| 1 | /*
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| 2 | * Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
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| 3 | * Generate AFS tickets
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| 4 | * Copyright (C) Volker Lendecke 2003
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| 5 | *
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| 6 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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| 7 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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| 8 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
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| 9 | * (at your option) any later version.
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| 10 | *
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| 11 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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| 12 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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| 13 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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| 14 | * GNU General Public License for more details.
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| 15 | *
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| 16 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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| 17 | * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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| 18 | */
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| 19 |
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| 20 | #include "includes.h"
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| 21 |
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| 22 | #ifdef WITH_FAKE_KASERVER
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| 23 |
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| 24 | #define NO_ASN1_TYPEDEFS 1
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| 25 |
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| 26 | #include <afs/param.h>
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| 27 | #include <afs/stds.h>
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| 28 | #include <afs/afs.h>
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| 29 | #include <afs/auth.h>
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| 30 | #include <afs/venus.h>
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| 31 | #include <asm/unistd.h>
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| 32 | #include <openssl/des.h>
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| 33 |
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| 34 | struct ClearToken {
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| 35 | uint32 AuthHandle;
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| 36 | char HandShakeKey[8];
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| 37 | uint32 ViceId;
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| 38 | uint32 BeginTimestamp;
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| 39 | uint32 EndTimestamp;
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| 40 | };
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| 41 |
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| 42 | static char *afs_encode_token(const char *cell, const DATA_BLOB ticket,
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| 43 | const struct ClearToken *ct)
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| 44 | {
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| 45 | char *base64_ticket;
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| 46 | char *result = NULL;
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| 47 |
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| 48 | DATA_BLOB key = data_blob(ct->HandShakeKey, 8);
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| 49 | char *base64_key;
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| 50 | TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
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| 51 |
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| 52 | mem_ctx = talloc_stackframe();
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| 53 | if (mem_ctx == NULL)
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| 54 | goto done;
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| 55 |
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| 56 | base64_ticket = base64_encode_data_blob(mem_ctx, ticket);
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| 57 | if (base64_ticket == NULL)
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| 58 | goto done;
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| 59 |
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| 60 | base64_key = base64_encode_data_blob(mem_ctx, key);
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| 61 | if (base64_key == NULL)
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| 62 | goto done;
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| 63 |
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| 64 | asprintf(&result, "%s\n%u\n%s\n%u\n%u\n%u\n%s\n", cell,
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| 65 | ct->AuthHandle, base64_key, ct->ViceId, ct->BeginTimestamp,
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| 66 | ct->EndTimestamp, base64_ticket);
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| 67 |
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| 68 | DEBUG(10, ("Got ticket string:\n%s\n", result));
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| 69 |
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| 70 | done:
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| 71 | TALLOC_FREE(mem_ctx);
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| 72 |
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| 73 | return result;
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| 74 | }
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| 75 |
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| 76 | /* Create a ClearToken and an encrypted ticket. ClearToken has not yet the
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| 77 | * ViceId set, this should be set by the caller. */
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| 78 |
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| 79 | static bool afs_createtoken(const char *username, const char *cell,
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| 80 | DATA_BLOB *ticket, struct ClearToken *ct)
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| 81 | {
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| 82 | fstring clear_ticket;
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| 83 | char *p = clear_ticket;
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| 84 | uint32 len;
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| 85 | uint32 now;
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| 86 |
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| 87 | struct afs_key key;
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| 88 | des_key_schedule key_schedule;
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| 89 |
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| 90 | if (!secrets_init())
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| 91 | return False;
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| 92 |
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| 93 | if (!secrets_fetch_afs_key(cell, &key)) {
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| 94 | DEBUG(1, ("Could not fetch AFS service key\n"));
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| 95 | return False;
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| 96 | }
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| 97 |
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| 98 | ct->AuthHandle = key.kvno;
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| 99 |
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| 100 | /* Build the ticket. This is going to be encrypted, so in our
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| 101 | way we fill in ct while we still have the unencrypted
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| 102 | form. */
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| 103 |
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| 104 | p = clear_ticket;
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| 105 |
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| 106 | /* The byte-order */
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| 107 | *p = 1;
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| 108 | p += 1;
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| 109 |
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| 110 | /* "Alice", the client username */
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| 111 | strncpy(p, username, sizeof(clear_ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,clear_ticket)-1);
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| 112 | p += strlen(p)+1;
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| 113 | strncpy(p, "", sizeof(clear_ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,clear_ticket)-1);
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| 114 | p += strlen(p)+1;
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| 115 | strncpy(p, cell, sizeof(clear_ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,clear_ticket)-1);
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| 116 | p += strlen(p)+1;
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| 117 |
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| 118 | /* Alice's network layer address. At least Openafs-1.2.10
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| 119 | ignores this, so we fill in a dummy value here. */
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| 120 | SIVAL(p, 0, 0);
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| 121 | p += 4;
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| 122 |
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| 123 | /* We need to create a session key */
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| 124 | generate_random_buffer(p, 8);
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| 125 |
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| 126 | /* Our client code needs the the key in the clear, it does not
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| 127 | know the server-key ... */
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| 128 | memcpy(ct->HandShakeKey, p, 8);
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| 129 |
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| 130 | p += 8;
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| 131 |
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| 132 | /* This is a kerberos 4 life time. The life time is expressed
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| 133 | * in units of 5 minute intervals up to 38400 seconds, after
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| 134 | * that a table is used up to lifetime 0xBF. Values between
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| 135 | * 0xC0 and 0xFF is undefined. 0xFF is defined to be the
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| 136 | * infinite time that never expire.
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| 137 | *
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| 138 | * So here we cheat and use the infinite time */
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| 139 | *p = 255;
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| 140 | p += 1;
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| 141 |
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| 142 | /* Ticket creation time */
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| 143 | now = time(NULL);
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| 144 | SIVAL(p, 0, now);
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| 145 | ct->BeginTimestamp = now;
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| 146 |
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| 147 | if(lp_afs_token_lifetime() == 0)
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| 148 | ct->EndTimestamp = NEVERDATE;
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| 149 | else
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| 150 | ct->EndTimestamp = now + lp_afs_token_lifetime();
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| 151 |
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| 152 | if (((ct->EndTimestamp - ct->BeginTimestamp) & 1) == 1) {
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| 153 | ct->BeginTimestamp += 1; /* Lifetime must be even */
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| 154 | }
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| 155 | p += 4;
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| 156 |
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| 157 | /* And here comes Bob's name and instance, in this case the
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| 158 | AFS server. */
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| 159 | strncpy(p, "afs", sizeof(clear_ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,clear_ticket)-1);
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| 160 | p += strlen(p)+1;
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| 161 | strncpy(p, "", sizeof(clear_ticket)-PTR_DIFF(p,clear_ticket)-1);
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| 162 | p += strlen(p)+1;
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| 163 |
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| 164 | /* And zero-pad to a multiple of 8 bytes */
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| 165 | len = PTR_DIFF(p, clear_ticket);
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| 166 | if (len & 7) {
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| 167 | uint32 extra_space = 8-(len & 7);
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| 168 | memset(p, 0, extra_space);
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| 169 | p+=extra_space;
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| 170 | }
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| 171 | len = PTR_DIFF(p, clear_ticket);
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| 172 |
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| 173 | des_key_sched((const_des_cblock *)key.key, key_schedule);
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| 174 | des_pcbc_encrypt(clear_ticket, clear_ticket,
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| 175 | len, key_schedule, (C_Block *)key.key, 1);
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| 176 |
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| 177 | ZERO_STRUCT(key);
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| 178 |
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| 179 | *ticket = data_blob(clear_ticket, len);
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| 180 |
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| 181 | return True;
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| 182 | }
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| 183 |
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| 184 | char *afs_createtoken_str(const char *username, const char *cell)
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| 185 | {
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| 186 | DATA_BLOB ticket;
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| 187 | struct ClearToken ct;
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| 188 | char *result;
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| 189 |
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| 190 | if (!afs_createtoken(username, cell, &ticket, &ct))
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| 191 | return NULL;
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| 192 |
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| 193 | result = afs_encode_token(cell, ticket, &ct);
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| 194 |
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| 195 | data_blob_free(&ticket);
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| 196 |
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| 197 | return result;
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| 198 | }
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| 199 |
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| 200 | /*
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| 201 | This routine takes a radical approach completely bypassing the
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| 202 | Kerberos idea of security and using AFS simply as an intelligent
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| 203 | file backend. Samba has persuaded itself somehow that the user is
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| 204 | actually correctly identified and then we create a ticket that the
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| 205 | AFS server hopefully accepts using its KeyFile that the admin has
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| 206 | kindly stored to our secrets.tdb.
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| 207 |
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| 208 | Thanks to the book "Network Security -- PRIVATE Communication in a
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| 209 | PUBLIC World" by Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman and Mike Speciner
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| 210 | Kerberos 4 tickets are not really hard to construct.
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| 211 |
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| 212 | For the comments "Alice" is the User to be auth'ed, and "Bob" is the
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| 213 | AFS server. */
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| 214 |
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| 215 | bool afs_login(connection_struct *conn)
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| 216 | {
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| 217 | DATA_BLOB ticket;
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| 218 | char *afs_username = NULL;
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| 219 | char *cell = NULL;
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| 220 | bool result;
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| 221 | char *ticket_str = NULL;
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| 222 | const DOM_SID *user_sid;
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| 223 | TALLOC_CTX *ctx = talloc_tos();
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| 224 |
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| 225 | struct ClearToken ct;
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| 226 |
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| 227 | afs_username = talloc_strdup(ctx,
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| 228 | lp_afs_username_map());
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| 229 | if (!afs_username) {
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| 230 | return false;
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| 231 | }
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| 232 |
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| 233 | afs_username = talloc_sub_advanced(ctx,
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| 234 | SNUM(conn), conn->server_info->unix_name,
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| 235 | conn->connectpath, conn->server_info->utok.gid,
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| 236 | conn->server_info->sanitized_username,
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| 237 | pdb_get_domain(conn->server_info->sam_account),
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| 238 | afs_username);
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| 239 | if (!afs_username) {
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| 240 | return false;
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| 241 | }
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| 242 |
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| 243 | user_sid = &conn->server_info->ptok->user_sids[0];
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| 244 | afs_username = talloc_string_sub(talloc_tos(),
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| 245 | afs_username,
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| 246 | "%s",
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| 247 | sid_string_tos(user_sid));
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| 248 | if (!afs_username) {
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| 249 | return false;
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| 250 | }
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| 251 |
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| 252 | /* The pts command always generates completely lower-case user
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| 253 | * names. */
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| 254 | strlower_m(afs_username);
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| 255 |
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| 256 | cell = strchr(afs_username, '@');
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| 257 |
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| 258 | if (cell == NULL) {
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| 259 | DEBUG(1, ("AFS username doesn't contain a @, "
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| 260 | "could not find cell\n"));
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| 261 | return false;
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| 262 | }
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| 263 |
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| 264 | *cell = '\0';
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| 265 | cell += 1;
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| 266 |
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| 267 | DEBUG(10, ("Trying to log into AFS for user %s@%s\n",
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| 268 | afs_username, cell));
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| 269 |
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| 270 | if (!afs_createtoken(afs_username, cell, &ticket, &ct))
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| 271 | return False;
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| 272 |
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| 273 | /* For which Unix-UID do we want to set the token? */
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| 274 | ct.ViceId = getuid();
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| 275 |
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| 276 | ticket_str = afs_encode_token(cell, ticket, &ct);
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| 277 |
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| 278 | result = afs_settoken_str(ticket_str);
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| 279 |
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| 280 | SAFE_FREE(ticket_str);
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| 281 |
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| 282 | data_blob_free(&ticket);
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| 283 |
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| 284 | return result;
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| 285 | }
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| 286 |
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| 287 | #else
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| 288 |
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| 289 | bool afs_login(connection_struct *conn)
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| 290 | {
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| 291 | return True;
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| 292 | }
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| 293 |
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| 294 | char *afs_createtoken_str(const char *username, const char *cell)
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| 295 | {
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| 296 | return NULL;
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| 297 | }
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| 298 |
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| 299 | #endif /* WITH_FAKE_KASERVER */
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