





Compute, but Verify: Efficient Multiparty Computation over Authenticated Inputs

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Abstract. Traditional notions of secure multiparty computation (MPC) allow mutually distrusting parties to jointly compute a function over their private inputs, but typically do not specify how these inputs are chosen. Motivated by real-world applications where corrupt inputs could adversely impact privacy and operational legitimacy, we consider a notion of *authenticated* MPC where the inputs are authenticated (for instance, signed using a digital signature) by some certification authority. We propose a generic and efficient compiler that transforms any linear secret sharing based honest-majority MPC protocol into one with input authentication.

Our compiler achieves an ideal notion of authenticated MPC equipped with stronger and more desirable security guarantees than those considered in prior works, while incurring significantly lower computational costs and competitive communication overheads when compared to existing solutions. In particular, we entirely avoid the (potentially expensive) protocol-specific techniques and pre-processing requirements that are inherent to these solutions. For certain corruption thresholds, our compiler additionally preserves the stronger identifiable abort security of the underlying MPC protocol. No existing solution for authenticated MPC achieves this regardless of the corruption threshold.

Along the way, we make several technical contributions that are of independent interest. This includes the notion of distributed proofs of knowledge and concrete realizations of the same for several relations of interest, such as proving knowledge of many popularly used digital signature schemes, and proving knowledge of opening of a Pedersen commitment.

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1 Introduction

Secure multiparty computation (MPC) [Yao82,Yao86,GMW87,Kil88,BGW88] allows two or more parties to jointly compute a function of their private inputs, while ensuring input privacy and output correctness (even in the presence of some corrupt parties). Traditional security notions for MPC ensure *output correctness* and *input privacy*, that is, nothing is leaked about the parties’ private inputs beyond the (correct) output of the computation. However, no assurance is given about how the parties choose their private inputs.

Unfortunately, certain applications of MPC could be sensitive to “ill-formed inputs”. Maliciously chosen inputs could either corrupt the output or reveal the output on arbitrary inputs, thus violating the desired real-world security guarantees of an MPC protocol. Such attacks are not captured by traditional MPC security definitions.

Input Authenticity in MPC. There are several real-world applications of MPC where it is important to ensure that the inputs used by parties are *authentic*. If a set of individuals on a job portal wish to compute “industry average compensation” for their expertise and experience in a privacy preserving manner (e.g., services provided by glassdoor), one would want them to input payslips bearing their employers’ signature. Similarly, in applications involving hospitals performing joint computations on patient data for treatment efficacy, it is desirable to ensure that the data used is signed by a regulatory authority. Input validation is also of practical relevance in applications of MPC in computation on genomic data [BB16]. For all of these applications, the traditional MPC security guarantees are clearly inadequate. A natural question that confronts us then is: *how do we ensure that authentic inputs are used in MPC?*

Authentication via Certification. In the real world, data authentication typically involves the data being attested by a relevant *certifying authority*. In our work, we specifically consider applications where an input bearing a signature is considered *authentic* and we can assume the existence of a relevant certifying authority that provides the signature. For instance, employers can act as the certification authority to digitally sign the payslips when parties wish to compute ‘industry average compensation’ using services like glassdoor, a financial auditor can act as the certification authority to digitally sign the bills of sale when shipping companies wish to compute aggregate statistics on private data, a regulatory authority (like WHO) act as the certification authority to digitally sign the medical records when hospitals wish to perform joint computation over sensitive patient data, and so on. Since the certifying authority cannot be omnipresent to vouch for authenticity of the data, it is increasingly common for individuals to claim this attestation through *digital signatures* that can be verified efficiently. In fact, there exist several digital signature schemes today [CV02,BBS04,PS16] that allow establishing attestation by a certifying authority while requiring minimal disclosure of attributes, and while maintaining *unlinkability* (several usages of the same credential cannot be linked to the same individual). Unfortunately, such secure mechanisms for authenticating data in the individual context do not translate when computing over data from *multiple* data owners using vanilla MPC protocols (that do not consider input authentication).

Potential Approaches and Pitfalls. A naïve approach would be to incorporate input authentication *as part of the function* to be computed. However, this is practically inefficient. For example, incorporating signature verification as part of the function would entail performing expensive operations such as hashing inside MPC (typically, most signature schemes hash the message), and would also require expressing the algebraic operations underlying signature verification as arithmetic circuits. This significantly blows up the size of the circuit, rendering the resulting MPC protocol practically inefficient.

A more efficient alternative is to have the certifying authority *sign a commitment* (e.g., a Pedersen commitment [Ped92]) to each input, and then have the parties prove that their inputs are those contained inside the public commitments (using customized zero-knowledge proofs). However, this fails to provide *unlinkability*, which is an essential privacy requirement. In particular, one can use the signed commitment to link different protocols where the same input is reused. The alternative would be to get the certifying authority to sign a different commitment for each protocol execution, which again requires the authority to be omnipresent, and is clearly impractical.

Certain prior works [ADEO21,BJ18] proposed using *authenticated secret-sharing* in order to certify inputs to an MPC protocol. However, authenticated secret-sharing only provides stand-alone guarantees about the

shares themselves, and additional techniques would be needed to ensure that malicious parties actually use these authenticated shares in the execution of the actual MPC protocol (the details of such techniques are not specified completely in prior works [ADEO21,BJ18]). Ideally, we want a notion that *ties* input authentication into the underlying MPC, thus preventing malicious parties from using inputs different from the authenticated ones.

Our Goal. We aim to *lift* existing MPC protocols into authenticated ones that ensure that an additional predicate is satisfied by each input (for instance, each input is signed by a common certifying authority). We want to achieve such input authentication (i) without changing the underlying MPC protocol, (ii) without representing the predicate as a circuit, (iii) incurring communication overhead that is succinct in the size of the inputs (which are typically large for the applications we consider), and (iv) maintaining unlinkability. These requirements immediately preclude prior approaches requiring the authentication relation to be expressed as a circuit [BBC⁺19,HVW22], as well as the natural approach based on signed public commitments outlined above, which lacks unlinkability.

1.1 Our Contributions

In this work, we study *authenticated MPC*. We present the first *generic compiler* that efficiently augments existing MPC protocols to additionally ensure that each input has a valid attestation (in the form of a digital signature) from a relevant certifying authority, while retaining both practical efficiency and unlinkability. We illustrate the compatibility of our proposed approach with popularly used privacy-preserving verifiable attestation mechanisms based on digital signatures such as BBS+ [BBS04,ASM06] and PS [PS16]. Towards this goal, we put forth a notion of distributed (zero-knowledge) proof of knowledge that is of independent interest.

Distributed Proof of Knowledge (DPoK). In Section 3, we put forth a notion of a *distributed proof of knowledge* (abbreviated as (DPoK)). A DPoK works in a setting with multiple provers and a single verifier, where the witness is secret shared among the provers. Concretely, for a relation \mathcal{R} and an instance-witness pair $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$, the verifier holds the (public) instance x , and each prover holds a share w_i of the (secret) witness w such that $w = \text{Reconstruct}(w_1, \dots, w_n)$. We also assume a restricted communication model: (i) the provers do not communicate with each other, and (ii) the verifier communicates only via a broadcast channel and is public coin (this facilitates *public verifiability*, which is used crucially in our eventual solution for authenticated MPC). Our definition of DPoK may thus be viewed a natural distributed analogue of honest-verifier public coin protocols.

Robust Complete DPoK. Our basic DPoK definition does not prevent malicious provers from disrupting protocol execution, and only provides *security with abort*. To tackle this, we introduce a stronger notion of *robust completeness* for a DPoK, which additionally provides tolerance against abort in the presence of (a potentially smaller number of) maliciously corrupt provers. Looking ahead, using robust complete DPoKs allows us to achieve authenticated MPC protocols with stronger security guarantees.

DPoK for Discrete Log. In Section 3, we also construct a DPoK for the discrete logarithm relation, where the witness (the discrete log of a publicly known group element) is secret-shared (using Shamir secret sharing) across multiple provers. Notably, our construction achieves: (i) *succinct* communication (logarithmic in the size of the witness), and (ii) robust completeness (which ensures that the protocol accepts even in the presence of up to $n/3$ malicious provers, where provers only holds shares to the correct witness). For succinct communication, we use techniques due to Attema et al. [AC20] to *compress* the communication complexity of our protocol from linear to logarithmic in the size of the witness. We realize robust completeness via error-correction *in the exponents* of group elements. To this end, we leverage results from low degree testing used in prior works to construct efficient zkSNARKs (such as in [AHIV17,BCR⁺19]). While achieving robust completeness is straightforward if we do not care about succinctness (and vice versa), the main technical novelty of our construction is to achieve *both* properties simultaneously.

In Appendix C, we present a generalization of the above DPoK for discrete log that works with *any threshold linear secret sharing scheme*. In this generalized version, we characterize the corruption threshold

for robust completeness in terms of the minimum distance of the linear code associated with the threshold linear secret sharing scheme. As an example, we derive concrete bounds on the corruption threshold for the popularly used *replicated secret sharing* scheme.

DPoKs for Algebraically Structured Signatures. Our DPoK for discrete log can be used to build a DPoK for any digital signature scheme where the associated proof of knowledge of a signature can be modeled as a proof of knowledge of the opening of a Pedersen commitment. We present specific instances of this general approach for signature schemes that are algebraically compatible, namely BBS+ [BBS04,ASM06,CDL16]³ (detailed in Section 4) and PS [PS16] (detailed in Appendix F). These signature schemes are popular candidates for applications such as verifiable credentials for self-sovereign digital identity. While these signature schemes natively support efficient (albeit non-distributed) zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of a valid message-signature pair, our work introduces the first practically efficient DPoKs for these signature schemes that are both succinct and robust complete. Our techniques are modular, and we believe that they can be extended to yield DPoKs for other algebraically structured signatures such as [CL01], as well as algebraic relations of interest for other applications.

Round Efficient DPoKs in the ROM. The above definitions and constructions of DPoKs are in the standard model. In Appendix D, we formally define *round efficient* DPoKs in the random oracle model (ROM). This definition is based on the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS87], using which we transform a DPoK (with number of rounds logarithmic in the size of the witness) into a round efficient DPoK (having constant number of rounds). Under this definition, we present round efficient versions of our DPoK constructions for discrete log and algebraically structured signatures; these protocols achieve the same robust completeness and succinct communication guarantees as the original protocols, albeit in the ROM.

Authenticated MPC. We now expand upon our main contribution, namely *authenticated MPC*. Informally, we consider a notion of input authenticity for MPC where each input is certified using a valid signature from a certification authority. This is standard in applications where a publicly known certifying authority (external to the MPC protocol) signs an input to certify that the input satisfies certain properties⁴. We build upon our DPoKs for BBS+ and PS signatures to propose a generic compiler that transforms any (threshold linear) secret-sharing based maliciously secure honest-majority MPC protocol into its *authenticated MPC* version. Our compiler yields the first practically efficient MPC protocols that satisfy an ideal notion of input authenticity while preserving practical efficiency and unlinkability. We prototype-implement a specific instance of our compiler that achieves input authentication based on our proposed DPoK for BBS+ signatures. Finally, we present experimental results to illustrate that our compiler incurs *negligible communication overhead* over the original MPC protocol. For simplicity, our ideal functionality and subsequent protocols are described assuming a common signature authority for all inputs. The more general case involving multiple signing authorities also follows with minor modifications without incurring any loss of efficiency.

Ideal Functionality for Authenticated MPC. In Section 5, we formalize the above notion for authenticated MPC via an ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MPC}}^{\text{auth}}$ that works as follows. The parties send their inputs x_i and signature σ_i on x_i to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MPC}}^{\text{auth}}$ for $i \in [n]$. The functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MPC}}^{\text{auth}}$ then checks if σ_i is a valid signature on x_i for all $i \in [n]$. For each $j \in [n]$ such that σ_j is not a valid signature on x_j , $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MPC}}^{\text{auth}}$ sends (**abort**, P_j) to all of the parties. Otherwise it computes $y = f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ and outputs y to all of the parties.

We note that our ideal functionality ties input authentication into the underlying MPC, thus preventing malicious parties from using different inputs as compared to the authenticated ones. The prior works [ADEO21, BJ18] only provide stand-alone guarantees about the authenticated shares themselves, and would require additional techniques to ensure that these authenticated shares are then used in the execution of the actual MPC protocol which are currently not considered. We further note that our ideal functionality already captures unlinkability, since the adversary does not learn any additional information about

³ There are standardization efforts for using BBS+ signatures in verifiable credentials for Web 3.0, leading to a recent RFC draft [LKWL22].

⁴ Our techniques extend to other notions of authenticity such as proving that the inputs open publicly known commitments.

the authenticated input (beyond the function output) that might allow it to correlate the usage of the same input-signature pair across multiple executions. This rules out solutions based on signing public commitments to inputs, which trivially violate unlinkability.

Compiler for Authenticated MPC. In Section 5, we present a compiler that transforms any Shamir secret-sharing based maliciously secure honest-majority MPC protocol Π into its *authenticated* MPC version Π' that securely realizes the above ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MPC}}^{\text{auth}}$, where each input is authenticated using a BBS+ signature. Our compiler builds upon our DPoK for BBS+ signatures from Section 4. In Appendix F, we present an analogous compiler for input authentication using PS signatures, which builds upon our DPoK for PS signatures. In both cases, the compiled protocol Π' inherits the security of Π as long as the inputs are authentic (by definition, we abort if this is not the case)⁵. If Π guarantees security with identifiable abort, then the same holds for Π' . If Π achieves guaranteed output delivery, then so does Π' (albeit for a corruption threshold $t < n/3$) – this crucially uses the *robust completeness* property of the underlying DPoKs.

Generalization and Extensions. We note that our approach works in general for: (a) any (threshold linear) secret-sharing based MPC protocol, and (b) any signature scheme such that the associated proof of knowledge can be modeled as a proof of knowledge of the opening of a Pedersen commitment (such as CL signatures [CL01] and PS signatures [PS16]). Our DPoK-based approach also offers the flexibility of extending our compiler to support other notions of input authentication, beyond proving knowledge of signatures. In particular, one can build upon our approach to prove a wider class of expressive predicates over secret-shared inputs, thus catering to a wide range of applications with diverse proof requirements (e.g., federated learning). For instance, each party can publish a commitment to its input at the beginning of the authenticated MPC protocol, and then use our DPoK-based framework to prove the following simultaneously: (i) the secret-shared input is signed by a certifying authority (this follows from the basic compiler), (ii) the secret-shared input is a valid opening to the published commitment, and (iii) the opening to the commitment satisfies a certain predicate. Note that, if a different application requires new/additional properties to be checked, the aforementioned approach avoids the need to involve the certifying authority each time. Similarly, it maintains unlinkability since a fresh commitment is used for each protocol execution, while the DPoK allows keeping the signature from the certifying authority private.

Implementation and Experiments. In Section 6, we present a prototype implementation of our BBS+ based authenticated MPC protocol, and illustrate that our approach incurs very little computational and communication overheads over and above the original MPC protocol. In particular, we implement the BBS+ based instance of our compiler and use it to transform an implementation of a native MPC (instantiated via MP-SPDZ [DPSZ12,KSS13,Kel20]) into an authenticated MPC. We use this implementation to benchmark an application of authenticated MPC, where n shipping companies with private datasets wish to securely compute aggregate statistics on some subset of their combined data. Note that this is an application where the number of inputs of each party is much larger than the number of parties involved in the protocol. Specifically, we consider each dataset $D_i = (C_i, S_i)$ to be partitioned into k *categorical* columns C_i and ℓ *numeric* columns D_i . A sample query specifies $\{(j, v_j)\}_{j \in J}$ for $J \subset [k]$. The goal is to compute means of numeric columns on the subset of rows satisfying the selection predicate $C[j] = v_j$ for $j \in J$, i.e the subset of rows with specified values of some categorical features. We also assume an external certifying entity \mathcal{T} (e.g. a financial auditor) which independently verifies the correctness of sales data reported by different organizations and issues a digital signature to attest the same (this entity does not participate in the MPC protocol).

We conduct experiments to evaluate the computational and communication overheads incurred by our protocol to achieve authentication on top of native MPC. The results are summarized in Table 1. For comparison, we also show the: (i) the actual computational and communication overheads for the native MPC protocol, and (ii) the computational and communication overheads incurred by an alternative approach of authenticating the inputs that shows the consistency of the input shares with a public digest of the input and proves knowledge of a BBS+ signature on this public digest by expressing the verification algorithm as

⁵ In some applications, it is acceptable to continue computation on default inputs instead of aborting when authentication fails.

an arithmetic circuit and evaluating it inside the MPC protocol. As demonstrated by the results in Table 1, the overheads for this alternative approach are substantial even when an MPC-friendly hash function like MiMC is used to hash the input. In comparison, the overheads for our DPoK-based approach are significantly smaller, and effectively minor when compared to the overheads for the base MPC protocol.

Table 1: Comparison of our DPoK-based approach for MPC input authentication with the naïve approach of validating BBS+ signatures inside MPC (which involves computing MiMC hashes inside MPC). These results correspond to datasets of size 500×10 in the KPI application.

# Parties	Vanilla MPC	Auth MPC with MiMC Hash	DPoK Overhead
3	33s/8437 MB	273s/13979 MB	5.7s/14.4 KB
5	125s/43823 MB	1369s/14498 MB	6.2s/30 KB
7	386.2s/127057 MB	3645.33s/207427 MB	8.2s/52 KB

1.2 Technical Overview

In this section, we provide a brief overview of our techniques. We begin by outlining ideas to distribute a well-known protocol for proving knowledge of discrete logarithm of a public group element. This relation will be at the core of expressive algebraic relations that we will consider later.

Proof of Knowledge of Discrete Log. Let \mathbb{G} be a group of prime order p . Given $x \in \mathbb{G}$, recall Schnorr’s protocol [Sch90,Sch91] for proving knowledge of discrete logarithm w such that $x = g^w$ for some generator g (here (g, x) is public and w is the secret witness). Let $(\mathcal{P}^1, \mathcal{P}^2, \mathcal{V})$ be the protocol where we denote by \mathcal{P}^1 and \mathcal{P}^2 the algorithms that compute, the prover’s first message $a = g^\alpha$ for random $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_p$, and the prover’s last message (response) $z = \alpha + cw$, respectively, where c is the challenge from the space $\{0, 1\}^l$ for some length l . Let \mathcal{V} be the algorithm that takes x , transcript $\tau = (a, c, z)$ and accepts iff $g^z = ax^c$.

DPoK for Discrete Log. In order to *distribute* the above protocol, we begin by assuming n provers \mathcal{P}_i who each hold a share w_i such that $w = w_1 + \dots + w_n \pmod{p}$. Now, each prover runs Σ with their respective shares in parallel⁶. That is, \mathcal{P}_i runs \mathcal{P}^1 , broadcasts $a_i = g^{\alpha_i}$, receives challenge c from \mathcal{V} , and runs \mathcal{P}^2 and broadcasts z_i . The transcript is $\tau = (a_1, \dots, a_n, c, z_1, \dots, z_n)$, and the verifier accepts iff $g^{\Sigma z_i} = \prod_i a_i x^c = \prod_i a_i x^c$. This holds since $g^{\Sigma z_i} = g^{\Sigma(\alpha_i + cw_i)} = \prod_i a_i x^c$.

This idea generalizes to any linear secret sharing scheme, and also extends to other relations. For instance, to prove knowledge of representation of a vector of discrete logarithms with respect to public generators. In our final construction we use additional ideas like randomization of the first message of each \mathcal{P}_i via a sharing of 0 in order to ensure zero-knowledge. This DPoK has communication complexity linear in the size of the witness. To achieve succinctness, we instead use as a starting point a compressed sigma protocol [AC20] in order to achieve a distributed protocol with logarithmic communication complexity (see Section 3.2 for details).

Robust Completeness. While the ideas described above result in protocols that are zero-knowledge and sound against a malicious adversary controlling up to t parties, completeness is guaranteed only if all the

⁶ This is a simplified description; in our actual protocol Π_{dlog} (Section 3.2), there are no parallel sessions, each instance uses a random share, ensuring that we do not reuse the shares, and in the FS-compiled version $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$ (Appendix D), parties send non-interactive proofs instead of sending the first-messages separately in parallel. We note that ROS attacks [BLL⁺21] in the context of concurrent signatures are therefore inapplicable in our setting. See also Section 1.4 for a more detailed discussion.

provers follow the protocol. However, in the distributed setting, a stronger, but natural notion is a *robust* completeness property where completeness holds as long as the shares reconstruct a valid witness, even if some provers are malicious. The main technical challenge in achieving robust completeness for a distributed proof is to retain succinctness. Our key technical novelty is to achieve both robustness and succinctness *simultaneously* via ideas from low-degree testing. We achieve this by identifying and discarding corrupt shares. At a high level, the provers commit to their shares and then reveal a certain linear form determined by the challenge over their shares. Given a challenge $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{F}_p^m$, each \mathcal{P}_i broadcasts $z_i = \langle \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{w}_i \rangle$. In the honest case, these opened linear forms are expected to be a sharing of the same linear form on the reconstructed witness: $\mathbf{z} = (z_1, \dots, z_n)$ recombine to z where $z = \langle \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{w} \rangle$. The verifier error-corrects the received \mathbf{z}' to the nearest codeword, and identifies the erroneous positions. By assumption our corruption threshold is smaller than half the minimum distance of the code, so the erroneous positions clearly come from corrupt provers. Can some corrupt provers strategically introduce errors in individual shares so that they “cancel out” in the inner product with \mathbf{c} ? We lean on coding theoretic result (Lemma 2) for linear codes to claim that such a prover only succeeds with negligible probability. Finally, having identified the corrupt messages, we can reconstruct the claimed commitment in the exponent using commitments of honest shares (now identified). We need more details around this core idea to ensure the protocol is zero-knowledge (see Section 3.2 for a complete treatment).

DPoKs for Algebraically Structured Signatures. It turns out that the above approach can be naturally generalized to obtain a DPoK for the opening of a Pedersen commitment [Ped91]. We use this observation as a starting point to realize DPoKs for algebraically structured signatures such as BBS+ [BBS04,ASM06,CDL16] and PS [PS16], which naturally admit proofs of knowledge that can be cast as proving knowledge of openings of Pedersen commitments. As a core technical contribution, we introduce a modified proof of knowledge for the BBS+ signature scheme, which leads to a vastly more efficient DPoK as compared to the straightforward approach of distributing prior proofs of knowledge for BBS+ signatures. We refer to Section 4 for details. Analogous DPoK for PS signatures is presented in Appendix F.

Compiler for Authenticated MPC. In order to construct an authenticated MPC protocol, we build upon the above DPoKs for BBS+ and PS signatures. Our compiler reuses the input sharing that is already done as part of an honest-majority MPC protocol. Before proceeding with computation on the shares, the distributed zero-knowledge proof is invoked to verify authenticity, and then the rest of the MPC protocol proceeds. Since the shares of the witness come from a party in the MPC protocol, our robustness property guarantees that if the dealer is honest (that is, a valid witness was shared), then even if some parties acting as provers are dishonest, the authenticity proof goes through (see Section 5 for details).

We also note that, while we rely on broadcast for our protocols, all relevant related work on FLPCP [BBC⁺19] and previous works on authenticated MPC [BJ18,ADEO21,HVW22] also make use of a broadcast channel. A broadcast channel is not a limitation, and can be implemented using point-to-point channels. In the setting where the number of parties is not too large (as in the applications we consider), the communication overhead to realize broadcast is not prohibitive.

1.3 Related Work

We summarize some relevant related work, and compare our compiler with prior approaches for authenticated MPC. We refer to Appendix A for some additional discussions.

Certified Inputs. The earlier works of [Bau16,KMW16,ZBB17] achieve input validation for the special case of *two*-party computation using garbled circuit (GC) based techniques. Another work [BJ18] constructs MPC with certified inputs, albeit using techniques that are specific to certain MPC protocols [DKL⁺13, DN07]. A recent work [ADEO21] develops techniques for computing bilinear pairings over secret shared data, which aims to enable signature verification inside MPC for the PS signature scheme [PS16]. Both works [ADEO21, BJ18] emulate a functionality similar to authenticated secret-sharing protocol, where shares of an input certified by some certification authority are provided at the end of the protocol execution. While the goal of authenticated MPC has been studied, these works would require additional consistency

checks to ensure the consistency of shares used across the protocols for authentication of shares and the underlying MPC execution. Although the explicit details are not provided in the protocol description, we expect the requirement of some consistency check on the MACs to ensure the usage of same shares during authentication protocol and original MPC for function computation. In our work, we formalize this notion of authenticated MPC as an ideal functionality which incorporates the consistency checks, and prove that the proposed constructions realize this. For instance, consider the scenario where a malicious party receives the shares of a certified input held by an honest party, which is done via an authenticated secret-sharing protocol, however while running the MPC itself it chooses to not use the shares received during the previously run authenticated secret-sharing protocol and uses an arbitrarily chosen share instead. The current definitions in [ADEO21, BJ18] fails to safeguard against such an attack and would require additional assumptions to ensure the consistency of shares.

To be precise, the current protocol description of $\Pi_{\text{CertInput}}$ in [ADEO21] (Section 5.1) emulates the authenticated secret-sharing, such that at the end of the protocol, if an input corresponds to a valid signature, the shares of that input is available to every party. This protocol first secret-shares the input, then using the shares held by everyone as input invokes another protocol Π_{Verify} to ascertain if the shares obtained in the previous phase corresponds to an input for which there is a valid signature. However, note that only Step 3 of Π_{Verify} considers the shares of the input, which need not be the shares used for running the MPC, unless additional consistency checks using the MACs on the shares are in place. Such details do not explicitly appear in the protocols presented in [ADEO21].

The protocols in [BJ18] also follow a similar template based on authenticated secret-sharing. Their techniques consider two specific MPC protocols [DN07, DKL⁺13] for input certification. Concretely, Theorem 8 for input certification in [BJ18] ensures that a malicious prover cannot feed an input which does not correspond to the valid signature. While it is not explicitly specified in [BJ18] that the commitments to the inputs used for the batch verification of signatures are consistent with the inputs used for the remaining proof of knowledge statements, we assume that this is indeed the case.

In this paper, we recognize the benefits of having a formal definition to capture the consistency of shares of input used in authentication and the MPC. To this end, we explicitly provide an ideal functionality ensuring the same, and then present a construction satisfying this ideal functionality. We also avoid the possibility of using different inputs for certification and MPC by enforcing that the honest party shares must completely determine the reconstructed input which is being authenticated. While this observation has not been specified in either of the works, this specific restriction would also ensure that the consistency of shares holds for constructions in [ADEO21, BJ18] as well.

We use efficient compressed DPoKs for signature verification instead of verifying signatures inside the MPC protocol, hence differing from both [ADEO21] and [BJ18] in terms of techniques used and properties achieved. In particular, our compiler is modular, fully generic (works in a plug-and-play manner with any threshold linear secret sharing based MPC protocol), and avoids the (potentially expensive) protocol-specific techniques and pre-processing requirements that are inherent to [ADEO21, BJ18]. Our compiler also enables stronger security guarantees as compared to abort security, namely identifiable abort (and even full security/guaranteed output delivery in certain cases), which neither [ADEO21] nor [BJ18] achieves.

Distributed Zero-knowledge. Various notions of distributed zero-knowledge have appeared in literature. The notion of distributed interactive proofs appeared in [Ped91], in the context of relations describing the verification of signatures, where the signature is public and the secret key is shared. The notion in [WZC⁺18] considers a distributed prover in order to improve prover efficiency, but the witness is still held by one entity. In Feta [BJO⁺22], the distributed notion is a generalization of designated verifier to the threshold setting where a set of verifiers jointly verify the correctness of the proof. Prio [CB17] proposes secret shared non-interactive proofs where again, there is a single prover and many verifiers.

Our formulation of DPoKs also differs from recent works on distributed zkSNARKs [SVdV16, OB21, DPP⁺22], where the focus is on jointly computing a non-interactive publicly verifiable proof (with specific focus on Groth16 [Gro16], Plonk [GWC19] and Marlin [CHM⁺20]). Their constructions require additional interaction among the workers over private channels. On the other hand, we consider DPoKs where all interaction with the verifier takes place over a public broadcast channel. We also study the notion of *robust complete-*

ness that guarantees completion even in the presence of malicious behavior while ensuring succinct proof size, which was not achieved in prior works. Note that distributed zkSNARKs fundamentally differ in their objective. DPoKs prove that the given shares (e.g., the one used for MPC) reconstruct a valid witness, whereas distributed zkSNARKs do not certify a given sharing.

A recent work on distributed zkSNARKs, called zkSaaS [GGJ⁺23], considers a monolithic prover that aims outsource proof generation to (untrusted) servers in a privacy-preserving manner for increased efficiency. However, we target applications that require proving (algebraically structured) relations involving an already secret-shared witness. Plugging it naively does not work as a replacement for our proposed compiler since it would not ensure that the same input shares are used consistently in the authentication protocol and the core MPC. Additionally, similar to the distributed proofs with multiple verifier, [GGJ⁺23] also requires expressing the algebraically structured relations as circuits, which is inefficient for the algebraic relations considered in our work.

Proofs on Secret-shared Data. Notions of zero-knowledge proofs on distributed data is explored in recent works [BBC⁺19,HVW22,BJO⁺22]. The former work proposes the abstraction of a fully linear PCP (FLPCP) where each verifier only has access to a share of the statement, and the latter work is based on MPC-in-the-head paradigm. The techniques of distributed verification [BBC⁺19,HVW22,BJO⁺22] assumes the relations to be represented as an arithmetic circuit, whereas our DPoKs consider algebraic relations whose circuit representation is prohibitively expensive. Additionally, distributed verifier paradigm considers a designated prover who knows entire witness to create a proof oracle, which is verified in distributed fashion, while DPoKs do not require a prover which knows the entire witness. For example for proof of $g^x h^y = C$ where x and y belongs to different parties, a DPoK will succeed as long as provers have valid shares of x and y .

Our observation is that algebraic relations like discrete log is naturally distributed witness relation. A public statement and shared witness is better suited for algebraic relations, and our distributed zero-knowledge definition captures such natural relations. Since the focus of our work is on concrete efficiency (prover overhead, communication overhead), we take advantage of the algebraic nature of the relation to design concretely efficient DPoKs by modeling the witness as being distributed and statement being public. In this approach, we expect rich classes of protocols (compressed sigma protocols, Bulletproofs etc that avoid circuit representation for several useful relations) to be amenable to be distributed under our definition. In addition, [BBC⁺19] provides sublinear communication only for special circuits (like degree 2) and the circuits of interest for us are unlikely to have this structure.

We also note that [BBC⁺19] does not consider the robustness property. We put forth the robustness notion that guarantees that the protocol runs to completion even in the presence of malicious parties (when the prover is honest). This property is indeed important for our applications, as this means that the compiled authenticated MPC protocol can identify malicious parties in the authentication stage. The distributed completeness guarantees of [BJO⁺22] considers robustness, however its protocol execution incurs communication cost linear in the size of the circuit in the offline phase. However, [BJO⁺22] does not allow aggregation of multiple instances of authentication of input into one execution of the underlying distributed protocol, which we support efficiently.

Finally, the motivating application for [BBC⁺19] is compiling passive security to active security, and therefore the statements that show up – like the next message function of the protocol – have a low degree circuit representation. We consider the authenticated input application where our relations of interest are algebraic in nature (e.g. verification of an algebraic signature scheme) and admit efficient sigma protocols.

1.4 Resistance to Known Vulnerabilities

Here, we present a discussion on why our proposed DPoK protocols and our compiler for authenticated MPC resist some known attacks and insecurities of ZKP protocols in practice.

Resistance to ROS Attacks. In [BLL⁺21], the authors presented an algorithm for solving ROS (Random inhomogeneities in a Overdetermined Solvable system of linear equations) mod p in polynomial time for $\ell > \log p$ dimensions, which leads to the ROS attack on certain advanced families of digital signatures which involve computations over secret shares. However, the ROS attack does not apply to our proposed DPoK

protocols. In particular, note that the ROS attack only works when: (i) there are more than $\log p$ parallel sessions for the same shares, (ii) the adversary chooses its first message after seeing all of the other first messages from the honest parties, (iii) the adversary chooses the challenge.

The ROS attack is not applicable for our protocols as: (i) there are no parallel sessions in our protocols, (ii) each protocol is instantiated using the output of (the randomized) **Share** algorithm of the underlying secret sharing scheme (**Share, Reconstruct**), thereby ensuring that we do not reuse the shares across sessions, and in the round-efficient versions of our proposed protocols: (iii) the parties send non-interactive proofs instead of sending the first-messages separately (see $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$ in Appendix D), and finally (iv) the challenge is not chosen by the adversary (verifier); it is determined by performing a hash of the available public transcript.

Resistance to OSNARK-related Vulnerabilities. In [FN16], the authors provide a study of when SNARKs are insecure in the presence of certain oracles (in particular, the knowledge soundness guarantees do not hold in such settings since the extraction fails). As defined in [FN16], an OSNARK is a SNARK that guarantees extraction even in presence of an oracle for the prover. We note here that the negative result for the existence of OSNARKs, as outlined in [FN16], does not provide a general impossibility result, since it only applies either to SNARKs where the prover has access to oracles with secret states (such that the extractor does not have access to these states), and for standard-model SNARKs. We note that the attack does not apply: (i) to SNARKs in the ROM, and (ii) when the extractor is black-box in the adversary. Fiat-Shamir transformed Sigma protocols are also known to satisfy black-box *simulation-extractability*, i.e., knowledge soundness holds even in the presence of proof oracles [GKK⁺21, GOP⁺23]. Analogously, our Fiat-Shamir transformed round-efficient proofs of knowledge are simulation-extractable in the random oracle model, as we establish through formal proofs of security. In particular, there are no other oracles with secret states in our setting. We emphasize that signatures are already independently obtained by the parties on their inputs, and signing or signature-oracles are not included as part of our authenticated MPC protocols.

2 Preliminaries

In this section, we introduce notations and present preliminary background material. We refer to Appendices B.1, B.2, and B.3 for additional preliminaries.

Notation. We write $x \leftarrow_R \mathcal{X}$ to represent that an element x is sampled uniformly at random from a set/distribution \mathcal{X} . The output x of a deterministic algorithm \mathcal{A} is denoted by $x = \mathcal{A}$ and the output x' of a randomized algorithm \mathcal{A}' is denoted by $x' \leftarrow_R \mathcal{A}'$. For $n \in \mathbb{N}$, let $[n]$ denote the set $\{1, \dots, n\}$. For $a, b \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $a, b \geq 1$, we denote by $[a, b]$ the set of integers lying between a and b (both inclusive). We refer to $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ as the security parameter, and denote by $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ any generic (unspecified) polynomial function and negligible function in λ , respectively. A function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is said to be negligible in λ if for every positive polynomial p , $f(\lambda) < 1/p(\lambda)$ when λ is sufficiently large.

Let \mathbb{G} be a group and \mathbb{F}_p denote the field of prime order p . We use boldface to denote vectors. Let $\mathbf{g} = (g_1, \dots, g_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$ and $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathbb{F}_p^n$, then $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}}$ is defined by $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}} = g_1^{x_1} \cdots g_n^{x_n}$. For $\mathbf{g} = (g_1, \dots, g_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$ and $\mathbf{h} = (h_1, \dots, h_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$, $\mathbf{g} \circ \mathbf{h}$ denotes component-wise multiplication, and is defined by $\mathbf{g} \circ \mathbf{h} = (g_1 h_1, \dots, g_n h_n)$. For $\mathbf{g} = (g_1, \dots, g_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$ and $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathbb{F}_p^n$, \mathbf{g}_L (similarly, \mathbf{x}_L) denotes the left half of the vector $\mathbf{g}(\mathbf{x})$ and $\mathbf{g}_R(\mathbf{x}_R)$ denotes the right half, such that $\mathbf{g} = \mathbf{g}_L \parallel \mathbf{g}_R$ and $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}_L \parallel \mathbf{x}_R$.

2.1 Threshold Secret Sharing

For ease of exposition we define a special case of *threshold linear secret sharing* scheme below. For concreteness, the reader may assume a (t, n) Shamir Secret Sharing. The more general definition appears in Appendix C.

Definition 1 (Threshold Secret Sharing). *A (t, n) threshold secret sharing over finite field \mathbb{F} consists of algorithms (**Share, Reconstruct**) as described below:*

- **Share** is a randomized algorithm that on input $s \in \mathbb{F}$ samples a vector $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \in \mathbb{F}^n$, which we denote as $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(s)$.
- **Reconstruct** is a deterministic algorithm that takes a set $\mathcal{I} \subseteq [n]$, $|\mathcal{I}| \geq t$, a vector $(s_1, \dots, s_{|\mathcal{I}|})$ and outputs $s = \text{Reconstruct}((s_1, \dots, s_{|\mathcal{I}|}), \mathcal{I}) \in \mathbb{F}$. We will often omit the argument \mathcal{I} when it is clear from the context.

A threshold secret sharing scheme satisfies the following properties:

- **Correctness**: For every $s \in \mathbb{F}$, any $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(s)$ and any subset $\mathcal{I} = \{i_1, \dots, i_q\} \subseteq [n]$ with $q > t$, we have $\text{Reconstruct}((s_{i_1}, \dots, s_{i_q}), \mathcal{I}) = s$.
- **Privacy**: For every $s \in \mathbb{F}$, any $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(s)$ and any subset $\mathcal{I} = \{i_1, \dots, i_q\} \subseteq [n]$ with $q \leq t$, the tuple $(s_{i_1}, \dots, s_{i_q})$ is information-theoretically independent of s .

A concrete (t, n) sharing scheme over a finite field \mathbb{F} , known as the Shamir Secret Sharing is realized by choosing a set of distinct points $\boldsymbol{\eta} = \{\eta_1, \dots, \eta_n\}$ in $\mathbb{F} \setminus \{0\}$. Then given $s \in \mathbb{F}$, the Share algorithm uniformly samples a polynomial p of degree at most t such that $p(0) = s$ and outputs $(p(\eta_1), \dots, p(\eta_n))$ as the shares. The Reconstruct algorithm essentially reconstructs the value $s = p(0)$ using Lagrangian interpolation. We canonically extend the Share and Reconstruct algorithms to vectors by applying them component-wise.

Definition 2 (Linear Code). An $[n, k, d]$ -linear code \mathcal{L} over field \mathbb{F} is a k -dimensional subspace of \mathbb{F}^n such that $d = \min\{\Delta(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) : \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{L}, \mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{y}\}$. Here Δ denotes the hamming distance between two vectors.

We say that an $m \times n$ matrix $\mathbf{P} \in \mathcal{L}^m$ if each row of \mathbf{P} is a vector in \mathcal{L} . We also overload the distance function Δ over matrices; for matrices $\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{Q} \in \mathbb{F}^{m \times n}$, we define $\Delta(\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{Q})$ to be the number of columns in which \mathbf{P} and \mathbf{Q} differ. For a matrix $\mathbf{P} \in \mathbb{F}^{m \times n}$ and an $[n, k, d]$ linear code \mathcal{L} over \mathbb{F} , we define $\Delta(\mathbf{P}, \mathcal{L}^m)$ to be minimum value of $\Delta(\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{Q})$ where $\mathbf{Q} \in \mathcal{L}^m$.

Definition 3 (Reed Solomon code). For any finite field \mathbb{F} , any n -length vector $\boldsymbol{\eta} = (\eta_1, \dots, \eta_n) \in \mathbb{F}^n$ of distinct elements of \mathbb{F} and integer $k < n$, the Reed Solomon Code $\mathcal{RS}_{n,k,\boldsymbol{\eta}}$ is an $[n, k, n - k + 1]$ linear code consisting of vectors $(p(\eta_1), \dots, p(\eta_n))$ where p is a polynomial of degree at most $k - 1$ over \mathbb{F} .

We note that shares output by (t, n) Shamir secret sharing are vectors in $[n, t + 1, n - t]$ Reed Solomon code. We can leverage tests for membership of a vector in a linear code (based on parity-check matrix) to check if a set of shares $\{s_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ for $\mathcal{H} \subseteq [n]$ and $|\mathcal{H}| > t$ uniquely determine a shared value s for Shamir Secret Sharing scheme. Below, we formalise the notion of consistent shares and state a lemma to check such shares. In the interest of space, we directly state the results for general $m \in \mathbb{N}$, i.e. when vectors $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}^m$ are shared.

Definition 4 (Consistent Shares). Let \mathcal{L} be the linear code determined by a (t, n) Shamir secret sharing scheme over finite field \mathbb{F} . For $m \in \mathbb{N}$, we call a set of shares $\{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ for $\mathcal{H} \subseteq [n]$ with $|\mathcal{H}| \geq t + 1$ to be \mathcal{L}^m -consistent if there exists $(\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n) \in \mathcal{L}^m$ such that $\mathbf{s}_i = \mathbf{v}_i$ for $i \in \mathcal{H}$. In this case $\mathbf{s} = \text{Reconstruct}(\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_n) \in \mathbb{F}^m$ is the unique shared value determined by the shares $\{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$.

We define the predicate $\text{Consistent} : \mathbb{F}^{\mathcal{H}+1} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ as

$$\text{Consistent}(\{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}, \mathbf{s}) = \begin{cases} 1, & |\mathcal{H}| \leq t \\ 1, & |\mathcal{H}| > t \wedge \{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \text{ is } \mathcal{L}^m\text{-consistent} \\ & \wedge \text{Reconstruct}(\{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}) = \mathbf{s} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

We use this $\text{Consistent}(\cdot)$ predicate to determine if a vector \mathbf{s} can be a possible candidate which could have been used to generate the set of shares held by the honest parties $\{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$.

Lemma 1. Let \mathcal{L} be the linear code determined by a (t, n) Shamir secret sharing scheme over finite field \mathbb{F} . Then for $m \in \mathbb{N}$ and all $\mathcal{H} \subseteq [n]$ with $q = |\mathcal{H}| \geq t + 1$, there exists $q \times (n - t)$ matrix $\mathbf{H}_{\mathcal{H}\mathcal{H}}$ over \mathbb{F} such that shares $\{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ are \mathcal{L}^m -consistent and determine the value $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}^m$ if and only if $\mathbf{X}\mathbf{H}_{\mathcal{H}} = (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{0}^{n-t-1})$ where $\mathbf{X} = (\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_q)$ is some canonical ordering of $\{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$.

Proof. We sketch the proof. For a matrix $\mathbf{P} \in \mathcal{L}^m$, we have $\mathbf{P}\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{0}^{n-t-1}$ where \mathbf{H} is the parity check matrix for the $[n, t+1, n-t]$ code \mathcal{L} . Now for $\mathcal{H} \subseteq [n]$ with $|\mathcal{H}| \geq t+1$, and matrix \mathbf{X} determined by \mathcal{L}^m -consistent shares $(s_i)_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$, there exists a matrix $\mathbf{T}_{\mathcal{H}}$ such that $\mathbf{X}\mathbf{T}_{\mathcal{H}} \in \mathcal{L}^m$, and hence $\mathbf{X}\mathbf{T}_{\mathcal{H}}\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{0}^{n-t-1}$. Thus for $\mathbf{H}_{\mathcal{H}} = [\mathbf{k}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathcal{H}}\mathbf{H}]$ where \mathbf{k} is the column of reconstruction coefficients for the set \mathcal{H} , we have $\mathbf{X}\mathbf{H}_{\mathcal{H}} = (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{0}^{n-t-1})$.

2.2 Proofs of Knowledge

Let \mathcal{R} be a NP-relation and \mathcal{L} be the corresponding NP-language, where $\mathcal{L} = \{x : \exists w \text{ such that } (x, w) \in \mathcal{R}\}$. Here, x is called an *instance or statement* and w is called a *witness*. An *interactive proof system* consists of a pair of PPT algorithms $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$. \mathcal{P} , known as the prover algorithm, takes as input an instance $x \in \mathcal{L}$ and its corresponding witness w , and \mathcal{V} , known as the verifier algorithm, takes as input an instance x . Given a public instance x , the prover \mathcal{P} , convinces the verifier \mathcal{V} , that $x \in \mathcal{L}$. At the end of the protocol, based on whether the verifier is convinced by the prover's claim, \mathcal{V} outputs a decision bit. A stronger *proof of knowledge* (PoK)⁷ property says that if the verifier is convinced, then the prover knows a witness w such that $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$. In this paper, we consider POKs that satisfy two security properties, namely, *honest-verifier zero-knowledge* (HVZK) and *special-soundness*.

A protocol is said to be *honest-verifier zero-knowledge* (HVZK) if the transcript of messages resulting from a run of the protocol can be simulated by an efficient algorithm without knowledge of the witness. A protocol is said to have *k-special-soundness*, if given k accepting transcripts, an extractor algorithm can output a w' such that $(x, w') \in \mathcal{R}$. Furthermore, a protocol is said to have (k_1, \dots, k_μ) -*special-soundness* [BCC⁺16], if given a tree of $\prod_{i=1}^{\mu} k_i$ accepting transcripts, the extractor can extract a valid witness. Here, each vertex in the tree of $\prod_{i=1}^{\mu} k_i$ accepting transcripts corresponds to the prover's messages and each edge in the tree corresponds the verifier's challenge, and each root-to-leaf path is a transcript. An interactive protocol is said to be *public-coin* if the verifier's messages are uniformly random strings. Public-coin protocols can be transformed into non-interactive arguments using the Fiat-Shamir [FS87] heuristic by deriving the verifier's messages as the output of a Random Oracle. In this work, we consider public-coin protocols.

We refer to Appendix B.1 for a detailed treatment of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof systems.

2.3 BBS+ Signatures and PoK for BBS

In this section, we recall the BBS+ signature scheme [BBS04,LKWL22,CDL16], and its proof of knowledge. We use the variant of BBS+ signatures and the proof of knowledge from [CDL16], which is the currently adopted variant in the IETF standard for verifiable credentials [LKWL22]. Later, we also describe a slight variant of the BBS+ proof of knowledge from [CDL16], which leads to corresponding distributed proofs with better amortized complexity (i.e, when several DPoKs are required at a time).

Definition 5 (BBS+ Signature Scheme [BBS04,LKWL22]). *The BBS+ signature scheme to sign a message of the form $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_\ell) \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ consists of a tuple of PPT algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify) described as follows :*

- **Setup**(1^λ) : *For security parameter λ , this algorithm outputs groups $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$, and \mathbb{G}_T of prime order p , with an efficient bilinear map $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ as part of the public parameters \mathbf{pp} , along with g_1 and g_2 , which are the generators of groups \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 respectively.*
- **KeyGen**(\mathbf{pp}) : *This algorithm samples $(h_0, \dots, h_\ell) \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}_1^{\ell+1}$ and $x \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p^*$, computes $w = g_2^x$ and outputs $(\mathbf{sk}, \mathbf{pk})$, where $\mathbf{sk} = x$ and $\mathbf{pk} = (g_1, w, h_0, \dots, h_\ell)$.*
- **Sign**($\mathbf{sk}, m_1, \dots, m_\ell$) : *This algorithm samples $\beta, s \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$, computes $A = \left(g_1 h_0^s \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} h_i^{m_i}\right)^{\frac{1}{\beta+x}}$ and outputs $\sigma = (A, \beta, s)$.*

⁷ Throughout this paper, we use *proof* and *argument* interchangeably, but we are only concerned with arguments (proofs with computational soundness) in this paper.

– Verify(pk, $(m_1, \dots, m_\ell), \sigma$) : This algorithm parses σ as $(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3)$, and checks

$$e(\sigma_1, wg_2^{\sigma_2}) = e\left(g_1 h_0^{\sigma_3} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} h_i^{m_i}, g_2\right).$$

If yes, it outputs 1, and outputs 0 otherwise.

PoK for BBS+ Signature Scheme. We present a modified proof of knowledge (PoK) for BBS+ signatures, building on the PoK originally proposed in [CDL16] (summarized in Appendix B.3), wherein we split the relation $d^{-r_3} h_0^{s'} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} h_i^{m_i} = g_1^{-1}$ by requiring the prover to equivalently show:

$$d^{-r_3} h_0^{s'-\eta} = C \wedge h_0^\eta \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} h_i^{m_i} = D \wedge C \cdot D = g_1^{-1}$$

The above decomposition has advantage that the (long) message \mathbf{m} appears only with public generators which leads to better aggregation of DPoKs over several messages. The complete modified protocol appears below.

– **Common Input:** Public Key $\text{pk} = (w, h_0, \dots, h_\ell)$

– **\mathcal{P} 's inputs:** Message $\mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ and signature $\sigma = (A, \beta, s)$ on \mathbf{m} , with $A = \left(g_1 h_0^s \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} h_i^{m_i}\right)^{\frac{1}{\beta+x}}$.

1. \mathcal{P} samples $r_1 \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p^*$ and computes $A' = A^{r_1}$ and $r_3 = r_1^{-1}$
2. \mathcal{P} computes $\bar{A} = (A')^{-\beta} \cdot b^{r_1}$, where $b = g_1 h_0^s \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} h_i^{m_i}$.
3. \mathcal{P} samples $r_2 \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$ and computes $d = b^{r_1} \cdot h_0^{-r_2}$ and $s' = s - r_2 \cdot r_3$
4. \mathcal{P} samples $\eta \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$ and sets $C = d^{-\eta} h_0^{s'-\eta}$, and $D = h_0^\eta \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} h_i^{m_i}$.
5. \mathcal{P} sends (A', \bar{A}, d, C, D) to \mathcal{V} .
6. \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} run a ZKPoK for the discrete-logarithm relation:

$$(A')^{-\beta} h_0^{r_2} = \bar{A}/d \wedge d^{-r_3} h_0^{s'-\eta} = C \wedge h_0^\eta \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} h_i^{m_i} = D$$

where $(\mathbf{m}, r_2, r_3, \beta, s', \eta)$ is the witness.

7. \mathcal{V} checks that $A' \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}_1}, C \cdot D = g_1^{-1}, e(A', w) = e(\bar{A}, g_2)$, verifies the ZKPoK proof and outputs 1 if all the checks pass, and 0 otherwise.

3 Distributed Proof of Knowledge

In this section, we formalize the notion of *distributed* proof of knowledge (DPoK) in which multiple provers, each having a share of the witness engage in an interactive protocol with a verifier to convince it that their shares determine a valid witness. The provers do not directly interact with each other, and all the interaction with the verifier takes place over a public broadcast channel.

3.1 Defining a DPoK

Definition 6 (Distributed Proof of Knowledge). We define n -party *distributed proof of knowledge* for relation generator RGen and a secret-sharing scheme $\text{SSS} = (\text{Share}, \text{Reconstruct})$ by the tuple $\text{DPoK}_{\text{SSS}, \text{RGen}} = (\text{Setup}, \Pi)$ where Setup is a PPT algorithm and Π is an interactive protocol between PPT algorithms \mathcal{P} (prover), \mathcal{V} (verifier) and $\mathcal{W}_1, \dots, \mathcal{W}_n$ (workers) defined as follows:

- **Setup Phase:** For relation $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow_R \text{RGen}(1^\lambda)$, $\text{Setup}(\mathcal{R})$ outputs public parameters pp as $\text{pp} \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(\mathcal{R})$. The setup phase is required to be executed only once for a given relation \mathcal{R} . We assume \mathcal{R} consists of pairs (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{w}) where \mathbf{w} is parsed as (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) with $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}^m$. Looking ahead, we partition the witness as (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) to explicitly specify which parts of the witness later needs to be shared ⁸.
- **Input Phase:** The prover \mathcal{P} receives $(\mathbf{x}, (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})) \in \mathcal{R}$ as input, while the worker \mathcal{W}_i , $i \in [n]$ receives $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{s}_i)$ as input, where $(\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(\mathbf{s})$. All parties receive \mathbf{x} as input.
- **Preprocessing Phase:** This is (an optional) phase where the prover \mathcal{P} sends some auxiliary information aux_i to worker \mathcal{W}_i using secure private channels.
- **Interactive Phase:** In this phase, the parties interact using a public broadcast channel according to the protocol Π . The protocol Π is a k -round protocol for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$, with $(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})$ as \mathcal{P} 's input, $(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{s}_i, \text{aux}_i)$ as the input of \mathcal{W}_i and (pp, \mathbf{x}) as the input of \mathcal{V} . The verifier's message in each round $j \in [k]$ consists of a uniformly sampled challenge $\mathbf{c}_j \in \mathbb{F}^{\ell_j}$ for $\ell_j \in \mathbb{N}$. In each round $j \in [k]$, the worker \mathcal{W}_i (resp. the prover \mathcal{P}) broadcasts a message $\mathbf{m}_{i,j}$ (resp., \mathbf{m}_i) which depends on it's random coins and the messages received in prior rounds (including pre-processing phase).
- **Output Phase:** At the conclusion of k rounds, verifier outputs a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ indicating accept (1) or reject (0).

A distributed proof of knowledge $\text{DPoK}_{\text{SSS}, \text{RGen}}$ as described above is said to be t -private, ℓ -robust if the following hold:

- **Completeness:** We say that completeness holds if for all $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow_R \text{RGen}(1^\lambda)$ and $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{s}) \in \mathcal{R}$, the honest execution of all the phases results in 1 being output in the output phase with probability 1.
- **Knowledge-Soundness:** We say that knowledge soundness holds if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$, where \mathcal{A}_2 corrupts the prover \mathcal{P} and subset of workers $\{\mathcal{W}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{C}}$ for some $\mathcal{C} \subseteq [n]$, there exists an extractor Ext with oracle access to \mathcal{A}_2 (recall that the prover and the set of corrupt \mathcal{W}_i are controlled by \mathcal{A}_2) such the following probability is negligible.

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x}) = 1 \wedge \\ ((\mathbf{x}, (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})) \notin \mathcal{R} \vee \\ \text{Consistent}(\{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}, \mathbf{s}) = 0) \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{R} \leftarrow_R \text{RGen}(\lambda) \\ \text{pp} \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(\mathcal{R}) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}) \leftarrow_R \mathcal{A}_1(\text{pp}) \\ (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) \leftarrow_R \text{Ext}^{\mathcal{A}_2}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x}, \{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}) \end{array} \right]$$

In the above, $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x})$ denotes the verifier's output in the protocol Π with its input as (pp, \mathbf{x}) and \mathcal{A} being the adversary. The extractor takes as input the shares of the honest parties specified by the adversary \mathcal{A}_1 , and with all but negligible probability extracts a valid witness.

- **Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge:** We say that a DPoK is honest verifier zero-knowledge if for all $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow_R \text{RGen}(1^\lambda)$, $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{s}) \in \mathcal{R}$ and any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} corrupting a set of workers $\{\mathcal{W}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{C}}$, where $|\mathcal{C}| \leq t$, there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that $\text{View}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x})$ is indistinguishable from $\text{Sim}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x})$ for $\text{pp} \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(\mathcal{R})$. Here, the view is given by $\text{View}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi} = \{\mathbf{r}, (\mathbf{M}_i)_{i \in \mathcal{C}}\}$ where \mathbf{r} denotes the internal randomness of \mathcal{A} and \mathbf{M}_i is the set of all messages received by \mathcal{W}_i in Π . We remark that we define honest-verifier zero-knowledge as is standard for public-coin interactive protocols. After Fiat-Shamir compilation into a non-interactive proof, we get full zero-knowledge against a malicious verifier.
- **Robust-Completeness:** We say that robust-completeness holds if for all $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow_R \text{RGen}(1^\lambda)$, $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{s}) \in \mathcal{R}$ and any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} corrupting a set of workers $\{\mathcal{W}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{C}}$, where $|\mathcal{C}| \leq \ell$, $\mathcal{V}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x}) = 1$ with overwhelming probability where $\text{pp} \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(\mathcal{R})$.

Remark 1. Robust completeness is a stronger notion of completeness in the sense that it holds even if some corrupt workers deviate maliciously from the protocol, as opposed to the standard notion of completeness which only holds if all the workers follow the protocol. Looking ahead, we use robust complete DPoKs

⁸ We specify $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}^m$ since our secret sharing works over a finite field. The witness component \mathbf{t} need not, in general, be a field element. In fact, in our application, the witness is a message signature pair where the message is in \mathbb{F}^m and the signature is a group element. This group element is not secret shared, yet, the DPoK guarantees extraction of a valid signature message pair.

to design authenticated MPC protocols that preserve the underlying protocol’s resilience against malicious behavior.

Remark 2. We assume that the sharing phase is executed before the onset of DPoK, hence the knowledge soundness extractor of DPoK expects honest party shares in order to extract the witness. Since knowledge soundness is supposed to hold against a corrupt prover and some corrupt workers, it is meaningful to say that the adversary breaks knowledge soundness if no extractor can construct corrupt party shares that **together with the honest party shares** determine a valid witness. Note that extractor is required to produce shares of corrupt parties which “explain” the successful outcome of the protocol in conjunction with the shares used by honest parties. Hence, DPoK enables us to certify a given sharing.

Remark 3. We assume an honest verifier \mathcal{V} for ease of exposition. In Appendix D, we relax this assumption by transforming any $\text{DPoK}_{\text{SSS}, \text{RGen}}$ protocol that uses only public coins and communication over broadcast channels between the workers and the verifier (with no communication among the workers), into a round-efficient version $\text{RE-DPoK}_{\text{SSS}, \text{RGen}}$ in the random oracle model, wherein the verifier’s challenge is computed using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS87].

3.2 Robust Complete DPoK for Discrete Log

In this section, we provide a $\text{DPoK}_{\text{SSS}, \text{DlogGen}}$ for the discrete log relation based on Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) [Sha79]. Let DlogGen be a relation generator that on input $(1^\lambda, 1^\ell)$ outputs $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbf{g}, p)$ where p is a λ -bit prime, \mathbb{G} is a cyclic group of order p and $\mathbf{g} = (g_1, \dots, g_\ell) \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}^\ell$ is a uniformly sampled set of generators. The associated relation \mathcal{R}^{DL} is defined by $(z, \mathbf{s}) \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{DL}}$ if $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}} = z$. Let $\text{SSS} = (\text{Share}, \text{Reconstruct})$ denote (t, n) Shamir secret sharing over \mathbb{F}_p . Our protocol Π_{dlog} realizing $\text{DPoK}_{\text{SSS}, \text{DlogGen}}$ is as below. However, for ease of exposition, we first explain a simpler non-robust version of the protocol, before explaining the robust version. We use an instantiation of compressed sigma protocols (CSP) due to Attema et al. [AC20] as a black-box (see Appendix B.2 for details). We run CSP protocol instances over a broadcast channel, meaning that each worker \mathcal{W}_i (playing the role of the prover of that instance) broadcasts its messages as part of the CSP protocol, and the verifier broadcasts all challenges as well.

Warm-up: Non-robust DPoK for DLOG. We begin by describing a simpler, non-robust version of Π_{dlog} outlined above, which we call $\Pi_{\text{nr-dlog}}$. Let us consider the scenario where the parties $\mathcal{W}_i, i \in [n]$, holds the shares \mathbf{s}_i for a secret \mathbf{s} such that $(z, \mathbf{s}) \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{DL}}$, i.e. $z = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}}$. Now note that since $(\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_n) \leftarrow_R \mathbf{s}$, there exists some publicly known k_i such that $\sum_i k_i \mathbf{s}_i = \mathbf{s}$. In particular, the protocol $\Pi_{\text{nr-dlog}}$ executes the following steps:

- **Input Phase:** The prover holds (z, \mathbf{s}) and each worker \mathcal{W}_i ($i \in [n]$) holds (z, \mathbf{s}_i) , where \mathbf{s}_i are shares of \mathbf{s} i.e. $(\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(\mathbf{s})$.

Interactive Phase

- Each worker \mathcal{W}_i ($i \in [n]$) broadcasts a commitment $A_i = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i}$ to their shares \mathbf{s}_i , along with a proof of knowledge π_i of its exponent \mathbf{s}_i with respect to the associated commitment A_i .
- Thereafter, the verifier checks the following:
 - The proofs π_i (with respect to the broadcasted commitment A_i) are valid for all $i \in [n]$.
 - The broadcasted A_i and the publicly known z satisfies the relation $z = \prod_i A_i^{k_i}$ for the publicly known reconstruction coefficients $\{k_i : i \in [n]\}$.

Robust DPoK for DLOG. Note that the previously described protocol $\Pi_{\text{nr-dlog}}$ achieves completeness only if all of the parties participating to produce the proof are honest. To achieve completeness even in the presence of corrupt parties, known as the stronger guarantee of robust completeness, we require error-correction. However the shares that requires error-correction are in the exponent of a publicly known group element and it is known from [Pei06] that error correction is not possible in the exponent. To ensure that

⁸ Note that here the witness is $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$, and we do not have any component \mathbf{t} which is not being secret-shared.

error correction is possible in the exponent, we leverage the coding theoretic lemma that states that a random linear combination of a set of error-correcting codes (e.g., Reed-Solomon code) retains the position of errors as long as the number of errors are ‘small’. In particular, the protocol Π_{dlog} executes the following steps:

- **Input Phase:** The prover holds (z, \mathbf{s}) and each worker \mathcal{W}_i ($i \in [n]$) holds (z, \mathbf{s}_i) , where \mathbf{s}_i are shares of \mathbf{s} i.e. $(\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(\mathbf{s})$.
- **Pre-processing:** We need an additional preprocessing step for providing robustness. In this phase, before the onset of the interactive phase of the protocol, the prover samples $r \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$, computes $(r_1, \dots, r_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(r)$ and sends the share r_i to the worker \mathcal{W}_i .

Interactive Phase

- **Commit to Shares:** In the interactive phase, each worker \mathcal{W}_i ($i \in [n]$) first commit to their respective shares by
 - broadcasting $A_i = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i}$ and running its associated proof of knowledge $\text{CSP}\{(A_i, \mathbf{s}_i) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i} = A_i\}$ over broadcast to obtain π_{i1} .
 - broadcasting $B_i = h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i}$ for $\omega_i \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$ and running its its associated proofs of knowledge $\text{CSP}\{(B_i, (r_i, \omega_i)) : h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i} = B_i\}$ over broadcast to obtain π_{i2} .
- **Reveal Linear Form over Shares:** The verifier samples a challenge $\gamma \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ and broadcasts it. Thereafter, the workers broadcast the linear form $v_i = \langle \gamma, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle + r_i$. Recall that, we know that random linear combination of a codeword is also a codeword (recalled in Lemma 2). Using Lemma 2, since $\{(\mathbf{s}_i, r_i) : i \in [n]\}$ are codewords respectively, the linear combination of those codewords (v_1, \dots, v_n) using the randomly sampled γ is also a codeword. Additionally, to ensure that corrupt workers use \mathbf{s}_i, r_i consistent with earlier commitments A_i, B_i we additionally require them to run the following proof of knowledge CSP over broadcast to obtain π_{i3} :

$$\pi_{i3} = \text{CSP}\{((A_i B_i, \gamma \| \mathbf{1} \| \mathbf{0}, v_i), (\mathbf{s}_i, r_i, \omega_i)) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i} h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i} = A_i B_i \wedge \langle \gamma, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle + r_i = v_i\}.$$

- **Verifier Determines Honest Commitments:** Let $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_n)$, defined by $v_i = \langle \gamma, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle + r_i$, be the vector of honestly computed values, and $\mathbf{v}' = (v'_1, \dots, v'_n)$ be the respective broadcasted values received by the workers in the previous step. If one of the proofs π_{i1}, π_{i2} or π_{i3} is invalid, the verifier set $b_i = 0$ else it sets $b_i = 1$. Since $\Delta(\mathbf{v}', \mathbf{v}) \leq d < (n - t)/2$, \mathcal{V} can compute \mathbf{v} from \mathbf{v}' by decoding algorithm (e.g. Berlekamp-Welch) for Reed-Solomon codes. Set $\mathbf{C} = \{i \in [n] : v_i \neq v'_i \vee b_i = 0\}$ and let $\mathbf{H}_Q = (h_{jk})$ denote the matrix guaranteed by Lemma 1 for $Q = [n] \setminus \mathbf{C} = \{i_1, \dots, i_q\}$ for $q \in \mathbb{N}$. Informally, \mathbf{C} is the set consisting of the position of ‘errors’ noted by the verifier and the new reconstruction coefficient k'_i is computed for the set $[n] \setminus \mathbf{C} = \{i_1, \dots, i_q\}$. Thereafter the verifier proceeds with the final check with the non-error positions in $\{i_1, \dots, i_q\}$ by using the new reconstruction coefficients and the corresponding commitments sent in the previous round. Also, we rely on the fact that we use shares of a codeword (\mathbf{s}, r) in the proof of knowledge π_{i3} to ensure that the received values (v_1, \dots, v_n) , if correctly computed, would also be a codeword and error-correction can be used on the new codeword (v_1, \dots, v_n) .
- **Output using Honest Messages:** \mathcal{V} outputs $(1, \mathbf{C})$ if $\left(\prod_{j \in [q]} A_{i_j}^{h_{jk}} \right)_{k=1, \dots, n-t} = (z, \mathbf{0}^{n-t-1})$, and $(0, \{\mathcal{P}\})$ otherwise.

This is achieved via the additional steps (4b) through (6) in Π_{dlog} outlined in the figure above. We subsequently present a formal proof that Π_{dlog} achieves d -robust completeness for $d < \text{dist}/2$, where $\text{dist} = (n - t)$ is the minimum distance of the Reed-Solomon code induced by (t, n) -SSS.

Remark 4. The final step of protocol Π_{dlog} checks $(n - t)$ equations over exponents and not just the reconstruction equation. This is to ensure that we extract the witness consistent with honest party shares of the witness. This is crucial in the security proof of our compiler for honest majority protocols where honest party shares determine a unique consistent witness, and this ensures that corrupt parties use the same inputs in both the DPoK protocol and the associated MPC protocol.

Protocol Π_{dlog}

1. **Public Parameters:** Let $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbf{g}, p) \leftarrow_R \text{DlogGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\ell)$. Let \mathcal{R}^{DL} denote the relation consisting of pairs (z, \mathbf{s}) such that $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}} = z$. Let $(h_1, h_2) \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(\mathcal{R}^{\text{DL}})$ be two independent generators of \mathbb{G} .
2. **Input Phase:** The prover gets (z, \mathbf{s}) while workers \mathcal{W}_i , $i \in [n]$ are given (z, \mathbf{s}_i) where $(\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(\mathbf{s})$.⁹
3. **Pre-processing:** Prover samples $r \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$, computes $(r_1, \dots, r_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(r)$ and sends r_i to \mathcal{W}_i for $i \in [n]$.
4. **Commit to Shares:** In the interactive phase, each worker \mathcal{W}_i , for $i \in [n]$, does the following.
 - (a) \mathcal{W}_i broadcasts $A_i = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i}$ and runs its associated proofs of knowledge $\text{CSP}\{(A_i, \mathbf{s}_i) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i} = A_i\}$ over broadcast to obtain π_{i1} .
 - (b) \mathcal{W}_i broadcasts $B_i = h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i}$ for $\omega_i \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$ and runs its associated proofs of knowledge $\text{CSP}\{(B_i, (r_i, \omega_i)) : h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i} = B_i\}$ over broadcast to obtain π_{i2} .
5. **Reveal Linear Form over Shares:**
 - (a) \mathcal{V} samples $\gamma \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ and broadcasts it.
 - (b) For all $i \in [n]$, \mathcal{W}_i computes $v_i = \langle \gamma, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle + r_i$ and broadcasts v_i .
 - (c) For all $i \in [n]$, \mathcal{W}_i also runs the associated proof of knowledge to obtain π_{i3} , i.e.

$$\pi_{i3} = \text{CSP}\{(A_i B_i, \gamma \| \mathbf{1} \| \mathbf{0}, v_i), (\mathbf{s}_i, r_i, \omega_i) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i} h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i} = A_i B_i \wedge \langle \gamma, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle + r_i = v_i\}.$$

6. **Verifier Determines Honest Commitments:**
 - (a) Let $\mathbf{v}' = (v'_1, \dots, v'_n)$ be the received values in the previous step by the workers, instead of the honestly computed values (v_1, \dots, v_n) .
 - (b) If one of the proofs π_{i1}, π_{i2} or π_{i3} is invalid, the verifier set $b_i = 0$ else it sets $b_i = 1$.
 - (c) Since $\Delta(\mathbf{v}', \mathbf{v}) \leq d < (n-t)/2$ from assumption, \mathcal{V} computes \mathbf{v} from \mathbf{v}' by decoding algorithm (e.g. Berlekamp-Welch) for Reed-Solomon codes. Set $\mathbf{C} = \{i \in [n] : v_i \neq v'_i \vee b_i = 0\}$ and let $\mathbf{H}_Q = (h_{jk})$ denote the matrix guaranteed by Lemma 1 for $Q = [n] \setminus \mathbf{C} = \{i_1, \dots, i_q\}$ for $q \in \mathbb{N}$.
7. **Output using Honest Messages:** \mathcal{V} outputs $(1, \mathbf{C})$ if $\left(\prod_{j \in [q]} A_{i_j}^{h_{jk}} \right)_{k=1, \dots, n-t} = (z, \mathbf{0}^{n-t-1})$, and $(0, \{\mathcal{P}\})$ otherwise.

Theorem 1. *Assuming that CSP satisfies completeness, knowledge-soundness and zero-knowledge with $O(\log \ell)$ -communication overhead, Π_{dlog} is a DPoK_{SSS, DlogGen} (as per definition 6) for relation generator DlogGen and (t, n) -SSS with the following properties:*

- **Security:** t -private and d -robust, for $d < \text{dist}/2$, where $\text{dist} = (n-t)$ is the minimum distance of the Reed-Solomon code induced by (t, n) -SSS.
- **Efficiency:** $O(n)$ communication over point-to-point channels and $O(n \log \ell)$ communication over broadcast channels.

Proof. We provide the proof of security and efficiency below.

Proof of Security. In order to prove security, we prove robust completeness, knowledge-soundness and zero-knowledge.

Robust Completeness. We show that when the prover is honest, and has a correct witness \mathbf{s} , the verifier outputs 1 and identifies the corrupt workers with overwhelming probability. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary corrupting set \mathcal{C}' of workers with $|\mathcal{C}'| = d < (n-t)/2$. Let \mathbf{S} denote the matrix with i^{th} column as (\mathbf{s}_i, r_i) for $i \in [n]$. Clearly $\mathbf{S} \in \mathcal{L}^m$ for $m = \ell + 1$. We construct a matrix \mathbf{S}' as follows: for $i \in \mathcal{C}'$ where the adversary's proofs π_{i1}, π_{i2} and π_{i3} are valid, we extract \mathbf{s}'_i and r_i from the proofs π_{i1} and π_{i2} respectively, and set (\mathbf{s}'_i, r'_i) as the i^{th} column of \mathbf{S}' . For $i \in \mathcal{C}'$ where one of the proofs is not valid, we set i^{th} column of \mathbf{S}' as (\mathbf{s}'_i, r'_i)

for \mathbf{s}'_i, r'_i sampled uniformly. Finally for $i \notin C'$, we set the i^{th} column of \mathbf{S}' as (\mathbf{s}_i, r_i) (i.e. it is identical to the corresponding column in \mathbf{S}). Intuitively, the matrix \mathbf{S}' is the corrupted version of honest matrix \mathbf{S} in which columns corresponding to corrupt provers consist of shares (\mathbf{s}'_i, r'_i) the adversary had in its “head”. Looking ahead, we force the adversary to reveal a linear combination over the shares in its “head”, and if they are inconsistent with \mathbf{S} , the resulting message v'_i will differ from honestly computed v_i (Lemma 2), which will identify the corrupt messages. We now proceed with the formal proof. Let E denote the set of column indices where \mathbf{S} and \mathbf{S}' differ. Let $\mathbf{v}' = (v'_1, \dots, v'_n)$ be the vector where v'_i is sent by \mathcal{W}_i in Step (5). Clearly, as $\Delta(\mathbf{v}', \mathcal{L}) \leq |C'| < (n - t)/2$, we can decode \mathbf{v}' to vector $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_n) \in \mathcal{L}$. By uniqueness of decoding, we must have $v'_i = v_i$ for $i \notin C'$. We will prove that with overwhelming probability we must have $(\mathbf{s}'_i, r'_i) = (\mathbf{s}_i, r_i)$ for all $i \in Q$, which from Lemma 1 will imply that verifier outputs 1 (this is because verifier simply checks matrix relation in Lemma 1 over exponents). For sake of contradiction, assume that $(\mathbf{s}'_i, r'_i) \neq (\mathbf{s}_i, r_i)$ for $i \in \mathcal{H}$. We can assume that the proofs $\pi_{i1}, \dots, \pi_{i3}$ were valid, for otherwise $b_i = 0$, which would imply $i \notin \mathcal{H}$, a contradiction. Now from soundness of the proofs and binding property of the pedersen commitments, with overwhelming probability we must have $v'_i = \langle \gamma, \mathbf{s}'_i \rangle + r'_i$. By assumption we have $i \in E$ and thus from Lemma 2, with overwhelming probability we have $v'_i \neq v_i$. Thus $i \notin \mathcal{H}$, which is again a contradiction. This proves that $\mathbf{s}'_i = \mathbf{s}_i$ for $i \in \mathcal{H}$, and thus the vector $(\mathbf{s}'_i)_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ is \mathcal{L}^m -consistent. From Lemma 1, we conclude that the verifier outputs 1.

Knowledge-Soundness. To prove knowledge-soundness, we describe the extractor Ext which is provided the shares $\mathbf{s}_i, i \notin C$ with C denoting the indices of workers corrupted by adversary \mathcal{A} . The extractor Ext runs the adversary \mathcal{A} . When \mathcal{A} succeeds, for each $j \in [q]$ in Step (6) the extractor Ext sets $\mathbf{s}'_{i_j} = \mathbf{s}_{i_j}$ if $i_j \notin C$; otherwise it invokes the extractor for CSP, which has oracle access to the worker \mathcal{W}_{i_j} acting as the prover for the instantiation of $\text{CSP}\{(A_i, \mathbf{s}_i) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i} = A_i\}$, to extract \mathbf{s}'_{i_j} satisfying $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}'_{i_j}} = A_{i_j}$. The verification check in Step (7) implies that the tuple $(\mathbf{s}'_{i_j})_{j \in [q]}$ is \mathcal{L}^ℓ -consistent. The extractor outputs the witness \mathbf{s} , which is reconstructed from the columns of the unique matrix $\mathbf{S} \in \mathcal{L}^\ell$ determined by the tuple $(\mathbf{s}'_{i_j})_{j \in [q]}$. This completes the proof of knowledge-soundness for Π_{dlog} .

Zero-Knowledge. For proving zero-knowledge, we describe the simulator as follows. Without loss of generality, let us assume that $C = \{1, \dots, \epsilon\}$ for $\epsilon \leq t$. The simulator Sim runs the adversary as follows:

- Sim receives $\{A_i, B_i\}_{i \in C}$ from the adversary.
- Sim simulates messages $\{A_i, B_i, \pi_{i1}, \pi_{i2}\}_{i \notin C}$ of the honest parties as follows:
 - Sim chooses $A'_i \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}$ for $1 \leq i \leq t$, and sets $\mathbf{a} = (z, A'_1, \dots, A'_t)$.
 - Sim sets $A'_{t+j} = \mathbf{a}^{\mathbf{t}_j}$ where $\mathbf{t}_j \in \mathbb{F}_p^{t+1}$ is the interpolation vector such that $f(t+j) = \langle (f(0), \dots, f(t)), \mathbf{t}_j \rangle$ for all polynomials $f(x)$ of degree $\leq t$, i.e. $\mathbf{t}_j = \{\lambda_0(t+j), \lambda_1(t+j), \dots, \lambda_t(t+j)\}$ where $\lambda_0(x), \dots, \lambda_t(x)$ are lagrange polynomials with respect to the set $\{0, \dots, t\}$.
 - Sim picks $B'_i, i > \epsilon$ uniformly at random from \mathbb{G} .
 - Sim invokes the simulator for the CSP to obtain $\pi_{i1} = \text{CSP}\{(A_i, \mathbf{s}_i) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i} = A_i\}$, $\pi_{i2} = \text{CSP}\{(B_i, (r_i, \omega_i)) : h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i} = B_i\}$.
 - Then Sim sends the messages $\{A'_i, B'_i, \pi_{i1}, \pi_{i2}\}_{i > \epsilon}$ to \mathcal{A} .
- Sim simulates the challenge by sampling $\gamma \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$.
- Sim receives $\{v_i\}_{i < \epsilon}$ from \mathcal{A} , along with the proofs $\{\pi_{i3}\}_{i < \epsilon}$.
- Sim sets $v' \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$ and computes $(v'_1, \dots, v'_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(v')$, computes simulated CSP proof $\pi_{i3} = \text{CSP}\{((A_i B_i, \gamma, v_i), (\mathbf{s}_i, r_i, \omega_i)) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i} h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i} = A_i B_i \wedge \langle \gamma, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle + r_i = v_i\}$, and sends $\{v_i, \pi_{i3}\}_{i > \epsilon}$.
- Sim sends $(v'_i, \pi_{i3})_{i > \epsilon}$ to the adversary \mathcal{A} .

To ensure indistinguishability of transcripts, we only need to provide argument for correctness of honest-party’s first messages $\{A_j\}_{j \notin C}$ provided by the simulator, since the other messages are sampled according to the protocol specification. We argue correctness of simulation of honest-party first messages $\{A_j\}_{j \notin C}$ as follows. In real execution of the protocol, the vector of shares for party j is of the form $(f_1(j), \dots, f_\ell(j))$, where $f_i : i \in [\ell]$ are the polynomials used to share the values $s_i : i \in [\ell]$ respectively. Let $\mathbf{f} = (f_1, \dots, f_\ell)$ denote the vector of sharing polynomials and let $\mathbf{f}(j)$ to denote the vector $(f_1(j), \dots, f_\ell(j))$. Then for

$j > \epsilon$ in the real protocol, $(A_j)_{j>\epsilon}$ are distributed as $(\mathbf{g}^{f(j)})_{j>\epsilon}$, subject to constraint that $\mathbf{g}^{f(0)} = z$. Sampling such a polynomials f_i , $i \in [\ell]$ corresponds to choosing $f_i(1), \dots, f_i(t)$ uniformly and then determining $f_i(t+j) = \langle (f_i(0), \dots, f_i(t)), \mathbf{t}_j \rangle$ using the interpolation vector \mathbf{t}_j . Thus $\mathbf{f}(t+j)$ is a \mathbf{t}_j -linear combination of $\mathbf{f}(0), \dots, \mathbf{f}(t)$, which dictates simulator's computation of A_{t+j} from vector \mathbf{a} . The simulated transcript is an accepting transcript as $\mathbf{g}^{f(0)} = z$ and $\mathbf{g}^{f(i)} = A_i$ for all $i \notin C$, and the verification check is satisfied since a known linear combination of $\{\mathbf{f}(i)\}_{i \notin C}$ in the exponent yields the desired value $\mathbf{f}(0)$ in the exponent. Additionally, since $\{\mathbf{f}(i)\}_{i \notin C}$ are implicitly set as the honest-party shares, it is identical to the correct distribution of secret shares. This completes the proof of zero-knowledge for Π_{dlog} .

Proof of Efficiency/Succinctness. Assuming that CSP has $O(\log \ell)$ -communication overhead [AC20], it follows by inspection that Π_{dlog} incurs $O(n)$ communication over point-to-point channels (where the prover distributes additional randomness to the workers) and $O(n \log \ell)$ communication over broadcast channels (for n instances of CSP). This completes the proof of efficiency/succinctness for Π_{dlog} , and hence the proof of Theorem 1. \square

The following corollary of Theorem 1 follows immediately and yields the concrete bounds on the corruption threshold tolerated by Π_{dlog} .

Corollary 1. *Setting $d = t < n/3$, Π_{dlog} is $n/3$ -private and $n/3$ -robust.*

Finally, the following corollary also follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 1, and formally captures the properties of the non-robust protocol $\Pi_{\text{nr-dlog}}$.

Corollary 2. *Assuming that CSP satisfies completeness, knowledge-soundness and zero-knowledge with $O(\log \ell)$ -communication overhead, $\Pi_{\text{nr-dlog}}$ is a $\text{DPoK}_{\text{SSS}, \text{DlogGen}}$ for relation generator DlogGen and (t, n) -SSS that satisfies completeness and t -privacy, and incurs $O(n)$ communication over point-to-point channels and $O(n \log \ell)$ communication over broadcast channels.*

Note that $\Pi_{\text{nr-dlog}}$ retains all properties of its robust counterpart apart from d -robustness as stated in Theorem 1.

Generalization to Threshold Linear Secret Sharing. We can generalize the above protocol to work with *any* threshold linear secret sharing (TLSS) scheme. In the generalized version, the corruption threshold for robust completeness depends on the exact distance of the linear code induced by the TLSS scheme. As a corollary, we derive concrete bounds on the corruption threshold for robust completeness when using *replicated secret sharing*. The relevant technical details appear in Appendix C.

Round Efficient DPoK for Discrete Log. In Appendix D, we describe a round-efficient version of Π_{dlog} in the random oracle model (obtained using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic), which we call $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$. We highlight here that, while Π_{dlog} requires a logarithmic (in the size of the witness) number of rounds of interaction, the round-efficient version $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$ only requires a *constant* number of rounds of interaction. Apart from this, $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$ satisfies the same robust completeness, knowledge soundness and zero-knowledge properties as Π_{dlog} , albeit in the random oracle model.

4 DPoK for BBS+ Signatures over Secret-Shared Inputs

In this section, we build upon our (publicly verifiable) DPoK for the discrete log relation to design a protocol that allows a prover \mathcal{P} to prove knowledge of a BBS+ (or PS) signature on a secret-shared input. Concretely, suppose that the prover \mathcal{P} holds a BBS+ (or PS) signature σ on a message \mathbf{m} under a public key pk , where \mathbf{m} is secret-shared across n parties $\mathcal{W}_1, \dots, \mathcal{W}_n$ (i.e. each worker \mathcal{W}_i holds a share \mathbf{m}_i). The goal of the protocol is to allow the prover \mathcal{P} to convince a designated verifier \mathcal{V} that σ is a valid signature on \mathbf{m} under pk , *without* revealing σ in the clear (this helps realize the desired property of signature unlinkability, as explained subsequently). We also present similar PoK protocols for PS signatures [PS16] over secret-shared inputs in Appendix F. Looking ahead, we use these protocols as building blocks to design our compiler for

upgrading any secret-sharing based MPC protocol into an authenticated version of the same protocol, where the (secret-shared) inputs are authenticated using BBS+(or PS) signatures as above.

We start by defining the relation for BBS+ signature verification.

Definition 7 (BBS+ Relation). Let BBSGen denote the relation generator, such that $\text{BBSGen}(1^\lambda, \ell)$ outputs a bilinear group $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, g_1, g_2, e, p) \leftarrow_R \text{BBS.Setup}(1^\lambda)$. The corresponding relation \mathcal{R}^{bbs} is defined by $(\mathbf{x}, (\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{t})) \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{bbs}}$ for $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{pk} = (g_1, w, h_0, \dots, h_\ell) \in \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \times \mathbb{G}_1^\ell$, $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_\ell) \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ and $\mathbf{t} = \sigma = (A, \beta, s) \in \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{F}_p^2$ if $e(A, wg_2^\beta) = e(g_1 h_0^s \prod_{i=1}^\ell h_i^{m_i}, g_2)$.

Protocol $\Pi_{\text{bbs}+}$

- **Public Key** $\mathbf{pk} = (w, h_0, \dots, h_\ell)$
 - \mathcal{P} 's **inputs**: Message $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_\ell) \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ and signature $\sigma = (A, \beta, s)$ on \mathbf{m} , with $A = \left(g_1 h_0^s \prod_{i=1}^\ell h_i^{m_i} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta+x}}$, such that $(\mathbf{pk}, (\mathbf{m}, \sigma)) \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{bbs}}$
 - \mathcal{W}_i 's **inputs** : \mathcal{W}_i possesses the i^{th} share \mathbf{m}_i of the message vector \mathbf{m} , such that $\text{Reconstruct}(\mathbf{m}_1, \dots, \mathbf{m}_n) = \mathbf{m}$
 - **Pre-processing** : \mathcal{P} samples $u \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p^*$, $r \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$, $\eta \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$, and computes $d = b^u \cdot h_0^{-r}$ and $t = s - r \cdot v$ where $v = u^{-1}$, $b = g_1 h_0^s \prod_{i=1}^\ell h_i^{m_i}$. \mathcal{P} computes $(r_1, \dots, r_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(r)$, $(v_1, \dots, v_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(v)$, $(\beta_1, \dots, \beta_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(\beta)$, $(t_1, \dots, t_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(t)$, $(\eta_1, \dots, \eta_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(\eta)$. \mathcal{P} sends the shares $(r_i, v_i, \beta_i, t_i, \eta_i)$ to \mathcal{W}_i , for all $i \in [n]$.
- In other words, each \mathcal{W}_i locally holds the i -th share $\mathbf{s}_i = (\mathbf{m}_i, r_i, v_i, \beta_i, t_i, \eta_i)$ such that

$$\mathbf{s} = (\mathbf{m}, r, v, \beta, t) = \text{Reconstruct}(\{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in [n]}).$$

– Interactive Protocol:

1. \mathcal{P} computes $A' = A^u$, $\bar{A} = (A')^{-\beta} \cdot b^u = (A')^x$, where $b = g_1 h_0^s \prod_{i=1}^\ell h_i^{m_i}$ and $d = b^u \cdot h_0^{-r}$. \mathcal{P} sets $C = d^{-v} h_0^{t-\eta}$, $D = h_0^\eta \prod_{i=1}^\ell h_i^{m_i}$, and broadcasts (A', \bar{A}, d, C, D) to each \mathcal{W}_i and \mathcal{V} .
2. The workers \mathcal{W}_i , $i \in [n]$ and \mathcal{V} run the DPoK Π_{dlog} for the relation $D = h_0^\eta \prod_{i=1}^\ell h_i^{m_i}$, where $(\eta, m_1, \dots, m_\ell)$ are secret-shared across the workers; and $\mathbf{g} = (h_0, \dots, h_\ell)$, $z = D$ is available to all parties.
3. Simultaneously, the workers \mathcal{W}_i , $i \in [n]$ and \mathcal{V} run the DPoK Π_{dlog} for the relation $C = d^{-v} h_0^{t-\eta} \wedge \frac{A}{d} = (A')^{-\beta} h_0^r$, where (v, η) and (β, r) are secret-shared; and $\mathbf{g} = ((d, h_0), (A', h_0))$, $z = (C, \frac{A}{d})$ is available to all parties.
4. \mathcal{V} accepts if $C \cdot D = g_1^{-1}$, and $e(A', w) = e(\bar{A}, g_2)$, and both instances of Π_{dlog} accept.

Our DPoK Protocol $\Pi_{\text{bbs}+}$. We build upon the robust complete DPoK Π_{dlog} for discrete log to propose a DPoK achieving robust completeness for BBS+ signatures, which allows a designated prover \mathcal{P} , to show knowledge of a BBS+ signature (A, β, s) over the message $\mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ that is secret-shared amongst the workers $\mathcal{W}_1, \dots, \mathcal{W}_n$. Recall that this PoK involved the following steps: (i) the prover randomly chooses some auxiliary inputs, and combines them with the signature to output a randomized first message (this randomization ensures unlinkability), and then (ii) the prover shows knowledge of these auxiliary inputs and components of the signature satisfying discrete-log relations determined by the first message. Our BBS+ DPoK over secret-shared inputs follows a similar blueprint, where the prover similarly randomizes the first message using certain auxiliary inputs. In our case, the prover: (i) secret-shares the auxiliary inputs to the workers using point-to-point channels (this step is unique to our protocol and is designed to facilitate distributed proving in the subsequent steps), and (ii) broadcasts the first message to the workers *and* the verifier (this step uses broadcast channels and is conceptually similar to the PoK over non-distributed inputs). At this

point, the problem reduces to a DPoK for the discrete log relation. We handle this using our robust complete DPoK Π_{dlog} for discrete log.

We prove the $\Pi_{\text{bbs}+}$ to be a DPoK for the relation generator BBSGen in the following theorem.

Theorem 2. *Assuming that Π_{dlog} is a DPoK $_{\text{SSS}, \text{DlogGen}}$ for relation generator DlogGen and (t, n) -SSS, $\Pi_{\text{bbs}+}$ is a DPoK for the relation generator BBSGen and (t, n) -SSS with:*

- **Security:** t -private and d -robust, for $d < \text{dist}/2$, where $\text{dist} = (n - t)$ is the minimum distance of the Reed-Solomon code induced by (t, n) -SSS.
- **Efficiency:** $O(n)$ communication over point-to-point channels and $O(n \log \ell)$ communication over broadcast channels.

Proof. We provide the proof of security and efficiency below. In order to prove security, we prove robust completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge.

Robust Completeness. Robust completeness follows from direct calculation using the robust completeness of the underlying subprotocols DPoK Π_{dlog} for DlogGen, used in step (3) and (4).

Knowledge Soundness. Consider an adversary that corrupts a t -sized subset of the workers in $\Pi_{\text{bbs}+}$. By inspection, for $t < n/3$, an honest verifier detects the corrupt subset of workers, since the underlying protocol Π_{dlog} satisfies d -robust completeness for $d < n/3$.

Consider an adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$ which corrupts \mathcal{P} and $\mathcal{W}_i, i \in \mathbf{C}$. We show that, given an extractor Ext for Π_{dlog} , it is possible to design an extraction algorithm Ext' that given $\{\mathbf{m}_i\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}}$, where \mathbf{m}_i is the share of \mathbf{m} provided to \mathcal{W}_i , extracts a signature σ on \mathbf{m} . First Ext runs the adversary \mathcal{A} to obtain the messages $(r_i, v_i, \beta_i, t_i, \eta_i)$ for $i \notin \mathbf{C}$. The extractor Ext' also obtains the message (A', \bar{A}, d, C, D) from \mathcal{A} . Next it sets $\mathbf{s}'_i = (\eta_i, \mathbf{m}_i)$ and $\mathbf{s}''_i = (v_i, y_i, \beta_i, r_i)$ for $i \notin \mathbf{C}$ where $y_i = t_i - \eta_i$ for $i \notin \mathbf{C}$. It then invokes the extractor Ext for DPoK sub-protocol Π_{dlog} in steps (2) and (3) respectively and computes the extracted witness as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} (\mathbf{s}')_{i \in \mathbf{C}} &= (\eta, \mathbf{m})_{i \in \mathbf{C}} \leftarrow_R \text{Ext}^{\mathcal{A}}(\{\mathbf{s}'_i\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}}) \\ (\mathbf{s}'')_{i \in \mathbf{C}} &= (v, y, \beta, r)_{i \in \mathbf{C}} \leftarrow_R \text{Ext}^{\mathcal{A}}(\{\mathbf{s}''_i\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}}) \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \eta &= \text{Reconstruct}(\eta_1, \dots, \eta_n), & \mathbf{m} &= \text{Reconstruct}(\mathbf{m}_1, \dots, \mathbf{m}_n) \\ v &= \text{Reconstruct}(v_1, \dots, v_n), & y &= \text{Reconstruct}(y_1, \dots, y_n) \\ \beta &= \text{Reconstruct}(\beta_1, \dots, \beta_n), & r &= \text{Reconstruct}(r_1, \dots, r_n) \end{aligned}$$

Using the message (A', \bar{A}, d, C, D) obtained from the adversary \mathcal{A} and the outputs $\eta, \mathbf{m}, v, y, \beta, r$ obtained from the extractor Ext for DPoK sub-protocol Π_{dlog} , extracted witness is computed as (\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{t}) , where $\mathbf{t} = (A'^v, \beta, y + \eta + vr)$.

Here, we parse the extracted witness \mathbf{m} as $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_\ell)$. From knowledge-soundness of the DPoK sub-protocol Π_{dlog} and verifier's checks, with overwhelming probability we have: $D = h_0^\eta \prod_{i=1}^\ell h_i^{m_i}$, $C = d^{-v} h_0^y$, $(A')^{-\beta} h_0^r = \bar{A}/d$, $C \cdot D = g_1^{-1}$ and $\bar{A} = (A')^x$. We first note that $v \neq 0$, otherwise substituting C, D in the relation $C \cdot D = g_1^{-1}$ yields a non-trivial discrete-log relation between the generators g_1, h_0, \dots, h_ℓ . From the preceding equations, we can derive:

$$(A'^v)^{\beta+x} = g_1 h_0^{y+\eta+vr} \prod_{i=1}^\ell h_i^{m_i}$$

which shows that $(A'^v, \beta, y + \eta + vr)$ is a valid signature on \mathbf{m} . Hence, the extractor Ext' has computed a valid witness for the BBSGen relation. This completes the proof of knowledge soundness for $\Pi_{\text{bbs}+}$.

Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge. Finally, consider an adversary \mathcal{A} that corrupts workers $\mathcal{W}_i, i \in \mathbf{C}$ where $|\mathbf{C}| \leq t$. We show that, given a ZK-simulator Sim_1^{zk} for Π_{dlog} and a ZK-simulator Sim_2^{zk} for the single-prover

proof of knowledge for BBS+ signatures from [CDL16], we construct a simulation algorithm Sim' that output a simulated view of an honest verifier in the protocol $\Pi_{\text{bbs}+}$ without the knowledge of the witness (\mathbf{m}, σ) . Using the simulator Sim_2^{zk} , the simulator Sim' generates the message (A', \bar{A}, d, C, D) . As the statements for the DPoKs in steps (2) and (3) depend entirely on the public parameters and the preceding message, the simulation follows by invoking simulator Sim_1^{zk} to simulate the transcript for respective DPoKs on the statements derived from the simulated first message. Looking ahead, in the formal proof of security for our compiled MPC protocol, we use this simulation algorithm Sim' to simulate proofs of knowledge of BBS+ signatures on the inputs of the honest parties. This completes the proof of zero-knowledge soundness for $\Pi_{\text{bbs}+}$.

Proof of Efficiency/Succinctness. Recall that Π_{dlog} has $O(n)$ communication over point-to-point channels and $O(n \log \ell)$ -communication overhead over broadcast channel. It follows by inspection that $\Pi_{\text{bbs}+}$ also inherit the same communication overheads from Π_{dlog} . This completes the proof of efficiency for $\Pi_{\text{bbs}+}$, and hence the proof of Theorem 2. \square

Protocol $\Pi_{\text{bbs-auth-opt}}$

- **Public Parameters:** $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, g_1, g_2, e, p) \leftarrow_R \text{BBSGen}(1^\lambda)$ defining BBS+ relation \mathcal{R}^{bbs} . Let $\text{pk} = (g_1, w = g_2^x, h_0, \dots, h_\ell)$ be a known public key for secret key $\text{sk} = x \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$.
- P_i 's **inputs:**
 - Message $\mathbf{m}_i \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ and signature $\sigma_i = (A_i, \beta_i, s_i)$ on \mathbf{m}_i under pk .
 - i^{th} share of the message \mathbf{m}_j of P_j .
- **Pre-processing:** \mathcal{P}_i samples $u_i \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p^*$, $r_i \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$, $\eta_i \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$, and computes $d_i = b_i^{u_i} \cdot h_0^{-r_i}$ and $t_i = s_i - r_i \cdot v_i$ where $v_i = u_i^{-1}$, $b_i = g_1 h_0^{s_i} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} h_i^{m_i}$. and secret shares $r_i, v_i, t_i, \eta_i, \beta_i$ among P_1, \dots, P_n . All parties set $\mathbf{g} = (h_0, \dots, h_\ell)$.

– Interactive Protocol

1. $\mathcal{P}_i, i \in [n]$ computes $A'_i = A_i^{u_i}$, $\bar{A}_i = (A'_i)^{-\beta_i} \cdot b_i^{u_i} (= (A'_i)^x)$. \mathcal{P} sets $C_i = d_i^{-v_i} h_0^{t_i - \eta_i}$, $D_i = \mathbf{g}^{\eta_i \cdot \mathbf{m}_i}$, and broadcasts $(A'_i, \bar{A}_i, d_i, C_i, D_i)$.
2. The verifier samples a challenge $\gamma \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ and broadcasts it. Each P_i then computes $\mathbf{y}_i = \sum_{j \in [n]} \gamma^j (\eta_{ij}, \mathbf{m}_{ij})$, where $\eta_{ij}, \mathbf{m}_{ij}$ denotes \mathcal{P}_i 's share of \mathcal{P}_j 's inputs \mathbf{m}_j, η_{ij} .
3. All parties compute $D = \prod_{j \in [n]} D_j^{\gamma^j}$.

Parties hold shares \mathbf{y}_i of \mathbf{y} satisfying $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{y}} = D$

4. Parties run the interactive phase of the protocol $\Pi_{\text{nr-dlog}}$ on statement D with \mathbf{g} as the generator. They run the interactive phase of the protocol $\Pi_{\text{nr-dlog}}$ on statements $C_i = d_i^{-v_i} h_0^{t_i - \eta_i} \wedge \frac{\bar{A}_i}{d_i} = (A'_i)^{-\beta_i} h_0^{r_i}$, for each $i \in [n]$ with generators (d_i, h_0) and (A'_i, h_0) respectively.
 5. Parties also check that $e(\prod_{i=1}^n A'_i, w) = e(\prod_{i=1}^n \bar{A}_i, g_2)$ holds.
- **Output:** P_j outputs $b_j = 1$ if all the above protocols lead to accept.

Efficiently Batching BBS+ PoKs. We now present the protocol $\Pi_{\text{bbs-auth-opt}}$ which efficiently batches n parallel instances of the protocol $\Pi_{\text{bbs}+}$ with the party \mathcal{P}_i acting as the prover in the i^{th} instance of the protocol. The optimization exploits the fact that each party needs to prove a linear (in exponents) relation over large part of its witness (the message vector), which can be reduced via a random challenge to proving a linear relation over the linearly combined messages. However we lose robustness: we can no longer identify the corrupt parties or a corrupt prover using error-correction as in $\Pi_{\text{bbs}+}$, as the combined witness cannot be attributed to a specific party. Thus, we simply abort if one of the checks in the underlying protocol $\Pi_{\text{nr-dlog}}$ fails.

Round Efficient DPoK for BBS+ Signatures. Finally, note that by replacing Π_{dlog} with its round efficient version $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$ in the random oracle model (obtained using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, presented in Appendix D) in steps (2) and (3) of the Interactive Phase, we obtain a round efficient version of the protocol, which we call $\Pi_{\text{bbs}^+}^{\text{FS}}$. Observe that $\Pi_{\text{bbs}^+}^{\text{FS}}$ requires constant rounds of interaction, as compared to logarithmic (in the size of the message) rounds of interaction for Π_{bbs^+} , and satisfies the same robust completeness, knowledge soundness and zero-knowledge properties as Π_{bbs^+} , albeit in the random oracle model.

5 Compiler for Authenticated MPC

In this section we present our compiler for MPC with input authentication that outputs an MPC protocol where each input is authenticated using a BBS+ signature under a common (public) verification key. In Appendix F, we outline a similar compiler based on PS signatures.

Class of MPC Protocols. Our compiler takes advantage of the observation that a large class of secret-sharing based MPC protocols share the following template. (i) There is an input sharing phase where parties secret-share their inputs, and (ii) when using secret sharing schemes with certain thresholds ($t_{\text{sh}} < |H|$), the input of parties is completely determined at the end of the input sharing phase. This means that using inputs inconsistent with this sharing is considered deviating, against which the protocol is secure. This is precisely where our compiler performs well: verification of authenticity (or any other predicate) on the inputs can be done fully outside the MPC by running a DPoK on the shares. (iii) For an MPC protocol of this template, there exists a simulator $\text{Sim} = (\text{Sim}_{\text{sh}}, \text{Sim}_{\text{on}})$, where Sim_{sh} deterministically extracts the inputs of corrupt parties, and Sim_{on} simulates the protocol view.

Features of Our Compiler. Our compiler allows identification of all (malicious) parties with non-authenticated inputs (this is a consequence of the robust completeness property of Π_{dlog} used inside Π_{bbs^+}). We further note that our robust protocol Π_{dlog} tolerates a maximum corruption threshold of $t < n/3$ (assuming that the secret-sharing used is Shamir’s secret sharing). Hence, our compiled MPC protocol also tolerates a maximum corruption threshold of $t < n/3$. Using the non-robust version will result in a non-robust compiler that retains the $t < n/2$ threshold of the underlying MPC.

The Desired Ideal Functionality. We define below the desired ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MPC}}^{\text{authid}}$ for MPC with input authentication.

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MPC}}^{\text{auth}}$

Inputs

The ideal functionality receives from each party P_i an input-signature pair of the form (\mathbf{x}_i, σ_i) under the public verification key pk .

Verify Authenticity

1. If $\text{Ver}(\text{pk}, x_i, \sigma_i) \neq 1$ for some party P_i , then output a set of corrupted parties C and abort.
2. Otherwise, proceed to computation.

Computation

Invoke the ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{MPC} for Π_{mpc} on inputs $(\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_n)$.

5.1 Our Compiler

We now present a formal description of our compiler. Let $\Pi_{\text{mpc}} = (\Pi_{\text{sh}}, \Pi_{\text{on}})$ be a secret-sharing based MPC protocol that guarantees security with abort against malicious corruptions of a dishonest majority of the parties $\{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$, where:

- Π_{sh} denotes the secret-sharing phase of Π_{mpc} and consists of the steps used by each party P_i for $i \in [n]$ to secret-share its input $\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ to all of the other parties (throughout, we assume that this sharing is done using a linear secret-sharing scheme (**Share, Reconstruct**)).
- Π_{on} denotes the remaining steps of the protocol Π_{mpc} where the parties interact to compute $y = f(\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_n)$.

Protocol $\Pi_{\text{ampc}} = (\overline{\Pi}_{\text{sh}}, \overline{\Pi}_{\text{on}})$

- **Inputs:** All parties hold public parameters and the verification key pk of a BBS+ signature scheme. Party P_i has input $\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$, together with a signature σ_i , such that $(\text{pk}, (\mathbf{x}_i, \sigma_i)) \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{bbs}}$.
- $\overline{\Pi}_{\text{sh}}$: This phase is identical to Π_{sh} , i.e., each party P_i shares its input \mathbf{x}_i to all other parties exactly as in Π_{sh} .
- $\overline{\Pi}_{\text{on}}$: In this phase, the parties do the following:
 - For each $j = 1, \dots, n$, the parties execute an instance of $\Pi_{\text{bbs+}}$ for $(\text{pk}, (\mathbf{x}_j, \sigma_j)) \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{bbs}}$ with P_j acting as the Prover, $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n$ constituting the workers and $P_i, i \neq j$ acting as verifiers, . If any party outputs 0 at the end of this phase, the protocol aborts.
 - Otherwise, the parties jointly execute Π_{on} .

In the description of our compiler, we assume that each party P_i holds a BBS+ signature σ_i on its input \mathbf{x}_i with respect to a common public verification key pk . The compiler runs n instances of $\Pi_{\text{bbs+}}$, where for instance i , party P_i acts as the prover and all other parties P_j for $j \neq i$ act as verifiers. Given $\Pi_{\text{mpc}} = (\Pi_{\text{sh}}, \Pi_{\text{on}})$, our robust compiler outputs an authenticated MPC protocol $\Pi_{\text{ampc}} = (\overline{\Pi}_{\text{sh}}, \overline{\Pi}_{\text{on}})$. The compiler Π_{ampc} is described above.

Theorem 3 (Security of Π_{ampc}). *Assuming that: (a) the MPC protocol Π_{mpc} securely emulates the ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{MPC} , and (b) Π_{dlog} is a $\text{DPoK}_{\text{SSS}, \text{DlogGen}}$ for relation generator DlogGen and (t, n) -SSS our compiled MPC protocol with input authentication Π_{ampc} securely emulates the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MPC}}^{\text{auth}}$ for the same corruption threshold of $t < n/3$.*

Proof. We construct a simulator for the Π_{ampc} protocol, and prove indistinguishability of the simulation from a real-world execution of Π_{ampc} . The underlying MPC protocol Π_{mpc} secure emulates \mathcal{F}_{MPC} , and let $\text{Sim} = (\text{Sim}_{\text{sh}}, \text{Sim}_{\text{on}})$ be the corresponding simulator.

Simulator for Π_{ampc} . We now describe the simulator $\overline{\text{Sim}}$ for the authenticated MPC protocol $\Pi_{\text{ampc}} = (\overline{\Pi}_{\text{sh}}, \overline{\Pi}_{\text{on}})$. Let $\mathcal{H} \subseteq [n]$ and $\mathcal{C} \subset [n]$ denote the set of honest and corrupt parties, respectively. The simulator $\overline{\text{Sim}}$ proceeds as follows:

1. Simulate the sharing phase $\overline{\Pi}_{\text{sh}}$ of the underlying MPC Π_{mpc} by invoking Sim_{sh} (note that Sim_{sh} does not expect any inputs). $\overline{\text{Sim}}$ receives the i th share $\{\mathbf{s}_i^j\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ from the adversary (invoked by Sim_{sh}) corresponding to the input \mathbf{s}^j of each corrupt party $P_j, j \in \mathcal{C}$.
2. For each P_j s.t. $j \in \mathcal{C}$, let $(\Pi_{\text{bbs+}})_j$ denote the instance of the protocol $\Pi_{\text{bbs+}}$ used by the parties where P_j acts as the prover, and all of the remaining parties acting as both workers and verifiers. The simulation of the online phase proceeds as follows.
 - (a) First, the simulator of the online phase invokes the simulator of the underlying DPoK $\Pi_{\text{bbs+}}$ to simulate the proofs of knowledge of BBS+ signatures on the inputs of the honest parties.
 - (b) For each instance $\Pi_{\text{bbs+}}$, where a corrupt party $P_j, j \in \mathcal{C}$ is acting as the prover, invoke the extractor Ext' of the DPoK $\Pi_{\text{bbs+}}$ on the shares of the honest parties $(\mathbf{s}_i^j)_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ corresponding to the corrupt party P_j 's input to extract the witness (\mathbf{x}_j, σ_j) from P_j . Note that since we assume honest-majority, the shares $\{\mathbf{s}_i^j\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ given as input to the extractor Ext' completely determines the respective inputs of each corrupt party $P_j, j \in \mathcal{C}$. Hence, the compiler aborts if $\text{Consistent}(\mathbf{x}_j, \{\mathbf{s}_i^j\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}) = 0$.

- (c) Invoke Sim_{on} to simulate the online phase of the underlying MPC Π_{mpc} .
3. Send $\{(\mathbf{x}_j, \sigma_j)\}_{j \in \mathcal{C}}$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MPC}}^{\text{auth}}$. If $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MPC}}^{\text{auth}}$ aborts by identifying some subset of corrupt parties, abort while identifying the same subset of corrupt parties; otherwise output whatever $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MPC}}^{\text{auth}}$ outputs.

Completing the Security Proof. We now prove the security of Π_{ampc} by using a sequence of hybrids described as follows (for simplicity of exposition, we assume w.l.o.g. that parties $P_1, \dots, P_{|\mathcal{C}|}$ are corrupt and parties $P_{|\mathcal{C}|+1}, \dots, P_n$ are honest):

- Hyb_0 : This hybrid is identical to the real-world execution of Π_{ampc} .
- Hyb_1 : This hybrid is identical to Hyb_0 except that we simulate the sharing phase $\overline{\Pi}_{\text{sh}}$ of the underlying Π_{mpc} protocol by invoking Sim_{sh} . Receive from Sim_{sh} the set of shares $\{\mathbf{s}_i^j\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ corresponding to the input \mathbf{s}^j of each corrupt party $P_j, j \in \mathcal{C}$.
- $\{\text{Hyb}_{2,j}\}_{j \in [0, n-|\mathcal{C}|]}$: Hybrid $\text{Hyb}_{2,0}$ is identical to hybrid Hyb_1 , and for each $j \in [1, n-|\mathcal{C}|]$, hybrid $\text{Hyb}_{2,j}$ is identical to $\text{Hyb}_{2,(j-1)}$ except that proof of knowledge corresponding to the input of honest party $P_{|\mathcal{C}|+j}$ is simulated using Sim' as described in Step 2(a) of the simulator. More concretely, for each honest party $P_{|\mathcal{C}|+j}$, instead of using the real input $\mathbf{x}_{|\mathcal{C}|+j}$ and the real BBS+ signature $\sigma_{|\mathcal{C}|+j}$, proof of knowledge of a BBS+ signature is simulated instead of running an instance of the protocol $\Pi_{\text{bbs+}}$ where party $P_{|\mathcal{C}|+j}$ is the prover.
- $\{\text{Hyb}_{3,j}\}_{j \in [0, |\mathcal{C}|]}$: The first of these hybrids, i.e., Hybrid $\text{Hyb}_{3,0}$ is identical to hybrid $\text{Hyb}_{2, n-|\mathcal{C}|}$. Next, for each $j \in [1, |\mathcal{C}|]$, hybrid $\text{Hyb}_{3,j}$ is identical to $\text{Hyb}_{3,(j-1)}$ except that we abort if the following bad event occurs: for the instance of $\Pi_{\text{bbs+}}$ where the corrupt party P_j is the prover, invoke the extractor Ext' (as mentioned in Step 2(b) of the simulator and described in the proof overview) on the shares of the honest parties $(\mathbf{s}_i^j)_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ corresponding to the corrupt party P_j 's input to extract the witness (\mathbf{x}_j, σ_j) from P_j . If $(\text{pk}, (\mathbf{x}_j, \sigma_j)) \notin \mathcal{R}^{\text{bbs}}$ or $\text{Consistent}(\mathbf{x}_j, \{\mathbf{s}_i^j\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}) = 0$, then abort.
- Hyb_4 : This hybrid is identical to $\text{Hyb}_{3,|\mathcal{C}|}$ except for the following: invoke Sim_{on} of the underlying Π_{mpc} protocol to simulate the online phase $\overline{\Pi}_{\text{on}}$, and output whatever Sim_{on} outputs.
- Hyb_5 : This hybrid is identical to Hyb_4 except that after invoking Sim_{on} to simulate $\overline{\Pi}_{\text{on}}$, we query $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MPC}}^{\text{auth}}$ with the extracted inputs $\{(\mathbf{x}_j, \sigma_j)\}_{j \in \mathcal{C}}$.

$\text{Hyb}_0 \approx_c \text{Hyb}_1$. This follows from the security of the underlying Π_{mpc} protocol. Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} that can distinguish between Hyb_0 and Hyb_1 . It is easy to use \mathcal{A} to construct a PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' that can distinguish between a real and simulated execution of Π_{sh} , thus breaking security of the underlying Π_{mpc} protocol.

$\text{Hyb}_{2,j-1} \approx_c \text{Hyb}_{2,j}$. This follows from the ZK property of Π_{dlog} and the PoK for single-prover version of BBS+ signatures. In particular, suppose that there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} that can distinguish between $\text{Hyb}_{2,(j-1)}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{2,j}$ for some $j \in [1, n-|\mathcal{C}|]$. Then \mathcal{A} can be used to construct one of the following algorithms: (a) either an adversary \mathcal{A}' that breaks the ZK property of the Π_{dlog} protocol, or (b) an adversary \mathcal{A}'' that breaks the ZK property of the PoK for single-prover version of BBS+ signatures.

$\text{Hyb}_{3,j-1} \approx_c \text{Hyb}_{3,j}$. This follows from knowledge soundness of Π_{dlog} . The two hybrids differ only when the bad event occurs, i.e., the extractor Ext' in Step 2(b) of the simulator fails to output a valid witness (\mathbf{m}, σ) where \mathbf{m} is consistent with the honest party shares. However, as described in the proof overview, assuming the knowledge-soundness of Π_{dlog} , the extractor Ext' outputs a valid witness. Hence, assuming knowledge-soundness of Π_{dlog} , the probability of the bad event occurring must be negligible.

$\text{Hyb}_4 \approx_c \text{Hyb}_{3,|\mathcal{C}|}$. This follows from the security of the underlying Π_{mpc} protocol. At the end of Π_{sh} , if abort did not occur, then for each $i \in [n]$, all honest parties hold shares $\langle \mathbf{x}_j' \rangle_{j \in \mathcal{H}}$ of some $\mathbf{x}_i' \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$. In $\text{Hyb}_{3,|\mathcal{C}|}$, the extractor succeeds in outputting a valid witness \mathbf{x}_i , and this is the unique \mathbf{x}_i' determined at the end of Π_{sh} . Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} that can distinguish between Hyb_4 and $\text{Hyb}_{3,|\mathcal{C}|}$. It is easy to

Table 2: Benchmarks for the secure KPI application with 3 and 5 parties. The second column titled “Rows” indicates the number of rows in each party’s dataset (the number of columns is fixed to 10).

# Parties	# Rows	Vanilla MPC		DPoK Overhead	
		Comm(MB)	Time (s)	Comm.(KB)	Time (s)
3	100	1733	6.67	13	0.519
	1000	16754	64	15	18
	2000	33398	129	15.3	65
	4000	66502	260	15.8	246
5	100	8838	26	28	0.643
	1000	87747	265	31	20
	2000	175671	521	32	76
	4000	350658	958	33	312

use \mathcal{A} to construct a PPT adversary \mathcal{A}' that can distinguish between a real and simulated execution of Π_{on} , thus breaking the security of the underlying Π_{mpc} protocol.

$\text{Hyb}_5 \equiv \text{Hyb}_4$. Hyb_5 and Hyb_4 are identical. In Hyb_4 , the output of is given by the output of Sim_{on} and in Hyb_5 , the output is given by the output of Sim_{sh} , which are identical by the security of the underlying Π_{mpc} . We also note that Hyb_5 is identical to Sim .

This completes the proof of Theorem 3. □

Round Efficient Compiler for Authenticated MPC. Finally, it is easy to see that invoking the round efficient DPoK $\Pi_{\text{bbs}^+}^{\text{FS}}$ protocol instead of the DPoK Π_{bbs^+} protocol enables us to obtain a round efficient version of our compiler. The round efficient version achieves the same security guarantees as the compiler presented above, albeit in the random oracle model.

6 Implementation and Evaluation

In this section, we present a prototype implementation of our compiler using $\Pi_{\text{bbs-auth-opt}}$ for BBS+ signatures. We test and benchmark our implementation on a 16GB system with Intel Core i5-9400 CPU clocked at 2.9GHz and running Ubuntu Linux 20.04. All the benchmarks use single execution thread. We use the implementation of BN128 elliptic curve from the library `libff` [SL23] to implement $\Pi_{\text{bbs-auth-opt}}$ with $(t, 2t+1)$ -Shamir secret sharing¹⁰. We then integrate our implementation of $\Pi_{\text{bbs-auth-opt}}$ with a maliciously secure implementation of Shamir-secret sharing-based MPC from the well-known `MP-SPDZ` library [Kel20] to obtain an implementation of authenticated MPC¹¹.

Evaluation and Discussion. We benchmark both $\Pi_{\text{bbs-auth-opt}}$ (in a standalone manner) and the final authenticated MPC protocol (obtained by integrating $\Pi_{\text{bbs-auth-opt}}$ with `MP-SPDZ` [Kel20] as specified in our compiler) in the setting of the industry KPI application outlined in the introduction. We consider two instances of the KPI application, with 3 and 5 parties, where each party’s dataset has 10 columns and variable number of rows (between 100 and 4000). We summarize the overheads for vanilla unauthenticated computation using `MP-SPDZ`, as well as the additional overheads incurred by the compiled authenticated MPC, in Table 2. It is readily apparent that the communication overhead of input authentication over vanilla MPC are minimal. The computational overhead grows with input size, which is unavoidable to an extent, as BBS+ signature verification involves algebraic operations that grow with the size of the input. The major contributor to the computational overheads are the instances of `NIPK`, which may be parallelized for large input sizes. We leave such optimized implementations as interesting future work.

¹⁰ We do not implement broadcast functionality cryptographically. To obtain the benchmarks we implement a server acting as a broadcast hub. Efficient broadcast can be implemented for our setting based on [GP16].

¹¹ An anonymized version of our code repository is available here: <https://anonymous.4open.science/r/authenticatedMPC-476E/CMakeLists.txt>.

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A Comparison with Anonymity Sets

In this section, we present some additional discussion on the comparison of our DPoK-based approach with the approach of signing public commitments. Previously we discussed an alternative approach for achieving authenticated MPC based on having the certifying authority sign commitments to the private inputs of the parties, and then having the parties prove during the MPC protocol that their inputs indeed open the public commitments. As discussed earlier, this approach trivially violates the desired property of *unlinkability*, since one can link the usage of the same input across different protocol executions from the public commitments. A possible fix is to use *anonymity sets*: all commitments to the inputs are made publicly available, and instead of explicitly identifying which commitment is linked with each input, the party provides a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of an opening of one of the several signed commitments, along with a proof of membership of the commitment in the public set.

While this is a plausible solution, we believe that full unlinkability (as modeled implicitly by our ideal functionality and realized by our proposed solution) is a better solution than anonymity. First of all, the anonymity set needs to be large enough for any reasonable notion of unlinkability to hold; however, this is an issue as the size of the statement to prove increases with the size of the set, leading to additional overheads for the proof of knowledge. Additionally, one has to prove that a commitment used is a member of the accumulated set, requiring additional proofs of membership. Finally, in practical applications, it is unclear which entity will create and maintain this set accumulator: for instance, if a new data set to be used as input for a computation is signed by an authority, it must be added to the accumulator. This leads to additional overheads for accumulator maintenance.

B Additional Preliminaries

B.1 NIZK in the ROM

The Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS87] transforms a public-coin interactive proof into an non-interactive version in the random oracle model. Given a public coin proof system $\Pi = (\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$ with r rounds and Ch_i is the challenge space for the i th round. The corresponding non-interactive proof system $\Pi_{\text{FS}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{FS}}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}})$ is defined as follows.

- $\text{H} \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}_{\text{FS}}(1^\lambda)$ The setup algorithm for $i \in [1, r]$ samples a function H_i uniformly from a set of all functions that map $\{0, 1\}^*$ to Ch_i . Note that this is equivalent to instantiating H_i from a single random oracle via domain separation. We denote by H the set $\{\text{H}_i\}_{i \in [1, r]}$.
- $\pi \leftarrow_R \mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{H}}(x, w)$ The prover produces a proof string π on input statement x , and witness w . For each round $i \in [1, r]$, $\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{H}}$ invokes the next message function of the interactive prover $\mathcal{P}(x, w)$ on prior challenge c_{i-1} to get a_i , and obtains the i th round challenge by computing $c_i = \text{H}_i(x, a_1, c_1, \dots, a_{i-1}, c_{i-1}, a_i)$. Then $\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{H}}$ outputs $\pi = (a_1, c_1, \dots, a_r, c_r, a_{r+1})$.
- $b \leftarrow_R \mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{H}}(x, \pi)$ The verifier on input statement x , and proof string π , outputs a decision bit. $\mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{H}}$ outputs $b = 1$, meaning the verifier accepts the proof, iff $\mathcal{V}(x, \pi) = 1$ and $c_i = \text{H}_i(x, a_1, c_1, \dots, c_{i-1}, a_i)$ for all $i \in [1, r]$.

Definition 8 (Knowledge soundness in the ROM). Consider a non-interactive proof system $\Pi_{\text{FS}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{FS}}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}})$ for relation \mathcal{R} . Π_{FS} is extractable with knowledge error $\kappa : \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ in the random oracle model, if there exists an extractor Ext and some polynomial poly , such that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{P} that makes at most q queries to H , it holds that

$$\text{ext}(\mathcal{P}, \text{Ext}) \geq \frac{\text{acc}(\mathcal{P}) - \kappa(\lambda, q)}{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$$

and Ext halts in an expected number of steps that is polynomial in λ and q , where the probabilities acc and ext are defined as follows.

$$\text{acc}(\mathcal{P}) = \Pr \left[b = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} \text{H} \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}_{\text{FS}}(1^\lambda); \\ (x, \pi) \leftarrow_R \mathcal{P}^{\text{H}}(\rho); \\ b \leftarrow_R \mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{H}}(x, \pi) \end{array} \right]$$

$$\text{ext}(\mathcal{P}, \text{Ext}) = \Pr \left[\begin{array}{l|l} b = 1 \wedge & \mathbf{H} \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}_{\text{FS}}(1^\lambda); \\ (x, w) \in \mathcal{R} & (x, \pi) \leftarrow_R \mathcal{P}^{\mathbf{H}}(\rho); \\ & b \leftarrow_R \mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}}^{\mathbf{H}}(x, \pi); \\ & w \leftarrow_R \text{Ext}^{\mathcal{P}}(x, \pi, \rho, \mathcal{Q}_1) \end{array} \right]$$

where $\mathcal{Q}_1 = \{\mathcal{Q}_{1,i}\}_{i \in [1,r]}$ is the set consisting of pairs corresponding to queries to the random oracle \mathbf{H} with index i , and the response. In the experiment ext , Ext has oracle access to the next-message function of \mathcal{P} .

Zero-knowledge for non-interactive proofs is defined in the explicitly programmable random oracle model where the simulator is allowed to program the random oracle. The zero-knowledge simulator \mathcal{S}_{FS} is modeled as a stateful algorithm that operates in two modes. In the first mode, $(c_i, \text{st}') \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{\text{FS}}(1, \text{st}, x, i)$ handles random oracle calls to \mathbf{H}_i on input x . In the second mode, $(\tilde{\pi}, \text{st}') \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{\text{FS}}(2, \text{st}, x)$ simulates a valid proof string. We define stateful wrapper oracles.

- $\mathcal{S}_1(t, i)$ denotes the oracle that returns the first output of $\mathcal{S}_{\text{FS}}(1, \text{st}, t, i)$;
- $\mathcal{S}_2(x, w)$ returns the first output of $\mathcal{S}_{\text{FS}}(2, \text{st}, x)$ if $(\text{pp}, x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$ and \perp otherwise; (This is because ZK is defined only for true statements.)

Definition 9 (Non-interactive Zero Knowledge). A NIZK $\Pi_{\text{FS}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{FS}}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\mathbf{H}}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}}^{\mathbf{H}})$ for relation \mathcal{R} is non-interactive zero knowledge in the random oracle model, if there exists a PPT simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\text{FS}} = (\mathcal{S}_1, \mathcal{S}_2)$ such that for all PPT distinguisher \mathcal{D} , the following is negligible in λ

$$\left| \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}^{\mathbf{H}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\mathbf{H}}}(1^\lambda) = 1 : \mathbf{H} \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}_{\text{FS}}(1^\lambda) \right] - \Pr \left[\mathcal{D}^{\mathcal{S}_1, \mathcal{S}_2}(1^\lambda) = 1 : \mathbf{H} \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}_{\text{FS}}(1^\lambda) \right] \right|$$

where both $\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\mathbf{H}}(x, w)$ and \mathcal{S}_2 return \perp if $(x, w) \notin \mathcal{R}$.

Additionally, given a HVZK simulator \mathcal{S} for Π , we can construct a NIZK simulator \mathcal{S}_{FS} for Π_{FS} as follows.

- On query (x, i) with mode 1, $\mathcal{S}_{\text{FS}}(1, \text{st}, x, i)$ lazily samples a lookup table $\mathcal{Q}_{1,i}$ maintained in state st . It checks whether $\mathcal{Q}_{1,i}[x]$ is already defined; if yes, it returns the previously assigned value; otherwise it returns and sets a fresh random value c_i sampled from Ch_i .
- On query x with mode 2, $\mathcal{S}_{\text{FS}}(2, \text{st}, x)$ calls the HVZK simulator \mathcal{S} of Π to obtain a simulated transcript $\tilde{\pi} = (a_1, c_1, \dots, a_r, c_r, a_{r+1})$. Then, it programs the tables such that $\mathcal{Q}_{1,1}[x, a_1] := c_1, \dots, \mathcal{Q}_{1,r}[x, a_1, c_1, \dots, a_r] := c_r$. If any of the table entries has been already defined \mathcal{S}_{FS} aborts, which happens with negligible probability under the assumption that a_1 has high min-entropy.

B.2 Compressed Sigma Protocols

We recall the sigma protocol for vectors, for proving knowledge of discrete log $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ of a vector of group elements \mathbf{g} , such that $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}} = z$. Here, a prover \mathcal{P} with knowledge of the secret vector \mathbf{s} , samples a random vector of scalars $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$, and sends $\alpha = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{r}}$ to the verifier \mathcal{V} . \mathcal{V} then samples a challenge $c \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$ and sends it to \mathcal{P} and in the next round \mathcal{P} replies with $\mathbf{x} = c\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{r}$ where \mathcal{V} checks if $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}} = z^c \alpha$. Here, the size of the last message of \mathcal{P} is linear in input size, and hence it makes the proof size linear. We note that, for the proof to be succeed, it suffices to convince the verifier \mathcal{V} that \mathcal{P} knows \mathbf{x} such that $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}} = z^c \alpha$. Here, we recall the $\log_2 m - 1$ round protocol using the *split and fold* technique [AC20], which has logarithmic proof size, for proving knowledge of $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ such that $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}} = y$ where $y = z^c \alpha$:

- **Common input :** $\mathbf{g} \in \mathbb{G}^m, z \in \mathbb{G}$
 - **\mathcal{P} 's input :** $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$
1. \mathcal{P} computes $A = \mathbf{g}_R^{\mathbf{x}_L}, B = \mathbf{g}_L^{\mathbf{x}_R}$ and sends them to \mathcal{V} .
 2. \mathcal{V} samples $c \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$ and sends it to \mathcal{P} .
 3. \mathcal{P} computes $\mathbf{x}' = \mathbf{x}_L + c\mathbf{x}_R$.
 4. \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} independently computes $\mathbf{g}' = \mathbf{g}_L^c \circ \mathbf{g}_R \in \mathbb{G}^{\ell/2}$ and $z' = Ay^c B^{c^2}$.

5. If $\text{size}(\mathbf{g}') = 2$, \mathcal{P} sends \mathbf{x}' to \mathcal{V} , else \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} repeat the protocol from step 1 with $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{x}'$, $\mathbf{g} = \mathbf{g}'$ and $y = z'$.

where for a vector \mathbf{s} , \mathbf{s}_L denotes the left half of the vector and \mathbf{s}_R denote the right half.

The underlying sigma protocol has perfect completeness, special honest-verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK) and 2-special soundness, and the later protocol has perfect completeness and 3-special soundness at each step of the recursion. Hence, the overall protocol $\text{CSP}\{(z, \mathbf{x}) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}} = z\}$ has perfect completeness, SHVZK which comes from the underlying sigma protocol and $(2, k_1, \dots, k_{(\log_2 \ell - 1)})$ -special soundness, where $k_i = 3 \forall i \in [\log_2 \ell - 1]$. The protocol can be compiled into a non-interactive argument of knowledge using Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS87] in the random oracle model, which we denote by $\text{NIPK}.\mathcal{P}_{\mathbb{F}_5}^{\text{RO}}\{(z, \mathbf{x}) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}} = z\}$ for the random oracle RO.

B.3 PoK for BBS+ Signature Scheme

Here, we recall the proof of knowledge for BBS+ signatures, which was originally proposed in [CDL16]. We present a modified version of the same in Section 2.3.

- **Common Input:** Public Key $\text{pk} = (w, h_0, \dots, h_\ell)$
- **\mathcal{P} 's inputs:** Message $\mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ and signature $\sigma = (A, \beta, s)$ on \mathbf{m} , with $A = \left(g_1 h_0^s \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} h_i^{m_i}\right)^{\frac{1}{\beta+x}}$.
 1. \mathcal{P} samples $r_1 \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p^*$ and computes $A' = A^{r_1}$ and $r_3 = r_1^{-1}$
 2. \mathcal{P} computes $\bar{A} = (A')^{-\beta} \cdot b^{r_1}$, where $b = g_1 h_0^s \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} h_i^{m_i}$.
 3. \mathcal{P} samples $r_2 \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$ and computes $d = b^{r_1} \cdot h_0^{-r_2}$ and $s' = s - r_2 \cdot r_3$
 4. \mathcal{P} sends (A', \bar{A}, d) to \mathcal{V} , and they run a ZKPoK for the relation:

$$(A')^{-\beta} h_0^{r_2} = \bar{A}/d \wedge d^{-r_3} h_0^{s'} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} h_i^{m_i} = g_1^{-1}$$

where $(\mathbf{m}, r_2, r_3, \beta, s')$ is the witness.

5. \mathcal{V} checks that $A' \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}_1}$, $e(A', w) = e(\bar{A}, g_2)$, verifies the ZKPoK proof and outputs 1 if all the checks pass, and 0 otherwise.

B.4 Coding Theory

The following coding theoretic result is used to identify malicious behaviour in the distributed proof of knowledge protocol in Section 3.2. It has been previously used in construction of zero knowledge proofs in the interactive oracle setting (e.g [AHIV17, BCR⁺19]), to check that the oracle represents “low degree polynomials”.

Lemma 2 ([BCI⁺20], Theorem 1.2). *Let \mathcal{L} be an $[n, k, d]$ -linear code over finite field \mathbb{F} and let \mathbf{S} be an $m \times n$ matrix over \mathbb{F} . Let $e = \Delta(\mathbf{S}, \mathcal{L}^m)$ be such that $e < d/2$. Then for any codeword $\mathbf{r} \in \mathcal{L}$, and γ sampled uniformly from \mathbb{F}^m , we have $\Delta(\mathbf{r} + \gamma^T \mathbf{S}, \mathcal{L}) = e$ with probability at least $1 - n/|\mathbb{F}|$. Furthermore, if E denotes the column indices where \mathbf{S} differs from the nearest matrix \mathbf{Q} in \mathcal{L}^m , with probability $1 - n/|\mathbb{F}|$ over choice of γ , the vector $\mathbf{r} + \gamma^T \mathbf{S}$ differs from the closest codeword $\mathbf{v} \in \mathcal{L}$ at precisely the positions in E .*

C Generalization to Threshold Linear Secret Sharing Scheme

In this section, we provide generalization of our technique shown for Shamir Secret Sharing [Sha79] to any Threshold Linear Secret Sharing Scheme. Here we present the definition of Threshold Linear Secret Sharing (TLSS) Scheme, which is a restriction of the definition of Linear Secret Sharing Scheme provided in [CDN15, Chapter 6] to the case when each party receives same number of shares.

Definition 10 (Threshold Linear Secret Sharing Scheme). A (t, n, r) threshold linear secret-sharing (TLSS) scheme over a finite field \mathbb{F} consists of algorithms (Share, Reconstruct) as described below:

- **Share** is a randomized algorithm that is defined by a $m \times (t+1)$ matrix M (for some $m \geq n$) and a labeling function $\phi: [m] \rightarrow [n]$ such that $|\phi^{-1}(i)| = r$ for all $i \in [n]$. On input $s \in \mathbb{F}$, **Share** samples $r_1, \dots, r_t \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}$ uniformly and independently and sets $\mathbf{r}_s = (s, r_1, \dots, r_t)$. It sets $\mathbf{s}_i = \{(M\mathbf{r}_s)_j : \phi(j) = i\}$ as the i^{th} share for all $i \in [n]$. We denote the output as $(\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(s)$, where $\mathbf{s}_i \in \mathbb{F}^r$ is the share sent to i^{th} party.
- **Reconstruct** is a deterministic algorithm that takes a set $\mathcal{I} \subseteq [n]$, $|\mathcal{I}| > t$, a vector of shares $(\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{|\mathcal{I}|})$ and outputs $s = \text{Reconstruct}((\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{|\mathcal{I}|}), \mathcal{I}) \in \mathbb{F}$. Specifically, for all sets $\mathcal{I} \subseteq [n]$ with $|\mathcal{I}| > t$, there exists a vector $\mathbf{k}_{\mathcal{I}} = (k_{11}, \dots, k_{nr}) \in \mathbb{F}^{nr}$ such that $\mathbf{s} = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^r k_{ij} s_{ij}$. Here $\mathbf{s}_i = (s_{i1}, \dots, s_{ir})$ for $i \in [n]$.

A TLSS scheme satisfies the following properties:

- **Correctness:** For every $s \in \mathbb{F}$, any $(\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(s)$ and any subset $\mathcal{I} = \{i_1, \dots, i_q\} \subseteq [n]$ with $q > t$, we have $\text{Reconstruct}((\mathbf{s}_{i_1}, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{i_q}), \mathcal{I}) = s$.
- **Privacy:** For every $s \in \mathbb{F}$, any $(\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(s)$ and any subset $\mathcal{I} = \{i_1, \dots, i_q\} \subseteq [n]$ with $q \leq t$, the tuple $(\mathbf{s}_{i_1}, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{i_q})$ is information-theoretically independent of s .

Remark 5. We focus on Threshold Linear Secret Sharing schemes in this section, and we denote it as TLSS. As before we can extend a TLSS scheme to secret-share vectors $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$ by applying **Share**, **Reconstruct** algorithms component-wise.

Robust DPoK for Discrete Log for TLSS In this section we generalize the construction of robust complete protocol for discrete-log relation presented in Section 3.2 to the case when (Share, Reconstruct) can be an arbitrary TLSS scheme. We also characterize the robustness threshold for the same in terms of minimum distance of linear code associated with the TLSS scheme. The proof of robust completeness now depends on Lemma 3 (below), which generalizes Lemma 2 to the case when linear code is over an extension field $\mathbb{F}_{p^r} \cong \mathbb{F}_p^r$ of the field $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{F}_p$.

Let **DlogGen** be a relation generator that on input $(1^\lambda, m)$ outputs $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbf{g}, p)$ where p is a λ -bit prime, \mathbb{G} is a cyclic group of order p and $\mathbf{g} = (g_1, \dots, g_m) \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}^m$ is a uniformly sampled set of generators. The associated relation \mathcal{R}^{DL} is defined by $(z, \mathbf{s}) \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{DL}}$ if $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}} = z$. Let TLSS = (Share, Reconstruct) denote (t, n, r) threshold linear secret sharing over finite field of order p $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{F}_p$. We follow the framework presented for **DlogGen**; namely Π_{dlog} (Figure 3.2), that is t -private, d -robust and incurs $O(n)$ communication over point-to-point channels and $O(n \log \ell)$ communication over broadcast channels. We present our generalized protocol with the similar guarantees.

Additional Preliminaries and Notation. We setup some useful notation and preliminaries specific to this section to ease the presentation. For $s \in \mathbb{F}$, we will view the output $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(s)$ to consist of n -shares each over \mathbb{F}_{p^r} , i.e. we view $s_i \in \mathbb{F}^r$ as an element of \mathbb{F}_{p^r} . Applying the sharing component-wise, for a vector $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}^\ell$, we view the output $(\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(\mathbf{s})$ to consist of n -shares, each in $(\mathbb{F}_{p^r})^\ell$, i.e. an ℓ -length vector over \mathbb{F}_{p^r} . We also view a vector $\mathbf{s} = (s_1, \dots, s_\ell) \in (\mathbb{F}_{p^r})^\ell$ as $\ell \times r$ matrix over \mathbb{F} , where i^{th} row of the matrix corresponds to $s_i \in \mathbb{F}_{p^r}$ viewed as a vector in \mathbb{F}^r . We also introduce the linear code $\mathcal{L}_{\text{TLSS}}$, which is induced by the sharings under the TLSS scheme.

Definition 11 (TLSS induced code). For an (n, t, r) -TLSS scheme over \mathbb{F} given by algorithms (Share, Reconstruct), we define linear code $\mathcal{L}_{\text{TLSS}}$ over the field \mathbb{F}_{p^r} as

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{TLSS}} = \{(s_1, \dots, s_n) : \Pr[(s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(s), s \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}] > 0\},$$

consisting of all possible sharings output by the Share algorithm.

We now state the generalization of Lemma 2 to fields of the form \mathbb{F}_{p^r} . The lemma is proved in [DPP⁺22][Lemma A.5]. We recall that for an $[n, k, *]$ linear code \mathcal{L} over \mathbb{F} , \mathcal{L}^m denotes the set of $m \times n$ matrices over \mathbb{F} whose rows are codewords in \mathcal{L} .

Lemma 3. Let \mathcal{L} be an $[n, k, d]$ -linear code over finite field \mathbb{F}_{p^k} and let \mathbf{S} be an $m \times n$ matrix over \mathbb{F}_{p^k} . Let $e = \Delta(\mathbf{S}, \mathcal{L}^m)$ be such that $e < d/3$. Then for any codeword $\mathbf{r} \in \mathcal{L}$, and $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$ sampled uniformly from \mathbb{F}^m , we have $\Delta(\mathbf{r} + \boldsymbol{\gamma}^T \mathbf{S}, \mathcal{L}) = e$ with probability at least $1 - d/|\mathbb{F}|$. Furthermore, if E denotes the column indices where \mathbf{S} differs from the nearest matrix \mathbf{Q} in \mathcal{L}^m , with probability $1 - d/|\mathbb{F}|$ over choice of $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$, the vector $\mathbf{r} + \boldsymbol{\gamma}^T \mathbf{S}$ differs from the closest codeword $\mathbf{v} \in \mathcal{L}$ at precisely the positions in E .

We now proceed with the description of the generalised protocol, where we highlight key differences from the protocol Π_{dlog} for the case of Shamir Secret Sharing.

1. *Public Parameters:* The public parameters, as before consists of $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbf{g}, p) \leftarrow_R \text{DlogGen}(1^\lambda, \ell)$. Additionally we have $h_1, h_2 \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}$. The relation \mathcal{R}^{DL} consists of (z, \mathbf{s}) satisfying $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}} = z$.
2. *Input Phase:* The prover gets (z, \mathbf{s}) while workers $\mathcal{W}_i, i \in [n]$ are given (z, \mathbf{s}_i) where $(\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(\mathbf{s})$.
3. *Pre-processing:* The prover sends δ_i to \mathcal{W}_i for $i \in [n]$ where $(\delta_1, \dots, \delta_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(\delta)$ for $\delta \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_{p^r}$.
4. *Commit to Shares:* In the interactive phase, the worker \mathcal{W}_i proceeds as follows: The worker views the share \mathbf{s}_i as $\ell \times r$ matrix M_i over \mathbb{F} . Then for each $j \in [r]$, it computes $A_{ij} = \mathbf{g}^{M_i[j]}$, where $M_i[j]$ denotes the j^{th} column of the matrix. Similarly it views the input δ_i as vector $(\delta_{i1}, \dots, \delta_{ir})$ over \mathbb{F} . It then computes commitments B_{ij} for $j \in [r]$ as $B_{ij} = h_1^{\delta_{ij}} h_2^{\omega_j}$ for $\omega_j \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}$. Finally \mathcal{W}_i broadcasts $\mathbf{A}_i = (A_{i1}, \dots, A_{ir})$ and $\mathbf{B}_i = (B_{i1}, \dots, B_{ir})$.
5. *Reveal Linear Form over Shares:* The verifier sends a challenge vector $\boldsymbol{\gamma} \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}^\ell$, and the workers broadcast the linear form $v_i = \langle \boldsymbol{\gamma}, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle + \delta_i$. In the preceding inner-product, we consider \mathbf{s}_i as a vector over \mathbb{F}_{p^r} and v_i, δ_i are considered as elements in the field \mathbb{F}_{p^r} . To ensure that corrupt workers use \mathbf{s}_i, δ_i consistent with earlier commitments $\mathbf{A}_i, \mathbf{B}_i$ we additionally require them to provide proofs by running the proof of knowledge CSP for the following relations (viewing \mathbf{s}_i as $\ell \times r$ matrix M_i over \mathbb{F}):

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_{i1} &= \text{CSP}(M_i) : \mathbf{g}^{M_i[j]} = A_{ij} \forall j \in [r], \\ \pi_{i2} &= \text{CSP}(\delta_i, \omega_1, \dots, \omega_r) : h_1^{\delta_{ij}} h_2^{\omega_j} = B_{ij} \forall j \in [r], \\ \pi_{i3} &= \text{CSP}\{(M_i, \delta_i, \omega_1, \dots, \omega_r) : \mathbf{g}^{M_i[j]} h_1^{\delta_{ij}} h_2^{\omega_j} = A_{ij} B_{ij} \wedge \langle \boldsymbol{\gamma}, M_i[j] \rangle + \delta_{ij} = v_{ij} \forall j \in [r]\}. \end{aligned}$$

The NIPK used above can be instantiated with $O(\log \ell)$ communication complexity using compressed sigma protocols (CSPs) of Attema et al. [AC20], made non-interactive using Fiat-Shamir transformation. We observe that each proof asserts r constraints, which can be reduced to one constraint each using a random challenge. We skip the details here.

6. *Verifier Determines Honest Commitments:* Let $\mathbf{v}' = (v'_1, \dots, v'_n)$ be the purported values of (v_1, \dots, v_n) received in the previous step. If one of the proofs π_{i1}, π_{i2} or π_{i3} is invalid, the verifier sets $v'_i \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_{p^r}$ (randomly). Here we use $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_n)$ defined by $v_i = \langle \boldsymbol{\gamma}, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle + r_i$ to denote the vector of honestly computed values. We recall that we consider \mathbf{v} to be a vector over $\mathbb{F}_{p^r}^n$. Since $\Delta(\mathbf{v}', \mathbf{v}) \leq d < \text{dist}/2$, with dist being the minimum distance of the code induced by the TLSS, \mathcal{V} can compute \mathbf{v} from \mathbf{v}' by using error correction. Let \mathcal{C} denote indices of corrupt workers (who actually deviate from the protocol). From Lemma 3 we conclude $\mathcal{C} = \{i \in [n] : v_i \neq v'_i\}$ with overwhelming probability. Let k'_1, \dots, k'_q denote the reconstruction coefficients for the set $[n] \setminus \mathcal{C}$ where each $k'_i = (k'_{i1}, \dots, k'_{ir}) \in \mathbb{F}^r$ for each i .
7. *Output using honest messages:* \mathcal{V} outputs $(1, \mathcal{C})$ if $\prod_{j \in [q], t \in [r]} A_{i_j, t}^{k'_{j,t}} = z$, and $(0, \{\mathcal{P}\})$ otherwise.

Theorem 4 (Robust Distributed Proof of Knowledge for Discrete Log for TLSS). Assuming that the discrete log assumption holds over the group \mathbb{G} , the above protocol is a $\text{DPoK}_{\text{TLSS}, \text{DlogGen}}$ for relation generator DlogGen and (t, n, r) -TLSS scheme which satisfies t -privacy and d -robustness, for $d < \text{dist}/3$, where dist is the minimum distance the linear code induced by the TLSS scheme. Moreover the protocol incurs $O(rn)$ communication over point-to-point channels and $O(rn + \log \ell)$ communication over broadcast channels.

The proof of the above theorem is similar to that for the protocol Π_{dlog} , except that we use Lemma 3 instead of Lemma 2 to identify corrupt messages, and appropriately omit them from the verification check. We now discuss implications of the above theorem for specific threshold secret sharing schemes.

(Corollary) Distributed Proof of Knowledge using Replicated Secret Sharing Our earlier results obtained for Shamir Secret Sharing [Sha79] in Theorem 1 can be seen as special case of Theorem 4 for $r = 1$ and $\text{dist} = (n - t)$. Here we additionally specialise Theorem 4 to the case of *replicated secret sharing*. We recall the definition of Replicated Secret Sharing (RSS) Scheme provided in [Esc22].

Definition 12 (Replicated Secret Sharing Scheme). A $(t, n, \binom{n-1}{t})$ replicated linear secret-sharing (RSS) scheme over a finite field \mathbb{F} consists of algorithms (Share, Reconstruct) as described below:

- **Share** is a randomized algorithm that on input $s \in \mathbb{F}$, samples $s_A \in \mathbb{F}$ for all $A \in [n], |A| = t$, such that $\sum_A s_A = s$, and sets $s_i = \{s_A : i \notin A\}$. We denote the output as $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(s)$, where $s_j \in \mathbb{F}^{\binom{n-1}{t}}$ is the share sent to party P_j .
- **Reconstruct** is a deterministic algorithm that takes a set $\mathcal{I} \subseteq [n], |\mathcal{I}| \geq t$, a vector $(s_1, \dots, s_{|\mathcal{I}|})$ and outputs $s = \text{Reconstruct}((s_1, \dots, s_{|\mathcal{I}|}), \mathcal{I}) \in \mathbb{F}$.

A RSS scheme satisfies the following properties:

- **Correctness:** For every $s \in \mathbb{F}$, any $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(s)$ and any subset $\mathcal{I} = \{i_1, \dots, i_q\} \subseteq [n]$ with $q \geq t$, we have $\text{Reconstruct}((s_{i_1}, \dots, s_{i_q}), \mathcal{I}) = s$.
- **Privacy:** For every $s \in \mathbb{F}$, any $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(s)$ and any subset $\mathcal{I} = \{i_1, \dots, i_q\} \subseteq [n]$ with $q < t$, the tuple $(s_{i_1}, \dots, s_{i_q})$ is information-theoretically independent of s .

Remark 6. We note that RSS scheme is a specific instance of TLSS scheme discussed in the prior section.

Let **DlogGen** be a relation generator that on input $(1^\lambda, m)$ outputs $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbf{g}, p)$ where p is a λ -bit prime, \mathbb{G} is a cyclic group of order p and $\mathbf{g} = (g_1, \dots, g_m) \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}^m$ is a uniformly sampled set of generators. The associated relation \mathcal{R}^{DL} is defined by $(z, \mathbf{s}) \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{DL}}$ if $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}} = z$. Let $\text{RSS} = (\text{Share}, \text{Reconstruct})$ denote $(t, n, \binom{n-1}{t})$ replicated secret sharing over \mathbb{F}_p . In this section, we state the theorems and the threshold bounds for RSS as a specific case of TLSS (Theorem 4).

Theorem 5 (Robust Distributed Proof of Knowledge for Discrete Log for Replicated Secret Sharing). Assuming that the discrete log assumption holds over the group \mathbb{G} , protocol $\Pi_{\text{rob-rss}}$ is a $\text{DPoK}_{\text{RSS}, \text{DlogGen}}$ for relation generator **DlogGen** and $(t, n, \binom{n-1}{t})$ -RSS scheme which satisfies t -privacy and d -robustness, for $d = t < \text{dist}/3$, where $\text{dist} = (n - t)$ is the minimum distance of two valid codewords of the linear code induced by the TLSS scheme.

Remark 7. We note that the corruption threshold of $t < n/3$ attainable for Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) Scheme and Replicated Secret Sharing (RSS) Scheme follows from the fact that the underlying linear code defined by both sharing schemes attain a minimum distance of $\text{dist} = n - t$ between any two valid codewords. We note that the linear codes considered for SSS scheme lies in \mathbb{F}_p (Reed-Solomon Codes), whereas the linear codes considered for RSS lies in \mathbb{F}_{p^k} .

D Round Efficient Distributed Proof of Knowledge

In this section, we formalize the notion of *distributed* proof of knowledge (DPoK) in the random oracle model (ROM) which multiple provers, each having a share of the witness engage in an interactive protocol with a verifier to convince it that their shares determine a valid witness. The provers do not directly interact with each other, and all the interaction with the verifier takes place over a public broadcast channel.

We define a round efficient DPoK by building upon our original definition for DPoK from Section 3. Our definition is based on the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS87], using which we transform a DPoK (with number of rounds logarithmic in the size of the message) into a round efficient DPoK (having constant number of rounds).

Definition 13 (Round Efficient DPoK in the ROM). Let $\text{DPoK}_{\text{SSS}, \text{RGen}} = (\text{Setup}, \Pi)$ be a DPoK as in Definition 6 for relation generator RGen and a secret-sharing scheme $\text{SSS} = (\text{Share}, \text{Reconstruct})$, where Setup is a PPT algorithm, and Π is a k -round interactive protocol between PPT algorithms \mathcal{P} (prover), \mathcal{V} (interactive verifier) and $\mathcal{W}_1, \dots, \mathcal{W}_n$ (workers), such that all of the interaction with the verifier takes place over a public broadcast channel, and where in each round $j \in [k]$, the verifier \mathcal{V} broadcasts a challenge sampled uniformly from the challenge set Ch_j . We define the corresponding round efficient DPoK for the same $(\text{RGen}, \text{SSS})$ pair as a tuple of the form $\text{RE-DPoK}_{\text{SSS}, \text{RGen}} = (\text{Setup}_{\text{FS}}, \Pi_{\text{FS}}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}})$, where Setup_{FS} is a PPT setup algorithm, Π_{FS} is an interactive protocol between PPT algorithms \mathcal{P}_{FS} (prover) and $(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_1, \dots, (\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_n$ (workers), and \mathcal{V}_{FS} is PPT verification algorithm. These are defined as follows:

- **Setup** $[(\text{pp}, \text{RO}) \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}_{\text{FS}}(\mathcal{R}, 1^\lambda)]$: The setup algorithm takes as input a relation $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow_R \text{RGen}(1^\lambda)$ and outputs a tuple of the form (pp, RO) , where $\text{pp} \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(\mathcal{R})$, and $\text{RO} = \{\text{RO}_i\}_{i \in [1, r]}$, with each RO_i being a random function sampled uniformly from the set of all functions that maps $\{0, 1\}^*$ to the challenge set Ch_i . As in our general definition of DPoK, the setup phase is required to be executed only once for a given relation \mathcal{R} . We again assume that \mathcal{R} consists of pairs (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{w}) where \mathbf{w} is parsed as (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) with $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}^m$; looking ahead, we partition the witness as (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) to explicitly specify which parts of the witness later needs to be shared. Also, note that sampling each RO_i independently is equivalent to instantiating RO_i from a single random oracle via domain separation.
- **Interactive Protocol Π_{FS}** : executed jointly by the prover $\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}$ and the workers $(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_1, \dots, (\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_n$ in the following phases:
 - **Input Phase**: The prover $\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}$ receives $(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x}, (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})) \in \mathcal{R}$ as input, while each worker $(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_i$, $i \in [n]$ receives $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{s}_i)$ as input, where $(\text{pp}, \mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(\mathbf{s})$.
 - **Preprocessing Phase**: This is (an optional) phase where the prover $\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}$ sends some auxiliary information aux_i to worker $(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_i$ using secure private channels. This phase is identical to the preprocessing phase (if any) in the underlying DPoK scheme, with the prover $\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}$ invoking the prover \mathcal{P} of DPoK to obtain its output in the preprocessing phase, and sending the same to the workers $(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_1, \dots, (\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_n$.
 - **Interactive Phase**: In this phase, the prover and the workers interact using a public broadcast channel as follows, where all algorithm presented with FS subscript have access to the random oracle RO :
 - * The prover $\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}$ (resp. each worker $(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_i$) invokes the prover \mathcal{P} (resp. the corresponding worker \mathcal{W}_i of) of DPoK to produce the same round message as in the protocol Π .
 - * Suppose that in round j of the protocol Π (for $j \in [k]$), the verifier \mathcal{V} of the underlying DPoK outputs a challenge $\mathbf{c}_j \leftarrow_R \text{Ch}_j$. In Π_{FS} , each worker $(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_i$ computes \mathbf{c}_j locally as

$$\mathbf{c}_j = \text{RO}_j(\mathbf{x}, \{\{\mathbf{m}_{i, \ell}\}_{i \in [n]}, \mathbf{c}_\ell\}_{\ell \in [j-1]}),$$

where $\mathbf{m}_{i, \ell}$ is the prior message of \mathcal{W}_i in round ℓ , and \mathbf{c}_ℓ is prior challenge in round ℓ .

Let $\pi = (\mathbf{x}, \{\{\mathbf{m}_{i, \ell}\}_{i \in [n]}, \mathbf{c}_\ell\}_{\ell \in [k]})$ denote the transcript of protocol Π_{FS} at the conclusion of k rounds.

- **Verification**: $[b \leftarrow_R \mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x}, \pi)]$: The verifier $\mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}$ takes as input $(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x}, \pi)$ and outputs a decision bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$. It outputs 1 if and only if both of the following hold: (i) $\mathcal{V}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x}, \pi) = 1$ (\mathcal{V} being the verifier of DPoK), and (ii) for each $j \in [k]$, $\mathbf{c}_j = \text{RO}_j(\mathbf{x}, \{\{\mathbf{m}_{i, \ell}\}_{i \in [n]}, \mathbf{c}_\ell\}_{\ell \in [j-1]})$. Otherwise, the verifier $\mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}$ outputs 0.

A distributed proof of knowledge $\text{RE-DPoK}_{\text{SSS}, \text{RGen}}$ as described above is said to be t -private, ℓ -robust if the following hold:

- **Completeness**: We say that completeness holds if for any $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow_R \text{RGen}(1^\lambda)$, for $(\text{pp}, \text{RO}) \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}_{\text{FS}}(\mathcal{R}, 1^\lambda, 1^k)$, and for any $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{s}) \in \mathcal{R}$, if π denotes the transcript of an honest execution of the protocol Π_{FS} , then we have

$$\Pr[\mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x}, \pi) = 1] = 1$$

- **Knowledge Soundness:** We say that knowledge soundness holds if for any security parameter λ and any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$ that makes at most $Q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ queries to RO, where \mathcal{A}_2 corrupts the prover $\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}$ and subset of workers $\{(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{C}}$ for some $\mathcal{C} \subseteq [n]$, there exists an extractor Ext with oracle access to \mathcal{A}_2 (which controls $\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}$ and the set of corrupt $(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_i$) such that for any $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow_R \text{RGen}(\lambda)$, the following probability is negligible,

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x}, \pi) = 1 \wedge \\ ((\mathbf{x}, (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})) \notin \mathcal{R} \vee \\ \text{Consistent}(\{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}, \mathbf{s}) = 0) \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{l} (\text{pp}, \text{RO}) \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}_{\text{FS}}(\mathcal{R}) \\ (\mathbf{x}, \{\mathbf{s}_i, \text{aux}_i\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}) \leftarrow_R \mathcal{A}_1(\text{pp}) \\ \pi := \\ \Pi_{\text{FS}}(\mathcal{A}_2(\rho), \{(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_i(\alpha_i)_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}\}) \\ (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}) \leftarrow_R \\ \text{Ext}^{\mathcal{A}_2}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x}, \{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}, \pi, Q) \end{array} \right]$$

where π denotes the transcript of an execution of the protocol Π_{FS} between the adversary \mathcal{A}_2 (which controls $\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}$ and the set of corrupt $(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_i$), and the honest workers.

- **Zero-Knowledge:** Zero-knowledge for publicly verifiable DPoKs is defined in the explicitly programmable random oracle model where the simulator is allowed to program the random oracle. The zero-knowledge simulator \mathcal{S}_{FS} is modeled as a stateful algorithm that operates in two modes. In the first mode, $(c_i, \text{st}') \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{\text{FS}}(1, \text{st}, \mathbf{x}, i)$ handles random oracle calls to RO_i on input \mathbf{x} . In the second mode, $(\tilde{\pi}, \text{st}') \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{\text{FS}}(2, \text{st}, \mathbf{x})$ simulates a valid proof string. We define stateful wrapper oracles.
 - $\mathcal{S}_1(t, i)$ denotes the oracle that returns the first output of $\mathcal{S}_{\text{FS}}(1, \text{st}, t, i)$;
 - $\mathcal{S}_2(x, w)$ returns the first output of $\mathcal{S}_{\text{FS}}(2, \text{st}, \mathbf{x})$ if $(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{s}) \in \mathcal{R}$ and \perp otherwise; (This is because ZK is defined only for true statements.)
- We say that a DPoK is zero-knowledge in the random oracle model if for all $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow_R \text{RGen}(1^\lambda)$, $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{s}) \in \mathcal{R}$ and any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} corrupting a set of workers $\{(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{C}}$, where $|\mathcal{C}| \leq t$, there exists a PPT simulator \mathcal{S}_{FS} such that $\text{View}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{RO}, \Pi_{\text{FS}}}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x})$ is indistinguishable from $\mathcal{S}_{\text{FS}}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x})$ for $\text{pp} \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}_{\text{FS}}(\mathcal{R})$. Here, the view is given by $\text{View}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{RO}, \Pi_{\text{FS}}} = \{\mathbf{r}, (\mathbf{M}_i)_{i \in \mathcal{C}}\}$ where \mathbf{r} denotes the internal randomness of \mathcal{A} and \mathbf{M}_i is the set of all messages received by $(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_i$ in Π_{FS} .
- **Robust-Completeness:** We say that robust-completeness holds if for all $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow_R \text{RGen}(1^\lambda)$, $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{s}) \in \mathcal{R}$ and any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} corrupting a set of workers $\{(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{C}}$, where $|\mathcal{C}| \leq \ell$, $(\mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi_{\text{FS}}}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{x}, \Pi_{\text{FS}}) = 1$ with overwhelming probability where $\text{pp} \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}_{\text{FS}}(\mathcal{R})$.

Protocol $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$

1. **Public Parameters:** Let $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbf{g}, p) \leftarrow_R \text{DlogGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\ell)$. Let \mathcal{R}^{DL} denote the relation consisting of pairs (z, \mathbf{s}) such that $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}} = z$. Let $(h_1, h_2) \leftarrow_R \text{Setup}(\mathcal{R}^{\text{DL}})$ be two independent generators of \mathbb{G} .
2. **Input Phase:** The prover gets (z, \mathbf{s}) while workers $(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_i$, $i \in [n]$ are given (z, \mathbf{s}_i) where $(\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(\mathbf{s})$.¹²
3. **Pre-processing:** The prover sends r_i to $(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_i$ for $i \in [n]$ where $(r_1, \dots, r_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(r)$ for $r \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$.
4. **Commit to Shares:** In the interactive phase, the workers first commit to their respective shares by broadcasting
 - (a) $A_i = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i}$ and its associated proofs of knowledge $\pi_{i1} = \text{NIPK}.\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}\{(A_i, \mathbf{s}_i) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i} = A_i\}$.
 - (b) $B_i = h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i}$ for $\omega_i \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$ and its associated proofs of knowledge $\pi_{i2} = \text{NIPK}.\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}\{(B_i, (r_i, \omega_i)) : h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i} = B_i\}$.
5. **Reveal Linear Form over Shares:** Each worker $(\mathcal{W}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})_i$ computes γ as $\gamma = \text{RO}(z \| A_1 \| B_1 \| A_2 \| B_2 \| \dots \| A_n \| B_n) \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$. Thereafter, the workers broadcast the linear form $v_i = \langle \gamma, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle + r_i$. To ensure that corrupt workers use \mathbf{s}_i, r_i consistent with earlier commitments A_i, B_i we additionally require them to broadcast proof π_{i3} as:

$$\pi_{i3} = \text{NIPK}.\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}\{((A_i B_i, \gamma \| \mathbf{1} \| \mathbf{0}, v_i), (\mathbf{s}_i, r_i, \omega_i)) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i} h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i} = A_i B_i \wedge \langle \gamma, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle + r_i = v_i\}.$$

6. **Verifier Determines Honest Commitments:** Let $\mathbf{v}' = (v'_1, \dots, v'_n)$ be the received values in the previous step by the workers, instead of (v_1, \dots, v_n) . If one of the proofs π_{i1}, π_{i2} or π_{i3} is invalid, the verifier set $b_i = 0$ else it sets $b_i = 1$. Here we use $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \dots, v_n)$ defined by $v_i = \langle \gamma, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle + r_i$ to denote the vector of honestly computed values. Since $\Delta(\mathbf{v}', \mathbf{v}) \leq d < (n - t)/2$, $\mathcal{V}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}$ can compute \mathbf{v} from \mathbf{v}' by decoding algorithm (e.g. Berlekamp-Welch) for Reed-Solomon codes. Set $C = \{i \in [n] : v_i \neq v'_i \vee b_i = 0\}$ and let $\mathbf{H}_Q = (h_{ij})$ denote the matrix guaranteed by Lemma 1 for $Q = [n] \setminus C = \{i_1, \dots, i_q\}$ for $q \in \mathbb{N}$.
7. **Output using Honest Messages:** \mathcal{V} outputs $(1, C)$ if $\left(\prod_{j \in [q]} A_{i_j}^{h_{jk}}\right)_{k=1, \dots, n-t} = (z, \mathbf{0}^{n-t-1})$, and $(0, \{\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}\})$ otherwise.

Robust Complete Round Efficient DPoK for Discrete Log. We now provide a RE-DPoK_{SSS, DlogGen} for the discrete log relation based on Shamir Secret Sharing (SSS) [Sha79]. Let DlogGen be a relation generator that on input $(1^\lambda, 1^\ell)$ outputs $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbf{g}, p)$ where p is a λ -bit prime, \mathbb{G} is a cyclic group of order p and $\mathbf{g} = (g_1, \dots, g_\ell) \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}^\ell$ is a uniformly sampled set of generators. The associated relation \mathcal{R}^{DL} is defined by $(z, \mathbf{s}) \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{DL}}$ if $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}} = z$. Let SSS = (Share, Reconstruct) denote (t, n) Shamir secret sharing over \mathbb{F}_p . Our protocol Π_{dlog} realizing RE-DPoK_{SSS, DlogGen} is as below. However, for ease of exposition, we first explain a simpler non-robust version of the protocol, before explaining the robust version.

We use the non-interactive proof of knowledge for the discrete logarithm relation, namely $\text{NIPK}_{\text{FS}} = (\text{NIPK.Setup}_{\text{FS}}, \text{NIPK.P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}, \text{NIPK.V}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}})$, obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic (using random oracle $\text{RO} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$) on the public-coin compressed sigma protocol [AC20] for proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm relation. Additionally, we present the protocol Π_{dlog} using Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS87] and a random oracle $\text{RO} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$.

We now state and prove the following theorem for $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$.

Theorem 6. *Assuming that NIPK satisfies completeness, knowledge-soundness and zero-knowledge with $O(\log \ell)$ -communication overhead, $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$ is a RE-DPoK_{SSS, DlogGen} (as per definition 6) for relation generator DlogGen and (t, n) -SSS with the following properties:*

- **Security:** t -private and d -robust, for $d < \text{dist}/2$, where $\text{dist} = (n - t)$ is the minimum distance of the Reed-Solomon code induced by (t, n) -SSS.
- **Efficiency:** $O(n)$ communication over point-to-point channels and $O(n \log \ell)$ communication over broadcast channels.

Proof sketch. For knowledge-soundness, the intuition behind extraction of a valid witness are the fact that the shares (provided to the extractor via definition) held by the honest parties uniquely determines the output and the adversary succeeds in proving the statement in a protocol where these honest-party shares are used. For zero-knowledge, the key intuition behind the simulation is that the adversarial messages can be ‘ignored’ for providing an accepting transcript as the protocol does ‘error-correction’ and removes the ‘bad shares’ from consideration.

Proof. Completeness and robust completeness of $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$ follows similarly from the completeness and robust completeness of its respective counterpart Π_{dlog} .

Knowledge-Soundness. To prove knowledge-soundness, we describe the extractor Ext for $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$ as follows. Let C be the set of indices of workers corrupted by adversary \mathcal{A} . Additionally, we assume that there is an extractor Ext_1 for NIPK proof. The extractor Ext runs the adversary \mathcal{A} as follows:

- Ext is provided $(\text{pp}, z, \{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \notin C}, \Pi_{\text{FS}}, \mathcal{Q})$ as input at the onset, where $\{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \notin C}$ are the honest-party shares and \mathcal{Q} is the set of RO queries made by the adversary \mathcal{A} .

¹² Note that here the witness is $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$, and we do not have any component \mathbf{t} which is not being secret-shared.

- Ext receives A_i, B_i from \mathcal{A} along with the NIPK proofs $\{\pi_{i1}, \pi_{i2}\}$ for all $i \in \mathcal{C}$, such that $\pi_{i1} = \text{NIPK}.\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}\{(A_i, \mathbf{s}_i) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i} = A_i\}$, $\pi_{i2} = \text{NIPK}.\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}\{(B_i, (r_i, \omega_i)) : h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i} = B_i\}$.
- Ext computes $\{A_i = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i}, B_i = h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i}\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ and sends $\{A_i, \pi_{i1}, B_i, \pi_{i2}\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ to \mathcal{A} , where $\pi_{i1} = \text{NIPK}.\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}\{(A_i, \mathbf{s}_i) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i} = A_i\}$, $\pi_{i2} = \text{NIPK}.\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}\{(B_i, (r_i, \omega_i)) : h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i} = B_i\}$.
- Ext computes $\gamma = \text{RO}(z \| A_1 \| B_1 \| A_2 \| B_2 \| \dots \| A_n \| B_n)$
- Ext receives $\{v_i, \pi_{i3}\}_{i \in \mathcal{C}}$ from \mathcal{A}
- Ext computes v_i, π_{i3} as $\{v_i = \langle \gamma, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle + r_i\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ and $\pi_{i3} = \text{NIPK}.\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}\{((A_i B_i, \gamma \| \mathbf{1} \| \mathbf{0}, v_i), (\mathbf{s}_i, r_i, \omega_i)) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i} h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i} = A_i B_i \wedge \langle \gamma, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle + r_i = v_i\}$, and sends $\{v_i, \pi_{i3}\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$
- Ext sets $\mathbf{s}'_i = \mathbf{s}_i$ for all $i \notin \mathcal{C}$ and for all $i \in \mathcal{C}$, it invokes the extractor Ext_1 for the Fiat-Shamir transformed proof π_{i1} to extract \mathbf{s}'_i satisfying $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}'_i} = A_i$.
- Ext finally computes \mathbf{s}' as $\mathbf{s}' = \text{Reconstruct}(\{s_i\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}})$ and outputs \mathbf{s}' .

Note that by using random oracle RO to obtain the challenge γ in Step (iii) described above, we ensure that a ‘random linear combination’ of the code is considered in Step (6) of the protocol. Now, considering that the adversary \mathcal{A} succeeds, we now argue the correctness of the extracted witness. Since the adversary succeeds, the verification check in Step (7) of the protocol implies that the tuple $(\mathbf{s}'_i)_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ is \mathcal{L}^ℓ -consistent and the reconstructed vector \mathbf{s}' satisfies $\mathbf{s}' = \text{Reconstruct}(\{s_i\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}})$ along with $\left(\prod_{j \notin \mathcal{C}} A_j^{h_j^{jk}}\right)_{k=1, \dots, n-t} = (z, \mathbf{0}^{n-t-1})$, where $A_j = \mathbf{g}^{s_j}$ for all $j \notin \mathcal{C}$. Note that the extractor’s output \mathbf{s}' is reconstructed from the columns of the unique matrix $\mathbf{S} \in \mathcal{L}^\ell$ determined by the tuple $(\mathbf{s}'_i)_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$. Hence, the extractor output is a valid witness for the given statement. This completes the proof of knowledge-soundness for $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$.

Knowledge-error. Since there are three non-parallel instances of Fiat-Shamir transformed NIPK protocol from Attema et al. [AC20] being invoked, if the knowledge-error of the Fiat-Shamir transformed version is κ' , then the knowledge-error of $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$ is $\kappa \leq 3\kappa'$. And we know from [AC20] that the knowledge-error κ'' of NIPK protocol is negligible, and [AFK23] ensures that the knowledge-error κ' of non-parallel Fiat-Shamir version of the multi-round protocol is still negligible and degrades only linearly with respect to the number of queries to the Random Oracle. Specifically, if Q is the upper-bound for the number of Random Oracle queries for NIPK protocol, then given that κ'' is the knowledge-error of the interactive NIPK protocol, from [AFK23] we get that $\kappa' = (Q + 1) \cdot \kappa''$.

Zero-Knowledge. For proving zero-knowledge, we describe the simulator as follows. Without loss of generality, let us assume that $\mathcal{C} = \{1, \dots, \epsilon\}$ for $\epsilon \leq t$. The simulator \mathcal{S}_{FS} runs the adversary as follows:

- \mathcal{S}_{FS} receives $\{A_i, B_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{C}}$ from the adversary.
- \mathcal{S}_{FS} simulates messages $\{A_i, B_i, \pi_{i1}, \pi_{i2}\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ of the honest parties as follows:
 - \mathcal{S}_{FS} chooses $A'_i \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}$ for $1 \leq i \leq t$, and sets $\mathbf{a} = (z, A'_1, \dots, A'_t)$.
 - \mathcal{S}_{FS} sets $A'_{t+j} = \mathbf{a}^{\mathbf{t}_j}$ where $\mathbf{t}_j \in \mathbb{F}_p^{t+1}$ is the interpolation vector such that $f(t+j) = \langle (f(0), \dots, f(t)), \mathbf{t}_j \rangle$ for all polynomials $f(x)$ of degree $\leq t$, i.e. $\mathbf{t}_j = \{\lambda_0(t+j), \lambda_1(t+j), \dots, \lambda_t(t+j)\}$ where $\lambda_0(x), \dots, \lambda_t(x)$ are lagrange polynomials with respect to the set $\{0, \dots, t\}$.
 - \mathcal{S}_{FS} picks B'_i , $i > \epsilon$ uniformly at random from \mathbb{G} .
 - \mathcal{S}_{FS} invokes the simulator for the NIPK to obtain $\pi_{i1} = \text{NIPK}.\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}\{(A_i, \mathbf{s}_i) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i} = A_i\}$, $\pi_{i2} = \text{NIPK}.\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}\{(B_i, (r_i, \omega_i)) : h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i} = B_i\}$.
 - Then \mathcal{S}_{FS} sends the messages $\{A'_i, B'_i, \pi_{i1}, \pi_{i2}\}_{i > \epsilon}$ to \mathcal{A} .
- \mathcal{S}_{FS} queries the random oracle RO to obtain the challenge $\gamma \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$.
- Thereafter, the simulator receives $\{v_i\}_{i < \epsilon}$ from \mathcal{A} , along with the proofs $\{\pi_{i3}\}_{i < \epsilon}$.
- \mathcal{S}_{FS} sets $v' \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$ and computes $(v'_1, \dots, v'_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(v')$, computes simulated NIPK. $\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}$ proof $\pi_{i3} = \text{NIPK}.\mathcal{P}_{\text{FS}}^{\text{RO}}\{((A_i B_i, \gamma \| \mathbf{1} \| \mathbf{0}, v_i), (\mathbf{s}_i, r_i, \omega_i)) : \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}_i} h_1^{r_i} h_2^{\omega_i} = A_i B_i \wedge \langle \gamma, \mathbf{s}_i \rangle + r_i = v_i\}$, and sends $\{v_i, \pi_{i3}\}_{i > \epsilon}$.
- Finally, \mathcal{S}_{FS} sends $(v'_i, \pi_{i3})_{i > \epsilon}$ to the adversary \mathcal{A} .

We argue correctness of simulation of honest-party first messages $\{A_j\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ as follows: in the real protocol, the vector of shares for party j is of the form $(f_1(j), \dots, f_\ell(j))$, where $f_i : i \in [\ell]$ are the polynomials used to share the values $s_i : i \in [\ell]$ respectively. Let $\mathbf{f} = (f_1, \dots, f_\ell)$ denote the vector of sharing polynomials and

let $\mathbf{f}(j)$ to denote the vector $(f_1(j), \dots, f_\ell(j))$. Then for $j > \epsilon$ in the real protocol, $(A_j)_{j>\epsilon}$ are distributed as $(\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{f}(j)})_{j>\epsilon}$, subject to constraint that $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{f}(0)} = z$. Sampling such a polynomial $f_i, i \in [\ell]$ corresponds to choosing $f_i(1), \dots, f_i(t)$ uniformly and then determining $f_i(t+j) = \langle (f_i(0), \dots, f_i(t)), \mathbf{t}_j \rangle$ using the interpolation vector \mathbf{t}_j . Thus $\mathbf{f}(t+j)$ is a \mathbf{t}_j -linear combination of $\mathbf{f}(0), \dots, \mathbf{f}(t)$, which dictates simulator's computation of A_{t+j} from vector \mathbf{a} . The simulated transcript is an accepting transcript as $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{f}(0)} = z$ and $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{f}(i)} = A_i$ for all $i \notin \mathcal{C}$, and the verification check is satisfied since a known linear combination of $\{\mathbf{f}(i)\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ in the exponent yields the desired value $\mathbf{f}(0)$ in the exponent. Additionally, since $\{\mathbf{f}(i)\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ are implicitly set as the honest-party shares, it is identical to the correct distribution of secret shares. This completes the proof of zero-knowledge for $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$.

We note that knowledge soundness ensures simulation extractability in the random oracle model [GKK⁺21, GOP⁺23], and hence, our Fiat-Shamir transformed round efficient DPoK is simulation-extractable. The following corollary of Theorem 6 follows immediately and yields the concrete bounds on the corruption threshold tolerated by $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$.

Corollary 3. *Setting $d = t < n/3$, $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{FS}}$ is $n/3$ -private and $n/3$ -robust.*

E PS Signatures and PoK for PS

In this section we show the generality of techniques shown above by providing distributed protocols for another pairing-based signature scheme, whose proof of knowledge of signature also reduces to discrete logarithm relation.

We begin by recalling the Pointcheval Sanders (PS) signature scheme from [PS16], along with the associated proof of knowledge.

Definition 14 (PS Signature Scheme [PS16]). *The PS Signature Scheme to sign a message $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_\ell) \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ consists of a tuple of PPT algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify) described as follows :*

- **Setup**(1^λ) : *For security parameter λ , this algorithm outputs groups $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$, and \mathbb{G}_T of prime order p , with an efficient bilinear map $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$, as part of the public parameters pp . Note that the bilinear groups are of type 3, which ensures that there are no homomorphisms between \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 that are efficiently computable.*
- **KeyGen**(pp) : *This algorithm samples $\tilde{g} \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}_2$ and $(x, y_1, \dots, y_\ell) \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p^{n+1}$, computes $(\tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}_1, \dots, \tilde{Y}_\ell) = (\tilde{g}^x, \tilde{g}^{y_1}, \dots, \tilde{g}^{y_\ell})$, and outputs (sk, pk) , where $\text{sk} = (x, y_1, \dots, y_\ell)$ and $D \text{pk} = (\tilde{g}, \tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}_1, \dots, \tilde{Y}_\ell)$.*
- **Sign**($\text{sk}, m_1, \dots, m_\ell$) : *This algorithm samples $h \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}_1 \setminus \{0\}$, and outputs $\sigma = (h, h^{x+\sum_j y_j m_j})$.*
- **Verify**($\text{pk}, (m_1, \dots, m_\ell), \sigma$) : *This algorithm parses σ as (σ_1, σ_2) , and first checks if $\sigma_1 \neq \mathbf{e}_1$. It then proceeds to check if*

$$e \left(\sigma_1, \tilde{X} \cdot \prod_j \tilde{Y}_j^{m_j} \right) = e(\sigma_2, \tilde{g}).$$

If yes, it outputs 1, and outputs 0 otherwise.

Note that given $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$, $\sigma' = (\sigma_1^r, \sigma_2^r)$ is also a valid signature if σ is a valid signature. However, it can be seen that the distribution of σ is not independent of the message \mathbf{m} in the above scheme.

Proof of Knowledge PS signatures support an efficient zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPoK) wherein a prover holding a valid PS signature σ on a message vector \mathbf{m} can efficiently prove knowledge of the signature. A prover \mathcal{P} who owns a PS signature $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ on a message $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_\ell) \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ can prove knowledge of such a signature using a slight modification of the signature scheme as described above.

At a high level, \mathcal{P} generates a signature on a pair (\mathbf{m}, t) for uniformly sampled $t \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$ based on the original signature σ ; the usage of a random t makes the resulting signature independent of \mathbf{m} . The complete protocol is as below:

- **Public Key** $\text{pk} = (\tilde{g}, \tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}_1, \dots, \tilde{Y}_\ell)$
- **\mathcal{P} 's inputs:** Message $\mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ and signature $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ on \mathbf{m}
 1. \mathcal{P} samples $r, t \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$ and computes $\sigma' = (\sigma_1^r, (\sigma_2 \cdot \sigma_1^t)^r)$.
 2. \mathcal{P} sends the computed value $\sigma' = (\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2)$ to \mathcal{V} .
 3. \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} run a ZKPoK of (\mathbf{m}, t) for the relation:

$$e(\sigma'_1, \tilde{X}) \cdot \prod_j e(\sigma'_1, \tilde{Y}_j)^{m_j} \cdot e(\sigma'_1, \tilde{g})^t = e(\sigma'_2, \tilde{g}).$$

4. \mathcal{V} accepts if the ZKPoK is valid.

The proof of knowledge protocol used in Step (3) is a special case of “proof of opening”, wherein we can use a protocol for proving the knowledge of $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ which opens the commitment $z = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}}$ where $\mathbf{g} = (g_1, \dots, g_\ell)$ and g_1, \dots, g_ℓ are public generators of a group \mathbb{G} (of order p), where the discrete log problem is hard. We describe the protocol concretely below.

- **\mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} 's common inputs:** $z \in \mathbb{G}$.
- **\mathcal{P} 's private inputs:** $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$.
 1. \mathcal{P} samples $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ and computes $\alpha = g^{\mathbf{r}}$.
 2. $\mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V}$: α .
 3. $\mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}$: $c \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$.
 4. $\mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V}$: $\mathbf{s}' = c\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{r}$.
 5. \mathcal{V} checks: $g^{\mathbf{s}'} = \alpha z^c$.

We also describe another variant of PS Signature Scheme, based on a stronger assumption (Assumption 1 in [PS16]), that leads to much more efficient distributed prover protocols. This variant is same as the one described in Definition 14, with the exception of KeyGen algorithm which includes additional elements in the public key (hence stronger assumption). The modified KeyGen algorithm is described below:

Definition 15 (PS Signature: B [PS16]). *The PS Signature Scheme to sign a message $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_\ell) \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ consists of a tuple of PPT algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify) as described in Definition 14, except KeyGen which is described below:*

- **KeyGen(pp):** *The algorithm samples $g \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}_1$, $\tilde{g} \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}_2$, $(x, y_1, \dots, y_{\ell+1}) \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p^{\ell+1}$ and computes $(X, Y_1, \dots, Y_{\ell+1}) = (g^x, g^{y_1}, \dots, g^{y_{\ell+1}})$, $(\tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}_1, \dots, \tilde{Y}_{\ell+1}) = (\tilde{g}^x, \tilde{g}^{y_1}, \dots, \tilde{g}^{y_{\ell+1}})$. It then outputs (sk, pk) where $\text{sk} = (x, y_1, \dots, y_{\ell+1})$ and $\text{pk} = (g, Y_1, \dots, Y_{\ell+1}, \tilde{g}, \tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}_1, \dots, \tilde{Y}_{\ell+1})$.*
- **Sign(sk, (m_1, \dots, m_ℓ)):** *Choose $h \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}_1 \setminus \{0\}$ and output $(h, h^{x + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} y_i \cdot m_i})$. Note that Sign still works on the ℓ -length message.*

Alternate Proof of Knowledge. We describe a protocol for showing knowledge of a PS signature (σ_1, σ_2) on a message $\mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ while simultaneously revealing a dynamically sampled commitment C of \mathbf{m} . The proof of knowledge reduces to the knowledge of opening of C and a short pairing check as described below:

- **Public Key** $\text{pk} = (g, Y_1, \dots, Y_{\ell+1}, \tilde{g}, \tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}_1, \dots, \tilde{Y}_{\ell+1})$
- **\mathcal{P} 's inputs:** Message $\mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ and signature $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ on \mathbf{m}
 1. \mathcal{P} samples $r, t, s \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$ and computes $\sigma' = (\sigma_1^r, (\sigma_2 \cdot \sigma_1^t)^r \cdot Y_{\ell+1}^s)$, $C = \tilde{g}^t \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \tilde{Y}_i^{m_i} \in \mathbb{G}_2$.
 2. \mathcal{P} sends the computed value $\sigma' = (\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2)$ and C to \mathcal{V} .

3. \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{V} run a ZKPoK showing knowledge of (m_1, \dots, m_ℓ, t) such that $C = \tilde{g}^t \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \tilde{Y}_i^{m_i}$ and a ZKPoK showing knowledge of s such that $e(Y_{\ell+1}, \tilde{g})^s = e(\sigma'_2, \tilde{g})e(\sigma'_1, \tilde{X})^{-1}e(\sigma'_1, C)^{-1}$.
4. \mathcal{V} accepts if the ZKPoKs are valid.

Proof. For completeness, notice that $\sigma_2 = \sigma_1^{x + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} y_i m_i}$ and thus we have $\sigma'_1 = \sigma_1^r$, $\sigma'_2 = Y_{\ell+1}^s \cdot \sigma_1^{r(x + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} y_i m_i + t)}$ and $C = \tilde{g}^t \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \tilde{Y}_i^{m_i}$. Thus we have:

$$\begin{aligned} e(\sigma'_2, \tilde{g}) &= e(\sigma_1^r, \tilde{g}^{x + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} y_i m_i + t}) \cdot e(Y_{\ell+1}, \tilde{g})^s \\ &= e(\sigma'_1, \tilde{X}) \cdot e(\sigma'_1, C) \cdot e(Y_{\ell+1}, \tilde{g})^s \end{aligned}$$

The above is equivalent to the verification relation. Zero knowledge follows from the fact that σ'_1, σ'_2 and C are distributed uniformly in their respective domains, and from the zero knowledge property of the ZKPoKs. To show knowledge soundness, we show an extractor \mathcal{E} which extracts a valid signature on a message in \mathbb{F}_p^ℓ . Using the extractors for the ZKPoKs, \mathcal{E} obtains $(m_1, \dots, m_\ell, t, s)$ such that

$$C = \tilde{g}^t \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \tilde{Y}_i^{m_i}, \quad e(\sigma'_2, \tilde{g}) = e(\sigma'_1, \tilde{X}) \cdot e(\sigma'_1, C) \cdot e(Y_{\ell+1}, \tilde{g})^s$$

The extractor \mathcal{E} computes $(\sigma_1 = \sigma'_1, \sigma_2 = \sigma'_2 (\sigma'_1)^{-t} (Y_{\ell+1})^{-s})$. To see that (σ_1, σ_2) is a valid signature we verify:

$$\begin{aligned} e(\sigma_2, \tilde{g}) &= e(\sigma'_2, \tilde{g}) \cdot e(\sigma'_1, \tilde{g})^{-t} \cdot e(Y_{\ell+1}, \tilde{g})^{-s} \\ &= e(\sigma'_1, \tilde{X}) \cdot e(\sigma'_1, C) \cdot e(\sigma'_1, \tilde{g})^{-t} \\ &= e(\sigma'_1, \tilde{X}) \cdot e(\sigma'_1, \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \tilde{Y}_i^{m_i}) \\ &= e(\sigma_1, \tilde{X} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \tilde{Y}_i^{m_i}) \end{aligned}$$

The above shows (σ_1, σ_2) is a valid signature for the block (m_1, \dots, m_ℓ) for the public key $(\tilde{g}, \tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}_1, \dots, \tilde{Y}_\ell)$.

F DPoK for PS Signatures over Secret-Shared Inputs

We now present a DPoK for PS signatures for secret-shared inputs. We refer the reader to Section E for the description of the PS signature scheme and its proof of knowledge (in the non-distributed setting) from [PS16]. We start by defining a relation relevant to PS signature verification.

Definition 16 (PS Relation). Let PSGen denote the relation generator, such that $\text{PSGen}(1^\lambda, \ell)$ outputs a bilinear group

$(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, g_1, g_2, e, p) \leftarrow_R \text{PS.Setup}(1^\lambda)$. The corresponding relation \mathcal{R}^{PS} is defined by $(\mathbf{x}, (\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{u})) \in \mathcal{R}^{\text{PS}}$ for

$\mathbf{x} = \text{pk} = (g, Y_1, \dots, Y_{\ell+1}, \tilde{g}, \tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}_1, \dots, \tilde{Y}_{\ell+1}) \in \mathbb{G}_1^{\ell+2} \times \mathbb{G}_2^{\ell+3}$, $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_\ell) \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ and $\mathbf{u} = (\sigma, t) = ((\sigma_1, \sigma_2), t) \in \mathbb{G}_1^2 \times \mathbb{F}_p$ if

$$e(\sigma'_1, \tilde{X}) \cdot \prod_j e(\sigma'_1, \tilde{Y}_j)^{m_j} \cdot e(\sigma'_1, \tilde{g})^t = e(\sigma'_2, \tilde{g}).$$

Our Protocol Π_{ps} . Our DPoK protocol Π_{ps} for relation PSGen is described below, which can be invoked from our compiler with input authentication based on PS signatures (instead of BBS+). It builds upon the known PS PoK [PS16] in the non-distributed setting. The PoK involved the following steps: (i) the prover

randomizes the signature using some auxiliary inputs and broadcasts the randomized signature to all other parties (this randomization ensures unlinkability), and then (ii) the prover shows knowledge of these auxiliary inputs and secret-shares of the message satisfying discrete-log relations determined by the first message.

Our PS PoK over secret-shared inputs follows the same blueprint, where the prover similarly randomizes the first message using certain auxiliary inputs. In our case, the problem reduces to a DPoK for the discrete log relation, with the workers holding the shares of the witness (message) and the verifier holding the public statement (public key pk + the randomized signature). We handle this using our robust complete DPoK Π_{dlog} for discrete log.

Protocol Π_{ps}

- **Public Key** $\text{pk} = (g, Y_1, \dots, Y_{\ell+1}, \tilde{g}, \tilde{X}, \tilde{Y}_1, \dots, \tilde{Y}_{\ell+1})$
- **\mathcal{P} 's inputs:** Message $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_\ell) \in \mathbb{F}_p^\ell$ and signature $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ on \mathbf{m}
- **\mathcal{W}_i 's inputs :** \mathcal{W}_i possesses the i^{th} share \mathbf{m}_i of the message vector \mathbf{m} , such that $\text{Reconstruct}(\mathbf{m}_1, \dots, \mathbf{m}_n) = \mathbf{m}$
- **Pre-processing :** \mathcal{P} samples $t \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$, computes $(t_1, \dots, t_n) \leftarrow_R \text{Share}(t)$. \mathcal{P} sends the shares t_i to \mathcal{W}_i , for all $i \in [n]$.
- **Interactive Protocol**
 1. \mathcal{P} samples $r, v \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}_p$ and computes $\sigma' = (\sigma_1^r, (\sigma_2 \cdot \sigma_1^t)^r \cdot Y_{\ell+1}^v)$, $C = \tilde{g}^t \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \tilde{Y}_i^{m_i}$. \mathcal{P} also generates a NIPK π showing knowledge of v such that $e(\sigma'_1, \tilde{X}) \cdot e(\sigma'_1, C) \cdot e(Y_{\ell+1}, \tilde{g})^v = e(\sigma'_2, \tilde{g})$.
 2. \mathcal{P} broadcasts the computed value $\sigma' = (\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2)$, C and π to \mathcal{V} .
 3. Each \mathcal{W}_i and \mathcal{V} locally set $\mathbf{g} = (\tilde{g}, \tilde{Y}_1, \dots, \tilde{Y}_\ell)$.
 4. Each \mathcal{W}_i locally holds the i -th share $\mathbf{s}_i = (\mathbf{m}_i, t_i)$ such that $\mathbf{s} = (\mathbf{m}, t) = \text{Reconstruct}(\{\mathbf{s}_i\}_{i \in [n]})$.
 5. All \mathcal{W}_i for $i \in [n]$ and \mathcal{V} run DPoK protocol Π_{dlog} for the relation $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{s}} = C$
 6. \mathcal{V} accepts if π is valid and Π_{dlog} accepts.

We note that DPoK protocol Π_{ps} achieves robust completeness, knowledge-soundness and zero-knowledge. The proof is straightforward from the existing proof of knowledge of PS signatures and robust completeness, knowledge-soundness and zero-knowledge properties of our DPoK protocol Π_{dlog} for discrete log.

Theorem 7. *Assuming that Π_{dlog} is a DPoK_{SSS, DlogGen} for relation generator DlogGen and (t, n) -SSS, Π_{ps} is a DPoK for the relation generator PSGen and (t, n) -SSS with the following properties:*

- **Security:** t -private and d -robust, for $d < \text{dist}/2$, where $\text{dist} = (n - t)$ is the minimum distance of the Reed-Solomon code induced by (t, n) -SSS.
- **Efficiency:** $O(n)$ communication over point-to-point channels and $O(n \log \ell)$ communication over broadcast channels.

Remark 8 (Public Verifiability). The protocol Π_{ps} was presented and analyzed assuming an honest designated verifier for simplicity. By replacing Π_{dlog} with its publicly verifiable version $\Pi_{\text{dlog}}^{\text{PV}}$ in steps (5) of the Interactive Phase, we obtain a publicly verifiable version of the protocol, which we call $\Pi_{\text{ps}}^{\text{PV}}$. Observe that $\Pi_{\text{ps}}^{\text{PV}}$ requires one less round of interaction, as compared to Π_{ps} , while it retains the properties of robust completeness, knowledge soundness and honest verifier zero-knowledge holds identically for the Π_{ps} .