NII-88 Branch 1 - Groettrup / Gorodomlya

Groettrup	Russian	Range
	R-1	00km
	R-2	00km
G-4	R-3	3000km
G-1	R-10	600km
G-2	R-12	2500km
G-3	EKR	10000km
G-1M	R-13	00km
G-4	R-14	3000km
G-5	R-15	3000km
G-5	???	3000km

According to Mark Wade in Encyclopedia Astronautica, the designations of Soviet missiles state secrets, where the actual system used in the Soviet Union consisted of the designations ‘secret’ and ‘public’. “The ‘secret’ designation for large ballistic missiles and space launchers consisted of the letters R followed by a sequential number, followed by letters indicating a modification to the basic design (e.g. R-1, R-2, R-3, . . . R-5M for modernized or maritime version, . . . etc.). This number system originated in the late 1940s and was shared between a Russian team under Chief Designer Korolev and a ‘guest’ German team under Gröttrup. The German team knew their own designs only under a ‘public’ system of ‘G’ (for Gröttrup) numbers. Unknown to them, the designs had a parallel secret ‘R-’ designation. The first two designs, the R-1 and R-2, were joint efforts. Korolev made sure he had the ‘lucky’ odd numbers (R-3, R-5, . . . but not R-13!), while the Germans were assigned numbers beginning with 10 (R-12, R-12 through R-15).”

The "Soviet" Germans led by Helmut Groettrup, ahead of the "American" Germans, in the projects of their missiles that gave the world technical solutions that are now textbook for all the missiles of the world. Before and during World War II, the Germans had developed a variety of missile systems. At the end of the war, they stood alone in the numbers and complexity of these systems. Some were used during the war with varying degrees of effectiveness; others were evolving when the war ended.

Many of these missile systems, and the scientists who had developed them, were acquired by the Soviets after the war, permitting the USSR to quickly establish its own missile program. By 1953, most of the Germans had departed the USSR, and subsequent developments were by and large the result of indigenous Soviet programs - planned, engineered, developed, and produced by Soviet personnel.

At first the Soviets attempted to keep the missile-related facilities intact on German soil, using German scientists to the maximum extent possible while Soviet counterparts were gaining familiarity in a new field. Later, the Germans, and most of the missile-related facilities, were sent to the USSR, where work continued under Soviet control.

They lacked a specialist with understanding of the whole problem. And soon he was found - it was Helmut Grettrup. Negotiations on cooperation with him were conducted personally by B.Chertok, also engineer on control systems. A good ration, a decent monetary allowance, the intelligence of the Soviet director played a role. Grettrup attracted leading German specialists, professors and doctors of science to work.

Helmut Groettrup did not dream about flights to space in his youth, he did not meet with Tsiolkovsky (this is necessary for our famous rocket men), he got into missile construction accidentally - specialists in control systems were required for this department, and he accepted the invitation. Becoming eventually the closest associate of the chief designer of the V-2, he was quite satisfied with the post of deputy chief of the group of management of ballistic, anti-aircraft and other missiles. He did not write his doctoral dissertation, he did not receive the title of professor, he did not aspire to the Nazi party.

The 66th CIC Group published a report on Helmut Groettrup on 02 June 1959. The report claimed that during WWII, the German Gestapo arrested Groettrup, believing that he was a Soviet spy. He apparently escaped the custody and remained hidden until the end of the hostilities, at which point he identified himself to the Soviets. A second account suggested that shortly before the fall of Germany, Helmut was loaded on a "death train" where the German High Command planned to kill. This account suggests that Groettrup was able to escape, at which point he approached the Soviets who "welcomed him enthusiastically."

To manage rocket development in the USSR, the Scientific Research Institute (NII) 88 was created. In the summer of 1946 some 500 leading German specialists were sent voluntarily to the USSR, where some of them (about 150 people) were placed in strict isolation on the island of Gorodoml in the middle of the picturesque Lake Seliger.

Gorodomlya is the second largest island on Seliger. Guidebooks praise the extraordinary beauty of its forests - it is there that the artist I.Shishkin sad that he painted sketches that became the basis of his paintings "The Ship Grove" and "Morning in the Pine Forest". The island it belonged to boyar Boris Fedorovich Lykov, and in 1629 it was presented to the monastery of Nilov Pustyn. About modernity, the guides for some reason are silent.

The first group of Germans were referred to as "contract" specialists, because many of them allegedly had signed contracts to work in the USSR for specified periodls of time. This was in contrast to another group of highly qualified Germans deported to the USSR in mid-1947. This latter group, which worked on the develelopmen of an air-to-surface anti-ship missile, was classified as being in "POW status"; apparently the Soviets believed them to be a kind of war booty.

The group that arrived in the USSR in 1946, estimated to be about 50 in number, was sent to the NII-88, located at Kaliningrad. (A few of the scientists in this group were alSo sent to such locations as Leningrad, Ilinskaya, Monino, Khimki, and Podlipki.

Following the initial V-2 tests at Kapustin Yar in late 1947, the 50 or so GentIans at NII 88 again moved. This time they went to Gorodanlya Island in Lake Selinger, near Ostashkov, located about midway between Moscow and Leningrad. The Gorodanlya Island facility was known as Branch 1 of NII 88. The island's isolation afforded an excellent location for classified operations. The move to Gorodomlya Island ended direct German involvenent at NII 88 at Kaliningrad; apparently the Soviets believed they could continue work there on their own.

By 1948, it is estimated that between 350 and 400 German missile specialists were working in the Soviet Union, a significant increase over the 50 scientists who had first arrived in late 1946. About half of this German work force, was located at Branch 1 of NII 88. It was mainly here that the Germans became involved in designing and developing a successor to the V-2 - called the R-10, and in other programs that were to follow, the R-ll through R-15. None of these missile projects apparently progressed beyond intermediate developmental stages, and little is known about their design.

In addition to the detailed design of the R-10 [G-1] missile with a range of 800 km, the report of the proposal for the R-12 [G-2] rocket for 2500 km, preliminary calculations of more promising projects (R-13, or G-1M, with a R-10 body and a forced propulsion system from A-4, a ballistic missile R-14 or G-4, and a cruise missile R-15, or G-5, with a range of 3000 km and a payload of 5 tons. these developments were at the level of sketching the circuit and calculating the main parameters.the depth of study, they were inferior to the A-9 / A-10 projects and Sanger interconnection titanium missile bomber.

On 12 October 1951 Minister of Armaments Dmitri Ustinov transmitted a "Letter from Ustinov on the employment of German rocket specialists in the NII-88[Scientific-Research-Institute No. 88] of the Ministry for Armaments" [Source: RGAE Register 8157, Procedure 1, File 1454, p. 118ff].

Ustinov noted that the German specialists from the SBZ (Soviet Occupation Zone) arrived in the NII-88 in November 1946. As of 01 October 1951, the number of the Germans was 166 specialists and 289 family members. At that time all foreigners remained together with their families in Branch No. 1 of the NII-88 on the island of Gorodomlya in Lake Seliger / Kalininer District.

In 1947 the German specialists were confronted with the participation in the successful finalization and reconstruction of the technical documentation of the A-4 (V-2) rocket. The Germans were also involved in the laboratory tests and trials of rocket components and assemblies. In addition, they were employed in the assembly and the subsequent tests of the special production equipment and plant originating from Germany. German specialists were also employed with the assembly of 10 A-4 type rockets with German components and assemblies. In October and November 1947, the German specialists took part in the implementation of tests on the A-4 (V-2) and with this provided significant assistance.

In 1948 the Germans began development of a design project for the R-10 rocket with a range of 800 km and a payload of 250 kg. They also began elaboration of a preliminary project for the R-12 rocket with a range of 2,500 km and a payload of 1 metric ton. In the projects identified, there was a series of new design elements and work principles which were tested on experimental models and designs.

In 1949 the Germans began development of a design project for the R-14 rocket with a range of 3,000 km and a payload of 3 metric tons. Ustinov reported the Germans also began "the elaboration of a preliminary project for the radio-controlled winged rocket with the range of 3,000 km and payload of 3 metric tons". Ustinov noted that "... as a result of the bulky design (large overall dimensions) and, among other things, a series of unsolvable problems of aerodynamics and stabilization as well as with the fuel feed, the continuation of these tasks proved to be inappropriate".

Eventually, the German specialists were excluded entirely from further developments of Soviet long-range missile projects and were assigned tasks of a secondary nature in the field of general rocket technology. Once the decision had been made for the repatriation of the Germans, the specialists were merely given assignments unrelated to rocketry. This is generally referred to as a “cooling-off” period, which for some of the specialists lasted for several years. Apparently, the Soviet leadership wanted to prevent the returning German specialists from divulging to the Allies their knowledge of the latest state of rocket development in the USSR.

In October 1950, all work at Branch No. 1 considered top secret was discontinued and geared to the imminent termination of the German specialists’ stay in the USSR. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Armaments kept the German collective occupied with a list of minor and thematically isolated tasks, which the main center of the NII-88 had refrained from dealing with for various reasons. Ustinov reported that in 1950 and 1951 the German specialists focused on a variety of highly granular technical problems, rather than overall design projects.

Ustinov concluded in hims memo of 12 October 1951 that "The German specialists, who worked in the field of rocket technology, provided significant assistance in the reproduction and reconstruction of German designs – particularly in the first part of their time in the USSR. Several of their theoretical and experimental activities were used with the projecting of own models. As a result of the long separation from the modern achievements of science and technology, the work of the German specialists remained stationary at the old status and became progressively less effective. If now, as a matter of principle, new and modern rockets are to be created, they [the German specialists] can no longer provide any significant assistance."

The 66th CIC Group report states that in 1954, Groettrup fled to West Berlin, where it was eventually able to gain access to West Germany. Apparently, a fellow rocket expert named BAUM (not further identified) accompanied Groettrup on his escape to West Germany.

Another document, dated August 8, 1954, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence contains additional information. Apparently, Groettrup contacted Dr. Alfred Lotze, instructing Lotze to deliver a message to the wife of Ernest Stuhlinger (a German scientist working in the US). The message was given to Lotze was that Groettrup was willing to provide information on Soviet rocket development. Clearly Groettrup was in an excellent position to provide details on the Soviet program.

Helmuth Gröttrup was a witty, inventive engineer. In 1968, long after the Gorodomlia period, he filed a patent for one Card with integrated circuit; he was considered the inventor of the chip card, it will used for telephone, credit, check and patient card. He was from the German federal government incorporated as one of the great German Inventors.