the clear and express terms of the treaties. In every other case, a sovereign has a right to treat those as enemies who attempt to interfere in his domestic affairs otherwise than by their good offices.
In those paragraphs are the rights of sovereign Nations not to be interfered with by outsiders. In para. 50 those that make injury or attempt to need not be a Nation. Any group that or organization that attempts to do that gives the right of response to those being injured. Then in 51 the right of force is given, and that, predicated on 50, is not just against Nations. From 52 is the right to guarantee FUTURE security via attacking any that so injure a Nation in chastisement. From diplomacy against Nations to the use of arms against Nations unwilling to utilize diplomacy in a manner to address such ills, or the plain right to attack those that have attacked, the right of a Nation to be secure in its internal affairs is sacrosanct.

The Korean War cannot be lumped in with Vietnam on a size or scale concept as they were two different affairs at start. Korea was a willful Nation attacking its neighbor to overrun it, while Vietnam was the interference of one Nation (or set of Nations) in the affairs of another without any due process between Nations to recognize it. The first was lawful war, the second unlawful due to the Nature of its starting point. Both required a response from the US, and they got the exact, same response of sending in the armed forces. In the first case that is wholly justified to help a friend and ally under attack. In the second, the scaling up of the armed forces from an advisory and teaching role to one of direct combat was ill-advised without first calling attention not only to the immediate source of destabilization, that being North Vietnam, but to the overall source of arms and equipment, that being the USSR and holding *both* accountable. The duty of the armed forces was not to decide that: that was a political matter between the Executive and Legislative branches. Any failure in Vietnam is directly traceable to the two branches of government guiding such actions having not communicated with each other and neither of them properly doing their jobs. With fully presented evidence of Soviet utilization of North Vietnam for destabilizing its neighbors, the first response of a minimal amount of troops to help bolster the South was a good one, if taken in consultation with each other. As the form of warfare was economically based and endangering our trade with an ally, Congress could and should have stepped into its role of defending *that* via authorizing citizens to interdict such trade and the President to give specific areas to remove it while pursuing further diplomatic work by exposing such evidence of interference and putting forward that both the immediate and ultimate backers were interfering in the sovereignty of South Vietnam, an ally of the US, and we would treat it as such in all venues and that the President and Congress would seek to interdict such trade that enables this as a first, and lowest measure to hold the parties accountable.

Within Book 3, Ch. III on the Just Causes of War, we find that not only are just causes necessary but proper motives:
§ 29. Both justificatory reasons and proper motives requisite in undertaking a war.
As the nation, or her ruler, ought, in every undertaking, not only to respect justice, but also to keep in view the advantage of the state, it is necessary that proper and commendable motives should concur with the justificatory reasons, to induce a determination to embark in a war. These reasons show that the sovereign has a right to take up arms, that he has just cause to do so. The proper motives show, that in the present case it is advisable and expedient to make use of his right. These latter relate to prudence, as the justificatory reasons come under the head of justice.

§ 30. Proper motives.
I call proper and commendable motives those derived from the good of the state, from the safety and common advantage of the citizens. They are inseparable from the justificatory reasons, — a breach of justice being never truly advantageous. Though an unjust war may for a time enrich a state, and extend her frontiers, it renders her odious to other nations, and exposes her to the danger of being crushed by them. Besides, do opulence and extent of dominion always constitute the happiness of states? Amidst the multitude of examples which might here be quoted, let us confine our view to that of the Romans. The Roman republic ruined herself by her triumphs, by the excess of her conquests and power. Rome, when mistress of the world, but enslaved by tyrants and oppressed by a military government, had reason to deplore the success of her arms, and to look back with regret on those happy times when her power did not extend beyond the bounds of Italy, or even when her dominion was almost confined within the circuit of her walls.

Vicious motives are those which have not for their object the good of the state, and which, instead of being drawn from that pure source, are suggested by the violence of the passions. Such are the arrogant desire of command, the ostentation of power, the thirst of riches, the avidity of conquest, hatred, and revenge.
By taking a least intrusive approach to sustaining the sovereignty of an ally, and using means less than outright warfare, the United States possesses a spectrum of capability to meet aggressors and demonstrate that they are, indeed, aggressors at base and that by using minimum means a civilized pathway out of such aggression is sought. In the concept of DIME, this is a shift via the Military to means less than war but still aggressive on defense via Economic means using Information to enable Diplomacy to work out a solution to a problem. None of these actions puts a Nation at war, although there may be some fighting going on in pursuit of it. Most Nations, even aggressive ones, do not want outright warfare and do not seek this out as a means to further their ends at start. By putting military equipment interdiction on North Vietnam, if it can be caught and stopped by authorized civilians working in a military capacity, we also put court jurisdiction over judging if each case has been done properly and in accordance with the directives of Congress and the President.

This is different than a pure embargo, which tends to be the only choice left to modern Nations, as it utilizes civilians to find necessary shipping intelligence, verify it and act upon it in accordance with the restrictions set by Congress and the President. This is also different than direct warfare, as it is a commerce power to capture and interdict trade of certain goods based on the ability of citizenry to find and stop it. Such citizens can seek leeway and help, on land and at sea, via other Nations friendly to such things or willing to see such trade ended. Citizens take up the responsibility to act within the bounds they are given, and yet are more free in their leeway as the exacting structure of the armed forces is not upon them. By calculating risks and rewards, citizens weigh their activities in risking their lives for the needs of the Union.

Flipping this to the immediate era of COIN, we come across the form of warfare known as Private War. All of those that are not Nations that take up the means of war against a Nation are waging Private War. It is Private not in the stance of publicity, of which that can be voluminous, but in these not being Public Enemies from a Nation with the backing of a Nation. A Public Enemy is seen thusly in paragraph 69:
§ 69. Who is an enemy.(147)
THE enemy is he with whom a nation is at open war. The Latins had a particular term (Hostis) to denote a public enemy, and distinguished him from a private enemy (Inimicus). Our language affords but one word for these two classes of persons, who ought, nevertheless to be carefully distinguished. A private enemy is one who seeks to hurt us, and takes pleasure in the evil that befalls us. A public enemy forms claims against us, or rejects ours, and maintains his real or pretended rights by force of arms. The former is never innocent; he fosters rancour and hatred in his heart. It is possible that the public enemy may be free from such odious sentiments, that he does not wish us ill, and only seeks to maintain his rights. This observation is necessary in order to regulate the dispositions of our heart towards a public enemy.
Thus a Private Enemy are private individuals in their groups taking up the means of war to their own ends. We are most used to Piracy in this, in which Nationality does not matter so much as vulnerability and amount of spoils, but the class of Private War holds Piracy, not Piracy holding Private War. This is gone through in the opening paragraphs of Book III, Chapter 1, paras 1-5. Because terrorists are private individuals using the weapons of war to wage war against Nations, they are all taking part in Private Warfare. Many of them also attack shipping (both in ports and on the high seas) which is Piracy. Those that wage Private War are not just in doing so, not being Nations and have no proper motives by not declaring sovereignty, rule of law, accountable military structure and identifying themselves as a Nation. By not being a Nation, or attempting to be a Nation in the immediate sense, these individuals have stepped beyond the Law of Nations and into the Law of Nature. Nor can any justifications be considered *just* as they refuse to do those things that would allow justice to prevail.

Also note that those waging Private War cannot declare peace: they are not a Nation and that, too, is the sole realm of Nations. Even in disbanding and trying to show that the organization they had is no more, the individuals involved are still considered to be at war. Private War only ends when all individuals professing it are put to an end or delivered up for justice to determine their fate. These individuals cannot make a treaty for they have no National basis for doing so and being held accountable as a Nation for such a treaty.

From that, those attacked by those making Private War need not declare war to go after such individuals with the full power of warfare. By stepping outside the realm of Nation to Nation justice and the rights of Nations to be secure under the Law of Nations, those joining up against a Nation without the backing of any Nation have made a life-long endeavor of that work. A Nation so attacked may do *anything* to rid the planet of those that attacked it: the Law of Nations exists between Nations in their adherence to being Nations so that a threat to any single Nation by those waging Private War is a threat to all Nations. Vattel makes this perfectly clear in the following paragraphs in Book III:
§ 67. It is to be distinguished from informal and unlawful war.
Legitimate and formal warfare must be carefully distinguished from those illegitimate and informal wars, or rather predatory expeditions, undertaken either without lawful authority or without apparent cause, as likewise without the usual formalities, and solely with a view to plunder. Grotius relates several instances of the latter.5 Such were the enterprises of the grandes compagnies which had assembled in France during the wars with the English, — armies of banditti, who ranged about Europe, purely for spoil and plunder: such were the cruises of the buccaneers, without commission, and in time of peace; and such in general are the depredations of pirates. To the same class belong almost all the expeditions of the Barbary corsairs: though authorized by a sovereign, they are undertaken without any apparent cause, and from no other motive than the lust of plunder. These two species of war, I say, — the lawful and the illegitimate, — are to be carefully distinguished, as the effects and the rights arising from each are very different.

§ 68. Grounds of this distinction.
In order fully to conceive the grounds of this distinction, it is necessary to recollect the nature and object of lawful war. It is only as the last remedy against obstinate injustice that the law of nature allows of war. Hence arise the rights which it gives, as we shall explain in the sequel: hence, likewise, the rules to be observed in it. Since it is equally possible that either of the parties may have right on his side, — and since, in consequence of the independence of nations, that point is not to be decided by others (§ 40), — the condition of the two enemies is the same, while the war lasts. Thus, when a nation, or a sovereign, has declared war against another sovereign on account of a difference arisen between them, their war is what among nations is called a lawful and formal war; and its effects are, by the voluntary law of nations, the same on both sides, independently of the justice of the cause, as we shall more fully show in the sequel.6 Nothing of this kind is the case in an informal and illegitimate war, which is more properly called depredation. Undertaken without any right, without even an apparent cause, it can be productive of no lawful effect, nor give any right to the author of it. A nation attacked by such sort of enemies is not under any obligation to observe towards them the rules prescribed in formal warfare. She may treat them as robbers,(146a) The inhabitants of Geneva, after defeating the famous attempt to take their city by escalade,7 caused all the prisoners whom they took from the Savoyards on that occasion to be hanged up as robbers, who had come to attack them without cause and without a declaration of war. Nor were the Genevese censured for this proceeding, which would have been detested in a formal war.
Private War is unlawful war and not to be confused with mere unjust and unmotivated war by a Nation, which still uses all of the proper means and reciprocities between Nations to fight such. As this is the basis of all diplomacy and all understanding by Nations, this means that those waging Private War fall outside of the Geneva Conventions, and any attempt to change that, as was done in 1977, makes this civilized world *less* civilized by granting any dignity to those that take up arms unlawfully. Which is one of the many reasons the US refuses to sign it: it violates the US Constitution which, itself, is based on the Law of Nations.

From that, every citizen, every Privateer, every member of the armed forces must work to end the Private Enemies of a Nation. As Congress has seen fit to classify those giving mere aid and comfort to such Private Enemies in the case of Piracy as only deserving 10 years if they are caught on the civil side of things, then it, too, should draft such law to address the Private Enemies of the Nation. For those that engage in Piracy, it is now life imprisonment, as well as those engaging directly with such, and there is no reason that Congress, under its Article I, Section 8 powers should not address Private Enemies likewise.

COIN then is not *just* an area delimited problem for Private Enemies as they may show up anywhere in this era of cheap and easy long distance travel. As we do not have those laws, and they are simple, single sentences, not voluminous page works of impossible to define work like the current 'terrorism laws', they are easy to communicate and, because they are grounded in the Law of Nations, universal in scope. A price on the head of every member of al Qaeda is, indeed, the way to go as a *start*, but the threat posed by *any* organization waging Private War is deadly to all of mankind and the Nations we have formed. By being unable to state this clearly, by being unable to say that like with Piracy any Nation giving aid and help to those waging Private War have declared their Nation outlaw in doing so, we have become less civilized in the 20th century due to the era of large scale mass warfare that turned to Total War. The fine and splendid tools to try and deal with the bipolar world of the Cold War has now left Nations schizophrenic in being unable to state that Warfare is something that is lawful only for Nations and that any others practicing it are outlaws.

Over the past two years or so of writing I have seen a slow but steady trickle of those who understand this very, very basic notion of warfare that is *not* Declared War but hostilities meant to punish short of war. The National armed forces are not set up for this kind of 'other war': they are the hard and fast means to hold other Nations accountable for their actions when they endanger the peace of our Nation or those that are our allies and friends. The National armed forces build up via the common commitment of the Nation through taxes and industrial payments for specific needs in that realm. Terrorists, however, disavow this form of warfare and, as Lincoln would promulgate for the armies of the Union, when they are found on the battlefield they get summary justice as mere highway robbers or pirates during wartime: there is no judge nor jury on the battlefield and these ones get that summary decision when captured or voluntarily giving up in combat. These are not even spies that get a first glance to ensure that they are, indeed, not wearing a uniform upon claim of being a soldier for a Nation. This lesser form of conflict by those willing to accept provisional payment to be sent after the enemies of the Union are not soldiers of the Nation, but Citizens volunteering as they are to meet criteria set by Congress to receive the ability to fight under the flag and be held accountable to the Nation via its military laws. Many who are too sickly to be in the armed forces, can do *that* and use civilian means to compensate for their lacks and yet still serve a useful role in confronting the enemies of the Nation. In previous eras those that had merchant ships served on this basis, not only in the commercial realm but seeking the prize for capturing or eliminating enemy commerce. These things are openly declared hostilities by Congress and guided by the Executive: they are not mercenaries nor terrorists nor anything other than private Citizens willing to risk their lives for just reward in protecting the Nation.

Those numbers we saw at the beginning are a reflection of the basic American impulse towards understanding such sacrifice for the Nation: it sets aside the full force of Warfare and yet still recognizes the need for letting an enemy know they are being hounded. One of the things Privateers could do was to slip in amongst normal commerce and learn valuable information to find their goals. No Army or Navy on this planet that is an official National arm can do that: only private citizens can. Americans have come to expect sacrifice by individuals in the form of blood, limbs and lives expended to meet the Nation's goals. While the National government slips into disarray, and cannot remember its actual role in protecting the Nation, the Citizenry does, even when not directly taught these things and the education establishment tries to banish them. Citizenship is *not* an entitlement enterprise, but a duty to the Nation that includes one's life.

Those who wish this to be otherwise, that wish to be a mere parasite on the Nation and receive only all that is good from it, denounce this form of warfare as 'archaic and uncivilized', thus missing the point that this form of warfare was used multiple times by the US through its history and that its recent non-use is not because we have given it up on a permanent basis. As with any toolbox, the tools still sit there, gathering some dust but still fitting the nature of the Nation itself. Americans reject a 'draft' or 'conscription' to fight those waging Private War upon us. By putting forth that *only* the armed forces are to try these sorts of things we cut ourselves off from the deepest meaning of being a republic of free people: We accept the responsibilities of the Nation when government CAN NOT do some things.

That is why charity begins at home and NOT in the offices of Foggy Bottom in the State Department. Those individuals are clueless on what good works are and what they mean to those involved. That should be the last place to seek charitable projects, not the first.

Similarly the armed forces are to hold Nations at bay during times of extreme trouble for the Nation. These moderate to small wars of COIN venues are not the best place for those armed forces save in the clean-up and aftermath of a Nation state war. Confronting these enemies on a global basis takes a National view but not necessarily a high military view to get things done. Sending the armed forces on 'peace keeping' and 'Nation building' excursions hither and yon actually makes the Nation less safe as the People of the US are alienated from such missions. 'Stopping the killing' is all very noble, but that is not our goal - to be the World's Policeman. That is what those who are lazy wish: for the US to be the 'nice cop' and clean things up globally and take all the blame for it when that goes wrong. Unfortunately that requires quite a bit of Congressional authorization per place, and Congress has balked, repeatedly, on that issue over decades. The view of 'only' the armed forces now leaves us defenseless against those who take up the weapons of war for Private War by not seeing the civilized route of an armed populace being the mainstay protector of the Nation. Not every enemy that threatens the Nation is a Public Enemy, and the Private Enemies need dealing with just as the Public ones do.

So long as that tool goes unused in the National Toolbox, we will always be at peril from those who are no Nation that take up war against us. That is the civilized way to go, or so our founders put forward. Perhaps we have become less civilized than they were in understanding the threats to liberty and freedom, and the costs of the duty of citizens to maintain them.

This ends part 2 of the National toolkit