Nuclear Threats - Korea / Truman in 1950, Eisenhower in 1953

On 29 October 1950, units of Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) (30 infantry and 4 artillery divisions) began to move into the DPRK. Together with the KPA formations, on October 25, 1950, in the Unzan and Khichen area, they attacked the American and South Korean forces on the move and threw them back 45-50 km. The third period of the war began, which lasted until July 10, 1951.

On November 23 General MacArthur had launched an assault on the Communist forces in Korea in an attempt to end the war. On November 28 he issued a special communiqué stating that the United Nations forces faced an "entirely new war" with an enemy force of 200,000 men, including a major segment of the Communist Chinese army.The Americans were shocked.

In this situation, the commander-in-chief of the UN coalition forces, General Douglas MacArthur, in messages to Washington insisted on taking decisive measures. This meant the use of nuclear weapons. The commander-in-chief was supported by the commander of the bomber aviation, General O'Donnell and the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, General Vanderberg.

They urged the president to start atomic bombing of China. On November 30, 1950, at a press conference, , the following exchange occurred:

“The President: We will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military situation, just as we always have.

[12.] Q. Will that include the atomic bomb?

The President: That includes every weapon that we have.

Q. Mr. President, you said ‘every weapon that we have.’ Does that mean that there is active consideration of the use of the atomic bomb?

The President: There has always been active consideration of its use. I don’t want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression. That happens when it is used.”

Later on the same day, the White House issued the following press release:

“The President wants to make it certain that there is no misinterpretation of his answers to questions at his press conference today about the use of the atom bomb. Naturally, there has been consideration of this subject since the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea, just as there is consideration of the use of all military weapons whenever our forces are in combat.

“Consideration of the use of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that weapon.

“However, it should be emphasized, that, by law, only the President can authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no such authorization has been given. If and when such authorization should be given, the military commander in the field would have charge of the tactical delivery of the weapon.

“In brief, the replies to the questions at today’s press conference do not represent any change in this situation.”

The commander of the US Strategic Air Force, General Power, these days was ready to carry out the decision to use atomic bombs. In recent years, the details of American "atomic" options in relation to China and North Korea have become known. So, in particular, the possibility of using six atomic bombs was considered during the period from 27 to 29 December in the Pyeongsan, Chorwon, Kimkhwa areas. The goal is the destruction of the combined group of the KPA and Chinese People's Volunteers, with an approximate number of up to 100 thousand people. Then the option of using six 30-kiloton bombs against Chinese troops north of the river was discussed. Imjingan. The Americans intended to use two more 40-kiloton bombs on January 7 and 8, 1951, in the Chonju area with the aim of destroying up to 10 thousand Chinese.

However, the American president did not dare to take this step. According to the famous American historian and political scientist Bernard Brody, there were several reasons why Washington did not dare to use atomic weapons. First, the US nuclear arsenal was relatively limited. To the beginningkorean warthe Americans have accumulated about 300 atomic bombs. This was barely enough to cover the European theater of operations in the event of a war.with the Soviet Union. Secondly, the OKNS and the presidential administration as a whole shared the point of view of General Curtis Lemai, the commander of the US Strategic Air Command, that the use of atomic weapons is justified in strategic bombing, in the event of the US entering a global war.... Korea is not the object of American interests, for the sake of which one can take the risk of unleashing a third world war.... Third, the idea of ??using atomic weapons in Korea has provoked strong opposition from the UK.

Thus, the American president was stopped not by humane considerations that were widely advertised in the West, but by fears of unpredictability of the consequences and a negative reaction from the world community.

General Omar Bradley, the former chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke even more openly on this topic in a radio speech on June 24, 1960. He explained that MacArthur's position was fraught with dangers, since Washington knew that the Soviet Union had atomic bombs and had a mutual assistance agreement with China, and Moscow had issued a public warning to the United States. According to Bradley, Washington believed that if the United States subjected China to an atomic bombing, the Soviet Union would drop atomic bombs in the rear of American troops in Korea. which will lead to the destruction of US transshipment bases in Busan and elsewhere.

The new Republican administration which came to power in January 1953 was equally, if not more, cautious than the previous one. The Soviet nuclear arsenal was growing and there remained a lack of forward-deployed atomic weapons. Neither Eisenhower nor Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had turned general ideas into a plan for ending the war in Korea. Although they met with the deposed MacArthur, they would not endorse his strategy of escalation. When he visited Korea, the President did not discuss nuclear war plans: The danger of a split in the Republican Party and the fragility of alliances necessitated caution.

The ‘crisis’ began with attempts to force an armistice in Korea. Although the NSC discussed plans for nuclear war to force the enemy’s hand, Stalin’s death in March revived hopes of relaxation and negotiated settlement. On 30th March, Beijing signalled qualified acceptance of proposals for the voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war, until then the main sticking point in negotiations. At home, Eisenhower’s ‘honeymoon period’ gave him room for manoeuvre. The bureaucratic climate had also changed: When General Clark requested redeployment of atomic weapons across the Pacific, the JCS had refused.

Within the Pentagon itself, controversy raged, making difficult the development of concrete nuclear strategy. While the navy and air force thought nuclear bombing could force China’s hand in negotiations, the army remained confident of victory through conventional means. The JCS were happy to drag their feet, feeling that a political decision on the use of atomic weapons should precede a military one. When an NSC policy document on the matter emerged, the Army Chief of Staff loaded it with so many preconditions as to make tactical use of nuclear weapons practically impossible. At the State Department, Dulles held back from nuclear deployment out of deference to British allies, who were retreating from the idea of escalation. When on 28th April he was presented with documents on the transferral of atomic bombs to army custody, Eisenhower withheld his approval and returned the issue for further study.

In discussions, the president remarked that Washington “desperately” needed its European allies and rejected Nixon’s suggestion that a quick strike might be preferable to waiting for Soviet stockpile to swell. When on 20th May the NSC gave final consideration to nuclear contingency plans for Korea, he repeated Truman’s concern of a Soviet counter-strike against Japan, saying only that “if circumstances arose which would force the United States to an expanded effort in Korea,” the JCS plan, which required a year of preparation, was “most likely to achieve the objective we sought.” Non-nuclear diplomacy to end the war continued and no ultimatum was issued.

On 21st May Dulles met with Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi. Expecting his words to reach Beijing, he indicated that Washington would probably make a “stronger rather than a lesser military response if talks failed” but at the same time emphasised the American desire to end the fighting through negotiation. Approaches by Ambassador Bohlen to Molotov a day later were similarly conciliatory.

It was not until the eve of the armistice agreement that Eisenhower approved the transfer of nuclear weapons abroad. He received the proposal on 20th June, just as the release of prisoners in Korea had endangered the agreement. The request came less than twenty four hours after the NSC had considered how to respond to a build up of enemy forces and a possible last minute Chinese ground offensive. But although the President called for immediate marine reinforcements to Japan, the JCS no longer sought authority for use of the weapons and no hints were dropped about the move, which was as much the beginning of a longer-term strategy for nuclear deployment as a short-term measure: In the event, an armistice was agreed without recourse to nuclear coercion.

The Korean War ended as it began, with not a single American nuclear weapon deployed within usable distance of the fighting. But while Washington never came close to tactical use of atomic weapons, statesmen of both administrations used them as a negotiating tool. The Berlin crisis had provided a model for action: public hints of varying menace and the deployment abroad of nuclear bombers in various states of readiness. Policy was constrained by pressures at home, enemy escalation in the spring of 1951, reluctant allies, fear, a feeling that the nuclear advantage ought to be useful and a host of other factors.

The events of early 1951 were a genuine crisis. In comparison, the events of 1953 were mild. The nuclear threat always hovered in the background during negotiations. Deployments may have strengthened deterrence but never supported coercive diplomacy. Except in times of extreme danger, it was almost impossible to achieve consensus within the US administration on the use of nuclear weapons. Atomic bombs were cumbersome, both literally and figuratively, and were not the simple lever Dulles claimed them to be.