Difference between revisions of "CA/CT Redaction"
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==== Response ==== | ==== Response ==== | ||
| − | In Chrome at least, enterprises already have this capability via enterprise policies, which do not require the installation of a specific root CA. I.e. they can turn off the CT requirement for particular roots. | + | In Chrome at least, which is currently the only browser that checks CT, enterprises already have this capability via enterprise policies, which do not require the installation of a specific root CA. I.e. they can turn off the CT requirement for particular roots. |
=== Concealing Network Topography === | === Concealing Network Topography === | ||
| − | Redaction means organizations can use publicly-trusted, CT logged certificates behind their firewalls that do not reveal their security topography by revealing all nodes in the FQDN during CT logging. | + | Redaction means organizations can use publicly-trusted, CT logged certificates behind their firewalls that do not reveal their security topography by revealing all nodes in the FQDN during CT logging. The alternative, multiple otherwise-identical wildcard certs with different key pairs, would be hard to track. |
==== Response ==== | ==== Response ==== | ||
| − | This is an argument for security through obscurity. And, in fact, will not succeed in achieving the obscurity sought. | + | This is an argument for security through obscurity. And, in fact, will not succeed in achieving the obscurity sought because hostnames leak in a number of other ways. |
| + | |||
| + | As for multiple wildcard certs being hard to track, they would have different serial numbers, so automated provisioning software could tell them apart without difficulty. | ||
=== IoT Usage === | === IoT Usage === | ||
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==== Response ==== | ==== Response ==== | ||
| − | Chrome, at least, believes that the IoT should use private roots, or roots separate from the WebPKI, to avoid the sort of stagnation and legacy compatibility problems we have seen previously, e.g. with SHA-1. | + | Chrome, at least, believes that the IoT should use private roots, or roots separate from the WebPKI, to avoid the sort of stagnation and legacy compatibility problems we have seen previously, e.g. with SHA-1 and 1024-bit certs. |
| + | |||
| + | === Makes DOS Easier === | ||
| + | |||
| + | For low-resource IoT devices (cameras, sensors, some car uses, etc.), DOS attacks are possible, and unredacted CT logs may help the DOS attacker. | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==== Response ==== | ||
| + | |||
| + | Why would someone DOS a random camera just because it was there? | ||
| + | |||
| + | === CT Logging Reveals Geolocation Information === | ||
| + | |||
| + | For some IoT devices (cameras, sensors, etc.), geo-location information is very sensitive. If the certificate is logged with CT, there must be a mechanism like redaction to anonymize. | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==== Response ==== | ||
| + | |||
| + | It is not clear how CT logging would reveal geolocation information for the device using the certificate. | ||
| + | |||
| + | === Reveals Commercially Sensitive Information === | ||
| + | |||
| + | Manufacturers using IoT certificates won't want to show the number of devices they have shipped, and redaction may help keep this information private. | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==== Response ==== | ||
| + | |||
| + | How? If counting certificates is indeed a good way of determining how many devices are shipped, redaction won't change the number of certificates logged. | ||
== Against == | == Against == | ||
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It is difficult to build robust policies and procedures around what happens when a domain owner sees a redacted cert they didn't request. How can they get an unredacted copy of the original? What happens if the CA can't or won't provide it? What recourse does the domain owner have? More details on this can be found in [https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/vsTzv8oNcws%5B76-100%5D this CT policy post]. | It is difficult to build robust policies and procedures around what happens when a domain owner sees a redacted cert they didn't request. How can they get an unredacted copy of the original? What happens if the CA can't or won't provide it? What recourse does the domain owner have? More details on this can be found in [https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-policy/vsTzv8oNcws%5B76-100%5D this CT policy post]. | ||
| + | |||
| + | == Alternatives == | ||
| + | |||
| + | * Disabling CT via browser policy | ||
| + | * Private roots | ||
| + | * Wildcard certs | ||
| + | * CT-logging anyway | ||
Revision as of 14:00, 21 November 2017
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THIS PAGE IS A WORKING DRAFT | 
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| The page may be difficult to navigate, and some information on its subject might be incomplete and/or evolving rapidly. If you have any questions or ideas, please add them as a new topic on the discussion page. |
This page is an attempt to summarise the arguments for and against the idea of redaction in CT.
Contents
For
Enterprise Users Are Requesting It
CAs report that enterprise customers are requesting this feature, for some of the reasons given in this document.
Response
In Chrome at least, which is currently the only browser that checks CT, enterprises already have this capability via enterprise policies, which do not require the installation of a specific root CA. I.e. they can turn off the CT requirement for particular roots.
Concealing Network Topography
Redaction means organizations can use publicly-trusted, CT logged certificates behind their firewalls that do not reveal their security topography by revealing all nodes in the FQDN during CT logging. The alternative, multiple otherwise-identical wildcard certs with different key pairs, would be hard to track.
Response
This is an argument for security through obscurity. And, in fact, will not succeed in achieving the obscurity sought because hostnames leak in a number of other ways.
As for multiple wildcard certs being hard to track, they would have different serial numbers, so automated provisioning software could tell them apart without difficulty.
IoT Usage
"Things" that connect to the internet (cars, baby monitors, etc.) will want to use publicly trusted certificates that work in common browsers and applications, but will not want the device identity number hierarchy publicly disclosed on CT logs for security purposes. While private roots could be used, going that direction could prevent interoperability, and incompatibility with modern browser software could cause IoT device software to rely on custom software that doesn’t receive security updates (as browser software does) and lead to the same kind of frozen legacy root stores that can’t be updated that we saw during SHA-1 deprecation problems. For low-resource IoT devices (cameras, sensors, some car uses, etc.), DOS attacks are possible, and unredacted CT logs may help the DOS attacker.
Response
Chrome, at least, believes that the IoT should use private roots, or roots separate from the WebPKI, to avoid the sort of stagnation and legacy compatibility problems we have seen previously, e.g. with SHA-1 and 1024-bit certs.
Makes DOS Easier
For low-resource IoT devices (cameras, sensors, some car uses, etc.), DOS attacks are possible, and unredacted CT logs may help the DOS attacker.
Response
Why would someone DOS a random camera just because it was there?
CT Logging Reveals Geolocation Information
For some IoT devices (cameras, sensors, etc.), geo-location information is very sensitive. If the certificate is logged with CT, there must be a mechanism like redaction to anonymize.
Response
It is not clear how CT logging would reveal geolocation information for the device using the certificate.
Reveals Commercially Sensitive Information
Manufacturers using IoT certificates won't want to show the number of devices they have shipped, and redaction may help keep this information private.
Response
How? If counting certificates is indeed a good way of determining how many devices are shipped, redaction won't change the number of certificates logged.
Against
Recourse is Hard
It is difficult to build robust policies and procedures around what happens when a domain owner sees a redacted cert they didn't request. How can they get an unredacted copy of the original? What happens if the CA can't or won't provide it? What recourse does the domain owner have? More details on this can be found in this CT policy post.
Alternatives
- Disabling CT via browser policy
- Private roots
- Wildcard certs
- CT-logging anyway
