



House of Commons

Committees on Arms Export Controls

Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2014): Scrutiny of the Government's UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012, the Government's Quarterly Reports from October 2012 to September 2013, and the Government's policies on arms exports and international arms control issues

First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of Session 2014–15

Second Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee of Session 2014-15
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Volume III

Oral and additional written evidence

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The Committees on Arms Export Controls

The Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees are appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and any associated public bodies.

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Committee staff

The current staff of the Committees are Keith Neary (Clerk), Su Panchanathan (Committee Assistant), and Alex Paterson (Media Officer)

Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Committees on Arms Export Controls, House of Commons, Committee Office, Palace of Westminster, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6394; the Committees' email address is caeccom@parliament.uk

Contents

Oral evidence

Monday 4 November 2013

Roy Isbister, Team Leader, Small Arms and Transfer Controls, Saferworld, **Oliver Sprague**, Programme Director, Military Security and Police, Amnesty International UK, and **Martin Butcher**, Policy Adviser, Arms Campaign, Oxfam GB Ev w1

Mr David Hayes, Chairman of Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD), **Mrs Susan Griffiths**, Head of Export Control UK, MBDA UK Ltd, **Ms Bernadette Peers**, Compliance Manager, Strategic Shipping Company Ltd, and **Mr Michael J.V. Bell**, Export Controls Consultant

Wednesday 18 December 2013

Rt Hon. Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and President of the board of Trade, **Edward Bell**, Head of the Export Control Organisation, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, and **Chris Chew**, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Ev w22

Wednesday 8 January 2014

Rt Hon William Hague MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, **Richard Tauwhare**, Head of Arms Export Policy Department, and **James Paver**, Deputy Head of Arms Export Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev w49

Monday 7 April 2014

Rt Hon Peter Hain, MP Ev w68

Additional written evidence

1	Reprieve (AEC001)	Ev w75
2	Neil Cooper and Gerald Walther (AEC002)	Ev w78
3	Campaign Against Arms Trade (AEC003)	Ev w82
4	Privacy International (AEC004)	Ev w88
5	Export Group for Aerospace Defence (AEC005)	Ev w93
6	Bahrain Watch (AEC006)	Ev w96
7	UK Working Group (AEC007)	Ev w104
8	Anna Stavrianakis (AEC009)	Ev w137

Ministerial correspondence

Previous Ministerial correspondence from 11 July 2012 to 20 May 2013 can be found in Volume III of the Committees' previous Report, Session 2013–14 HC 205 at www.parliament.uk/caecom

Date	From	To	Subject	Evidence reference
19/06/2013	Chairman	David Cameron	Arms for Syrian opposition	EV w138
02/07/2013	William Hague	Chairman	Illegal arms shipments	EV w139
02/07/2013	Vince Cable	Chairman	Extant licences - validation of figures	EV w139
07/07/2013	Michael Fallon	Chairman	Arms for anti-piracy	EV w140
11/07/2013	William Hague	Chairman	Arms for Syrian opposition	EV w141
15/07/2013	William Hague	Chair of Public Accounts Committee	Giftng equipment to Syria	EV w142
30/07/2013	Vince Cable	Chairman	Pre-Government response - Egypt revocations, Transparency initiative, OGEL licences, Register of brokers	EV w145
22/08/2013	Chairman	William Hague	Balance of Competencies Review	EV w148
09/09/2013	Chairman	Vince Cable	Syria dual-use chemical exports	EV w148
10/09/2013	Vince Cable	Chairman	Syria, Egypt and DSEi update	EV w153
11/09/2013	Chairman	Vince Cable	Syria dual-use chemical exports	EV w155
12/09/2013	Chairman	William Hague	CAEC questions on Government Annual Report on Strategic Exports	EV w155
17/09/2013	William Hague	Chairman	Balance of Competencies Review	EV w162
04/10/2013	Vince Cable	Chairman	Syria dual-use chemical exports	EV w162
06/10/2013	William Hague	Chairman	Consolidated Criteria for arms exports	EV w172
11/10/2013	Vince Cable	Chairman	Syria dual-use chemical exports	EV w173
14/10/2013	Chairman	William Hague	CAEC not included in letter regarding arms exports to Syria	EV w173
21/10/2013	William Hague	Chairman	CAEC not included in letter regarding arms exports to Syria	EV w175
23/10/2013	Chairman	Vince Cable	Syria dual- use chemical exports - company names	EV w176
25/10/2013	Vince Cable	Chairman	Syria dual-use chemical exports - company names	EV w177

Date	From	To	Subject	Evidence reference
29/10/2013	William Hague	Chairman	CAEC questions on Government Annual Report	EV w177
25/11/2013	Chairman	Clerk of the House	Freedom of Information application	EV w191
28/11/2013	Clerk of the House	Chairman	Freedom of Information application	EV w191
02/12/2013	Michael Fallon	Chairman	CAEC Westminster Hall debate follow-up	EV w192
16/12/2013	Michael Fallon	Chairman	CAEC Westminster Hall debate follow-up	EV w194
06/01/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Prior to evidence session	EV w194
06/01/2014	William Hague & Vince Cable	Chairman	Government policy on internal repression and arms exports	EV w197
06/01/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Government policy on internal repression and arms exports	EV w197
20/01/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Syria dual-use chemical exports - company names	EV w199
03/02/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Syria dual-use chemical exports - company names	EV w199
13/02/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Balance of Competences report	EV w201
26/02/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Overseas Security and Justice Assistance and arms exports	EV w201
27/02/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Iran – Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	EV w202
06/03/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Syria dual-use chemical exports - company names	EV w203
11/03/2014	Hugh Robertson	Chairman	Evidence session	EV w204
11/03/2014	Chairman	Hugh Robertson	Evidence session	EV w205
20/03/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Iran – Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	EV w205
25/03/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Arms Trade Treaty	EV w206
26/03/2014	Hugh Robertson	Chairman	Evidence session	EV w206
02/04/2014	Chairman	Hugh Robertson	Evidence session	EV w207
03/04/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Arms Trade Treaty	EV w208
10/04/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Extant licences information request	EV w209
16/04/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Trade fair legal proceedings	EV w210
17/04/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Request for list of revoked licences	EV w211
17/04/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Priority Markets List	EV w211
17/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Balance of Competencies letter	EV w213
17/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Giftng equipment letter	EV w214
17/04/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty	EV w214
24/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	OECD & G4S	EV w215

Date	From	To	Subject	Evidence reference
24/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Government policy on internal repression and arms exports	EV w215
24/04/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Ukraine - suspended licences	EV w216
24/04/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Egypt - suspended licences	EV w216
24/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Russia - suspended licences	EV w217
24/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Syrian dual-use chemicals Declaration	EV w217
24/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Ukraine - sniper rifles	EV w220
24/04/2014	Chairman	Justine Greening	DFID and arms export controls	EV w221
27/04/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Balance of competencies and Syrian gifting letters	EV w222
28/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Barrel bombs	EV w222
28/04/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Consolidated Criteria for arms exports	EV w222
29/04/2014	Hugh Robertson	Chairman	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Report	EV w223
08/05/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Syrian dual-use chemicals Declaration	EV w235
08/05/2014	Alan Duncan	Chairman	DFID and arms export controls	EV w236
09/05/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Government policy on internal repression and arms exports	EV w236
09/05/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Kurdistan end-use certificates	EV w237
12/05/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Extant licences information request	EV w239
12/05/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	UAVs	EV w474
12/05/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Counter-piracy licences	EV w474
14/05/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Egypt, Ukraine and Russia suspended licences, Ukraine sniper rifles, OECD & G4S, Consolidated Criteria for arms exports	EV w474
19/05/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Barrel Bombs	EV w490
20/05/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Missing letters	EV w491
20/05/2014	Chairman	Justine Greening	Report response follow-up	EV w492
04/06/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Syrian dual-use chemicals Declaration	EV w492
06/06/2014	Alan Duncan	Chairman	DFID and arms export controls	EV w494
06/06/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	UAVs, anti-piracy, DSEi, revocations, UK-US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty	EV w499
12/6/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Revocations discrepancy	EV w505
19/6/2014	Michael Fallon	Chairman	ECO processing	EV w506
27/6/2014	Michael Fallon	Chairman	ECO processing	EV w507
30/06/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Revocations discrepancy	EV w508

Oral Evidence

Taken before the Committees on Arms Export Controls

on Monday 4 November 2013

Members present:

Sir John Stanley (Chair)

Sir Malcolm Bruce

Richard Burden

Katy Clark

Ann Clwyd

Mike Gapes

Ann McKechin

Sir Bob Russell

Bob Stewart

Chris White

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: **Roy Isbister**, Team Leader, Small Arms and Transfer Controls, Saferworld, **Oliver Sprague**, Programme Director, Military Security and Police, Amnesty International UK, and **Martin Butcher**, Policy Adviser, Arms Campaign, Oxfam GB, gave evidence.

Q1 Chair: Good afternoon, UK Working Group representatives. Welcome to you once again, Mr Isbister, Mr Sprague and Mr Butcher.

I am going to start with the Arms Trade Treaty. I put this question to you—it is in part quite a technical question, and, if you would find it helpful to come back and give a more detailed answer than you might be able to give off the cuff here, that would of course be entirely acceptable and welcome to the Committee. You will have seen that one of the questions that we put to the Government in our latest report was to ask what changes in primary legislation, secondary legislation and, indeed, in policy the Government would have to make to ensure that they were fully compliant with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty, which of course they have signed and are now in the process of ratifying. You will have seen the Government's response to that question in their White Paper reply to our Committee: their answer, in brief, is that they consider that no changes in primary legislation are required, that a very limited change in secondary legislation is required with regard to the ambit of the controls on arms brokering, and that no changes in policy are required. The question that I have for you is whether you consider that that is a correct response by the Government: that only one limited change is required in legislation and no change in policy to ensure full compliance by the British Government with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty.

Martin Butcher: We understand that, in addition to the changes on brokering, the Government are taking this opportunity to revise the consolidated criteria, in order to be fully

in line with the EU common position and the Arms Trade Treaty. We have not as yet had detailed discussions with the Foreign Office about that. So there is an additional change. We welcome the changes in the controls on brokering.

Olly, do you want to add something?

Oliver Sprague: We have yet to see the secondary legislation that is coming in, but our understanding is that they will be amending category B of the current brokering controls in order to be more in line with the ATT scope. That, for us, is a welcome step forward because it actually means that a greater number of category C goods will be moved to category B and will then be subject to full extraterritorial controls as well as those on transport and shipping. As I said, however, we have not yet seen the extent of those orders; this is only what we imagine to be the case from what we have been told.

There is another secondary benefit, which may not necessarily come forward in legislation but which I think would be helpful in terms of policy. It relates to issues of enforcement—not only trafficking and brokering controls, but arguably in tackling the brass-plate phenomenon, in that an operative provision in the implementation section of the ATT requires all Governments that are signatories to offer full co-operation in terms of legal and investigative help.

It has been a problem in the past—we have heard the argument before—that it has been difficult to prosecute or to enforce some of these controls because they involve overseas investigations, and it is difficult to get information. The ATT therefore has a built-in tool that will allow you to do that, because all signatory states will be required to co-operate in those matters. I can see a future benefit to the ATT in terms of the enforcement policy of UK controls in that respect.

Roy Isbister: In terms of primary legislation, I should have thought that probably no change has to be made, but there are two elements within the criteria section of the ATT that are slightly interesting when compared with UK and EU controls, and those relate to gender-based violence and transnational organised crime. It is arguable, but I think that there could be some revision of language to reflect more accurately what the Arms Trade Treaty says on those issues, but there is still a bit of a conversation going on, certainly at the EU level, on whether or not it should be changed.

Chair: Thank you. We come now to the DESi arms exhibition.

Q2 Ann McKechin: There is another DESi exhibition this year and another set of problems. We have had another example this year of companies being found to be promoting banned goods at the exhibition. As you will be aware, there have been calls to close the exhibition in its entirety. What do you think is the right balance to be struck in order to ensure that trade can exhibit legitimately while conforming to legislation on the promotion of banned goods?

Oliver Sprague: I would state here that the policy of Amnesty is one that is not opposed to a regulated arms trade. We do not take a position on whether an arms exhibition should be banned, but I would say that there is a long-standing track record of failure to comply and of companies promoting illegal or banned goods. In this case, it would be two companies, a French company and a Chinese company, prominently displaying such goods in product brochures. It was not something that was hidden from view; it should have been quite easy to spot. There are questions about whether the fair is able to operate within the law.

Certainly, I would say, yet again, that the enforcement of the controls has not been good enough. I think that serious questions need to be asked about how the fair is run in future.

We have put forward recommendations, but one of the things that should be pretty essential at the moment is that all product brochures should be screened in advance. A person whose responsibility is enforcement should be responsible for looking at all the promotional and display materials before they go live in the fair. I also think that this Committee should examine the memorandum of understanding between the company that hosts DESi and the Government. We have tended to see both camps—the company organising the fair and the Government—almost blaming each other or pointing to each other's policies as a way of showing how they are enforcing at the fair; but yet again, as at every exhibition since 2005, we have seen problems.

Q3 Ann McKechin: Do either of the other two witnesses want to add to that, or do you concur?

Roy Isbister: I agree with what Olly says, but one other issue that came up this year—a more fundamental issue in a way—is the way in which the fair brings certain buyers and certain sellers together. This year, there were eight or nine countries on the Foreign Office's human rights report list of the most problematic countries on human rights grounds that had delegations at the fair. They are potential buyers, and you are bringing them together with, for example, the chief Russian marketing organisation, at the same time as Russia is the main supplier to the Syrian regime, so it is operating in direct opposition to what the UK has described as its foreign policy goals. Bringing those two people together and creating a space for them to talk to each other about arms sales—I have a problem with that.

Q4 Ann McKechin: There is obviously an issue about sufficient punishment, but your suggestion, Oliver, is that there should be an enforced screening of all material before the exhibition starts. I presume that you are referring to this being a role for the Government to play rather than the organisers.

Oliver Sprague: Yes. Another point—this would cut across licensing but it is specifically relevant to DESi—is that, within normal licensing, a country's adherence to the relevant non-proliferation standards is central to whether they should be permitted destinations for certain licences. They take, for example, whether you are signed up to the Australia Group, whether you have signed up for the non-proliferation treaty regime and so on. There is a clear case for adding the Arms Trade Treaty to the list of relevant proliferation standards that Governments have to sign to make them eligible for certain more permissive licences. I think that non-signatory countries should not have the automatic right to display through an open licence.

Ann McKechin: One of the companies—it was stated to be a French company—would be covered, would be allowed in, but there is still the same problem about what they are trying to market. Thank you.

Chair: I want to turn now to the all-important issue of Syria.

Q5 Mike Gapes: You are well aware that the Government were instrumental, along with France, in getting the lifting of the European Union arms embargo on Syria towards the

end of last year and the early part of this year. Subsequently, however, it was decided, I think rightly, not to pursue the policy of supplying weapons into the Syrian civil war.

In your submission to us, you say that the supply of arms to any of the warring parties would be hard to justify under existing UK and EU legislation. Can you clarify whether that is subsequent to the lifting of the arms embargo? Even with the lifting of the arms embargo, it would be difficult to justify. If the UK Government were to supply lethal weaponry into the Syrian conflict to some element within the Syrian opposition, would that in your opinion be in line with abiding by the EU common position and the UK consolidated criteria, specifically 3 and 4?

Martin Butcher: While the process was ongoing for the lifting of the embargo, we were quite disappointed that the Government, at the same time as they were working hard to agree the Arms Trade Treaty and establish that global norm, were pushing to have the embargo on Syria lifted. We worked with some barristers to develop a legal opinion, which is reflected in the memorandum on Syria that we supplied to the Committee.

Yes, even after the embargo was lifted, the conclusion that we came to after going through the consolidated criteria point by point is that it is extremely hard to see how all of the hurdles set out in those criteria could be overcome to supply arms to any party in the conflict. There is the obvious risk of the diversion of arms. Even the groups that recognise the authority of General Idris and his supreme command work on the ground closely with a wide spread of other groups that do not—and on occasion even groups that are part of al-Qaeda. There are clear human rights concerns across a spread of opposition groups, although the Government are preponderant as a problem in that area.

There are other concerns and, yes, we have taken the position that, although we cannot say it is absolutely impossible to leap all those hurdles, in sum it is very difficult.

Q6 Mike Gapes: Given that there are 1,200 opposition groups apparently operating in Syria, it might be rather difficult to be clear about which ones were, if you like, reliable and which were not.

Martin Butcher: Absolutely, and the membership of the different brigades changes all the time. They are interchangeable, and the alliances that they form vary city by city. It is a very confused situation, and it shifts on a daily basis.

Q7 Mike Gapes: I now move on to the wider question that relates to something on which we have been in correspondence with the Government—in fact, the Chair has been in extensive correspondence with the Secretary of State for Business—which is the decision taken in January 2012, when the civil war was intensifying, to issue two licences for chemicals that are precursors for the production of sarin to a country that was known, but was not at the time admitting, to be a holder of chemical weapon stockpiles. The country was not at the time a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention and therefore not subject to the rules of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Do you have any comment to make on that? Do you have any view on whether a proper risk assessment was carried out?

Oliver Sprague: Of course, we are aware of the correspondence that we are currently having with BIS on this issue. It is also worth stating that, as you are probably aware, although the chemicals in question might be precursors for chemical agents, they are also fairly standard chemicals that have a wide variety of industrial uses. The reason why they are on a

control list is that they fall within the Australia Group's list of proscribed chemicals. What that should have done is trigger a detailed and thorough risk assessment. Being a member of the Australia Group, there is a whole set of additional export control factors that you are supposed to apply in these cases. A lot of that is intelligence led, but basically you have to check the end use; given the nature of these chemicals, you have to be pretty sure that they are going to the right place.

Given the sensitivities of this case, for obvious reasons the onus is now on the Government to show their workings in this area. For example, I would want to see how they applied those criteria and what risk assessments they made—and in some detail. We would want to know what the companies were, who the end users were, what the quantities were, how sure they were that they were for use in health care, toothpaste, aluminium window-frame manufacture and so on. It is not good enough, in this particular incidence, to say that we applied the criteria and we are sure that nothing went wrong. You have to see that those criteria were applied and that nothing untoward went wrong.

Chair: We are going to turn now to the Arab Spring, and the Government's arms export policy review, which took place after the Arab Spring commenced.

Q8 Richard Burden: When we questioned the Foreign Secretary about the policy review, we asked him what had changed. His response—I paraphrase—was basically, “Well, the controls are much the same, but we are implementing them in a much more robust fashion.” In your evidence to this inquiry, you say that there has been little change in practice and that the tendency of the Government is to react to events after they have happened, rather than to look ahead and evaluate risks. You are also concerned that undertakings to improve transparency in strategic exports have been abandoned. We are going to come on to transparency a little later, but on the first of those issues, how has the review been operating in practice? Has much changed?

Roy Isbister: We do not get to see inside the licensing process, so we start from the position of there being an element of ignorance. All that we can go on is the figures of what has been exported.

Looking at the MENA region as a whole, there is little indication that there has been a change in the pattern of exports. I have some figures showing, for example, that licences to the MENA region as a proportion of total licences issued increased from 9.5% in 2008 to 30% in 2012, and that, by value, arms licences—SIELS—to the Middle East were over 50% of total arms exports in 2012. That first cut opens up some questions.

Using Egypt as an example, and drawing on the work of the Committee and the information that it revealed in its report earlier this year, we struggle to understand how that policy is working in Egypt. If you were going to argue in 2011 that you could not see it—that is, what happened—coming, we could argue about whether it was a valid argument, but it is very difficult to make that argument in 2013. We were certainly arguing for a tight policy on exports to countries such as Egypt. When the level of civil disturbance lifted again, we saw the Government start by revoking five licences. More than a month later, and only after an EU Council conclusion, the Government suspended 48—it turned out to be 47—more licences. It is a slow way of operating. Again, we are not sure why those licences were issued in the first place.

There have been a couple of other issues around that, so we have been trying to find out. It would be helpful in cases like this, if the Government think that there is a big enough change to provoke this response, if they not only gave the number of licences being refused, suspended or revoked, but said what is still licensed for transfer to Egypt. We understand that nothing was being licensed to the army, the air force or the Ministry of the Interior, but quite a number of open licences were never suspended. Open licences do not name the permitted end user, so how did the Government know that this equipment was not going to those end users?

We see now that some of those suspended licences—around half of them—have been opened up again. What has changed in Egypt to give the Government the extra confidence that this is appropriate? Looking at Egypt as an example, there are a lot of unanswered questions, and we would like much more detail about how the Government are operating their export policy.

Q9 Richard Burden: Do you think that the Government have their priorities right?

Roy Isbister: Would you elaborate slightly?

Richard Burden: In your submission, you indicated that, in view of their record, to which you alluded, the Government may be sending the wrong signals about priorities. Would you elaborate a little? What do you think those signals are, and what would be the right signals?

Roy Isbister: This links into the notion of joined-up Government. There are a number of areas where the Government state with some vigour that they apply one of the tightest export licensing regimes in the world and that they apply the criteria very tightly. At the same time, these Committees have drawn attention to the apparent disconnect between the Foreign Office's human rights report and the licensing policy.

The UKTI's priority countries for arms exports include six or seven countries in the MENA region, including Libya, which is perhaps the most obvious example. In a number of areas, it feels that the signals coming from some parts of Government are very different from the signals that we receive—the rhetorical statements about the application of licensing policy here. Again, at DESi we had the highest levels of Government making a strong case for defence exports being such a crucial component of the UK economy, saying that a high level of exports was important and necessary for the UK to be seen as being on the leader board. There are certainly questions to be asked about priorities.

Chair: We continue with the middle east and arms export policy.

Q10 Ann Clwyd: I, too, want to ask about the export of components for chemical weapons. In July 2011, DFID, the FCO and the MOD published “Building Stability Overseas Strategy”. In it, the Foreign Secretary stated that the strategy was “built on the insight that stability can only be achieved when a society has the strong and legitimate institutions it needs to manage tensions peacefully.” Do you think that the present arms export policy coincides with that statement? Obviously not.

Roy Isbister: Again, that is part of the whole joined-up Government side of things. If there is a real commitment to that approach to building stability overseas, it should be reflected in export licensing policy. To come back to the earlier point, and looking across our export licensing policy to the MENA region, where there are clear issues of stability and governance, that does not fit perfectly together.

Martin Butcher: On Libya in particular, which is a priority country for export, we have a situation where the militia linked to one part of the Government recently kidnapped the Prime Minister. The Government cannot assure security even for high officials in its own capital. Militias linked to the Government in the eastern part of the country are refusing to recognise the authority of the Government in the west. An ongoing situation that has lasted since the overthrow of Gaddafi, with Libya as a prominent source of black-market arms across the Sahel, is contributing to the problems in Mali. It rather seems that a number of measures would be needed to assist in building up the governance of Libya, and they need to be carried out before thinking about it being a priority market for arms.

Oliver Sprague: It is also certainly the case that if you apply the policy and logic behind “Building Stability Overseas Strategy”, especially the focus on building institutions’ capacity and governance reforms, that in itself means that you need a system to develop that has proper control over the army and security services. If you applied that logic back to before the Arab Spring crisis, many UK export licences to some of those countries would not have gone ahead. We have talked about Egypt, but if you apply those lessons—the need to ensure that you have proper accountability over the way that the security forces operate, over their command and control structures, and how they investigate breaches and hold people to account—they fail on all of those counts.

Only yesterday, the same day that President Morsi was on trial, the Government announced that they were overruling another 23 or 24 suspensions for Egypt. As far as Amnesty is aware, none of the perpetrators of the unlawful killings, the civil unrest, the response to that civil unrest or the brutal crackdowns that took place over the summer, especially in recent weeks—none of the perpetrators—has been held to account or even started to be investigated. It seems entirely the wrong signal to start revoking suspensions and putting arms export licences back into operation before those things have happened.

Q11 Ann Clwyd: May I ask a quick question about the export of components for chemical weapons? After the Iraq war, some firms were found to have illegally sold components in this country, but there have been very few prosecutions here compared, for example, with Germany. Do you think that it would sharpen people’s minds if there were more prosecutions in the UK?

Roy Isbister: Is that the first Iraq war or the second?

Ann Clwyd: The first and the second.

Roy Isbister: We have argued as a group for a number of years that a more robust approach needs to be taken to enforcement. To be fair to the Government, we have seen prosecutions—not for chemical weapons, that I am aware of, but certainly for the illegal export or brokering of conventional arms. That represents a positive shift over the previous approach of disruption, for the obvious example that it sets. Things are better than they used to be, but that is not to say that they could not be better.

Chair: Following their Arab Spring policy review, the Government set great store by the introduction of their new export licence suspension mechanism. As you know, the Committee has questioned the adequacy of that. May we now turn to that issue?

Q12 Chris White: With reference to the situation in Mali in 2012 and other similar experiences, why do you think the strategic export licence suspension mechanism has been ineffective? Perhaps more importantly, how do you think it could be improved?

Oliver Sprague: As the UK Working Group, we have serious concerns about how the licence suspension mechanism is going to work. When we had initial discussions about it, it was meant to be an early warning system. It was meant to put an immediate freeze on deteriorating situations where it was impossible to ascertain proper risk assessment in licensing. It was supposed to be very much an early warning mechanism. It was not used in Mali, and it was used in Egypt only when, as far as we were concerned, it had already reached crisis point. It was not an early warning mechanism at all. It was imposed after the situation had already deteriorated to a pretty serious extent.

I guess that that is not the only concern that we have with it. We question the logic of applying suspension only to pending licence applications. We think that that is a fundamental flaw. If you are going to suspend licensing, you should be suspending arms transfers, not just licensing. If there are pending shipments or extant licences, then you must have the ability to suspend those as well. To focus only on licence applications makes it entirely possible that a shipment to an end user who is already licensed will go ahead, even though a pending licence application to the same end user is subject to suspension.

Roy Isbister: May I build on that? The only case that we are aware of where the suspension mechanism has been applied is Egypt. In that case, it seems that it has been applied to extant licences, which is not how it was explained to us; it also took a long time. As I said, five licences were revoked on 19 July, but the actual suspensions did not take place until 28 August. That is a pretty slow early warning mechanism.

It has been quite confused since then. It was applied in a way that seems different from the message that we were given. There is also the change that Olly mentioned, with approximately 24 licences being unsuspending in the last couple of days. If you look at the notice to exporters, it says that the suspension mechanism has been modified. I shall quote from it, if I may. It states that we have “agreed to modify the way the suspension is applied. In future we will not adopt a blanket approach to the Egyptian organisations listed in paragraph (1) but consider each extant licence and new licence application on its merits.” As far as I can see, that is a standard licensing policy. I do not understand how it is a suspension mechanism, but apparently the mechanism has been modified, not stopped. I do not understand how the Government are operating.

Q13 Chris White: Just to clarify, do you think that this is a timing problem, or do you think that, in terms of a mechanism being triggered, the bar is being set too high?

Roy Isbister: It is probably both, as far as we can see. As I said, it feels confused as to how it is supposed to be applied and when.

Q14 Chris White: What is your advice as to how it could be improved?

Oliver Sprague: Use it as it was intended, which is as an early warning mechanism. It was needed because it was argued that to revoke licences was quite a problematic process—that you had to cancel a licence and then go through the entire process of reapplying for the licence even if the decision to cancel it was, in hindsight, slightly ill-judged.

The idea of a suspension mechanism, where you would put a temporary freeze on something while a situation was developing and unfolding, and answers were being sought, seems to be inherently sensible, so our advice would be to use it as it was originally intended: to lower the threshold for it being used; to use it when situations are deteriorating, and information about the conduct of the security forces is questionable or unknown; and to apply it to all of the transfer process. Apply it not only to pending licence applications but to extant licences and pending deliveries.

Q15 Chair: Would you agree that the fundamental frailty of resting policy on a suspension mechanism is that, once the goods have been shipped, the UK Government have effectively lost any control over them? I use the phrase “once the bullets have bolted, that is the end of the story”. Does not that indicate that the really crucial decision, as has been highlighted by the Committee in successive reports, is the original decision as to whether you export a particular group of goods to a particular country or not?

Roy Isbister: Absolutely. As I have said before, and using Egypt as an example, the first question is why so many licences have been issued over the last couple of years, when the situation was so bad in 2011. You could ask any number of experts and they would all advise extreme caution.

Martin Butcher: May I just add quickly to that? Mali has been mentioned, which is a good example. There is a rising number of credible reports, although still at a fairly low level, of the Malian army, as it moves north, behaving in a fairly bad way towards Tuareg herders and some of the nomadic communities in the north of Mali, and people are now fleeing to Mauritania, for example. At the moment, it is still at a fairly low level, it would seem. Without looking it up, I do not know what, if any, extant licences there are from this country for Mali, but a political signal could be sent at this point to the Malian Government to get their soldiers under control by suspending licences now, while things are still at a fairly low level.

Chair: I want to move on now to goods that can be used for internal repression.

Q16 Chris White: You state that you believe that there are additional items that could be used for internal repression which should also be incorporated into UK and EU lists. You have been critical of the Government’s actions with regard to restrictive measures for equipment that could be used for internal repression. In this instance, where do you think the Government have gone wrong—and, again, what do you think they could do better?

Oliver Sprague: There are a number of issues that we should touch upon here. The first thing to say is that the idea of an enhanced list of goods that could be used for internal repression being subject to export control is a good one and one that we support. There is a conversation to be had with the Government about what that range of equipment is.

One of the issues that we have—you might want to ask the defence industry representatives about this as well—is that many of the items that the UK has on its additional list of goods that could be used for internal repression do not currently appear on any export control list. It is full of examples, and I shall quote from it. They include: “Fire-arms, ammunition and related accessories...not controlled by the Common Military List”, “Explosive substances and related equipment...not controlled by the Common Military List”, and “military knives and combat knives with blade lengths in excess of 10 cm”. At the

moment, as far as I can tell, none of those items currently appears on any export control list, so how are the Government outreaching to companies that might be making and exporting those goods, as they would never have fallen within the licensing system in the first place? Do companies that are making military combat knives or knives with a blade in excess of 10 cm now know that those products are subject to control in certain circumstances? I don't know.

Q17 Chris White: Are you suggesting that there is a problem of awareness?

Oliver Sprague: I would want to know how companies have been made aware of these new restrictions, because they would never have been subject to licensing requirements in the first place.

The other point is that there are some notable exclusions from that list, things that groups like Amnesty would like to see included. A whole variety of policing equipment—handcuffs and restraints, specialist batons and police whips—seems to be missing from the list and should be included. When Governments start identifying targets for state repression, the first thing that they look to is surveillance technology, image processing and phone surveillance, stuff that is used to intercept e-mails, face-recognition software—all those kinds of equipment, which are the first sign that a Government wish to crack down on their own civilians, are missing from the list. There is a conversation to be had there about making sure that that equipment, too, is captured.

The idea of having an expanded list of goods that could be used for internal repression is a good one. It is not something that we are opposed to.

Chair: The Government, as you know, have made a great deal of what they term their transparency initiative in this area, and we have some questions on that.

Q18 Ann Clwyd: Given the reduced amount of information that will be available about open licences, and the fact that the Government are now going to publish it annually instead of quarterly, and obviously with greatly reduced content in that information, how valuable is this going to be?

Roy Isbister: We need to be very clear in the first instance that there is not going to be a reduction in transparency but that the improvements that were promised in transparency are not going to happen. We are very disappointed by the outcome of this whole process and by the way that the process has been managed. When the Government announced their intention, they held a formal public consultation process. Approximately 100 industry representatives responded to that consultation, and to a large extent they announced themselves content with what was proposed, saying that it was manageable and so on.

That was in July last year. As recently as May, it was announced that this was still planned but that, because of teething issues and IT issues, there was to be a three-month delay. We met the Government on 11 July and were told that everything was fine and still going ahead. There was a hint on 18 July that not all was well, when the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills said that we are looking at the quarterly versus annual reporting issue, but then we were hit with the bombshell on 31 July that all bets were off. We do not understand how this happened. A follow-up freedom of information request was tabled by Action on Armed Violence, which asked an exploratory question about what

further contact there had been with industry on this subject, and the answer was that the records had been searched and that there was no record of correspondence or e-mails on this.

What has happened? Why has the change been announced? We are told in one of the notices to exporters that there had been some indications from industry that this was more burdensome than they had wanted, but what was the process by which this happened? A transparent process was producing a significant improvement in transparency, but the process disappeared behind closed doors and, all of a sudden, the transparency of the outcome has disappeared. We would like to know why.

It is also worth mentioning that the information that would be entering the public domain is basic to standard inventory control, so it is not that industry would not have this information. It is required to make it available to the Government in the event of an audit, so it is hard to understand where things have gone wrong. We would welcome an explanation.

Chair: We now want to turn to some quite extraordinary and surprising information that we have been highlighting in relation to the particular scale of export licence shipments granted to private security companies, supposedly for anti-piracy.

Q19 Mike Gapes: Can we look at the overall situation? We have statistics on the export of various things, including 24,000 assault rifles, 2,700 combat shotguns, 9,000 rifles, 1,000 sniper rifles and 3,000 sporting guns, which have been exported supposedly under the heading of anti-piracy. That includes the export of assault rifles to Sri Lanka. Given the concerns that we have about human rights situations in a number of the countries on the list—another is Maldives, where there has been a coup, which has been contested and the situation has been difficult since then—is it possible that these numbers conceal the fact that some of the weapons might have been diverted to purposes other than anti-piracy?

Oliver Sprague: It is worth stating here that it is not just the SIELs that you need to be looking at; there is also an open general export licence for the supply of ML1 and ML2 for anti-piracy operations. I am unaware of the reporting requirements for OGELs, but I imagine that the figures do not appear in any of the annual reports. The last time I looked, over 85 UK private military security companies had registered to use the open general licence.

As a general rule, we would be opposed to the idea that you could have an open general licence to allow the transfer of assault rifles and combat shotguns for private military security companies operating overseas. It seems to be a very lax licensing regime for those sorts of activities, not least because we have long-standing concerns about the conduct of private military security companies operating overseas stemming from real concerns about accountability and oversight. We have seen from numerous examples, not just relating to anti-piracy, that there is an accountability gap. When things go wrong, what legal recourse is available to ensure that the perpetrators of atrocities are held to account?

You have a situation in the UK where you have a proliferation of over 80 companies working in the realms of private security provision overseas. What happens if there is an incident in international territorial waters? Who is going to be responsible for the outcome? What level of human rights training, combat training, do these individuals have? It seems to us that the only eligibility requirement at the moment for these licences is that you need to be signed up to the international voluntary code of conduct on private military companies.

We have long argued that a voluntary regulatory approach to something as serious as the provision of private and military security companies is wholly inadequate and that we

need a legal framework and a licensing system. In general terms, we are concerned about the proliferation of the huge number of small arms and light weapons and their related ammunition for private military companies engaged in anti-piracy. That is not to say that we do not acknowledge that piracy is a big problem, but we have long-standing concerns about the conduct and accountability of private military companies.

Q20 Sir Malcolm Bruce: To follow that up, if you look at the countries, what we would expect is a bit variable. Do you have any idea to whom these are being supplied? I know that it is a small place, but 12 rifles for the Seychelles, which is very much in the area, does not seem very much if they are engaged in it. Who is buying them?

As you have said, given that we are trying to restrict small arms distribution, is there not a danger that the genuine concern about piracy, and the alarms and incidents that have happened, could nevertheless be a kind of cover for saying, “Let’s get some more weapons out there”? What information do you have to suggest that the way that these have been licensed and to whom they are being licensed is being properly tracked?

Oliver Sprague: I go back to talking about the risks of the system. At the moment, we have no specific evidence of large-scale diversions taking place or of weapons being secured in unsafe facilities. The point is that we are supposed to have some of the strictest and most robust controls possible for the export of small arms and light weapons overseas, but it seems that, for anti-piracy, those rules are thrown out of the window. It seems to us that, as long as you say that it is for anti-piracy, you are going to be given a licence. The requirement on you to prove that you are going to use them responsibly is that you adhere to some notional voluntary code of conduct, but who scrutinises the application of that code of conduct? We don’t believe that a voluntary code of conduct is sufficient to regulate private military companies, and we certainly do not think that light-touch licences should be allowed so easily.

Roy Isbister: To add to that, we do not know where they are going, but that links back to the transparency review and Olly’s point on the open general licence. We have no knowledge, and as far as I can tell the Government do not collect information about it, on the scale of small arms exports for anti-piracy operations that take place under the open general licence. That is what the transparency review originally said would be the case—that we would be told at least what the quantities and the nature of the equipment exported under open general licence would be, but we do not have any information on that.

Q21 Sir Malcolm Bruce: Something in excess of 40,000 guns have been licensed, and we do not know where they are going or who is using them. You are saying that we should do something about it.

Roy Isbister: That is 40,000 under the standard licence. We do not know how many have gone under the open general licence.

Oliver Sprague: It is certainly the case that the current reporting requirements on the open general anti-piracy licence fall well below the international standards to which the UK Government subscribe. The international marking and tracing regime for small arms and light weapons, of which the UK was a big supporter, has a requirement to keep records for 20 years. The ATT says that records for small arms exports must be kept for a mandatory 10 years. The reporting requirement on the OGEL is that companies are required to keep records for only four years, which is five times less than under the international agreement that we

have signed up to, and it is clearly at odds with requirements under the ATT. We simply do not know what is being exported under those licences.

Chair: Thank you. We have time for one last short question about cluster munitions.

Q22 Mike Gapes: In your submission to us, you expressed concern that the Government have gone back on a commitment to end indirect investment in the financing of cluster munition producers from this country. Will you clarify why you think that that is? How can we ensure that, as well as the direct financing, which is stopped, indirect financing is not being promoted from this country?

Oliver Sprague: Let me go back to the passage of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010, which was initiated in the House of Lords. The previous Government committed themselves to developing with civil society and financial institutions a voluntary code of conduct to end the practice of indirect financing of cluster munitions. When in Opposition, the current Government tabled a specific amendment in the House of Lords to ensure that indirect financing was captured under the terms of the Act. They withdrew that amendment because agreement was reached on a ministerial statement on the need to develop a voluntary code of conduct. In other words, when it was announced that a voluntary code of conduct would be developed and that the Government would seek to work with civil society and the industry to develop that, the amendment was withdrawn.

All parties at the time recognised that indirect finance was a problem that needed to be tackled, and we remain disappointed that the current Government have not honoured that commitment and have left it up to the banks to develop their own code of conduct. I have met representatives of a number of high street banks—a month ago, I was in the offices of a very large household name that has revised and strengthened its policy, and its message to me was simple. The banks are crying out for the Government to get together with all the financial institutions and civil society NGOs to start the process, because they think that developing policies in these tricky areas in isolation is not helpful. What is needed is everybody to get together, because each financial institution will have a different set of problems that it needs to address, as it is a complicated area.

In the first instance, what we continue to call for is simply the setting up a meeting of all the relevant parties, so that we can at least thrash out some of these issues. All the banks support it, and all civil society NGOs working on it think that it is a good idea.

Q23 Mike Gapes: Which is the lead Government Department? Which Department is causing the problem?

Oliver Sprague: It falls within the remit of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, because it is dealing with international treaties. I expect that it also touches on areas of finance and banking reform, so the Treasury may well be involved. Specifically, the lead Department is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Chair: Mr Isbister, Mr Sprague and Mr Butcher, thank you very much indeed. We are grateful to you for your evidence, and also for your written evidence. Thank you so much.

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: **Mr David Hayes**, Chairman of Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD), **Mrs Susan Griffiths**, Head of Export Control UK, MBDA UK Ltd, **Ms Bernadette Peers**,

Compliance Manager, Strategic Shipping Company Ltd, and **Mr Michael J.V. Bell**, Export Controls Consultant, gave evidence.

Q24 Chair: Good afternoon David Hayes, Susan Griffiths, Ms Bernadette Peers and Michael Bell. We are very glad to see EGAD again. We thank you also for your written evidence to us before this session.

I would like to start with a broad question about the Export Control Organisation. From where you sit, from the business standpoint, do you believe that ECO is producing a gradually improving service for you, or a gradually deteriorating service, or is it much the same service as before? What is the direction of travel?

David Hayes: It is difficult to say what the direction of travel is. It is clear to most people that the organisation is operating under serious constraints at the moment.

Q25 Chair: Do you mean financial restraints?

David Hayes: Ultimately, yes—both financial and resource constraints driven by the financial constraints. It also has to react to issues such as the Arab Spring within existing resources, and that necessarily has an impact on the day-to-day licensing processing and the resources available for day-to-day running when unexpected issues arise, but that is true of all departments in all circumstances.

It is clear, as I say, that the organisation itself is struggling at the moment. It is endeavouring to deal with that in a number of ways, one of which is a proposal that we move further towards the use of open licensing in an effort to reduce the number of standard individual export licences. This type of initiative may help, but only time will tell how successful that is in achieving its objective in the broader sense.

Q26 Chair: Do any others want to comment on how they perceive ECO and its direction of travel? Is it getting better for you, getting worse or staying the same?

Okay, let us move on. I come back to trade exhibitions. What is your view as to the performance of DSEi on trade exhibitions? I would expect you to say that you are embarrassed because it can reflect poorly on the arms export industry generally if things are found in those exhibitions that should not be there, but what is your view on the utility of these exhibitions as far as you are concerned?

David Hayes: The utility of the exhibitions is a commercial matter. If they were not of use to the industry and not of benefit to the industry overall, then market forces would dictate that they no longer happened. The fact that they continue to happen is presumably a demonstration to the contrary—that they are of use to the industry. There are incidents at these fairs and exhibitions that should not happen, and it would help, when these incidents do happen, if there was perhaps a little more transparency around what happened and precisely how it was dealt with, and what was happening to the individual companies involved.

To set this in context, DSEi happens in a very tightly regulated environment. There are countries in which similar events happen without a fraction of the control that is exercised over them in the UK. The fact that every now and again companies step out of line is clearly something that we do not wish to tolerate, but some greater transparency for all of us around what actually happens when these transgressions are identified would be helpful.

Chair: We want now to turn to the issue of transparency. The Government set much store by it, but on some aspects it is not at all clear to us whether transparency has increased or is reducing.

Q27 Mike Gapes: The Government recently increased the reporting period for open licences from quarterly to annually; they also dropped the requirement for companies to provide descriptions of goods shipped or their ratings. Did the Government consult your organisation, or your individual members, before they took this decision?

David Hayes: We took part in the consultation more broadly. Did they specifically consult us on the plans to change the reporting period from quarterly to annually? No, not that I am aware of.

Q28 Mike Gapes: You were not in a position to give them any advice, because they did not indicate to you that they were going to do it.

Susan Griffiths: The only thing that we took part in was that a number of companies, through EGAD, took part in some user acceptance testing on the Spire system prior to that. There were a number of things about which we went back to ECO using the tool—about not meeting the requirements and not being able to report accurately as it had asked—but at no stage was it proposed to us that these things would change.

Q29 Mike Gapes: Do you believe that the new arrangements will be helpful to parliamentary and public scrutiny, or will they reduce it?

David Hayes: They would reduce it in the sense that the more data you have to process, the easier it is to lose things in the midst of those data. The data that were going to come out of the system focused largely on the use of licences, the scope of which was already entirely in the public domain. For the most part, the data in relation to exports under those licences were already in the possession of the Government, so there was a repetition in data collection, certainly for any exports going outside the EU, which ran counter to the red tape challenge.

The licences themselves, particularly open general export licences, are already published in full on the internet, and their scope is entirely around very low risk exports. It would not be logical to anticipate people having particular issues with exports that were within the scope of those licences, and, if they were, then the problem would surely be around the scope of the licence and not the number of occasions on which the licences had been used.

Q30 Mike Gapes: The Export Control Organisation has improved its processing of single export licences to 71% within 20 working days and 95% within 60 days. However, the processing of appeals has declined to 23% within 20 days against a target of 60%, and to 60% within 60 working days against a target of 95%. Does it concern you that this appeal time scale has deteriorated, and how can the Export Control Organisation improve its processing of appeals?

David Hayes: The answer to that has to be yes, although the number of appeals taken as an absolute figure is low anyway. It comes back to the original question of resource. With a defined amount of resource, you can only do a certain number of things. If you increase the

focus on one of those things, you necessarily have to remove some of the focus from one of the other activities. That is the price that we pay for the constrained environment.

Q31 Sir Malcolm Bruce: I have a quick question on the change in the licence. How can greater transparency be achieved cost-effectively? It seems to me that you are saying that the system was cumbersome, that the cost falls on you and that the Government have the information anyway, but that changing the licensing term from quarterly to annually nevertheless gives the impression that we are lowering the visibility of what is going on, rightly or wrongly. How can you make this change in ways that reassure the public that the information is just as available, and that it is cost-effective?

There is an argument that the industry needs to be part of the process of reassurance, but you seem to be implying that the Government should be responsible and that the Government should pay. Should it not be at least a joint effort?

David Hayes: I am not implying that the industry should not play a role in this. I am implying that industry should not be asked to provide the same information twice, which was the case with many of the requirements under the transparency initiative. There are other ways in which this information could be compiled. For example, the point was made that a lot of this information already exists in companies anyway, in preparation for audit. Yes, it does, and, if we could find a way in which the information could be collated without putting in place a completely new, repetitive and duplicative system, that would be a cost-effective means of doing it.

Companies have to collect the information, and they have to provide it to the ECO in questionnaires in advance of compliance visits. One solution may be to extract the information that has already been provided in previous questionnaires—not all of it obviously, but extracting those parts of the data that are required for the transparency initiative—and publishing it in some form, perhaps in the annual report.

Q32 Sir Malcolm Bruce: I guess that that would be helpful. This Committee obviously prides itself on getting information out of the Government, which quite often is like drawing teeth. The more proactive the system, the more reassurance everybody has. I suggest that the industry has as much interest in assuring the public as the Government do.

Bernadette Peers: The industry certainly feels that it has a role to play and is quite happy and content to provide the information, which of course it does at a compliance visit. What companies object to is that they have to provide it for compliance audits and provide it when they try to make an export, so the information is already being given twice, and they are now being asked to supply it a third time in the transparency initiative. If there was some give, so that we had to give the information once or perhaps twice and that was it, I think that the industry would be content.

Q33 Sir Malcolm Bruce: I am sure that a clever computer programmer could solve that problem.

Bernadette Peers: That is resource again.

Q34 Chair: We turn now to the website issue, which we have dealt with before. When you came before us last year, you were concerned about the Government's

introduction of the gov.uk website to replace the existing ECO website. In the light of experience so far, do you think that your concerns were justified, or do you feel that they have been allayed by the way in which the Government website is now operating?

David Hayes: A little of both. Now that we have had experience of it, there is a lot of information in there, and much of it is valuable. Unfortunately, the downside is that it is very difficult to find the information. It is difficult for us, as seasoned practitioners, to find the information, so for people who need it more than we do, because they are new to the compliance world and are desperately trying to find a source of help, it has to be said that it is not particularly user-friendly.

Susan Griffiths: I second that. As David says, when you are used to using it on a regular basis you become familiar with it and can find a way around it and navigate it. Some time ago, they had something like an A to Z on the website that was extremely useful, and new exporters could find the information readily and easily. If they were to go back to something like that, just as an example, it would help enormously.

Q35 Chair: I turn now to the issue of extraterritoriality. As you know, the Committees have consistently advocated the extension of the provisions of extraterritoriality to the remaining goods in category C. We have done so because it seems to us to be self-evident that an arms transfer, brokering, or whatever act involving goods on the military list or dual use list that would be an offence if committed in the UK should equally be an offence if committed by a British person overseas. You have previously expressed some reservations about that. Do you still have reservations, and if so would you explain why?

Michael Bell: Yes, we do have reservations. We have reservations of principle. We object in principle to having a situation where somebody is subject to two different jurisdictions for the same action, which is the case if a UK person is in a foreign country and subject to that foreign country's laws. Secondly, we have objections in practice. We all know that it is extremely hard to bring successful prosecutions against extraterritorial breaches or violations of export controls. In fact, the only people who suffer are the compliant: people who are not compliant find it relatively easy to get around them.

EGAD said in its letter that we regarded the way forward as the successful implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty, because that places on individual countries the responsibility of ensuring that exports from that country are properly regulated according to principles that we share. In a sense, the effect of the Arms Trade Treaty should be that the requirement for brokering controls disappears.

Q36 Chair: Would you not agree that it is difficult to erect an argument against what the Committees are proposing on grounds of principle, given that if such a principle exists it has been breached on successive occasions for about 150 years by successive British Governments? We have published in our reports the list of the totality of extraterritorial provisions that exist in statute dating back to the middle of the 19th century, so I suggest that the principle that you have erected about double jurisdiction is one that the British Government have set aside in cases of what they regard to be serious criminal offences.

Michael Bell: Yes, and indeed, there are circumstances where extraterritorial jurisdiction is entirely defensible—war crimes and so on. In this case, however, I repeat that the position is that an individual is subject to two different jurisdictions for the same action.

That, to my mind, cannot be right. However, it is also true, Chair, as you mentioned in the previous question period, that the new Arms Trade Treaty has resulted in the British Government saying that they wish to extend brokering controls to the range of items covered by the Arms Trade Treaty. That would be an extension of the category B controls. We do not share that interpretation of the Arms Trade Treaty; none the less, assuming that it is sustained, it will get you a fair way towards your objective.

Chair: I want to turn now to a number of international arms export trading agreements that we have. The first are the US export control amendments.

Q37 Richard Burden: You warned that there could be “considerable commercial and bureaucratic consequences for UK businesses trading with the US” because of developments in the US’s own export control reform. Would you tell us what the reforms are that you are worried about, and what the consequences are that you mentioned?

David Hayes: To pick a practical example, with effect from 15 October, US suppliers of a range of aerospace items that we would regard as military for UK purposes will be able to export from the US to 36 countries without applying formally for an export licence, under arrangements that the US calls licence exceptions, which you can regard as being conceptually akin to OGELs. One of those countries is Turkey, which is on our doorstep and not the doorstep of the United States. That gives US exporters of this type of equipment a clear advantage over UK exporters, who currently cannot supply the equivalent items to Turkey under open licence.

Q38 Richard Burden: As far as UK legislation is concerned, are there things that could be done that would address these matters without weakening controls that we have brought up over quite a long time?

David Hayes: Very easily. The UK has the option to amend military OGELs to add countries very simply. I do not underestimate the difficulties of adding Turkey to general licences, and the terms of those licences would probably need to be reviewed carefully, particularly in relation to the ultimate end user of the goods, but there is no reason why that avenue should not be explored, with the safeguards necessary to implement it being added to the licences at the same time.

Michael Bell: One might add that another strategic trade authorisation destination is Argentina. We might be a little uneasy at the export without prior licensing authorisation of items that we would categorise as military to that destination.

Q39 Chair: As you know, we are giving specific and detailed attention to Argentina in our next report, including a list of all the extant arms export licences that currently exist with Argentina.

I now turn to the UK-US Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty, to which you attach great importance, as do the Committees. You will have seen the detailed series of questions that we put in our latest report and recommendations, and you will have seen the detailed reply that the Government gave in their Command Paper 8707. The key issue for our Committees, and I imagine also for you, is whether British industry is getting fairer treatment—indeed, better treatment—as a result of this treaty than was the case prior to it coming into effect.

In question f), we asked the Government to state in their response how satisfactorily or not the treaty is working as far as British companies are concerned. The Government, in opening their reply, said, "The Treaty could be working more satisfactorily than at present because the first UK Industry-to-US Government transaction has yet to take place." I have to say that I read that with some degree of surprise and amazement. Would you tell us what is your perception of how well, or not, the treaty is working as far as British industry is concerned?

David Hayes: The treaty was born at a challenging time. It rapidly became apparent to us that the greater the success of the export control reforms to which you referred, Chair, the less would be the relevance of the treaty. A lot of the activities being undertaken by UK companies that would previously potentially have fallen under the treaty will now transfer to the responsibility of the Department of Commerce in the United States and therefore be outside the scope of the treaty. Couple that with the requirements and constraints of the treaty itself, and you end up with something that conceptually started life as a good idea but, as a result of the constraints that were then put around it, combined with developments that took place at the same time in the US export control system more broadly, so we have ended up with something that has little operational relevance or use to industry. That is why the uptake is so low.

Chair: It is very disappointing to hear that, but thank you for sharing your perspective with us.

We now come, inevitably and inescapably, to ITAR.

Q40 Mike Gapes: I have been asking questions on this for about 15 years, starting with my time on the Defence Committee years ago. In those days, we were talking about ITAR waivers, and then we were going to have a treaty to deal with all the problems in another way, but you seem to be telling me that it has not had a great effect. Will you update us? You expressed concern last year about the United States International Traffic in Arms Regulations procedure. Has the situation improved in the last year?

David Hayes: Considerably. There are mechanisms within ITAR that, taken in combination with an exchange of notes between the UK and US Governments relating to our security clearance procedures, have the potential to alleviate a lot of the burden that previously existed.

Q41 Mike Gapes: Does that particularly apply to dual nationals?

David Hayes: It does.

Q42 Mike Gapes: Is there anything further that we can do? Are there any outstanding problems that need resolving?

David Hayes: There was one, but industry representatives are currently working that out with the US Department of Commerce. When things transfer jurisdiction from the State Department to the Commerce Department under US export control reform, we do not want to end up in a situation worse than it would have been under ITAR. However, that issue has already been identified, discussed and addressed.

Q43 Mike Gapes: It is a good news story.

David Hayes: It is, yes.

Q44 Mike Gapes: This is the first time that I have heard that said in all these years.

David Hayes: There is a first time for everything.

Mike Gapes: That is good. Thank you.

Michael Bell: May I add that another piece of good news is the new ITAR brokering regulation? It has finally abandoned attempts to extend jurisdiction to foreign persons outside the United States. This has been dropped from the latest regulation, so it will no longer be the case that the Department of State can claim jurisdiction over foreign companies engaged in what they describe as brokering activities. That is extremely good news.

Q45 Chair: Thank you. We turn now to another important trade agreement, and that is the UK-France Defence and Security Co-Operation Treaty. In our last report, we asked the Government to tell us how satisfactorily or not the treaty is working as far as British companies are concerned. The Government's reply was, "While it is for industry to judge how the Treaty is working for them, they are able to express views through the UK-France High Level Working Group which oversees capability and equipment issues associated with the Lancaster House Treaty." The Government then went on to say, "Industry representatives have indicated a broad level of satisfaction with progress, particularly when considering joint programmes such as complex weapons and Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles." Do you consider that Government reply to be an accurate statement of the industry's position as to how well the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty is working?

Susan Griffiths: I would say yes. Negotiations have been ongoing, and rightly, so quick decisions have not been made. There is still a lot of negotiation going on, in which we have been heavily involved, and lots of consideration. There is recognition by both sides that, while we are trying to move forward on this, there are some small steps to take. There could be some advantage to this, but it is obviously being considered at a very slow pace with the agreement of both sides. There has been good engagement between the Government and industry on this, and we hope for a satisfactory conclusion.

Q46 Chair: Thank you. The last matter that I wish to turn to is the intra-Community transfer, ICT, directive on arms transfers within the EU. Can you tell us how well, or not, armed transfers within the EU under that directive are working as far as British companies are concerned?

David Hayes: As far as British companies are concerned, from the point of view of exporting, it was never that significant a change for us, because our open licensing system has always facilitated export from the UK to our European partners. It was more important for multinational companies to be able to get exports from the EU into the UK under the directive. How is it functioning, Susan?

Susan Griffiths: I would say that uptake is a bit slow, primarily because some EU countries have not yet established global licensing. We are therefore trying to see a broader aspect of where the balance is, because they have been introduced differently in different EU countries.

The benefit for some EU countries has been a change in their own national export licensing. In general, however, it is early days to see how balanced the introduction has been,

because they are not always equal. For the UK, we have possibly seen a slight increase in the ability to get licences in a quicker way from those countries, but because there is an onus on the importing side as well, the uptake in some countries has been very small.

Bernadette Peers: The problem is partly a lack of awareness throughout the EU. The UK is very good at doing awareness and advertising to industry that something is available, and we have had a lot of dialogue between industry and Government, from the outset all the way through to getting the directive. That was not the case in the EU, and trying to find sources of information to make use of the directive is difficult. Few UK companies are certified, and we are going to go through the process in order to push the message out. The message as to the benefits of the directive is even more limited across the rest of the EU, because people just do not understand it or know about it.

Q47 Chair: Before we conclude, are there any final points that you would like to put to us?

David Hayes: No, thank you, Chair.

Chair: Thank you, Michael Bell, Bernadette Peers, David Hayes and Susan Griffiths. Thank you very much indeed for your evidence today.

Oral Evidence

Taken before the Committee on Arms Export Controls

on Wednesday 18 December 2013

Members present:

Sir John Stanley (Chair)

Sir Malcolm Bruce

Katy Clark

Mike Crockart

Mike Gapes

Mr James Gray

Fabian Hamilton

Peter Luff

Ann McKechin

Bob Stewart

Chris White

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: **Rt Hon. Vince Cable MP**, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and President of the board of Trade, **Edward Bell**, Head of the Export Control Organisation, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, and **Chris Chew**, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, gave evidence.

Q48 Chair: Secretary of State, welcome to you and your officials, Mr Bell and Mr Chew. I believe we will be interrupted by a Division in about half an hour's time. We will resume after the Division.

Secretary of State I want to start with what is far and away the most important policy issue facing the Committees, which is to establish, I hope beyond any doubt, precisely what is the Government's policy on arms exports and internal repression. As you know, we have pursued this with the Foreign Secretary, who gave us an absolutely clear statement of policy in his oral evidence on 7 February 2012. I asked him for his confirmation that, as far as arms exports and internal repression are concerned, this was the policy of the Government: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." The Foreign Secretary replied: "That is still the policy. The 'or', as you have pointed out on other occasions, is important." Secretary of State will you confirm that you agree that that is the policy, as stated by the Foreign Secretary to this Committee?

Vince Cable: My understanding is that the phrase “clear risk”, which is embedded in criterion 2, is indeed the criterion we use. I am sure it was not in the Committees but subsequently I think there was some commentary that the Foreign Secretary was saying something different. I am fairly confident that across Government we say exactly the same thing and we are following the criteria established, the consolidated eight criteria. That is the way we operate. There is no difference between us. I think the Foreign Secretary is coming before you at the beginning of January. If there is any misunderstanding, I am sure he can clear that up. Mr Bell, do you want to add to that?

Q49 Chair: I just want to take evidence from the Business Secretary here. Business Secretary, we are quite clear about the position of the Foreign Secretary. It is as I have quoted it and as he has stated it to the Committee. We are not clear whether you endorse the policy.

Vince Cable: Of course—

Chair: May I continue? The policy is not made up just of clear risk as the Foreign Secretary made perfectly clear. The policy is “We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.” Do you accept those words are the Government’s policy?

Vince Cable: That is a very clear statement, which I would happily endorse. It is my understanding that that is what criterion 2 says. We don’t have independent policies on this.

Q50 Chair: I am delighted to hear you say that, Secretary of State, but I am afraid that is wholly at variance with the letter which your Minister of State wrote to me after the Westminster Hall debate, in which he focused solely on the first part of that sentence. The policy is made up of two strands. The policy, which appears in the policy paragraph before the listing of the criteria, which was originally done, as you know, in October 2000, contains the words: “An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by the need to comply with the UK’s international obligations and commitments” and—this is the crucial phrase—“by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression”. That is the basis of the Foreign Secretary’s second part of the policy statement. We wished to have your assurance, which you have now given to the Committee, that that policy statement, appearing in that paragraph, also represents the policy of the Government, coupled with what is said in criterion 2, in which there is the reference to “clear risk”. It is a two-strand policy, correctly stated by the Foreign Secretary to the Committees, and you yourself have now endorsed the Foreign Secretary’s statement.

Vince Cable: Yes, it absolutely is the case that we would not endorse licences relevant to internal repression, as well as conflict. I don’t think there is any misunderstanding—certainly there is none on my part. If I may say so, I think that, as a result of the exchange of correspondence with the Minister of State, a comma was inserted that had not been there before and this has been used to create the impression that there was some difference of policy, which there certainly isn’t. The two strands are absolutely inherent in our licensing criteria. *[Interruption.]* Can I just ask Mr Bell to clear this up, because I know he has been involved in the correspondence?

Q51 Chair: Can I just respond to that point? Your official can certainly come in then. I am very pleased to hear what you say; that is very reassuring to the Committees. However, I have to point out to you what your Minister of State said, and it is not the first time, in something coming from your Department, that the only reference to policy has been the reference to the “clear risk” part of the policy, ignoring the second part. This is what your Minister of State said in his letter to me following the Westminster Hall debate on 2 December: “I can confirm that the Government’s policy is set out clearly and unambiguously in Criterion 2: Her Majesty’s Government will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression. This policy has been applied consistently by successive Governments since 2000. This is the policy we apply now and there has been no change to policy.” I must point out to you that that is not the correct statement of policy. The correct statement of policy is the one that was made by the Foreign Secretary to these Committees on 7 February 2012 and which, I am glad to say, you have endorsed today.

Vince Cable: Yes, indeed. You are correct: there has been absolutely no change in Government policy at all. Certainly we would not issue an export licence if there was a clear risk that the exports might be used for internal repression. That is not an—

Q52 Chair: That is not the totality of the policy. It is, after the comma, “or which might be used to facilitate internal repression”, which is a wider policy than having to demonstrate clear risk. That is the crucial point.

Vince Cable: I think that the issue revolves around this comma, which was inserted, as I understand it, inadvertently in the Minister of State’s letter. The policy is unchanged.

Q53 Chair: With respect, the comma is irrelevant. It doesn’t matter really whether there is a comma. The sentence is made up of two parts, divided by an “or”. There are two strands of policy and have been since the year 2000: one is the “clear risk” strand and the other is “which might be used to facilitate internal repression.” The Committees unanimously attach great importance to both strands featuring in the Government’s policy. That has been endorsed by the Foreign Secretary. You have endorsed it today. Thank you.

Vince Cable: Good; thank you. Just to confirm, there has been no change in Government policy.

Q54 Chair: Right. That being the case, I look forward to receiving a corrected letter from your Minister of State.

Vince Cable: Okay.

Q55 Chair: Thank you. Did your official want to say anything?

Edward Bell: No. We will obviously follow up with a further letter.

Chair: Thank you very much indeed. We now move on to the transparency initiative.

Q56 Sir Malcolm Bruce: There seems to have been some movement in policy on the transparency initiative for open licences. On 15 May, you published that it would start in

October and users of the system would have to report quarterly. By 31 July, it was made clear that they would not report quarterly, but annually, the reporting period will be next year—2014—and they will not be required to report the category or goods description. It has moved from a very detailed statement to a rather less detailed statement produced annually, and some of the comments we have had are that it will be of very little value because it will be so late and so lacking in detail that it will not help the process of transparency. First, may I ask why you changed the rules in such a short period of time from the original to what it now is?

Vince Cable: I will happily explain. Our starting point is that we should have as much transparency as possible in the process—I think, Chair, that you acknowledged that in the recent debate in Parliament. I endeavoured in the first statement to push thos as far as we possibly could with the open licensing, and we set out a new set of procedures. Many of those elements remain: there will be more information about the frequency with which licences are used, about the destination and about the end use, so we are adding substantially to the information available.

When we published the details of how the information will be collected, there was a fairly substantial push-back from many of the companies involved, in whose view it would add substantially to paper-filling and bureaucracy without adding much enlightenment. In one particular case that you may have been in Parliament to hear about, one of our colleagues referred to a company that he represented—a quite substantial employer—which was choosing between ourselves and the United States as a base, and concluded that our system under the revised arrangement would be substantially more bureaucratic. The combination of the general reaction from exporters and particular cases of that kind persuaded me that we should have more transparency, but we should reduce some of the detail—in particular, the quarterly reporting.

Q57 Sir Malcolm Bruce: That is an explanation of a commercial issue that affects companies, but it does compromise the original idea of transparency. The Campaign Against the Arms Trade says: “If the published information is no longer to include ratings/goods description nor, it appears, the value, it is almost meaningless.” It has also been stated that the information, by the time it is published, could be 15 to 18 months old. Together with the lack of detailed information, it would be virtually useless for scrutiny by Parliament or the general public. Are you satisfied that it would still be useful? The UK working group at EGAD said it was not consulted about the change. Who was consulted, apart from the companies?

Vince Cable: I will ask my officials to say who precisely was consulted. As a result of the change we will have a more transparent system that we did before. Your question about whether everybody considers it to be materially useful is perfectly fair, but it is certainly more transparent; there will be more information out there. The new system is now on the SPIRE IT system. It will be available next year. We can then have a look at whether we need to improve it further.

What has happened is basically a good process. We put out an idea—how to make the system more transparent. We got some feedback and reacted to it. We came out with a compromise—that is the word you used—between the interests of more transparency for the public and the interests of the exporters themselves, who are, I think legitimately, concerned about not having too much bureaucracy. We will see how it goes. We can adapt it further when

the system is up and running. But it is a more transparent set of arrangements than we had originally.

Q58 Sir Malcolm Bruce: Perhaps that is my final point, then: people who would expect to be consulted, and might have had some input, weren't.

Vince Cable: That is a fair point.

Q59 Sir Malcolm Bruce: Also, the announcement was made to Parliament in reply to an oral question during BIS questions on the day the House rose for the summer recess. The point that is being made here is that you may have had perfectly good reasons, and you have explained them to us now, about why you changed from the original proposal to where it is now, but it appears that all the interest groups have not been consulted and the House has not been given a proper opportunity to have an input. Given what you have just said, are you prepared to accept suggestions, allowing for the fact that you said, "Let's not compromise our commercial interests"? On the other hand, let us not compromise detailed transparency.

Vince Cable: They are perfectly fair questions about the consultation process. I do not know if you can add anything as to who was consulted and who was not.

Edward Bell: There was certainly a public consultation and companies, trade associations and NGOs responded to that. That public consultation led to the original proposals. Subsequent to that, there were certainly strong representations from trade associations and companies, and the particular case that the Secretary of State referred to, where there was clear evidence that jobs would go if we implemented the initiative as it was originally proposed.

I think we ought to have a look at this once current arrangements, which were announced by the Secretary of State in July, have been in place and have been bedded in, partly, to ensure that the IT works properly. To make reporting and additional reporting work, it is important that the IT is robust and it is simple for companies to report.

I think we should keep it under review. I propose that we look at this in about a year, to see how it is working and to revisit the issue at that stage.

Vince Cable: But are we satisfied that everybody who should have been consulted was consulted?

Q60 Sir Malcolm Bruce: They say they have not been. The working group from EGAD said they had not been consulted. They are telling us that.

Edward Bell: I certainly received strong representations from EGAD, at an executive committee meeting—and ADS, as well.

Q61 Chair: Secretary of State. I want to move on to what seems to us to be a quite extraordinary volume of automatic weapons and small arms, et cetera, that have been granted licences for export, supposedly for anti-piracy purposes.

Q62 Mike Gapes: Secretary of State, the Foreign Secretary told us, in evidence earlier this year, that we have been supplying some weaponry to countries for anti-piracy issues, which

raised concerns with regard to the consolidated criteria. The exact phrase was, “so we have to look at those Criteria”.

According to the data you provided us with, between April 2012 and June 2013, a total of 30,000 assault rifles, 2,536 pistols and 11,000 rifles were supplied to a number of countries on the coast of East Africa and to the Arab world, and also to South Africa and Russia. These include countries about which we have internal repression or human rights concerns, such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives, which had had a coup, and a few others where there are concerns. Egypt also features on the list.

I am interested to know whether such quantities of such weapons seem reasonable in terms of the need, which clearly exists, for anti-piracy work. Also, is there evidence of diversion of any of these weapons away from the purposes for which they are supplied—to purposes other than anti-piracy?

Vince Cable: There is no evidence of diversion. As I understand it, the arguments—the proper procedures that were followed were entirely correct. The fact that British security companies happen to have been based in Sri Lanka and Egypt I do not think is material to the purpose, which is supplying vessels with protection.

Q63 Mike Gapes: Are all these weapons going to British security companies in all cases?

Vince Cable: Perhaps Mr Bell can explain.

Edward Bell: Yes, they are. They are going to British companies in all cases, and rigorous terms are applied to the licences for all these shipments. I understand the concern about the volumes. I would make two points. First, the bulk of companies involved in these activities are British, so that will be behind the volumes involved. Having said that, having now heard about the volumes, I would like to do a bit more digging around that. I have no concerns that anything untoward has happened, but I certainly will have a closer look at the volumes involved.

Vince Cable: Just a couple of other points of reassurance. All the companies involved are subject to the code of conduct governing security. The other point, which I think is quite important, is that since this piracy epidemic erupted, I don't think there has been a single case of piracy succeeding against vessels that have had armed protection.

Q64 Mike Gapes: The Foreign Affairs Committee did a report on that. We made a recommendation that there should be armed personnel on the ships, and the Government changed their policy before our report was published, which was a remarkable coincidence.

Other countries are also presumably supplying weapons in similar circumstances to their own nationals, or related companies, or even perhaps to other Governments. Do you have any information about weapons being licensed by other countries for anti-piracy purposes?

Chris Chew: As far as we are aware, around 70% or 80% of the private security companies operating in this sector are UK companies. So the vast majority of the weapons are going to UK companies, and they are being supplied by UK companies.

Q65 Mike Gapes: Not by other countries as well?

Chris Chew: Not by other countries as well. There is a small number, and we have had some discussions with some of our international partners, but because of the different ways in which we license these activities it is difficult at the moment to make any fair comparison—but the vast majority of the activity is UK-based.

Q66 Mike Gapes: Can you supply the Committees, in confidence if necessary, with more information about this issue and what information you have, so that we are able to get a wider picture of it?

Chris Chew: Yes.

Q67 Chair: Secretary of State, we will want this on a non-classified basis. Your official expressed some surprise about the volumes. We, as Committees, find the volumes that are going under the banner of anti-piracy really quite extraordinary given the known number of pirates. I am requesting that this be looked at seriously by Ministers, and we would like a ministerial response when you have looked at the figures in relation to the current piracy activities in the Indian Ocean.

Vince Cable: We will happily do that.

Q68 Mr Gray: From the BIS quarterly reports, we understand that 5,194 sporting guns were exported for anti-piracy purposes. What are sporting guns?

Chris Chew: They would be shotguns.

Q69 Mr Gray: But the report says that you have 4,200 combat shotguns—they are separate—and 5,000 sporting guns.

Chris Chew: A combat shotgun is classified differently in the reports from an ordinary 12-bore shotgun, for example. A combat shotgun would be a repeating gun—a kind of semi-automatic shotgun, for example. So that would be the difference.

Q70 Mr Gray: Is “sporting guns” really the right description? Surely, if indeed they are shotguns—12-bore or whatever—you should say so.

Chris Chew: They are usually used for hunting game, clay pigeon shooting, etc., so in that respect “sporting gun” is the right term. We would have to reflect on whether in this context it gives the right impression.

Mr Gray: Chasing pirates is good sport, by the sound of it.

Q71 Fabian Hamilton: My question relates to oral evidence that was given to the Committees on 4 November by Amnesty and other non-governmental organisations, who told us that open general export licences had been granted for the supply of ML1 and ML2 goods for anti-piracy. Is that true?

Chris Chew: Yes.

Q72 Fabian Hamilton: Why do you believe that granting these open general export licences for this activity is justified? Should they not be just as restricted? These are dangerous weapons and you don't know where they are going to end up.

Chris Chew: It is only one open general trade control licence for anti-piracy, but companies have to go through a registration process to be allowed to use it. The licence has strict conditions. It provides that companies are allowed to possess or move only very limited quantities of weapons at any one time. I think it is limited to four firearms. It does not allow them to have automatic weapons, and there are strict conditions on storage and control of the weapons. For example, companies must maintain ownership and control of the weapons. They are not allowed to give or sell the weapons to anyone else. At the time of creating the licence, we needed to provide a flexible solution to allow these companies to operate in the way that they need to operate in order to provide their services, but we felt that by building those strict conditions into the licence we could limit the risk of the weapons being diverted to undesirable end users. At the time, we wrote to the Committees with information about that licence, explaining how it would work, so we have been quite clear about what the licence is intended for and how it is structured.

Q73 Fabian Hamilton: You mentioned the code of conduct. I understand that the international code of conduct for private security service providers states that its members should keep records about the weapons they hold, as you say. However, do the Government ever examine those records?

Chris Chew: We do audit the companies, yes.

Q74 Fabian Hamilton: And are you satisfied from auditing those records that none of the weapons are being diverted?

Chris Chew: Yes.

Q75 Fabian Hamilton: That is good. Apart from the voluntary code for private security firms, do the Government undertake any other further checks to ensure that these items are not being diverted from their intended use?

Chris Chew: No; our checks are limited at the moment to the compliance audits that we carry out on the companies within the UK. As you can imagine, it is quite problematic for us to go and inspect the companies where they are operating. There have been some discussions about how that might be possible, but it clearly presents a number of logistical and security challenges in itself and we have not been able to do that kind of check yet.

Q76 Fabian Hamilton: It has been suggested to us that a voluntary code is not quite sufficient for these private security companies, who have no accountability or, indeed, oversight, and that there should be a legal framework and licensing system. Have the Government any plans to introduce such controls either unilaterally or in conjunction with other countries?

Chris Chew: There are no plans to introduce a statutory regime for private security companies. I think the Government made that announcement back in 2010 or 2011, when they

said that it would work through this international code of conduct. Fairly recently, the International Code of Conduct Association was launched and will provide global oversight of the code of conduct, including auditing and inspection of the companies. We are working with other countries to set up that association and the processes. That is being led by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, so, as the Export Control Organisation, we are not the experts on that particular aspect of regulating those companies.

Q77 Fabian Hamilton: But isn't the problem with that kind of voluntary code of conduct that no statutory body, no elected body and no elected politicians have any oversight at all? There is no accountability to anyone really, is there? It is a self-regulating organisation.

Chris Chew: Well, this was subject to public consultation and deep consideration across Government, and it was felt that a self-regulatory regime was the best approach to address the issue and that a statutory regime would create far more problems than it solved. I would have to go back and look at the outcome of the public consultation and the announcements the Government made at the time, because it is not our direct area of responsibility.

Q78 Fabian Hamilton: I understand and appreciate that. However, you say that a statutory regime would create far more problems—problems for whom? Surely the problems would be for the private companies and not for the public, who are concerned that these weapons may be at large.

Chris Chew: For the regulator as well.

Vince Cable: Problems of enforcement.

Chris Chew: Problems of enforcement and for the regulator.

Chair: Secretary of State, I want now to come to the well-worn issue, as far as the Committees are concerned, of establishing a pre-licence register of arms brokers. We were very pleased that your Minister of State announced in his winding up of the Westminster Hall debate that you, Secretary of State, have finally made a move in the direction that the Committees have been pressing for for several years, which we very much welcome. Mike Crockart is going to pursue this issue.

Mike Crockart: Thank you, Chair. It may well be a well-worn issue, but it is a new one to me as this is my first time on the Committee. From reading through its history, I can see that it has been rolling for years. In 2007, the then Minister said that "it may be worth having a look at it at some point in the near future". By 2009, the then Government were saying that they would "be happy" to look at it. In 2010—*[Interruption.]*

Chair: Order. We will adjourn and resume as soon as we are quorate or at 5 minutes past 4, whichever is the earlier.

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

On resuming—

Chair: Secretary of State, we will resume. Mike Crockart.

Q79 Mike Crockart: As I was saying, we have gone through 2007, 2009, 2010, and the Government's response to the Committee's last report. I imagine it was very welcome when you said you would "take a fresh look at the evidence for and against a register". That would happen after a consultation that was to take place in early autumn. I know we have just had the autumn statement, but surely we are stretching it. Has the consultation started?

Vince Cable: I had hoped that with my comment I had broken the mould of inaction on the subject. I undertook to do a consultation with a view to taking action on brokerages. Your Committees had persuaded me that there was a serious issue there. I can only say that I am sorry that we have not actually done it yet. There is a clear undertaking to ensure that it is done as soon as possible in the new year. We will get on with that.

The reasons are that, as you know, with launching Government consultations you have to get the rest of Government on side. We have had to get legal opinion on some of the more complex issues. In terms of your basic question, we have been slow to put this into practice and I will undertake to get this launched in the new year as soon as possible. We have given an absolute deadline to the officials to ensure this is done before the end of March. It will be a proper Government consultation.

Q80 Mike Crockart: But that is an absolute deadline?

Vince Cable: I have given you that assurance; that is the best I can do in the circumstances.

Q81 Mike Crockart: Have you done any work on a list of organisations that will be consulted?

Vince Cable: When the consultation is launched, we will cover as much ground as possible—people in the industry and campaigning groups on the other side. Do we have a standard list?

Edward Bell: I think it would be a bit difficult to finalise a list. We do not have a final list of organisations we will consult, but certainly the commitment is to launch that public consultation by the end of March.

Chris Chew: It will be a public consultation, so anyone can respond, but we can proactively send it to specific organisations, and we will send it to the people who have brokering licences now, because clearly they will have an interest. We can also send it to the NGOs that have regularly expressed an interest in this subject, so that they can comment.

Q82 Mike Crockart: I realise that this is asking how long is a piece of string, but if we have figured out when the likely start of the consultation is, do we have a time scale for when it would finish and any results might be available?

Chris Chew: The usual procedure is to consult for between six to 12 weeks, so we would need to consider what the appropriate period was. For a very specialist subject such as this,

which affects quite a narrow group of people, a shorter consultation period might be more appropriate, but we are open to suggestions and comments.

Q83 Mike Crockart: It is just that this is a long-awaited piece of work, so it would be good to have an end time scale in mind.

Vince Cable: We fully understand that. It has been protracted and we are keen to get this moving.

Q84 Mike Crockart: One other thing you said was that, “In addressing these questions we will seek to learn lessons from those countries that have introduced registration of brokers.” Has any work been done to find out more and to see which countries have which systems?

Chris Chew: We know roughly which countries have a register. The NGOs have highlighted that in a number of their submissions to the Committees, and there are submissions to bodies such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. So we know which countries have registers, and the intention is to write to them formally on a Government-to-Government basis and seek evidence from them on how it helps them to regulate brokers, what advantages they see and what difficulties, so that we get direct evidence from them that we can then take into account.

Q85 Mike Crockart: How many countries are we talking about?

Chris Chew: From the submissions I have seen previously, somewhere in the region of 12 to 15 EU member states have registers of brokers. Interestingly, most of the large exporters—Germany, France, Sweden—do not, so we will also want to understand why that as, as well as why Spain, Portugal, Bulgaria and Romania, for example, do have one. We will be looking at the totality of the evidence.

Q86 Mike Crockart: My final question is again on time scales. Will you be looking to write to those countries within the same sort of time scales—contacting them by the end of March and looking for them to—

Chris Chew: We will do that in parallel with the public consultation, and then, when we publish the response to the consultation, we will include the views expressed by the other Governments—provided they do not tell us that the information is confidential, of course.

Q87 Chair: Secretary of State, I made the same point that Mike Crockart has been making in a Westminster Hall debate: the need, after this long period of time, to bring the consultation to a ministerial conclusion and hopefully to have the register in place. We hope that will be your decision and that, by the time you come in front of us for what will probably be the last time—about this time next year—we will be able to question you about an up and running, pre-licence register of arms brokers. I hope you will give that the priority that it requires in your Department.

Vince Cable: Thank you.

Chair: I am going to return to the issue of the DSEi trade exhibition, where, once again, and disappointingly, items were found that should not have been there.

Q88 Peter Luff: Secretary of State, I think we can agree that the DSEi, well run, is an important contribution to our economic ambitions, our security objectives and the growth of our defence industries. It is all the more important that it is run consistently well. Can you explain why once again we found companies promoting banned goods at the exhibition?

Vince Cable: Going back to what the exhibition is, as you know—you have been as involved in it, as I have—it is commercially run by Clarion, and has been for over a decade. The Government's contribution is to invite a selected list of visitors, but it is overwhelmingly a commercial event. To ensure that past episodes are not repeated, or are at least minimised, a memorandum of understanding was drawn up with the organisers this year to have a tight set of rules. The basic outcome is that if an exhibitor—there are 1,300 of them; it is not a small exhibition—breaks the rules, as last year a Russian operation did, they are stopped immediately and action is taken to prevent illegal activity taking place.

Q89 Peter Luff: I will come to the nature of that action in a minute. Do you not think that we should at least be able to screen the product brochures to ensure that unacceptable products are not being offered for sale at the exhibition?

Chris Chew: With 1,300 or more exhibitors, that is potentially quite a daunting task. If each exhibitor brought 10 different brochures it would be problematic. It is clear that we need to do more in advance of the show to identify where problems might lie, but I don't think we can say anything other than we need to work harder.

Edward Bell: I think we do. I was keen to put a memorandum of understanding in place with Clarion this year. It is a good mechanism. During the exhibition we have a strong presence of personnel from the Export Control Organisation, HMRC and the police. That is why we picked up the infringements. Yes, we need to work harder at that, but we put a good mechanism in place this year to hold Clarion to account. My colleague's point is well made, though: there are more like 1,500 exhibitors, so it is quite a daunting task.

Q90 Peter Luff: I think the companies concerned were ejected from the exhibition.

Edward Bell: Yes, they were.

Chris Chew: Two were, I think.

Edward Bell: Yes, two companies were ejected.

Q91 Peter Luff: Are any other sanctions possible against companies that transgress?

Vince Cable: If they have committed a criminal offence, action can be taken.

Edward Bell: I think the material was handed over to Customs, so that will have been considered.

Q92 Peter Luff: Do you think it would help confidence in the exhibition if the Government made more public what happened to the exhibitors who broke the rules—if there was greater transparency about the punishments?

Chris Chew: There has been media reporting about the event. I am not sure what more we could say. If Customs investigates and concludes that prosecution is appropriate, that would be in the public domain and it would send a strong signal, but it would be a matter for Customs and we cannot comment on that.

Q93 Peter Luff: Should Governments collectively highlight to exhibitors that if they break the rules, legal sanctions can be enforced against them?

Edward Bell: I think we should look at that in relation to the next exhibition. We should revisit the memorandum of understanding to see whether we can reinforce those messages.

Q94 Peter Luff: This is the world's leading exhibition of its kind, but we have other exhibitions at which defence and security export products are marketed. The UK Working Group has suggested that any company that has not signed the arms trade treaty should not be allowed to participate. I appreciate that there are some countries on that list that might cause some difficulties, but what do you think of that suggestion?

Vince Cable: We have certainly thought about it. As you imply in your question, there would be some strange omissions. Apparently, Canada has not signed the treaty—no doubt it will do in time—so it is an arbitrary cut-off. The arms trade treaty was a big success, and we are proud of our role in it. We are encouraging as many countries as possible to sign and ratify it, but we should not penalise countries that have not—Canada is the most obvious one, but I am sure there are others that are not controversial.

Q95 Peter Luff: Speaking personally, I think there are some problems with that suggestion. The other suggestion that has been made is that companies, or subsidiaries of companies, that produce cluster munitions should in no circumstances be allowed to exhibit. I think that must be much easier to do and agree with.

Vince Cable: I think that cluster munitions are not legal activity anyway.

Q96 Peter Luff: Any company that has not signed a written guarantee that they do not produce them anywhere in their organisation should not be allowed to participate. To me, that seems to be a reasonable ask.

Vince Cable: At first sight it does, but there are a whole lot of other banned substances, aren't there?

Q97 Peter Luff: But we played a leading role in the campaign against cluster munitions.

Vince Cable: I think that fits within what Mr Bell said about ensuring that the memorandum of understanding with the company next year is more foolproof and explicit and that the guarantees sought of the companies follow up the suggestions you made.

Peter Luff: I look forward to your response to that particular suggestion.

Q98 Chair: Secretary of State, I want to turn now to the very important issue of the export approvals by this Government and the previous Government of dual-use chemicals to Syria, in particular, sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride. They are dual-use because, in addition to their civil uses, they are precursor chemicals in the manufacture of sarin, and we now know that there have been 14 or more sarin attacks in the appalling hostilities taking place in Syria.

I want to start with a significant issue, which, up until now—possibly by the end of this session it will be different—has been a point of major difference between the Committees and yourself: your refusal thus far to name the companies who applied for the seven dual-use chemical export licences. The implication for the Committees of you not being prepared to name those companies publicly is that we are not able to take public evidence from them.

In your letter to me of 25 October, you set out three justifications for refusing to give these Committees the companies' names. I dealt with those justifications in turn in the Westminster Hall debate. Those were, in summary, that you felt you were bound by provisions of the Freedom of Information Act; you were concerned about reputational risk to the companies; and you highlighted that one company had expressed concerns, although no evidence was provided, that it might put some individuals in that company at risk.

Subsequent to the Westminster Hall debate, I took advice from the Clerk of the House on your first point as to whether the Freedom of Information Act provisions have any relevance in this context. He replied, "You asked me to confirm that House of Commons Select Committees are not governed or circumscribed by the Freedom of Information Act with regard to the evidence they seek in the course of their inquiries. I can readily confirm that proposition." The Clerk of the House concludes his letter in reply to me by saying, "In conclusion, the Freedom of Information Act does not prevent your Committees from requesting the names of the requestors granted licences for dual-use chemicals for Syria between 2004 and 2012, nor does the Act preclude the Secretary of State from providing those names." I think that deals with the Freedom of Information Act point.

As far as the other two arguments are concerned, I merely repeat what I said in the Westminster Hall debate: namely that if witnesses to Select Committee inquiries could claim that possible reputational risk to themselves, or possible unsubstantiated, non-evidenced possible risk to a member of their staff, would be valid grounds for not appearing before them, that would have more or less collapsed the entire Select Committee system. These Committees would not be willing to establish any such precedent, which would have far-reaching implications for the Select Committee scrutiny system in the House of Commons.

In the end of my remarks in the Westminster Hall debate, I said that in the light of the points I had made, I hoped that you would reconsider your position. Can you now tell the Committees whether you have reconsidered your position, and if so, whether you will now agree to give us the names, so that we can use those names publicly and ask the companies to give public evidence to the Committees?

Vince Cable: I have made a proposal to you, so that you can have a discussion with the companies concerned. I think there were several steps in your preamble that I would like to go over, to explain how we got where we are, if you don't mind. My starting point throughout is that I would like the companies to give you evidence but there are various, I think legitimate, reasons why we cannot just hand over the names.

If you don't mind, let me just go over the sequence. We are dealing with five licences applying to two companies in the period before 2012. Those were toothpaste material manufacturers. Subsequent to 2012 there was one company involved in two licences to supply material that was going to be used for aluminium windows. That was the basis of their application. The second were never sent, as you know, because the European Union regulations came in. That was what actually happened.

In terms of making available the names so that you can cross-question the companies on that, I asked them whether they would waive confidentiality. All our applicants give information on a confidential basis; that is the basis on which export licensing operates. I asked if they were happy to waive that, because I thought it would be good for the Committees and public interest if they were to appear. One company was happy to do so; the other two were not. I could see that that created a difficulty for your Committees. I then proposed that we take advantage of precedent and invite the companies here on the basis that they give you evidence on a confidential basis. Two of the three companies involved are happy to do that; the other is not.

I think the reasons are perfectly plausible and common sense when you reflect on them. You are a mainstream manufacturer, producing common substances, hundreds of thousands of tonnes of which are produced all over the world, which are wholly innocuous. There is no suggestion that they have behaved in any way improperly. What they fear, I think understandably, is that articles might appear in a newspaper saying, "Company X involved in chemical weapons probe", with names, addresses and individuals. If I were in that company, I would quite reasonably be concerned about the fallout from that. That is why they are reticent to give evidence.

I am anxious to be as co-operative as possible with you. We do not wish to have a dispute between the Government and the Select Committees. You have a job to do and we do. That is why I put forward the proposal that you hear them on a confidential basis, and that way you can check out the story that they have given.

Q99 Chair: Secretary of State, I stated in the Westminster Hall debate why the compromise you have put forward was not satisfactory: it prevents the Committees from reporting on or citing the evidence that they received, and prevents them performing their paramount duty of reporting to Parliament. That remains the position.

You cite confidentiality of your dealings on export licences, but the reality, as I listed in the Westminster Hall debate, is that you have been prepared to disclose all the other key items with just one exception, which is the names of the companies. You have disclosed the dates of approval of the licences, the chemicals that were approved, the quantity of the chemicals approved in each case, the financial value of each contract and the name of the bodies in Syria to which the licences were granted. So much for confidentiality. You have been prepared to

disclose, in response to questions we have put to you, all that information. The one and only piece of information that you are not prepared to disclose publicly is the names of the companies. That does not seem to us to be an acceptable position.

As for your arguments about reputational risk and so on, any number of Select Committee inquiries are going on all the time in which witnesses could say, "Well, there is a possible risk to my reputation if I come before this Committee." It is the reality of life that, if Select Committees are to do their job properly, they have to call witnesses and take public evidence.

I will make this point. The issue for these Committees is your Department and the handling of these licence applications within your Department. Very significantly, another item you have disclosed is that not one of these single export licences was put to Ministers, despite it being well known that those are precursor chemicals for the manufacture of chemical weapons; that Syria is one of the largest holders of chemical weapons in the world; and that Syria is a non-signatory of the chemical weapons convention. Despite all those things being in the public domain, according to the evidence you have given us in writing, not one of those export licences was ever put to Ministers.

This is a necessary and proper area of inquiry for these Committees to explore in a public and open fashion. Once again, Secretary of State, I am asking you to consider what we have said to you and to reconsider your position, and tell us whether you will, after reflection, enable us to take public evidence from the companies concerned, as part of our scrutiny of your Department.

Vince Cable: I will obviously consider what you have said and the strength of feeling with which you have expressed it, but I do not think we can change the position we have adopted. Can I just make two points? First, there is an enormous difference between the confidentiality that is sought in hundreds of Select Committee inquiries by people who are worried about their reputation, and the problem we are faced with here of a company making fairly standard chemical products at risk of being accused indirectly or by innuendo of being involved in chemical weapons exports, with all the horrendous consequences of that. I think that is a unique situation.

Secondly, under the international classification, the chemicals are dual-use products. I think my Department quite reasonably did not refer them to Ministers by applying a bit of common sense. After all, toothpaste and cleaning fluids for windows are not, by most people's understanding, chemical weapons. Domestos is a weapon of mass destruction because it contains chlorine; nitrogenous fertilisers are weapons of mass destruction, as the IRA demonstrated. We would not in normal circumstances regard these standard products, manufactured in hundreds of factories all over the world on a large scale, as subject to risk. I think it was perfectly reasonable that my officials showed a little common sense in applying the licensing criteria.

You have obviously expressed yourself very strongly. I shall have to reflect on your views. My wish is to be as helpful as possible, but I think the request for confidentiality by the companies concerned is reasonable, and I hope I have given you those reasons.

Q100 Chair: I will just say finally to you that your comments seem almost to put the companies and your Department into equivalent positions. They are absolutely not in equivalent positions. The companies are commercial organisations, carrying out perfectly normal business in civil activities, to which you have referred—toothpaste manufacture, aluminium window frames and so on. That is a totally legitimate undertaking, and as you have rightly pointed out and I have confirmed to you, they took entirely the right steps to make the necessary export licence application as those are dual-use chemicals.

The responsibility lies with Government and your Department. It is your Department that has access to all the necessary intelligence information. It is your Department that has access to the nature of the bodies in Syria to whom the chemicals were going. It is your Department that has the intelligence enabling it to judge the risk of any of these bodies being, basically, front companies under the control of the Assad regime or someone else from which they might be able to obtain quantities of these chemicals. All that information lies within Government. All those issues are the Government's responsibility. I put it to you that it is not reasonable to suggest that there is some form of equivalence between the company and the Government. This was a Government decision, and the Government alone could take the decision in light of the intelligence and information that it alone has.

Vince Cable: That is absolutely correct, Chair, and we fully understand that. That is why it is absolutely right that you question the Department and the officials involved about why they made the decision and whether that was reasonable. What you are asking for—me to give you the names of the companies involved—is a different question which raises different issues of principle. By all means, interrogate me and the officials about how that decision was made. That was our responsibility.

Q101 Ann McKechin: Can we turn to the detail of the two licences granted in 2012 for the purpose of manufacturing aluminium pipes? These licences were granted when conflict had already commenced within Syria, so this was not a normal, day-to-day commercial transaction—you were dealing with a country at war with itself. Also, the recipient company, which you have disclosed to the Chair, Awad Ammora Co & Partners, based in Damascus, had been identified in previous media reports to be a front company for the Assad regime. If that was so and you were aware of those claims, why was the licence application granted?

Vince Cable: Those reports were investigated and found to have absolutely no substance.

Q102 Ann McKechin: This was a report of the Senate investigation of the oil for food scandal. The company was named in a Senate investigation. So you thought that that report was unsubstantiated?

Vince Cable: They were not named, but my understanding was that both public source and intelligence material was checked. Clearly, the accusation made is serious, and my understanding is that those were checked before the licences were approved. Can you confirm that?

Chris Chew: The allegations that were reported by the UN oil for food programme were that Awad Ammora were approached by Iraq in order to circumvent the UN sanctions. The

reports did not say that Awad Ammora were a front company for the Assad regime. We have no information from any source that links Awad Ammora to the Assad regime and we are not aware of any information to that effect.

When we looked at these licences, we looked at the information we had about Awad Ammora and we looked at the concerns and the possible uses for the chemicals. There was nothing to link Awad Ammora to the Syrian Government or to a chemical weapons programme. Because this was a legitimate—

Q103 Ann McKechin: Mr Chew, can I just clarify? Are you saying that this company was not mentioned in any document produced by the US Senate inquiry—yes or no?

Chris Chew: The documents I am aware of are the reports of the UN oil for food programme and the circumvention of—

Q104 Ann McKechin: I am talking about the US Senate inquiry, of which I am sure that the Foreign Office would have been aware and which would have been on the record. I would have thought that any inquiry carried out by the US Senate would have been of interest and relevance in terms of preparing an intelligence report in relation to this issue. Because it is important that we have this detail on the record, I am asking you to clarify that it is your contention that this specific company was not referred to as part of the inquiry by the Senate into the oil for food scandal.

Vince Cable: That was not what Mr Chew said, I think. He said that it may well have been referred to, but there was no evidence that it had any connection with the Syrian regime.

Chris Chew: We were not and are still not aware of any information that links Awad Ammora to the Syrian Government. That is what I can say categorically.

Edward Bell: Perhaps I can add that I looked very carefully at this case this summer, coming in as someone fresh to the Export Control Organisation, with no history and no baggage. I looked at all the files and at all the classified and unclassified information that was available to me, and I spoke to officials at the Foreign Office, MOD and other agencies who would have been involved in providing professional advice when the applications were being processed.

Having looked at all that information, I am confident that the officials who made the decisions made reasonable decisions on the basis of the information that they had in front of them. In relation to Awad Ammora Co & Partners, I am aware of two reports, and although I do not have any knowledge of what the Senate said, I am aware of the link to the UN oil for food programme and the suggestion, although I am not entirely sure about it, that the company had been approached for the procurement of aluminium tubes. I certainly consulted agencies on that. Clearly, I cannot talk about classified information—

Ann McKechin: I accept that.

Edward Bell: —but I certainly investigated that, and we do not have information that confirms those allegations.

Q105 Ann McKechin: The second thing I want to clarify is that two months after the licences were granted, the European Union included the materials in its sanctions list. It would be surprising to many people if, at the time the licences were granted in January, there had not been some sort of discussion at ministerial level at the very least, if not among officials, about imposing sanctions on the Syrian regime. If that dialogue was ongoing, why were any licences any granted? Surely a hold should have been put on applications until that dialogue had resolved the position of the European Union?

Edward Bell: Clearly sanctions were being discussed at EU level around that time. Sanctions were eventually introduced in June 2012, and the two licences that we are talking about were subsequently revoked. On investigation, we established that no goods were shipped against those licences. What officials cannot do is pre-empt sanctions; the officials would have made the assessment on the basis of the information and the consolidated criteria.

Q106 Ann McKechin: So you did not think that you could place the applications on hold or have a dialogue with the companies to say, “We have concerns, given the situation in Syria, about your application. Can we hold it until there have been further discussions?” Was there no attempt to hold back applications, given that there was an active dialogue about sanctions? That seems quite extraordinary.

Chris Chew: The licences were applied for in August 2011, I believe, and they were not granted until January 2012, so there was extensive consideration—

Q107 Ann McKechin: But the situation in Syria was changing rapidly at the time, and it was worsening considerably by January.

Vince Cable: I think it is fair to say that I have introduced, as you know, a system of suspension of licence applications where there is uncertainty about the environment, but you are talking about decisions that were made significantly before that change of policy.

Chris Chew: The arms embargo on Syria was imposed in May 2011. That was when the first sanctions were imposed, and between that time and the end of 2011, there were 10 amendments to those sanctions, so there were continuous discussions about actual sanctions, potential sanctions and some of those discussions came to nothing. At one point, there were discussions about possible sanctions on the export of phosphates to Syria, because they can be used in the manufacture of explosives. That has not happened; there is no embargo against those items. Although all those discussions were taking place, we could not know that those actual chemicals would be subject to the sanctions until the EU agreed them, which was not until June 2012. We have accepted that, once the EU did decide, we were somewhat tardy in revoking the licences, and we have put measures in place to ensure that does not happen again, but at the time we granted the licences, we did not know for sure, and we could not have predicted for certain, that the chemicals would be subject to sanctions five or six months later.

Q108 Mike Gapes: It may be true that the EU arms embargo was imposed in May 2011, but prior to that there was a European Union regime with regard to the consolidated criteria; there were also issues that were discussed about dual-use material; and there was, of course, our national legislation with regard to these issues, so it is not as though there was nothing before

May 2011. Clearly the assessment could have been made, even before then, about the possible implications of these things.

Chris Chew: Exactly. These chemicals require an export licence to all destinations outside the EU, and that has been the case for a very long time—it pre-dated May 2011. Those assessments were made. An assessment against the consolidated criteria was undertaken. It took us about five or six months to undertake that assessment. We looked at all the available evidence. We found no information that was sufficiently strong to suggest that there was any risk of diversion to any illicit activity, and on that basis there were no grounds to refuse the licence under the criteria and so the licences were granted. That was the process we went through; it is the standard process. As Mr Bell said, he reviewed the process and found that it was a reasonable process to undertake. So we stand by the decision that was taken at the time. In hindsight, I can see how it looks problematic, but on what we knew at the time it was the right decision.

Q109 Chair: Secretary of State, I am concerned by the responses from both your officials. It seems to me that far too limited a view was being taken. Your Department knew that Syria was a major holder of chemical weapons. Your Department knew that Syria was a non-signatory of the chemical weapons convention. Your Department knew there was a raging civil war going on in Syria. It has not been disclosed to the House whether your intelligence sources had informed your officials that there may have already by that time been small sarin attacks—the 14 events to which the Prime Minister has referred, and to which he has been reluctant to attach any dates. Your Department knew that there was a serious risk, with a civil war going on.

In addition, by January 2012—I have the EU document extending the sanctions to a very large number of dual-use chemicals—your Department must surely have had sight of preliminary drafts of the EU directive that was finally agreed in June. I find it extraordinary that, with that combination of factors, your Department should have still approved those two licences in January 2012. When your officials say, “Well, we don’t do anything until something has actually happened in terms of treaty,” I have to say that that is completely contrary to a whole series of steps which you have rightly taken on a precautionary basis.

You have been informing these Committees and the House of precautionary halting of various arms exports to Argentina. We do not wait for the Argentinians to do something against the Falklands before you rightly call a halt on certain arms exports to Argentina. Recently you have announced, on a precautionary basis, suspensions and revocations with regard to Egypt. So the policy you are following is not one of just waiting until some new document is in place before you look afresh at whether particular export licences are granted. Ministerially, you rightly look at the wider picture, and where precautionary steps are taken, you take them. So I must put it to you, I remain unpersuaded and concerned that these two licences in January 2012 should ever have been approved.

Vince Cable: The simple answer is that, in the case of Argentina and Egypt, as I recall, the licences related to weapons, whereas in this case I think we are talking about bog-standard chemicals, which the officials had absolutely no reason whatever to believe had any connection with chemical weapons or were likely to be used in that capacity. That was the judgment they made, and I have to say it seemed reasonable. The matter did not come to Ministers, as you have

noted, but it seems to me that the officials were acting perfectly intelligently on the basis of the information they had.

Chair: We now move on to your licence suspension mechanism.

Q110 Sir Malcolm Bruce: This mechanism was introduced in a Foreign Office statement of 13 October 2011. Reference was made to “immediate licensing suspension to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability.” That is generally to be welcomed, but it subsequently seems that it was not entirely clear how and when the suspension would be applied, and we were told that the only time it was applied was when the situation in Egypt deteriorated so badly, so the first question is: how high has the bar been set?

The second question is: at what point do you actually suspend a licence? If a two-year licence is exhausted, it doesn’t matter—it is finished—but if it is extant, there is still the potential to supply. It was not entirely clear what would be suspended at what point, but I guess people would hope that, once you had decided that the situation had deteriorated and arms should not be supplied, you should have the capacity to stop any shipments immediately. However, that appears not to be the case—or can you explain precisely how it works?

Vince Cable: Let me explain. I think it is clear, again in retrospect, that the European Union were applying a lower bar. I did introduce the suspension process, and this partly reflects our earlier discussion of the very good examples you used of what happens when the licensing Government are faced with a rapidly evolving situation. The suspension mechanism, which I think I presented to the House, related to new applications and applications in process. When the European Union introduced their suspension mechanisms for Egypt, they went further—the bar was lower, and it applied to extant licences. Perfectly understandably, that has created some confusion, and I think the view we now take in the Department is that what we need is clarity and simplicity. The European Union suspension mechanism seems to us to be sensible. We are thinking about how we can assimilate it into our existing processes, so that we do not have a British system and a European system operating on different principles. We are trying to absorb the lessons of that Egypt case, and we will apply them in our domestic process.

Q111 Sir Malcolm Bruce: Are there any practical difficulties? The public would take the view that you have issued a licence in good faith, let us assume, in a situation where the licence was justified. Then, let us say, the circumstances change sharply and you conclude that it is no longer appropriate for exports to happen. The public would therefore expect any shipment that is ready to go to be stopped, but it appears that that is not the case and only new licences are stopped or not applied. That is the point: the public would expect that, if you come to that judgment, you can intervene and stop the shipment.

Vince Cable: I think that is the point we have now come to.

Edward Bell: Absolutely. The situation that was established by the Foreign Affairs Council on 21 August takes us beyond the previous announcement, effectively, of suspension only of new licence applications. Given that experience with Egypt, we are going to look now at whether we need to formalise that. But effectively, we have moved beyond the previous position because of the Egypt situation.

In the case of Egypt, you will see that the announcement was made on the 21st and action was taken one week later. There are practicalities, clearly, around identifying the licences and assessing them against the criteria, and it does take a short while to do that. But we moved as quickly as we could, we really did.

Vince Cable: Can I reiterate that, until I introduced that new system, there was no suspension mechanism at all? Now there is, and the question now is where the bar should be.

Q112 Sir Malcolm Bruce: It was welcome and what people were looking for. Presumably, once you have made the decision, you can pick up the phone and say to a company, “Have you got any shipments? Stop them immediately.” You can pretty well do that straight away.

Vince Cable: That is effectively—

Chris Chew: —what we did in relation to Egypt.

Q113 Chair: Secretary of State, do you agree that both suspension and revocation are relatively frail protections, because once a shipment has left these shores and has passed to whichever country it is going to, it is effectively outside UK control? Does not that highlight the critical importance of the original decision as to whether or not an export licence is granted? As you will know, these Committees, in successive reports in this Parliament, have for that reason unanimously recommended that you adopt a more cautious approach to export licence approvals for authoritarian regimes.

Vince Cable: You are quite right, and we have adopted a more cautious approach. The suspension mechanism is part of that approach. As Sir Malcolm has identified, following the European Union precedent, we are now having to think about a lower bar.

Chair: We are now going to move on to the issue of shipments by UK subsidiaries.

Q114 Mike Gapes: Secretary of State, we understand that a UK company, Survitec Group, had supplied via its subsidiary based in Singapore, W.H. Brennan, equipment—including smoke grenades, stun grenades, tear gas projectiles and grenades, pepper spray refills, rubber bullets and 300 multiple projectile cartridges—that went to the police in the Maldives. The police in the Maldives were involved in some pretty brutal activity to prevent a rerun of an election following the coup in 2012 and the political crisis that followed. We were told that that was outside the UK’s legal jurisdiction.

What is the point of this country having controls over British companies and their export regime if they can use a subsidiary of the same company in another country? Do the Government not have any view about that? Don’t we have any sanctions? The United States, for example, has extraterritoriality, and there are other issues that apply. Surely such a practice drives a coach and horses through attempts to control equipment going to a country that might use it for the wrong purposes when there is an internal conflict?

Vince Cable: Your central point is correct. The Americans have extraterritoriality and we do not. That affects a whole set of issues, such as extradition, where we have a very different view from the Americans. We do not apply our law extraterritorially. The issue that you raised is,

from an ethical point of view, very strong, but it would apply to any aspect of an activity by a British subsidiary overseas. You referred to selling weapons to the Maldives, but if a subsidiary of a British company behaved badly overseas in relation to their labour force or their environmental standards or whatever, the British Government do not have legal sanctions over them. If a British company overseas breaches British minimum wage legislation, I cannot invoke that legislation.

Q115 Mike Gapes: Do you accept, Secretary of State, that there is a serious flaw in the current situation? Were it to export from its UK facilities, a company would be subject to controls and perhaps not allowed to export, yet it can use its subsidiary—a subsidiary of a British company—in another part of the world to do the same export, and we do nothing about it.

Vince Cable: It is a frustration and a “flaw,” if you like, but it can be remedied only by fundamentally changing the whole basis on which we operate law in the UK.

Q116 Mike Gapes: Should we not start thinking about that? Otherwise, in this globalised world, companies will increasingly get around our export control regime by using their subsidiaries in other parts of the world.

Vince Cable: But it applies to every aspect of corporate behaviour.

Q117 Mike Gapes: It may do, but is it not time that we started to look at that? Otherwise, our standards are just words and are not applied.

Vince Cable: It is words. One of the things I did was that in October I launched with the Foreign Secretary a set of principles for British companies operating overseas. It was an action plan under United Nations auspices to set standards on human rights that we expect British companies to honour when they are operating overseas. It does not have legal sanctions, and we could not make those legal sanctions unless we completely overthrew the basic principles we have in the way we apply law in the UK.

Q118 Mike Gapes: Other countries do.

Vince Cable: The United States does, but I do not think anybody else does. I agree that there are anomalies in this field. There are some areas where we do apply extraterritoriality—overseas paedophiles, I think, is one—but in most cases we do not, and it would involve a very radical change.

Mike Gapes: There are precedents.

Vince Cable: I accept that.

Chair: Secretary of State, I have to put on the record here that the only reason why extraterritoriality is not extended to the remaining category C goods on the military list is because that was resisted by the previous Government and, most regrettably, it continues to be resisted by the present Government. It is an extraterritoriality that this Committee, in both the previous Parliament and the current one, has unanimously urged on successive Governments.

We now come to another important and growing area of concern, which is the export of UK surveillance equipment.

Q119 Ann McKechin: *The Guardian* reported on 18 November that more than 70 UK companies are selling surveillance technologies that promise off-the-shelf equipment to allow you to snoop, in effect, on millions of people's e-mails, phone calls and text messages. In that article, the Government were quoted as stating that further regulation was necessary, and that they recognised that although the products had legitimate uses, some of them could be used to conduct espionage. The article stated that it was your intention to announce new rules about the sale of such equipment. It was mentioned that the new protocols were likely to be announced this month, and I wonder whether such an announcement has been or will be made.

Vince Cable: I will give you a broad statement and ask officials to follow up. We are aware of the problems around surveillance equipment. They are subject to control, I think, in two cases: first, where you have encryption, and secondly where it is part of a weapons system or has clear military use. Our Department has been engaged with the Foreign Office in trying to update the Wassenaar convention, under which those definitions are applied. Perhaps my officials can bring us up to date.

Edward Bell: I defer to my colleague, who was at Wassenaar when the decision was made.

Chris Chew: On 4 December, the participating states of the Wassenaar arrangement agreed to adopt new controls on two specific technologies. One is software tools that allow someone to insert what is effectively a virus on someone's computer or smartphone, which extracts data or tracks their movements without their knowledge. The second is equipment or software that extracts data from internet traffic and can extract information about who you communicate with and what your social networks are. Those controls were agreed and the 41 participating states of the Wassenaar arrangement have committed to introducing those controls. The UK, along with France, has been instrumental in reaching that agreement and it is something that we worked very hard to achieve. We now need to get those changes implemented in EU law through the EU dual-use regulation, and we will be working hard to make that happen.

Q120 Ann McKechin: Can you give us any kind of indicative timetable for when you think you will be able to implement that change?

Chris Chew: There is a window of opportunity between now and the European Parliament elections in May next year, because it needs the approval of the European Parliament. If we cannot do it in that time, we will have to start from whenever the European Parliament first sits after the May election, so it would be the second half of the year. So there is a small window of opportunity to do it in the next four or five months, but if not it would be the second half of the year.

Q121 Ann McKechin: And it would be your intention to wait for this to happen at EU level rather than to do it unilaterally?

Chris Chew: Our whole approach to this problem has been to do it on a multilateral level through international partners so, yes, that would be our intention.

Ann McKechin: Thank you.

Chair: Lastly, we have two areas of questioning on your Export Control Organisation, Secretary of State. The first is on the processing of applications.

Q122 Mike Crockart: I have a question about good process and about process that is perhaps not quite so good. The annual report on strategic export controls stated that for 2012, the Export Control Organisation had improved its processing of SIELs to 71% processed within 20 working days and 95% processed within 60 working days, so it met the targets of 70% and 95% respectively. The latest quarterly figures show that 80% were completed in 20 working days and 97% within 60 working days. That is a significant improvement. Perhaps you can outline how that improvement from previous years has been achieved.

Edward Bell: Performance has certainly improved in 2013. We have improved performance in a number of ways. We have looked at the way that the online systems that we use operate. So there are enhancements that have come through the online system that we use for processing licence applications and we looked at the way that we have been deploying our staff both here and in the Departments that we work through across Government. So it has been a combination of looking at the ways that we work and the systems that we use to process licence applications. At this stage, certainly on standard individual export licences, we are around 80% on the primary target, which is 70% within 20 working days, and we are actually at about 98.5% on the new secondary target that we introduced this year, which is 99% within 60 working days.

We have seen improvements also in processing times for open individual export licences, where some 75% are now being processed within 60 working days against a 60% target. So we have seen improvements in that area. There is one area where we've still got some work to do and that is the handling of appeals. I take personal responsibility for that because I am one of the people who looks at appeals as I am not involved in the day-to-day process of approving licence applications. Looking at 2012, we had around 22 appeals and only five, I'm afraid, were completed within the target of 20 working days. So we've got to do some work there. Some of those cases are quite complex. They will involve going to Ministers and as a consequence will take extra time to process. But it is an area that we really do need to improve.

Q123 Mike Crockart: Yes. That is a bit of an understatement, to be honest. Looking at the statistics for the last five years, this has been a long-term problem. I wonder whether you have any feeling for why that is, because it has gone from 69% in 2008 to 68% to 51% to 26% to 23%. So that is a trend that has been in progress for five years. It feels a bit late to be sitting here saying, "We are aware of this and we are looking at this." It is a trend.

Edward Bell: It is never too late to put things right, of course.

Q124 Mike Crockart: Yes, but what has gone wrong?

Edward Bell: I think this is about the resources.

Q125 Mike Crockart: Why has this not got the priority that it obviously needs?

Edward Bell: I think because the focus has been elsewhere in terms of the processing time for licences. We do need now—we will do it urgently—to focus on appeals. We are talking about a small number of cases in any one year, but that should not be an excuse for not ensuring—

Q126 Mike Crockart: No, but I would have expected the excuse to be that you have a large number of appeals and that is what causes the issue. A small number of appeals makes it worse, doesn't it?

Edward Bell: These do tend to be complex cases. They will often involve the review of classified information, so we have to ensure that the people taking the appeals have the appropriate clearances. I think we just have to hold up our hands and say, "Look, it has not been working. We need to improve the performance and we will improve the performance in the coming year."

Q127 Mike Crockart: The Export Group for Aerospace and Defence told the Committee that they think it is down to a lack of resource. Is that the basic issue?

Edward Bell: I think it is a combination of factors. I think it is about the complexity of the cases and ensuring that we have sufficient people who have appropriate security clearance to take those cases. So it is not just about resources, but resources are certainly a feature. The question is security clearance, rather than the number of people available to do the work.

Q128 Mike Crockart: But we can expect in the next year to be a lot closer to the aim of 60%, rather than 23%.

Edward Bell: *indicated assent.*

Q129 Katy Clark: The Export Control Organisation website is now located at gov.uk. The Export Group for Aerospace and Defence have said to us that while they think it contains lots of useful information, it is difficult even for regular users to find what they need on it. Is that something you are aware of, and is it something you are doing anything about at the moment?

Vince Cable: There have been a whole lot of issues around the establishment of gov.uk. I think it is now in a much better state than it was when it was originally launched, but I think we are aware that there has been some dissatisfaction in the process.

Chris Chew: gov.uk is structured in a very different way from the previous departmental websites and we had no choice in that; we had to fit to the structure that was given to us. That created some issues with how we organised the information and also the way you search for information is different. I think there has been a learning curve, certainly for us in how we present that information, but also for exporters in how they access it. We have very recently made some changes to the information that is on there and we continue to review it and to try to improve it, so it is an ongoing process. We know there have been some difficulties but we are committed to working to improve it and that is what we are doing.

Edward Bell: We are aware of the concerns and we are addressing them.

Katy Clark: So we should expect improvements.

Chair: Secretary of State, Mr Bell and Mr Chew, thank you very much indeed for being with us this afternoon.

Oral Evidence

Taken before the Committees on Arms Export Controls

on Wednesday 8 January 2014

Members present:

Sir John Stanley (Chair)

Mr Adrian Bailey

Sir Malcolm Bruce

Ann Clwyd

Mike Gapes

Mr James Gray

Fabian Hamilton

Mark Hendrick

Ann McKechin

Peter Luff

Bob Stewart

Derek Twigg

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: **Rt Hon William Hague MP**, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, **Richard Tauwhare**, Head of Arms Export Policy Department, and **James Paver**, Deputy Head of Arms Export Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.

Q130 Chair: Foreign Secretary, welcome to this meeting of the Committees on Arms Export Controls, and thank you for bringing your officials, Mr Richard Tauwhare and Mr James Paver.

I want to commence with what is undoubtedly the single most important policy issue the Committee has been addressing, as you well know. At the Committee's oral evidence session with you on 7 February 2012, we asked you for a clear statement as to the Government's policy on arms exports and internal repression. You said that the policy was: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." Foreign Secretary, is that still the Government's policy?

Mr Hague: Yes. The "clear risk" applies to both parts of the sentence, in line with our long-established policy. The Business Secretary and I have written to the Committee in the last couple of days, following your session with him on 18 December. To be absolutely clear about that, it is the long-standing policy to follow criterion two of the consolidated criteria. We will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression, so "clear risk" applies to the whole of the sentence of two years ago.

Q131 Chair: That is absolutely not a construction that anybody could, I think, reasonably have placed on your previous statement to the Committee on 7 February 2012. It is also a construction that certainly cannot be placed on the policy that was set in October 2000 by the then Government, which the present Government claim they are adhering to. There are two separate tests. One is the “clear risk” test set out in criterion two, which we accept completely. You will have seen from my letter to you of Monday that we repeated this a total of 26 times in our previous report. That is set out in criterion two as the first test, but it is a relatively limited test, because you can always argue that there is a risk, but the risk is not clear and, therefore, the export licence should be granted. Completely separate from criterion two is the policy paragraph in the original Peter Hain statement of October 2000. That is the second crucial test. It is absolutely clear that the wording there is not subject to clear risk. The wording reads: “An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by...concern that the goods might be used for internal repression.” That is a policy that has existed since 2000. That is the policy which you stated to the Committees on 7 February 2012. The only conclusion we can make from the answer you gave to my first question is that you are now resting the Government’s policy solely on criterion two—the clear risk test—and, contrary to what you and your fellow Ministers have been saying to us, which is that there has been no change in policy, that represents a fundamental change of policy from that enunciated by the previous Government, and by yourself on 7 February 2012.

Mr Hague: No, Mr Chairman, I do not agree with that at all. There has not been any change of policy under the last Government or the current Government. You correctly read out the statement of Peter Hain, the Minister in 2000, but what he was giving then, as I understand it, was a summary of the detailed criteria. The last Government pursued the policy of criterion two—of clear risk as the test. That is what we have carried on under the current Government. The policy that has always been applied—officials can come in on this and correct me, because they go back further than Ministers—is the clear risk test, and the policy that is applied now is the clear risk test. There is a particular issue on the suspension of licences to Egypt, as you know, but the clear risk test is the one that is always applied. That is our policy; that is the policy Her Majesty’s Government pursue, and if we wanted to change it we would of course consult our partners in the EU, we would inform Parliament and we would inform our officials, but we have not done any of those things because we have not at any point changed the policy.

Q132 Chair: Foreign Secretary, you say that, but that is not a construction that can be put on your original statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012. As far as the policy of the previous Government is concerned, I can tell you that I have personally spoken informally to Peter Hain, who told me that he deliberately inserted that policy paragraph into the written statement that was made in October 2000. He has personally told me that he attached profound importance to that policy statement. Obviously, it will be for the Committees as to whether they wish to try to seek further evidence from Mr Peter Hain, but I have to make it very clear that your statement today is a fundamentally different statement of policy from the one you put to the Committees on 7 February 2012.

Mr Hague: I do not agree with that at all, Mr Chairman. The “clear risk” stated at the beginning of a sentence can apply to both parts of the sentence. I think that is all we are really

arguing about here. It absolutely applies. Sometimes we use sentences in a brief form to try to assist in getting through the business of Parliament. “Clear risk” applies to both parts, and it always has done. I am very interested in what you say about Peter Hain and would be happy to hear more about that, but I am confident in saying—I must not speak for the previous Government—that they applied the clear risk test just as we apply it. I turn to the officials to confirm that point. They do confirm it; they are nodding in the affirmative for the record.

Q133 Chair: It is for Ministers to speak for the policy of the previous Government.

Mr Hague: I wish it was—but it is those Ministers.

Chair: It is for those Ministers to speak for the policy of the previous Government.

Mr Hague: But be in no doubt that the policy implemented—the policy actually being pursued by the previous Government—was the same as the policy of the current Government.

Q134 Chair: So you state, Foreign Secretary, and that remains to be tested. I go back to the wording of your statement to the Committees. I do not think any reasonable construction is other than the one that I put to you. You said that “clear risk” applies to both parts. I suggest that it does not. It says: “We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts.” It does not then say “or that”. If it was “or that”, the clear risk would apply to both. Quite differently, after the comma it says “or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.” This is not semantics; it is an absolutely fundamental point of policy. It will be for the Committee to take a view as to how you have responded to my question, but on any reasonable construction of the wording, to me the fact that after the comma it says “or which might be used to facilitate internal repression” makes it absolutely clear that the so-called clear risk test did not apply to the second half of the sentence.

Mr Hague: I do not agree with that either. I can see how it is possible to read it a different way, but, since we have always been absolutely clear that it should be read in the way I have described, I might be best placed, as the author of the sentence, to be able to say what it has always meant.

Q135 Chair: I go back to what I said to you earlier, which is that separation of the “clear risk” test from “which might be used to facilitate internal repression” is made even clearer by the fact that the wording “which might be used to facilitate internal repression” is entirely separate, and in a separate paragraph in the original Peter Hain statement.

Mr Hague: We would all be interested to know what Peter Hain says about that, but the policy implemented by the previous Government and the policy implemented by the current Government throughout is to apply the clear risk test to items that could be used for internal repression. Whatever our arguments about the words, that is the policy that for the last 13 years has been pursued in practice. That is how officials and Ministers have been applying these tests to licences; that is the test we are using in practice on a day-to-day basis. I can assure you there has been no change in that. It is possible to make a case for a change, but there has not been a change. If there were to be a change, we would certainly inform Parliament, and in any case we would want to co-ordinate it with our partners across the European Union.

Chair: The Committees will reflect further on the exchange that has taken place. We are now going to move to the very important issue of the Government's policy on export licences for chemicals to Syria.

Q136 Fabian Hamilton: Can I move on to chemical exports to Syria, which I understand were made as late as the middle of 2012 before they were revoked in September 2012? I believe that the two extant licences were for sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride, which are dual-use chemicals. It was suggested that they were going to be used for industrial processes, including the manufacture of toothpaste and the fluoridation of water. I understand that they were revoked in September. The company buying those chemicals was Awad Ammora Co & Partners of Damascus in Syria. Did not the facts that Syria was known to be a major holder of chemical weapons, that the chemicals being exported were both precursors for the production of sarin gas, that the recipient company had been previously identified as a front company for the Assad regime, and that there was a civil war in progress in Syria raise any concerns when the licence applications were considered? I wonder whether you could comment on that. It seems strange that, in spite of the fact that these are dual-use chemicals, no question marks were raised. Did you have an input?

Mr Hague: These were considered, and I think considered correctly, by officials at the time, because they were not covered by the sanctions at the time. On the company Awad Ammora, the information about it was checked across the Government. I think Vince Cable also commented on this when you asked him the other day. There was no information to corroborate the media reports in 2004 linking the company to the Saddam Hussein regime, nor was there any evidence linking the company to any chemical weapons programme, nor have we seen any subsequently. Whatever media reports there have been, the Government have not been able to establish any such evidence, if that is of any reassurance on that point.

Q137 Fabian Hamilton: Can I ask whether it was confirmed to you that these were precursor chemicals for the manufacture of sarin gas? I am not a chemist so I do not know, but presumably you had expert advice on this.

Mr Hague: These would not be considered by Ministers at the time. As you know, we have increased the number of licences that are now considered by Ministers; 300 a year is the latest figure, which is nearly a tenfold increase compared with 2010. There is a huge increase in ministerial scrutiny, but that happens only where there are legal grounds to refuse a licence, so that Ministers really have something to consider.

Q138 Fabian Hamilton: This was in 2012 when the civil war was raging and things were looking pretty grim. We know that the Syrian Government had access to chemical weapons. I just wonder why any export licences at that time were not given to Ministers for approval—for any product.

Mr Hague: There are two things to say about that. First of all, if such a situation arose again, as we have already seen in the Egypt crisis, we would rapidly apply a suspension of all licences in a new Syria crisis, unless all the facts were available very quickly. Using the new mechanism—we are always improving the system and we often use the advice of the Committees to improve the system—we would apply a rapid suspension of all licences. The speed with which licences can be and are reviewed has also been greatly improved since that

time. As we saw in August last year in the case of Egypt, within seven days of the agreement across all EU member states to suspend licences to Egypt, every licence had been dealt with. Quite a lot would have changed since this episode. I do not want to say that everything would now happen exactly as it did then. Procedures have improved. What we can do rapidly to suspend licences has moved on tremendously, even since 2012.

If you look back to whether it was correctly handled at the time, it was right that it would have official consideration, because these chemicals have legitimate commercial uses for making toothpaste, and window and shower frames. Each licence was assessed against the criteria, and there was no embargo on these chemicals at the time; the stated end use was credible and there was no evidence of any link to a chemical weapons programme. When we agreed new sanctions on Syria in June 2012, these licences were revoked and no chemicals were exported under them, which I think is of additional reassurance to people. Those things were all done, and they were done correctly, but would it all happen much faster under today's procedures? Yes, it would.

Q139 Chair: Before we leave dual-use chemicals, in one of the questions I put to the Business Secretary back in October to see whether we were learning any lessons from what had happened in relation to Syria, I asked him to set out the dual-use chemicals that had been approved by the British Government since 2003 both to known holders of chemical weapons and to known non-signatories and ratifiers of the chemical weapons convention. In annex 2 of his reply of 11 October, the Business Secretary gave a detailed list of those export licence approvals to countries other than Syria. They included Burma, North Korea, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Russia and the USA. Have you and the Business Secretary combed through this list and other applications for such countries that are in front of you, and are you making any changes of policy in the light of those revelations, which many of us will find very disturbing?

Mr Hague: I will turn to the officials to add to my reply. In some of those countries the policy will have changed in any case since 2003, so there could be licences issued before such a policy change. In other cases, it is possible that such licences are for the sorts of things we have just been talking about on Syria. While they may be dual use, they may credibly be for the manufacture of toothpaste, so it is very important to bear those things in mind. They will all have been tested against the consolidated criteria. We would be very concerned to hear if any of them had not been. Perhaps the officials would like to add to those points.

Richard Tauwhare: Indeed they were. Anything that is controlled is checked against the consolidated criteria and if it is not in breach or crossing the threshold of any of the criteria—we have to consider whether, for example, it is covered by an embargo—there is no reason to refuse a licence. I admit that some of those countries are non-signatories to the chemical weapons convention, as indeed was the case with Syria, but that in itself is not sufficient reason to refuse a licence.

Q140 Chair: Why should we have been exporting sodium sulphide, which is a dual-use chemical, to a country like North Korea?

Richard Tauwhare: These things have legitimate commercial uses; they are dual-use chemicals. I do not know the specific example, but I have to assume it was the case that there was a legitimate and credible commercial end use, that it was checked against the risks of

diversion to a chemical weapons programme, and it was considered in that case that there were not sufficient grounds to refuse it.

Q141 Chair: Don't Ministers take into account whether a particular country might be a holder of chemical weapons?

Mr Hague: We apply the consolidated criteria and we apply any sanctions regime that is in force. Sanctions usually cover a wide range of goods for any country with chemical weapons, so any licence that has been approved clearly did not fall within those sanctions.

Chair: We are now going to turn to the Government's policy on the export or not of arms to the Syrian opposition.

Q142 Mike Gapes: When the Government, with France, vetoed the continuation of the European Union's arms embargo on Syria in April last year, the reason given—you repeated it in the letter you sent to us—was that it would send a powerful political signal to the Assad regime. Given that the Assad regime continues to murder tens of thousands of people—there are 120,000 dead, Aleppo is being bombed and there is no sign that the Assad regime has in any way moderated its behaviour—how effective do you think that political signal has been?

Mr Hague: So far, none of the political signals from the rest of the world to the Assad regime has been successful in bringing an end to this horror. That does not mean that it is wrong to try them. We have passed presidential statements at the UN Security Council, because we have not been able to pass resolutions there. Many countries in the world have said many things about the Assad regime and its loss of legitimacy. We also took this action on the EU arms embargo. None of those things has yet succeeded in changing the behaviour of the Assad regime, but it does not mean that it is wrong to try them. As we come towards the Geneva peace talks in two weeks' time, which I will attend for this country, all the pressure that can be mustered on the Assad regime is necessary.

Q143 Mike Gapes: The decision was taken to lift the embargo to allow, potentially, the supply of lethal and non-lethal equipment to the Syrian opposition. What is the current position with regard to the supply of lethal and non-lethal equipment? As I understand it, because the Free Syrian Army's headquarters, or bases, were overrun, supply was suspended before Christmas. Can you clarify where we are on that? What kind of equipment is now in the hands of people we do not wish to hold it, and what guarantee do we have that, if there was a resumption of supply, the same thing will not happen and we might end up arming or supplying sophisticated equipment to al-Qaeda-linked groups?

Mr Hague: Under our current policy there is no question of arming. The first part of your question was about what lethal support we give. The answer is that we do not give any.

Mike Gapes: We don't but other countries do.

Mr Hague: I can answer here only for Her Majesty's Government.

Q144 Mike Gapes: Are there any other EU countries that are?

Mr Hague: I am not aware of other countries in the EU doing so. Certainly, the United Kingdom does not. In fact, it has not been our approach in any of the conflicts in the middle east, since the so-called Arab spring began in 2011, to send arms to any of the

protagonists. Even in Libya, where our own armed forces were engaged, we did not do that, and we have not done that in Syria.

Q145 Mike Gapes: You are telling me that no lethal equipment of any kind has been supplied to any faction of the Syrian opposition?

Mr Hague: By the United Kingdom. Yes, that is right. That remains the policy. You quite rightly ask about non-lethal equipment and the position since what happened with the seizure of the Supreme Military Council's stores in early December. With them, we have given some non-lethal equipment; for instance, in August last year we gave them escape hoods, in order to escape chemical attack, detector paper for chemical attack and nerve agent pre-treatment tablets. Typically, we have given them equipment that might save lives—that they could use to save lives—but that is not lethal to anybody else. The latest equipment we were proposing to send to them included commercially available medical and communications equipment. Even that we have put on hold, given what happened at their stores and headquarters in December, and we are keeping that situation under very close review to see when and if we can resume such supplies.

Q146 Mike Gapes: If you were to resume, what certainty is there that it will not again fall into the hands of the bad people?

Mr Hague: I should have said in answer to the last question that we are not aware of any UK-supplied equipment having been seized by anybody else. The great majority of these stores are intact, and the great majority have also been checked. There is no report of any loss of any UK-supplied equipment, so that should be of some reassurance. Clearly, we would want to know how they were going to work together and how secure areas are. Additional assurance on this comes from the fact that we are not supplying any lethal equipment to them, so, even if it did fall into the wrong hands, it would not be something that could be used against other people.

Q147 Mike Gapes: Does that include vehicles?

Mr Hague: We have supplied a small number of vehicles—four-wheel drive vehicles—but they are not affected by the recent incident.

Q148 Mike Gapes: But vehicles could potentially be used to assist people who had got weapons from elsewhere moving around, and therefore would be a force multiplier for them in the conflict.

Mr Hague: There is no evidence that the vehicles we have supplied have fallen into anybody's hands other than the people we supplied them to, and at the moment we are not supplying more vehicles.

Q149 Mike Gapes: Your statement to us in February 2012 said that you would not export where it might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts. Is it not the case that, if we are supplying even non-lethal equipment in a military conflict to assist one side in that conflict, among the many sides in the Syrian conflict, we are going to help to prolong that conflict? Is there not some inconsistency between the stated position of the Government from 2012 and the decision with regard to arming elements within the Syrian opposition?

Mr Hague: No, for several reasons. Unless there is a moderate opposition able to function in Syria—one that is committed to a democratic non-sectarian future for Syria—the conflict there will be even longer than it might otherwise be. It will become even harder to bring about a political solution. If Syria faces a choice only between Assad and extremists, there will not be a political solution. By helping a moderate opposition, we are trying to keep alive the possibility of a political solution, and we are also only sending equipment that helps to save lives. We are not sending equipment that is being used to prolong a conflict; we are sending equipment that is being used, hopefully, to try to create the circumstances in which conflict can be brought to an end.

Q150 Mike Gapes: The Americans are reported to be rethinking their position. They are saying that their original position, which we supported, that Assad must go, has become impossible. Therefore, they are rethinking, with regard to the possibility of some deal at Geneva only being possible if the regime, in some part, remains. What is our position on that?

Mr Hague: There are several points in your question. We have all been clear that some part of the regime plays a part in a political solution in Syria. The Geneva communiqué on 30 June 2012, which we, the United States, Russia and others supported, speaks of forming a transitional government in Syria drawn from regime and opposition. That is a different matter from Assad having a role in the future of Syria, because that sentence goes on to say “a transitional government formed by mutual consent.” It is impossible to imagine President Assad presiding over the future of Syria by the consent of a wide range of parties, including the opposition. That has been our position, and it is the position of the United States. In the London 11 communiqué in October, Secretary Kerry and I put our names to the same communiqué on Syria not having a future with Assad there. We will be meeting again this weekend and we will adopt a new communiqué, but it will be fully consistent with the communiqué of October.

Q151 Derek Twigg: I noted with interest that in the House, when you spoke about this, and in your letter, you talked about non-lethal weapons, not equipment, but we have been talking just about equipment. To carry on with what Mr Gapes has been asking, can we be clear about two things? In terms of the equipment that has been supplied, you have mentioned vehicles and communications equipment. Can you give an idea of exactly what that communication equipment is and what the vehicles are? Are they capable of mounting weapons? What do you think is the key indicator that weapons would not fall into the hands of the extremists at a future point?

Mr Hague: We are not planning to supply lethal equipment.

Q152 Derek Twigg: I am not talking about that. I am talking about your answer to Mr Gapes. There were two things: vehicles and communications equipment. You were very clear about that.

Mr Hague: The details we can give about those are set out in the minutes we send to parliamentary Committees in the House.

Derek Twigg: I am asking you today.

Mr Hague: Yes, but that is the information we are able to supply.

Q153 Derek Twigg: Can you just repeat it?

Mr Hague: For obvious reasons, we cannot go into the detail of communications equipment, because that would help the Assad regime to frustrate, intercept or otherwise deal with it.

Q154 Derek Twigg: It could fall into rebel hands as well.

Mr Hague: It is for the opposition, and it includes commercially available communications equipment and medical equipment. What we sent them in the last consignment were escape hoods, detector paper and nerve agent pre-treatment tablets. On other occasions in the past, we have sent water purification kits and other commercial communications equipment.

Q155 Derek Twigg: I understand the point about specific communications equipment. Can we come back to vehicles now, because you do not want to answer the issue?

Mr Hague: No, I am very happy to answer the issue. The vehicles have been set out in a minute to Parliament—a small number of bullet-proof four-by-four vehicles. I think there were five of those involved. That is what we have sent them. It is all non-lethal, and we have no evidence that it is being used for any purpose other than what it was given for.

Q156 Derek Twigg: You say you stopped providing equipment because you were unsure as to whether it would fall into the hands of Islamist extremists. What key evidence would need to be provided to you to restart the supply of this non-lethal equipment?

Mr Hague: To be clear, I was not saying we were unsure. Because the stores at Bab al-Hawa of the Supreme Military Council were seized by other groups, we put it on hold. We are not aware, including following checks on that equipment, of any UK-supplied equipment having been seized by any other group.

What are the sort of things we want to know in order to be able to resume supplies? Obviously, we and other countries who do this would have to have a high degree of confidence about the probability of such incidents being reduced, the stores being as secure as they possibly could be and continued assurances about the use of such equipment.

Q157 Derek Twigg: You do not have that yet?

Mr Hague: Given what happened in December, we need time to take stock and have the necessary confidence. We have not taken any decision yet, nor is any decision imminent, about resuming such supplies.

Chair: We are now going to turn to the extraordinary volume of automatic weapons, assault rifles and so on, which the Government have approved for export, ostensibly for anti-piracy purposes.

Q158 Ann McKechin: In the 15 months up to June 2013, licences were given for over 30,000 assault rifles, 4,200 combat shotguns, over 11,000 rifles, 1,200 sniper rifles and over 5,000 guns classified as sporting guns. When we raised this issue with the Secretary of State for BIS and his officials in December, it appeared that there was not one part of the process

for examining licences where you actually look at the cumulative impact of the number of licences you are granting. Would that be correct?

Mr Hague: When you were asking him about this, I think he undertook to look into it, which is entirely reasonable. That is what we should do. The Committee raises a good point about this. However, we do have to bear certain things in mind. One is that the vast majority of the private maritime security companies operating in the Indian ocean are British, so probably a large proportion of the volume of such weapons is coming through our licensing system rather than that of another country. Secondly, a proportion of the weapons is in maintenance at any one time. Thirdly, the companies need a degree of operational flexibility; they will always have more such weapons than they are deploying. Furthermore, approximately 4,500 ships transit the high-risk area every month. Once you think about that figure—4,500 ships every month—it puts these figures into something of the right perspective, but that does not mean we should not have a look at this and satisfy ourselves and the Committee on the point you raise about the overall quantity.

Q159 Ann McKechin: I take it that there is an average number of weapons per vessel, and some will be on standby and some will be in operation, but it does seem astonishing, if I take the example of Mauritius, that in a period of just 15 months, we have exported over 5,000 assault rifles and 3,200 rifles. It does prompt the question of how many vessels have been passing by Mauritius in that 15-month period to justify that level of export. Are you satisfied, Secretary of State, that all the weapons are being used for their stated purpose—anti-piracy—and are not being diverted? Have you made any study of the problem of diversion, which clearly is present in that region? What controls exist for monitoring the weapons once they have been shipped?

Mr Hague: There are a lot of controls. These companies have to meet strict conditions. They have to keep detailed records. They have to provide training for staff, and they have to have clear lines of accountability. Their UK offices are subject to regular inspection. Those visits are by BIS. They must sign up to the international code of conduct for private security service providers.

You ask about Mauritius and the thousands of items involved. There are 4,500 ships per month transiting through that area, which is close by Mauritius. We do not have evidence of the diversion of any of these weapons. If we did, we would take it extremely seriously. It is important to point out that, so far, this policy has been a contributing factor to the huge reduction in pirate attacks in recent times. It is one of the factors. Not a single merchant ship carrying private armed security guards has been hijacked. This is part of a successful policy overall. We have to be very vigilant about it. You are quite right to ask these questions, but we are vigilant about it. It is a successful policy, so far, and we have not seen evidence of any diversion. It is an important issue. Do the officials want to add anything? Have I missed out anything?

Richard Tauwhare: No.

James Paver: No.

Q160 Ann McKechin: It does seem extraordinary that, given the sheer volume of guns, there has not been one case or suspicion of diversion over that period of time. I certainly accept, and I am sure the Committee accepts, the need for this type of equipment

and the particular dangers in the region. You are right to comment on the success, but the Committee is still concerned—given the sheer volume of weapons over a relatively short period, and given that their age, in terms of how long they can be utilised, is quite substantial—about why we have not made more spot-check investigations, to ensure that we have the most rigorous possible types of criteria to prevent diversion.

Mr Hague: The checks that I mentioned take place regularly; they are taking place all the time. These questions are absolutely understandable. There are questions about it from NGOs who might be concerned. I notice that in their evidence to you Amnesty International said they had no specific evidence of large-scale diversions taking place, or weapons being secured in unsafe facilities. We do not have evidence of any diversions taking place. We expect these companies to uphold very high standards. We will continue the inspections and regular checks that I have spoken of, and the consequences for any company that did not do so would of course be very serious. They certainly would not be getting any more licences if they did not observe the necessary standards.

Q161 Mr Gray: I have a small question, and the detail may be for BIS rather than yourselves. What are 5,196 sporting guns used for?

Mr Hague: That definitely is one to turn to the officials to answer.

Richard Tauwhare: We would have to check that. This is probably one of the peculiarities of the rating system for export licences. Certain bits of equipment come under certain headings. I dare say that, although these particular cases may come under that heading, they are in fact useful for anti-piracy operations.

Q162 Mr Gray: It does seem an enormous number. There are 4,200 combat shotguns, but these are different from combat shotguns. These are something other than combat shotguns. Oughtn't you really to know what they are for? They must have a purpose; they cannot be for shooting snipe.

Mr Hague: Between the FCO and BIS, we will write to you with further details on this point—so far as we can.

Chair: Another important area is the Government's policy on the export of surveillance equipment and the human rights implications of that.

Q163 Bob Stewart: Some concern has been raised about countries with bad human rights records getting more surveillance equipment, because surveillance equipment can be used to intercept e-mails and the rest of it. Do you share the concerns that some people are raising, mainly NGOs of course?

Mr Hague: We agree that action is necessary to strengthen export controls in this area, over certain cyber security-related equipment and software. These products have legitimate uses in defending networks, and tracking and disrupting criminals. Many of the exports listed under cryptographic headings are also, for instance, equipment for mobile telephone networks that have a cryptographic aspect to them. Sometimes when you see that several billion pounds of cryptographic material has been exported, it is an item of that kind, but we have to recognise that such equipment can also be used to conduct espionage, to track and disrupt political opponents and to restrict freedom of expression. We need to move the policy on, on this subject. That is why the UK has been leading work in the Wassenaar

arrangement, which resulted in agreement last month to adopt new controls on specific technologies of concern. These are going to be implemented through the EU's controls on dual-use items. We also made further proposals to the relevant countries as necessary. We are also helping industry to produce guidance on the potential risks posed by cyber-security exports. Our policy is moving forward on this as technology is changing, and we are also open to further suggestions and ideas about what we should do.

Q164 Bob Stewart: Thank you, Foreign Secretary. I think you have also answered my second question, which was fundamentally that in 2012 when the Government addressed this Committee, they suggested that international action was required on surveillance equipment. You have just suggested that international action is pending, or has taken place. Do you have any other comment apart from that?

Mr Hague: It is under way and we are at the forefront of it. We are leading it. We are putting forward proposals. Officials in the FCO and BIS are doing a very good job on this. We are working with other member states, with the European Commission and the European Parliament to implement these changes, I hope, before the European Parliament elections in May. If that does not prove possible, we certainly want them adopted later this year. We are pushing for changes in this area, and successfully so.

Q165 Chair: Following the answer you have just given to Bob Stewart's last question, as you will be well aware, it was reported yesterday that the OECD has just launched a major investigation into exports from, I assume, the UK, by G4S of surveillance equipment to the Israeli security authorities for use in the Palestinian occupied territories. Can we be assured that the British Government will be co-operating fully in the OECD's investigation?

Mr Hague: We work closely with the OECD on all issues, so whatever the OECD want to ask about, we will of course assist them with; I do not think there will be any problem in doing that. It is important to bear in mind as a general comment—this may not be the point that the OECD are looking into—that there is a licence for cryptographic equipment to Israel which involves software for building public mobile phone networks in residential areas and for small businesses, so sometimes what is listed as cryptographic material is something of that nature.

Q166 Chair: I just make the point that the reports yesterday were very explicit that this was surveillance equipment being supplied to the Israeli security forces.

Mr Hague: We will have a look at that, and of course we will always work with the OECD on any issue.

Chair: We are now going to turn to the Government's new procedure for the suspension of export licences.

Q167 Sir Malcolm Bruce: I think it was generally welcomed that, in the light of the Arab spring, the Government reviewed the policy and said they would allow for the immediate suspension of licences where there was a sharp deterioration in security and stability, but it has since emerged that that policy applied only to new licences rather than to extant licences. Can you say whether or not it has been extended? We had a discussion with the Secretary of State for BIS, and I got the impression from what he said—indeed, I think he

said it—that you recognised you had unexpired licences and there was not much point in letting them complete that if you were not issuing new licences. What you had to do was stop the flow of equipment because of the deteriorating situation. Could you tell us exactly what the situation is?

Mr Hague: The policy that he announced in February 2012 was to allow the Government quickly to suspend the processing of pending licence applications. However, that does not mean that we cannot change that policy if necessary, if the circumstances require it. In the case of Egypt, where we used a suspension on 21 August last year, we agreed among EU Foreign Ministers that all of us—all member states of the EU—would suspend export licences to Egypt. So we did that—including the extant licences. From memory, that involved 47 licences. We suspended them all while the situation became clearer. As the situation became clearer, we have subsequently revoked some licences and confirmed others; some remain suspended. In that case, we applied it to extant licences as well. We have the flexibility to do so, and I think we will learn from experience as we go along.

Q168 Sir Malcolm Bruce: You are saying basically that, in future, licence suspension will review all licences including extant ones. It is nonsense to suspend new licences if there is more equipment from previous licences still going into the particular country.

Mr Hague: It will depend on the situation, but in that case we did suspend all the extant ones. We were able to do so within a week, as I mentioned earlier in another context. Officials were able to go through all the licences within a week, much faster than the incidences we were talking about in Syria a couple of years ago. The systems are now in existence to do that. We will have to judge each case as it comes along. We have considered using suspension on several other occasions in response to changes in circumstances in the last year, but in most of those cases enough information has been available quickly enough for us to be able to determine whether licences needed revoking, or whether to continue with them, so we have not needed to use the suspension mechanism in other cases.

Q169 Sir Malcolm Bruce: That partly answers my second and final question. NGOs were concerned that you had set the bar too high. What you have said is that you will review the licensing situation when you see a crisis developing, but their concern was that, for example, in Mali it did not seem to be applied at all. I appreciate that Mali was not our top area of interest; it is much more a sphere for the French. Nevertheless, are you satisfied? What you have just said is that you have considered them, but are you satisfied that you are quick enough to respond? The world is changing very fast and moving very unpredictably. I think you will accept that the public and the media will inevitably come to your door if they feel that in a changing situation you have not acted quickly or comprehensively enough to prevent weapons or other unsuitable equipment from moving into a crisis situation. Do you accept the NGOs' concerns, or do you feel you can meet them?

Mr Hague: They are entirely understandable questions, and I am very conscious of our responsibility, which you point out. Since you raise Mali, I use that as an example of why we did not use the suspension mechanism in that particular case. We considered using it in January last year, but it was not necessary because, within a short time of the crisis beginning, we had enough information to make valid risk assessments against the consolidated criteria. In any event, in the case of Mali the only military list equipment licensed for export since

January has been protective equipment and communications equipment for use by UN personnel. I do not think people would want us not to be able to supply such things to the UN.

Q170 Sir Malcolm Bruce: The net effect of the Mali conflict was that it displaced people with weapons to neighbouring states. Do you keep the situation under review and say, “We may have closed that avenue, but we may possibly have opened up another problem area”?

Mr Hague: That is a wider policy issue about what happens in the whole of the Sahel region. We are advocating, and pursuing with France and other EU member states, a comprehensive political and development approach to try to stop the problems of the Sahel spreading. That demands a broader policy response that goes far beyond export controls. We are very alert to emerging problems. We will not hesitate to use the suspension mechanism. Clearly, when it is necessary and it is used, it does give us the time to check the facts, so the announcement by the Business Secretary in 2012 is an important policy innovation, and I have no doubt, sadly, that it will be necessary to use it again.

Chair: We are now going to come to the Government’s export policy on arms to authoritarian regimes, on which the Committees have taken a somewhat different position from the Government, but on which we thought we had an encouraging response from the Business Secretary.

Q171 Ann Clwyd: Foreign Secretary, can you confirm that the FCO along with BIS have accepted the Committees’ recommendation, made twice, that the Government should adopt a more cautious approach to the issuing of licences to regimes with authoritarian records?

Mr Hague: We will apply the consolidated criteria, but we do so with the benefit of experience all the time. There has been quite a lot of experience in this subject over the last couple of years, given the number of suspensions and revocations we have had to make. We apply these things with that in mind, and we are very conscious of what the Committee has said about this. We are always cautious on this subject.

Q172 Ann Clwyd: Can you explain how this greater caution is manifested in your approach on licensing?

Mr Hague: As I think the Committee knows, we are very careful about all the licences. It is a rigorous process—a process that has been improved over recent years. It is informed by all FCO information—all our understanding of the world—about what may happen in a country; the risk of internal repression, and the risk of regional or internal conflict. We are able to weigh all those things heavily, so we use all the information available to us.

Q173 Ann Clwyd: In a country like the Maldives, where the political situation is very unsettled, what would be your approach to licensing?

Mr Hague: In the case of the Maldives, the only licences I can see listed are for use by private security companies in anti-piracy operations, so it overlaps with our earlier discussion. The Maldives is part of that area. Our assessment is that weapons are held in secure storage while in the Maldives, and that the companies concerned are signed up to the

international code of conduct for private security service providers. Although the Maldives is listed as the country on the licence, these are for private security companies for anti-piracy work; they are not for the Government of the Maldives to use.

Q174 Ann Clwyd: But they could fall into the hands of the Government of the Maldives.

Mr Hague: That goes back to our earlier discussion. First, many of these things will be held offshore. Secondly, if any of those companies allow weapons to fall into hands different from those they are licensed for, those companies are not getting any more licences.

Chair: I want to turn now to the key area of the Government's policy on arms exports to countries of human rights concern.

Q175 Mr Bailey: Minister, you will be aware that a previous report by the Committees raised this issue. There are 27 countries of human rights concern, plus a further five listed as causing concern. In your reply to the previous Committee report, the Government gave reassurance that in effect all these licences were compliant. Having looked at some examples—Iran: cryptographic equipment and components for military electronic equipment; Israel: components for electronic warfare equipment and surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles—it is breathtaking. Can you really say that the 3,461 extant licences as of May 2013 comply with the Government's policy not to issue licences where they judge there is a clear risk that the "proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which may be used to facilitate internal repression"?

Mr Hague: All licences will have been assessed against those criteria. Yes, absolutely. As you know, we have the power to revoke licences if we think those criteria are no longer met, and we do sometimes revoke licences wherever there is any such evidence. The UK does not offer trade support for Iran, although we do not have a ban on trade with Iran, as the Committees know. The types of things that received licences were civil aviation, machine tools, lubricants and various cryptographic equipment as well. It is those sorts of things, and those are not covered. They would be items that are not covered by sanctions, and that meet the consolidated criteria.

Q176 Mr Bailey: But given the number of countries, the scale and the potential use of something, do you not think that perhaps it is an area that needs to be re-examined? With respect, Minister, your reply seems rather complacent.

Mr Hague: Don't take it as being complacent. We are never complacent about these things. Over the last few years, I have seen how rapidly issues can arise on export licences. That is why we introduced the suspension mechanism and that is why we revoke licences. There is absolutely nothing complacent about it. A huge amount of work goes on in testing licences against the consolidated criteria, with a tenfold increase in the last three years in the number of licences referred to Ministers for decision: 300 licences a year is about one a day—that Ministers consider ourselves—compared with 39 a year in 2010. I am not criticising my predecessors. The world has changed since then, particularly with events in the middle east. There is no complacency. We are very rigorous about it. We do not hesitate to turn down licences, but we do so in a way that is consistent, that is justified under the law and under the

criteria, that can be defended and that is not obstructing normal trade, which these licensing systems are not intended to do.

Q177 Mr Bailey: In response to the Committees' previous report, you said that basically you had daily monitoring, or facilities for daily monitoring. Do you actually carry that out now on the extant contracts with these countries?

Mr Hague: Officials can probably best describe the processes involved. With every licence we ask the relevant questions. Ministers are frequently asking questions about many of the countries concerned. Richard or James, do you want to add to this?

Richard Tauwhare: When we are considering the risks against the criteria, we go into a great deal of detail, particularly for those countries which are of human rights concern, not only those on the FCO's list but any country where we know there are human rights concerns. We go into a lot of detail. We ask the post. We look at NGO evidence as well. We routinely monitor what Amnesty, Human Rights Watch and others are saying, and we take all of that into account in the advice we give to Ministers. After the event, posts have a standing requirement to keep an eye on developments in human rights in their countries and to report back to us if there are any developments that might affect our licensing.

Q178 Chair: Foreign Secretary, you will be aware that the Committees, for the very first time, in our last report brought together the Foreign Office's designated 27 countries of top human rights concern worldwide, and we asked you to list all the extant arms export licences to those 27 countries. Did it come as any surprise to you that there were over 3,000 such licences and that their total value was over £12 billion?

Mr Hague: Not really, Mr Chairman, no. This is a large industry for this country and it is a legitimate trade. We do not have a trade ban with those countries of concern, so trade takes place between the UK and those countries. They involve some of the biggest economies in the world. As you know from the list of 27, they include the second biggest economy in the world: China.

Q179 Chair: But of top human rights concern to the British Government?

Mr Hague: All these countries are countries of concern. We have a no-holds-barred report on human rights. We publish that every year. We are working on this year's report, and we now do quarterly updates. Whatever the state of our relations with these countries, we do not hold back from speaking about our human rights concerns, but it is not the policy of this Government, or of previous British Governments, to prevent trade with countries that are of human rights concern. Specific sanctions may apply to some of them and we implement those sanctions, but that is different from obstructing all trade with them.

Chair: We turn now to another key area: the export of cryptographic equipment.

Q180 Ann Clwyd: Does it not seem extraordinary that we are selling cryptographic equipment to countries such as Iran, Libya, Russia and Zimbabwe?

Mr Hague: I made a couple of references to this in earlier answers, because it relates to other subjects we have discussed. The majority of such licences are for commercial equipment for commercial end use: building public mobile phone networks; internet infrastructure; or building virtual private networks for private companies. We would not grant a licence if there

was a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression. Additionally, as I was discussing with Mr Stewart, we are moving forward the whole international policy on this, so that the requirements are going to get tougher, but the great majority of these licences are for things of that kind.

Q181 Ann Clwyd: Can the Committees be expected to believe that none of the 194 extant cryptographic licences to China, valued at £571.8 million, might not have either a clear risk, or might be used to facilitate internal repression in that country?

Mr Hague: We go through each of these licences individually. Something that is to build a virtual private network for a private company is not something where there is a clear risk of it being used for internal repression in China. The majority of licences are for things of that kind, and of the kinds that I described a moment ago. I do not know whether the officials would like to offer additional reassurance on that.

Chair: It might be easier if you submitted a letter, if that is all right.

Mr Hague: Of course.

Q182 Chair: Ann Clwyd raised China. Surely, China is a country where you cannot make a distinction between the private sector and the public sector; they are effectively together, and that is why our eyebrows rise when the largest single number of cryptographic equipment licences in this group of countries is to China—nearly 200.

Mr Hague: China has become a more complex economy and society. That is one point. Secondly, given that it is now the second biggest economy in the world, it is not surprising that it shows up to a large extent in export figures. Thirdly, we are able to analyse to a good level of detail the uses to which particular technologies can be put, and we are very mindful of that in assessing each licence.

Chair: We will move on to the UK consolidated criteria and the EU common position.

Q183 Mark Hendrick: In the Government's response to the Committees' report last year, they stated that they intended to review the UK's consolidated criteria in order to bring them into line with the EU's common position. In your response to our last report, it was stated that the EU had completed its review process on the EU common position "provisionally." What was meant by "provisionally"? When will the final review be concluded?

Mr Hague: The External Action Service of the EU is managing the review of the common position, so the time scales are in their hands; the time scales are set in Brussels. The review of the legal text is complete, and all the member states of the EU are satisfied that the current eight criteria have stood the test of time and do not need amendment at this stage. That was announced at the end of 2012. We are also all agreed that there are practical steps we need to take to improve co-ordination at EU level. We agreed to look at the EU users' guide to bring it up to date. It needs updating in the light of the recent adoption of the arms trade treaty. Those are the things that are now being worked on, and we will keep you up to date. We are working on bringing the criteria into line with the ATT and the EU common

position. I will write to you shortly about the update of the criteria, and when and how we expect it to take place.

Q184 Mark Hendrick: Will you publish the outcome of the EU's provisional review? You mentioned briefly the review of the UK's consolidated criteria. Is there going to be a public consultation on that?

Mr Hague: There is a review with EU member states. On the UK consolidated criteria, the work going on is on the subjects I have just mentioned: bringing it into line with the arms trade treaty and updates to the EU common position. On publication, that is up to the EU to decide. I do not see any reason why it should not be published, and we would be in favour of doing so.

Q185 Mark Hendrick: And the public consultation on the UK's review of the consolidated criteria?

Mr Hague: I will write to the Committees about the update of the criteria, and we will take that request into account.

Q186 Chair: Do you agree that the EU common position is a floor, not a ceiling?

Mr Hague: Yes. It is not something we would want to be below, so it is a floor.

Chair: And you don't preclude being above.

Mr Hague: We don't preclude being above it.

Q187 Fabian Hamilton: We have been informed by the UK working group of NGOs that the revised users' guide, incorporating changes to criteria seven and eight, to do with the basis on which you can export arms and associated materials to countries throughout the world, has been issued, and that member states of the EU Council working group on conventional arms are expected to use that guidance on a trial basis. Are the British Government using this new guidance, and, if so, what impact has it had so far?

Mr Hague: In the case of the UK implementing changes to criterion eight, for instance, it does not make that much difference because we already have a sophisticated methodology for criterion eight, but we are already implementing at national level the changes on this. Richard might want to add a sentence.

Richard Tauwhare: The revised guidance was agreed on a provisional basis for criteria seven and eight. Now all the member states are giving it a trial run to see how it works, and we are doing the same. It is working well. We are also going on, in Brussels, to look at the user guide on the other criteria to see what might need updating with them.

Q188 Fabian Hamilton: The UK working group suggested to us that the British Government should persuade EU member states to publish the reviews of criteria seven and eight without further delay, and if they do not agree, we should publish it unilaterally. Would you try to persuade member states to publish the review, and, if not, will you publish it unilaterally?

Mr Hague: I am happy to look at that. I am always in favour of transparency. We are often ahead of the rest of the EU on that.

Richard Tauwhare: We are hoping that the review will be complete later this year. We will give it a trial run. We will complete the review of all the criteria, and, once it is agreed, there will be a new EU users' guide, and that will be published.

Mr Hague: We will favour transparency.

Chair: We come to the arms trade treaty.

Q189 Ann McKechin: Perhaps I could combine two questions in one given the time constraints. When will the Government implement the secondary legislation to be compliant with the arms trade treaty, and by what date do you expect the Government to ratify the treaty?

Mr Hague: On ratification, Parliament completed its procedures on 4 November. We cannot ratify until we receive agreement from the European Parliament, because the treaty covers matters of EU exclusive competence, in addition to matters of national competence, so we are not in independent control of that. With that in mind, we expect to ratify by the spring of this year.

On the subject of the secondary legislation, that is needed to ensure it is consistent with UK legislation. BIS are in the lead on this. The current plan is to roll the amendments together with other changes, such as the ones to the military list, and updates to the consolidated criteria, so that we can produce a single package, as it were, for businesses, and minimise the additional regulatory burden on businesses.

Q190 Chair: What is the Government's policy on developing a code of conduct on the indirect financing of cluster munitions?

Mr Hague: On cluster munitions, as you know and as your question implies, direct financing is clearly prohibited; indirect financing is not. We think that a voluntary approach is preferable to Government intervention, but we do not rule out, as I think I said last year, the Government's taking a more active role. I would like to see how things develop. I welcome the steps taken on a voluntary basis by a number of British financial institutions, but we will continue to monitor this closely. We will look at it again with the financial sector, if necessary, to see when and whether there is scope and need for the Government to act.

Chair: Foreign Secretary, we seem to have managed to beat the Division. I am grateful to you, Mr Tauwhare and Mr Paver. Thank you very much indeed.

Oral Evidence

Taken before the Committees on Arms Export Controls

on Monday 7 April 2014

Members present:

Sir John Stanley (Chair)

Katy Clark

Ann Clwyd

Mike Gapes

Mr James Gray

Fabian Hamilton

Ann McKechin

Bob Stewart

Gisela Stuart

Examination of Witness

Witness: **Rt Hon Peter Hain, MP**, gave evidence.

Q191 Chair: Mr Hain, welcome to our Committee for this formal oral evidence session. We have asked you to come and give oral evidence to us today on what is, probably, the key policy issue for these Committees, which is Government policy on the export of arms that can be used for internal repression. The purpose of this session is to obtain an understanding from you as to what the policy was of the previous Government and whether that policy has or has not been changed by the present Government.

By way of background and for the record, I just need to recite the key ministerial statements in chronological order that we are dealing with. We start with the written answer that you gave as the then Minister of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 26 October 2000, when you set out the United Kingdom's consolidated criteria for arms exports. In your written answer, you made two policy statements with regard to the export of arms that could be used for internal repression.

Those two policy statements were as follows. The first was in the last paragraph of the opening section of your answer before you went on to list each of the numbered criteria. It read as follows: "An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by [...] concern that the goods might be used for internal repression [...]." That was your first statement and provided what I would describe as a broad test of whether these types of goods should be exported where they might be used for internal repression.

You then went on to state a second policy in criterion two, which I would describe as a very much narrower test. You said "the Government will [...] not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression."

So, the conclusion that we have drawn in this Committee from the last Government and under this Government is that you announced two tests, one a broad test and one a very narrow

test—the so-called “clear risk” test. That was the policy that, as far as we understand it, continued throughout the lifetime of the previous Government.

We then come to the present Government, and the first policy statement that was made during the present Government, not surprisingly perhaps, was in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of the so-called “Arab spring” at the beginning of 2011, when it was found that a significant number of UK-approved arms exports that could be used for internal repression were found in Arab-spring countries in the middle east. That statement was made by the then Foreign Officer Minister, Alistair Burt, in a press statement on 18 February 2011, in which he said this: “The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.” That seemed to the Committees to be a faithful and accurate reflection of the two tests, one broad and one narrow, which you had previously announced back in October 2000.

We returned to the same issue approximately a year later when the Foreign Secretary came in front of us on 7 February 2012. I put this question to the Foreign Secretary: “As far as arms exports that involve weapons that could be used for internal repression are concerned, your junior Minister, Alistair Burt, in his press release statement on 18 February last year, entirely accurately and correctly summarised the previous Government’s position carried forward by the present Government on policy in this area. He summarised that accurately in these words: ‘The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.’

“Foreign Secretary, has that policy changed, or is it as correctly stated by Mr Alistair Burt?

“Mr Hague: That is still the policy.”

The Foreign Secretary went on to say: “The ‘or’, as you have pointed out on other occasions, is important.”

So the two tests continued in that statement.

However, two years later, on 8 January of this year, when the Foreign Secretary came in front of us, we had a further exchange on this issue, and I put the following question to the Foreign Secretary: “At the Committee’s oral evidence session with you on 7 February 2012, we asked you for a clear statement as to the Government’s policy on arms exports and internal repression. You said that the policy was: ‘We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.’ Foreign Secretary, is that still the Government’s policy?

“Mr Hague: Yes.”

Then the Foreign Secretary went on to say: “The ‘clear risk’—“clear risk” being in quotes—“applies to both parts of the sentence.” In other words, the broad test appears to have gone out of the window.

That, indeed, is confirmed by the Business Secretary's written ministerial statement of 25 March 2014 in which the consolidated criteria that you, Mr Hain, announced to Parliament on 26 October 2000 have now been replaced by the Business Secretary's present statement, headed "The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria." In that written ministerial statement, the words of the broad test that were in your original consolidated criteria have been removed and do not appear. The only reference to arms exports and internal repression is the narrow test. It is there again in criterion two. It reads as follows: "...the Government will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression."

The first question, Mr Hain, I would like to put to you is this. Are the Committees right or not in understanding that throughout the period of the previous Government you applied both the broad test, which I quoted in your original consolidated criteria, and also the narrow "clear risk" test?

Mr Hain: Sir John, thank you for inviting me. I agree with you that there was the broad test that related to concern, which is stated in the preamble to my written ministerial statement, and then there was the—sorry, the narrow test that related to concern. Then there was the broader test. Well, it depends which way you define this. There was a broad test that related to concern, and then there was a narrow test that related to clear risk. Why did I include both of those? I included both of those because different people might share a concern that exports could be used for internal repression. We might share that concern. Hence, on the second test, we might have a different judgment of the risk. One might think, "Well, I'm concerned, but actually there is no risk. I don't judge there to be a risk on the basis of the information given to me." Another might say, "I agree with the concern, but there is no risk. So it passes, as it were, the second test but it doesn't pass the first test." If you do not include both of those tests, as appears to be the case in the statement from the Business Secretary of 25 March, which I have read, and where, as you say, he repeats the second test about the clear risk but he drops the first one, which is the broader one about concern, then the policy has changed from the way that I enunciated it in 2000.

Q192 Chair: Thank you. That brings me to one further question, which I think you have more or less answered. The Business Secretary stated in his written statement of 25 March: "None of these amendments should be taken to mean that there has been any substantive change in policy." Do you disagree with that or agree with it?

Mr Hain: I disagree with it for the reasons I have explained. While there has been a faithful transposition of criterion two (a) from my original statement in terms of a clear risk, there is no transposition of the first, broader test about concern. To that extent, I judge that the policy has changed, yes.

Chair: Do any of my colleagues wish to ask anything?

Q193 Ann McKechin: Yes. To what extent were you aware that the staff who were dealing with the export licences were aware of the fact that there would be two tests applied for licences about the issue of risk, on the one hand, and concerns, on the other?

Mr Hain: All of my officials were very aware of those two. You started off with the concern and then you applied an additional test—a narrower test—of risk. Yes, they were

both very clear, as I was. I remember going through that draft of the ministerial statement very carefully indeed, because it was a very important statement.

Q194 Bob Stewart: It is a bit unfair, perhaps, Mr Hain, after all this time, but maybe you can remember. Do you have a concrete example of a broad criteria refusal and do you have a concrete example of a narrow criteria refusal in export licences? From your expression, if you say, “No, I don’t. I can’t remember,” I will withdraw my question, but, if possible, could you give us an example of what it might have been?

Mr Hain: I can’t remember a specific case, but if I were to imagine a specific case—

Bob Stewart: That’s fine.

Mr Hain: —it might be, in the context of ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, that you might say, in terms of issuing an export licence to Israel, you were concerned about the possibility of it being used for internal repression. However, a peace process had been established. There was no active conflict at the time, and you might judge that there was no clear risk. Now, I cannot recall that being the case because there was a peace process in 2000 and in the months leading up to it, but then the intifada happened after that broke down and the conflict resumed. That might be the kind of situation you could imagine, but I cannot, I am afraid, recall a specific example.

Bob Stewart: I think that is a fair enough answer; thank you.

Q195 Mike Gapes: Let me give you another example, which is what happened in Sri Lanka. There was a period when we were not exporting to Sri Lanka. There was then a ceasefire, during which time—and the previous Foreign Affairs Committee was very critical of this—there was a resumption of exports to the Sri Lankan Government. Then the ceasefire broke down, and it appears that exported weaponry into Sri Lanka—we were never able to determine what—including rifles, ammunition and small arms of various kinds, was used subsequently during the last few years of the Sri Lankan civil war. Clearly, there was a judgment at one point that the ceasefire might lead to a political process, but, actually, we ended up with what happened in 2009. That might be another real example, but you were not the Minister at that time in that Department.

Mr Hain: No.

Mike Gapes: Nevertheless, I do flag that up as a possible example.

Mr Hain: Having been a Minister for Sri Lanka, and having sought to work with the Norwegian peace representative/facilitator, to try and bring a negotiated end to it, I was always concerned; so exports would have failed the broader test in that instance. But, on the second narrower test, presumably, the Government and the Ministers at the time took the decision that there was no risk, whereas it turned out that there was. If you had applied the first criterion, then you would not have proceeded with any exports.

Q196 Ms Stuart: In your view, has the Government’s policy on arms exports changed since you were a Minister?

Mr Hain: In the statement issued by the Business Secretary last month, yes, it has. It has been relaxed in the sense that the broader test that I applied no longer exists. In other respects, that statement is an admirable modernisation—an updating—of the situation. For example, I noticed that in criterion two (c) there is a welcome addition to items that might be

used, and I quote, “to commit gender-based violence or serious violence against women or children.” That was not part of the original statement, and I think that is a welcome update. There are updates on treaties and so on, which are welcome, and then there is a repeat of the second test, as it were, the narrow test, which is welcome, but the broader test has been dropped. So I do think the policy has changed. It is a more relaxed approach to arms exports.

Q197 Ms Stuart: I totally understand. Your view is that, with the Business Secretary’s statement, while we have updated helpfully in some areas, broadly speaking we have relaxed.

Mr Hain: By omitting the broader test of concern, we have relaxed the policy.

Q198 Ms Stuart: If you regard this to be an unfair question, please just say, “This is outwith my remit.” In October 2013, the Foreign Secretary did not think that there had been any changes. Was he at that stage wrong, or was he, in October 2013, right?

Mr Hain: He laid great stress on the “or.” The word “concern” is actually not in the quotes he used in his evidence. The word “concern” is not there, but, without the word “concern,” it is more or less the same. So the “or” is rather important, as the Chair, Sir John, confirmed to him. I had noticed that the word “concern” was not in there, nevertheless.

Q199 Ms Stuart: I really don’t want to put words into your mouth, but do you see a substantive difference between the Foreign Secretary’s view and the Business Secretary’s view, or is the Business Secretary’s statement taking the position further than the Foreign Secretary had, or did the statement simply express the same thing but in different words?

Mr Hain: Sir John, as Chair, took a face-value assessment, which I don’t quarrel with, on the Foreign Secretary’s statement, although he did not use the word “concern.” Nevertheless, it is a reasonable interpretation that he was talking about the same thing as my statement talked about. The Business Secretary’s written ministerial statement of March 2014 limits it to the clear risk. If you take a charitable view of the Foreign Secretary’s answer—and who am I not to?—then the Business Secretary has changed the policy. If you don’t take a charitable view of the Foreign Secretary’s answer, meaning that you attach a lot of importance to the fact that he did not use the word “concern” as per my original statement, then you might think that they were more or less in the same place.

Q200 Chair: Would you agree, Mr Hain, that the key issue here is whether your broad test has been dropped or not? Given that the Foreign Secretary, in the statement that he made to the Committees on 8 January which I read out, said that the clear risk applies to both parts of the sentence—in other words, the broad test goes out of the window—it is, in essence, no different from the Business Secretary’s written ministerial statement a few weeks later, where, again, the broad test is not to be seen.

Mr Hain: Yes. On that view of his statement, absolutely, then the two are consistent. That is why there are different takes on that statement.

Chair: Thank you.

Q201 Mike Gapes: Given your experience as a Minister in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at the time when these consolidated criteria were being developed, could you confirm that, although the Department, as it then was, namely, the Department of

Trade and Industry, would take the lead role in terms of exports, any consolidated criteria statement would have had to have been approved at the highest level within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and, presumably, the Department for International Development as well? So it would not be a question of a Department going out on its own. It would have to have been a collective position representing the Government as a whole.

Mr Hain: Yes—and ultimately it would come to Ministers to decide. For example, an agreed position on a particular case might come to me that had been negotiated between officials of the Departments involved, and I might say—in fact there were some occasions when I did say—“I’m not happy about that. I would like you to go back and say that, from a Foreign and Commonwealth Office point of view, I think we’ve laid too much stress on the opportunities for a company to trade its goods—its exports.”

Q202 Mike Gapes: Can I get back to the wording of the consolidated criteria as opposed to a specific decision? When the decision was taken in 2000, this was, clearly, a position that had been agreed within Government.

Mr Hain: Absolutely.

Q203 Mike Gapes: Therefore, would you, like me perhaps, assume that any statement made today, or in March, by the Business Secretary, in terms of the new consolidated criteria, will have been agreed within the different Government Departments collectively?

Mr Hain: Unquestionably.

Q204 Mike Gapes: Therefore, would you agree with my view that there has been a change between the Foreign Secretary’s statements towards the end of last year and the statements made by the Business Secretary three months later?

Mr Hain: That appears to be the case to me.

Q205 Mike Gapes: With the agreement, presumably, of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and other departmental Ministers.

Mr Hain: There would have to be agreement. This policy was never unilaterally determined by one Department or the other. It was an agreed position.

I might add, Sir John, that these decisions were not taken lightly. They were meticulously assessed, because you have to consider the opportunities for the British industries involved, the jobs involved and, therefore, the economic effects, as against your concerns about how they might be used for purposes that we did not agree with as a Government. So there was not a pre-set view that you would always oppose export licences or you would always grant them. You looked at each case on its merits. The submissions, as I remember, coming through to me were not just a page; they were quite detailed. The criteria were all assessed for each one.

Q206 Mike Gapes: Finally, would you take the view that there is, therefore, a deliberate change of approach by the Government collectively on this particular issue to downplay the issue of internal repression in order to encourage greater possibilities of defence sales to some countries?

Mr Hain: It would appear so. I am genuinely puzzled how the Government can reconcile the Foreign Secretary's evidence and statements that the policy has not changed with dropping the broader test, keeping, in the exact words, the second test but dropping the former one. Either the policy has changed or it hasn't. If it hasn't changed, why do you not include both tests with the welcome updates that I have referred to, such as the effect of conflicts on women or additional treaties that were not in existence then? That is what puzzles me. And how can you reconcile, on the one hand, the statement by the Government that the policy has not changed, and then a glaring omission of the broader test, which suggests that it has?

Chair: Mr Hain, thank you very much indeed. That has been extremely helpful. I am most grateful.

Written Evidence

Written evidence from Reprieve (AEC001)

Export licensing of components for weaponised unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs”)

As you may know, Reprieve is a legal action charity which works to ensure respect for the human rights of prisoners, including those whose rights may be infringed by counter-terror operations effected by the US and other governments. This work includes investigation and advocacy in relation to the use of UAVs by the US in non-war zones to carry out its so-called “targeted killing” programme, which violates international law and a number of internationally recognised human rights.

As part of this work, Reprieve has been investigating the adequacy of export licensing procedures in relation to components that are exported to the US for use in weaponised UAVs, including the General Atomics MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper. As has been widely reported, such UAVs are used by the US for military purposes and to carry out strikes in areas where there is no declared armed conflict, such as Pakistan and Yemen. From our research and correspondence with the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), we have identified severe shortcomings in the safeguards in place to ensure that UK-manufactured products are not used in these unlawful targeted killings. Our concerns are twofold:

(i) Licences granted for export of components for weaponised US UAVs

Reprieve has identified a number of licenses granted to UK companies for the export to the US of components which appear to be used on weaponised UAVS such as the Predator and/or Reaper. As you know, BIS maintains a “consolidated list of strategic and dual-use items that require export authorization” (August 2012) (the “Consolidated List”), which is intended to include all military and dual-use items requiring an export licence, and incorporates the UK Military List and the UK and EU Dual-Use Lists, among others. In recent correspondence, BIS has confirmed that some licences have been granted for the export of goods which are intended for use by the US government in weaponised UAVs.

As you know, when considering applications for export licences in respect of controlled goods, BIS has said that it applies the “Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria” (the “Consolidated Criteria”). These criteria include:

“the respect of human rights”;

refraining from issuing export licenses which would “provoke or prolong armed conflicts” or “aggravate existing tensions or conflicts” in the country of final destination; and

refraining from issuing export licenses where there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export “aggressively against another country”;

the behaviour of the buyer country with regard to ... respect for international law.

Furthermore, pursuant to the Export Control Act 2002, controls may be imposed for military equipment and technology if their exportation or use is "capable of having a relevant consequence". "Relevant consequences" include "the carrying out anywhere in the world of (or of acts which facilitate) (a) acts threatening international peace and security; (b) acts contravening the international law of armed conflict; ... (d) breaches of human rights".

The US's use of drones in non-war zones, such as Pakistan and Yemen, is inconsistent with these criteria. In particular, it is in breach of the international law of armed conflict. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force by one state against another, other than in certain very limited circumstances. The US's use of drones in areas where there is no armed conflict, including Pakistan and Yemen, fall so far short of the international humanitarian and human rights law requirements for legality, that none of those exceptions – such as arguments of 'state consent' or 'self-defence' – could render them lawful.

Where there is no declared armed conflict, only international human rights law applies to determine whether specific killings are lawful. International human rights law permits the intentional use of lethal force when strictly necessary and proportionate. Thus, "targeted killings" as typically understood (intentional and premeditated killings) cannot be lawful under international human rights law, because this allows intentional lethal force only when necessary to protect against a threat to life, and where there are no other means of preventing that threat to life. There is little public evidence that the targeted killings carried out fulfil this strict legal test.

The US is not involved in an "armed conflict" with either of these states. Moreover, even if there were a declared armed conflict, such that international humanitarian law applied, the legality of any drone strike must still then be assessed in accordance with fundamental principles including distinction, proportionality, humanity and military necessity. "Living Under Drones", a study published by Stanford and NYU in September 2012, was based on interviews with more than 60 people in North Waziristan, Pakistan – many of whom were survivors of strikes, with others having lost family members.¹ The report documents substantial evidence to suggest that these criteria are not met by drone strikes in Pakistan – including the reported failure to distinguish between "civilian" and "militant" targets, the large number of people killed in strikes, and the timing of particular strikes, which do not appear to be in response to any particular threat. In particular, an exposé in the New York Times revealed that the Obama administration considers "all military-age males [killed] in a strike zone" to be "combatants . . . unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent."²

There is also significant evidence of "double" tap strikes, whereby the same area is hit by successive missiles, meaning rescuers have been struck.³ The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, has observed, "[I]f civilian 'rescuers' are indeed being intentionally targeted, there is no doubt about the law: those strikes are a war crime."⁴

¹ <http://www.livingunderdrones.org/>, see in particular pages 30-35, Chapter 3 and 112-117.

² <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>

³ See Living Under Drones, pages 74-76.

⁴ <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/06/21/un-expert-labels-cia-tactic-exposed-by-bureau-a-war-crime/>

The level of concern about the US use of drones is such that Ben Emmerson, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism, is currently investigating the legality and impact of US targeted killings in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.⁵ In May this year, the Peshawar High Court in Pakistan declared the strikes in that country to be war crimes, and ordered the Pakistani government to take a series of steps to stop future strikes.

Even aside from the legality of specific strikes, the constant presence of US drones has devastating human rights impacts on communities living in affected regions due to their inability to protect themselves and their families from a strike, which could happen at any time. “Living Under Drones” reported that communities in North Waziristan are being terrorised by the constant presence of drones overhead, with as many as six of these hovering over a village at any one time. Those interviewed said that the widespread fear of drones has led people to shy away from social gatherings and inhibited their willingness to carry out day-to-day activities and important community functions, including attending school or funerals.

It is quite clear, therefore, that in addition to violating the right to life, the US’s use of drones in non-war zones infringes numerous human rights of those living in the affected areas, including the right to freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, to privacy, family life and a home, to education and to an adequate standard of health and well-being.

The impact of drones on children’s rights, in particular, was recently highlighted in the Annual Report of the UN Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict.⁶ This report noted an “increasingly worrisome number of reports of child casualties” in the course of drone strikes. It further reported that the mixed use of armed and surveillance drones has “resulted in permanent fear in some communities, affecting the psychosocial well-being of children and hindering the ability of such communities to protect their children”. In addition, the Secretary-General highlighted the impact on access to education, in some cases due to fear among children of drone strikes.

In light of the use by the US of weaponised drones in violation of international law and human rights, it is of extremely concern that BIS, the FCO and MOD consider the grant of export licences for components to be consistent with the Consolidated Criteria. Such a policy risks implicating the UK in the harm carried out by US drones, as well as severely damaging its international reputation.

(ii) Components for weaponised UAVs not requiring export licenses

We are also aware of certain components being exported to the US for use in Predator and Reaper UAVs which do not appear on the Consolidated List, and as such do not currently require export licences. This is clearly of great concern, because it undermines the entire purpose of the export licensing regime, in that components specifically intended for use on weapons capable of carrying out great destruction may be exported free from any governmental scrutiny at all.

⁵ <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/01/24/un-launches-major-investigation-into-civilian-drone-deaths/>

⁶ <http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/annual-report-of-the-secretary-general-on-children-and-armed-conflict/>

We have drawn this situation to BIS's attention, asking the department to consider adding certain specific components to the Consolidated List. However, BIS has indicated it does not intend to add such components to the list because this export control would operate solely at the national level and therefore could easily be circumvented and would have no effect on the export of these products from other parts of the European Union. We do not accept that properly implemented controls could be easily circumvented purely because those same controls are not in place elsewhere in the EU. Furthermore, we certainly do not consider that because these controls may not be implemented in other countries, BIS should refrain from doing so. The UK should consider and put in place its export controls on the basis of its own priorities and international obligations, rather than adopting a passive approach which would result in the lowest standard of regulation being applied across all EU countries.

24 September 2013

Written evidence from Neil Cooper and Gerald Walther, Peace Studies, University of Bradford (AEC0002)

Data on Compliance Visits to Companies and Sites Holding Open Export Licences

Abstract

1. This submission discusses (i) the levels of non-compliance suggested by the data on HRMC compliance visits to open license-holders (ii) the fall in the number of such visits and (iii) our concerns about the apparent drift away from transparency in this area as evidenced by recent changes in the presentation of data.

Context

2. After the Export Controls Act received Royal Assent on 24 July 2002 and came into force on the 1st of May 2004, the Export Control Organisation (ECO) was reorganized, resulting in a notable reduction in staff.⁷ It has previously been asked if this reduction in staff would undermine the performance of the Export Control Organisation (ECO), to which the reply was that exporters were encouraged to use open licenses.⁸ Despite the pressure on staff numbers, the most recent (2012) annual report indicates that the ECO has continued to meet its goal of processing 70% of SIEL applications within 20 days and 90% within 60 days. However, the head of ECO informed the Committee in 2012 that the 70% target had attained 'almost God-like status in the organisation to the extent that every other activity that the organisation undertakes is subordinate to it, and those other activities suffer'.⁹ He also noted:

'we have reached the stage where the organisation is processing something like 17,000 standard individual export licences a year with resources adequate to slightly more than half that

⁷ House of Commons, 2005, paragraph 71

⁸ House of Commons, 2005, paragraph 74

⁹ House of Commons Committees on Arms Export Controls, Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013): First Report of Sessions 2013-14, *Scrutiny of the Government's UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011 published in July 2012, the Government's Quarterly Reports from October 2011 to September 2012, and the Government's policies on arms exports and international arms control issues*, Vol. II

figure...if we could move only a small proportion of these over to open licensing, it would free up resources...to focus on the more difficult cases'.¹⁰

3. In other evidence to the committee The Export Group for European Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) also argued that the 17,000 SIELs processed every year could be reduced to 10,000 by replacing them with open licences.¹¹ At the same time however, EGAD also highlighted the results of a 2011 survey of its members in which 50% of respondents reported that they 'had been advised by the ECO to use an OGEL which would not, in the opinion of the industry's compliance officers, have been compliant for the export concerned'.¹² EGAD even cited one case of a company that had originally applied for a SIEL and had been advised by the ECO to use an OGEL. However, when the goods covered by the OGEL arrived at a UK port for export they were seized by the Border Force on the grounds that they had been presented without an appropriate licence.¹³
4. It would therefore appear that the ECO has responded to the twin problems of limited staff resources and pressure to meet the 70% target for SIEL's by encouraging companies to apply for Open Export Licences. At the same time, the reports from the defence industry raise concerns about the rigour with which the Open Licensing System is being policed. Of course, by definition, open licences are only supposed to be provided to categories of exports deemed to be relatively uncontentious and therefore a move to the more frequent use of such licences should not necessarily be problematic. However, the 2012 report by the Committee also listed a range of open licences that had recently been revoked following a review of licensing decisions prompted by recent events in the Middle East. This included a range of open licences revoked on the grounds that licences to states such as Bahrein, Egypt and Libya contravened one or other of the government's export criteria.
5. The Government has also committed itself to introducing greater transparency in the export licensing system, including the provision of more information on open export licences, a commitment that was praised by the Committee.¹⁴ However, in the case of data provided by ECO on compliance visits to companies and sites holding open licences the trend appears to be in the opposite direction – away from transparency. Moreover, the data that is available raises some issues of concern about the levels of compliance on the part of licence-holders, although because of the increasingly opaque nature of the data provided, it is difficult to come to any firm conclusions.

Data on License Misuse

6. Starting with the 2010 report, each annual report has provided a table listing compliance visits by HMRC. Tables 1.1, 1.2., and 1.3 below summarize the findings.

¹⁰Ibid., Ev. 60, para. 109.

¹¹ Ibid., Ev. 59, para, 106.

¹² Ibid., Ev, 60, para. 108.

¹³ Ibid., Ev. 59, para.107

¹⁴ Ibid., Ev. 66, para. 118

Table 1.1. Results of HMRC visits to open license holders

	Number of companies and sites holding open licenses	Number of visits	Number of misuses (% of visits)	Categories of Misuse Found		
				Administrative errors	Unlicensed shipments	General lack of knowledge leading to errors
2007	1600 (approx)	587	220 (37%)	186	34	58
2008	1600 (approx)	675	219 (32%)	179	40	59
2009	1800 (approx)	836	290 (35%)	235	55	39
2010	1900 (approx)	821	273 (33%)	174	27	71
Totals	6900	2919	1002 (34%)	774	156	227

Table 1.2. Results of HMRC visits to open license holders in 2011.

	Number of visits	% Compliant	% Not fully compliant
First time visits	216	70	30
Routine visits	445	73	27
Revisits	59	73	27

Table 1.3. Results of HMRC visits to open license holders in 2012.

	Number of visits	% compliant and generally compliant	% Not fully & non-compliant
First time visits	100	70	30

Routine visits	101	74	26
Revisits	99	77	23

7. As can be seen from table 1.1 HMRC visits uncovered over a thousand examples of misuses of licences in the period 2007-10, with roughly one in every three visits revealing some example of misuse. Moreover, whilst most of these examples were categorised as administrative errors, there were 156 examples of unlicensed shipments in this period. The 2009 report discusses unlicensed shipments “where the company had no valid licence to cover the goods at the time of the shipment, but [this] did not imply a licence would not have been granted e.g. the company had sent goods to its parent company in an EU country under a licence which only allowed sales to Governments.” (UK Strategic Export Controls, 2009). Although worrying in itself, this might not count as the most serious breach of licensing procedures. Nevertheless, given the ECOs apparent emphasis on increasing the use of open licences as a means of dealing with its staffing pressures and the problems reported by the defence industry the significant levels of non-compliance – and particularly unlicensed shipments - recorded are a concern – although without more detail on the types of non-compliance covered by the data it is difficult to come to any firm conclusions.
8. More recently the percentage of visits revealing licence misuse/non-compliance has dropped from a high of 37% in 2007 to 30% for first time visits in 2012 and 23% for revisits. Nevertheless, it remains the case that a significant proportion of visits to open licence holders still reveal examples of non-compliance, particularly for first time visits.
9. In addition, although the number of compliance visits gradually increased from 587 in 2007 to over 800 in 2009 and 2010, since then, the number of visits has fallen quite significantly to a low of just 300 in 2012, with a particularly notable drop recorded for the number of routine visits undertaken. Given the levels of non-compliance recorded for even routine visits the rationale for such a drop in the number of visits is unclear and raises further concerns about the rigour with which the open licensing system is being policed.
10. As noted above, it is also the case that this appears to be one area of data provision where the ECOs commitment to transparency has gone into reverse. In particular, more recent reports have failed to distinguish between different categories of misuse and, most notably, have stopped providing data on the number of unlicensed shipments discovered by compliance visits. Instead, data is only provided on visits found to be either ‘compliant and generally compliant’ or ‘not fully and non-compliant’ but it is not clear what the distinction is, if any, between, ‘not fully’ and ‘non-compliant’.
11. This data therefore raises a number of questions:
 - Does the ECO consider the current levels of non-compliance recorded by HMRC visits as acceptable?
 - What is the ECO doing to ensure better compliance levels on the part of licence holders?
 - How does the ECO define (i) ‘compliant (ii) generally compliant’ (iii) ‘not fully compliant’ and (iv) non-compliant?

-Can the ECO provide examples of the most serious cases of (i) unlicensed shipments uncovered by visits in the 2007-10 period and (ii) non-compliance uncovered by visits in 2011 and 2012?

-Will the ECO provide data on the number of unlicensed shipments discovered as a result of compliance visits in 2011 and 2012 respectively?

-Will the ECO commit to provide such data in future reports, in line with its more general commitment to transparency?

-Why has there been such a significant drop in (i) the number of overall compliance visits since 2009 and (ii) the number of first time and routine visits in particular?

Written evidence from Campaign Against Arms Trade (AEC003)

1. The Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) in the UK, which was established in 1974, works to end the international arms trade, which has a devastating impact on human rights and security, and damages economic development. CAAT believes that large scale military procurement and arms exports only reinforce a militaristic approach to international problems.

2. This submission looks at Government priorities and arms export promotion; export licensing transparency; the arms trade treaty; and the work of your Committees.

Arms sales put before human rights

3. CAAT is pleased that, in your July 2013 report, your Committees reiterated the point made in 2012, namely that "the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time rather than claiming, as the Government continues to do, that these two policies 'are mutually reinforcing'." Such an acknowledgement is vital for public discussion about arms exports.

4. It is also essential, for an informed debate about military exports, that the Government acknowledges your Committees' point "that it is fundamentally anomalous, not least in terms of public perceptions, for countries listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as being of human rights concerns, such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, then to be listed by the United Kingdom Trade and Investment Organisation within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills as Priority Markets for arms exports."

5. UK military exports have aircraft at their heart. Leaving aside the use of UK-supplied aircraft by Saudi Arabia in Yemen, it has been argued that aircraft do not violate human rights. However, the very sale of such top-of-the-range military equipment gives support and prestige to authoritarian regimes. The aircraft often form part of a package which necessitates a long-term relationship between that regime, the supplying company and the UK government. This makes it difficult for the latter to raise issues regarding human rights or to refuse export licences for other equipment.

6. Through their actions, successive UK governments have made it clear that arms sales take precedence and that human rights advocacy is muted. The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index for 2012 ranks Saudi Arabia at 163 out of 167, meaning that there are only

four more authoritarian regimes in the world. However, the quest for arms deals leaves the UK government reluctant to do anything to upset the Saudi authorities. Far from giving the UK influence over human rights in Saudi Arabia, arms deals give the power to the prospective purchaser.

7. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) said the UK Embassy in Riyadh had been informed on 13th March 2011 that UK-made armoured vehicles would be going into Bahrain and the Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud had called the UK Foreign Secretary William Hague on the same day (FCO FoI response, 28.6.13). The next day the Saudi forces entered Bahrain to guard the infrastructure, freeing the Bahraini security forces to suppress pro-democracy protesters. There is no indication that William Hague remonstrated with Prince Saudi about this; indeed, an export licence for Tactica components was issued on 10th June 2011, while Saudi forces remained in Bahrain (BIS FoI response, 12.9.12).

8. The exception to this general rule is that, to Saudi displeasure, the UK government has not armed the Syrian rebels, nor has it taken military action against the Syrian government. However, in both cases it was the UK Parliament that prevented the UK government from acting in the way the Saudi authorities would have wished. This did not prevent former UK Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Sir William Patey, warning of the possible impact on future trade: "It's difficult to pin it on a particular contract but from a Saudi point of view, our unwillingness to live up to our brave words would cause them to maybe doubt our reliability as an ally ...". (Daily Telegraph, 2.9.13)

Prime Ministerial sales effort

9. The Government claims to have tough export criteria, but many people are, rightly, sceptical when they see Prime Ministerial arms sales trips to some of the world's most repressive regimes. David Cameron's November 2012 visit to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to promote the Eurofighter Typhoon is an example of this.

10. That promotional trip was remarkable as the media consensus in favour of arms sales, at least to human rights violators, appeared to break down. In contrast to the times when Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair made similar visits, this trip was questioned. On 5th November 2012 *The Guardian* editorial said the Prime Minister should admit that the interests of the military-industrial complex were taking precedence over human rights, while the *Daily Telegraph* headlined its article: "David Cameron defends arms deals with Gulf states".

11. In yet another demonstration of his eagerness to promote the Eurofighter Typhoon, David Cameron welcomed Bahrain's autocratic ruler King Hamad to Downing Street on 7th August 2013. The King expressed his thanks for the UK's "supportive stances" towards Bahrain and indicated his eagerness to buy a fleet of Eurofighter Typhoon jets. In turn, David Cameron pledged continued support for "ongoing political reform in Bahrain". On the same day, the King issued new decrees banning protests.

12. Arms sales are put before regional peace. Defence Secretary Philip Hammond thinks increased military expenditure in Asia is "worrying": "(It) has the potential to escalate and become at best a prolonged source for instability and at worst, a driver for conflict," he said. (AFP, 2.6.13) However, these worries did not prevent a business delegation to India in February

2013, led by David Cameron and including representatives of arms companies, among them BAE, EADS UK, Thales UK, Cobham and Ultra Electronics.

Royal assistance

13. The Gulf royal families like to be associated with UK royalty, so the latter are used to support the arms sales effort. The Prince of Wales and the Duchess of Cornwall visited Saudi Arabia in March 2013 with military and commercial links high on the agenda. Later, from 30th April to 1st May 2013, the ruler of the UAE, Sheikh Khalifa, was welcomed by the Queen on a state visit to the UK. BAE's Chief Executive Ian King was a guest at the lunch for the Sheikh at Windsor Castle. In September 2013, Prince Andrew met with King Hamad of Bahrain in London.

Poor human rights record no bar to arms fair invites

14. The UK's biggest arms fair, Defence & Security Equipment international (DSEi) took place in London's Docklands from 10th to 14th September 2013. DSEi is organised by Clarion Events, a private company, but the UK government, through the United Kingdom Trade and Investment Defence and Security Organisation (UKTI DSO), co-ordinates the presence of Ministry of Defence (MoD) and military representatives as well as inviting international delegations.

15. Nine of the UK government invitees to DSEi 2013 are also on the FCO list of countries with the most serious wide-ranging human rights concerns. These are Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. Two others, Israel and Russia, had pavilions to display their wares. The invitation list also included **Algeria, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were new to the list in 2013 while Libya was back**, having been omitted from the 2011 invitations. As the UK government condemned the terrible violence in Syria, it invited other brutal dictators to an arms fair.

16. The 1,400 companies exhibiting at DSEi came from around the world, including Rostec (Russian Technology State Corporation). Rostec owns 100% of Rosoboronexport, the Russian state agency which supplies the equipment to Syria's President Assad. The 30,000 DSEi visitors from around the globe could trade freely, begin discussions on new deals or seal those mooted beforehand. In many cases, the equipment involved in the deals done or discussed at DSEi does not enter the UK, so even UK export regulations do not apply.

17. CAAT is also concerned about the late publication of the DSEi invitation list. Business Minister Michael Fallon said the list would be placed on the UKTI website "when the exhibition opens." (Hansard, 20.5.13, col 619w)

18. Although there had been no consistent pattern regarding the date of the release of DSEi invitation lists, previously it has usually been before the start of the exhibition. In 2009 the list was released two months in advance and included many delegates' names. In 2011, although the full list was not available until the start of DSEi, a partial list of those not from the volatile (and potentially embarrassing to the UK government) countries was published at the beginning of June.

19. Disappointed the 2009 timetable had not been followed this time, CAAT wrote to the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, on 13th June 2013. In his response on 13th August 2013, he said

that the invitations were not all issued at the same time: "Publishing details of countries invited in a piecemeal fashion risks causing offence to those countries who have not been invited at a particular point in time, and who may in fact be due to receive an invitation. It also risk offending countries that we may have planned to invite, but subsequently decide not to." CAAT wonders if the real reason for the delay is that the Government is an attempt to avoid the outcry the invitation list has caused previously.

20. To allow an informed debate about the delegations invited, it is essential that the UK government shows a commitment to greater transparency by making the invitation lists available at least one, and preferably two, months in advance of all military and security exhibitions where delegations are invited by UKTI DSO.

Ongoing support from the UKTI Defence and Security Organisation

21. UKTI DSO's 150 civil servants promote military and security equipment sales around the world, working on behalf of private arms companies, but paid for by the UK taxpayer. Reflecting the huge and disproportionate support given to arms companies, UKTI employs more civil servants to sell military and security equipment than it provides for sector specific support for every other industry sector combined. Since 2012, companies have also received assistance from the MoD's Defence Export Support Group.

22. While Prime Ministerial visits and the major arms fairs are in the public eye, much of UKTI DSO's work takes behind the scenes, arranging contacts and smaller scale visits. For instance, despite continuing security problems in Libya, on 3rd April 2013 UKTI DSO organised a "Defence and Security Industry Day" in Tripoli aboard the Royal Navy frigate HMS Kent. Eleven companies were there including Babcock International, BAE, General Dynamics, Thales and Ultra (Hansard, 19.3.13 plus update).

23. There are very many meetings. One example was on 29th April 2013, when UKTI DSO Head Richard Paniguan and UK Defence Attaché Commodore Christopher Murray met with the Bahrain Minister for Defence Affairs, in Manama to discuss "bilateral military cooperation". (Bahrain News Agency, 29.4.13)

24. There is no economic justification for such support: arms sales account for just 1.2 % of UK exports and sustain just 0.2% of the national labour force. As the International Economy Editor of the Financial Times said in August 2010: "You can have as many arms export jobs as you are prepared to waste public money subsidising."

Institutionalised support for sales to Saudi Arabia

25. Large contracts between UK companies and Saudi Arabia are overseen by the UK MoD. The Ministry of Defence Saudi Armed Forces Project (MODSAP) covers the Saudi British Defence Co-operation Programme, formerly known as Al Yamamah (sale of Tornado, Hawk and PC-9 aircraft to the Royal Saudi Air Force) and the Al Salam programme (sale of Eurofighter Typhoons to the Royal Saudi Air Force). The Saudi Arabia National Guard Communications Project (SANGCOM) looks after the eponymous project.

26. Although its approximately 200 staff are UK civil servants and military personnel Saudi Arabia pays for MODSAP, £36.72 million in 2012/3.

27. It is only in recent months that CAAT has fully understand that the costs of SANGCOM are met in the same way, being paid for by the UK MoD in the first instance and then recouped from the Saudi Arabian government. CAAT has been told that a clause in the Memorandum of Understanding covering this deal, unlike that for MODSAP, prevents the disclosure of the costs. However, as at 1st April 2012, one MoD civil servant based in the UK worked on SANGCOM as did 20 UK military personnel and 50 UK MoD civil servants in Saudi Arabia. (Hansard, 19.12.12 col 837w)

28. The arrangements give a country that the FCO considers to be of human rights concern, and BAE, a private company, a centre of influence within the UK MoD establishment.

Suspension of export licensing process

29. In July 2013, following the ousting of President Morsi and the establishment of military rule in Egypt, CAAT contacted the Export Control Organisation (ECO) to ask if the new mechanism announced in 2012 suspending the export licence process had been used. In reply, the ECO said it had not been, but that it had been considered in 2012 in relation to Mali, Ethiopia, Syria, the Maldives, Egypt and Israel and, earlier in 2013, Egypt. It was said that any use of the mechanism would be announced to parliament.

30. On 21st August 2013 the mechanism was used with respect to Egypt, but only for equipment which might be used for internal repression. Since it should be expected that any such goods would have, in any event, have been refused an export licence, this does not appear to reflect any change in export control policy.

31. There is a need to clarify the purpose of the suspension mechanism, one of the main responses of the Government to the failings in the export licensing system exposed by what was then known as the "Arab Spring". If the suspension mechanism just means that the processing of individual licence applications is suspended on a case-by-case basis, this would be a retrograde step from the refusal of export licence applications on a case-by-case basis.

About turn on export licensing transparency

32. CAAT welcomed much in the July 2012 Government Response to the BIS Transparency in Export Licensing Consultation, but said at that time that a lot depended on how the changes were implemented.

33. It was with considerable dismay, therefore, that CAAT read the Notice to Exporters 2013/18 issued on 31st July 2013 with regard to Open Licences. This represented a major step back from the greater transparency promised by Vince Cable, and is not in line with the July 2012 Response. If the published information is not to include ratings / goods description nor, it appears, the value, it is almost meaningless, especially as Open Licences often cover an extremely wide range of equipment.

34. It is unclear what prompted the about turn. In answer to a parliamentary question Michael Fallon said it was the "need to strike a proper balance between increased transparency and the need to minimise administrative burdens on business." (Hansard, 6.9.13, col 533w) However, the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD), in its submission to the Committees' last report, quoted a company responding to the Consultation: "If summary information for goods comprising destination/ rating and the number of shipments and total value was provided this could probably be achieved within current resources." EGAD appeared to have no problem with the provision of the data as long as it could be provided simply. Indeed, the companies must collect and retain the data as a condition of the Open Licences.

35. The speed of the about turn on transparency was also strange, as was the way it was slipped out. On 1st July 2013 the Notice to Exporters 2013/15 indicated that the Open Licence transparency measures would be going ahead, albeit slightly later than planned. Yet just over two weeks later, it seems that major changes had been made. CAAT had not understood Vince Cable's answer to Sir Bob Russell MP's question (Hansard, 18.7.13, col 1295) as being an announcement to Parliament on the open licensing generally. It seems highly likely that many MPs would not have realised this was an announcement either.

36. If BIS undertook further consultations with industry, or received representations from companies, it should, in fairness, have contacted all those who responded to the original Consultation so that their views might be taken into account before the Government made a decision contrary to its previous announcement.

37. It is also unclear what is happening with regards to the provision of additional and disaggregated information on the Single Licences. There was correspondence between CAAT and Michael Fallon earlier in 2013 regarding CAAT concerns that less, rather than more, information might be provided than at present.

38. The export licence browser on CAAT's website uses the ECO data, but is comprehensively searchable and provides itemised licences with ratings, values and the precise date on which the licence was approved, refused or revoked. The full raw data is also available from the CAAT website as .csv files for download. BIS had appeared reluctant to acknowledge that in a large proportion of cases, disaggregating the data to the daily level, equates to providing information about individual licences. The data should be available to all and not depend on CAAT producing a usable browser.

39. On 6th August 2013 CAAT wrote to Michael Fallon about this, urging him to think again about the Open Licences and asking what is happening regarding the Single Licence information. At the time of writing this submission, a reply to the letter is still awaited.

An Arms Trade Treaty, but it makes no difference

40. CAAT has always been sceptical about an arms trade treaty. These doubts appeared justified when William Hague told the Foreign Affairs Committee on 16th July 2013 that, even if it became a signatory to the arms trade treaty, Russia would argue that it would be within its rights to supply the Assad regime with weapons and that would not change. Despite the treaty, it seems the UK will continue to enthusiastically arm Saudi Arabia's authoritarian rulers while Russia's weapons supplies to Syria will continue unabated.

Work of your Committees

41. CAAT believes that the work of your Committees has had an immensely beneficial effect on the parliamentary, media and public discussion of arms trade issues. The Committees' detailed questioning, through letters and evidence sessions, of the Government has done much to hold it to account for its export policy and practice, as well as to illuminate the issue more generally.

42. CAAT believes your Committees' work could be further enhanced by varying the civil society organisations and industry representatives invited to give oral evidence each year, so that a wider range of views and perspectives might be heard. It appears that the UK Working Group on Arms may be perceived to reflect the whole civil society sector working on these issues when it does not. CAAT, which has made a written submission to the Committees every year, has never been asked to give oral evidence. There are others working on arms export issues too.

43. Likewise, on the industry side, oral evidence is usually given by representatives of the EGAD plus a consultant or two. While they do not submit written evidence, CAAT would suggest that staff from the export licensing departments of some of the bigger exporters of military goods, such as BAE Systems or Chemring, might provide a useful additional perspective if they were asked to appear before your Committees for the industry session in some years.

September 2013

Written Evidence from Privacy International (AEC004)

1. Founded in 1990, Privacy International (PI) is a registered UK charity that campaigns on the right to privacy at an international level. Our work aims to fight against unlawful surveillance and other intrusions into private life by governments and corporations and seeks to ensure that technological developments strengthen rather than undermine every individual's right to a private life. PI has developed particular expertise in the trade of surveillance systems given the devastating impact this unregulated trade has had on the basic right to privacy as well as fundamental political and civil freedoms across the world. PI has been at the forefront of international efforts to introduce oversight to the surveillance industry and to put to an end the current situation that allows US, British and other European companies to sell surveillance systems to repressive regimes where it is used to maintain a stranglehold over free expression, smother political dissent and target individuals for arrest, torture and execution.

2. This submission covers: Background Information, General Policy, the Wassenaar Arrangement, Transparency & Cryptographic Exports to Countries of Human Rights Concern, The UK's Approach to Exports of Cyber Security, End-Use Controls, and Embargoes.

3. The systems, technology and software necessary for monitoring, communications interception and surveillance encompass a wide range of items. 'Surveillance equipment' in this submission includes, but is not limited to, items listed within Annex V (A) of Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012.¹⁵

¹⁵ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:016:0001:0032:EN:PDF>

Background Information

4. Ten years ago, the value of the global surveillance industry was negligible; today, industry experts value it at around \$5 billion a year. PI has documented how surveillance equipment has been used to track the activities of dissidents, human rights activists, journalists and others living under authoritarian governments. New technologies allow the financial transactions, communications activity and geographic movements of millions of people to be captured, analysed and stored both cheaply and efficiently. The emerging information and communications infrastructures of developing countries are being hijacked for surveillance purposes, and the information thereby collected is facilitating unlawful interrogation practices, torture and extrajudicial executions.

5. PI has identified 77 companies operating in the UK that sell the surveillance equipment necessary for this. The industry reasons that such equipment is necessary for law enforcement purposes, but fails to acknowledge the fact that there is usually no legal framework in place that would allow a clear lawful basis for the operation of these systems. In the wrong hands, these can be just as dangerous as guns or bombs, but there are currently no licensing requirements for the export of the wide range of surveillance equipment in place in the UK. Regulatory oversight in the form of export controls is urgently required if the UK wants to meet its human rights commitments and foreign policy objectives.

General Policy

1. PI welcomes the committees' focus on this crucial issue and its scrutiny of Government policy regarding the topic. Companies producing surveillance equipment are, by their very nature, extremely secretive and extremely little has been known about the industry's reach and operations until very recently. As more details have emerged regarding the functions and capabilities of these products, it has become clear that they can be used to significantly bolster the military and security capabilities of a state as well as for internal repression and widescale abuses of human rights. It is necessary therefore that they be considered as strategic exports and that Government policy on this is scrutinized. We therefore strongly urge the committee to continue its focus on this topic.

2. Privacy International welcomes the recognition by the British Government that "the existence of software designed to penetrate the defences of computers and communications devices and to record, modify and/or relay data without the user's knowledge poses a threat to national security, industry, and commerce, as well as to human rights."¹⁶ The UK Government has made clear its intention to pursue international agreement to expand the scope of export control to include surveillance equipment. It has also outlined its decision not to pursue unilateral restrictions because it considers unilaterally imposed restrictions to be ineffective given that they "could be more easily circumvented given the likelihood that many of the companies which manufacture such equipment will have offices in other EU and third countries."¹⁷

3. While agreeing that for enforcement purposes international action is more effective than unilateral controls, PI does not share the UK Government's view that unilaterally imposed

¹⁶ Committee on Arms Export Control, *Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013)*, Annex 3: The Committees' questions on the Government's Response (Cm8441), published in October 2012, to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II) and the Government's answers <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmquad/205/205ii_04.htm>

¹⁷ *ibid*

restrictions should not also be applied. Given the acknowledged threat that such equipment poses, it makes little sense to wait for international agreement on the issue while the UK at present has the legislative authority and the enforcement capacity to control its own exports prior to reaching international agreement on the issue. The USA, for example, already has controls on 'Surreptitious Listening' equipment aimed at denying such equipment to terrorist-designated entities and individuals as part of its foreign policy-based export controls.

4. PI is of the opinion that if the Government is serious about the threat posed by the unregulated trade in surveillance equipment, which public statements suggest it is, it should impose unilateral controls without delay and not avoid taking action merely because it believes that other states have failed to do so.

Wassenaar Arrangement

5. This 2012 Strategic Exports Annual Report states that the Government has initiated discussions within the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) on the issue of surveillance equipment and that it intends to make a formal technical proposal to the forum. A further commitment to pursue agreement among Wassenaar participants was made in response to the Committees on Arms Exports Controls and published in its Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control First Report (2013).

6. Privacy International welcomes the Government's intention to pursue agreement within the Wassenaar Arrangement and agrees that it is an appropriate forum given the scope of its control lists and participating states. Wassenaar already contains controls on passive telecommunications interception equipment and specific items that are used to identify mobile phone details. However, this list needs to be urgently expanded. The surveillance industry is heavily based in developed economies with developed ICT sectors that are major arms exporters. The WA is thereby particularly useful in this regard given that it includes 5 out of the world's 6 biggest arms exporters and that its control lists also serves as the basis for the control lists of numerous other states.

7. Given the secretive nature of negotiations at Wassenaar however, it is unclear at this stage what the UK technical proposal will be. In order for any international agreements on surveillance equipment to have an impact, they are required to include as wide a scope of specific equipment as possible. There is a real risk however that products used by human rights activists, journalists and others to evade government surveillance and censorship in repressive regimes could also fall within control lists – having a detrimental impact on their access to communications technology. We are concerned by the lack of engagement the Government has shown towards civil society on this topic, and have so far not been consulted on any substantive issues to be put forward by the UK delegation.

8. We therefore recommend that the committees' suggest that the Government pursue outreach activities with civil society on this important issue and that stakeholders with a demonstrable interest in and knowledge of the issues be consulted.

9. We further recommend that the committees make Government policy accountable by reviewing the UK technical proposal and ensuring that the Government meets its commitment to pursue meaningful negotiations on this topic within the Wassenaar Arrangement.

10. PI is also concerned about the length of time that this approach takes given the complexity of negotiations and how long it takes to incorporate the updated Wassenaar list into the national consolidated list. While we understand that the delay is largely down to the length of time it has taken to update the EU Dual-Use Regulation since the Lisbon Treaty, it does not change the fact that this entire process including negotiations takes several years to produce tangible results. It suggests that the Government has not fully recognised the seriousness of the situation and its implications for victims of surveillance equipment.

11. Although it is an appropriate forum, PI believes that it is not the only avenue through which to achieve tangible results. We recommend that the committees ensure that the Government explores all avenues available to pursue controls, including across the EU level. Various parliamentarians and officials within the EU have expressed their strong support for updating the EU Dual-Use regulation to cover surveillance equipment, while the Parliament itself endorsed amendments proposed by Dutch Member of European Parliament Marietje Schaake calling for EU export control regulation to include additional binding export controls for surveillance equipment.¹⁸ PI also recommends the use of interim measures within the UK, such as the powers contained within the Export Control Act that previously allowed the control of sodium thiopental on an emergency basis.

Transparency & Cryptographic Exports to Countries of Human Rights Concern

12. Data on what exports have taken place is not accessible given that a large amount of surveillance equipment is not currently on the consolidated list.

13. Some surveillance equipment and software does fall within the scope of controls because of the strength of cryptography used. This particularly relates to products that fall within categories 5A002 and 5D002. Such controls are inappropriate. Cryptography is a key security measure to protect the confidentiality of communications, and to also ensure trust and confidence in digital interactions. Despite strict controls up until the 1990s, governments realised that in order to increase confidence in the then-emerging Internet economy, greater security was required. Encryption was becoming an essential safeguard for electronic commerce and global communications. The ready availability of strong cryptography (made available for use by human rights activists) over the Internet made export controls a competitive disadvantage for companies in controlled countries. To meet the interests of the US controls, the US National Security Agency worked with companies to introduce technologies that contained backdoors or reduced security obstacles for the NSA, which hindered US companies' abilities to sell their products to governments and companies overseas. As increased risks of surveillance by states and criminals increased, cryptography export controls became untenable and were eventually liberalised.

14. The depth in detail reported on exports of cryptographic equipment is not sufficient to make a reliable judgment on what the product being exported actually is. 5A002a1a can, for example, include a wide range of products employing cryptography to secure communication in addition to extremely pervasive surveillance systems. It is therefore difficult to assess the risk posed by extant Government approved licenses for cryptographic goods exported to the 27 Countries listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as being of the greatest human rights concern.

¹⁸ See Marietje Schaake, European Parliament endorses stricter European export control of digital arms
<<http://www.marietjeschaake.eu/2012/10/ep-steunt-d66-initiatief-controle-europese-export-digitale-wapens/>>

15. Nevertheless, given that PI has identified at least 77 companies in the UK producing surveillance equipment, the amount of licenses approved to these 27 countries is clearly concerning – especially given the high prevalence of licenses for equipment employing cryptography within the approvals. Equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, or software for equipment employing cryptography was approved for 20 of the 27 countries on the list from 1 January to 30 September alone, while equipment employing cryptography makes up by far the largest proportion of approved licenses.

16. We therefore highly recommend that CAEC determine which of these licenses was for surveillance products and that it recommend to the Government that more detailed reporting within this category is made accessible for both the committees' and public scrutiny.

The UK's Approach to Exports of Cyber Security

17. PI has several concerns regarding the Government's approach to exports of 'cyber security', as outlined by the UKTI.¹⁹ It is clear that the UK has historically had a high level of competence in this sector because of its security services. According to figures cited by UKTI, cyber security exports now total some 33% of UK security exports and a third of all sales coming out of the UK security sector. Considering these figures, and the fact that UKTI believes there to be an estimated 2,380 companies working on cyber security in the UK, it is understandable that the Government will be keen to promote the industry.

18. However, as the UKTI report itself makes clear, export controls within this section of the security sector do not always apply. This is particularly worrying because of the nature of some of the technology. Deep-packet inspection equipment, for example, has a legitimate use in network management and the detection of malware and Trojans. However, the same equipment can also be used to monitor packets of data for surveillance purposes and for censoring particular websites and services from general access. UKTI has identified several countries considered to be 'priority markets' for cyber security exports. PI is concerned that these 'priority markets' include authoritarian governments in the Gulf where access to the Internet is widely censored and that appear in the FCO's list of countries of human rights concern.

End-Use Controls

19. Emphasis on list-based controls is limited in its efficacy for surveillance systems given the speed at which technology and software and their technical specifications develop. There is a real risk that by the time list based controls on surveillance equipment are implemented they will already be out of date. Consequently, there needs to be robust end-use controls contained in any solution that will be able to catch non-listed goods. PI recommends that the Government review the options available for such a control, given that it believes the catch-all principles within the EU Dual-Use Regulation and the Wassenaar Arrangement are too narrow for these purposes and only allow it to control non-listed items if there is a risk they will be used as part of a WMD programme, be exported to a destination under embargo or incorporated into items on the military list. In Flanders, for example, a military end-use catch-all clause allows for control of any unlisted goods if they are intended for use in military actions.

¹⁹ See UKTI, 'Cyber Security: The UK's approach to exports'

<http://www.gchq.gov.uk/Press/Documents/Cyber_Security-the_UKs_approach_to_exports.pdf>

Embargoes

20. Privacy International welcomed the Council's decision to include surveillance equipment within EU restrictive measures imposed on Iran and Syria in light of evidence that European companies had sold surveillance equipment to the authorities there. PI considers this as recognition of the fact that such equipment significantly bolsters the security and military capabilities of a government and that it can be used for internal repression. We therefore recommend that the Government pursue action to ensure that all of the equipment listed within these measures are controlled in all restrictive measures in place and in the UK's consolidated list.

21. Annex II of the Export Control (Syria Sanctions) Order, 2013 should also be expanded to recognise that surveillance systems can also be used to facilitate internal repression. By virtue of such recognition, the logical extension is that they would also be incorporated into the UK consolidated list. Items already on this list should also be incorporated into the UK consolidated list.

27 September 2013

Written evidence from Export Group for Aerospace Defence (EGAD) (AEC005)

1. Introduction:

1.1 The Export Group for Aerospace & Defence (EGAD) is a UK-based not-for-profit-making special interest industry group, founded in September 2004, focusing exclusively on all aspects of export and trade control matters. EGAD is the only dedicated national industrial body in the UK dealing exclusively with export control issues. EGAD operates under the joint auspices of ADS Group Ltd, the British Naval Equipment Association (BNEA), INTELLECT and the Society of Maritime Industries (SMI).

1.2 A dedicated website (www.egad.org.uk) has been created at the request of the group's Executive Committee and with guidance from its Awareness Outreach Activities Sub-Committee, that is intended to become the first port of call for companies as the source of user-friendly basic, initial guidance on all aspects of export and trade controls, created by like-minded people to help compliance staff within companies. It seeks to identify potential sources of help, and ideas for problem solving, and presents easy steps to "bite-sized compliance".

1.3 The website has been kept simple, and, in addition to providing information on EGAD, itself, seeks to present a practical and simple step-by-step guide on understanding export and trade controls, and addressing the fundamental questions which companies ask: when do I need an export licence and how do I go about trying to obtain and use one?

1.4 EGAD has also created, with Cranfield University, a series of externally-accredited training courses in export control compliance, at four levels, running from very basic awareness (appropriate for all company staff) up to a Master's equivalent course (for senior export control compliance managers within companies). For further information, details on these are available at: www.strategicexportcontrols.org/index.cfm.

1.5 EGAD welcomes this opportunity to contribute to the open consultation around Strategic Export Controls; the CAEC invited comment on several specific areas, the response of EGAD to those areas, is detailed below:

2. General Comment:

2.1 From the viewpoint of responsible and law-abiding UK companies, it is clear that we support the continuation of the current UK export licensing system, which operates on a strict “case-by-case” basis. It is our strongly-held contention that the continued retention of the current “case-by-case” basis is the most logical and rational way in which an export control system can function, offering, as it does, the flexibility to permit responsible, whilst preventing undesirable exports, sometimes to the same destinations.

2.3 This principle is enshrined in the current UK Open licensing system, that allows the Government to identify categories of “low-risk” goods which can be exported to certain destinations, with minimal intervention from the export licensing authorities and a minimal administrative burden on UK businesses.

2.4 Concerns raised by the Committee regarding two recent export licenses granted for the export of two dual-use chemicals, sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride, to Syria reinforces the need for a well-informed, evidence-based discussion on Export Controls. Sodium fluoride has a multitude of uses, most notably in dental hygiene products such as toothpaste and mouthwash. In this case, the chemicals in question were for civilian use in the finishing of aluminium profiles used to make aluminium showers and aluminium window frames, as demonstrated by the exporter and company due to receive the chemicals in Syria. The export licenses themselves were only granted once the Government was satisfied that the chemicals were indeed for this use and not for use in the manufacturing of chemical weapons.

2.5 The reasons export licence applications of this nature often take so long to process is due to the scrutiny with which they are assessed and time taken to determine their clear end-use are.

2.6 Responsibility, therefore, lies with UK industry to disclose all relevant information required in the full assessment of export license applications in a timely manner, not only to help speed up the application process but also to create as transparent an audit trail as possible for any subsequent enquiries that may take place. By requesting this information, UK Government officials are doing all they possibly can to try to ensure that the UK acts responsibly in its export activities. UK companies are advised to apply as early as possible and provide as much supporting information as possible to assist UK Government officials in assessing their applications.

2.7 As SPIRE , the ECO’s online export licensing system, itself says *"the ECO has to return roughly half of all export license applications to the exporter, either for more information or because the application has been completed wrongly. These incomplete or incorrect applications cause delays in processing."* The delay in applications has caused instances where shipments have been delayed, impacting on customer confidence and their perceptions of the UK as a supplier.

2.8 EGAD is working to inform exporters better on how to complete licence applications more thoroughly and to ensure all necessary data is provided at the initial stage, in order to reduce delays in the process and prevent the current unacceptably high level of returned application and delayed shipments.

3. Exhibitions:

3.1 EGAD does not believe that any useful purpose would be served by a successful campaign to abolish DSEI (Defence and Security Equipment International). Held in the UK, in conjunction with the UK Government, DSEI is regulated by tighter controls and higher standards than might be the case should the event take place elsewhere in the world. The event also enables UK SMEs to promote their business, network and meet potential customers that they might otherwise not come into contact with; contributing to the success of the UK's supply chain.

4. US Export Control Amendments:

4.1 We are aware that UK Government officials are endeavouring to keep abreast of developments in the US on Export Control Reform, which could have considerable commercial and bureaucratic consequences for UK businesses trading with companies in the US. It is important that the UK Government takes an active role in discussing the implications in the context of the Wassenaar Arrangement and considers ways in which it can seek to amend our own national legislation to ensure that UK Defence Industry is not at a competitive disadvantage in the increasingly crucial global marketplace.

5. Extraterritorial Regulations:

5.1 EGAD believes that an extension of extraterritorial trade controls will fail to achieve the desired results from such measures and will in practice be easily evaded by illegal arms brokers, whilst subjecting companies to two different jurisdictions for the same transaction. Extraterritorial jurisdiction should only be exerted in extreme circumstances that warrant it in order to avoid conflicts arising from multiple laws. Both the EU and the UK have already manifested their opposition to extra-territorial laws through adopting (i) **Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom;** (ii) The Extraterritorial US Legislation (Sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya) (Protection of Trading Interests) Order 1996; and (iii) The Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980.

5.2 Seeking to improve the level of control on the export of defence materiel by encouraging states to sign and ratify the Arms Trade Treaty is, in our view, a much more productive approach in the longer term. We assume that CAEC members are primarily concerned about undesirable exports of defence equipment from third countries, which may fuel conflict and human rights abuses rather than those cases of responsible 3rd country exports which tangentially involve a "UK person" because they may be employed by a company established in a third country.

5.3 The Arms Trade Treaty seeks to address the problem and HMG should be encouraged to provide outreach and assistance to those countries that request it to bring their export control systems up to a comparable level. In the interim, we understand the desire for some measure of enhanced trade controls, but would request that it should expressly exclude legitimate trade from its scope.

6. Transparency:

6.1 Industry is initially positive about the new proposed shape and scope of the information, the ECO will seek from companies in an effort to enhance the existing high-level of transparency that we feel more effectively tries to achieve a practical and pragmatic balance, without imposing an unrealistic and disproportionate bureaucratic burden on UK companies. We remain unhappy, however, that industry should be required to pay the cost in terms of overheads and diversion of resources due to the Government's inability to modify and interrogate effectively the information that it already has on its own IT systems.

Written submission from Bahrain Watch (AEC006)

SUMMARY OF SUBMISSION

1. The Bahrain government is committing serious violations as part of a crackdown against its opposition, human rights defenders and free expression. It is failing in its pledges to enact reforms and has failed to hold perpetrators of violations responsible for their acts.
2. British manufactured arms and repressive technology have been used to suppress Bahraini citizens.
3. The British government has regarded Bahrain as a key export destination since 2010. It has consistently supported arms exports to Bahrain, despite continued human rights abuses.
4. The British government has given legitimacy to Bahraini officials and agencies accused of serious human rights abuses by inviting them to arms fairs.
5. The British government has increased its defence relations with Bahrain and is presently leading negotiations to sell arms worth a reported £1 billion.

INTRODUCTION

6. Bahrain Watch is an independent research and advocacy group that seeks to promote effective, transparent and accountable governance in Bahrain. It is led by independent researchers inside and outside Bahrain and focuses on evidence-based advocacy in the areas of political reform, economic development, and security.

FACTUAL INFORMATION

CURRENT SUMMARY AND BRITISH EXPORTS

7. Bahrain has been in a state of crisis since February 2011 when a popular uprising was brutally suppressed, with activists killed, maimed, tortured, and imprisoned. No senior official has been held accountable for these ongoing violations. There is little evidence of any

substantial reform in Bahrain.²⁰ In September 2013, 47 countries signed a joint statement describing Bahrain's human rights situation as "an issue of serious concern". While the European Parliament also passed a resolution raising similar concerns,²¹ to date the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has failed to name Bahrain as a "country of concern".

8. British made arms have been used to suppress Bahraini citizens since 2011. Saudi troops used Tactical armoured vehicles manufactured by BAE Systems when they entered Bahrain in March 2011. Bahrain police armed with shotguns use birdshot against protesters, which has resulted in several deaths and serious injuries. Birdshot cartridges manufactured by UK firms Gamebore, Eley Hawk and Hull Cartridge have been identified in photographs taken by activists reportedly following the suppression of protests. Bahrain security forces have used tear gas manufactured by US firm Federal Laboratories, owned by Armor Holdings.²² Until July 2012, Armor Holdings was owned by BAE Systems. Surveillance technology sold by a British based company has been used by Bahrain to target activists.²³

9. Whilst some UK export licences were revoked in February 2011, the British government has largely maintained close relations with the Bahraini authorities and consistently encouraged arms sales. The Commander-in-Chief of the Bahrain Defence Force has claimed that he successfully pressured the British government into lifting the freeze on arms exports. Interviewed in February 2012, he recounted a conversation with "a senior British officer": *"I told him that we would impose a ban on dealing with British planes, ships and military personnel in Bahrain if the ban on Bahrain was not lifted within two weeks. We do not need to import anything from them, but it is a matter of principle. The British ban was lifted after one month."*²⁴

10. Some of the worst human rights abuses were committed during the three-month state of emergency announced by the King on 15th March 2011. Several export licenses to Bahrain were approved during this period. In April 2011, export licenses for "body armor", "civil body armor" and "training hand grenades" were approved. In May, licenses were approved for "small arms ammunition", as well as components and technology for "military support vehicles" and "all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection". The Ministry of Interior, Bahrain Defence Force, Bahrain National Guard and National Security Agency were responsible for implementing the state of emergency. British exports to - and relations with - these government bodies are therefore of particular concern.

11. There has been a steady trade with Bahrain since 2010. In 2010, the UK approved export

²⁰ <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/28/bahrain-no-progress-reform>

²¹ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0390&language=EN&ring=B7-2013-0422>

²² <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmcaff/writev/bahrain/sab51.htm>

²³ <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-25/cyber-attacks-on-activists-traced-to-finfisher-spyware-of-gamma.html>, <https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/oecd-complaint-against-gamma-international-accepted-for-further-investigation>, <https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/privacy-international-files-for-judicial-review-of-hmrc-refusal-to-reveal-the-state>

²⁴ <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/bahrain-protests-a-coup-plot-defence-chief-says-1.980961>

licenses worth at least £8,776,392.²⁵ In February 2011, licenses for goods worth at least £5,249,516 were revoked. Approved arms exports in 2010 include small arms and ammunition, “CS hand grenades”, “tear gas/riot control ammunition” and “stun grenades”.

12. In 2011, export licences worth at least £13,310,376 were approved, a significant increase from the previous year. Several of these, worth at least £893,397, were revoked in February 2011. In 2012, export licenses worth at least £7,968,437 were approved. This included the export of 400 machine guns and components worth £4,100,000 for “naval end use”, and “secure communications equipment” to the Bahrain military to improve their “command and control”.²⁶ The figures reveal a significant increase in exports from previous years. In 2008, export licences worth £5,167,508 were approved and in 2009 that figure was only £2,873,044. These figures may be dwarfed if the UK Government succeeds in selling Bahrain 12 Eurofighter Typhoon jets worth a reported £1billion.²⁷

PROMOTING DEFENCE EXPORTS

13. Promoting British business interests in Bahrain has been a consistent thrust of the current government. Writing for the UKTI sponsored “Doing Business in Bahrain” website, the British Ambassador notes: “*In meetings with the British Prime Minister, HM The King has declared that he looks to Britain to be Bahrain's 'partner of choice' (...). David Cameron said this was 'music to his ears.'*”²⁸ The events of 2011 did not impact British business. In 2012, exports of goods to Bahrain increased by 21.4%.²⁹

14. The FCO is increasingly engaged in promoting defence exports. One of the actions in the FCO’s 2012 Business Plan is: “Use defence engagement to help maintain the UK share of the global defence export market and to increase the UK’s share of the global security export market, including supporting export campaigns for Typhoon.”³⁰

15. Prior to 2011, Bahrain was named as a “key market” for UKTI Defence and Security Organisation (UKTI DSO). In a UKTI DSO case study, Praetorian International’s co-founder reports that UKTI “helped us immensely when we were trying to make worthwhile contacts. The [UKTI] desk officer for Bahrain arranged valuable meetings for us with people such as the UK Defence Attaché in Manama”.³¹ Bahrain is one of 72 countries which has a UK

²⁵ These and the following figures are taken from Campaign Against Arms Trade using data from the Strategic Export Controls database: http://www.caat.org.uk/resources/export-licences/licence?date_to=2010-12-31&date_from=2010-01-01®ion=Bahrain&n=0

²⁶ http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmquad/205/205ii_02.htm#a3

²⁷ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/10233673/Britain-to-sell-Typhoon-jets-to-Bahrain-despite-human-rights-record.html>

²⁸ <http://www.bahrain.doingbusinessguide.co.uk/forewords/>

²⁹ <http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2013-07-03a.162710.h&s=bahrain+exports#g162710.q0>

³⁰ https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32853/business-plan-12.pdf

³¹

www.ukti.gov.uk/download/108692_100812/Case%2520study%3A%2520Praetorian%2520International.html

Defence Attaché.³²

16. UKTI DSO officials had meetings with the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) and Ministry of Interior in the months before February 2011. On 5th-10th October 2010, representatives demonstrated a “Ballistic Toolkit” to the BDF. On 19th January 2011, two UKTI DSO officials met with the MOI to discuss “possible sharing of info between UK and Bahrain on Security and Policing best practice”.³³

17. On 11th May 2010, the first day of the new Coalition Government, the FCO published “A Charter for Business”, pledging that “FCO Ministers and officials will lobby tirelessly on behalf of UK business interests overseas”.³⁴ As noted by the Foreign Affairs Committee, this new FCO Charter “made no mention of the FCO's role in helping businesses address the potential human rights implications of their overseas operations”.³⁵ On the same day, UKTI launched a five-year strategy titled “Britain Open for Business” aimed at expanding inward investment and overseas exports through “building strategic relationships at the highest levels”.³⁶ Arms formed a central part of this renewed export drive. Speaking at a UKTI DSO event in November 2010, Defence Minister Gerald Howarth described “the biggest defence exports drive in decades”.³⁷ UKTI has four staff members based in Bahrain.³⁸

18. Several Ministers in the new government had begun forging relations with Bahraini officials whilst in opposition. On 13th-16th March 2009, Alan Duncan MP (currently Minister of State for International Development) and Keith Simpson MP (currently Private Parliamentary Secretary to the Foreign Secretary) visited Bahrain, with “accommodation and flights paid for by the Government of Bahrain”. The Bahrain government paid for Liam Fox MP (Defence Secretary from May 2010 to October 2011) to visit Bahrain on 21th-23th July 2009 to “meet with the King”. William Hague MP (current Foreign Secretary) visited Bahrain on 9th-11th January 2009 to meet the Foreign Minister. His trip was funded by the Bahrain government.³⁹

19. After coming to office, Defence Secretary Liam Fox and Foreign Secretary William Hague visited Bahrain on May 24th 2010. They had meetings with the King and Foreign Affairs Minister respectively.⁴⁰ In June 2010, Foreign Secretary William Hague launched the “Gulf Initiative” which sought “to improve commercial, economic, cultural and educational ties”

³² <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm121213/text/121213w0001.htm>

³³ <http://www.caat.org.uk/resources/foi-responses/pdf/2012-03-05.ukti-dso.foi-12-0185-ukti-dso-bahrain-meetings.pdf>

³⁴ https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/35438/business-charter.pdf

³⁵ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmcaff/964/96404.htm>

³⁶ <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/britain-open-for-business>

³⁷ <http://www.caat.org.uk/resources/foi-responses/pdf/2010-12-08.ukti-dso.foi-10-2390-ukti-dso-symposium-2010-gerald-howarth-presentation.pdf>

³⁸ <http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2013-07-03a.162534.h&s=bahrain+lucas#g162534.q0>

³⁹ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmregmem/100412/100412.pdf>

⁴⁰ <http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/441404>, <http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/441394>

with Bahrain and other GCC countries.⁴¹ The following month, King Hamad met with Prime Minister David Cameron at Downing Street. They discussed “furthering economic bilateral ties”.⁴²

20. Defence Secretary Liam Fox and Defence Minister Lord Astor visited Bahrain in December 2010. They had meetings with the King and Crown Prince, who are also respectively the Supreme Commander and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Bahrain Defence Force.⁴³ Fox had also met with the Crown Prince in London the previous week⁴⁴. Fox’s associate Adam Werritty was also in Bahrain during the period of this trip to attend the Manama Dialogue.⁴⁵ It has been reported that Werritty’s company Pargav Limited funded his overseas trips. One of Pargav’s donors was G3 (Good Governance Group). G3 is a private intelligence firm whose clients include British arms firm BAE Systems. It held meetings with Fox during his time in opposition and government.⁴⁶ In July 2011, G3 received a £1.5million contract with the Bahrain government to develop a “media campaign to support Bahrain's position in the international community”.⁴⁷ Liam Fox resigned as Defence Secretary in October 2011, following a scandal involving his ties to Werritty and the Atlantic Bridge charity which he founded. Lord Astor was a trustee of Atlantic Bridge.⁴⁸

DEEPENING UK-BAHRAIN ENGAGEMENT

21. Shortly after the state of emergency had ended in Bahrain, the British government began to expand its drive for arms exports. On 8th September 2011, the UKTI DSO Senior Management Team hosted a lunch in London to give members of the AeroSpace, Defence, Security (A|D|S) trade association an opportunity to meet “meet newly appointed UK Defence Attachés”, including the official who was due to start work in Bahrain.⁴⁹ On the same day, two officials from UKTI DSO, including the Country Manager for Bahrain, spoke at an event organised by the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry titled: Middle East: A Vast Market For UK Defence and Security Companies. Bahrain was named as a “top destination” for the UK defence industry.⁵⁰

22. The following week, London hosted the DSEi international arms fair. A delegation from Bahrain National Guard attended “as guests of the UK Government”.⁵¹ The Bahrain National

⁴¹ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmcaff/writev/fcogov/m12.htm>

⁴² <http://royaltyinthenews.com/david-cameron-holds-talks-with-bahraini-king>

⁴³ <http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2011-11-14b.78705.h>

⁴⁴ <http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/444998>

⁴⁵ <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/datablog/2011/oct/10/liam-fox-and-adam-werritty-links-liamfox>

⁴⁶ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/8843810/Inside-the-corporate-intelligence-company-which-bankrolled-Liam-Fox.html>

⁴⁷ <https://bahrainwatch.org/pr/g3.php>

⁴⁸ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/8843804/Second-Defence-Minister-faces-questions-over-links-with-Liam-Foxs-best-man.html>

⁴⁹ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmbis/419/419we03.htm>

⁵⁰ <http://www.londonchamber.co.uk/DocImages/9245.pdf>

⁵¹ <http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/arms-fairs/dsei/delegations/2011-09-13.ukti-dso.dsei-2011-invitation-list.pdf>

Guard supported other agencies in the March 16th 2011 assault on Pearl Roundabout and security operations at Salminaya Medical Complex and the Financial Harbour.⁵²

23. According to emails obtained by Private Eye, the UK Government had originally decided not to invite Bahrain, however it changed its mind after determining that the human rights situation had “improved considerably”.⁵³ A delegate from the Bahrain National Guard was escorted around the arms fair by Gerald Howard MP, then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for International Security Strategy at the Ministry of Defence, as well as two officials from UKTI DSO.⁵⁴ According to Private Eye: *“The government also arranged dinner dates and “stand visits” with arms firms, and the two Bahraini National Guard reps attended a BAE Systems reception on 13 September. There were also meetings with defence ministers Gerald Howarth and Lord Astor, a “lunch hosted by Air Vice Marshal Nigel Maddox” in the “VIP Dining Area” and a 45-minute presentation on unmanned drones”*.⁵⁵

24. The Bahrain International Airshow was held on 19th-21st January 2012. The event is organised by UK firm Farnborough International, a subsidiary company of A|D|S. Two days before the start of the airshow, A|D|S held a lobbying event in Parliament to announce their new “Flying Forward” campaign and a “newly established All Party Parliamentary Group Aerospace”.⁵⁶ A spokesperson for Farnborough said of British involvement in the airshow: “government-to-government relations are still good and invitations have been extended to the UK defence and aerospace community as well as the UK government.”⁵⁷ UKTI DSO had intended “to organise a joint chalet” with A|D|S at the airshow, however this didn’t happen.⁵⁸ A Government Minister subsequently claimed that whilst UKTI DSO “deployed a small team to support the airshow”, they did not purchase a chalet as “the expense could not be justified”.⁵⁹ Defence Minister Lord Astor attended the Airshow and held meetings with Bahrain’s Prime Minister, Crown Prince, Foreign Minister and BDF Commander-in-Chief. General Simon Mayall, the MoD’s Defence Advisor for the Middle East, also attended the meeting with the BDF Commander-in-Chief.⁶⁰

25. On 30th January 2012, the UK government approved an export for 2 assault rifles worth £6,620 to “a member of the Bahrain Royal family”.⁶¹ Although the monetary value is small, the export carries great symbolic weight.

26. In July 2012, a delegation from the Bahrain military attended the Farnborough Airshow,

⁵² <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/450034>

⁵³ <http://www.caat.org.uk/resources/countries/bahrain/uk-arms-sales.php>

⁵⁴ <http://www.caat.org.uk/resources/foi-responses/pdf/2012-03-05.ukti-dso.foi-12-0185-ukti-dso-bahrain-meetings.pdf>

⁵⁵ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/13/syria-hama-massacre-live#block-18>

⁵⁶ <https://www.adsgroup.org.uk/articles/27855>

⁵⁷ <http://www.flightglobal.com/features/bahrain-special/>

⁵⁸ <http://web.archive.org/web/20110523011557/http://www.ukti.gov.uk/download/file/128537.html>

⁵⁹ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201212/ldhansrd/text/120213w0001.htm>

⁶⁰ <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/490082>, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/490038>, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/490058>

⁶¹ http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmquad/205/205ii_02.htm#a3

following an invitation from UKTI DSO.⁶² Prime Minister David Cameron opened the airshow which was attended by 16 government ministers.⁶³ Then Defence Minister Gerald Howarth MP “had 15 meetings with overseas delegations”.⁶⁴

27. King Hamad visited London on 23rd August and met with the Prime Minister. They “discussed opportunities for British businesses in” Bahrain.⁶⁵ Two week later, Defence Secretary Philip Hammond visited Bahrain and held several meetings, including with the King, Crown Prince and Defence Minister. General Simon Mayall attended some meetings “in his role as defence senior adviser middle east”. General Mayall also met with the Interior Minister.⁶⁶ General Mayall returned to Bahrain on 7th October and met with the BDF Commander-in-Chief.⁶⁷

28. On 11th October, Defence Secretary Philip Hammond and the Bahrain Foreign Secretary signed a new UK-Bahrain Defence Cooperation Accord in the presence of the Crown Prince.⁶⁸ The Ministry of Defence did not publicise this accord and have not released a copy of the text. Defence Minister Dr Andrew Murrison told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in 2013 that he “will not discuss the content of that particular document”. At the same hearing, Foreign Minister Alistair Burt described the accord as “evidence of [the] strong relationship” between the UK and Bahrain.⁶⁹

29. Three days after the accord was signed, the Crown Prince attended a banquet held in his honour at Sandhurst Military Academy.⁷⁰ General Mayall met with the Crown Prince during the event.⁷¹ Sandhurst has close links to the Bahrain Royal Family. In January 2012, it received a £3million donation from King Hamad, following “negotiations [...] about the donation throughout 2011”.⁷² Following the donation, Sandhurst renamed “Mons Hall” to “King Hamad Hall”. King Hamad’s son Sheikh Nasser represented his father at the opening of the hall on 13th May 2013.⁷³ King Hamad and Sheikh Nasser are both graduates from Sandhurst. The Crown Prince’s son Sheikh Mohammed graduated from Sandhurst in April 2011.⁷⁴ In

⁶² <http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/arms-fairs/farnborough/delegations/2012-08-20.ukti-dso.farnborough-2012-invitation-list.pdf>

⁶³ <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-opens-farnborough-international-air-show-2012>, <http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/arms-fairs/farnborough/about.php#note1>

⁶⁴ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm120716/debtext/120716-0001.htm#12071613000595>

⁶⁵ <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/aug/24/david-cameron-bahrain-king-talks>

⁶⁶ <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/524084>, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/524204>, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm121015/text/121015w0002.htm#1210166000187>, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/524029>

⁶⁷ <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/527927>

⁶⁸ <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/528759>

⁶⁹ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmcaff/c88-ii/c8801.htm>

⁷⁰ <http://www.sandhurstfoundation.org/news/VIP-Dinner-13-October-2012.htm>

⁷¹ <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/528952>

⁷² <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/blog/2012/09/02/sandhurst-took-3m-bahrain-gift-after-regimes-crackdown-on-demonstrators/>

⁷³ <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/560627>

⁷⁴ <http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=303989>

2012, he began an “exchange programme with the British Army”.⁷⁵ 39 Bahraini officers have been trained at Sandhurst since 2002, 5 of whom were training in 2011. The UK Government subsidises their training by £29,600.⁷⁶

30. Defence Minister Lord Astor visited Bahrain in early December 2012 “to attend high level talks with leaders”.⁷⁷ Later that month, Lord Astor accompanied several British officials to a reception at the Bahrain Embassy in London. Former Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon was also present.⁷⁸ Hoon works for AgustaWestland, which is owned by Italian firm Finmeccanica, one of the manufacturers of the Eurofighter Typhoon.

31. Lord Astor returned to Bahrain on 10th January 2013 to brief a Defence Minister on British made Typhoon warplanes which had arrived in Bahrain that day.⁷⁹ In August 2013, it was revealed that the UK government is leading negotiations to sell Bahrain a reported 12 Eurofighter Typhoons worth around £1billion. Lord Astor’s trip was followed by a series of high-level meetings. General Mayall visited Bahrain on 14th February and met with the Crown Prince, Foreign Minister, BDF Commander-in-Chief and Sheikh Nasser, Royal Guards Commander.⁸⁰ On 9th March, the outgoing Chief of Staff of the British Army met with the BDF Commander-in-Chief.⁸¹ On 19th March, UKTI DSO’s Senior Military Advisor met with the BDF Commander-in-Chief and a Defence Minister.⁸² On April 29th the Head of UKTI DSO was in Bahrain to meet the Minister for Defence Affairs.⁸³ On May 12th, a UK Defence Minister, the British Chief-of-Staff and Prince Andrew attended a reception held by King Hamad in London.⁸⁴

32. During this period, Bahraini delegations were invited to two British trade expos. In March, a Bahraini delegation attended the Home Office run “Security and Policing” expo. BAE Systems were introduced to the delegation and the firm “outlined its cyber defence capabilities”.⁸⁵ In April, Sheikh Nasser was amongst the delegates at the Counter Terror Expo.⁸⁶ Sheikh Nasser is accused of having “personally engaged” in torture in 2011 and heading “a punitive campaign to repress Bahraini athletes who had demonstrated their support [for] the peaceful pro-democracy movement”.⁸⁷ His attendance at the arms fair and high-level meetings with British defence officials are therefore a cause of concern.

⁷⁵ <http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/News-and-Events/Latest-News/2011/December/30/111230-UKMCC-Prince>

⁷⁶ <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/blog/2012/09/02/sandhurst-took-3m-bahrain-gift-after-regimes-crackdown-on-demonstrators/>,

⁷⁷ <http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=342710>

⁷⁸ <http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/537671>

⁷⁹ <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/541309>

⁸⁰ <http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/546412>, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/546419>, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/546406>, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/546407>

⁸¹ <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/449467?date=2012-09-10>

⁸² <http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/552222>, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/558631>

⁸³ <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/558660>

⁸⁴ <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/560364>

⁸⁵ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmaff/writev/humanrights/hr03.htm>

⁸⁶ <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/558160>

⁸⁷ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/20/bahrain-olympic-prince-human-rights>

33. King Hamad met with the Prime Minister in Downing Street on 6th August. Bahrain state media revealed that the King expressed “Bahrain’s keenness to purchase the British Typhoon warplanes”. King Hamad returned to London in September, the week before the DSEi arms fair. Defence Secretary Philip Hammond met him at his private residence. They reportedly discussed the Typhoon deal. King Hamad also made Defence Minister Lord Astor and former UKTI Special Representative Prince Andrew.⁸⁸

34. A delegation from Bahrain attended DSEi as guests of UKTI DSO.⁸⁹ DSEi hosted several arms companies whose tear gas has been used in Bahrain since 2011, including Non-Lethal Technologies, Condor Technologies and Rheinmetall. Benelli, whose shotguns are used by the Bahrain police, and Less Lethal Africa, who have reportedly supplied Bahrain with rubber bullets, also exhibited at DSEi.⁹⁰ During DSEI, UK firm BMT revealed that it has entered a partnership with Turkish shipyard Ares to supply boats to Bahrain’s Coast Guard.⁹¹

35. UKTI are currently actively promoting their presence at the 2014 Bahrain International Airshow in January, where they will have their own chalet. UKTI is also offering to help British firms “win business in this market”.⁹² The 2014 airshow is being organised by UK firm Farnborough International and includes a “Security and Surveillance Pavillion”.⁹³

Written evidence from the UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG) (AEC0007)

Introduction

1. On 2 April 2013 the UN General Assembly adopted the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This was a major achievement, the culmination of many years hard work, and the UK is to be congratulated for the leadership it has shown throughout the ATT process. Since the ATT opened for signature on 3 June, progress has been remarkable. In four months, 113 states have signed and seven have ratified the Treaty. If this momentum can be maintained, the UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG)⁹⁴ estimates that the Treaty could enter into force by the end of 2014.

2. This momentum is far from guaranteed, however, and the UK still has an important leadership role to play in terms of both encouraging other States to sign and ratify and assisting effective Treaty implementation by countries with less resources and/or less-developed arms

⁸⁸ <http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/578084>, <http://bna.bh/portal/en/news/578248>, <http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/578220>, <http://www.zajilpress.com/britains-opportunities-growing-in-the-arabian-gulf/4748/>

⁸⁹ http://www.ukti.gov.uk/gb_gb/defencesecurity/item/603020.html?null

⁹⁰ http://www.dsei.co.uk/page.cfm/Action=ExhibList/ListID=1/PageNum=1/loadSearch=295843_1592, <http://www.ihs.com/events/exhibitions/dsei-2011/news/day-2/Control-without-loss-of-life.aspx>

⁹¹ <http://www.ihs.com/events/exhibitions/dsei-2013/news/day-2/Partnership-with-Turkey-for-Bahrain-programme.aspx>

⁹² <http://www.ukti.gov.uk/defencesecurity/defence/event/550700.html>

⁹³ http://www.goshowoff.com/FIL/BIAS2014/files/bias2014_security_surveillance_pavilion_brochure.pdf

⁹⁴ The UK Working Group on Arms comprises Action on Armed Violence, Amnesty UK, Article 36, Omega Research Foundation, Oxfam and Saferworld.

transfer control systems. The second of these roles will be relatively resource-intensive and we urge the Government to prioritise funding for this work. We also encourage the Government to consider the ATT with regard to other policy decisions that are related to arms transfer; for example invitations to Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi) arms fairs should not be extended to States or exhibitors from States that do not support the ATT.

3. With regard to UK Government policy or practice at the national level, there have been several areas of concern over the last year. These include:

- The role played by the UK in the changes to the EU arms embargo on Syria, and the subsequent ambiguous approach to arming Syrian groups opposed to the Assad Government;
- The apparent lack of lessons-learned by the UK following the 2011 Arab Spring, in particular, but not exclusively, with regard to arms exports to Egypt;
- The weaknesses in the new licence-suspension mechanism;
- A U-turn on plans to improve transparency on arms exported under open licences, in spite of the defence industry appearing comfortable with the proposed regime;
- An ongoing and longstanding failure to prevent exhibitors at DSEi from breaking export control law;
- A failure to follow-through on previous commitments relating to indirect financial support for cluster munitions and to end-user controls on equipment for use in torture or for use in carrying out the death penalty.

4. This memorandum also examines problems at the EU level, such as:

- Confusing messages from the EU (and consequently from the UK) about the supply to Egypt of items that could be used for internal repression;
- A lack of transparency with regard to the EU Common Position review and a possible failure to honour all the commitments expressed in EU Council conclusions regarding the scope of the review.

Recommendations

Syria

5. The UKWG urges the UK Government to prevent and avoid any action which would contribute to the escalation of the continuing conflict in Syria.

6. In keeping with the relevant arms transfer control statutes of both the UK and the EU – particularly Export Control Act 2002 and the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP – the UK should continue its current stance of not providing lethal equipment to any warring party in Syria, especially explosive weapons, which have been used by all parties to the conflict in densely populated areas with horrific effects upon non-combatants.

7. The Government should provide complete and transparent answers to Sir John Stanley's queries regarding the provision of export licences for dual-use chemicals to Syria.

The Arab Spring and the UK policy review

8. The UK Government should demonstrably shift the balance of export licensing risk assessment from a reactive to a proactive process.
9. The UK Government should ensure that any rhetorical or substantive support for the UK defence industry is located unambiguously within a restrictive approach to arms transfers.
10. The UK Government should identify which licences for exports to Egypt it has revoked/suspended and explain the rationale for those revocations/suspensions; list extant licences and explain why it saw fit to issue the since-revoked/suspended licences in the first place.
11. The UK Government should explain in detail its licensing policy for exports to Egypt before the recent increase in violence and how it has since changed.
12. The UK Government should clarify in detail the difference between the current policy for licensing arms transfers to Egypt and the standard application of the Consolidated Criteria.
13. The UK Government should expand the UK Military List, and push for changes to the EU Military List, so as to ensure that any military or security equipment which might be used for internal repression is specified as such and fully controlled.
14. The UK Government should establish unilaterally in the first instance, and then with EU partners a comprehensive list of equipment currently included in the Military List categorised as most at risk of being used for internal repression, so as to thereby giving greater substantive meaning to any future EU decision to suspend or revoke licences for items that might be used for internal repression.

Export policy toward the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

15. The Government should explain whether and how its arms transfer licensing policy for the MENA region has changed since the beginning of the Arab Spring and how it is consistent with its assessments of conflict risk and with its Building Stability Overseas Strategy.

Export licence suspension mechanism

16. To be effective, the Government must significantly enhance and expand its license suspension process to capture all stages of the arms transfer process. As well as current licence applications, the suspension must also apply to all extant licences and deliveries pending.
17. The Government should outline its criteria and the threshold for invoking the suspension process. This should include information about the sources and types of information used in making an assessment and how a judgement is made as to whether a particular country is experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability.
18. The CAEC should ask the Government to explain how relevant Government departments are co-ordinated when a decision is taken to invoke the suspension mechanism, and in particular what systems are in place to co-ordinate export licensing with HMRC who remain responsible for oversight of all physical exports leaving UK territory.

19. The CAEC should investigate why, despite serious deteriorations in security in Mali in March 2012, the Government has so far only used the suspension mechanism once (in August 2013) in response to the current security crisis in Egypt.

Transparency initiative reversal

20. The Government should reinstate its original plans to provide substantive information on transfers made under open licences, in line with the Conclusions that arose from the Review of Transparency in Export Licensing of July 2012.

21. The Government should also give a full explanation of how, why and when it made the decision to renege on its undertaking to provide substantive information on transfers made under open licences. It should give a full account of why this decision was taken in light of previous statements made by the Secretary of State concerning the need for, and benefits of, greater transparency in export licensing, along with a generally supportive defence industry.

22. The Government should explain why each of the 21 separate OGELs listed in *Notice to Exporters 2013/18* have been exempted from the new reporting requirements.

23. The Government should set out a timetable for providing additional information in relation to SIELs – including specific information on the nature of the end-user – in the Quarterly and Annual Reports. The Government should confirm that this information will be such as to provide a meaningful level of information and that it will go well beyond generic descriptions such as “government”, “military” or “industry”.

24. The Government should also give an account of its further deliberations on the matter of the proposed Independent Reviewer to look into the operation of the licensing system and should further consult with parliament, the public and industry on this important issue.

EU Common Position review

25. The UK Government should persuade EU Member States to publish the provisional result of the reviews of Criteria 7 and 8 without further delay or, if that is not possible, to publish the new guidance unilaterally.

26. The UK Government should insist that, as required by the November 2012 Council Conclusions on the review of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, all other criteria are reviewed, preferably starting with Criteria 2, 3 and 4.

27. The UK Government should encourage Member States to consult externally on the development of further guidance in the application and interpretation of the Common Position Criteria, including through publication of interim findings. If this is not possible then the UK Government should itself hold consultations at the national level and incorporate the substance of these consultations into its discussions with other Member States.

28. The UK Government should treat the development and introduction of the online information-sharing EU database as a matter of urgency; ensure that its design allows for amendment into the future; and promote greater information sharing on specific licences approved.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

29. The UK should make the strongest possible interpretative statement upon ratifying the Treaty, for example, making it clear that the UK will continue to regulate a comprehensive list of arms, equipment and munitions beyond the minimum scope allowed by the Treaty and calling on other States Parties to do likewise.

30. The Government should work proactively to ensure that as many States as possible are able to quickly sign, ratify and begin to properly implement the Treaty by providing assistance bilaterally, and through regional and global organisations, and by offering technical and legal assistance to all state signatories that may need it. In addition, the UK should be a significant donor for ATT implementation purposes, and should encourage other States to be likewise.

31. The Government should ensure that participation at DSEi or in co-production agreements with UK companies is dependent on whether the State concerned has signed the ATT; a country's ATT-status should be one of the most important factors making up assessments under criteria 1 ('international obligations') of the National Consolidated Criteria, and for a country's inclusion in OGELs.

32. The UKWG encourages the CAEC, and indeed all UK Parliamentarians, to use every opportunity to raise the ATT with counterparts in other countries, to make offers of assistance to other Parliaments regarding the role of Parliamentarians in the ratification process, in preparing any necessary implementing legislation and in scrutinising national implementation of the Treaty once it enters into force.

DSEi attendance and trade promotion

33. The UK Government should ensure that companies based in countries that have not signed the ATT are not able to exhibit at a UK arms fair nor should they be invited as an official delegation.

34. All open general licences issues to allow companies to automatically participate at future DSEi exhibitions should be amended to explicitly exclude those companies originating from non ATT signatory states.

35. The Government should not officially invite delegations from any country named as a country of most serious Human Rights concern in the FCO's Human Rights and Democracy Report.

Trade fairs and advertising activities

36. The UK Government should investigate, with a view to prosecuting, all companies involved in potential breaches of UK trade control regulations at trade fairs, and publish without delay the results of any investigations.

37. Given repeated breaches of UK trade control regulations at UK trade events, the UK Government should put in place more robust procedures to prevent further breaches, including a compulsory ban on any future activity (incl. trade fair attendance) in the UK for a company found to be promoting prohibited equipment.

38. Given the clear and repeated failure of Clarion to enforce the contractual obligations of exhibitors at the DSEi trade events, the Memorandum of Understanding between Clarion and the Export Control Organisation should be scrutinised by the CAEC.

39. Given the clear and repeated failure of Clarion and HM Revenue and Customs to adequately manage the compliance of companies attending the DSEi trade event, all companies should in future be required to submit all of their promotional literature to organisers/HMG for approval in advance of the fair.

40. Any state that has not signed and ratified the Cluster Munitions Convention, and any company that has not signed a written guarantee that they (or any subsidiary or partner) do not produce cluster munitions or their components, should be prohibited from attending any trade event in the UK.

Cluster munitions and financing

41. We urge the Government to honour commitments made to end indirect financial support for cluster munitions and initiate a thorough and inclusive consultation process aimed at providing guidance to financial institutions on disinvesting from cluster munitions. As a first step, we urge the UK Government to set up a multi-stakeholder meeting between relevant industry, NGOs and Government representatives to initiate work on this area.

Torture and end-use

42. The UK Government should reverse its decision to abandon the introduction of new end-user controls on equipment for use in torture or for use in carrying out the death penalty.

3D printing

43. The UKWG is concerned about the advent of 3D printing technology and its implications for strategic export controls. We therefore urge the CAEC to raise this issue with the Government and to ask what action the UK is taking at international level to develop a clear and concerted response to this issue.

Syria

44. The civil war in Syria continues unabated. Over 100,000 Syrians have died as a result of the war,⁹⁵ while over 7 million have been forced to flee their homes, with 2 million becoming refugees in neighbouring countries.⁹⁶ The number of deaths and of refugees has climbed as the fighting has intensified and spread. The conflict has been fuelled by transfers of arms, munitions and ammunition from Russia and Iran to the Government of Syria, and reportedly by transfers of arms to armed opposition groups from a number of sources including Croatia, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan and Turkey, financed by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and supported by several intelligence agencies.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ BBC News, *Syria death toll now above 100,000, says UN chief Ban*, 25 July 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23455760><http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23455760>

⁹⁶ The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), *Number of Syrian refugees tops 2 million mark with more on the way*, 3 September 2013 <http://www.unhcr.org/522495669.html><http://www.unhcr.org/522495669.html>

⁹⁷ There are many different reports of the illicit trade in arms to Syrian opposition groups, but these are by their very nature hard to track. This BBC report is a reasonable summary of available open source information: BBC News, *Who is supplying weapons to the warring sides in Syria*, 14 June 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22906965><http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22906965>

45. The UKWG is pleased that, with effect from 6 September, the Government established national controls on the export of equipment to Syria which could be used for internal repression (see paragraph 63 below).⁹⁸ However, the reason this change was necessary was that three months previously the UK, along with France, changed the terms of the EU embargo on Syria to allow arms exports to the opposition. The UKWG is concerned at the UK Government's role in the loosening of the embargo, and has concluded that the actual supply of arms to any of the warring parties would be very hard to justify under existing UK and EU legislation. A Saferworld/Oxfam report entitled *Arms for Syria?* concludes:

Ultimately it is for governments to demonstrate that they can satisfy the demands of national arms transfer control requirements, of EU law, of UN Security Council resolutions, of international humanitarian law, and customary international law before any arms transfers take place.

The balance of available information on the situation in Syria, when considered alongside Member States' legal responsibility to apply certain restrictive criteria when deciding whether to transfer arms to opposition groups in Syria, indicate a number of serious obstacles which 14 governments would need to overcome before proceeding with any supply. Serious doubts arise, under both EU law and international law more generally, as to the legality of supplying arms to any warring party in Syria. The onus for showing that safeguards can and will be put in place to allay the concerns which arise lies very firmly with those who propose to supply arms. However, given the fluid and evolving situation on the ground in Syria and the fractured nature of the opposition, there is reason to doubt the likely efficacy of any safeguards that might be put in place to prevent misuse or diversion.⁹⁹

46. Current international concern focuses on the use of chemical weapons in contravention of the Syrian Government's obligations under, *inter alia*, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. However, there are also significant concerns with regard to the use of conventional arms by all parties to the conflict in contravention of international humanitarian law and human rights law, as well as customary international law and international norms concerning the protection of civilians, including the use of cluster munitions and incendiary weapons.¹⁰⁰

47. In the context of the chemical attacks in Syria in August and the international crisis which followed, the UKWG notes the exchange between Sir John Stanley and the Government over the licences granted for the export of items covered by the Australia Group Common Control Lists to Syria over the last decade.¹⁰¹ We understand the Government is compiling a detailed response to Sir John, which we hope will clarify the nature of these exports. Given the sensitivities of these exports, we would urge the government to demonstrate to the CAEC how it applied the Australia Group's detailed licensing risk assessment guidance in these particular cases.

⁹⁸ See Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Notice to Exporters 2013/22*, http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/uncategorized/notice-to-exporters-201322-changes-to-eu-sanctions-against-syria-and-burma-and-related-uk-legislation/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery

⁹⁹ See paragraphs 36 and 37 in Saferworld/Oxfam, *Arms for Syria?*, June 2013 available at: <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Arms-to-Syria-briefing.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰ See for example the reports of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, available at <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentInternationalCommission.aspx>

¹⁰¹ Australia Group Common Control Lists, <http://www.australiagroup.net/en/controllists.html>

Recommendations

48. The UKWG urges the UK Government to prevent and avoid any action which would contribute to the escalation of the continuing conflict in Syria.

49. In keeping with the relevant arms transfer control statutes of both the UK and the EU – particularly Export Control Act 2002 and the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP – the UK should continue its current stance of not providing lethal equipment to any warring party in Syria, especially explosive weapons, which have been used by all parties to the conflict in densely populated areas with horrific effects upon non-combatants.¹⁰²

50. The Government should provide complete and transparent answers to Sir John Stanley's queries regarding the provision of export licences for dual-use chemicals to Syria.

The Arab Spring and the UK policy review

51. On 13th October 2012, Foreign Secretary William Hague announced the outcome of the Government's review of the UK arms transfer control system in light of events in the Middle East and North Africa. Despite claims that review has led to more robust procedures,¹⁰³ the UKWG has seen little evidence of an impact on actual decision-making. Moreover, there still appears a tendency for the Government to react to events after they have happened rather than to evaluate risks ahead of time, while undertakings to improve transparency in strategic exports have been abandoned (see paragraphs 87-100 below).

52. The Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013) Report by the Committees on Arms Export Controls¹⁰⁴ (the 2013 CAEC report¹⁰⁵) recorded that in 2012 the Government issued over £12 billion worth of standard individual export licences (SIELs) to the 27 countries identified as of most concern in the Foreign & Commonwealth Office's (FCO) 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report along with five other countries that the CAEC identified as problematic on human rights grounds but which were not referenced in the FCO's report.¹⁰⁶ Eight countries from the FCO's list are from the MENA region (Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, the Palestinian controlled territories, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen); a further three MENA countries (Bahrain, Egypt and Tunisia) were identified by the CAEC in their 2013 report as problematic. In addition, many open licences—open general export licences (OGELs) and open individual

¹⁰² Ibidem

¹⁰³ In his statement to parliament on 13 October 2011, Foreign Secretary William Hague announced a number of changes to UK arms export policy that were being put in place as a consequence of a review of UK defence and security export policy in the light of the Arab Spring. These included measures such as a mechanism to allow immediate licensing suspension after a sharp deterioration in security and ministerial scrutiny of open licences. See <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-review-of-export-policy><https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-review-of-export-policy>

¹⁰⁴ See Committee on arms export controls, <http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/other-committees/committee-on-arms-export-controls/>

¹⁰⁵ Committees on Arms Export Control, *Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control*, 2013, <http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/other-committees/committee-on-arms-export-controls/news/pn-report/http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/other-committees/committee-on-arms-export-controls/news/pn-report/>

¹⁰⁶ Human Rights and Democracy: *The 2012 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Report*, April 2013, <http://www.hrdreport.fco.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/2012-Human-Rights-and-Democracy.pdf>

export licences (OIELs) which place no upper limit on quantities/values of arms that can be delivered — were also issued for transfers to these countries.

53. The UKWG is not arguing that *all* of these licences are problematic (e.g. most of the licences, by value, for transfers to Iran are for components for civilian aircraft), however this data suggests little has changed in terms of UK licensing practice as a consequence of the Arab Spring or subsequent transfer control reviews (see paragraphs 75-78 below).

54. The recent publication and launch of *Securing prosperity: A strategic vision for the UK defence sector*¹⁰⁷ by the Defence Growth Partnership makes it clear that Government, from the Prime Minister down, sees defence manufacture and export as a “key sector of the economy ... a vital driver of opportunity and employment all over the country”¹⁰⁸ and intimately connected to “deliver[ing] a long-term strategic vision to maintain our position on the leader board”.¹⁰⁹

55. When all of the above is considered in the context of some of the delegations and exhibitors invited to the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi) arms fair held from 15 to 18 September in London (see paragraphs 126-132 below), the UKWG is concerned that the Government may be sending the wrong signals about its priorities, i.e. that perceived economic gain can take precedence over existing risks including those identified in the national Consolidated Criteria¹¹⁰.

Egypt

56. Licensing policy with regard to Egypt provides an interesting test case.

57. The 2013 CAEC Report recorded that for export licences to Egypt there were extant at the time the Report was published 88 SIELs worth £59,073,314 and 47 OIELs.

58. On 19 July, the Government announced that “in light of recent events which have led to deaths of civilians” they had revoked five extant SIELs for Egypt.¹¹¹ On 23 August, in accordance with a 21 August decision of the EU Foreign Affairs Council,¹¹² the Government announced it was suspending export licensing for Egypt of any equipment which might be used for internal

¹⁰⁷ Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Defence Growth Partnership, *Securing Prosperity: A Strategic Vision for the UK Defence Sector*, September 2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/securing-prosperity-a-strategic-vision-for-the-uk-defence-sector><https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/securing-prosperity-a-strategic-vision-for-the-uk-defence-sector>

¹⁰⁸ Gov.uk Press Release, *New partnership to equip defence sector for long-term success*, 9 September 2013, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-minister-hails-new-partnership-to-equip-defence-sector-for-long-term-success>

¹⁰⁹ Ibidem, quoting UK Prime Minister David Cameron.

¹¹⁰ See Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, *Consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria*, 21 November 2012, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consolidated-eu-and-national-arms-export-licensing-criteria><https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consolidated-eu-and-national-arms-export-licensing-criteria>

¹¹¹ Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, *Press Release: Business Secretary revokes five export licences to Egypt*, 19 July 2013, <http://news.bis.gov.uk/Press-Releases/Business-Secretary-revokes-five-export-licences-to-Egypt-69029.aspx>

¹¹² Council of the European Union, *Council conclusions on Egypt*, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 21 August 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/138599.pdf

repression—equipment which is not included in the UK Strategic Export Control Lists¹¹³. One week later, the Government declared that it had suspended 48 licences for Egypt and added Egypt to the list of non-permitted destinations on four OGELs.¹¹⁴

59. The Government has presented this as an appropriate and timely response to the deteriorating domestic security situation in Egypt, but we disagree with this assessment.

60. In 2011, the Government argued that it could not have been expected to anticipate the Arab Spring and that rather than being criticised it should be commended for responding rapidly—by revoking over 150 licences for exports to a range of countries (including approximately 56 licences for exports to Egypt)—as circumstances changed. Regardless of whether this defence was valid in 2011—and the CAEC and others, including the UKWG, took issue with it at the time—it surely is not in 2013. We hoped that the Arab Spring would have functioned as a wake-up call on export licensing policy to the region (and indeed more broadly), yet only two years later the exact same pattern is being repeated. The UK Government has shown little capacity to evaluate risk in advance (as required by the Consolidated Criteria) but instead is once again playing catch-up, firstly by revoking five licences, and then nine days later by suspending 48 licences, with the Government also “considering whether further extant licences should be revoked”.¹¹⁵ [Using the figures in the CAEC report as a base, there are likely to be approximately 80 still-valid licences for exports to Egypt.]

61. In order to help external stakeholders better understand its actions, the Government should identify which licences it has revoked or suspended, explain why such decisions were taken for those but not for other licences, list extant licences, and explain why it saw fit to issue all of the revoked/suspended licences in the first place.

Equipment for internal repression

62. While the 21 August EU Council conclusions on Egypt might also be seen as an attempt (this time with EU partners) to correct previous licensing mistakes, a closer look at the details of these conclusions raises serious questions about the expected impact of the instruction to “suspend export licenses to Egypt of any equipment which might be used for internal repression”.

63. For situations where “restrictive measures” (such as arms embargoes) apply, the EU has developed an additional list of equipment that might be used for internal repression that goes beyond the standard EU Common Military List.¹¹⁶ Equipment on this additional list includes, for example, bombs and grenades not controlled by the Common Military List, and vehicles specifically designed to deploy mobile barriers. Before the EU embargo on Syria was amended in

¹¹³ Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *UK Strategic Export Control Lists*, March 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/184049/strategic-export-control-consolidated20130320.pdfhttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/184049/strategic-export-control-consolidated20130320.pdf

¹¹⁴ Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Notice to Exporters 2013/24: Suspension of extant licences for Egypt and changes to OGELs*, 28 August 2013, <http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/uncategorized/notice-to-exporters-201324-suspension-of-extant-licences-for-egypt-and-changes-to-ogels/>

¹¹⁵ Ibidem

¹¹⁶ See Annex I of *Council Regulation 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria and repealing Regulation 442/2011*, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:016:0001:0032:EN:PDF>.

May (by way of Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP) this additional list was in operation (see Annex I of Council Regulation 36/2012¹¹⁷), meaning that a licence for export of these items to Syria was required.¹¹⁸ Once the embargo was relaxed, however, the items on this additional list were no longer subject to licensing control. The UK Government has since introduced new legislation (Export Control (Syria Sanctions) Order 2013, entry-into-force 6 September 2013¹¹⁹) which includes a list of items that could be used for internal repression so as to ensure that such goods cannot be exported to Syria from the UK without first being subject to a licensing procedure (for more on the Syrian case see paragraphs 44-50 above).

64. In the case of Egypt, since no “restrictive measures” were in force at the EU level, licences for the export of items on the EU’s additional list of equipment that might be used for internal repression have never been required (note that EU Member States could have added such items to their national control lists, however the UKWG is not aware of any Member State having done so). With no pre-existing EU requirement for licences, the Council conclusions instruction to “suspend export licences to Egypt of any equipment which might be used for internal repression” is rendered effectively meaningless, as there would be no licences to suspend.¹²⁰ The conclusions could even be seen as disingenuous, in that they give an impression of action when the substantive impact is negligible. With regard to the UK specifically, although the Government has accepted, in the case of Syria, that non-Military List items could be used for internal repression and should therefore be subject to licensing controls, it is notable that a comparable measure has not been introduced regarding exports to Egypt.

65. The UKWG understands from conversations with Government officials that for exports to Egypt of items that *are* on the Military List, decisions on whether they might be used for internal repression are based on factors such as the precise nature of the equipment and the identity of the end-user. Since these are considerations that routinely apply in standard export licensing, this suggests that the Government has not adopted any special provisions with regard to licensing the transfer of arms to Egypt, even in the wake of the heightened levels of violence and instability of the past three months.¹²¹ It would thus be helpful if the Government could clarify in detail the difference between the current policy for licensing arms transfers to Egypt and the standard application of the Consolidated Criteria. The UKWG believes that the Government

¹¹⁷ Ibidem

¹¹⁸ Official Journal of the European Union, *Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 concerning restrictive measures against Syria*, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:147:0014:0045:EN:PDF>

¹¹⁹ The Export Control (Syria Sanctions) Order 2013 No. 2012, <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukxi/2013/2012/contents/made>

¹²⁰ *Council conclusions on Egypt, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 21 August 2013*, states: “Member States also agreed to suspend export licenses to Egypt of any equipment which might be used for internal repression and to reassess export licences of equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and review their security assistance with Egypt.” The implication of this statement is that the suspension imperative applies only to items that are beyond the EU Common Military List; for items included on the EU Common Military List the conclusions require reassessment, not suspension.

¹²¹ The National Consolidated Criteria state that the Government will not issue an export licence “if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression, see Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, *Consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria*, 21 November 2012, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consolidated-eu-and-national-arms-export-licensing-criteria><https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consolidated-eu-and-national-arms-export-licensing-criteria>

should apply the same rules to Egypt regarding non-Military List items which might be used for internal repression as are currently applied with regard to Syria.

66. It should be noted that this is an issue that has wider application than Egypt: the Government having recognised this equipment as particularly relevant to, and at risk of, being used for internal repression, the UKWG believes it should be fully controlled and so added to the UK Military List without delay, and that the matter should be raised with EU partners with a view to similarly extending the EU Common Military List. Furthermore, the Government should set out a specific list of equipment currently included in the UK Military List which can be categorised as at risk of being used for internal repression and advocate for a similar undertaking at the EU level so as to give meaning to any Council decision that makes reference to this issue in the future.

67. Finally, the UKWG believes that there are additional items which could be used for internal repression and which should also be incorporated within the UK and EU lists. This equipment includes, but is not limited to: handcuffs and other restraints; law enforcement striking weapons (including saps, police batons, side-handle batons, tonfas, sjamboks, and whips); protective equipment such as police helmets and anti-riot suits, and parts thereof; directed-energy systems including optical devices and laser dazzlers, microwave and millimetre wave devices; biometric devices used for border control, security or policing (including iris or retina recognition, face recognition, voice recognition, gait or body feature recognition, behaviour recognition); and telecommunications monitoring equipment. Provision of training in this equipment should also be subject to control. The UKWG would welcome a discussion with the UK Government in this regard.

Recommendations

68. The UK Government should demonstrably shift the balance of export licensing risk assessment from a reactive to a proactive process.

69. The UK Government should ensure that any rhetorical or substantive support for the UK defence industry is located unambiguously within a restrictive approach to arms transfers.

70. The UK Government should identify which licences for exports to Egypt it has revoked/suspended and explain the rationale for those revocations/suspensions; list extant licences and explain why it saw fit to issue the since-revoked/suspended licences in the first place.

71. The UK Government should explain in detail its licensing policy for exports to Egypt before the recent increase in violence and how it has since changed.

72. The UK Government should clarify in detail the difference between the current policy for licensing arms transfers to Egypt and the standard application of the Consolidated Criteria.

73. The UK Government should expand the UK Military List, and push for changes to the EU Military List, so as to ensure that any military or security equipment which might be used for internal repression is specified as such and fully controlled.

74. The UK Government should establish unilaterally in the first instance, and then with EU partners a comprehensive list of equipment currently included in the Military List categorised as most at risk of being used for internal repression, so as to thereby giving

greater substantive meaning to any future EU decision to suspend or revoke licences for items that might be used for internal repression.

Export policy toward the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

75. As highlighted above, and according to the UK's most recent reports on Strategic Exports, the Government's export policy across Middle East and North Africa (MENA) appears to have undergone little change since the Arab Spring of 2010-11.¹²² Indeed, far from having been disturbed by the turmoil that affected the entire region, the number and value of UK strategic export licences granted to countries such as Bahrain, Egypt, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) actually rose overall between 2008 and 2012: from 615 licences (547 SIELs and 68 OIELs) granted and 5 refused in 2008, to 1076 licences (968 SIELs and 108 OIELs) granted and 22 refused in 2012.¹²³ In the case of Saudi Arabia, the UK Government granted 99 SIELs for arms exports worth £105.8 million in 2008, rising to 206 SIEL applications worth £1,750 billion in 2011, when regional unrest had reached unprecedented levels. Moreover in the case of Egypt, after dipping from £23.4 million worth of SIELs granted in 2008 to £7.7 million in 2011, this increased again to £18.8 million in 2012. As a proportion of the number of total UK export licences granted, licences to the MENA region increased from 9.5 per cent in 2008 to 30 per cent in 2012.¹²⁴ By value, well over half of all UK arms exports for 2012 were to the Middle East.¹²⁵

76. This would seem problematic for at least two reasons. Firstly there is the risk of arms being used for internal repression. This has received considerable attention, to the point that the Government is now at least more willing to acknowledge the extent of this risk. Secondly, the overall security environment of the region has become extremely fraught over the last two years. Indeed, the conflict in Syria is widely regarded as having pushed the Middle East considerably closer to a major regional conflict, with other MENA states and actors seeking to advance their interests by supporting different parties to the Syrian conflict.¹²⁶ As well as internal Syrian dynamics, the Sunni-Shia divide, the Arab Israeli conflict and the influence of Al Qaida-affiliated actors are all relevant here. Given the heightened risk of all-out regional conflict we would expect the UK Government to have tightened its approach to exporting arms into the Middle East. However, as highlighted above, the region continues to be a critical UK export market, with indications that this is seen in some quarters as more of a marketing opportunity than a reason for greater restraint (see, for example, paragraphs 126-132 below).

77. It would be useful if the Government could provide the CAEC with its assessment of the risk of a broader conflict in the Middle East and how this has changed over the last two years, while

¹²² Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, *Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics*, Searchable database, <https://www.exportcontroldb.bis.gov.uk>

¹²³ Note that in 2011, 1163 export licences were granted (1026 SIELs and 137 OIELs), 26 were refused and 75 were later revoked.

¹²⁴ For detailed data of the aforementioned export licences, see *Annex A. UK licences granted for exports to MENA region, 2008 – 2012*

¹²⁵ UK Trade & Investment, *UK Defence & Security Export Statistics for 2012*, 21 June 2013, <http://www.ukti.gov.uk/defencesecurity/item/527180.html>

¹²⁶ See for example The Guardian, *Syria: civil war turns regional crisis*, 5 May 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/05/syria-israel-lebanon-air-strikes> or Alain Gresh, *Syria's Proxy War*, Le Monde Diplomatique English Edition, 15 June 2013, <http://mondediplo.com/2013/07/05syria>

explaining the impact this broader security situation in MENA has had on its assessment of risk for prospective arms supplies to MENA states, including specific examples of licence applications granted or refused. It would also be helpful if the Government could explain how its arms transfer policies for the region are consistent with its objectives with regard to upstream conflict prevention as set out in its Building Stability Overseas Strategy.¹²⁷

Recommendation

78. The Government should explain whether and how its arms transfer licensing policy for the MENA region has changed since the beginning of the Arab Spring and how it is consistent with its assessments of conflict risk and with its Building Stability Overseas Strategy.

Export licence suspension mechanism

79. As part of a package of changes proposed in the framework of the post-Arab Spring review of the UK defence and security export policy, the Foreign Secretary announced a new procedure to:

Allow immediate licensing suspension to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability. Applications in the pipeline would be stopped and no further licenses issued, pending Ministerial or departmental review.¹²⁸

80. The UKWG initially welcomed this initiative, as it could enhance the UK's export control system's capacity to respond more quickly to quickly changing circumstances by placing an immediate freeze on arms transfers that risk exacerbating instability; this would be especially useful in situations where the rapidly changing circumstances in the recipient country prevented adequate risk assessments from taking place.

81. However, in follow up discussions with officials, it is now clear that in its current form the suspension mechanism is not fit for purpose and requires radical overhaul. The fundamental flaw in the system is that it seems only to apply to new and pending license applications and not to extant export licences. This means that in situations where the Government has decided that an unfolding crisis makes it impossible to make a meaningful assessment of new license applications, existing licences could nevertheless continue to be honoured. For example, in a situation where the Government has decided to suspend license applications to a country's internal security units due to immediate concerns about the use of equipment in internal repression in a rapidly unfolding crisis, licences already granted to those same units would still be valid and transfers could continue. For the suspension mechanism to be meaningful, it must clearly apply to the whole arms transfer process and so must place an immediate freeze on all arms transfers, including all extant licences and any pending shipments due to take place.

82. The UKWG is also unclear about how the suspension mechanism is triggered and the thresholds that are used when deciding to apply it. For example, despite the rapidly unfolding conflict and deteriorating security situation that took place in Mali in March 2012, the

¹²⁷ Department for International Development, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, *Building Stability Overseas Strategy*, July 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67475/Building-stability-overseas-strategy.pdf

¹²⁸ FCO Announcement, *Foreign Office review of export policy*, 13 October 2011, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-review-of-export-policy>

suspension mechanism appears to have not been used. In fact, to date, as far as the UKWG understands, it has only been used in response to the very serious situation in Egypt in August 2013.¹²⁹ This suggests that the threshold that triggers the suspension mechanism has been set at a very high level, once armed conflict and instability have already reached crisis point; it therefore does not serve as the flexible response to rapidly developing and unfolding situations that we had expected.

Recommendations:

83. To be effective, the Government must significantly enhance and expand its license suspension process to capture all stages of the arms transfer process. As well as current licence applications, the suspension must also apply to all extant licences and deliveries pending.

84. The Government should outline its criteria and the threshold for invoking the suspension process. This should include information about the sources and types of information used in making an assessment and how a judgement is made as to whether a particular country is experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability.

85. The CAEC should ask the Government to explain how relevant Government departments are co-ordinated when a decision is taken to invoke the suspension mechanism, and in particular what systems are in place to co-ordinate export licensing with HMRC who remain responsible for oversight of all physical exports leaving UK territory.

86. The CAEC should investigate why, despite serious deteriorations in security in Mali in March 2012, the Government has so far only used the suspension mechanism once (in August 2013) in response to the current security crisis in Egypt.

Transparency initiative reversal

87. It was with alarm and dismay that the members of the UKWG read the 31 July 2013 *Notice to Exporters 2013/18: Important Changes to the Strategic Export Control Transparency Initiative*,¹³⁰ in which the UK Government announced a decision to roll back from a number of significant commitments it had previously made in the field of transparency in export licensing in response to the events in the Middle East and North Africa.¹³¹ There had been little warning given of this decision other than *Notice to Exporters 2013/14* of 15 May¹³² which announced the postponement by three months – to July 2013 – of the implementation of the proposed changes, and an oblique reference in Parliament by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and

¹²⁹ Richard Norton-Taylor, *UK suspends Egypt military export licences*, The Guardian, 28 August 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/aug/28/uk-suspends-egypt-military-export-licences>

¹³⁰ Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Notice to Exporters 2013/18: Important Changes to the Strategic Export Control Transparency Initiative*, 31 July 2013, <http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/uncategorized/notice-to-exporters-201318-important-changes-to-the-strategic-export-control-transparency-initiative/>

¹³¹ For a timeline of the UK Transparency Initiative, see <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/uk-transparency-initiative-timetable.pdf>

¹³² Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Notice to Exporters 2013/14: Progress towards implementing the strategic export control Transparency Initiative*, 15 May 2013, <http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/uncategorized/notice-to-exporters-201314-progress-towards-implementing-the-strategic-export-control-transparency-initiative/>

Skills (BIS) to a decision to “dispense with some procedures relating to quarterly reporting”.¹³³ Moreover, in a face-to-face meeting between Government officials and the UKWG on 11 July 2013, officials confirmed that the implementation of the Conclusions of the Transparency Initiative¹³⁴ was proceeding as planned.

88. In his Written Ministerial Statement to Parliament of 13 July 2012¹³⁵ the Business Secretary asserted the following:

Public confidence in the workings of the export licensing system is crucial. These measures will result in a significant increase in the amount and quality of information that the Government makes public about controlled exports. This will enable the public and Parliament to more effectively hold the Government to account in this important and sensitive area.

89. One year after this statement however, without warning, the Government announced it was abandoning plans to require exporters to report quarterly on the volume or value of transactions under Open General and Open Individual licences, whether according to Control List classification or by giving a description of the items exported. Instead, exporters will merely be required to report, annually, on the number of times they have used an open licence, giving the country of destination and type of end-user.¹³⁶ This continuing failure to provide information on the volume or value of UK exports of controlled goods under specific open licences means that Parliament and the public will continue to be deprived of access to key information on arms transfers that the UK Government was, until recently, prepared to collect and disclose. Moreover, it is difficult to understand why the Government itself no longer wishes exporters to provide regular information relating to exports and transfers under open licences when timely access to such information could assist the Government in making informed decisions on future licence applications.

90. The Government justifies its decision to significantly scale back reporting under open licences on the grounds that “[m]any companies have expressed concerns that this would place an unacceptable administrative burden on exporters”.¹³⁷ However this is at odds with the published feedback from companies, communicated as follows in the Conclusions following the Review of Transparency in Export Licensing of July 2012: “Exporters generally accept the rationale for this initiative and are generally supportive provided that the administrative burden is kept to a minimum and that what they consider to be truly sensitive information is

¹³³ Oral Answers to Questions: Business, Innovation and Skills, Hansard 18 July 2013: Column 1296
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130718/debtext/130718-0001.htm#13071867000021>

¹³⁴ See Written Ministerial Statement, Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills; *Export Controls: Transparency in Export Licensing*, 13 July 2012, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-vote-office/July_2012/13-07-12/4-BIS-ExportLicensing.pdf
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-vote-office/July_2012/13-07-12/4-BIS-ExportLicensing.pdf

¹³⁵ Ibidem

¹³⁶ Notice to Exporters 2013/18: Important Changes to the Strategic Export Control Transparency Initiative, op.cit.

¹³⁷ Ibidem

protected".¹³⁸ This gives the clear impression that exporters' concerns could be handled appropriately and that the majority had accepted the proposals advanced by BIS. Indeed it is worth noting that exporting companies are already required to keep records of transfers made under open licences, so they already have this data available; the question would be one of packaging and delivery of this information to BIS.

91. In light of this turnaround, serious questions must be asked as regards the process that resulted in the decision to abandon so much of the proposed changes, particularly given the published responses from the defence industry and that significant time and resources were clearly expended within Government in order to deliver greater transparency.

92. Also in the *Notice to Exporters 2013/18* the Government lists 21 separate OGELs that will be exempted from the new reporting requirements. Given that some of the licences relate to military and dual-use goods it will be important that the UK Government explains why the different licences listed have been exempted from the few additional reporting requirements that have survived.

93. Beyond the issue of reporting under open licences there has been little concrete information provided in recent months concerning the fate of the other proposals set out in the BIS transparency initiative. Of particular concern is the apparent lack of progress in providing additional information from SIELs, such as the nature of the end-user, in the Quarterly and Annual Reports. In the initial announcement of the BIS transparency review on 7 February 2012 the Secretary of State made the assertion that because export licence applications are currently made in confidence this makes it difficult to make additional information available in the Quarterly and Annual reports but that the Government was exploring ways of rectifying this.¹³⁹ Thirteen months later, the notice to exporters of March 2013 refers only to the possibility of making additional information from SIELs available "under the Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) 2000" with no mention of the provision of such information through the Quarterly or Annual reports.¹⁴⁰

94. The UKWG has long argued that additional licensing information, such as that identifying the type of end user, is essential to allowing informed scrutiny of arms transfer policy and practice on the part of Parliament and the public. It is therefore to be hoped that the UK Government is not also intending to back-track on this commitment.

95. In addition, there has been no mention of the fate of the proposal concerning the possibility to appoint an Independent Reviewer to look into the operation of the licensing system since the

¹³⁸ Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Transparency in Export licensing: Government Response*, July 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32009/12-920-transparency-export-licencing-government-response.pdf

¹³⁹ Written Ministerial Statements, Business, Innovation and Skills, Hansard, 7 February 2012: Column 7WS, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120207/wmstext/120207m0001.htm#12020767000002>

¹⁴⁰ Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Notice to Exporters 2013/11: Implementation of transparency in strategic export licensing*, 21 March 2013, [http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/licensing/notice-to-exporters-201311-implementation-of-transparency-in-strategic-export-licensing/](http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/licensing/notice-to-exporters-201311-implementation-of-transparency-in-strategic-export-licensing/http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/licensing/notice-to-exporters-201311-implementation-of-transparency-in-strategic-export-licensing/)

Written Ministerial Statement of 13 July 2012¹⁴¹ that pledged to return to the matter at a later date and the Government's Conclusions following the Review of Transparency in Export Licensing of July 2012¹⁴² that stated it would "conduct further research into the 'Independent Reviewer' role". As we noted in our 2012 Memorandum to the CAEC, given the recent experience of the Arab Spring the UKWG believes that an independent reviewer could play a key role in assisting in the identification of potential problems within and lessons learned for the transfer licensing system, thereby enabling the UK's systems to develop over time in anticipation of, as well as in response to, external developments.¹⁴³

Recommendations

96. The Government should reinstate its original plans to provide substantive information on transfers made under open licences, in line with the Conclusions that arose from the Review of Transparency in Export Licensing of July 2012.

97. The Government should also give a full explanation of how, why and when it made the decision to renege on its undertaking to provide substantive information on transfers made under open licences. It should give a full account of why this decision was taken in light of previous statements made by the Secretary of State concerning the need for, and benefits of, greater transparency in export licensing, along with a generally supportive defence industry.

98. The Government should explain why each of the 21 separate OGELs listed in *Notice to Exporters 2013/18* have been exempted from the new reporting requirements.

99. The Government should set out a timetable for providing additional information in relation to SIELs – including specific information on the nature of the end-user – in the Quarterly and Annual Reports. The Government should confirm that this information will be such as to provide a meaningful level of information and that it will go well beyond generic descriptions such as "government", "military" or "industry".

100. The Government should also give an account of its further deliberations on the matter of the proposed Independent Reviewer to look into the operation of the licensing system and should further consult with parliament, the public and industry on this important issue.

EU Common Position review

101. In our November 2012 memorandum to the CAEC, the UKWG set out a number of recommendations regarding the review of the EU Common Position.¹⁴⁴ These built on the November 2011 collaborative NGO report *Lessons from MENA: Appraising EU Transfers of Military and Security Equipment to the Middle East and North Africa*.¹⁴⁵ The recommendations

¹⁴¹ See Written Ministerial Statement, Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable, 13 July 2012, op.cit.

¹⁴² Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Transparency in Export licensing: Government Response*, July 2012 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32009/12-920-transparency-export-licencing-government-response.pdf

¹⁴³ Committees on Arms Exports, *Written evidence from the UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG)*, November 2012, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmquad/writev/689/m06.htm>

¹⁴⁴ Ibidem

¹⁴⁵ See An Vranckx, Frank Slijper and Roy Isbister (eds.), *Lessons from MENA: Appraising EU Transfers of Military and Security Equipment to the Middle East and North Africa*, November 2011, <http://www.psw.ugent.be/crg/publications/bb2withhyperlinks.pdf>.

included: establishing a regularly-updated list of ‘countries of concern’; operating a policy of ‘presumption of denial’ with regard to transfers to those states; and that licensing decisions should be less dependent on assessing past behaviour and instead take more account of future risk.

102. While we maintain that such changes should still be implemented, this memorandum has a tighter focus in that it looks at only those issues that Member States have themselves decided should be subject to change, i.e. the review of two of the criteria and improvements in information-sharing among Member States.

103. On 19 November 2012 the EU Council adopted Council conclusions on the review of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.¹⁴⁶ The central ‘conclusion’ was that “the provisions of the Common Position, and the instruments it provides for, continue to properly serve the objectives set in 2008 and to provide a solid basis for the co-ordination of Member States’ arms export policies”. The Council did however recognise that “further progress is achievable in the implementation of the Common Position and in order to maximise convergence among Member States in the field of exports of conventional arms.”

104. On this basis the Council committed itself to “the development of further guidance in the application and interpretation of the eight export criteria of the Common Position, the refinement of the information-exchange mechanism on specific destinations, the improvement of the denial notification and consultation mechanism” and noted that “the results of this second stage of the review process will be reflected, *inter alia*, in updates of the User’s Guide accompanying the Common Position, and providing detailed guidance for its implementation”.

105. As with the first stage of the review, these follow-up activities are being conducted behind closed doors, an issue over which the UKWG has previously expressed its disappointment. Furthermore, we understand that, contrary to the commitments expressed in the Council conclusions, not all the Criteria are to be reviewed. So far only Criteria 7 (‘diversion’) and 8 (‘sustainable development’) are being reviewed, with the possibility that Criterion 2 (human rights) will be next. The reasons for such a limited approach are not clear; given the issues thrown up by the Arab Spring the failure to review Criteria 3 (‘internal situation’) and 4 (‘regional peace and security’) is particularly perplexing.

106. We have been informed that Member States have provisionally agreed new guidance for Criteria 7 and 8 and that the EU Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) has issued a revised User’s Guide incorporating these changes, with Member States expected to use the new guidance on a trial basis.¹⁴⁷ It is, however, open for further revision and no new version of the User’s Guide will be published until this new guidance is finalised.

107. The other main aspect to the second part of the Common Position review, i.e. refinement of the information exchange, denial notification and consultation mechanisms, is apparently

¹⁴⁶ Council of the European Union, *Council conclusions on the review of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment*, 3199th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 19 November 2012,

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133569.pdf

¹⁴⁷ The current version of the Council of the EU, *User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment*, 29 April 2009, is available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st09/st09241.en09.pdf>

proceeding slowly, with Member States having different ideas of what is desirable or even feasible.

108. The UKWG is frustrated by the pace of review, but more fundamentally by the fact that civil society has been unable to engage in any meaningful way with any aspect of the whole Common Position review process, including the review of Criteria 7 and 8. While we have been free to give our views, this has been without a proper understanding of what Member States have been willing to 'put on the table'; thus the possibility for constructive discussion has not existed and our capacity to make relevant contributions has been hampered. Even now the content of the provisionally-completed Criteria review remains confidential, though the rationale for this is unclear. Certainly it undermines EU Member States' claims to a transparent system.

109. With regard to the information-sharing mechanisms, we are pleased that Member States do seem finally convinced by the arguments made for several years by the UKWG and other EU NGOs and that they have decided to establish a real-time online information-sharing database, though we are once again disappointed by the time it is taking to complete this project. We understand that as well as data on denials and consultations, Member States are considering sharing information regarding specific destinations—though it will be at the discretion of states as to whether and when they choose to use the system in this way. Unfortunately, as far as we know, the system will not provide for sharing information on specific licence approvals; it has long been our contention that as much can be learned from 'difficult' licensing decisions that resulted in an approval as from denials. We thus continue to encourage Member States to share information of this type and hope that the system being developed will be able to easily accommodate such changes in future.

Recommendations

110. The UK Government should persuade EU Member States to publish the provisional result of the reviews of Criteria 7 and 8 without further delay or, if that is not possible, to publish the new guidance unilaterally.

111. The UK Government should insist that, as required by the November 2012 Council Conclusions on the review of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, all other criteria are reviewed, preferably starting with Criteria 2, 3 and 4.

112. The UK Government should encourage Member States to consult externally on the development of further guidance in the application and interpretation of the Common Position Criteria, including through publication of interim findings. If this is not possible then the UK Government should itself hold consultations at the national level and incorporate the substance of these consultations into its discussions with other Member States.

113. The UK Government should treat the development and introduction of the online information-sharing EU database as a matter of urgency; ensure that its design allows for amendment into the future; and promote greater information sharing on specific licences approved.

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

114. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by overwhelming vote by the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013, 155 in favour, 22 abstentions and 3 votes against.¹⁴⁸ This came after the final Diplomatic (negotiating) Conference had failed to adopt the draft Treaty when Iran, Syria and North Korea blocked consensus. However, by utilising a clause in the Resolution that had mandated the final negotiations, a like-minded group of supporter States, including the UK, were able to take the draft Treaty text to the UN General Assembly for adoption by vote. The UKWG notes that while the UK initially opposed the relevant clause (OP7) in the Resolution, arguing against the Control Arms Coalition and more progressive states who had proposed it, they ultimately recognised the value of this inclusion and helped to utilise it to secure the vote.

115. The ATT sets an important basis for global action to control the international trade in conventional arms. It is the first global legally binding instrument to control the arms trade, and creates a new global norm against which States' practice will be measured by other States and by international civil society. It is not perfect, and civil society will continue to push for robust interpretation of its provisions, and encourages the UK, as a leader in this process, to ensure a very strong statement upon depositing their instrument of ratification.

116. The ATT opened for signature on June 3, 2013, and at the time of writing has been signed by 113 States including the UK, and ratified by 7 States. The Treaty will enter into force ninety days after the 50th ratification. Assuming that the necessary EU procedural issues will soon be completed, EU Member States are likely to be able to ratify in late 2013, in which case entry-into-force could take place before the end of 2014. We welcome the fact that the UK has already commenced ratification proceedings in anticipation of EU procedures being completed, and urge the Government to maintain outreach to other States to sign and ratify as soon as possible.

117. We particularly welcome the recent signature by Senator John Kerry on behalf of the US, and recognise the contribution by the UK government, as well as civil society campaigning, in encouraging the US to sign. US signature is very significant given their role as world's largest arms exporter, and is likely to lead to other hesitant countries now joining the treaty.

118. It is now vital that the Government does everything possible to strengthen the international norms embedded in the Treaty. The UK should make the strongest possible interpretative statement upon ratifying the Treaty, for example, making it clear that the UK will continue to regulate a comprehensive list of arms, equipment and munitions beyond the minimum scope allowed by the Treaty and calling on other States Parties to do likewise.

119. It is widely acknowledged that many States will require technical, legal and financial assistance to be able to ratify and implement that ATT. For some the level of support required will be significant. Before the Secretariat, envisaged in the Treaty, comes into existence, providers of assistance will need to carefully co-ordinate work between themselves to avoid duplication. The UKWG urges the UK Government to work proactively to ensure that as many States as possible are able to quickly sign, ratify and begin to properly implement the Treaty. This assistance can be provided bilaterally, and through regional and global organisations. The UK Government should offer technical and legal assistance to all States which may need it as they sign the Treaty. In addition, the UK should be a significant donor for ATT implementation purposes, and should encourage other States to be generous in this regard.

¹⁴⁸ The full text of the ATT and other Treaty associated document can be found at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/>

120. The Government should take other States attitude toward the ATT into account in a range of arms-transfer related activities. For example, participation at DSEi or in co-production agreements with UK companies should be dependent on whether the State concerned has signed the ATT (see paragraphs 126-132), while a country's ATT-status should be one of the most important factors making up assessments under criteria 1 ('international obligations') of the National Consolidated Criteria. Eligibility for inclusion among the eligible destinations on OGELs could be similarly dependent.

121. The UKWG also notes that Parliament has a role to play in raising awareness among parliamentarians worldwide of the Treaty and of what effective implementation will look like. We encourage the CAEC, and indeed all UK Parliamentarians, to use every opportunity to raise the ATT with counterparts in other countries, to make offers of assistance to other Parliaments regarding the role of Parliamentarians in the ratification process, in preparing any necessary implementing legislation and in scrutinising national implementation of the Treaty once it enters into force.

Recommendations

122. The UK should make the strongest possible interpretative statement upon ratifying the Treaty, for example, making it clear that the UK will continue to regulate a comprehensive list of arms, equipment and munitions beyond the minimum scope allowed by the Treaty and calling on other States Parties to do likewise.

123. The Government should work proactively to ensure that as many States as possible are able to quickly sign, ratify and begin to properly implement the Treaty by providing assistance bilaterally, and through regional and global organisations, and by offering technical and legal assistance to all state signatories that may need it. In addition, the UK should be a significant donor for ATT implementation purposes, and should encourage other States to be likewise.

124. The Government should ensure that participation at DSEi or in co-production agreements with UK companies is dependent on whether the State concerned has signed the ATT; a country's ATT-status should be one of the most important factors making up assessments under criteria 1 ('international obligations') of the National Consolidated Criteria, and for a country's inclusion in OGELs.

125. The UKWG encourages the CAEC, and indeed all UK Parliamentarians, to use every opportunity to raise the ATT with counterparts in other countries, to make offers of assistance to other Parliaments regarding the role of Parliamentarians in the ratification process, in preparing any necessary implementing legislation and in scrutinising national implementation of the Treaty once it enters into force.

DSEi attendance and trade promotion

126. The presence at DSEi 2013 of Rostec, the parent company of Rosoboronexport—one of the main suppliers of weapons to the Syrian Government throughout the current crisis—raises concerns over the message the UK Government is sending about its commitment to the ATT. The UKWG believes that when deciding who can exhibit at DSEi, the UK Government should consider the international obligations and standing of the states in which potential exhibitors are based. In this regard we recommend that a company from any state that has not signed the ATT

should be prohibited from attending any UK arms fair. At a minimum, any OGELs issued to allow companies to automatically participate at DSEi should exclude companies originating from non ATT signatory states.

127. The UK Government invited official delegations from 67 countries to DSEi in 2013¹⁴⁹; of these, eight were from countries that abstained or were absent from the UN General Assembly vote on adopting the ATT and who have not yet signed the treaty.¹⁵⁰ The UKWG believes inviting countries that have not signed the ATT to such events undermines the UK Government's support for universal adherence to the Treaty.

128. Furthermore, Secretary of State for Defence, Phillip Hammond, reiterated at DSEi that selling arms is a Government priority¹⁵¹ while launching *Securing prosperity: A strategic vision for the UK defence sector*¹⁵² which sets out plans for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and BIS to work with the defence industry to "maximise the UK's competitive advantage to boost British jobs, trade and growth". That neither the *Securing prosperity* document nor Hammond's speech make reference to the obligation to ensure the protection of human rights is of significant concern.

129. Moreover, nine countries identified in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report¹⁵³ received official invitations to attend the 2013 DSEi¹⁵⁴; these are among the countries regarded as raising the most serious concerns for human rights. The UKWG is at a loss to understand how the Government can justify inviting such countries to an exhibition promoting the sale of a vast array of defence and security equipment and services. The UKWG is concerned that this demonstrates a serious lack of joined-up government in this field. Furthermore the UKWG is also concerned that this could be interpreted as a weakening of the Government's support for the ATT given that it is effectively bringing together sellers from states that do not support the Treaty with buyers from states that by the Government's own calculation raise significant human rights concerns.

Recommendations

130. The UK Government should ensure that companies based in countries that have not signed the ATT are not able to exhibit at a UK arms fair nor should they be invited as an official delegation.

131. All open general licences issues to allow companies to automatically participate at future DSEi exhibitions should be amended to explicitly exclude those companies originating from non ATT signatory states.

¹⁴⁹ UK Trade and Investment, Defence and Security, *Countries invited to DSEi 2013*, 12 September 2013, <http://www.ukti.gov.uk/defencesecurity/item/603020.html>

¹⁵⁰ The eight countries were Bahrain, India, Indonesia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.

¹⁵¹ Richard Norton-Taylor, *Defence Secretary: selling weapons abroad is priority for Britain*, The Guardian, 10 September 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/10/defence-secretary-weapons-priority-britain>

¹⁵² Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, *Securing prosperity: a strategic vision for the UK defence sector*, 9 September 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/237314/bis-13-1154-defence-growth-partnership.pdf.

¹⁵³ See Human Rights and Democracy: The 2012 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Report, April 2013, op.cit. <http://www.hrdreport.fco.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/2012-Human-Rights-and-Democracy.pdf>

¹⁵⁴ The nine countries were Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

132. The Government should not officially invite delegations from any country named as a country of most serious Human Rights concern in the FCO's Human Rights and Democracy Report.

Trade fairs and advertising activities

133. At DSEi 2013, two companies were ejected for promoting Category A goods—which includes cluster munitions and certain paramilitary goods that can be used for internal repression or torture. The DSEi compliance team failed to notice that Tianjin Myway International Trading Co (China) and Magforce International (France) were advertising electric shock weapons and leg cuffs in company brochures available to visitors and it was only after Caroline Lucas MP alerted organisers to the prohibited activities that the stalls were closed. These companies should be immediately investigated for potential breaches of UK Export Control legislation.

134. It is very concerning that these recent events seem to be following a well-established pattern. In 2011 the UKWG called for an investigation into three companies that were displaying prohibited literature at the 2011 DSEi. In fact at every DSEi since 2005 MPs or NGOs have found companies in breach of regulations around permitted promotional activity¹⁵⁵.

135. The UKWG are disappointed to note that at no point to date have any of these companies been prosecuted for prohibited activities nor, as far as we know, has this even been seriously considered. This is despite the fact that Article 21 of the Export Control Order 2008 states:

No person to whom this article applies shall directly or indirectly do any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of any category A goods, where that person knows or has reason to believe that such action or actions will, or may, result in the removal of those goods from one third country to another third country.¹⁵⁶

136. In addition the UK Government's own website states: "The controls on Category A goods cover any act calculated to promote the movement of such goods with no exemption for general advertising or promotion".¹⁵⁷

137. It is therefore somewhat puzzling that in a letter to CAEC regarding DSEi 2011 the Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, stated that "it is necessary to prove a link between the display of the brochure, and the eventual movement of the goods between two overseas destinations".¹⁵⁸ This is at odds with the wording of the 2008 Order which makes it clear that there is no need for an actual link and that Article 21 applies even if an

¹⁵⁵ For a full list, see *Annex B. History of companies advertising prohibited equipment*

¹⁵⁶ The Export Control Order 2008, Article 21,

<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukxi/2008/3231/article/21/made?view=plain><http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukxi/2008/3231/article/21/made?view=plain>

¹⁵⁷ See Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, *Trade controls on military goods for trade fairs and exhibitions*, <https://www.gov.uk/trade-controls-military-goods-on-trade-fairs-and-exhibitions><https://www.gov.uk/trade-controls-military-goods-on-trade-fairs-and-exhibitions>

¹⁵⁸ Committees on Arms Exports, *Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon. Vince Cable MP*,

Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills, Further Follow Up To Oral Evidence to the Committees on Arms Export Controls, 26 March 2012,

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmcaff/419/419we51.htm><http://www.publication.s.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmcaff/419/419we51.htm>

eventual transaction doesn't take place. Moreover, the UK Government's own guidance on the promotion of Category A goods states:

Unlike trading in category C and B goods, there are no exemptions for those whose sole involvement is in transportation services, financing or financial services, insurance or reinsurance services or general advertising and promotion (*such as displaying category A goods at trade fairs or advertising them in periodicals*) (emphasis added). Therefore, anyone involved in the provision of these services requires a licence.¹⁵⁹

138. Almost by definition, the display of Category A goods in promotional literature is calculated to promote supply of those goods, and so the display of catalogues containing Category A goods at UK trade exhibitions must surely constitute "general advertising or promotion". Indeed in the Supplementary Guidance Note on Trade ("Trafficking and Brokering") in Controlled Goods the UK Government expressly defines what it means by the terms "general advertising":

General advertising is where the advertising is not directed at one individual/company and is not intended to close a deal i.e. its main objective is to gain people's interest. An example of general advertising may include a stand at a trade fair with promotional materials such as posters or brochures; or an advert in a periodical magazine.¹⁶⁰

139. It therefore seems clear that the Act is designed to prohibit such promotional activities in relation to Category A goods and it is not necessary to wait until an actual transfer has taken place for a criminal act to have occurred. Such activities are covered by the Act and we call on the UK Government to fully investigate them.

140. The UKWG also believes that the repeated discovery of companies breaching the regulations around permitted promotional activity shows inadequate compliance checks both before and during the fair by the exhibition organisers and HM Revenue and Customs; it should not be the job of civil society or MPs to identify these breaches.

141. According to Michael Fallon, the Minister of State for Business and Enterprise, the Export Control Organisation has agreed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Clarion Events, the organisers of DSEi, which sets out Clarion's roles and responsibilities.¹⁶¹ Given the clear and repeated failure of Clarion to exercise proper oversight of company compliance at the DSEi trade events and to enforce the contractual obligations of exhibitors, the MoU between Clarion and the Government should be scrutinised by the CAEC.

142. While promotional literature pertaining to cluster munitions was not found at DSEi 2013, companies were found to be promoting these weapons at DSEi in 2007, 2009 and 2011 and at Farnborough International Airshow in 2010. To prevent future promotion of cluster munitions,

¹⁵⁹ Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Export Control Act 2002, *Review of Export Control Legislation (2007) Supplementary Guidance Note on Trade ("Trafficking and Brokering") in Controlled Goods (in effect from 6 April 2009)*, January 2009, p. 5,

<http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file49827.pdf><http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file49827.pdf>

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 17

¹⁶¹ House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 13 September 2013, c869W,

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130913/text/130913w0001.htm#130913w001.htm_wqn1http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130913/text/130913w0001.htm_wqn1

the Government should prohibit any state that has not signed and ratified the Cluster Munitions Convention, and any company that has not signed a written guarantee that they (or any subsidiary or partner) do not produce cluster munitions or their components, from attending any military or defence trade event in the UK.

Recommendations

143. The UK Government should investigate, with a view to prosecuting, all companies involved in potential breaches of UK trade control regulations at trade fairs, and publish without delay the results of any investigations.

144. Given repeated breaches of UK trade control regulations at UK trade events, the UK Government should put in place more robust procedures to prevent further breaches, including a compulsory ban on any future activity (incl. trade fair attendance) in the UK for a company found to be promoting prohibited equipment.

145. Given the clear and repeated failure of Clarion to enforce the contractual obligations of exhibitors at the DSEi trade events, the Memorandum of Understanding between Clarion and the Export Control Organisation should be scrutinised by the CAEC.

146. Given the clear and repeated failure of Clarion and HM Revenue and Customs to adequately manage the compliance of companies attending the DSEi trade event, all companies should in future be required to submit all of their promotional literature to organisers/HMG for approval in advance of the fair.

147. Any state that has not signed and ratified the Cluster Munitions Convention, and any company that has not signed a written guarantee that they (or any subsidiary or partner) do not produce cluster munitions or their components, should be prohibited from attending any trade event in the UK.

Cluster munitions and financing

148. The UK Government is a State Party to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions following the enactment of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010. In a written Ministerial Statement dated 7 December 2009, the Government stated that the direct financing of cluster munitions is prohibited under the provisions of the Bill. Through this Statement, it also committed to work with financial institutions, non-governmental organisations and other interested parties, to undertake a thorough consultation and establish a working group, and to put in place a voluntary code of conduct to prevent indirect financing, and if necessary initiate legislation. No progress has been seen on any of these areas.

149. It is of concern that the Government appears to have rejected its previous commitment to end indirect investments in cluster-munition producers. In its official response to the CAEC's 2011-2012 investigations, published on 22 October 2012, it stated:

Indirect financing – such as the purchase of shares in or the provision of loans to large multinational conglomerates that amongst other many other activities may be involved in the manufacture of cluster munitions – is not captured by the prohibitions of the Act. We consider this form of indirect financing an issue for individual institutions to

consider under their own investment charters and social corporate responsibility agendas.¹⁶²

150. An increasing number of UK-based financial institutions continue to strengthen their policies on investments in companies involved in the production of cluster munitions including the Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds, Aviva, Co-operative Financial Services and HSBC. In discussions between financial institutions and members of UKWG, all companies have strongly supported the idea of a jointly-developed, industry-wide Code of Conduct to end indirect finance and have expressed disappointment that thus far, the Government appears to have abandoned previous commitments to help to facilitate its development.

151. It is of importance that the Government engages with financial institutions and non-governmental organisations through a multi-stakeholder process to provide guidance. Financial institutions have indicated that they would benefit from government guidance and leadership on this issue to harmonise policies and practice.

152. Furthermore, at least nine UK financial institutions are understood to continue to invest in companies producing cluster munitions¹⁶³.

Recommendation

153. We urge the Government to honour commitments made to end indirect financial support for cluster munitions and initiate a thorough and inclusive consultation process aimed at providing guidance to financial institutions on disinvesting from cluster munitions. As a first step, we urge the UK Government to set up a multi-stakeholder meeting between relevant industry, NGOs and Government representatives to initiate work on this area.

Torture and end-use

154. The UKWG is disappointed at the decision by the UK Government to abandon its commitment to introduce new end-user controls on torture and death-penalty equipment. In a written response to the CAEC the UK Foreign Minister stated in October 2012:

The Government continues to believe that list-based controls are more likely to be effective than horizontal end-use controls, which can have uncertain impacts on legitimate trade and be problematic to enforce.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² Reports from the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees, *Strategic Export Control: Her Majesty's Government's Annual Report for 2010, Quarterly Reports for 2010 and 2011, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny*, Session 2012-2013, <http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm84/8441/8441.pdf><http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm84/8441/8441.pdf>

¹⁶³ A list of UK financial institutions with current indirect financial investments in producers of cluster munitions can be found in the following report by IKV Pax Christi/FairFin, *Worldwide investments in cluster munitions a shared responsibility*, June 2012, http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/media/files/worldwide-investments-in-clustermunitions-a-shared-responsibility-juni-2012_0.pdf
http://www.ikvpaxchristi.nl/media/files/worldwide-investments-in-clustermunitions-a-shared-responsibility-juni-2012_0.pdf

¹⁶⁴ CAEC, *Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013), Annex 3: The Committees' questions on the Government's Response (Cm8441), published in October 2012, to the Committees' Report 2012 (HC 419-I & II)*

155. In the 2008 review of UK export control legislation the introduction of new end-user controls was deemed a policy priority and one that received widespread and unanimous support from NGOs, the CAEC and defence industry representatives. We are dismayed that the UK Government has dropped this policy without consultation with the original stakeholders.

156. As previously stated we believe that end-user controls on torture and death-penalty equipment would both enhance a system of list-based controls and bring UK export control policy into line with its international legal obligations to prohibit torture and ill-treatment. End-user controls in this area were widely accepted to be an important safety net to allow the UK Government to take action on areas of trading activity where there is universal agreement that involvement in such activities is unacceptable. By scrapping this commitment, the UK Government is sending a signal to would-be exporters that it will permit UK involvement in the facilitation of torture, ill-treatment and capital punishment as long as the equipment is not covered by an export control list.

157. End-use controls may well have prevented the export of drugs subsequently involved in lethal injections in certain US penitentiaries in 2010¹⁶⁵, without the initial recourse of judicial review of Government licensing decisions¹⁶⁶, given it was clear that the exporter was aware that the drugs were being exported for use in executions¹⁶⁷. A torture end-use clause would also help by mitigating the danger of relying purely on list-based controls, which tend to be reactive in nature and slow to respond to new and emerging technologies or unforeseen items.

Recommendation

158. The UK Government should reverse its decision to abandon the introduction of new end-user controls on equipment for use in torture or for use in carrying out the death penalty.

3D printing

159. One emerging issue for Parliamentary consideration is the emergence of 3D printed guns. This year has seen a number of firsts in the field, including the first functional printed firearm components, the first fully-functional printed pistol and rifle, and the first functional printed repeating gun. The technology is still nascent but rapidly advancing, and 3D printed weapons could potentially circumvent existing means of international arms control by existing solely as data until the point where they are created by the end user, who could be anywhere there is an Internet connection.

160. The U.S. State Department clearly views 3D printed guns as a threat to existing export controls, having requested that the designers of a 3D printed pistol remove the weapon's design

and the Government's answers,

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmquad/205/205ii_04.htm

¹⁶⁵ Reprieve, *Death Penalty: Stop Lethal Injection Project timeline*, 18 June 2013,

<http://www.reprieve.org.uk/publiceducation/executiondrugstimeline/>

¹⁶⁶ Reprieve, *Judicial Review Application for urgent consideration*, 5 November 2010,

http://www.reprieve.org.uk/downloads/2010_11_02_PUB_Zagorski_Judicial_Review_Application.pdf

¹⁶⁷ Reprieve, *Georgia FDA Release proof Mr Alavi knew of use for capital punishment*, 19 January 2011,

http://www.reprieve.org.uk/static/downloads/2011_01_19_FDA_release_-_proof_Mr_Alavi_knew_of_use_for_capital_punishment.pdf

files from their website as a potential violation of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act.¹⁶⁸ This reflects the distinct lack of clarity around the status of designs for weapons in national and international law relating to arms transfers. The UKWG would therefore encourage the CAEC to raise with the Government how it proposes to approach the potential availability of 3D printed weapons distributed internationally via the Internet.

Recommendation

161. The UKWG is concerned about the advent of 3D printing technology and its implications for strategic export controls. We therefore urge the CAEC to raise this issue with the Government and to ask what action the UK is taking at international level to develop a clear and concerted response to this issue.

ANNEX

A. UK licences granted for exports to MENA region, 2008 – 2012

1. Number/Value of licences granted, refused and revoked per country from 2008 - 2012¹⁶⁹

Key:

SIELS: a. Granted; b. Value; c1: Refused (criteria); c2. Revoked

OIELS: d. Granted; e1. Refused; e2. Revoked

¹⁶⁸ Todd Sperry, *U.S. requires group to remove 3-D gun instructions from its website*, CNN.com, 13 May 2013, <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/09/politics/3-d-guns/index.html>

¹⁶⁹ Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics, Searchable database, <https://www.exportcontroldb.bis.gov.uk>

Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Country					
Bahrain					
a	31	34	70	50	36
b	£5,167,509	£2,873,043	£8,776,389	£13,310,376	£7,968,437
c		1 (c1: 2; 3)		2 (c1: 2; 3) - 23 (c2)	
d	10	8	9	18	9
e		1		7 (e2)	
Egypt					
a	70	81	80	55	60
b	£23,428,953	£16,352,102	£6,826,613	£7,700,496	£18,823,204
c		1 (c1: 1)		10 (c1: 2; 3; 5; 7) - 36 (c2)	12 (c1: 1; 2; 3; 7)
d	11	11	13	10	13
e		3	1	5 (e1) - 5 (e2)	1
Oman					
a	87	107	187	327	277
b	£13,912,321	£20,004,096	£363,774,154	£39,263,031	£441,276,750
c				1 (c1: 1)	1 (c1: 1)
d	9	11	21	38	25
e	1		1		2
Qatar					
a	73	52	60	45	80
b	£2,629,913	£8,956,927	£12,634,030	£3,060,969	£16,925,073
c				2 (c2)	
d	9	8	11	14	12
e	1		1		1
Saudi Arabia					
a	99	155	226	206	226
b	£105,805,778	£1,697,810,344	£425,323,506	£1,750,906,252	£117,345,508
c					
d	13	15	28	26	23
e		2	1	4	4
UAE					
a	187	205	322	343	339
b	£76,139,814	£36,806,390	£254,083,219	£1,608,748,415	£1,203,175,441
c	3 (c1: 1; 5)	2 (c1: 1; 5)		3 (c1: 1) - 2 (c2)	
d	16	12	22	31	26
e		3	3	1	1
Aggregate total granted	615	784	1.049	1.163	1.076
Aggregate total refused	5	13	7	26	22
Aggregate total revoked				75	

2. Number and value of licences granted per region and worldwide from 2008 – 2012¹⁷⁰

Key:

a: number of licences granted

b: value of licences granted

¹⁷⁰ UK submissions to the EU Annual Reports According to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, see http://www.eas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control/index_en.htm

Year Region	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
North Africa					
a	168	258	487	43	30
b	€44,094,609	€40,614,042	€335,625,451	€16,747,152	€4,337,713
Middle East					
a	1292	2724	3285	1095	1214
b	€627,188,883	€1,996,926,607	€783,935,490	€2,156,370,429	€775,180,105
Worldwide					
a	10 417	27 368	27 368	8 786	9 679
b	€7,065,906,642	€3,461,836,404	€3,461,836,404	€7,002,564,521	€2,663,476,929

B. History of companies advertising prohibited equipment

Fair	Company	Information
DSEi 2013	Tianjin Myway International Trading Co Ltd, China	Company literature promoted torture equipment (leg cuffs and electric shock batons) Company ejected from fair ¹⁷¹
DSEi 2013	Magforce International, France	Company literature promoted torture equipment (leg cuffs and electric shock batons) Company ejected from fair ¹⁷²
DSEi 2011	Pakistan Ordnance Factory (POF)	Company literature contained information on the 155mm Base Bleed DP-ICM (Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition) which is a cluster munition. Company ejected from fair ¹⁷³
DSEi 2011	Nammo Talley (Nammo Group),	Company literature contained information on / promotion of cluster munitions. The company was contacted after the fair – the product sheet was subsequently amended ¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ DSEi, *Statement on compliance breach*, (undated),

<http://www.dsei.co.uk/page.cfm/action=Press/libID=1/libEntryID=184/listID=4>

¹⁷² Ibidem

¹⁷³ DSEi 2011, *Official Statement*, (undated), <http://www.dsei.co.uk/page.cfm/T=m/Action=Press/PressID=161>

DSEi 2011	Defence Export Promotion Organisation (DEPO), Pakistan	155mm M483A1 artillery ammunition containing 88 submunitions, and the 'Programmable SubMunition Dispenser - 1'. Company ejected from fair ¹⁷⁵
DSEi 2011	Beechwood International, UK	Brochure found promoting oversized leg cuffs, waist chains, lead chains and “the enhanced transport restraint system” (which combines waist chains and cuffs with leg cuffs) on behalf of US company CTS-Thompson. Company ejected from fair ¹⁷⁶
Farnborough 2010	Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (FSUE SRPE Bazalt), Russia	Promoting cluster munitions Issue raised by UK-WG in CAEC submission ¹⁷⁷
DSEi 2009	Pakistan Ordnance Factory	Company literature contained information on the 155mm Base Bleed DP-ICM (Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition) which is a cluster munition. Raised by Amnesty International with the exhibition organisers – promised action would be taken. ¹⁷⁸
DSEi 2007	BCB International (Cardiff), UK	Company found to be promoting leg cuffs and Taser projectile electric shock gun.

¹⁷⁴ Nammo Talley, *News: To whom it may concern*, (undated), <http://www.nammo.com/News/To-whom-it-may-concern>

¹⁷⁵ DSEi 2011, Official Statement, op.cit. <http://www.dsei.co.uk/page.cfm/T=m/Action=Press/PressID=161>

¹⁷⁶ Exhibition News, *DSEi ejects exhibitors for compliance breaches*, 22 September 2011, <http://www.exhibitionnews.co.uk/newsdetails/1688/dsei-ejects-exhibitors-for-compliance-breaches>

¹⁷⁷ Committees on Arms Export Controls, *First Report Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation*, Written evidence submitted by the UK Working Group on Arms, 22 March 2011, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmquad/686/686.pdf>

¹⁷⁸ House of Commons, Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs, and International Development Committees, *Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2010): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2008, Quarterly Reports for 2009, licensing policy and review of export control legislation*, First Joint Report of Session 2009–10, Written evidence submitted by the UK Working Group on Arms 16 March 2010, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmquad/202/202.pdf>

		Company ejected from fair ¹⁷⁹
DSEi 2007	Famous Glory Holdings, China	Company found to be promoting leg cuffs Company ejected from fair ¹⁸⁰
IFSEC 2007	Echo Industrial Co. Ltd, China	Company found to be displaying electric shock batons. Mr Xia was deported from the UK, however the CPS decided not to bring charges ¹⁸¹
DSEi 2005	Denel, South Africa	Discussed selling of 155 millimetre artillery shell containing 42 bomblets. ¹⁸²
DSEi 2005	Tar Ideal, Israel	Brochure found advertising stun guns, stun batons and leg-irons. Company ejected from fair. ¹⁸³
DSEi 2005	Global Armour, South Africa	Brochure found advertising stun guns, stun batons. Company ejected from fair ¹⁸⁴

October 2013

¹⁷⁹ The Guardian, *Leg irons row sees two companies thrown out of London arms fair*, 12 September 2007, <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/sep/12/arms>

¹⁸⁰ Ibidem

¹⁸¹ House of Commons Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees Strategic Export Controls: *2007 Review First Joint Report of Session 2006–07, Memorandum from Mark Thomas*, 23 July 2007, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmfaff/117/117.pdf>

¹⁸² The Independent, *Cluster bombs on offer at arms fair despite sales ban*, Wednesday 14 September 2005 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/cluster-bombs-on-offer-at-arms-fair-despite-sales-ban-506739.html>

¹⁸³ House of Commons Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees Strategic Export Controls: *Annual Report for 2004, Quarterly Reports for 2005, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny First Joint Report of Session 2005–06: Further memorandum from Mark Thomas*, 19 July 2006, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmquad/873/873.pdf>

¹⁸⁴ Ibidem

**Written evidence from Dr. Anna Stavrianakis, Senior Lecturer in International Relations,
University of Sussex (AEC009)**

Introduction and Summary

I am a scholar researching the international arms trade and UK arms export policy. This submission seeks clarification on three issues discussed in the Government's response (Cm 8707, October 2013) to the Committees on Arms Export Controls Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013) report (HC 205, 1 July 2013).

- First, it asks whether the Government will be consulting publicly on its updating of the UK's Consolidated Criteria on arms exports.
- Second, it seeks clarification on the character of the arms export licence suspension mechanism.
- Third, it seeks clarification on the suspension of arms export licences to Egypt.

1. **Review of the UK's Consolidated Criteria.** The Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) asked the Government whether it would consult publicly on its updating of the Consolidated Criteria (Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013), paragraph 46). In its response, the Government stated that "We are now studying the impact of the ATT on the EU Common Position and in light of that will be updating the Criteria". The Government did not answer the CAEC's question about public consultation. Is the Government going to consult publicly on its updating of the UK Consolidated Criteria? If so, what is the timescale and format for this?

2. **Arms export licence suspension mechanism.** In its response to the CAEC Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013) report, the Government states that the suspension mechanism "applies only to licence applications that are still being processed and to any new applications that may subsequently be submitted. Once an item has left the UK suspending or revoking the licence will not result in the return of that item. For extant licences, i.e. those that are wholly or partially unused, we have the option of revocation or suspension should that be deemed necessary" (paragraph 124).

3. Three claims about suspension are made in the above paragraph. First, licence applications that are still being processed can be suspended. Second, new licence applications can be suspended. The Government initially claims that suspension applies "only" to these two scenarios. Later in the same paragraph, however, it makes a third claim: that extant licences (licences that have been issued but are wholly or partially unused) can be revoked or suspended. This mix of claims makes it unclear whether it is possible to prevent equipment being shipped once a licence has been granted.

4. Can the Government clarify its policy and practice in relation to the suspension of: new licence applications; applications that are still being processed; and licences that have been granted and are still valid, but are partially or wholly unused.

5. In particular, can the Government confirm whether extant licences – licences that have been granted and are still valid, but are wholly or partially unused i.e. the equipment has not yet been

shipped – can be suspended? If so, on how many occasions have such licences been suspended, of what equipment, to what end-user?

6. Can the Government explain what happens in practice if an extant licence is suspended, and what happens in practice if an extant licence is revoked?

7. **Arms export licence suspensions: Egypt.** The suspension mechanism “has been considered on several occasions but pursued in only one instance, in respect of Egypt” (Government response to CAEC report, paragraph 94). EU Member States agreed to “suspend all export licensing for equipment which might be used for internal repression.” Can the Government clarify whether, in the UK case, this involved the suspension of acceptance of new licence applications; the suspension of the processing licence applications already submitted; and/or the suspension of extant licences already granted but wholly or partially unused?

8. EU Member States also agreed “to reassess export licences of equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP” (Government response to CAEC report, paragraph 94). Can the Government clarify what this process involved in the UK case? Did this involve reassessing licences that had already been granted?

9. The Business Secretary announced on 28 August “that the UK had suspended 48 extant licences as a result of this agreement” (Government response to CAEC report, paragraph 94). Similarly, in its Notice to Exporters 2013/23 published on the same date, ECO that “suspension will apply to extant licences and new licence applications.”¹⁸⁵ This wording suggests that *both* extant licences that have been granted but are wholly or partially unused, *and* licence applications that are still in process can be suspended. Can the Government confirm this, and clarify what happened in the case of extant licences in respect of Egypt that were suspended?

On 25 October 2013, in Notice to Exporters 2013/27, ECO stated that “24 licences will have the suspension lifted because we do not judge the goods might be used for internal repression. 7 will be revoked as there is a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression. The balance of 16 will remain suspended because the goods might be used for internal repression.”¹⁸⁶ Were these extant licences i.e. licences that had been granted but were partially or wholly unused?

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon David Cameron, MP, Prime Minister

I should be grateful for the fullest available text of the EU agreed “common framework for those who, in future, may decide to supply it [the Syrian National Coalition] with military equipment” and also full details of the “clear safeguards to ensure that any such equipment would be supplied only for the protection of civilians, and in accordance with international law, “ to which you referred in your statement to the House of Commons on June 3.

¹⁸⁵ <http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/uncategorized/notice-to-exporters-201324-suspension-of-extant-licences-for-egypt-and-changes-to-ogels/>

¹⁸⁶ <http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/uncategorized/notice-to-exporters-201327-egypt-results-of-the-review-of-licences/>

19 June 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Thank you for your letter of 18 March about UK legislation on the seizure of illegal arms shipments. I apologise for the delay in replying but the FCO has no trace of having received your original letter in March.

Under international maritime law, private contractors are not provided any powers to seize and dispose of illegal arms shipments. This remains a privilege of State authorities. The Royal Navy is given appropriate legal powers but, as you would expect, the position is kept under review. The Government is currently at the early stages of considering the legislative programme for the 4th Session of Parliament. At the moment at least one draft Bill, if it went forward, would later the statutory legislative powers available to the Armed Forces. Cross-Whitehall discussions are continuing and at present I am unable to give any further detail but I will keep you informed if the position changes.

2 July 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

Thank you for your letter of 6 June, seeking clarification that the information provided in our letters to you dated 10 and 20 May were interpreted correctly.

Firstly, I can confirm the number of extant licences to the countries listed in the FCO's countries of human rights concern and referred to in my letter of 10 May, was at the time of writing 3,074 (2,604 SIELs and 470 OILEs).

However, although the total value for all countries within both letters is correct, the country breakdown you provided shows an error as follows:

Iraq should be £15,915,430.

I hope you find this information useful.

2 July 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Michael Fallon, MP, Minister of State for Business and Enterprise, Department of Business, Innovation and Skills

I am writing to bring you up to date on export licensing matters relating to counter-piracy efforts. I know that you take a close interest in this area and wanted me to inform you that my

Department will soon begin issuing UK trade licences authorising the use of floating armouries for the storage of controlled equipment, particularly firearms.

As you know, UK Private Security Companies (PSCs) have a strong presence in the region, which is encouraging because these companies are comprised of highly disciplined ex-UK forces personnel and a high standard of security is provided. This is also a commercial success story.

The biggest difficulty facing PSCs is a logistical one relating to the storage of controlled goods. While initially the land-based armouries, operating primarily under government or police oversight, were welcoming and accommodating of PSCs engaged in counter-piracy efforts, increasingly storage has been problematic. This is due to a combination of armouries reaching capacity, armouries operating restrictive hours not conducive to twenty four hour operations, spiralling costs due to excessive demand and, also, the Sri Lankan MOD choosing to close its land-based naval armoury to commercial companies and offering only an off-shore vessel outside their territorial waters.

The available solution to this problem is the operation of off-shore vessels designed to store controlled goods like firearms securely, and in some cases, accommodate personnel as well. Whilst authorising transfers of controlled goods to platforms operating in international waters is not new to us — we have long supported UK exports of strategic goods to the UK Continental Shelf — the difference here is that the goods include weapons, which represent new challenges for us when it comes to assessing the risks.

We have been working with our advisors, principally officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to find a way to manage these risks. We have decided to adopt a case by case approach and assess a range of points for each vessel. These points are set out in an annex to this letter.

We have focused initially on a vessel called the *MV Mahanuwara*, which is operated by a company called Avant Garde Maritime Services of Sri Lanka, which is operated under the authorisation and the protection of the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence. Having collected and assessed the information set out in the annex our advisors and my officials concur that the risks of allowing PSCs to use this vessel, as a short term storage solution, is acceptable. We will therefore begin authorising licences for the use of this vessel with immediate effect.

We will then move to assess other vessels that the UK PSCs have expressed an interest in using. We are working with officials at the Department of Transport and the Home Office to determine any additional conditions that they may wish to place on UK-flagged vessels. This is due to be discussed this month at a cross-Government Ministerial Working Group on Counter-Piracy. UK vessels should be inherently lower risk but you will appreciate that they will need to comply with DfT guidance on the use of armed guards and relevant Home Office firearms legislation.

Please do let me know if you or any members of the CAEC have any questions arising from this letter.

Annex

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HMG WILL REQUIRE TO ASSESS THE RISK OF FLOATING ARMOURIES AGAINST THE CONSOLIDATED CRITERIA

- The vessel name and International Maritime Organisation (IMO) number.
- Details of the flag under which the vessel operates.
- The size/class of the vessel and a description.
- The vessel's minimum and maximum crew complements.
- The location(s) where the vessel operates including ports.
- Details of the operation and accessibility to the vessel's armoury.
- Details of which personnel, apart from the crew, will be allowed access to the vessel and under what circumstances.
- Details of the insurance of the vessel.
- The maximum armoury capacity of the vessel and the types of weapons they will be permitted to be stored.
- Details of the plans for disposal of surplus/abandoned equipment.
- Details of the protection measures for the vessel.
- Details of what legislation and regulations the vessel is subject to, including details of any inspections undertaken to date.
- Details of any circumstances under which the vessel may lease capacity to other organisations.
- Details about any circumstances under which weapons may be leased to other organisations.

Licence holders will be required to monitor these points, and to notify ECO of any changes. As with all activity undertaken under a UK trade licence, records of transactions will be kept and inspected by ECO officials during each compliance audit. We are also exploring the viability of conducting on-vessel inspections. Companies will be required to report on licence use on a quarterly basis.

7 July 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Thank you for your letter of 19 June to the Prime Minister about his statement to the House on 3 June on Syria.

With regards to your request for the fullest available text on the agreed EU common framework, I enclose a copy of the EU Council declaration agreed by the Foreign Affairs Council on 27 May, which may also be found at the following link at

www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137315.pdf

You also ask for details on the issue of safeguards referred to by the Prime Minister in his statement. Our priority remains advancing a political transition that ends the conflict in Syria, allows refugees to return to their homes, and prevents further radicalisation in the country. We will do all we can to ensure that the forthcoming US-Russia Geneva conference delivers that outcome.

I want to be clear that the UK has not yet made a final decision to provide lethal equipment to the National Coalition, but we now have the flexibility to respond in the future if the situation continues to deteriorate and if the Assad regime refuses to negotiate. We have said we would only provide lethal equipment in carefully controlled circumstances, and in accordance with our obligations under national and international law.

When the Foreign Affairs Council agreed to end the EU arms embargo and return decisions on arms provision to member states on 27 May, Ministers also agreed a framework of safeguards to guide those member states which might decide to provide arms: arms could only be sent to the National Coalition; they should be intended for the protection of civilians; there should be safeguards to ensure delivery to the right hands; and existing obligations under the EU Common Position for arms exports (CP944) remained in place.

I have explained to Parliament that with every week that passes we are coming closer to the collapse of Syria and a regional catastrophe which will affect the security of the UK. We will therefore continue to increase our efforts to press for an end to the conflict, provide life-saving assistance and work to ensure that Syria achieves the political transition its people deserve. There are no simple solutions to the crisis, but we must help the Syrian people find a way to end the bloodshed and begin to build a new future.

11 July 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

There is evidence of attacks using chemical weapons (CW) in Syria, including sarin, and we believe that the use of chemical weapons is sanctioned and ordered by the Assad regime.

On 14 June 2013, the Prime Minister publically announced that we will continue to support, train and assist and work with the Syrian moderate armed opposition. As part of our support to the opposition, we aim to give the moderate armed opposition in Syria a degree of protection against chemical weapons.

It is normal practice when a government department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £250,000, for the department concerned to present to the House of Commons a

Minute giving the particulars of the gift and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from making the gift until fourteen parliamentary sittings days after the issue of the Minute, except in cases of special urgency.

In this case, making the gift is a matter of special urgency. The rapidly deteriorating situation in Syria and the urgent need to support the Syrian opposition means that the Government needs to act as soon as possible. Due to the summer recess, it is unfortunately not possible to allow 14 sitting days for the House to consider the gifting minute.

The Treasury document Managing Public Money states that, in exceptional cases of special urgency, it is permissible for some or all of the notice period to fall during recess. In this case, we will not proceed with plans to make the gift until a period of 14 working days after the minute has been laid has expired. Three of those working days are also sitting days.

I have laid the gifting minute today and plan to issue a Written Ministerial Statement tomorrow. I am therefore writing to ask you to consider the gift on behalf of Parliament during the period of fourteen working days. If there are no objections, we will proceed with plans to make the gift on or after 3rd August 2013.

The proposal is to gift:

- 5,000 commercial escape hoods.
- Medical pre-treatment against nerve agents (“NAPs” tablets) sufficient to treat 5,000 people for 6 months, from MOD excess stocks.
- Three colour CW ‘detector paper’, also from MOD excess stocks.

The gift will be offered to the Supreme Military Council of Syrian national Coalition, which the UK recognises as the sole legitimate representatives of the Syrian people. The value of this equipment is approximately £656,800 which will be met by the Government’s Conflict Pool Fund. There will be an additional cost for transportation and training which is not yet confirmed but which will also be funded by the Conflict Pool. The cost of this will be limited as far as possible but we are not able to give an accurate estimate until we discuss the proposal with the Syrian Opposition.

The Treasury has approved this proposal in principle. If, during the period of fourteen days (exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Bank Holidays) beginning on the date of this letter, you signify objection, final approval of the gift will be withheld pending an examination of the objection. I am copying this letter to Richard Ottaway MP, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as the Chairs of the defence Committees and the Committees on Arms Export Controls.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Minute dated 15th July 2013 on gifting of chemical weapons protective equipment to the Syrian Opposition

It is the normal practice when a Government department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £250,000, for the department concerned to present to the House of Commons a

Minute giving particulars of the gift and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from making the gift until fourteen Parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the Minute, except in cases of special urgency. This is a case of special urgency because of the need to provide the Syrian Opposition with protection against chemical weapons at the earliest possible opportunity. As a result, the notification period will be 14 working days beginning on the date on which this Minute was laid.

As the Foreign Secretary told the House on 10th July, we are faced with a growing and protracted crisis in Syria. There is evidence of attacks using chemical weapons in Syria - including sarin. We believe that the use of chemical weapons is sanctioned and ordered by the Assad regime. The Foreign Secretary explained on 10th July that we are exploring the possibility of supplying the Syrian Opposition protective equipment against chemical and biological weapons use. This minute provides more detail on these plans.

The proposal is to gift:

- 5,000 commercial escape hoods;
- Medical pre-treatment against nerve agents (“NAPs” tablets) sufficient to treat 5,000 people for 6 months, from MOD excess stocks; and
- Three colour chemical weapons „detector paper“, also from MOD excess stocks.

The gift will be offered to the Supreme Military Council of the Syrian National Coalition, which the UK recognises as the sole legitimate representatives of the Syrian people.

Escape hoods protect against sarin gas for approximately 20 minutes, allowing a person to move away from an affected area but not enabling them to continue to fight. They do not require fitting or extensive training to be effective. Pre-treatment with NAPs gives a person who is exposed to a nerve agent (including sarin) a greater chance of reaching a place where atropine can be administered under medical supervision. Chemical weapons detector paper enables the basic detection of chemical weapons agents. The capability to detect quickly whether chemical weapons agents are present will inform decisions on whether or not to remain in an area and so potentially save lives.

A train-the-trainer package is also proposed. This will provide a number of trainers with the ability to deliver further training within Syria on the appropriate way to use the gifted material. Instructions will be provided in Arabic. The final delivery mechanism is yet to be decided but the gift may be delivered in tranches in order to minimise the risk of diversion.

The approximate total cost of the equipment in the proposed gift is £656,800 which will be met by the Government’s Conflict Pool Fund. There will be an additional cost for transportation and training which is not yet confirmed but which will also be funded by Conflict Pool. The cost of this will be limited as far as possible but we are not able to give an accurate estimate until we discuss the proposal with the Opposition.

The use of Conflict Pool funds to cover the costs of this gift has been approved by the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for International Development. FCO and MOD officials have also assessed the gift against the Consolidated

Criteria and the gift does not cross the risk thresholds in the consolidated criteria provided adequate measures are put in place to mitigate the risk of diversion. In assessing the risks of providing these materials, the FCO Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) have been consulted and agree the recommendation to provide the gift. This gift is also consistent with HMG agreed policy on

"s Counter T

15 July 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

I wanted to provide an update on a number of issues in advance of the Government's official response to the Committees' Report which is due in mid-September.

Export Licence revocations for Egypt

As I announced on 19 July I have revoked 5 export licences for Egypt. This followed a review of all extant licences for Egypt in the light of the recent actions of the military and police in crowd control and the possibility of further violent clashes in which the military will play an active role. While at the time the licences were granted they were assessed to be fully consistent with the Consolidated Criteria we judge that there is now a clear risk that the specific equipment in the 5 revoked licences might contribute to internal repression.

The revoked licences were for armoured personnel carrier components, radios and base station, vehicle aerials, machine gun components, components for tracked armoured fighting infantry vehicles and communications equipment for tanks. The armoured personnel carrier components were for the Ministry of Interior, the other equipment was for the Egyptian Ministry of Defence and the Army. The Annex to this letter identifies the 5 specific licences that have been revoked.

The Government did consider a suspension of licensing for Egypt. However it was decided that we were still able to make informed assessments against the Criteria and therefore a suspension was unnecessary.

Transparency Initiative

This Government is committed to greater openness and transparency as this provides the means for Parliament and the public to hold us to account. At the same time it is important that we do not impose unnecessary burdens on business or put UK companies at a disadvantage over foreign competitors. In making the final preparations for the launch of the Transparency in Export Licensing Initiative it was clear to me that we had not struck the right balance between these two objectives. As I told Sir Bob Russell MP in the house on 18 July "I have ...established that we should dispense with some procedures relating to quarterly reporting and we will do so."

As a result, users of Open General and Open Individual licences will be required to make reports on their usage of those licences on an annual basis, rather than quarterly as originally envisaged. In addition, exporters will now have to provide information on the destination

country, type of end-user, and the number of times the licence has been used for that country/end-user type. They will not have to provide ratings or descriptions of the specific items exported. The revised reporting requirement will apply from 1 January 2014, with the first year's data being published in 2015.

JSF OGEL

I have decided to grant an Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for exports in support of the Joint Strike Fighter project (JSF, also known as F-35 or Lightning II) The JSF has been developed under a US Government-led collaborative programme with eight partner countries (various NATO, plus Australia) for circa 3000 aircraft. The UK has a requirement for up to 138 aircraft. The MOD has so far taken delivery of three aircraft for testing.

The UK Government is the only 'Level 1 partner' in the project and UK industry has won a 12–15% share, by value, in all the aircraft produced – estimated to be worth some £30 billion. Support and maintenance of the aircraft will attract further revenue for UK industry. In all, over 100 UK companies are engaged in the supply chain, and have invested in facilities for the production of the aircraft.

The OGEL will permit the export of the majority of items (but not weapons) required for the production and sustainment of JSF to all the Partner nations (including the UK requirement) and export customers. The OGEL will reduce the administrative burden on UK exporters while permitting the Government to retain oversight of exports — companies using the licence will have to comply with the terms and conditions of the licence and to report annually on actual goods exported under the transparency in export licensing initiative. Export of weapons for JSF will continue to require individual licensing on a case-by-case basis as would the export of whole aircraft.

The Government has carefully considered the case for an OGEL for JSF against the Consolidated Criteria in light of the fact that Israel is a confirmed export customer. Israel is expected to take delivery of its first aircraft in 2016 but it is not expected to be operationally deployed before 2018. At this time we do not believe there is a clear risk that the JSF would be used for internal repression, would aggravate existing internal tensions or conflict, or be used aggressively against another state. As none of the relevant thresholds for refusal have been reached, and given the huge potential benefits for UK industry, I believe that an OGEL is the most appropriate licence.

Any licence can be revoked or amended where circumstances change significantly such that the export is no longer consistent with the Criteria. The OGEL for JSF is no different.

My officials are currently finalising the draft of the OGEL. I expect to publish it shortly.

Register of Brokers

The question of a register of arms brokers is one that has been raised regularly with me by the Committees. I undertook to have a first look at the issue. It has always been unclear whether the benefits in terms of compliance and enforcement are sufficient to outweigh the

additional administrative burdens on legitimate businesses and on Government. However I do believe it is time to look again at the evidence for and against. I have therefore decided to conduct a public consultation to gather the necessary evidence to allow the Government to make a decision on whether or not to take forward proposals for the introduction of a register of brokers. Key questions that the consultation will address include:

- What should be the criteria for acceptance onto the register?
- Should the register be made public?
- How would a register help to prevent illegal brokering activity?
- What would be the additional costs to business of complying with a registration scheme on top of the costs already incurred in complying with the licensing requirement? What offsetting benefits would a register bring?

We will also consider the administrative costs to Government of setting up and maintaining a register. In addressing these questions we will seek to learn lessons from those countries that have introduced a register of brokers.

I anticipate the public consultation taking place in the early autumn. I would welcome the Committees' views on the questions posed above and indeed on any other aspects of a register of arms brokers.

I trust you find this information useful.

Annex – Export Licence Revocations for Egypt

Four of the revoked licences were included in the list of extant licences provided to the Committees on 10 May 2013 and reproduced on page Ev 570 of Vol II of the Committees report, as follows:

Application Type	Goods (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine guns	128,662
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine guns	181,820
SIEL (Permanent)	ground vehicle military communications equipment	142,880
SIEL (Permanent)	ground vehicle military communications equipment	764,850

The fifth revoked licence was for supply of components to Germany for incorporation into other equipment that was ultimately to be supplied to Egypt:

Application Type	Goods (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
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SIEL (Permanent)	ground vehicle military communications equipment	3,050
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30 July 2013

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

I was surprised that your letter of July 22 to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Richard Ottaway, on the Balance of Competencies review was not copied to the Committees on Arms Export Controls.

There are key interfaces between the national competencies of EU member states and the competence of the EU itself as far as arms export controls and international arms control issues more widely are concerned, both of which are scrutinised by the Committees on Arms Export Controls.

The four House of Commons Select Committees which comprise the Committees on Arms Export Controls have now made a unanimous submission to the Government's balance of Competencies review which I trust will be given careful consideration by Ministers.

I should be grateful if you could ensure that all ministerial letters to Select Committees that bear on the responsibilities and work of the Committees on Arms Export Controls are copied to the Committees.

22 August 2013

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

Since the start of the civil war in Syria, the Committees on Arms Export Controls have been scrutinising in detail the Government's approval of export licences for both military and dual-use goods to that country.

With statements from both the British and the US Governments that sarin has been used in chemical attacks in Syria, I am returning to the Government's approval in January 2012 of export licences to Syria for potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride both of which are stated to be precursor chemicals in the manufacture of nerve gas.

I am setting out in full the exchanges between the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) and Ministers on this key issue to date.

In March 2012, I tabled a Written Parliamentary Question to yourself asking "Which UK strategic export control licences to Syria are currently extant; and what the nature and

quantity of the licensed goods or services are under each licence”. Your Minister Mark Prisk answered on March 27 that there were 9 such licences of which 7 were Standard Individual Licences and 2 were Open Individual Licences. Of the 7 Standard Individual Licences 2 were for “chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes”, with the goods valued at £10,000 and £10,200 respectively.

Following publication of the Committees 2012 Report (HC 419) on July 13, I wrote to the Foreign Secretary five days later on July 18 putting to him a total of 55 requests for further information about the 9 extant UK Government approved arms export licences to Syria. Of these 55 requests, 10 related to the two Standard Individual Export Licences (SIEL) for “Chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes”.

The 10 items of further information that the Committees required were:

1. The names of the individual chemicals for which UK Government export licence approval was given.
2. The reasons why each of the chemicals concerned are subject to export licence approval.
3. The internal repression purposes to which each of the chemicals concerned could be put.
4. The quantities of each of the chemicals concerned for which export licence approval was given.
5. The names of the individuals, companies or organisations to whom the chemicals were being exported.
6. The extent to which those named individuals, companies or organisations are subject to the influence, ownership or control of the Syrian Government.
7. The last known location in Syria of the chemicals for which UK Government export licence approval was given.
8. The dates of approval of each of the chemical export licences concerned, whether any have now been revoked and, if so, on what date.
9. Which, if any, of the chemical export licence applications concerned were put to Ministers for approval.
10. Copies of each of the chemical export licence applications concerned and of each of the approval decisions with any conditions attached – to be provided to the Committees on a classified or non-classified basis as necessary.

You replied to the Committees’ requests for these 10 items of information in your letter to me of 6 September 2012 as follows:

“These licences were issued on 17 and 18 January 2012 and authorised the export of dual-use chemicals to a private company for use in industrial processes. The chemicals were sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride.

These chemicals have legitimate commercial uses – for example, sodium fluoride is used in the fluoridation of drinking water and the manufacture of toothpaste; and potassium fluoride has applications in the metallurgical industry and the manufacture of pesticides. However they could also be used as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons which is why they are included on the Australia Group chemical weapons precursors list and are listed in Annex 1 of Council Regulation 428/2009, meaning a licence is required for their export from the EU.

In these cases the chemicals were to be used for metal finishing of aluminium profiles used for making aluminium showers, windows, etc. Each licence application was assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, including whether there was a clear risk that they might be used for internal repression or be diverted for such an end-use. The licences were granted because at the time there were no grounds for refusal.

Subsequently, the European Union imposed new sanctions on Syria via Council Regulation (EU) No 509/2012 which came into force on 17 June 2012. The sanctions included prohibitions on the sale, supply, transfer or export of certain dual-use items and chemicals (including sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride) which might be used for internal repression or in the manufacture of items which might be used for internal repression. As a result, these licences were revoked on 30 July 2012”.

On 18 March this year, I wrote again to you about the chemicals approved by the Government for export to Syria as follows:

“Thank you for your letter of 6 September 2012 responding to the Committees on Arms Exports’ request for further information relating to extant arms export licences to Syria.

However, the answer provided to the Committees’ question relating to the two SIELs for “chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes” has raised a further question. Your response stated that these licences had been revoked on 30 July 2012 as a result of the Council Regulation (EU) No 509/2012 imposing new sanctions on Syria coming into force on 17 June 2012. The Committees wish to know if the goods covered by these two licences were shipped to Syria before the licences were revoked.”

You replied to my letter on April 10 2013 as follows:

“Thank you for your letter of 18 March requesting further information about extant arms export licences to Syria.

Both licence records showed that there were some goods remaining to be exported and that was why those licenses were revoked on 30 July 2012, to prevent export of the chemicals caught by the new EU sanctions on Syria which came into force on 17 June 2012. However, revocation could not prevent the shipment of chemicals already exported against those licences and, unfortunately, we do not have data showing what quantity of chemicals covered by these SIELs had already been shipped.”

Please could you now respond to the following further questions and requirements for further information:

1. Please provide the Committees, numbered item by numbered item, with each of the 10 items of information originally requested about the two “chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes” SIELs as detailed in my original letter of 18 July 2012 to the Foreign Secretary much, if not most of which, was not provided in your reply to me of 6 September 2012. Please also provide the name of the company to whom your Department gave licence approval on 17 and 18 January 2012 to export potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride to Syria. The company’s name cannot credibly be withheld from the Committees on grounds of commercial confidentiality given that both licences were revoked over a year ago.

Please also provide the name(s) of the company or companies to whom FCO Minister Alistair Burt has now stated five further export licences for sodium fluoride to Syria were issued between 2003 and the start of the conflict.

2. Syria has long been known to be a holder of chemical weapons and your Department were clearly fully aware that sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride are precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons as you specifically stated this in your letter to me of 6 September 2012. Given that Syria was a known holder of chemical weapons, given that there was a civil war in Syria and given that both sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride were known by your Department to be precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons, do you agree on reflection that both of these licences should have been refused?
3. You said in your letter to me of 6 September 2012 “The licence was granted because there were no grounds for refusal.”

You also stated that “Each licence application was assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export licensing Criteria, including whether there was a clear risk that they might be used for internal repression or be diverted for such an end-use.” However, this is not an accurate or complete statement of the Government’s policy on arms exports where the goods might be used for internal repression. The Foreign Secretary’s statement of policy to the Committees on 7 February 2012 was as follows: “The long-standing British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.” The policy of not issuing export licences “which might be used to facilitate internal repression” is a substantially different, and materially tighter export control policy than “a clear risk that they might be used for internal repression”. Do you and all your Department accept that the Foreign Secretary’s statement of Government policy to the Committees on 7 February 2012 is the definitive Government policy on arms exports and internal repression? If so, why was that policy not complied with in relation to the export licence applications for potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride both of which “might be used to facilitate internal repression”?

4. On what date was the Government first aware that the EU's proposed Regulation for new sanctions on Syria was going to prohibit the export to Syria of both potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride? Why were these licences for potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride not revoked immediately at that date instead of only being revoked on 30 July 2012 - 6 weeks after the Regulation came into force on 17 June 2012?
5. On September 3 2013 your Department's "Statement on exports to Syria" stated in respect of the licences for sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride that "the chemicals were not exported to Syria." In addition, the previous day the Secretary of State for Defence stated in the House with regard to these two licences that "no such chemicals were exported" (Hansard 2 September 2013 Col. 10).

Both your Department's statement and that of the Secretary of State for Defence in the House are in direct contradiction with what you said in your letter to me of 10 April this year when you said: "Both licence records showed that there were some goods remaining to be exported and that was why those licences were revoked on 30 July 2012, to prevent export of the chemicals caught by the new EU sanctions on Syria which came into force on 17 June 2012. However, revocation could not prevent the shipment of chemicals already exported against those licences and, unfortunately, we do not have data showing what quantity of chemicals covered by these SIELs had already been shipped."

Please provide the Committees with the evidence you clearly had when you wrote to me on 10 April this year that some quantities of the potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride had already been exported.

6. Please provide details of all previous export licence approvals to Syria of potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride stating the value and quantity in each case and the date of licence approval.

Please provide details of all previous export licence approvals to Syria of all other chemicals included on the Australia Group chemical weapons precursor list and/or are listed in Annex 1 of EU Council Regulation 428/2009 stating the value and quantity in each case and the date of licence approval.

7. Please list from open sources the countries, in addition to Syria, which are holders of chemical weapons. In respect of each of those other countries, please provide details of export licence approvals from 2003 of all chemicals included on the Australia Group chemical weapons precursors list and/or are listed in Annex 1 of the EU Council Regulation 428/2009 stating the value and quantity in each case and the date of licence approval.

Please may I have your reply by October 4.

9 September 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

Export Controls: Egypt, Syria and DSEi

I was writing to bring you up to date with the actions of the Government in respect of export controls for Syria and Egypt when I received your letter today. I will come back to you on the detailed points you have raised but in the meantime wanted to give you a quick readout or what's been happening. I also want to let you know the steps we have taken to ensure that Clarion, the organisers of the Defence and Security Equipment International, comply with their obligations under UK export and trade control legislation.

Export licences for chemicals for Syria

I wrote to you on the 6 September last year about two licences to export dual use chemicals to Syria issued on the 17 and 18 January 2012. You will recall that the licences were for sodium fluoride (1000kg) and potassium fluoride (1000kg) and that they were subsequently revoked in July 2012 following the imposition of EU sanctions. HMRC has confirmed that the licences were not used before revocation. The chemicals are not listed by the Chemical Weapons Convention but are subject to export controls by virtue of our membership of the Australia Group and are listed in Annex I of Council regulation 428/2009.

I stand by what I wrote last year that the two licence applications in question were subject to proper assessment against the Consolidated EU and national Arms Export Licensing Criteria and were determined to be for legitimate commercial use. There was therefore no clear basis on which to refuse licences as this predated EU sanctions. Although the chemicals in question can be used as precursors for chemical weapons they also have a large number of commercial applications and the volumes licensed are consistent with commercial use.

In the light of the recent and shocking use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria I asked my officials to determine whether any other licences for chemicals had been granted for Syria over the last ten years. They identified five other licences, all for sodium fluoride, issued in July 2004, September 2005, March 2007, February 2009 and May 2010 (for, respectively, 50kg, 2000kg, 50kg, 2000kg and 50kg). These licences all pre-date the conflict in Syria. They were issued to two UK exporters for despatch to two Syrian companies. I am confident that each application was properly assessed to determine end use and that the exports were for legitimate commercial purposes, namely cosmetics and healthcare products. The volumes of sodium fluoride covered by these licences are consistent with commercial use.

I want to assure you there is no evidence that exports of chemicals from the UK have been deployed in Syrian weapons programmes and I have determined that there has been no breach of controls or international obligations. The Government remains confident that UK export controls continue to be among the most stringent in the world.

Suspension of export licensing for Egypt

At the Foreign Affairs Council on the 21 August EU Member States agreed to suspend export licensing for any equipment which might be used for internal repression and to reassess export licences of equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.

Following advice from the FCO we moved quickly to suspend 48 extant licences (the initial figure was 49 but one was reinstated following investigation). These licences cover a wide range of equipment, including spares for helicopters and other aircraft, specialist software and communications equipment. This followed a decision in July to revoke five licences for crowd control equipment. In addition we have republished a number of Open General Export licences to exclude Egyptian end users.

The suspension applies to new licence applications as well as extant ones and will continue until further notice. This has been communicated directly to the licence holders affected by the suspension and there have been wider communications through a BIS press statement and an ECO Notice to Exporters.

We are now assessing whether any of the suspended licences should be permanently revoked. I expect advice on this in the near future.

The application of the licensing suspension is wide and all activities of the Egyptian Army, Air Force and Internal Security Forces or Ministry of the Interior are being interpreted as ones which might, at this time, involve internal repression. This reflects the decision of the FAC to apply suspension to all licences “which might be used for internal repression” — which you will appreciate is a lower threshold than that set out in Criterion 2.

HMRC is keeping a watch for any attempts to export to these entities, The FCO will continue to monitor the situation in Egypt very closely to determine how long the suspension should remain in place.

I feel sure that, in the light of recent and continuing violence in Egypt, you will support these measures.

Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi)

You will be aware that DSEi is taking place this week at the ExCel exhibition centre. While Clarion Defence and Security Ltd — in association with the Defence Trade Associations — organises the exhibition and is responsible for inviting UK and international companies to exhibit at the exhibition, we have agreed a Memorandum of Understanding with Clarion, to address compliance with UK export and trade controls. Clarion has committed to work with ECO and compliance agencies to ensure that all exhibitors comply with UK, EU and international laws and regulations related to the export of defence, security and dual use equipment. ECO, along with HMRC, Border Force and the Metropolitan Police will maintain a presence at the ExCel throughout the exhibition and will not hesitate to take action in the event of non-compliance.

I hope you find this information useful. I will write to you again in the next few days on the detailed points raise in your letter of the 9 September.

10 September 2013

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

Thank you for your letter of September 10.

Please may I have your answers to the following further questions on British Government approval of export licences of chemicals to Syria.

In your letter to me of 6 September 2012, you acknowledged that the Government knew when your Department gave licence approval on January 17 and 18 that year for sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride exports to Syria that both chemicals could be used as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons.

In your latest letter, you say that 5 further licences were approved for the export of sodium fluoride for cosmetics and healthcare products as follows:

July 2004	50kg
September 2005	2000kg
March 2007	50kg
February 2009	2000kg
May 2010	50kg

With regard to these 5 further licences:

1. What quantity for each licence was actually exported from the UK to Syria?
2. What were the names of the two UK exporters to whom the export licences were granted?
3. What were the names of the two Syrian companies to whom the sodium fluoride were exported under these licences?
4. Please provide full details of the cosmetics and healthcare products for which the sodium fluoride exported under these licences was apparently going to be used in Syria?

Please may I have your reply by October 4.

11 September 2013

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

The Committees on Arms Export Controls are considering the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 (HC 561) and have agreed questions relating to that Report as set out in the Annex to this letter. Please may the Committees have the Government's answers to these questions by October 18.

The Committees will be making this letter and the Annex public.

Annex

Questions relating to the Government's Report – United Kingdom Strategic Export

Controls Annual Report 2012 – HC 561

The paragraph numbers follow those in the Government's Report

Ministerial Foreword

- a) What were each of the six occasions in 2012 when the use of the export licence suspension mechanism was considered, and why in each case was it decided not to invoke it?
- b) Please provide the Committees with the country risk categorisations used in assessing export licence applications.
- c) Please state, on a classified basis if necessary, which countries are placed in each risk category.
- d) How many open licence applications were processed in 2012?
- e) How many MoD Form 680 applications were processed in 2012?
- f) Do the Secretaries of State accept that though their statement: "There was no evidence of any UK-supplied equipment being used for internal repression" may be factually correct, it is also profoundly misleading given that for many of the goods for which Government export licence approval has been given and which could be used for internal repression it is totally or virtually impossible to obtain evidence about their use once exported — even in the unlikely case there are independent personnel on the ground in a position to provide such evidence? Such exported goods, non-identifiable as British once exported, that could be used for internal repression include components for military equipment, software for military use, military technology, cryptographic equipment, components and technology, dual-use chemicals, ammunition and most sniper rifles and automatic weapons?
- g) At the end of the Secretaries of State's statement that: "There was no evidence of any UK-supplied equipment being used for internal repression or in any other way which would contravene the export licensing Criteria" why were the words "or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" omitted, in accordance with the Foreign Secretary's policy statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012?
- h) How is the Secretaries of State's statement that "43 licences for Argentina were subsequently revoked but the licensing of exports for purely commercial or private use has continued" to be reconciled with the Government's approval after the 43 licence

revocations in 2012 of export licences to Argentina for SIELs for small arms ammunition, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and OIELs for cryptographic equipment.

- i) Please list each new set of EU sanctions on Iran being referred to, and the specific licensing changes made by the present Government, or its predecessor, following each new set of sanctions.

Section 1 UK and EU Policy Developments in 2012

Paragraph 1.1 Legislation

- a) What UK and/or EU export controls are currently in place over the export of pancuronium bromide to the USA for the use in executions by lethal injection?
- b) Has the EU's analysis of the responses to the consultation on the EU Commission's Green Paper, "The dual-use export control system of the European Union: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world", been published? If so, please provide the link to the analysis and inform the Committees of any responses the Government made to it.
- c) When does the Government now expect the EU Commission's Report on Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 (the so-called "Dual-use Regulation") to be made to the EU Council and the European Parliament? Please inform the Committees of any response the Government makes to that Report when published.
- d) Has the EU Commission now commenced its review of Council Regulation (EC) 1236/2005 (the so-called "Torture Regulation")? Please inform the Committees of any response the Government makes to this review.

Paragraph 1.2 Policy Developments

- a) Why is the Department for International Development, unlike the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, not asked for its advice before the final decision to suspend export licences is taken by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills?
- b) What current risks, in addition to "WMD, political, security and human rights", are included in the Government's new risk categorisation of countries to whom military goods may be exported?
- c) Please provide the Committees with a copy of the revised Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance as soon as this is published.
- d) The Government's Report states that all proposals from Government sponsors to gift controlled goods are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour. Please confirm therefore that all proposals to gift controlled goods are assessed not only against the UK's Consolidated Criteria but also against the Foreign Secretary's policy statement to the

Committees on 7 February 2012 that the export would not be permitted of controlled goods “which might be used to facilitate internal repression”.

- e) Why are companies who are being assessed for counter-piracy Open General Trade Licences or Individual Trade Control Licences not being assessed against the Foreign Secretary’s policy statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012 that the export would not be permitted of controlled goods “which might be used to facilitate internal repression”, as well as against the UK’s Consolidated Criteria?

Paragraph 1.3 Transparency and Accountability

- a) The Government’s Report, published on 12 July 2013, states: “It is intended that the first reports of open licence usage would be published, in line with standard practice, 3 months after the end of the Quarter to which they relate, i.e., October 2013.” However, on 18 July the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, stated in the House: “I have none the less established that we should dispense with some procedures relating to quarterly reporting, and we will do so.” This was followed by a Notice to Exporters issued by ECO on 31 July 2013 stating that: “the Secretary of State announced to Parliament on Thursday 18 July 2013 that reporting requirements on the use of Open Licences under the Transparency Initiative would be scaled back significantly”. Why did the Government announce in the House of Commons on 18 July a less transparent policy on open licence usage than that set out in its Annual Report published 6 days previously?
- b) Will the Government make public the same information relating to standard licence usage as it now going to do for open licence usage?

Paragraph 1.4 Awareness

- a) Will the Government be publishing on the Export Control Organisation’s website entities of potential WMD concern in countries in addition to Iran, for instance Syria?
- b) With regard to the Government’s updated website, what are the specific usability improvements that have been put in place, what are the ones in the pipeline in addition to better navigation, and when will the additional facility to identify which Open General Trade Control Licences may be applicable be in place?

Section 2 International Policy in 2012

Why are there no sub-sections on:

1. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
2. The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
3. The Chemical Weapons Convention
4. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
5. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
6. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

7. Sub-Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons
8. A Middle-East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone
9. The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012–2015

all of which raise proliferation issues?

Will the Government include its policies on all the above in its 2013 Annual Report?

Paragraph 2.2 Small Arms and Light Weapons

- a) What progress has been made in enhancing the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument to promote international co-operation in marking and tracing illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons?
- b) Has a voluntary sponsorship fund to boost assistance to less developed states in dealing with illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons been established? If so, what is the size of the fund and what amount has the British Government contributed to it?

Paragraph 2.3 Cluster Munitions

Is the UK Government still on track to destroy the remainder of its cluster munitions by the end of 2013?

Paragraph 2.4 Ottawa Treaty/Landmines

What is the area of land in the Falkland Islands that is still to be cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance and then released?

Paragraph 2.6 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

What were the Government's policy objectives at the meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons held in November 2012 and how far have these objectives been achieved? Does the Government consider that any additions should be made to the existing five protocols which are as follows:

- Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments
- Protocol II on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices
- Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons
- Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons
- Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War

Paragraph 2.10 The Wassenaar Arrangement

What are the specific issues relating to the future membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement at which participating states will be looking at in 2013?

Section 3 Export Licensing Case Studies

Argentina

Why was the value of arms export licences to Argentina in 2012 nearly 5 times greater than it was in 2011, notwithstanding the fact that in April 2012 the Business Secretary announced that the Government would no longer grant licences for any military or dual-use goods and technology for military end-users in Argentina, other than in exceptional circumstances?

Libya

In deciding whether or not to approve arms export licence applications to Libya what account is the Government taking of the Report of Experts to the UN on 9 March 2013 of what has happened to the Gaddafi arms stockpiles, to which the UK was a contributor? The Experts' Report stated: "The proliferation of weapons from Libya has continued at a worrying rate and has spread into new territory: West Africa, the Levant and, potentially, even the Horn of Africa. Since the uprising and the resulting collapse of the security apparatus, including the loss of national control over weapons stockpiles and the absence of any border controls, Libya has over the past two years become a significant and attractive source of weaponry in the region. Illicit flows from the country are fuelling existing conflicts in Africa and the Levant and enriching the arsenals of a range of non-State actors, including terrorist groups."

Section 4 Export Licensing Data and Performance Against Targets During 2012

Paragraph 4.6 Open General Export Licences (OGELs)

If a UK exporter's application satisfies the terms of an EU General Export Authorisation, is it the Government's policy that it must also satisfy the terms of the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the Foreign Secretary's arms export policy statement to the Committees on Arms Export Controls on 7 February 2012 before being approved?

Table 4.7 List of Open General Export Licences

Which is the country or countries of export destination for the OGELs named:

- Chemicals
- Cryptographic Development
- International Non-Proliferation Regime De-controls: Dual-Use Items
- Low Value Shipments
- Technology for Dual-Use Items
- Specified Dual-Use Items (X) (and what is the meaning of (X)?)
- Access Overseas to Software and Technology for Military Goods: Individual Use Only
- Military Components
- Military Goods
- Software and Source Code for Military Goods
- Military Surplus Vehicles
- Technology for Military Goods
- Open General Transshipment Licence
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Trade and Transportation: Small Arms and Light Weapons)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Certified Companies)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Exports Under The US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty)

Paragraph 4.7 Performance in processing licence applications

- a) Why do performance targets not apply to applications for licences to export goods that are subject to control solely because of United Nations Sanctions or to appeals in relation to such applications?
- b) In Table 4.10 what are the reasons for the deterioration of appeals finalised within both 20 working days and 60 working days over the period 2010–2012?
- c) What actions are being taken to achieve the target of processing 60% of appeals within 20 working days (currently 23%) and 95% of appeals within 60 working days (currently 60%)?

Section 5 Compliance and PerformanceParagraph 5.1 Compliance

What are the reasons why the number of warning letters where breaches of licence conditions were found during visits rose from 45 in 2011 to 101 in 2012?

Paragraph 5.2 Enforcement activity undertaken by HM Revenue and Customs, Border Force and the Crown Prosecution Service

Is the increase in the number of seizures of strategic goods in breach of licensing requirements or sanctions and embargoes from 141 in 2011–12 to 280 in 2012–13 due to increased effectiveness of the authorities or to increased attempts to breach the licensing requirements or both?

Section 6 Gifted Equipment

The Government's Report states: "As a matter of policy, all proposals to gift controlled military equipment are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria by relevant Government departments in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour." Why are Government gifts of military equipment not also being assessed against the Foreign Secretary's policy statement to the Committees on Arms Export Controls on 7 February 2012 that exports would not be permitted of goods "which might be used to facilitate internal repression"?

Section 7 Government to Government

What is the policy followed in deciding whether or not to approve UK export licensing coverage for either industry or the customer in Government to Government exports?

Annex D UK Return to EU Annual Report 2012

- a) In future UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports will the Government include in this Annex a description of each of the numbered EU Common Military List categories?
- b) Does the government make a UK Return to the EU Annual Report in respect of items on the EU Dual-Use List? If so, will the Government include its Return in this Annex?

Annex E International Commitments and Sanctions Regimes**E.1 Export Control Commitments in 2012**

Will the Government in its subsequent Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports include the year in which each Commitment was concluded?

12 September 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Thank you for your letter dated 22 August about the Balance of Competences Review. I very much appreciate your interest in this important piece of work.

First, I am sorry that you did not receive a copy of the letter that was sent to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee informing him of the publication of the first set of reports. Whilst competence issues relating to arms export and control issues are being dealt with in the second set of reports currently underway, the Foreign Policy report did refer to the Arms Trade Treaty as an example of how the EU is involved in international negotiations and so you should also have received a copy. I can confirm that any further letters that impact on the responsibilities of the Committees on Arms Export Controls will be copied to you.

I understand that your Committee's work mainly touches on the Balance of Competence reports covering Free Movement of Goods as well as Trade and Investment. HMRC wrote to you with specific questions related to those two reviews. I am grateful for your contribution and know that your response was highly useful to the Departments working on these reports and has been incorporated into the emerging drafts. On current plans, we expect to publish these reports towards the end of the year.

I hope that you will continue to contribute as the review progresses.

17 September 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

Thank you for your letters of 9 and 11 September.

In your letter of 9 September you ask seven specific questions. Here are the answers.

1. Points raised in previous correspondence.

1. Names of the chemicals: One licence was for sodium fluoride and the other for potassium fluoride.

2. and 3. Reasons why they are controlled and the purposes to which they were put. The two chemicals are subject to export control and are listed in the Australia Group chemical weapons precursor list and Annex I of Council regulation (EC) 428/2009 because they are

capable of use as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons. They are not however listed in the Schedules of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

They have legitimate commercial uses such as the manufacture of toothpaste, the fluoridation of drinking water, production in the metallurgical industry, and in the manufacture of pesticides. In these cases the stated end-use for both chemicals was in metal finishing of aluminium profiles used for making aluminium showers, window frames, etc. This is a credible and legitimate use for these chemicals and consistent with the quantities licensed.

4. Quantities: The licences were for 1000kg in each case.

5. Names of end-user: The end-user was Awad Ammora Co. & Partners, Nashabia, Damascus, Syria.

6. Extent to which the end-user is under the influence of the Syrian Government. The Government has no specific evidence that the end-user is subject to the influence, ownership or control of the Syrian government. It should be noted that there is older media reporting, ultimately derived from the Iraq Survey Group, indicating that the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq was seeking to procure aluminium tubes for its nuclear programme from Awad Ammora in late 2002 or early 2003, and linking the company to alleged efforts by the Iraqi regime to fund Palestinian organisations via the UN oil-for-food programme. However none of these reports provide evidence of a link to any chemical weapons programme in Syria. The Government was aware of these reports when the licences were granted in 2012 and appropriate checks were carried out which confirmed that there were no grounds for refusing these licence applications.

7. Last known location in Syria. The goods were not exported. HMRC has confirmed that no exports of either chemical were declared under the revoked licences and we have written confirmation from the exporter that the licences were not used and no goods were shipped before the licences were revoked.

8. Dates of approval and revocation. Both licence applications were submitted on 1 August 2011; the licences were granted on 17 and 18 January 2012; and both were revoked on 30 July 2012.

9. Ministerial involvement in decision-making. The process was as follows. Each application was reviewed by advisers in MOD (including defence Intelligence and DSTL at Porton Down), in the FCO (including the regional Desk and POST, the Sanctions Team, and the Australia Group desk officer) and in the Chemical Weapons Convention UK National Authority in DECC. No concerns about end-use were identified by any of these reviews and accordingly neither licence application was put to Ministers for approval.

10. Copies of the licences and any conditions. All the relevant information that I am ready to disclose is contained within this letter and its attachment.

I am not disclosing the assessments that supported the decisions to approve these two licences. To do so would be likely to inhibit the free and frank provision of advice and the free and frank exchange of views for the purpose of deliberation. I have carefully considered the arguments in favour of disclosure, in particular that transparency in policy making may improve engagement between the public and government, and it is desirable that the public can satisfy themselves that decisions are taken on the basis of the best available information. However BIS, as the statutory licensing authority, makes decisions on export licence applications based on advice received from other Government Departments, and it is my view that releasing the advice received for specific export licence applications would impact adversely on the quality of the advice provided by other Departments and on the ultimate decisions taken.

After giving the matter careful consideration, and consulting the companies concerned, I have also decided not to disclose either the licence application forms or the names of the UK companies to which these licences were granted. I have taken the same decision in respect of the companies to which the other five licences covered in this letter were granted. I recognise that there is a public interest in knowing that the Government acted properly in this matter. But the companies behaved responsibly by applying for export licences and were engaged in legitimate transactions. We have taken into account strong feedback from some of the companies that they should not be exposed to reputational damage when they have acted in an entirely proper way. Their licence applications were submitted in confidence and it is important that the Government respects that fact and maintains that confidence in the integrity of the system.

2. Should the licences granted in January 2012 have been refused?

Each licence application was assessed on its own merits against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria taking into account all relevant information available to us at the time. The stated end-use of these chemicals was a legitimate commercial application. The media reporting about the end-user I referred to above did not suggest any link to chemical weapons. There was no information from either open or classified sources available at the time, and none that we have received since, to link the end-user to any chemical weapons programme in Syria, and we did not — and do not — have any information to indicate that Syria was actively seeking to acquire these chemicals for use in the manufacture of chemical weapons. Given the nature of the stated end-use and the lack of evidence that would justify refusal, the licences were granted. Having reviewed the information on which these decisions were based, I am satisfied that this was the correct decision.

3. Grounds for refusal

The position set out in your letter appears to be an over-interpretation of the statement made by the Foreign Secretary in the course of giving oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012. I know that the Foreign Secretary is writing to you to set the record straight on this very important point.

The Government's policy remains as set out in the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, announced by the then Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Peter Hain, in the House of Commons on 26 October 2000. There has been no change to this policy. Specifically with regard to exports that might be used for internal repression, the Government continues to assess applications against Criterion 2 in full, which states that: "[The Government will] not issue an export licence if there is a *clear risk* [my emphasis] that the proposed export might be used for internal repression."

4. Delay in revoking licences

EU discussions about additional sanctions against Syria continued throughout the second half of 2011 and beyond (the original EU sanctions regulation was adopted on 9 May and amended on 10 occasions before the end of the year). In parallel with this, the participating states of the Australia Group (AG) had agreed in June 2011 that they should take steps to control the export to Syria of chemicals potentially usable in the manufacture of chemical weapons, over and above those included on the AG chemical weapons precursors list. There were also discussions within the EU about how to implement these additional controls. However the actual decision to pursue sanctions targeted against the manufacture and use of chemical weapons was not finally taken until 23 April 2012 (Council decision 2012/206/CFSP). Article 1 of the decision said:

"The sale, supply, transfer or export of certain other equipment, goods and technology which might be used for internal repression or for the manufacture and maintenance of products which could be used for internal repression, to Syria by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States or using their flag vessels or aircraft, shall be prohibited, whether originating or not in their territories."

"The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this paragraph."

Negotiation of the Regulation that would implement this provision — and which would include the list of items covered by it — began shortly thereafter. It was clear from an early stage in the negotiation of the Regulation that it was likely to include both potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride, but this could not be known for certain until the text was finalised at working group level on 12 June. The Regulation was finally adopted by the Council on 15 June and came into force on 17 June. This is the earliest we could have revoked the licences. I accept that the fact the licences were not revoked immediately after that date was an oversight, and that we should have acted more quickly following the entry into force of the Regulation.

Since that time we have reviewed our procedures to ensure that revocations take place as soon as possible after the adoption of any EU sanctions or other restrictive measures. For example, following the decision at the 21 August Foreign Affairs Council to suspend certain export licensing for Egypt, we reviewed and suspended 48 extant licences by 28 August.

5. Clarification of earlier remarks on export of the chemicals

There is no contradiction between my letter of 10 April and the statements on 2 and 3 September, though I can see there was scope for confusion. Let me explain why.

As you know, a Standard Individual Export licence (SIEL) permits the export of a specified quantity of items to a named recipient and is usually valid for up to 2 years. The licence is valid until the full quantity of items is shipped — at which point it is said to be “exhausted” — or until the 2-year validity period is reached — at which point it is said to be “expired”. A licence which neither exhausted nor expired is “extant”. An extant licence is therefore one which is wholly or partially unused and of course only an extant licence can be revoked. The licensing database (SPIRE) shows a licence’s status, but for extant licences it does not show with any certainty what quantity — if any — has been shipped or what quantity remains to be shipped.

My statement of 10 April the “unfortunately, we do not have data showing what quantities of chemicals covered by these SIELs had already been exported” was meant to reflect this uncertainty. It was not meant to suggest that we had actual evidence that some quantities has actually been exported. We had no such evidence, and as my answer to point 1.7 above makes clear, no chemicals were in fact exported.

To avoid confusion in the future, we will, when revoking licences, always ask HMRC to check its records and we will contact the exporter directly to seek confirmation of licence use. We adopted this approach when we recently revoked export licences for Egypt.

6. Details of previous export licences.

The five licences for sodium fluoride that I referred to in my letter of 10 September are the only other licences granted since 2003 for the export to Syria of chemicals included on the Australia Group chemical weapons precursor list and listed in Annex 1 of Council regulation 428/2009. Information regarding these five licences is given in Annex 1 to this letter. In each case the end-use was for the manufacture of toothpaste.

7. Countries holding stockpiles of chemical weapons

There are four states that have acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, have declared their stockpiles, and are now participating in OPCW-verified destruction programmes: Iraq, Libya, Russia and the United States. The information requested in respect of these states is at Annex 2.

For states not party to the Chemical Weapons Convention open source reporting is not a reliable guide because states not party to the CWC have no obligation to declare any stockpiles they may have. While it is clear that Syria maintains significant CW stockpiles, open source material does not reliably confirm the existence or non-existence of stockpiles in those other states that have not ratified or acceded to the CWC, namely Angola, Burma,

DPRK, Egypt, Israel and South Sudan. I have however also included information in respect of export licences granted to these states in Annex 2. I want to emphasise that by providing this information the Government is not confirming that it believes that any of these states does or does not possess chemical weapons — the information is provided for the sake of completeness only.

Please note that all chemicals included on the Australia Group chemical weapons precursor list are included in entry 1C350 of Annex I to Council Regulation 428/2009, with the exception of 3 chemicals which are listed at ML7c1 and ML7c2 of the Military List. Furthermore some chemical weapons precursors not included on the Australia Group list are listed at entry 1C450 of Annex I of Council regulation 428/2009. Annex 3 [should read Annex 2] therefore includes all licences granted for the supply to the 10 states named above of chemicals listed in entries 1C350, 1C450, ML7c1 and ML7c2. Note also that all chemicals listed in entry 1C350 may be exported to the USA under the terms of the EU General Export Authorisation No. EU001. This accounts for the relatively small number of individual licences granted for the USA.

Your letter of 11 September.

All the information you requested in your letter of 11 September — with the exception of the exporter names which I am not disclosing for the reasons given above — is included in Annex 1.

Conclusions

You are right to question me about granting licences for the export of chemicals to Syria given the public interest which the issue has raised. I hope that this letter reassures you that the Government takes its responsibilities very seriously, is acting effectively to promote global security and responsible exporting, and is ready to make changes to our procedures when this is necessary.

Annex 1 — Details of 5 licences for export to Syria of sodium fluoride granted between 2004 and 2010

End-User	Value (£)	Quantity Licensed	Date Licence Granted	Usage	End-Use
MADA for Industry & Commerce	345	50kg	11/05/2010	One shipment of 50kg on 16/8/2010	Manufacture of toothpaste
Kaadan & Sioufi	6220	2000kg	03/02/2009	Five shipments totalling 2000kg shipped as follows: 13/02/2009 150kg 18/06/2009 1000kg 15/04/2009 100kg	Manufacture of toothpaste

				03/07/2009 100kg 13/01/2011 650kg	
MADA for Industry & Commerce	695	50kg	15/03/2007	Unknown - No records available	Manufacture of toothpaste
Kaadan & Sioufi	6220	2000kg	28/09/2005	2000kgs exported - but not known on which date or in how many shipments as records no longer available	Manufacture of toothpaste
MADA for Industry & Commerce	228.5	50kg	15/07/2004	Unknown - No records available	Manufacture of toothpaste

Annex 2 — details of licences granted to specified destinations for chemicals listed in the Australia Group chemical weapons precursors list and/or listed in Annex I of Council regulation 428/2009

	Destination	Good Rating	Chemical name	Goods Quantity	Total Goods Value (£)	Date licence granted
1	Burma	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	500g	19.4	15/08/2005
2	DPRK	1C350.50	Sodium sulphide	500g	8.15	04/02/2003
3	Egypt	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	200L	1262	25/04/2003
4	Egypt	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	1200L	11844	25/04/2006
5	Egypt	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	1000kg	17600	06/08/2007
6	Egypt	1C350.46	Polyethanolamine	1025L	2480	08/06/2009
7	Egypt	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	1000L	6128	01/10/2009
8	Egypt	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	50L	304.2	06/01/2011
9	Egypt	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	300kg	2715	30/08/2011
10	Egypt	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	200kg	1810	25/11/2011
11	Egypt	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	2000kg	18100	17/11/2011
12	Egypt	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	66L	6.5	16/11/2012

13	Egypt	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	25kg	270	25/03/2013
14	Egypt	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	2000kg	8000	19/04/2013
15	Egypt	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	6000kg	30000	10/05/2013
16	Iraq	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	50g	13.57	17/04/2008
17	Israel	1C350.16	Dimethylamine	600 tonnes	275000	14/11/2003
18	Israel	1C350.46	Polyethanolamine	120 tonnes	39000	18/03/2004
19	Israel	1C450a5	Cyanogen Chloride	1kg	5500	08/04/2005
20	Israel	1C350.46	Polyethanolamine	200 tonnes	170000	11/10/2005
21	Israel	1C350.24	Hydrogen Fluoride	32.4kg	660	08/10/2009
22	Israel	1C350.24	Hydrogen Fluoride	32.4kg	660.98	29/01/2010
23	Israel	1C350.9	Thionyl chloride	500ml	33.67	04/04/2013
24	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	100L	1796	06/02/2003
25	Libya	1C450b8	Methyldiethanolamine	64000kg	134824.01	18/08/2003
26	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	10L	271.8	12/05/2004
27	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	200L	2400	24/05/2004
28	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	100L	958.82	18/06/2004
29	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	3000ml	50.58	07/06/2005
30	Libya	1C350.45	Sodium cyanide	3kg	621	07/04/2006
31	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	6L	115.68	03/04/2006
32	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	20L	331.4	28/07/2006
33	Libya	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	500g	125.61	05/02/2008
34	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	6L	46.87	11/07/2008
35	Libya	1C350.46	Triethanolamine	1L	21.46	04/08/2008
36	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	1L	27.30	12/08/2009
		1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	1kg	31.34	

37	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	10L	472.3	12/12/2012
38	Russia	1C350.17	Diethyl ethyl phosphonate	6kg	300	28/01/2004
39	Russia	1C450b4	2-Diethylaminoethyl chloride hydrochloride	140kg	1903.19	02/12/2013
40	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	2700kg	10500	01/04/2004
41	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	6400kg	12837.5	29/10/2004
42	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	10000kg	38900	19/11/2004
43	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	1600kg	3209.4	10/02/2005
44	Russia	1C350.2	Phosphoryl Chloride	1.5L	1469.59	28/09/2005
45	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	25000kg	52567	11/11/2005
46	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	20kg	2	17/11/2005
		1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	20kg	2	
47	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyl chloride hydrochloride	700kg	8750	08/02/2006
48	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	20000kg	28300	1-/01/2006
49	Russia	1C450b1	Dilsopropyl methylphosphonate	100g	71	21/02/2006
50	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	19000kg	39235	15/05/2006
51	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	28400kg	58646	11/07/2006
52	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	45000kg	175050	15/08/2006
53	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	19200kg	39744	31/08/2007
54	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	20kg	257	12/10/2007
55	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	45000kg	175050	09/01/2008
56	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyl chloride hydrochloride	1000kg	12650	19/03/2008
57	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyl chloride hydrochloride	1000kg	12400	10/06/2008

58	Russia	1C350.3	Dimethyl methylphosphonate	10kg	624	26/01/2009
59	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	500kg	6200	15/01/2009
60	Russia	1C350.48	Disopropylamine	100L	662	23/03/2009
61	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	1000kg	15500	11/05/2009
62	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	45000kg	123750	07/09/2009
63	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	1000kg	15500	17/03/2010
64	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	45000kg	123750	13/04/2010
65	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	1000kg	15500	11/05/2009
66	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	2000kg	31000	29/09/2010
67	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	50kg	1100	09/02/2011
68	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	45000kg	145332	01/08/2011
69	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	2000kg	33000	14/10/2011
70	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	2500kg	38750	30/07/2012
71	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	45000kg	140445	07/03/2013
72	Russia	1C450b4	Diethylaminoethylchloride hydrochloride	3500kg	42000	10/05/2013
73	USA	1C350.41	Mixture of Potassium hydrogen difluoride and hydrogen fluoride	350kg	2768.5	28/01/2003
74	USA	1C350.46	Polyethanolamine	1,560,000kg	450000	10/11/2003
75	USA	1C350.48	Disopropylamine	34800kg	45600	21/07/2005

76	USA	1C350.24	Hydrogen Fluoride	500000kg	850000	17/08/2010
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4 October 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

I am concerned that the Committees on Arms Export Controls have perceived a change in UK arms export policy when none has taken place. I am writing to set the record straight.

My concern arises from comments made in the Committees' Annual report published on 17 July and in other recent correspondence. These suggest that in my evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012 I announced that the Government had in effect deleted the qualification, "if there is a clear risk, " from the Criterion: "We will not issue a licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression."

I want to be absolutely clear: the Government's policy has not changed. I enclose a copy of the relevant extract from the Committee's record of the meeting, from which it is clear that what I said was not an announcement of a new approach but confirmation of our longstanding policy. The Government continues to assess export licence applications on a case by case basis against the Consolidated European Union and National Arms Export licensing Criteria as set out by the then Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Peter Hain, in the House of Commons on 26 October 2000.

If we find it necessary to vary our policy, as we have done recently in the case of Egypt, we will always inform you explicitly.

As you know, the government is in the process of reviewing the Criteria in the light of the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty and the review of the EU Common Position. We expect to complete this update before the end of the year and to announce the result to Parliament.

Annex: Extract from Oral Evidence to Committees on Arms Export Controls, 7 February 2012

Chair: "Secretary of State, I want to start with what is a major policy issue, if not the major policy issue for our Committees, which is whether there has been a change in Government policy on the approval of arms export licences for arms and ammunition and military equipment that could be used for internal repression. We took a deliberate decision in our report of last April to publish in full, as annex 1, the written answer that was given by the then Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Peter Hain, on 26 October 2000 in which he set out in full the consolidated criteria for arms exports.

"As far as arms exports that involve weapons that could be used for internal repression are concerned, your junior Minister, Alistair Burt, in his press release statement on 18 February

last year, entirely accurately and correctly summarised the previous Government's position carried forward by the present Government on policy in this area. He summarised that accurately in these words: "The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." Foreign Secretary, has that policy changed, or is it as correctly stated by Mr Alistair Burt?

Mr Hague: That is still the policy. The "or", as you have pointed out on other occasions, is important.

Chair: It is profoundly important, Foreign Secretary, and I am glad that you have acknowledged that..."

6 October 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

I wrote to you on 4 October in response to your letters of the 9 and 11 September. I am now sending you a revised version of my response. I have been informed that the original contained a statement that may be misleading. I want to be completely open with the committee over this sensitive issue and I am therefore sharing my latest information with you.

I refer to the section of my letter ("1. Points raised in previous correspondence"), specifically point 6 ("Extent to which the end-user is under the influence of the Syrian Government").

The closing sentence of my original letter reads, "The Government was aware of these reports when the licences were granted in 2012 and appropriate checks were carried out which confirmed that there were no grounds for refusing these licence applications". This refers to media reports about the end user for the licences issued in January 2012.

In fact, although officials did have access to information about the end user, from open and classified sources some of which dated back to 2001, we cannot confirm definitively that officials did in fact investigate the contents of the 2004 media reports. That said, officials assessing the licence applications did make proper checks based on the information dating back to 2001. They have confirmed to me categorically that there was no evidence at the time the licences were assessed — and there is no evidence now — of any links between the end user and chemical weapons programmes. I therefore remain confident that checks made were appropriate and that there were no grounds for refusing the applications.

11 October 2013

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

I should be grateful to know why your letter of August 4 to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee setting out EU and UK policy on the export of military and dual-use equipment to Syria was not copied to the Committees on Arms Export Control notwithstanding the fact that the subject matter of your letter is of prime importance to the Committees. A copy of this letter is attached for convenience.

I should be grateful for your assurance in your reply that all Ministerial letters to Select Committees relating to the transfer from the UK, whether by way of commercial exports or by gift, are sent or copied to the Committees on Arms Export Controls, together with all ministerial letters relating to arms control measures.

Annex

Letter from William Hague to Sir Richard Ottaway, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, dated 4 August 2014

The EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) agreed on 27 May to lift the arms embargo on Syria, and a new Council Decision was adopted on 31 May. The Regulation implementing these changes was adopted by the FAC on 22 July and came into effect on 24 July.

Lifting the embargo directly supports our priority on Syria of finding a political solution to the conflict. It sends a clear signal to the Assad regime that if it does not engage seriously in negotiations at a future Geneva conference, no option is off the table. And it gives us the flexibility to respond to continued radicalisation and conflict. We have to be open to every way of strengthening moderates and saving lives rather than the current trajectory of extremism and murder.

As I told the House on 10 July, on the question of any future lethal support, that is arming the opposition or intervening militarily ourselves, the Government's position has not changed. No decision has been made and any decision would be put to the House on a substantive motion. We are continuing to provide technical assistance for the protection of civilians and non-lethal support to build the capacity of the Syrian opposition.

Against this backdrop, at the 27 May FAC where we agreed to end the arms embargo, I also agreed with my fellow EU Foreign Ministers that with all arms and internal repression items the following conditions would apply:

- The sale, supply, transfer or export of military equipment or of equipment which might be used for internal repression will be for the Syrian National Coalition and intended for the protection of civilians;
- Member States shall require adequate safeguards against misuse of authorisations granted, in particular relevant information concerning the end-use and final destination of the delivery;

- Member States shall assess the export licence applications on a case-by-case basis, taking full account of the criteria set out in the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 (i.e. broadly the Consolidated Criteria) defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment.

The UK Government has in place existing robust and effective measures that control the export of military and dual use equipment (as defined in the UK 'Consolidated Control List') to Syria and to all other destinations. In addition, a significant package of EU sanctions, including assets freezes – which cover many Syrian regime figures and supporters– remains in place. Such existing legislation and our wider international and domestic obligations provide safeguards in stopping support from reaching the Assad regime and designated terrorist organisations, including Jabhal al-Nursa Front in Syria. These measures have not changed as a result of the ending of the EU Arms embargo.

To fully meet the commitments made at the FAC on 27 May the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills will also set in place the necessary measures to ensure that equipment that might be used for internal repression (as defined in Annex II of EU Document 17464/09) will be treated as a licensable good, and where export licence applications are made they shall be assessed on a case-by-case basis in line with the commitments made on 27 May.

Over 100,000 people have died since the start of the conflict and the lives of millions of innocent Syrians remains at stake. Our efforts will continue to be focused on promoting a political solution in Syria, on helping to save lives and on protecting national security of the United Kingdom.

I am placing a copy of this letter in the libraries of both Houses.

14 October 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Thank you for your letter dated 14 October about the EU and UK policy on the export of military and dual-use equipment to Syria.

I am sorry you did not receive a copy of my letter of 4 August which was sent to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. In my letter to you of 17 September I gave assurances that in future all Ministerial letters to Select Committees relating to the transfer of arms from the UK will also be sent to the Committees on Arms Export Controls. This practice is continuing, but unfortunately the letter in question was issued before this.

The work of the Committees on Arms Export Controls is extremely important, particularly as we form our policy towards Syria, and I will keep you fully informed of future events.

21 October 2010

**Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of
State for Business, Innovation and Skills**

Thank you for your letter of 11 October in reply to my letters of 9 and 11 September on the licence approvals given by both the present and previous Governments between 2004 and 2012 for the export of dual-use chemicals to Syria which could be used as precursor chemicals for the manufacture of chemical weapons, including sarin.

The Committees on Arms Export Controls will be pursuing further a number of issues raised by the information in your reply. However, there is one answer you gave that I must take up with you immediately as it is of significance not just for the Committees' current inquiry but for the House of Commons as a whole. It is your refusal to provide the Committees with the names of the companies who were given Government licence approval to export to Syria the dual-use chemicals sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride, which can be used to manufacture sarin.

Under Standing Orders, House of Commons Select Committees are empowered "to send for persons, papers and records" (S.O. 152(4)). The effect of your decision to refuse to provide the Committees with the names of the companies concerned is to deny the Committees the ability to take Evidence from those companies.

Your reply of 11 October in my view provides no substantive justification for refusing to provide the Committees with the names of the companies.

The Committees fully accept that the companies concerned, in applying for export licences for the export of these dual-use chemicals to Syria, were acting in an entirely proper way.

With regard to "possible reputational damage", the prime object of the Committees' scrutiny of this key issue, is not the companies but the Government—your own Department in particular.

There is no way that revealing the names of these companies will be prejudicial to their future exports of sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride to Syria. An EU embargo on the export of these chemicals to Syria is now in place. The Prime Minister revealed on 29 August 2013 that there had been at least 14 previous uses of chemical weapons in Syria prior to the appalling attack on 21 August. It is self-evident that there are not going to be any further British Government approvals for the export of sodium fluoride or potassium fluoride to Syria for the foreseeable future.

In the light of the above, I ask you to reconsider your decision to refuse to provide the Committees with the names of the companies who were given Government licence approval to export sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride to Syria between 2004 and 2012, and to provide the Committees with the names of the companies concerned.

I should be grateful for your reply by Friday 15 November.

23 October 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

Thank you for your letter of the 23 October about the disclosure of the names of the exporters granted licences for dual use chemicals for Syria between 2004 and 2012.

In deciding whether to disclose the names of the exporters we thought it was important to establish whether they were willing to be publicly interrogated on this issue, given that they had shared information with us on a confidential basis. We used the framework provided by the Freedom of Information (FoI) Act as a basis on which to make this decision.

Two of the three exporters raised compelling objections. In particular they argued, and we agreed, that they were reputable British companies that had done nothing wrong. Specifically they were engaging in the legitimate trade of sodium fluoride used for the manufacture of toothpaste, not chemical weapons. One company cited the potential risk of physical danger to their employees both in the UK and in their US parent company. They also cited commercial confidentiality and reputational damage which might have an impact on their financial interests. I judged on this basis that the balance of the argument was not in favour of public disclosure in this case.

In withholding the names of the exporters it was never my intention to obstruct the work of the Committees on Arms Export Controls. I therefore would like to explore with you the possibility of disclosure on a confidential basis to enable you to see the exporters in closed session. As we originally contacted the companies under the FoI framework we would be obliged to go back to them to take their views if you are amenable to this proposal. Clearly we would need to discuss the exact terms of a confidential disclosure but it would be helpful to know whether you agree to this in principle.

25 October 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Thank you for your letter of 12 September enclosing questions on the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012. It is my pleasure to forward to the Committees the attached response, agreed with other relevant Departments, which addresses the questions in the Annex to your letter.

The Government remains committed to addressing the Committees' concerns in a transparent and timely fashion. We welcome the rigorous scrutiny by the Committees and

their vital work on strategic export controls. I look forward to giving Oral Evidence before the Committees again in January.

Annex

Questions relating to the Government's Report – United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 – HC 561

The paragraph numbers follow those in the Government's Report

Ministerial Foreword

- a) What were each of the six occasions in 2012 when the use of the export licence suspension mechanism was considered, and why in each case was it decided not to invoke it?

The use of the suspension mechanism was readied on several occasions in response to a change in circumstances in Mali, Ethiopia, Syria, Maldives, Egypt and Israel. However in each case it was not necessary to use the suspension mechanism as, within a short time of the initial crisis, the Government was able to gather sufficient information to make valid risk assessments against the Consolidated Criteria.

- b) Please provide the Committees with the country risk categorisations used in assessing export licence applications.

The Government's position remains as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 12 November, that it would not be in the national interest for the Government to provide the information requested by the Committees. Officials would however be available to brief the Committees orally on the risk categorisation process.

- c) Please state, on a classified basis if necessary, which countries are placed in each risk category.

The Government's position remains as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 12 November 2012, that it would not be in the national interest for the Government to provide the information requested by the Committees.

- d) How many open licence applications were processed in 2012?

A full breakdown of applications processed for both Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) and Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs) is provided in Tables 4.3 (OIELs) and Table 4.5 (OITCLs) of the 2012 Annual Report. 318 OIELs were processed and 25 OITCLs.

- e) How many MoD Form 680 applications were processed in 2012?

The Government processed 3098 MOD Form 680 applications in 2012.

- f) Do the Secretaries of State accept that though their statement: “There was no evidence of any UK-supplied equipment being used for internal repression” may be factually correct, it is also profoundly misleading given that for many of the goods for which Government export licence approval has been given and which could be used for internal repression it is totally or virtually impossible to obtain evidence about their use once exported — even in the unlikely case there are independent personnel on the ground in a position to provide such evidence? Such exported goods, non-identifiable as British once exported, that could be used for internal repression include components for military equipment, software for military use, military technology, cryptographic equipment, components and technology, dual-use chemicals, ammunition and most sniper rifles and automatic weapons?

The Government has acknowledged in previous correspondence that we cannot prove conclusively that UK exports have not been diverted from the legitimate end use stated in the licence application and been used for internal repression. But we do not accept that it is misleading to state that there is no evidence of such misuse. Exports of all UK controlled goods are only permitted if, after a thorough assessment, there is no clear risk that they might be used for internal repression. Any evidence of the misuse of similar non-UK supplied goods in the end user destination is factored into this assessment. The UK does not implement a US-style system of end-use monitoring since we do not claim the same extra-territorial rights and we focus on rigorous pre-licence checks and, for open licences, compliance audits carried out at the exporters' premises in the UK.

- g) At the end of the Secretaries of State’s statement that: “There was no evidence of any UK-supplied equipment being used for internal repression or in any other way which would contravene the export licensing Criteria” why were the words “or which might be used to facilitate internal repression” omitted, in accordance with the Foreign Secretary’s policy statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012?

Please refer to the Foreign Secretary’s letter of 6 October which clarifies this point.

- h) How is the Secretaries of State’s statement that “43 licences for Argentina were subsequently revoked but the licensing of exports for purely commercial or private use has continued” to be reconciled with the Government’s approval after the 43 licence revocations in 2012 of export licences to Argentina for SIELs for small arms ammunition, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and OIELs for cryptographic equipment.

All licences for Argentina issued after 26 April 2012 took into account the policy announced by the Business Secretary on that date as well as the Consolidated

Criteria. This is addressed in detail on pages 7 and 17 of the Annual Report.

Licences for the equipment quoted above were for commercial and private end use.

- i) Please list each new set of EU sanctions on Iran being referred to, and the specific licensing changes made by the present Government, or its predecessor, following each new set of sanctions.

A list of the amendments to EU sanctions on Iran that were implemented in 2012 is given below. More details of the specifics of these amendments can be found at http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf. The relevant UK legislation is the The Export Control (Iran Sanctions) Order 2012 as referred to in the Annual Report (<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/1243/article/4/made>). Detailed information on how export licensing applications are assessed is provided in Annex A of the Annual Report. Our international obligations under EU sanctions regimes are considered as part of the assessment under Criterion 1 of the Consolidated Criteria.

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 amended by:

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 350/2012 of 23 April 2012

Council Regulation (EU) No 708/2012 of 2 August 2012

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 709/2012 of 2 August 2012

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 945/2012 of 15 October 2012

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1016/2012 of 6 November 2012

Council Regulation (EU) No 1067/2012 of 14 November 2012

Council Regulation (EU) No 1263/2012 of 21 December 2012

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1264/2012 of 21 December 2012

COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 amended by:

Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP of 23 January 2012

Council Decision 2012/152/CFSP of 15 March 2012

Council Decision 2012/169/CFSP of 23 March 2012

Council Decision 2012/205/CFSP of 23 April 2012

Council Decision 2012/457/CFSP of 2 August 2012

Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP of 15 October 2012

Council Decision 2012/687/CFSP of 6 November 2012

Section 1 UK and EU Policy Developments in 2012

Paragraph 1.1 Legislation

- a) What UK and/or EU export controls are currently in place over the export of pancuronium bromide to the USA for the use in executions by lethal injection?

As stated in both the Government's response to the Committees' questions on the Government's Annual Report for 2011 (Section 1, paragraph 1.3 (a)), and in the Annual Report for 2012, the UK control on the export to the United States of the drug pancuronium bromide was made permanent on 16 April 2012. There are no EU controls on the export of this drug to the USA.

- b) Has the EU's analysis of the responses to the consultation on the EU Commission's Green Paper, "The dual-use export control system of the European Union: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world", been published? If so, please provide the link to the analysis and inform the Committees of any responses the Government made to it.

A link was provided in the Government's response to the Committees' Annual Report for 2012 (Cm 8707). The Government does not intend to make any formal response to this document.

- c) When does the Government now expect the EU Commission's Report on Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 (the so-called "Dual-use Regulation) to be made to the EU Council and the European Parliament? Please inform the Committees of any response the Government makes to that Report when published.

We expect the report to be submitted before the end of the year. Should we make a formal response to that report we will of course provide a copy to the Committees.

- d) Has the EU Commission now commenced its review of Council Regulation (EC) 1236/2005 (the so-called "Torture Regulation)? Please inform the Committees of any response the Government makes to this review.

Please see the Government's response to Recommendation 43 of the Committees' Annual Report for 2012 (Cm 8707).

Paragraph 1.2 Policy Developments

- a) Why is the Department for International Development, unlike the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, not asked for its advice before the final decision to suspend export licences is taken by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills?

The Department for International Development is asked for its advice when the suspension mechanism is being considered and should have been referred to in the Annual Report.

- b) What current risks, in addition to “WMD, political, security and human rights”, are included in the Government’s new risk categorisation of countries to whom military goods may be exported?

The Government considers all relevant risks in particular those highlighted in the Consolidated Criteria.

- c) Please provide the Committees with a copy of the revised Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance as soon as this is published.

The Government will do so when the revised Guidance is finalised, as stated in Cm 8707, its Response to the Committees’ Annual Report.

- d) The Government’s Report states that all proposals from Government sponsors to gift controlled goods are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour. Please confirm therefore that all proposals to gift controlled goods are assessed not only against the UK’s Consolidated Criteria but also against the Foreign Secretary’s policy statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012 that the export would not be permitted of controlled goods “which might be used to facilitate internal repression”.

Please refer to the Foreign Secretary’s letter of 6 October. The statement in the Annual Report is correct.

- e) Why are companies who are being assessed for counter-piracy Open General Trade Licences or Individual Trade Control Licences not being assessed against the Foreign Secretary’s policy statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012 that the export would not be permitted of controlled goods “which might be used to facilitate internal repression”, as well as against the UK’s Consolidated Criteria?

Please refer to the Foreign Secretary’s letter of 6 October, which confirms that our policy is to assess against the Consolidated Criteria.

Paragraph 1.3 Transparency and Accountability

- a) The Government’s Report, published on 12 July 2013, states: “It is intended that the first reports of open licence usage would be published, in line with standard practice, 3 months after the end of the Quarter to which they relate, i.e., October 2013.” However, on 18 July the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, stated in the House: “I have none the less established that we should dispense with some procedures relating to quarterly reporting, and we will do so.” This was followed by a Notice to Exporters issued by ECO on 31 July 2013 stating that: “the Secretary of State announced to Parliament on Thursday 18 July 2013 that reporting requirements on the use of Open Licences under the Transparency Initiative would be

scaled back significantly”. Why did the Government announce in the House of Commons on 18 July a less transparent policy on open licence usage than that set out in its Annual Report published 6 days previously?

Plans are reviewed regularly to ensure that we have the right balance between the benefits of greater transparency and minimising the burdens on business. In making the final preparations for the launch of the Transparency Initiative we reviewed its scope and the potential for it to impose unacceptable burdens on business. The original proposals did not strike that balance and, as soon as this was established, a statement was made in the House on 18 July. This statement superseded any previous statements made.

Although the annual report was published in July 2013 it is intended to be a report of the Government’s strategic export control policy and practice during the 2012 calendar year. Occasionally it will be appropriate to make reference to events in 2013, such as the adoption by the UN of the Arms Trade Treaty; however these references will always be the exception rather than the rule. The statements in the 2012 Annual Report regarding the Transparency Initiative are a true reflection of the Government’s actions and intent during 2012. In any event, the final version of the annual report was cleared by Ministers at the end of June and submitted to the publishers on 4 July 2013. This was the cut off point for making changes to the report and still ensuring we laid it in Parliament before summer recess.

- b) Will the Government make public the same information relating to standard licence usage as it now going to do for open licence usage?

We have no plans at this time to extend reporting to actual usage of standard licences.

Paragraph 1.4 Awareness

- a) Will the Government be publishing on the Export Control Organisation’s website entities of potential WMD concern in countries in addition to Iran, for instance Syria?
The Government has no immediate plans to publish any additional information about entities of potential WMD concern in countries in addition to Iran. We will continue to publish the information for Iran.

- b) With regard to the Government’s updated website, what are the specific usability improvements that have been put in place, what are the ones in the pipeline in addition to better navigation, and when will the additional facility to identify which Open General Trade Control Licences may be applicable be in place?

The Government Digital Service (GDS) within the Cabinet Office is responsible for transforming government digital services including the design and development of

GOV.UK. Further information about the projects involved is available on the Cabinet Office website <http://digital.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/projects/>

The Export Control Organisation (ECO) is working closely with GDS to refine and condense the amount of export control policy and licence application information to further improve search results. ECO has recently launched:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/export-control-organisation> to enable exporters to readily establish whether a licence is required and how to apply. This ECO Landing Page web address will feature on all future ECO promotional material. and OGELs. Technical and budget issues have prevented

ECO plans to make further improvements to the OGEL Checker tool to better enable exporters to identify appropriate OGTLs further work at this time but we will revisit this in the New Year.

Section 2 International Policy in 2012

Why are there no sub-sections on:

1. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
2. The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
3. The Chemical Weapons Convention
4. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
5. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
6. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
7. Sub-Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons
8. A Middle-East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone
9. The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012–2015

all of which raise proliferation issues?

Will the Government include its policies on all the above in its 2013 Annual Report?

The Annual Report is intended to highlight the Government's work on export controls, not the whole range of its work on proliferation issues. The Government does not intend to include contributions on all these issues in its 2013 Annual Report although it may do so on a case-by-case basis where there have been significant developments relevant to export controls. The Government regularly provides public information on proliferation issues. The subjects listed above have been covered in some depth in the Government's Response to the Committees' Annual Report published on 8 October and most, if not all, of these issues have been the subject of previous correspondence with the Committees which is readily (and freely) available in the public domain to parliamentarians, media and other interested parties.

Paragraph 2.2 Small Arms and Light Weapons

- a) What progress has been made in enhancing the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument to promote international co-operation in marking and tracing illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons?

The UN Programme of Action Review Conference held in August 2012 agreed an Implementation Plan for the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) for the period 2012-2018. At the Review Conference, States resolved to increase their efforts to achieve full and effective implementation of the ITI. More details about the Implementation Plan can be found at <http://www.poa-iss.org/RevCon2/Documents/RevCon-DOC/CRP3-ITI-IP.pdf>

- b) Has a voluntary sponsorship fund to boost assistance to less developed states in dealing with illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons been established? If so, what is the size of the fund and what amount has the British Government contributed to it?

A voluntary fund to boost assistance to less developed states in dealing with illicit small arms and light weapons has been established. The UK has pledged to donate £100,000 to the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) and has allocated a further £250,000 to fund projects devoted to supporting ATT implementation. The EU will also provide considerable funding to support ATT implementation.

Paragraph 2.3 Cluster Munitions

Is the UK Government still on track to destroy the remainder of its cluster munitions by the end of 2013?

Yes, as stated at the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Lusaka in September.

Paragraph 2.4 Ottawa Treaty/Landmines

What is the area of land in the Falkland Islands that is still to be cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance and then released?

There are around 20,000 landmines remaining, covering an area of approximately 20km².

Paragraph 2.6 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

What were the Government's policy objectives at the meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons held in November 2012 and how far have these objectives been achieved? Does the Government consider that any additions should be made to the existing five protocols which are as follows:

- Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments
- Protocol II on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices

- Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons
- Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons
- Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War

The UK's main objective at the November 2012 meeting was to support Australia in maintaining dialogue on practical measures to combat the unlawful manufacture and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) under Protocol II. The UK delivered an expert presentation on its Counter-IED approach at the conference. Our work with Australia is continuing in advance of this year's meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention in November.

More broadly, the UK's main objective remains to encourage the universalisation of the Convention and to achieve adherence to the existing protocols. The Government is not currently considering any additions to these protocols.

Paragraph 2.10 The Wassenaar Arrangement

What are the specific issues relating to the future membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement at which participating states will be looking at in 2013?

The Government's Response to the Committees' Annual Report (Cm 8707) and the Foreign Secretary's letter of 8 April provided an update on membership issues. The General Working Group is being held on 21-24 October and the Plenary will be held in December. We will update the Committees in 2014.

Section 3 Export Licensing Case Studies

Argentina

Why was the value of arms export licences to Argentina in 2012 nearly 5 times greater than it was in 2011, notwithstanding the fact that in April 2012 the Business Secretary announced that the Government would no longer grant licences for any military or dual-use goods and technology for military end-users in Argentina, other than in exceptional circumstances?

The value of export licences issued for military list goods was several times smaller in 2012 than in 2011 as a result of the policy specifically directed at military end users. The export of dual-use and military list goods to civil and commercial end users was unaffected by the policy.

Libya

In deciding whether or not to approve arms export licence applications to Libya what account is the Government taking of the Report of Experts to the UN on 9 March 2013 of what has happened to the Gaddafi arms stockpiles, to which the UK was a contributor? The Experts' Report stated: "The proliferation of weapons from Libya has continued at a worrying rate and has spread into new territory: West Africa, the Levant and, potentially, even the Horn of

Africa. Since the uprising and the resulting collapse of the security apparatus, including the loss of national control over weapons stockpiles and the absence of any border controls, Libya has over the past two years become a significant and attractive source of weaponry in the region. Illicit flows from the country are fuelling existing conflicts in Africa and the Levant and enriching the arsenals of a range of non-State actors, including terrorist groups.”

The Government takes into account reports from a wide variety of sources including the UN when assessing export licensing applications. Criterion 7 of the Consolidated Criteria requires the Government to assess the risk of diversion and this is something we take account of for Libya, as with all destinations worldwide.

Section 4 Export Licensing Data and Performance Against Targets During 2012

Paragraph 4.6 Open General Export Licences (OGELs)

If a UK exporter’s application satisfies the terms of an EU General Export Authorisation, is it the Government’s policy that it must also satisfy the terms of the UK’s Consolidated Criteria and the Foreign Secretary’s arms export policy statement to the Committees on Arms Export Controls on 7 February 2012 before being approved?

The EU General Export Authorisations (EU GEA) are the EU equivalent of UK OGELs and are available for use by any exporter in the EU provided they can meet the terms of that Authorisation. UK exporters do not make an “application” for an EU GEA and we do not “approve” their use of it. Instead, any UK exporter wishing to use an EU GEA must register with the Export Control Organisation and will be subject to our compliance procedures. The scope of the EU GEAs was agreed by all Member States including the UK: EU GEAs do not cover any export that the Government would not have been content to cover under an OGEL. Please also refer to the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 October.

Table 4.7 List of Open General Export Licences

Which is the country or countries of export destination for the OGELs named:

- Chemicals
- Cryptographic Development
- International Non-Proliferation Regime De-controls: Dual-Use Items
- Low Value Shipments
- Technology for Dual-Use Items
- Specified Dual-Use Items (X) (and what is the meaning of (X)?)
- Access Overseas to Software and Technology for Military Goods: Individual Use Only
- Military Components
- Military Goods
- Software and Source Code for Military Goods
- Military Surplus Vehicles
- Technology for Military Goods
- Open General Transshipment Licence

- Open General Trade Control Licence (Trade and Transportation: Small Arms and Light Weapons)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Certified Companies)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Exports Under The US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty)

All Open General Licences, including the permitted destination lists, are available to view and download on the gov.uk website (<https://www.gov.uk/dual-use-open-general-export-licences-explained>, <https://www.gov.uk/military-goods-ogels>, <https://www.gov.uk/open-general-trade-control-licences> and <https://www.gov.uk/transshipment-licences>). In reviewing these licences it is important that each Open General Licence is considered in its entirety taking into account the items that may be exported and the specific terms and conditions of that licence, including any limitations on end-use or end-user, rather than looking at the permitted country lists in isolation.

The Committees may also wish to note that the Open Licence for Certified Companies is an OGEL, not an OGTCL as stated.

The title of the 12th OGEL in Table 4.7 is 'OGEL (X)'. The additional description 'specified dual-use items' is intended to be self-explanatory. This particular OGEL was introduced to allow the export of the least sensitive dual-use items.

Paragraph 4.7 Performance in processing licence applications

- a) Why do performance targets not apply to applications for licences to export goods that are subject to control solely because of United Nations Sanctions or to appeals in relation to such applications?

Licence applications and appeals relating to sanctions are often particularly complex and therefore difficult to assess, especially where it is necessary to determine whether the proposed export is subject to an exemption in the sanctions. In addition, in many cases it is necessary to seek prior approval from the relevant UN sanctions committee before granting the licence and this adds to the time required to process the licence application or appeal.

- b) In Table 4.10 what are the reasons for the deterioration of appeals finalised within both 20 working days and 60 working days over the period 2010–2012?

Appeals performance in 2012 was affected by the same factors that led to the reduction in performance from 2010 to 2011 and described in the Government's

response to the Committees' questions on the Government's Annual Report for 2011.

- c) What actions are being taken to achieve the target of processing 60% of appeals within 20 working days (currently 23%) and 95% of appeals within 60 working days (currently 60%)?

We are working to improve response times to appeals against a backdrop of increasing numbers of export licence applications and finite resources. We have recently refocused resources to bring about an improvement.

Section 5 Compliance and Performance

Paragraph 5.1 Compliance

What are the reasons why the number of warning letters where breaches of licence conditions were found during visits rose from 45 in 2011 to 101 in 2012?

There are a number of reasons why the number of warning letters will vary from year to year, not least the complex nature of compliance audits themselves. It is too early to tell whether the increase is due to a trend of increasing non-compliance. We continue to explore ways of improving our compliance procedures to support businesses that have been found to be non-compliant.

Paragraph 5.2 Enforcement activity undertaken by HM Revenue and Customs, Border Force and the Crown Prosecution Service

Is the increase in the number of seizures of strategic goods in breach of licensing requirements or sanctions and embargoes from 141 in 2011–12 to 280 in 2012–13 due to increased effectiveness of the authorities or to increased attempts to breach the licensing requirements or both?

The Government believes this increase is the result of a combination of factors.

- **The range of goods in scope has increased steadily over the last few years as a result of the introduction of new sanctions, for example those directed against Iran and Syria, and other new strategic export regulations and restrictions. These developments increase the potential for greater non-compliance through accident (lack of awareness of the new rules) or design. This appears to be supported by the general increase in the number of voluntary disclosures, 'no further action' and warning letters we have issued in recent years, and also a general increase in the number of 'technical' offences we have encountered.**
- **The increase in results has also been achieved by good strategic analysis by HMRC which has considerably improved the national picture of the most sensitive commodities and ports of highest risk. Expanded training and development of**

Border Force front line staff has also resulted in heightened awareness of strategic export control risks and increased front-line activity.

The Government, in line with previous answers to the Committees, attributes the majority of seizures to administrative errors on the part of exporters. The Government has no reason to believe there has been an increase in wilful non-compliance by exporters.

Section 6 Gifted Equipment

The Government's Report states: "As a matter of policy, all proposals to gift controlled military equipment are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria by relevant Government departments in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour." Why are Government gifts of military equipment not also being assessed against the Foreign Secretary's policy statement to the Committees on Arms Export Controls on 7 February 2012 that exports would not be permitted of goods "which might be used to facilitate internal repression"?

Please refer to the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 October which clarifies this point.

Section 7 Government to Government

What is the policy followed in deciding whether or not to approve UK export licensing coverage for either industry or the customer in Government to Government exports?

The consideration of Export Licence Applications for exports under government-to-government arrangements is the same as for any other application. An Export Licence Application must be submitted to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, which is assessed in the usual manner against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria by advisory Departments, including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence.

Annex D UK Return to EU Annual Report 2012

- a) In future UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports will the Government include in this Annex a description of each of the numbered EU Common Military List categories?

The numbered categories of the EU Common Military List are essentially the same as the categories of the UK Military List. The current version of the EU Common Military List can be found here <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:090:0001:0037:EN:PDF>

- b) Does the government make a UK Return to the EU Annual Report in respect of items on the EU Dual-Use List? If so, will the Government include its Return in this Annex?
No such return is required for the EU Annual Report.

Annex E International Commitments and Sanctions Regimes

E.1 Export Control Commitments in 2012

Will the Government in its subsequent Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports include the year in which each Commitment was concluded?

Yes.

29 October 2013

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to Sir Robert Rogers, Clerk of the House of Commons

I attach the letter of October 25 that I have received from the Secretary of State for Business, Innovations and Skills.

With regard to Dr Cable's reference in his fourth paragraph to the Freedom of Information Act, I should be grateful if you could confirm to me that House of Commons Select Committees are not governed or circumscribed by the Freedom of Information Act with regard to the evidence they seek in the course of their inquiries.

I should be most grateful for your reply by this Thursday November 28 if at all possible.

25 November 2013

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Sir Robert Rogers, Clerk of the House of Commons

Thank you for your letter of 25 November 2013, which enclosed a copy of a letter to you from the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skill dated 25 October 2013. You asked me to confirm that House of Commons Select Committees are not governed or circumscribed by the Freedom of Information Act with regard to the evidence they seek in the course of their inquiries.

I can readily confirm that proposition.

As far as a Committee's request for evidence is concerned, the Freedom of Information Act places duties on public bodies to respond to requests for information. The Act does not, and in my view could not in any case, govern or circumscribe the scope of requests for evidence that House of Commons Select Committees may make in the course of their inquiries.

The Secretary of State's letter of 25 October 2013 sets out his response to the request that the Committees on Arms Export Controls have made for certain information. The select committees which comprise the Committees on Arms Export Controls each severally have, under Standing Order No. 152(4)(a), the power to send for persons, papers and records (PPR). That power cannot be exercised by a Committees to send for Government papers

directly: as Erskine May (24th edition, 2011, page 818) notes, a select committee has no power to send for any papers which, if required by the House itself, would be sought by Address. As an Address would be required for the House to seek a direction from Her Majesty to one of her Secretaries of State, a select committee is consequently not capable of taking the formal step of ordering a Secretary of State to produce papers. On the other hand, the Resolution of Ministerial Accountability of 19/20 March 1997 requires Ministers to be as open as possible with Parliament, refusing to provide information only when disclosure would not be in the public interest.

In his letter of 25 October 2013, as I read it, the Secretary of State is explaining his approach to the “public interest” in this case by reference to the Department’s framework for making FOI decisions. The public interest test was set out in the FOI legislation enacted by Parliament subsequent to the adoption of the 1997 Resolution. There is of course no statutory bar on the Secretary of State choosing to comply with a select committee request, even when he would be entitled to an FOI exemption.

The Secretary of State would be mistaken if he tried to assert his Department was under a statutory duty not to disclose to a select committee information which could be exempted from disclosure in response to a written request under the Freedom of Information Act, but that is not what I take his response to say.

I note you raised this matter on Thursday 24 November in Westminster Hall at columns 404–405WH and Mr Fallon replied to your point on disclosure at column 424WH.

So in conclusion, the Freedom of Information Act does not prevent your Committees from requesting the names of the requesters granted licences for dual use chemicals for Syria between 2004 and 2012, nor does the Act preclude the Secretary of State from providing those names. I note that you have been offered a way forward, in terms of a confidential disclosure to the Committee on Arms Controls.

Do, please, let me know if I can help further.

28 November 2013

**Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Michael Fallon, MP, Minister of State for
 Business and Energy, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills**

Westminster Hall Debate on Arms Exports

I was grateful for the opportunity to respond to the Westminster hall debate on Arms Exports on 21 November. I would like to follow up on points raised.

You asked the following about Sri Lanka:

“before my right hon. Friend leaves the issue of Sri Lanka, is he really telling us that 600 assault rifles will be deployed by private security companies operating out of Sri Lanka to deal

with piracy? There are also a number of machine guns, but what use are they for anti--piracy measures?"

My officials have checked the three Standard Individual Export licences (ELs) in question and I can confirm that the 600 assault rifles are for maritime security use only. The number rifles seems high but I understand that vast majority of private security companies operating in the Indian Ocean are British and a proportion of the rifles is bound to be in maintenance at any given time. No machine guns are permitted for export to Sri Lanka under these licences.

Machine guns are automatic weapons which fall outside the scope of the Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy). To be able to use machine guns companies would need to apply for Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) or Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs), where the use of automatic weapons is permitted, and these applications would be assessed on a case by case basis against the Consolidated Criteria.

In addition, Ann McKechin, MP for Glasgow North, asked about Croatia and Transparency. I have consulted the Foreign and Commonwealth Office re Croatia.

Regarding Croatia supplying arms to the opposition in Syria she asked:

"Will he also confirm whether, to his knowledge, Croatia has carried on supplying arms to rebel forces, as was widely reported earlier this year, since their accession into the European Union in July? If so, what discussions have been held at European Union level about the consequences of such continued supply in the run up to possible negotiations to resolve this ghastly conflict?"

With regard to the question raised on Croatia by the Hon. Member for Glasgow North, we are looking into these comments. I will reply on this issue separately when our enquires are complete.

Regarding the Transparency Initiative the Hon. Member asked:

"Where is the evidence that exporters in the United Kingdom have said at any point that they will take their business elsewhere?"

The department has received strong representation from the trade association EGAD (Export group for Aerospace and defence) about the additional administrative burdens the original proposal as would have imposed on its members. However, the point came home forcefully in a case raised with the Secretary of State by Sir Bob Russell MP. A company in Sir Bob's constituency made it clear that the additional reporting requirements represented a significant extra burden over and above those imposed by the United States. The company is considering moving some of its operations to the US with a consequent loss of jobs in the UK. As a result, SoS decided to strike a better balance between transparency and red tape and by changing the scope of the Transparency Initiative. The modified arrangements still represent a significant increase in transparency over and above existing reporting levels.

You made a comment about HMG changing policy on the pre-licence register of arms brokers. You said, “we will be paying close attention to the welcome and long-awaited change of policy on a pre-licence register of arms brokers that the Minister has just announced,” I want to clarify that I made reference to a public consultation as a means to a fresh consideration of this issue. This is not a change of policy in itself although the consultation may result in a change in due course.

Just to clarify, thought you asked me not to write on “clear risk”, I can confirm that the Government’s policy is set out clearly and unambiguously in Criterion 2: Her Majesty’s Government will not issue an export licence if there is a *clear risk* that then proposed export might be used for internal repression. This policy that has been applied consistently by successive Government since 2000. This is the policy we apply now and there has been no change to policy.

I look forward to working closely with the Committees in the future.

2 December 2013

**Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Michael Fallon, MP, Minister of State for
 Business and Energy, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills**

Westminster Hall Debate on Arms Exports

Following my letter of 2 December 2013 I said that with regard to the question raised by Ann McKechin, the Hon. Member for Glasgow North, about Croatia supplying arms to the opposition in Syria I would reply separately on this issue.

We have made enquiries into this question, including with our Embassy in Zagreb, and are not aware of any such exports. If you have any information to the contrary, we would be happy to consider it.

16 December 2013

**Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First
 Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

I look forward to giving evidence to the CAEC on 8 January. I very much appreciate the thorough scrutiny which the Committees provide, reflected in your comprehensive 2013 Annual Report, and welcome the open dialogue between us.

As on previous occasions, I propose not to make an opening statement, understanding your wish to allow as much time as possible for Members’ questions. I am writing to set out some key points on the Government’s export controls.

The Government is committed to managing all transfers of strategic goods responsibly, to ensure that none fall into the wrong hands. At the same time, we support a responsible defence and security industry that helps meet the UK's legitimate needs as well as those of other states. The sector is important for the economy, employing over 600,000 and generating exports of over £11.5 billion in 2013. Export controls provide a vital service to the industry by ensuring that its legitimacy is not compromised by its products being misused.

As a further improvement to that service, in July we raised one of the already-tough targets for processing licence applications from 95% to 99% within 60 working days; we are currently achieving 98.4%. Over 17,000 applications were processed during 2013, a figure that continues to increase by some 5% each year.

All applications are rigorously assessed on a case by case basis against the Consolidated Criteria, taking into account all relevant factors. A licence will not be issued if to do so would be inconsistent with any of the Criteria. Close Ministerial scrutiny of decisions has continued, with over 300 submissions considered by FCO Ministers during 2013, up from 39 in 2010.

Recent events in Egypt highlighted the importance of responding quickly to a deteriorating security situation in a country. This was the first time we have deployed the Suspension Mechanism. In two important respects Egypt was a special case. First, we suspended extant licences as well as pending licence applications; this was an addition to the policy announced to Parliament by the Business Secretary on 7 February 2012, which referred only to suspension of pending licence applications. Secondly, we applied suspension to "equipment which might be used for internal repression". This is of course a lower threshold than Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria, where the test is a "clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression".

These specific steps were the result of the conclusions reached jointly with our EU Partners on 21 August. We moved quickly, on a precautionary basis, to suspend all licences, both extant and pending, for the Egyptian army, air force and internal security forces. After five weeks, when the situation became clearer, we refined our approach to distinguish between licences which failed the Criterion 2 test (i.e. "clear risk") and were revoked or refused; those where there was not a "clear risk" the equipment might be used for internal repression but which nevertheless failed the lower-threshold EU test ('might be used for internal repression') and which were kept suspended; and those we judged the equipment would not be used for internal repression, which we re-instated or approved.

The security situation particularly in the Sinai remains very difficult, and we should support the legitimate security needs of the Government of Egypt while preventing British exports from being used for internal repression.

The EU arms embargo to Syria was lifted as a powerful political signal that there could be no equivalence between the legitimate moderate Opposition and the Assad regime. The UK does not supply lethal weapons to any party in Syria.

Negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty were successfully concluded with the near-universal UN adoption of a robust and effective text on 2 April. For the first time in history, this Treaty sets clear, high, common standards for the regulation of the trade in conventional arms globally. This could not have been done without the combined effort of successive Governments, parliament and civil society. I am most grateful for the support of your Committees in our work to achieve this important goal. As the Prime Minister said: “We should be proud of the role Britain has played to secure this ambitious agreement, working with international partners to secure this momentous step that will make our world safer for all.”

We are now working to secure the 50 ratifications required to bring the Treaty into force as soon as possible. Nationally, our Parliamentary procedures for ratification were completed on 4 November. The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills are taking forward, in consultation with industry, a minor expansion of our extra-territorial controls on brokering. Our ratification will then only require authorisation from the European Council (as the Treaty includes some matters of EU exclusive competence) which we hope will be forthcoming before the Spring.

Internationally, we are encouraging other nations to sign or ratify as soon as possible and providing assistance where necessary: we have given £350,000 in this Financial Year to help states implement the Treaty.

We will also update the Consolidated Criteria to bring them fully into line with both the Arms Trade Treaty and the EU Common Position. I will write to you on this in more detail shortly. The update will clarify that we will not grant a licence where there is a clear risk of serious violations of international humanitarian law. We will also state that we will take account of the risk of serious acts of gender based violence.

However, the updated criteria will not include any change to the risk threshold for Criterion 2. We will continue to apply the standard in the EU Common Position, as set out in the current consolidated criteria: we will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression.

I understand that my officials are endeavouring to arrange quarterly meetings between you and CAEC members, and Hugh Robertson, with the first meeting pencilled in to take place in February. I hope that a regular programme of meetings at ministerial level will increase transparency and give you and your colleagues further opportunities to raise issues of concern. I would also like to invite you and your colleagues back to our Arms Export Policy department again in 2-14 to see the export licence process in action and to talk to staff about their roles.

6 January 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

CONSOLIDATED EU AND NATIONAL ARMS EXPORT LICENSING CRITERIA

Thank you for the opportunity to give oral evidence to the Committees on Arms Export Controls on the 18 December and the 8 January. We appreciate the open and constructive dialogue between our Departments and the Committees. Although we may disagree on some points please rest assured that we both value the role that the Committees play in scrutinising the Government's policy on export controls.

We are concerned that some misunderstanding may remain with respect to criterion 2 (human rights and internal repression) of the Consolidated Criteria. We are therefore writing to you jointly to confirm the Government's policy, which remains unchanged from the position established by the previous Government in 2000.

The opening words from criterion 2 are most pertinent here:

“The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination.

“Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, the Government will:

*“a. Not issue and export licence if there is a **clear risk** that the proposed export might be used for internal repression...”*

Following his evidence to the CAEC on 7 February 2012, the Foreign Secretary wrote to you on 6 October 2013 to confirm there had been no change to Government policy and that the *clear risk* still applied. That policy remains unchanged and we have no plans to change the policy at this time. This is also the basis of the letter of clarification sent by the Minister of State for Business and Energy, Michael Fallon, on the 2 December, following the recent Westminster Hall debate.

We hope this letter clarifies the Government's policy and look forward to continuing to work closely with your committees.

6 January 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Thank you for your letter of 6 October 2013.

I have delayed replying until after the Committees had taken Oral Evidence from the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills on 18 December during which the issue of the Government's policy on arms exports and internal repression was scrutinized at some length at Questions 48-54.

Your letter was, frankly, mystifying to the Committees. Your evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012 cannot conceivably, in our view, bear the construction that you had deleted from the Government's policy on arms exports and internal repression the words: "we will not issue a licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression."

For the avoidance of doubt, the relevant transcript of Oral Evidence, which is also reproduced in the Annex to your letter, reads:

Chair: "Secretary of State, I want to start with what is a major policy issue, if not the major policy issue for our Committees, which is whether there has been a change in Government policy on the approval of arms export licences for arms and ammunition and military equipment that could be used for internal repression. We took a deliberate decision in our report of last April to publish in full, as annex 1, the written answer that was given by the then Minister of State in the Foreign office, Peter Hain, on 26 October 2000 in which he set out in full the consolidated criteria for arms exports.

"As far as arms exports that involve weapons that could be used for internal repression are concerned, your junior Minister, Alistair Burt, in his press release statement on 18 February, last year, entirely accurately and correctly summarised the previous Government's position carried forward by the present Government on policy in this area. He summarised that accurately in these words: "The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." Foreign Secretary, has that policy changed, or is it as correctly stated by Mr Alistair Burt?"

Mr Hague: "That is still the policy. The "or", as you have pointed out on other occasions, is important.

Chair: It is profoundly important, Foreign Secretary, and I am glad that you have acknowledged that ..."

We hoped that you would have been glad to see that in the Committees' latest July 2013 report and in my memorandum of Evidence to the Committees the complete wording of your key policy statement namely: "We will issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" is reproduced no less than 26 times and in full.

The concern of the Committees was precisely the converse of your own, namely that the Government, or at least part of the Government, was ignoring the second condition in your policy statement for approving and arms export, namely the wording that follows after the "or", which you rightly acknowledged to be important, ie "or which might be used to facilitate internal repression." I gave specific illustrations of the omission of these words in my

contribution to the debate on the Committees latest Report in Westminster hall on November 21.

The Committees welcome the fact that the Business Secretary made it clear that the Government's policy on arms exports and internal repression remains unchanged, and is as stated by yourself to the Committees on 7 February 2012 namely: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression".

We trust therefore that in future Ministers in their public statements on UK arms exports and internal repression policy will cite your policy statement to the Committees of 7 February 2012, repeated again in your letter of 6 October 2013, not selectively, but in full.

6 January 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

At your Oral Evidence session with the Committees on December 18, I put to you the reasons why we would wish you to reconsider your prohibition on the companies that were given licence approval to export dual-use chemicals to Syria by both the present and the previous Government giving evidence in public to the Committees. You said that you would reflect on this.

I should be grateful to know the outcome of your reflection at an early date as the Committees wish to decide their next step.

It would be most helpful to have your reply by Tuesday February 4.

20 January 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

EXPORTS TO SYRIA

Thank you for your letter of 20 January 2014 about the names of the companies granted licences to export dual-use chemicals to Syria.

I have of course given further consideration to my earlier decision not to make public the names of the companies granted licences to export sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride to Syria between 2004 and 2012. In doing so I have reviewed the arguments put forward by you and your Committee, as well as the companies themselves, regarding the harm to their legitimate commercial interests that disclosure might cause, and the potential harm to employees. I find that these latter arguments remain compelling. I have also taken account of

the fact that export licence applications are made in confidence. As a result, I still believe that on balance the argument is not in favour of public disclosure.

Let me make it clear once again that I do not wish to obstruct the work of the Committees. You have acknowledged that the companies have not done anything wrong and, indeed, acted responsibly by applying for export licences. Your concern rather is to hold the Government, rather than the exporters, to account. It is absolutely right that you should do so and I therefore repeat my offer to disclose the names of the companies on a confidential basis so that you can meet them “in camera”.

I would like to take this opportunity to touch briefly on other points raised by CAEC members when I appeared before you on the 18 December.

I reaffirm my commitment to launch a public consultation on a proposal for a pre-licensing register of arms brokers in March of this year. The consultation will help us to gather the necessary evidence to allow me to decide whether or not to introduce such a register. There will be an emphasis on the relative costs and benefits alongside its likely effectiveness. As a part of this evidence gathering exercise we also intend to enquire about the use and effectiveness of registers in other member States of the EU. According to previous submissions to the Committees by the UK Working Group on Arms the following countries maintain a register of arms brokers: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania and Spain. We also want to seek the views of major EU arms manufacturing and exporting countries who do not have registers, in particular, Germany, France, Italy and Sweden.

On the issue of export licences for maritime anti-piracy, while we do not have any concerns as to the decision-making process, we committed to look again at the volumes of goods involved in these licences. I can confirm that this work is underway and I will write to you about this matter by the end of March.

I have asked my officials to work with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence to review the Government’s licensing suspension mechanism. Following the recent Egypt suspension it is my intention to widen the scope to include extant as well as new licences. To paraphrase the Foreign Secretary, when he appeared before the CAEC on the 8 January, there is now a greater willingness on the part of the Government to suspend licensing and we will not hesitate to do so if it proves impossible or extremely difficult to apply the Consolidated Criteria.

Finally, I would like to reaffirm that we intend to review the reporting requirements under the Transparency Initiative after twelve months — January 2015 — and will update the Committees at the next evidence session at the turn of the year. We also intend to provide an update at the time of our review of the Memorandum of Understanding with the organiser of Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi) 2015 and to update you on our progress in improving the timescales in relation to appeals against licence refusals.

3 February 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

I am writing to update you on progress of the Balance of Competences Review. This follows our correspondence off September 2013, committing to keep you informed.

The reports for semester two — covering the Single Market: Free Movement of Goods, Asylum and non-EU Migration, Trade and Investment, Environment and Climate Change, Transport, Research and Development, Tourism and Sport, and Civil Judicial Co-operation — have today been published at <https://www.gov.uk/review-of-the-balance-of-competencies>. The reports were written by departments leading on these policy areas. Work is continuing on the report entitled “The Single Market: Free Movement of Persons” which will be published at a later date.

I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate my thanks for your contribution to the reports covering Free Movement of Goods and Trade and Investment. As I said in my previous letter, your contribution was extremely useful to the departments working on these reports, and has been incorporated into the reports.

Calls for evidence for semester two reports were launched in May 2013, and were open for three months. As with the first set of reports, we saw a high level of interest and received over 600 contributions from experts and interested groups right across the UK. The reports have undergone rigorous internal challenge to ensure they are balanced, robust and evidence-based. Evidence submitted (subject to the provisions of the Data protection Act) has been published alongside the reports on the gov.uk website to ensure transparency.

Calls for evidence for semester three reports were launched in October 2013 and closed in January 2014. Reports in this semester cover: Single Market: Services; Single Market: Financial Services and Free Movement of Capital; EU Budget; Cohesion; Social and Employment; Agriculture; Fisheries; Competition and Consumer Policy; Energy; and Fundamental Rights. The final reports are expected to be published in summer 2014. Calls for evidence for semester four reports will launch in spring 2014.

I am writing in similar terms to The Rt Hon Richard Ottaway MP, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Rt Hon Sir Alan Beith MP, Chairman of the Liaison Committee, and copying to the Clerks of those Committees, Les Saunders at the Cabinet office, Magdalena Williams, FCO Departmental Scrutiny Co-ordinator and Jonathan Layfield, FCO Select Committee Liaison Officer.

13 February 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

I am writing to inform the Committees of the publication of revised Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Guidance.

The Guidance remains a vital tool for assessing the human rights implications of our overseas assistance work in the security and justice sectors. The Committees recommended that the Guidance should be updated to refer more clearly to the additional assessments against the EU and National Consolidated Criteria that need to be undertaken if the assistance involves the provision of equipment which is controlled under Export Control legislation.

A review of the Guidance has provided the opportunity to make amendments in response to the Committees' recommendation. A revised version of the Guidance is attached and is available on the www.gov.uk website. In particular, new paragraph 11 states:

"It is important to stress that an assessment under this guidance is not in itself sufficient when the provision of licensable equipment is envisaged as part of a project. A further assessment under the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria will be required. Please contact the FCO's Arms Export Licensing Department for further advice on how such an assessment will need to be undertaken. There is also no requirement to undertake an OSJA assessment if the assistance to be provided consists solely of the provision of licensable equipment and an assessment under the EU Consolidated Criteria has been or will be undertaken."

I hope this amendment to the Guidance addresses the Committees' concerns. I have also made a Written Ministerial Statement announcing publication of the revised Guidance and have written in similar terms to Sir Richard Ottaway and Sir Malcolm Rifkind. Let me take this opportunity to thank you for your engagement in the review process.

26 February 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

I should be grateful if you could tell me the British Government's position on whether or not the issue of Iran's ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should be brought within the framework of the negotiations taking place with Iran to ensure that Iran does not become a holder of nuclear weapons.

Please could you tell me in your reply the reasons for the policy position that the UK Government has taken on this issue.

It would be helpful to have your reply by March 24.

27 February 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

Thank you for your letter of January 3 (assumed to be in error for February 3 when it was received).

It is regrettable that you continue to refuse to put into the public domain the names of the companies that were given UK Government approval to export to Syria dual-use chemicals which could be used as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of sarin. The effect of your decision, as you are clearly aware, is to prevent the Committees on Arms Export Controls from taking Oral Evidence in public from the companies concerned.

Given the position you have adopted the Committees will therefore be taking Evidence from the companies “in camera” as you have proposed.

The information already obtained by the Committees regarding the 7 Government approved export licences for dual-use chemicals to Syria is set out in the Table below.

British Government approvals of exports of dual-use, i.e. civil or military use, chemicals to Syria 2004-2012

	Date of licence approval	Type of chemical	Qty (kg)	Value (£)	Usage	Stated end-use	Stated end-user
1	15/7/2004	Sodium Fluoride	50	228.5	Unknown – No records available	Manufacture of toothpaste	MADA for Industry & Commerce
2	28/9/2005	Sodium Fluoride	2,000	6,220	2,000kgs exported – but not known on which date or in how many shipments as records no longer available	Manufacture of toothpaste	Kaadan &Sioufi
3	15/3/2007	Sodium Fluoride	50	695	Unknown – No records available	Manufacture of toothpaste	MADA for Industry & Commerce
4	3/2/2009	Sodium Fluoride	2,000	6,220	Five shipments totalling 2,000kg: 13/2/2009 – 150kg 18/6/2009 – 1,000kg 15/4/2009 – 100kg	Manufacture of toothpaste	Kaadan &Sioufi

					3/7/2009 – 100kg 13/1/2011 – 650kg		
5	11/5/2010	Sodium Fluoride	50	345	One shipment of 50kg on 16/8/2010	Manufacture of toothpaste	MADA for Industry & Commerce
6	17/1/2012	Sodium Fluoride	1,000	10,000	No shipments made	Metal finishing of aluminium profiles for aluminium showers, window frames	Awad Ammora Co. & Partners, Nashabia, Damascus, Syria
7	18/1/2012	Potassium fluoride	1,000	10,200	No shipments made	Metal finishing of aluminium profiles for aluminium showers, window frames	Awad Ammora Co. & Partners, Nashabia, Damascus, Syria

Sources: Written Answer from the Business Minister Mark Prisk to the Chairman of CAEC, Sir John Stanley, on 27 March 2012, col. 1137W and the letters from Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, to the Chairman of CAEC, Sir John Stanley, dated 4 October 2013 and 11 October 2013.

Please could you provide the name of the company which was given the Government export licence approval in each case.

Please may I have your reply by close on March 20.

6 March 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Hugh Robertson, MP, Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

I understand that the Committees wish to invite me for a formal evidence session.

I am aware the Foreign Secretary appeared in front of the Committees on 8 January. I would not wish to duplicate this formal channel for scrutiny, and would therefore prefer an opportunity to discuss informally the issues that are of concern to the CAEC. This was something suggested by my predecessor Alistair Burt for us to build on the constructive

dialogue the Foreign & Commonwealth Office enjoys with the Committees. If you agree, I will ask my officials to arrange a mutually agreeable time.

11 March 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Hugh Robertson, MP, Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Thank you for your letter of March 11.

Your proposal to give only informal evidence to the Committees on Arms Export Controls does not meet the Committees needs as such discussions are not evidential.

In our 2012 Report the Committees took scrutiny of the Government's policy on multilateral arms control agreements to a new and much more comprehensive level as set out in paragraphs 65–85 of our Report and in Evidence pages 108–172.

With the exception of the Arms Trade Treaty, none of this area of Government policy was covered when the Foreign Secretary came before the Committees on January y8 so there would be no duplication of scrutiny.

The Committees are now preparing their 2014 Report and we therefore need to take formal oral evidence from you at the earliest possible date. I trust therefore that you will confirm that you will give formal oral evidence to the Committees on the afternoon of Monday April 7 as provisionally agreed.

11 March 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Thank you for your letter of 27 February, seeking the UK government position on whether Iranian ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) should be brought within the framework of E3+3 negotiations with Iran.

The purpose of the E3+3 negotiations with Iran is to reach a negotiated comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue which ensures the Exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. This will require Iran to take significant action to limit its nuclear programme, and increased monitoring and verification of its activities. As part of a comprehensive solution, it is important that all unresolved issues set out in the UNSC resolutions are addressed.

Iranian ratification of the CTBT would be a further step in reassuring the international community about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. It would also bring the Treaty closer to entry into force. Dr Lassina Zerbo, the Executive Secretary of the Provisional

Technical Secretariat of the CTBT Organisation, is encouraging Iran to consider ratification of the CTBT and to transmit data from the International Monitoring System's Primary Seismic Station in Tehran to the International Data Centre in Vienna. These would be welcome steps. I believe, however, that adding CTBT ratification to the E3+3 negotiations at this stage would risk further complicating an already complex negotiation. Securing Iranian commitments to limit Iran's programmes to a point well short of conducting a test must remain the priority.

20 March 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

I should be grateful if you could provide the following information in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty:

1. The steps that have been taken by the Government so far to achieve UK ratification of the Treaty.
2. The steps that remain to be taken and the timetable for them.
3. Whether for UK ratification to have legal effect in the UK, it is necessary for all other EU member states to achieve ratification.
4. The Government's timetable for making the changes in secondary legislation that will be required to achieve full UK compliance in law with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty.

Please may I have your reply by close on Thursday April 3.

25 March 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Hugh Robertson, MP, Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Thank you for your letter of 11 March, clarifying the Committee's requirements regarding formal evidence for its 2014 report on Arms Export Controls.

I understand the Committee would like to hear formal oral evidence on those areas of the Government's policy on multilateral arms control agreements that were not covered by the Foreign Secretary on 8 January, and that these are:

- Cluster Munitions
- Small arms and light weapons
- Landmines
- The Wassenaar Agreement

- The UN register of conventional arms
- The Fissile Missile Cut-Off Treaty
- The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
- The G8 Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction
- The Nuclear Suppliers Group
- The Australia Group
- The Academic Approval Scheme
- The Chemical Weapons Convention
- The Biological & Toxins Weapons Convention
- The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
- The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
- Sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons
- A Middle East weapons of mass destruction free zone
- The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy 2012-15

To complement the evidence already given by my colleagues the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills, together with the written evidence already provided by my department, I would be happy to give evidence on the above subjects.

I am currently in the middle of a period of extensive travel so unfortunately I would not be able to appear on 7 April. I would however be available during w/c 12 or 19 May to give evidence.

All my very best wishes,

26 March 2013

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Hugh Robertson, MP, Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Thank you for your letter of March 26.

I confirm that the Committees will be taking formal Oral Evidence from you on the subjects listed in your letter on May 12.

We may also wish to put questions to you on the Arms Trade Treaty arising subsequent to the Foreign Secretary's Oral Evidence to the Committees on January 8.

2 April 2014¹⁸⁷

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Thank you for your letter of 25 March, asking for additional information in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

I am pleased to announce that on 27 March 2014 I signed the instrument of ratification, and on 2 April 2014 the United Kingdom formally deposited its ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty in New York. The Ratification was marked by a joint event in which we deposited our ratification alongside 16 EU Member States and El Salvador, at a stroke more than doubling the total number of ratifications which now stands at 31.

In terms of the domestic legislative and regulatory steps needed to ensure the Treaty could enter into force in the UK, two processes have taken place. On 19 March the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) laid before Parliament and Order amending UK trade (brokering) controls to ensure that they are fully compliant with Article 10 of the ATT. The Export Control (Amendment) Order 2014 (S.I. 2014 No. 702) adds to Category B of the trade controls those items listed in Article 2.1 of the ATT that are not already included in Category B, namely: battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles; large calibre artillery systems; combat aircraft and attack helicopters; certain warships; and certain missiles and their launchers. As a result, brokering of these items by UK persons will be subject to control wherever in the world those persons are located. The amending Order comes into force on 9 April.

On 25 March an update to the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria was announced to Parliament in a Written Ministerial Statement by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Dr Vince Cable. This was necessary before ratification to ensure the UK was compliant with provisions of the ATT such as Article 7(4), which obliges State Parties to take into account the risk of conventional arms being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of Gender based Violence. The update also brings the Criteria into line with EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

These two changes are sufficient to ensure the UK export control policy and practice are fully compliant with the provisions of the ATT.

The UK does not require other EU Member States to ratify in order for the Treaty to have legal effect in the UK. This is because the UK has signed up to the Treaty as a State. The ATT cleared parliamentary scrutiny under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act (CRaG) on 5 November 2013. But we were unable to ratify until we received authorisation from the EU Council of Ministers. This was necessary because the Treaty is mixed competence (it

¹⁸⁷ Hugh Robertson subsequently stated that he was not available on the date suggested for the Oral Evidence session.

covers issues of trade for which the EU has competence). The Plenary of the European Parliament voted on this on 5 February 2014. The majority of MEPs voted in support of ratification. The Council decision was approved by the Council of Ministers on 3 March.

The UK is ready for entry into force of the Treaty (which will happen ninety days after 50 ratifications have been deposited). The collective ratification event on 2 April has brought this closer and the UK is rightly proud of its role. We will, of course, continue to encourage states to sign and ratify the Treaty so that it can enter into force soon and start having a substantive impact on arms flows around the world.

I would like to extend my thanks and the warm appreciation that the Foreign Office has for the role that Parliament and the CAEC have played in supporting and canvassing for this Treaty. The unified front of civil society, government, industry and Parliament enabled the UK to lead convincingly and from the outset of the process.

3 April 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

1) Extant licences for the FCO Countries of Human Rights concern

Please could you state which UK strategic export control licences are currently extant, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence, to each of the 28 countries listed as Countries of Human Rights concern in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 2013 Human Rights and Democracy Report namely:

- Afghanistan
- Belarus
- Burma
- Central African Republic (CAR)
- China
- Colombia
- Cuba
- Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
- Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
- Eritrea
- Fiji
- Iran
- Iraq
- Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories
- Libya
- Pakistan
- Russia
- Saudi Arabia

Somalia
South Sudan
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Syria
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Yemen
Zimbabwe

2) Extant licences for other countries

Please could you state which UK strategic export control licences are currently extant, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence, to each of the five following countries:

Argentina
Bahrain
Egypt
Tunisia
Ukraine

I should be grateful for the reply by 8 May.

10 April 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

In its edition of March 22 “the Independent” newspaper carried an article headed “Torture gear’ displays at weapons fair backfire”. I attach a copy of this article for convenience. Please could you tell me whether your Department, or any other Government department took specific steps to draw to the attention of the Crown Prosecution Service possible criminal offences committed by Magforce International and Tianjin Myway at the DSEi exhibition in London last year.

If so, please could you tell me what those specific steps were.

If not, please could you explain why no such steps were taken.

I should be grateful for your reply by May 8.

I am copying this letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence.

Attachment at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/torture-gear-brochures-at-worlds-largest-weaponry-fair--backfire-9208852.html>

16 April 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

Arms export licence revocations for the period 14 May 2013 to the present

Please could you provide details of **all** licence revocations made in the period 14 May 2013 to the present, by country.

Please could you provide the information in the same format as in Annex 1 of Cm 8079 (SIELS/OIELS/etc., End User Country, Annual Report Summary, Rating, Reason for Revocation). Please could you also include the date of revocation in each case.

I should be grateful for this information by 8 May.

17 April 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees and to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

In view of the previous interest of the Committees on Arms Export Controls and Foreign Affairs Committee, I am writing to advise that the UK Trade and Investment Defence & Security Organisation (UKTI DSO) has completed a review of priority markets for 2014/15, consulting Ministers and officials from relevant Whitehall departments.

The review concluded that the list should be as shown at Annex A. This includes a brief explanation of why each country is included in the list.

I should explain that the identification of DSO priority markets is an administrative tool to allow DSO to focus its efforts better to help UK companies export in the increasingly competitive Defence and Security Sectors. The purpose of the exercise is to serve as an indication to UKTI DSO and industry of those countries where there are significant, addressable opportunities for UK exporters to win business orders. The list itself has not been adjusted to take account of export licensing and other restrictions that limit export potential.

One country, Saudi Arabia, is an FCO Human Rights Country of Concern. The Government is confident that the UK's Export Licensing process is robust enough to address any human rights and democracy concerns arising from individual product sales. As you know, all export licences are considered case-by-case against the Consolidated Criteria in light of

circumstances at the time the application is made, and depending on the end use of the goods. The Government provided further details concerning Saudi Arabia in the 'Priority markets for the UK' section of our consolidated response to the CAEC Annual report for 2012 and this information remains valid. The Government also continues to have concerns about human rights in Bahrain. Although many export licence are approved, equipment for internal security and crowd control may require consideration by Ministers. All Applications, including for aviation goods, are considered against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. In relation to C2 concerns, a licence will not be approved if there is a clear risk goods might be used for internal repression.

You will wish to note that previous Priority Market lists have treated Europe/the EU and NATO as 'single markets'. However, in assessing which were the most significant individual markets on which DSO should focus its trade promotion activities, this year's review concluded that treating the EU and NATO as groups was not helpful, and instead decided to assess individual member countries on their merits. Doing so does not in any way detract from the fact that Europe as a whole remains a significant market for UK defence and security exports, with average annual sales exceeding £900million (spread across 15 countries). Nor does this mean that UKTI DSO will do less on the Brussels-based shared defence procurement mechanisms (EDA and NATO). It is solely an attempt to give a more accurate prioritised picture of where DSO is concentrating its ale promotion efforts.

Annex A

Recommended List of DSO Priority Markets 2014/15

Market	Summary of Reason for Inclusion
Australia	Significant market with opportunities in defence & security sectors coupled with increasing defence and security collaboration. Important route into other markets in Asian region.
Bahrain	Large single Air sector prospect, although no additional significant opportunities.
Brazil	Growth market for UK defence (security exports. Opportunities for industrial defence partnership. Opportunities arising from the Olympics and Cyber Security capacity building.
France	Inward investment opportunities in all DSO sectors. Potential to be UK's key collaborative defence manufacturing partner in Europe.
India	Large and growing market for UK all defence and many security sector exports. Potential Disaster Relief market interest. UK agreed to transfer technology in 2013 (subject to our international obligations) and widened the scope of our exports market. Opportunity to collaborate with India on research to produce military equipment.
Indonesia	Important market for UK defence exports. Still has significant opportunities and high demand for DSO support from UK companies.

Japan	Large market for both defence and security. Third largest market for UK security exports. High demand from UK industry for DSO support. Relaxing of Japan's arms export policies enabling greater opportunities for international collaborative projects. Opportunities Arising from the Olympics.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Largest market for UK defence exports. Still has significant opportunities and high demand for DSO support from UK companies.
Kuwait	High value G2G Security programme.
Malaysia	Significant G2G potential for high value opportunities in the defence Air and Sea sectors. High demand for DSO support.
Oman	Continued export opportunities in support of previous platform sales. Significant new export opportunities across Land, Sea, Air and Security sectors provide large and balanced market for UK exporters. Applications for equipment for use in internal security may require consideration by Ministers.
Qatar	Very large opportunities in defence Air sector. Increasing interest in UK defence and security products and services.
South Korea	Growth market for UK defence exports in the Air and Sea sectors. High demand for DSO support from UK exporters. In Top 10 Security exports market.
Turkey	Growth market for UK defence & security exports with opportunities for industrial defence partnership & further exports targeted by UK companies. Large defence market of regional importance bordering EU.
UAE	Significant opportunities for defence Air and Sea sectors. High demand for DSO support. Large volume of export licences approved.
USA	Largest market for defence Land, Sea and Air sectors. Largest market for Security sector. Key defence partner. Industrial partner and investor opportunities, for both export and inward investment.

17 April 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

I wrote to you on August 22 last year expressing my surprise that your letter of July 22 to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Balance of Competencies Review was not copied to the Committees on Arms Export Controls.

In your reply to me of 17 September you said "I can confirm that any further letters that impact on the responsibilities of the Committees on Arms Export Controls will be copied to you."

I am advised that your letter to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of 27 March this year on the Balance of Competencies Review was not copied to the Committees on Arms Export Controls.

As I stated to you previously, the Committees have made a submission to this Review and I should be grateful for your assistance once again that future letters from Government Ministers on this subject will be copied to the Committees.

17 April 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

In my letter to you of 14 October 2013 I asked why your letter of August 4 to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the export of military and dual-use equipment to Syria was not copied to the Committees on Arms Export Controls.

In that letter I asked for your assurance in your reply that all Ministerial letters to Select Committees relating to the transfer of military and dual-use equipment from the UK, whether by way of commercial export or by gift, are sent or copied to the Committees on Arms Export Controls, together with all Ministerial letters relating to international arms control measures.

In your reply of 21 October you provided the assurance I requested by referring to your letter to me of September 17 in which you said "I can confirm that any further letters that impact on the responsibilities of the Committees on Arms Export Controls will be copied to you."

I am advised that your letter of March 28 to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the resumption of deliveries of non-lethal equipment to the Supreme Military Council in Syria was not copied to the Committees on Arms Export Controls.

I should be grateful, once again, for your assurance that all Ministerial letters to Select Committees relating to the transfer of military and dual-use equipment from the UK, whether by way of commercial export or by gift, are sent or copied to the Committees on Arms Export Controls, together with all Ministerial letters relating to international arms control measures.

17 April 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

I attach a copy of the RUSI Analysis of 22 January 2014 by Doctor Joanna Spear of the recent changes made by the US Government to the export controls for the US defence industry.

Please could you tell me whether the British Government considers these changes to be compliant with the terms of the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty.

Please could you also state whether the British Government considers that the US Government's export control changes will have an adverse or beneficial impact on UK defence exports and in what specific ways.

Please may I have you reply by 8 May.

Attachment at: <https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C52DFF7E0C0F8C/>

17 April 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

It was reported in The Independent on 7 January that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) will be investigating supplies to Israeli security services from G4S.

Please could you tell me if the British Government is co-operating with the OECD in its investigation. If so, please could you state what information has been submitted by the Government to the OECD in connection with its investigation.

I should be grateful for your reply by 8 May.

24 April 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

In your letter to me of January 6 in relation to arms that might be used for internal repression you said in the second paragraph of page 2 of your letter "those where there was not a "clear risk" the equipment might be used for internal repression but which nevertheless failed the lower-threshold EU test ('might be used for internal repression') ..."

Please could you state in what EU document, and where, the EU test you have quoted of 'might be used for internal repression' is to be found other than for purpose of defining the technology or equipment to which the "clear risk" test in Criterion Two of the EU Council Common Position (2008/944/CFSP) is to be applied.

Please may I have your reply by 8 May.

24 April 2014

**Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of
State for Business, Innovation and Skills**

Ukraine – suspended licences

The ECO Notice to Exporters (2014/04) issued on 24 February 2014 announced a review of strategic export licences to Ukraine in the light of the recent levels of violence and internal repression in the country. Please could you provide details of any licences that have been suspended as a result of that review.

Please could you provide details of all licence suspensions, and of any subsequent revocations or re-instatements, to Ukraine made in 2014.

Please could you provide the information in the same format as in Annex 1 of Cm 8079 (SIELS/OIELS/etc., End User Country, Annual Report Summary, Rating, Reason for Revocation). Please could you state the date of suspension and the date of any subsequent revocation or re-instatement in each case.

I should be grateful for this information by 8 May.

I am copying this letter to the Foreign Secretary.

24 April 2014

**Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of
State for Business, Innovation and Skills**

Egypt –suspended licences

The Foreign Secretary in his letter to me of 6 January provided an update to your own letters to me of 30 July 2013 and 10 September 2013 on arms export licences to Egypt that had been suspended and in some cases subsequently re-instated.

Please could you provide details of all licence suspensions, and of any subsequent revocations or re-instatements, to Egypt made in the period 14 May 2013 to the present.

Please could you provide the information in the same format as in Annex 1 of Cm 8079 (SIELS/OIELS/etc., End User Country, Annual Report Summary, Rating, Reason for Revocation). Please could you state the date of suspension and the date of any subsequent revocation or re-instatement in each case.

I should be grateful for this information by 8 May.

I am copying this letter to the Foreign Secretary.

24 April 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Russia – suspended licences

In the debate on Ukraine on 18 March, you said: “We believe that in the current circumstances there is a compelling case for EU member states to act on defence export licences. The UK will now, with immediate effect, suspend all extant licences and application processing for licences for direct export to Russia for military and dual-use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine. We will also suspend licences for exports to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia where there is a clear risk that the end product will be used against Ukraine. All such licences were reviewed following the Prime Minister’s statement on 10 March, and so we are able to act immediately. We encourage other European nations to take similar action.”

Please could you provide details of all licence suspensions, and of any subsequent revocations or re-instatements, to Russia made in the period 10 March 2014 to the present.

Please could you provide the information in the same format as in Annex 1 of Cm 8079 (SIELS/OIELS/etc., End User Country, Annual Report Summary, Rating, Reason for Revocation). Please could you state the date of suspension and the date of any subsequent revocation or re-instatement in each case.

Please could you also state which other NATO and EU Members States have taken action similar to the British Government with such details as you can provide of the specific action taken by individual countries.

I should be grateful for this information by 8 May.

I am copying this letter to the Business Secretary.

24 April 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

In the Oral Evidence you gave to the Foreign Affairs Committee on March 18 on Syria, we had the following exchange:

Q19 Sir John Stanley: “Foreign Secretary, you will be aware that the Committees on Arms Export Controls, of which this Committee is a part, has been pursuing the issue of the precursor chemicals for which British Government export licence approval was given between 2004 and 2012—precursor chemicals that could be used in the manufacture of sarin. Subsequently, in the reports that have been made by the OPCW of the Syrian declarations of chemical weapons, there are references to precursor chemicals for the manufacture of chemical weapons. Could you, by letter to the Committee, give us the information that is available to your Department as to precisely which precursor chemicals that have been or could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons have now been declared by the Syrians?”

Mr Hague: “Yes, absolutely. I will update the Committee on that, particularly if there is any new information. I will update the Committee in any case.”

Notwithstanding your reply, you declined to provide the information I had requested. In your follow-up letter to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee you said: “Sir John Stanley asked for details of precursor chemicals that have been or could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons that have now been declared by the Syrians. This information is proliferation sensitive and classified under the Chemical Weapons Convention’s confidentiality regime, so I cannot include it in a letter.”

I fail to understand how the withholding of this information can be justified on grounds of confidentiality given the following two factors.

First, the precursor chemicals that can be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons have been put by Governments into the public domain internationally for many years. For example they are listed in EU Council regulation (EC) No 2432/2001 of 20 November 2001 amending and updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology and are also listed in the Australia Group Export Control List: Chemical Weapons Precursors.

Second, Ministers have already put a substantial quantity of detailed information into the public domain on the Government’s approval of exports of dual-use chemicals to Syria in the period 2004 – 2012 as set out in the Table I attached to my letter of 6 March to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, a copy of which I attach for convenience.

In the light of these factors I should be grateful if you would reconsider your position of refusing to make public to the Committee on Arms Export Controls as to precisely which precursor chemicals have been or could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons, have now been declared by the Syrians.

I should be grateful for your reply by 8 May.

Attachment

British Government approvals of exports of dual-use, i.e. civil or military use, chemicals to Syria 2004-2012

	Date of licence approval	Type of chemical	Qty (kg)	Value (£)	Usage	Stated end-use	Stated end-user
1	15/7/2004	Sodium Fluoride	50	228.5	Unknown – No records available	Manufacture of toothpaste	MADA for Industry & Commerce
2	28/9/2005	Sodium Fluoride	2,000	6,220	2,000kgs exported – but not known on which date or in how many shipments as records no longer available	Manufacture of toothpaste	Kaadan & Sioufi
3	15/3/2007	Sodium Fluoride	50	695	Unknown – No records available	Manufacture of toothpaste	MADA for Industry & Commerce
4	3/2/2009	Sodium Fluoride	2,000	6,220	Five shipments totalling 2,000kg: 13/2/2009 – 150kg 18/6/2009 – 1,000kg 15/4/2009 – 100kg 3/7/2009 – 100kg 13/1/2011 – 650kg	Manufacture of toothpaste	Kaadan & Sioufi
5	11/5/2010	Sodium Fluoride	50	345	One shipment of 50kg on 16/8/2010	Manufacture of toothpaste	MADA for Industry & Commerce
6	17/1/2012	Sodium Fluoride	1,000	10,000	No shipments made	Metal finishing of aluminium profiles for aluminium showers, window frames	Awad Ammora Co. & Partners, Nashabia, Damascus, Syria
7	18/1/2012	Potassium fluoride	1,000	10,200	No shipments made	Metal finishing of	Awad Ammora

						aluminium profiles for aluminium showers, window frames	Co. & Partners, Nashabia, Damascus, Syria
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Sources: Written Answer from the Business Minister Mark Prisk to the Chairman of CAEC, Sir John Stanley, on 27 March 2012, col. 1137W and the letters from Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, to the Chairman of CAEC, Sir John Stanley, dated 4 October 2013 and 11 October 2013.

24 April 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

In your Oral Evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 March on Ukraine we had the following exchange:

Q7: Sir John Stanley: “Foreign Secretary, there were widespread reports in the press, on which the Foreign Office declined to comment following the change of Government in Kiev, that British personnel—whether Government personnel or Government-approved personnel—had gone to Kiev to give expert ballistic advice as to the location of sniper positions from which those demonstrating peacefully were killed in Kiev. Against that background, do you have any regrets to express to the Committee that in each quarter of 2011, the British Government gave export licence approval to sniper rifles to Ukraine, and did so again in 2012 and in 2013?”

Mr Hague: “We have to base our decisions on the information available at the time, of course, and that will always be the way. We will always have the benefit of hindsight on some of these things. I would have to look at the details of any applications before giving any detailed opinion about that, but I am satisfied that all our export licence decisions are based on the information available at the time.”

I attach in Ukrainian a copy of the article that appeared in “Minding Russia” on the internet on 24 February 2014. I also reproduce immediately below what we have been told is the article’s translation into English:

Rada Commission Determines Who Shot People in Kiev
 Author Voronz, Vsk, 23/02/2014 - 13:22

The Verkhovna Rada [parliamentary] commission to investigate the massacre in Kiev, chaired by Hennadiy Moskal, deputy from the Bitkivshchina [Fatherland] Party, has determined that the sniper rifles with which people were shot in Kiev on the morning of 20 February were purchased for the Crimean Territorial Department of Internal Forces, UNIAN reported, citing a statement from commission chairman Moskal.

This special sub-division was created personally by Stanislav Shulyak, a commander of the Ukrainian internal troops; its commander is Col. Sergei Asavalyuk, Moskal stated.

According to Moskal's report, soldiers from the Crimean special division were captured on video by journalists, and their radio chatter was recorded. Information about the purchase of 80 British AVK type sniper rifles for this sub-division is contained in the Vestnik gosudarstvennykh zakupok Ukrainy [Bulletin of State Purchases of Ukraine].

Please could you tell the Committees whether the statement in the article that 80 British AVK type sniper rifles were purchased for the Crimean Territorial Department of Internal Forces is correct, and whether the fact that this information is contained in the Vestnik gosudarstvennykh zakupok Ukrainy [Bulletin of State Purchases of Ukraine] is also correct. If so, please could you state on what date or dates the Government gave export licence approval for the export of these sniper rifles from the UK to the Ukraine.

Finally, please could you provide details of all UK Government export licence approvals of sniper rifles to Ukraine from the beginning of 2010 giving the same information as in the Table to my letter to the Business Secretary of March 6, a copy of which is attached for convenience, i.e. providing the following information in respect of each licence approved namely: date of licence approval, type of sniper rifle, quantity, value, usage (i.e. how many were exported to Ukraine), stated end-use, stated end-user.

I should be grateful for your reply by 8 May.

I am copying this letter and the attachments to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills.

24 April 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Justine Greening, MP, Secretary of State for International Development

The Committees in their 2013 Report (HC205) at paragraph 164 made the following Recommendation:

Now that a global Arms Trade Treaty has been adopted, the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the outcome of the Department for International Development's consideration of its role in the UK arms export control system.

The Government's Response (Cm8707) was:

DFID is in the process of assessing its role in the Arms Export Control Process. Officials will be submitting advice to Ministers in the Autumn, and will update the Committees as soon as possible thereafter.

Please could you state whether officials have submitted their advice to Ministers, and if so, when will the Committees receive this update.

24 April 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Thank you for your letters of 17 April, regarding my recent letters to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the most recent Balance of Competencies review, and the resumption of gifting to the Syrian Opposition. You are right that both of these should have also been sent to the Committees on Arms Export Controls and it was an oversight that they were not.

I have asked the departments who lead on these issues to ensure that in future the CAEC are included in any correspondence.

27 April 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Please could you state whether the Government considers that the use of barrel bombs is contrary to international law, and, if so, please could you also state the provisions in question.

If not, please could you state whether the Government would be willing to press for barrel bombs to be brought within the ambit of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons or any other international arms control agreement.

I should be grateful for your reply by 14 May.

28 April 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

Following your Written Ministerial Statement on 25 March 2014, the Committees on Arms Export Controls have the following questions relating to the new Consolidated Criteria for Arms Export Licensing which replaced those announced by the then Minister of State at the FCO, Peter Hain, on 26 October 2000:

1) Why are the new Criteria entitled “Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria” when the text:

- a) has substantial differences from the EU Council’s Common Position on arms exports not least under the UK Government’s sub-heading “Other factors”,
- b) is not an EU document, and
- c) is clearly the UK’s national variant of the EU Common Position?

2) Why has the policy statement in the previous Criteria announced on 26 October 2000 by the then Minister of State at the FCO, Peter Hain, that “An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed ... by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression or international aggression” been omitted?

3) Why has the statement in the previous Criterion One (d) that the Government will not issue an export licence if approval would be inconsistent with ... “The Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers agreed by the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council, and the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports” been omitted?

I should be grateful for your reply by 8 May.

I am copying this letter to the Foreign Secretary.

28 April 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Hugh Robertson MP, Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

I have pleasure in enclosing the United Kingdom’s national report to the 2014 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Commission, in line with the commitment made by the UK and other Nuclear Weapons States in the NPT Action Plan agreed in 2010.

This report will be tabled by the UK delegation to the NPT Preparatory Committee in New York this week. I have arranged for a copy to be made available in the Library of the House. I am also sending the report to Sir Richard Ottaway.

All my best wishes

Annex- United Kingdom’s national report to the 2014 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Commission

**The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report
Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21
of the NPT Review Conference Final Document**

As provided in the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference Action Plan, the Governments of the five NPT nuclear-weapon states, or “P5”, are working to implement Action 5 to “further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence” and to make national reports on our Action 5 and other undertakings to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee under a common framework, consistent with Actions 20 and 21.

Action 21 states “As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security.” The framework we use for our national reports includes common categories of topics under which relevant information is reported, and it addresses all three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

We encourage all States Parties, consistent with Action 20, to make similar reports.

Section I: Reporting on National Measures Relating to Disarmament

The UK considers the NPT to be the cornerstone of global efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and we are committed to the step-by-step process agreed by consensus at the 2000 RevCon and reaffirmed at the 2010 RevCon.

i. National Security Policies, Doctrine, and Activities Associated with Nuclear Weapons Nuclear Doctrine

The 2006 white paper “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent”,¹ as amended by the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR),² provides our current policy on nuclear deterrence, our capability and force structure. It makes clear that we will maintain only the minimum credible nuclear deterrent, under full political control, in the form of continuous-at-sea patrols of a Vanguard-class submarine carrying Trident ballistic missiles with the fewest warheads since the introduction of our SSBN capability in the 1960s.

We believe we already have the smallest stockpile of nuclear warheads among the recognised nuclear weapons states, and are the only one to have reduced to a single deterrent system since the withdrawal of our air component in the late 1990s.

Operational Policy

The UK has long been clear that we would only consider using our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies. While we remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate their use, we have provided some parameters.

¹<http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-of-the-united-kingdoms-nuclear-deterrent-defence-white-paper-2006-cm-6994>

²<http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-and-security-review-securing-britain-in-an-age-of-uncertainty>

In the 2010 SDSR, the UK strengthened its negative security assurance to state that the UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT. In giving this assurance, we emphasised the need for universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and noted that this assurance would not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations. We also noted that while there is currently no direct threat to the UK or its vital interests from states developing capabilities in other weapons of mass destruction, for example chemical and biological, we reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat, development and proliferation of these weapons make it necessary.

In the interests of international security and stability, the UK has taken steps to lower the operational status of our deterrent system. UK nuclear weapons are not on high alert, nor are they on “launch on warning” status. The patrol submarine operates routinely at a “notice to fire” measured in days rather than minutes as it did throughout the Cold War. The missiles are no longer targeted at any country (they have been de-targeted since 1994). This position was considered and re-affirmed during the work in the 2006 White Paper. We believe that a nuclear attack on the UK's vital interests is deterred by demonstrating our capability to respond under any circumstances, rather than just by an ability for a rapid response. There is no immediacy of launch in our normal operating posture.

The security and safety of our nuclear weapons is given the very highest priority and is entirely consistent with our obligations under non-proliferation agreements. Robust arrangements are in place for the political control of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. There are a number of technological and procedural safeguards built into the UK's nuclear deterrent to prevent an unauthorised launch of its Trident missiles.

Finally, the UK has maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions since 1991.

ii. Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Arms Control (including Nuclear Disarmament) and Verification

Stockpile Size

The UK has achieved substantial reductions in its nuclear weapon stockpile. In the late 1970s, when the UK's stockpile was at its highest, the UK had more than 400 warheads in-service across 5 types. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference the UK has unilaterally decided to cut our stockpile of nuclear warheads, as outlined in the SDSR. Today we have fewer than 225 warheads, all of a single type. We have committed to reducing this maximum stockpile to no more than 180 by the mid 2020s, with the requirement for operationally available warheads at no more than 120, a target that the UK is steadily working towards. All nuclear material no longer deemed necessary for military purposes has been placed under international safeguards. We have also committed to reduce the number of deployed warheads from 48 down to 40 per SSBN. In conjunction, each submarine will then field eight operational Trident ballistic missiles.

Verification

Developing and agreeing effective measures for verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads will be an important precondition for fulfilling the goals of Article VI of the NPT. The UK-Norway Initiative (UKNI) is an example of the world-leading research the UK is undertaking to address some of the technical and procedural challenges posed by effective verification of warhead dismantlement. In 2012, the UK hosted a P5 expert-level meeting on verification to discuss lessons learned from UKNI to date.

We are in our second decade of an active partnership with the United States in monitoring and verification research. Our joint technical cooperation programme allows us to apply policy, technology and programme expertise to develop and evaluate targeted approaches for transparent reductions and monitoring of nuclear warheads, fissile material and associated facilities for potential disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives. Technical experts conduct activities and share information to explore and address essential and difficult monitoring and verification challenges, working to integrate potential approaches for arms control monitoring and transparency. Additionally, the UK and China have conducted two technical exchange visits and will continue to explore collaborative exchanges into arms control and verification research.

iii. Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures

Through the SDSR and other documents, the UK has voluntarily declared its maximum warhead stockpile numbers and operational warhead numbers.

We have also expressed our unconditional support for the 2010 Action Plan at numerous fora. In line with this support, the UK actively participates in regular working level meetings of the P5 Nuclear-Weapon States that advance our collective dialogue on disarmament and review progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The UK held the first P5 Conference in 2009, and looks forward to starting the second cycle of Conferences before the NPT Review Conference in 2015.

The UK actively promotes its work on UKNI to non-nuclear weapon states. This has included hosting a joint UK-Norway workshop for 12 non-nuclear weapon states in December 2011 and side events at the 2010 NPT Review Conferences and the 2012 and 2013 Preparatory Committees. Another side event will be held at the 2014 Preparatory Committee.

Nuclear Glossary

The P5 are, under China's leadership, developing a glossary of nuclear terms to aid understanding between states in discussing related matters. The UK has strongly supported the authoring of this glossary and looks forward to using this multilingual handbook in future work.

iv. Other Related Issues

Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

The UK recognises the CTBT as a key element of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, and provides extensive technical and political support to the CTBT Organisation's (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission. The UK maintains the UK National Data Centre, Eskdalemuir Seismometer Array, a number of other International Monitoring Systems (IMS) stations throughout UK territories and one of 16 global radionuclide laboratories that provide analytical support to the IMS. These facilities are backed up by enduring research in a number of areas, notably through the Atomic Weapons Establishment's Forensic Seismology Team. In addition, the UK is heavily involved in preparations for Integrated Field Exercise 2014 which will evaluate the CTBTO's On-Site Inspection capability.

The UK is active in the CTBTO's Working Groups in Vienna and provides funding for Sir Michael Weston to chair the finance-focused Advisory Group. Our work ensures that the CTBTO has the necessary funding and working time to build and maintain an effective monitoring regime.

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

Since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the UK has upheld a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Since then, all enrichment and reprocessing in the UK has been conducted under international safeguards. We are committed to the pursuit of an international treaty that would put an end to the future production of fissile material for such purposes. We made a commitment in the 2010 NPT Action Plan to begin negotiation within the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The UK supported the resolution at the UN General Assembly First Committee in 2012 to create an FMCT Group of Government Experts (GGE). We hope that the FMCT GGE, in which we are pleased to have a UK Expert participating, will complement existing efforts to find a positive way forward on the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the first session of the GGE, held 31 March-11 April, made a strong and constructive start to the process.

Section II: Reporting on National Measures Relating to Non-proliferation

i. Safeguards

All civil nuclear material in the UK is subject to Euratom safeguards and to the terms of the UK/Euratom/IAEA tripartite safeguards agreement under the NPT. Euratom safeguards obligations stem from Chapter VII (Articles 77-85) of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, which requires the European Commission, inter alia, to satisfy itself that nuclear materials are not diverted from their intended uses as declared by users. This is achieved through:

- a requirement that all operators of nuclear installations provide the Commission with Basic Technical Characteristics (BTCs) describing the location and intended activities of their installation;

- a requirement that operators keep and report nuclear material accountancy records;
- provision for the Commission to inspect installations and records;
- provision for the imposition of sanctions by the Commission in the event of infringement of the Treaty safeguards obligations. These sanctions can range from a published written warning to withdrawal of the nuclear material concerned.

The various reporting requirements are amplified in Commission Regulation (Euratom) 302/05. Euratom safeguards do not apply to nuclear material intended to meet defence requirements.

Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement

The UK Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and Euratom came into force in 1978. The agreement allows for the application of safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in facilities or parts thereof within the UK, subject to exclusions for national security reasons only. Nuclear materials accountancy reports on all civil nuclear material in facilities is provided to the IAEA by Euratom, and the IAEA may “designate” any facility, or part thereof, for inspection. Currently, some of the plutonium stores at Sellafield and the gas centrifuge enrichment facilities at Capenhurst are designated for IAEA inspection. The agreement gives the UK the right to remove facilities and/or withdraw nuclear material from the scope of the agreement for reasons of national security. However, as part of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the UK agreed that any future withdrawals from safeguards would “be limited to small quantities of nuclear materials not suitable for explosive purposes” and undertook to publish information on any such withdrawals.³

Additional Protocol

The UK Additional Protocol to the voluntary offer safeguards agreement is based on the model agreement (INFCIRC/540 corr.), and contains measures aimed at the primary objectives of Additional Protocols – to increase the IAEA’s capability to detect any undeclared nuclear material and activities in Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) or to increase the efficiency of IAEA safeguards. Information, and associated access, is therefore provided on all Protocol-relevant activities that are done in collaboration with or are otherwise relevant to a NNWS, or where the information would improve the effectiveness or efficiency of IAEA safeguards in the UK.

ii. Export Controls

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540

The UK has worked hard to fully implement UNSCR 1540 since its unanimous adoption in 2004. As one of the vice-chairs of the 1540 Committee, the UK works with UN Member States to strengthen efforts to promote universal implementation of the resolution. We work with and through International Organisations and initiatives, including the IAEA and the G8 Global Partnership, to provide technical and financial support to deliver concrete improvements in the security of materials, knowledge and know-how in partner countries; facilitate debate and deliver training to help build partners’ engagement and capacities; and

³ <http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/safeguards/withdrawals.htm>

maintain domestic technical and scientific expertise in counter proliferation, arms control and chemical, biological and nuclear security. UK export controls and enforcement capability enable us to maintain a robust and effective national export control regime, and to strengthen international export controls.

Nuclear Suppliers Group

By fulfilling its obligations under the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee (ZC), the UK contributes to minimizing nuclear proliferation while ensuring that eligible states are able to access nuclear technology for peaceful uses. The UK implements effective strategic export controls in regards to its nuclear transfers in line with the NSG and ZC control lists. Relevant exports are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria and stated UK Government export control policies. A robust enforcement system, underpinned by the Export Control Order 2008, operates to deter attempts to breach the controls and help facilitate legitimate transfers.

The UK also actively supports the work of the NSG and ZC. The UK contributed extensive technical expertise to the NSG's recent three-years-long fundamental review of its control lists, and continues this through the newly established Technical Experts Group, ensuring that the NSG's control lists reflect changing proliferation threats. We also share licensing and enforcement information with fellow Participating Governments, both ad hoc and at the Licensing and Enforcement and Information Exchange Meetings.

In 2013 the UK authored a paper entitled "Good practices for corporate standards to support the efforts of the International Community in the non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction". It was agreed at the 31st Consultative Group meeting and posted on the NSG public website shortly thereafter. The paper recognises the important role that the diverse commercial sector can play in assisting multilateral efforts in non-proliferation of WMD. The UK has supported NSG outreach activities with emerging technology holders.

iii. Nuclear Security

The UK's security regime for the civil nuclear industry is robust and effective and fully meets international standards. Security arrangements are based on the principles of the graded approach and defence in depth and are kept under constant review.

In 2010 the UK deposited its instruments of ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Although the 2005 amendment has not yet entered into force the UK has in place legislation which implements it.

In 2013 the UK extended the scope of its security regulation to cover civil nuclear sites under construction in order to take account of the UK's new nuclear build programme. The legislation had previously regulated operating civil nuclear sites. Revised guidance was issued to the industry by the UK's nuclear regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation, in October 2012, which is a key step towards an increasingly more outcome-focused regulatory regime for

security in the Civil Nuclear Industry. By the end of January 2014 all nuclear premises regulated by ONR Civil Nuclear Security now have National Objectives Requirements Model Standards (NORMS) compliant approved Nuclear Site Security Plans.

Nuclear Information Security

The UK has promoted the need to secure sensitive nuclear information within the framework of the Nuclear Security Summit, the Global Partnership and the IAEA.

Key Attributes of an Excellent Nuclear Security Culture

In 2012 a tripartite sub-group was established (with representatives from the regulator, industry and government) to develop a better understanding of the attributes of an excellent security culture, and for this to be captured and codified. The output of this work is a guidance document⁴ which was published in June 2013. The guide sets out key attributes deemed necessary for an excellent security culture and then sets out for each one what is required to achieve this. The implementation of the recommendations in the guide is not compulsory, but is intended to inform and enhance understanding of how all parties (regulator, industry and government) can deliver to meet the objective.

International Physical Protection Advisory Service

The UK was the first Nuclear-Weapon State to welcome an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission. A Mission Team visited the Sellafield civil nuclear site and Barrow port in October 2011, and concluded that the state of civil nuclear security is robust. The team identified many examples of good practice within the civil nuclear security regime and made a number of valuable recommendations. In March 2014 the UK Government invited the IAEA to send a follow up IPPAS Mission to the UK. The UK provides security experts who participate in a number of outward IPPAS Missions.

iv. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

The United Kingdom continues to support the principle of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. As previously stated in 1995 and 2010, we recognise the role that negative security assurances can play in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and enhancing regional and international security.

Existing Zones

To date, the United Kingdom has signed and ratified Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean), the Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific), and the Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa): 74 states, therefore, already have in place protocols that provide legally-binding negative security assurances from the United Kingdom. We also support the parallel political declarations adopted by the Nuclear Weapon States and Mongolia concerning that country's nuclear weapon free status.

Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

⁴<https://www.nuclear.nscademy.co.uk/system/files/0034%20Spooner%20Security%20Culture%20Leaflet.pdf>

We will continue to pursue signing protocols to existing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones as a practical way of strengthening our existing negative security assurances. The United Kingdom therefore welcomes the forthcoming signature by the Nuclear Weapon States of a Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ). Under this Protocol, the Nuclear Weapon States will extend legally binding assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any CANWFZ Treaty Party and not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the CANWFZ Treaty or its Protocol. The United Kingdom hopes to ratify the Protocol by the end of 2014.

South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

In conjunction with other Nuclear-Weapon States, the United Kingdom will continue to engage with the State Parties to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty in order to allow signature of a Protocol to that Treaty in the near future.

MEWMDFZ

The United Kingdom remains committed to the implementation of the 1995 NPT Resolution on the Middle East and, as one of the co-sponsors of that Resolution, is working hard to deliver against the practical steps agreed in 2010. We look forward to convening an inclusive conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction (MEWMDFZ) as soon as the practical arrangements for that conference are agreed by the states of the region. We will continue to work with all the states of the region, our fellow Co-conveners and the Facilitator, Ambassador Laajava, to encourage progress towards this common goal.

v. Compliance and Other Related Issues/Concerns

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The UK has been fully supportive of all UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the Presidential Statement of 16 April 2012, made in the wake of the satellite launch of 13 April 2012. We continue to support the UN DPRK Panel of Experts in their work, and have reported violations of DPRK sanctions to the Panel. Our work to raise awareness of existing DPRK sanctions and to encourage implementation is ongoing. The UK has funded the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) to run workshops in partnership with the Panel of Experts to raise awareness of DPRK sanctions and encourage implementation in both the public and private sector. In 2013 workshops were held in Sub Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Hong Kong. We plan to continue this work.

The UK is not a member of the Six Party Talks, nor are we seeking involvement in discussions. However, given the risk of the DPRK's nuclear programme to international security, we are maintaining close contact with all sides. We have made clear to the DPRK that if it carries out any further provocations the international community will respond robustly. However, we have also been clear that if the DPRK takes concrete steps to resolve the nuclear issue there will be a positive response.

vi. Other contributions to Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation

Iran

The UK remains concerned about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. However, we are committed to finding a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The UK has adopted a dual track strategy of pressure and engagement. We have supported six UNSCRs which prohibit Iran from all reprocessing, heavy water and enrichment related activity, most recently UNSCR 1929, adopted in June 2010. We continue to call on Iran to fully comply with its obligations under UNSCRs, and to call on all UN member states to implement UNSCRs fully. We actively support the work of the UN Iran Panel of Experts. We have also implemented EU sanctions on Iran which go beyond these measures. In addition, the UK has played an active role in P5+1 negotiations with Iran and we welcome the agreement of the Joint Plan of Action between the E3+3 and Iran in November 2013, as well as Iran's substantive engagement in talks to reach a Comprehensive Agreement.

The UK shares the IAEA's "serious concerns" about the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme due to the credible information available to it which indicates that Iran had carried out activities "relevant to the development of a nuclear device." As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, the UK has supported two IAEA Board Resolutions in 2011 and 2012 which stress that it is essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue to resolve all outstanding substantive issues. We continue to support the IAEA in its tireless efforts to address these issues. We welcome the agreement of a Joint Statement on a Framework for cooperation between Iran and the Agency in November 2013, in which Iran has agreed to resolve all outstanding issues with the Agency. We continue to call on Iran to address fully the substance of all of the Agency's outstanding concerns including by granting access to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested.

Global Partnership

The UK makes a major contribution to the G8 Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction and, as part of the UK's G8 Presidency in 2013, held the Chair of the GP. Under the UK Presidency, the GP established mechanisms to better match GP partners' funds and expertise with specific security requirements, and improve project coordination and implementation. We also held an outreach event with 1540 Committee experts to encourage universal reporting by States (in line with resolution obligations). From 2002-2012, the UK committed over £350m of funding to GP projects.

The UK's largest contribution to the GP is through the Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP). We are working on GTRP programmes that aim to:

- improve the security of fissile materials;
- reduce the number of sites containing sensitive nuclear and radiological material and improve security of remaining sites;
- reduce the risks in the proliferation of biological expertise and materials; and
- prevent terrorists acquiring proliferation-relevant information and expertise.

Academic Technology Approval Scheme

In the UK the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) is responsible for stopping the spread of knowledge and skills from academic programmes that could be used in the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery.

Academic institutions have a mandatory obligation to comply with UK visa requirements. Obtaining a certificate under the scheme is a requirement for all students applying for student visas and intending to enter or remain in the UK for more than six months to undertake post-graduate studies or research in certain designated subjects.

Section III: Reporting on National Measures Relating to the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

i. Promoting Peaceful Uses

The UK fully supports the inalienable right of all state parties to the peaceful uses of civil nuclear energy under the NPT in a culture of openness, transparency and confidence and believes in the responsible, safe and secure access to civil nuclear energy worldwide, subject to the State being in conformity with the non-proliferation requirements of the NPT.

We note the increasing demand for civil nuclear energy and stress its potential in addressing climate change and in providing energy security. Furthermore, we support the work of the IAEA in facilitating achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and sustainable development and in addressing vital non-power applications such as nuclear medicine, agriculture and industry.

Developments in Civil Nuclear Energy

The UK recognises the importance of civil nuclear energy, not least as civil nuclear power facilities need to sit alongside other low carbon forms of electricity generation. The UK has been clear that civil nuclear energy will be a key part of our future low carbon energy mix. It also offers us a cost-effective pathway to meet our legally binding carbon targets. The UK's commitment to civil nuclear power is evident in the steps which have been taken in the last year in relation to the new build programme in the UK. This is being done without subsidy from the Government, but work is being done to secure the long-term commercial investment needed.

Nuclear Industrial Strategy

The UK has taken several steps over the past year to continue our efforts in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We published the Nuclear Industrial Strategy in March 2013, which identified priorities for Government and industry to work together in a long-term partnership. It aims to provide more opportunities for economic growth and create jobs through an increased share of all aspects of the civil nuclear market. One of the main points in the strategy was the creation of the Nuclear Industry Council, which brings together all the key players across the civil nuclear supply chain. The Council will be looking at a number of issues essential to the success of our civil nuclear sector in the future: skills, trade & investment, business capability and how the public perceives the civil nuclear industry.

The Energy Act

The UK Government also recognises the importance of an independent and robust regulatory regime and is committed to creating the highest standards of civil nuclear regulation. To that end, it has embarked on steps to enhance the UK's civil nuclear regulatory framework, to ensure it remains world class and has the flexibility to be able to address future challenges. The Energy Act, which gained Royal Assent in December 2013, includes provisions to establish the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR, created in 2011) as a statutory, independent regulator. The ONR brings together the functions of civil nuclear safety, security, safeguards implementation, radioactive materials transport, and health and safety on civil nuclear sites. The ONR began operating as a statutory body on 1 April 2014.

Memoranda of Understanding

The UK Government is keen to enhance the links between the UK and other countries around the world with the view of enhancing civil nuclear energy cooperation. We made several high profile announcements in this regard last year. These include the signing of Memoranda of Understanding with various countries focusing on, inter alia, setting the strategic framework for collaboration on investment, technology, construction and expertise in civil nuclear energy, and exploring bilateral cooperation opportunities.

The UK Government has several mechanisms through which civil nuclear energy cooperation is enabled, including Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding. In addition to bilateral agreements, we are also party to Euratom cooperation agreements. Our activities in this area indicate a clear intent for the UK to work with various countries across a range of relevant civil nuclear energy related activities, and we are in discussion with several other States regarding how civil nuclear energy cooperation can be enhanced bilaterally.

Nuclear Fuel Assurance

The UK fully supports moves to create a menu of viable and credible assurances of fuel supply, which would enable a new nuclear state to avoid the need to develop expensive and complex indigenous Enrichment technologies. The United Kingdom's Nuclear Fuel Assurance proposal, a response to the IAEA's request for Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNAs), was adopted at the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2011. This is one practical approach ensures that NPT States Parties have access to the peaceful uses of civil nuclear energy, while upholding high standards of safety, security and non-proliferation. The UK views all MNA proposals as complementary, and hopes that states are able to select proposals which contribute best to their energy mix.

ii. Technical Assistance through the IAEA to its Member States

The UK is committed to supporting the IAEA's Technical Cooperation (TC) Programme and demonstrates this by paying our contributions to the TC fund promptly and in full on an annual basis. We are involved in the ongoing discussions regarding the TC Programme and are keen to ensure that it continues to improve, fulfil its potential and provide the vital work that it undertakes.

The UK is very supportive of the contribution that the TC Programme makes towards the Millennium Development Goals. The good work that the TC Programme can achieve should not be underestimated and it has made numerous, positive contributions to the peaceful uses of nuclear-related technologies in many countries around the world.

The UK is encouraging the IAEA to continue to ensure Results-Based Management and “sustainable” outcomes, accountability, transparency and synergies in the TC Programme.

iii. Nuclear Safety and Civil Nuclear Liability

The UK is a strong supporter of co-ordinated international efforts towards the continuous improvement of nuclear safety across the globe. As part of our commitment to achieving high nuclear safety standards the UK aims to show a leadership role in meeting its obligations as a Contracting Party to relevant international nuclear safety instruments such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safe Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste. In particular we are playing a leading role in proposing possible measures to strengthen the Convention on Nuclear Safety peer review processes.

Additionally, the UK has been a Contracting Party to the Paris Convention on nuclear third party liability and the Brussels Supplementary Convention since the 1960s. The Paris and Brussels Conventions were revised by amending Protocols in 2004. The UK is committed to implementing the changes and plans to lay legislation in 2014.

The UK actively encourages all States with civil nuclear programmes, or those thinking about developing one, to join a nuclear liability regime and to become Contracting Parties to the relevant international instruments and in particular the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention.

iv. Other Related Issues

No additional material.

ANY OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT AND/OR STRENGTHEN THE NPT

No additional material.

29 April 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Thank you for your letter of 24 April requesting me to reconsider my position to make public to the Committees on Arms Export Controls which precursor materials that have or could have been used for the manufacture of chemical weapons as declared by the Syrian Regime.

Firstly, I would like to apologise for not having provided you with a full response to your request by the 8 May. Reconsidering your request has brought to light a number of issues that

need to be addressed in conjunction with Whitehall partners. I hope to address these issues very soon with a view to sending you a full reply by the 14 May.

I trust this is acceptable to you and apologise again for any inconvenience caused.

8 May 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Alan Duncan, MP, Minister of State for International Development

Thank you for your letter of 24 April, to Justine Greening, Secretary of State for International Development, about DFID's role in the arms export control process. I am replying on behalf of the Secretary of State.

The process to assess DFID's role has taken longer than anticipated. My officials are designing an update to the methodology used by the Government in relation to Criterion 8. They are preparing to submit advice on this to ministers shortly, and on DFID's wider role in the UK arms export control system. I apologise for the delayed timing and will update the Committees as soon as possible.

As requested, I am copying this letter to Sir Malcolm Bruce, Chair of the International development Committee.

8 May 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Thank you for your letter of 24 April, referring to mine of 6 January, in which you ask for documentary evidence from the EU to support the use of the phrase 'might be used for internal repression' in relation to the decision to suspend exports to Egypt.

As I said in my letter of 6 October 2013, para 8 of the conclusions of the extraordinary meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council on 21 August 2013 states that 'Member States also agreed to suspend export licences to Egypt of any equipment, which might be used for internal repression and to reassess export licences of equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and review their security assistance with Egypt.'

As you are probably aware, paragraph 4 of the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 February 2014 contained a similar statement in respect of Ukraine; 'Member States agreed to suspend export licences on equipment that might be used for internal repression and reassess export licences for equipment covered by the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.'

As you can see, these provisions are qualitatively different from the provision in Criterion 2(a) of the common rules governing control of exports on military technology and equipment, agreed in Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, that Member States shall 'deny an export if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used for internal repression.'

I hope this clarifies the sources of these references.

9 May 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Thank you for your letter of 17 April, about the Government's policy on accepting end-use certificates from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in respect of military and dual-use goods being exported from the UK.

Firstly, I apologise that the answer to your Question was not as full as it might have been. At the time, my officials were in the process of reviewing our interpretation and policy on this issue, which you may be aware, has also been raised with us by the KRG. I am now able to set out our position more fully.

The British Government does not at present accept end-use certificates from the KRG in respect of military goods being exported from the UK. As I am sure you are aware, the UK applies the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria in considering whether to grant licences for export, the first of which is whether the export would contravene the UK's international commitments. In the case of Iraq, an arms embargo was put in place by UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 661 (1990) and 687 (1991). UNSCR 1546 (2004) then stated in paragraph 21 that:

"The Security Council...*decides* that the prohibitions related to the sale or supply to Iraq of arms and related material under previous resolutions shall not apply to arms or related material required by the Government of Iraq or the multinational force to serve the purposes of this resolution, *stresses* the importance for all States to abide strictly by them, and *notes* the significance of Iraq's neighbours in this regard, and *calls upon* the Government of Iraq and the multinational force each to ensure that appropriate implementation procedures are in place.

Our interpretation of UNSCR 1546 is that this exemption to the arms embargo applies to the federal government of Iraq, but cannot be considered as applying to devolved bodies such as KRG. Therefore, all exports of military goods to the KRG would be in breach of sanctions without an end-use certificate from the Government of Iraq (GoI) to demonstrate that the export is required. As part of our review of our interpretation and policy on this issue, we have consulted with various EU Member States, namely France, Germany, Italy, Spain,

Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the Czech republic, who appear to share our interpretation.

This interpretation was also shared with Parliament in a Written Ministerial Statement in November 2010. A Copy of the text is enclosed.

However, the arms embargo set out in the UNSCRs mentioned above does not apply to dual-use goods. In some cases, an end-use certificate may not be required in order to export such goods; this will depend on factors including the nature of the equipment, the final use, and the end user. Where an end-use certificate is required, however, there is no reason why HMG could not accept a certificate from the KRG, signed off at the appropriate level.

We continue to discuss this issue with partners, and to keep our policy on the export of military goods under review, to ensure that we have fully explored all options. I am sure that this is an issue to which you will want to return as part of the Foreign Affairs Committee's Inquiry into HMG policy towards the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and we will therefore keep you informed of any significant developments.

Attachment – Written Ministerial Statement 11 November 2010

Iraq: Export Licence System

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Alistair Burt): The arms embargo in Iraq continues under United Nations Security Council resolution 1546 with exemptions for supplies of arms and related matériel required by the Government of Iraq (GoI) or the multinational force (MNF) to serve the purposes of the resolution.

Following a thorough review of its procedures for processing export licence applications to Iraq, Her Majesty's Government will consider as exempt from the embargo exports to the GoI, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, diplomatic missions in Iraq, the US forces in Iraq, the NATO training mission in Iraq, the UK naval training mission training the Iraqi Navy and entities contracted or subcontracted to the GoI, US or UK forces or NATO. Export licence applications to these end users will not therefore require the approval of the GoI prior to approval of the application but may require extra information to be provided by the entity seeking the export licence. For exports serving the purposes of UNSCR 1546 to entities other than these, the exporter is required to provide a supporting document from the GoI to demonstrate that the proposed export is required and thus exempt from the embargo. All export licence applications for Iraq as elsewhere will be assessed on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria and will not issue a licence where to do so would be inconsistent with the criteria.

9 May 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

Thank you for your letter of 10 April 2014, seeking information about extant export licences for the following countries: Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Fiji, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Libya, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe, Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia and Ukraine.

As of date of this letter there are over 3,400 export licences that remain extant for these destinations and the information you requested is attached at Annex A.

I hope you find this information useful.

12 May 2014

Application Type	Country Outcome	Goods Summary	Total Goods Value
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	military equipment for initiating explosives	491,941
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	electrical connectors	2,725
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	military support vehicles, technology for military support vehicles	1,497,581
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for pistols, pistols (8)	3,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	military airborne equipment	7,539
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	general military vehicle components	402,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	imaging cameras	146,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	287,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for pistols	2,350
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	military support aircraft	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for electronic warfare equipment, electronic warfare equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment	550,195
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	12,848
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography	231
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	285,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	65,250

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	16,278
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	aircraft military communications equipment	15,225
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography	200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	inertial equipment	3,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	body armour	350
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	34,643
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	military improvised explosive device detection equipment	80,742
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	26,498
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography	26,655
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography	27,809
SIEL (Transshipment)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for combat helicopters	451,637
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for electronic warfare equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment	550,195
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	imaging cameras	73,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	5,086

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	body armour, components for body armour	1,360
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	small arms ammunition	81,180
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography	400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	assault rifles (32), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, pistols (17)	56,223
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	178,568
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	119,962
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	83,934
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	125,603
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military helicopters	23,693
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	5,912,739
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	military support vehicles	57,389
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military bridges/pontoons/ferries	104,525
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	16,053
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	equipment employing cryptography	755,212
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment	308,078
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for body armour, military helmets	44,253

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	small arms ammunition	7,850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	small arms ammunition	101,790
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	small arms ammunition	10,269
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military combat vehicles	621,698
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for machine guns, components for pistols, machine guns (25), pistols (25)	38,275
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	209
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	1,427,443
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	gun silencers	620
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	cryptographic software	23
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	assault rifles (13), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, pistols (38), small arms ammunition	81,736
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	body armour, components for body armour	16,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	small arms ammunition	6,230
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	animal pathogens	259
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	technology for the production of biotechnology equipment	3,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	4,401,430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	31,520
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,232,871

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	radiation hardened TV cameras	26,708
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	submersible equipment	109,210
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	human pathogens	300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (15)	12,992
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	equipment employing cryptography	50,700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	equipment employing cryptography	754
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (2)	14,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (1)	7,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	imaging cameras	9,750
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (1)	4,500
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (2)	3,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (600)	210,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	components for sporting guns, sporting guns (1)	4,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (1)	16,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (2)	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	imaging cameras	31,578
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (3)	1,500
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (1)	3,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (2)	4,000

SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (2)	6,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (2)	5,500
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (1)	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (2)	1,277
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	small arms ammunition	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	9,861,331
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	metal alloy powder production equipment	437,385
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (1)	13,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	9,861,331
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	1,493
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	components for sporting guns, sporting guns (2)	9,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Argentina)	civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment	38,346
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (1)	10,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Argentina)	sporting guns (1)	7,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	1,270
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	1,580
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	assault rifles (4), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, pistols (3), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (4)	15,498
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	gun silencers, sniper rifles (1), weapon sights	10,000
SIEL	ISSUE (Bahrain)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	67,500

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military training aircraft	3,765
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	2,870,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for pistols	1,434
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	general military vehicle components	2,428
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	2,846
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	sporting guns (2)	3,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns (6), weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights	68,331
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military aero-engines	1,763
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	2,846
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	48,979
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military training aircraft	1,230
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	2,902
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for sporting guns, sporting guns (3), weapon sights	3,657
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military training aircraft	11,487
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military aero-engines	40,429
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	321,830
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	military communications equipment	24,806
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	24,620
SIEL	ISSUE (Bahrain)	accessories for materials analysis equipment	6,000

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	sporting guns (2)	3,345
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	595
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	gun silencers, sporting guns (1), weapon sights	4,735
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	370
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	inertial equipment	31,990
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for naval guns, components for weapon mountings, equipment for the use of naval guns, naval guns, technology for naval guns, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts	1,517,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	inertial equipment	3,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment	370
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	4,895
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	small arms ammunition	4,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	616
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	assault rifles (5000), components for assault rifles, equipment for the use of assault rifles, weapon cleaning equipment	5,668,374
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for sporting guns, gun silencers, pistols (1), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (4)	35,837
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	inertial equipment	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	inertial equipment	250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military bridges/pontoons/ferries	3,230,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	inertial equipment	38,407

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	2,280,500
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	20,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	8,500
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	inertial equipment	15,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	machine guns (1), sniper rifles (1)	13,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	246,719
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for combat aircraft	1,741,155
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	185,700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	military helmets	400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	7,231,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5,875,950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	machine tools	153,483
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography	52,804
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	combat aircraft	2,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	425
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	general military aircraft components	6,358
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	4,037
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for gun mountings, components for machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns (50)	484,875

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	7,715,745
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military training aircraft	11,662
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5,875,950
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, improvised explosive device jamming equipment	70,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	turrets, weapon mountings	11,950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	hand grenades, training devices containing military pyrotechnic materials	335,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military radars	8,642
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	software for telecommunications jamming equipment, telecommunications jamming equipment	51,273
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military aero-engines	13,058
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for military training aircraft	2,926
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	sporting guns (1)	5,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	imaging cameras	7,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	9,988
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	components for equipment employing cryptography	120,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	imaging cameras	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	X-ray accelerators	1,692,012
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	X-ray generators	1,550,742
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	X-ray generators	1,692,012
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Belarus)	laser optical components	2,700

SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Belarus)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	375,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Burma)	bomb suits, components for bomb suits, components for devices for initiating explosives, non-military firing sets	60,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Burma)	equipment employing cryptography	4,632
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Burma)	inertial equipment	3,200,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Burma)	general laboratory equipment	9,194
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Central African Republic)	components for body armour, military helmets	19,050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Central African Republic)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	168,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Central African Republic)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	9,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for nuclear reactors	42,935
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	21,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, civil NBC detection systems, components for NBC detection equipment, components for civil NBC detection systems, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for civil NBC detection systems, technology for NBC detection equipment	4,882,097
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for the use of nuclear reactors	15,001
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	high speed pulse generators	16,450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	radar equipment	1,550,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	21,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	106,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	electronic measurement equipment	10,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	4,309

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	toxic gas monitoring equipment	557
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general naval vessel components	344,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	180,820
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	materials analysis equipment	20,025
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1,600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	130,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for the development of space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for the production of space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for the use of space qualified focal plane arrays	601,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment	104,101
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for NBC detection equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	69,699
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	606,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for the development of advanced telecommunications equipment, technology for the production of advanced telecommunications equipment	2,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	3,316
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	157,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	283,470
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	523,028
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,578
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	5,820
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	microwave components	400

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	32,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	110,050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	18,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military support aircraft	358,013
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	magnetometers	2,606
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	156,050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	123,370
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	77,920
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	123,290
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	668,850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	95,440
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	156,420
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	410,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,862
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	587,370
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	615,380
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software	1

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	124,110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	836,825
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	18,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	86,879
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography	62,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for instrumentation cameras	24,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	radiation hardened TV cameras	194,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	radiation hardened TV cameras	282,450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	electronic test equipment	22,601
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	biotechnology equipment	27,773
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	237,078
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging camera software	210,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for the development of advanced telecommunications equipment, technology for the production of advanced telecommunications equipment	1,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	6,251
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	309

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military image intensifier equipment	26
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	295,025
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	37,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,675,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	3,487,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,850,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	3,575,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	668,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,850,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	3,550,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	8,587,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,262,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,587,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	6,251
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	radar equipment	262,015
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	uranium isotope separation equipment	1,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools, numerical control software	961,008
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	78,000

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	394
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	4,928
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	650,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	66,960
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibre prepregs	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging camera software, technology for the production of imaging cameras	210,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	154,275
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	2,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	radiation hardened TV camera lenses, radiation hardened TV cameras	71,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	25,023
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	3,408
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	33,370
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	millimetric wave components	14,760
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	79,870
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	2,500,000

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	2,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	4,405
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	21,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy materials	8,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	3,895,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	183,890
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	25,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	149,790
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	630,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	123,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	106,010
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	3,029,150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	numerical control software	1,572,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	126,020
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	183,630
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	575,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	123,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	174,050
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	technology for submersible equipment	2

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	image intensifier tubes, imaging cameras	132,754
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	21,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	89,385
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	15,250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	22,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	167,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	25,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	accelerometers	10
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	72,480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	306,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	542,739
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	space qualified focal plane arrays	104,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	28,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	16,800

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	25,788
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	315,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	210,024
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	187,270
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	biotechnology equipment	2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	164,460
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	133,840
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	109,700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the use of military communications equipment	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	24,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	37,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	3,056
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	dimensional measuring equipment	23,330
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for advanced telecommunications equipment	4,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for nuclear reactors, technology for nuclear reactors	42,936
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment, technology for equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment	42,936
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	140,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military communications equipment	20
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	mass spectrometers	558,220
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, military parametric technical databases, technology for NBC detection equipment	185,218
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	274
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	280,024
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for periscopes	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for nuclear reactors	14,999
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	22,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,587,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	30,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for civil explosive detection/identification equipment	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	33,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	160,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	2,980
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	1,100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	1,700,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	870,428
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	786,278
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	880,000

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	2,166
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	127,590
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	520
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	1,950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	121,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,687,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,106,875
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for nuclear reactors	3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	817
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	19,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	96,135
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,092,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	numerical control software	278,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	394
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,710
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	28,500
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,075

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	26,150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	721,110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	721,110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	submersible equipment	3,428
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	147,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	241,875
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	10,537,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military electronic equipment, military electronic equipment	4,914
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	182,773
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	40,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	360,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,130
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for combat aircraft	300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	140,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	weapon sights	18,239
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	weapon sights	150,000
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	7,877
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	22,812
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,740
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	13,891,440
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor process equipment	842,758
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	5,427,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	52,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	705,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	civil NBC protection clothing	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	2,261
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	263,494
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	128,470
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	126,040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	126,040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	441,140
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	39,290
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,550,000
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	336,000,000

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	197,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	333,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	35,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	civil NBC protection clothing	3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	energetic materials additives	360
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	766,950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for NBC detection equipment	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	nickel powders	4,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	nickel powders	9,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	8,170
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for nuclear reactors	73,108
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	2,988
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools, numerical control software, software for machine tools	351,880
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	civil NBC protection clothing	593
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	magnetometers	505
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	138
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,043,750
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	9,812,500

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	15,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	8,350,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	725,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	3,662,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	8,812,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	38,562,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	2,272
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	86,405
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	mass spectrometers	526,856
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	mass spectrometers	479,685
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	mass spectrometers	393,082
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	104,280
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	162,030
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,027
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	567,107
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	civil NBC protection clothing	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	numerical control software	1,500,000
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	civil NBC protection clothing	13,100

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	vibration test equipment	120,602
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	30,579
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	193,783
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for instrumentation cameras	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for instrumentation cameras	8,140
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for instrumentation cameras	12,810
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	unfinished products for military aero-engines	123,878
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,238
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	1,238
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,816
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for military helicopters	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for nuclear reactors	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	nickel powders	4,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,850,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	37,000,000
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	14,500,000

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	laser optical components	4,280
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	129,785
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	civil NBC protection clothing	92,709
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	15,612
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	56,745
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	mass spectrometers	344,099
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	weapon sights	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	1,605
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	970,110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	970,110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	69,127
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	504
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	520,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	10,950,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military radars	1,476,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	637,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,725,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,687,500
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	460,000

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	civil NBC protection clothing	746
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	451,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	2,776,150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	970,110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment	3,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, magnetometers	3,333
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	12,582
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	16,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	small arms ammunition	2,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	42,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for the production of civil aero-engines	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography	12,850,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	high speed pulse generators	17,793
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for imaging cameras	100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	4,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	5,174
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	15,000
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	4,535

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	29,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, magnetometers	7,038
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	accessories for digital computers, accessories for vibration test equipment, components for vibration test equipment, digital computers, software for vibration test equipment	45,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	114,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	55,302
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military electronic equipment	10
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	43,411
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	laser optical components	8,560
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	970,110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for NBC detection equipment	500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for chemical agent detection equipment, software for chemical agent detection equipment, technology for chemical agent detection equipment	471,150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	25,001
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	submersible vehicles	1,736,777
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	20,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,095,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	881,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	21,750,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,139
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	41,888
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	3,430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	3,430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	3,430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	3,430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	9,972
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	139,740
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	200,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	625,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	19,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	37,455

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	46,183
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	423,088
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	253,176
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy tubes	14,996
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	92,575
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	528,150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	137,170
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	165,435
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	12,105
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	19,917
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	RF direction finding equipment	25,188
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	pressure transducers	1,868
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	1,368
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	dimensional inspection equipment	120,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	rebreathing swimming equipment	25,043
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	3,442
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	19,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	28,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	74,050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for the development of space qualified focal plane arrays	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment, marine position fixing equipment	264,325
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	127,740
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	30,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,888,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	192,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,955,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	606,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,043,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor process equipment	1,705,142
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	74,050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	522
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	25,001
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	173,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	40,622

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	32,710
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,394
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	601
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat aircraft	418,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	12,903
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	516,384
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	5,148
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	39,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	41,025
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	355,525
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	12,782
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	10,223
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	37,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	46,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	68,400
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	96,000

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	2,615
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	biotechnology equipment	6,815
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	pressure transducers	503
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	476,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	606,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,325,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	civil NBC detection systems	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	thorium	743
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	19,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	27,539
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,846,350
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	59,850,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	3,824,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for the production of military communications equipment	500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	47,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	55,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,195,400
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	7,959

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military communications equipment	190
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	3,000,720
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	2,762,548
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	6,758
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military electronic equipment	2,510
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	9,972
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	74,929,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	15,830
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	civil NBC protection equipment	3,982
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for chemical agent detection equipment, equipment for the use of chemical agent detection equipment, software for chemical agent detection equipment, technology for chemical agent detection equipment	50,602,435
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	153,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	80,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	94,195
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	146
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	25,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	space qualified focal plane arrays	230,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	24,645
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	18,589

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	107,120
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	nuclear grade graphite	10,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	5,636
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	14,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military helicopters	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	170,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	565,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	submersible equipment	53,040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	530,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,607,450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	618,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	418,250

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,132
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	24,411
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for instrumentation cameras	46,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	guidance/navigation equipment	26,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	320,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	19,719
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	1,852
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	60,684
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military communications equipment	5,276
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	31,658
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	submersible equipment	3,381
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	40,045
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5,400,720
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	27,295
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,925,000

SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	226,545
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	128,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general naval vessel components	19,845
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	321
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,508
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	magnetometers	3,366
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	960,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	143,040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	900,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	45,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	226,840
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	181,618
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	51,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,650,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,867,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,062
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,345,000

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat aircraft	299,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,968,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,050,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	970,110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	410,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	262,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	2,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,525,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	2,254
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military electronic equipment	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	36,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	213,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	44,654
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	690,550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,184,500
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,529

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	11,850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for computer analogue to digital equipment, technology for computer analogue to digital equipment	2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	118,539
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	76,344
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	239,540
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for civil aero-engines	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	35,448
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	electronics cooling fluids	55,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,311,535
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	72,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	11,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,943
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	27,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	laser optical components	24,234
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	190
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software	1

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,229
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	31,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	3,792
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	169
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	21,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	24,411
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	24,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	280,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	175,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	187,590
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	519,700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	437,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	7,310
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	laser optical components, lasers	456,504
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	24,688
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,755
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	pressure transducers	1,354

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	225,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	magnetometers	3,986
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,062
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	mass spectrometers	470,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	350,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	99,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	44,930
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	72,255
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	203,050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	249,030
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,016,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	33,156
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	91,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	28,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	22,263
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	730,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	chemicals used for chemical/materials production	27,634
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	100,024
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,308,575
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	65,772
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,869,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,087,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,043,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	35,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	22,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	22,848
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,396
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	110,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	25,620
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	38,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,211
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	12,964,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,062
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military aircraft ground equipment	14,040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	5,265
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military patrol/assault craft	72,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	18,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	639,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	4,380
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	107,120
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,424
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	28,943
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	24,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	2,460,659
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	128
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	44,295

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	2,169
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor process equipment	975,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	61,958
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	mass spectrometers	330,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	441,580
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	195,493
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17,164
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	72,970
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	71,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,687,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	ballistic test equipment	161,902
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military helicopters	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	10,325
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays	27,854
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat aircraft	310,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	185,077
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	84,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	44,430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	9,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	97,650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	99,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	15,995
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for periscopes	17
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	2,527
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	biotechnology equipment	66,095
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	7,725
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	97,650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	120,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	11,976
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	14,121
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,462,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,575,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	737,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	19,256
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	28,307
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,559

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers, technology for semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,610,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	10,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, civil NBC detection systems, civil explosive detection/identification equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, components for civil NBC detection systems, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment, technology for civil NBC detection systems	394,809
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,749
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	5,247
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	852,562
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	35,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	180,070
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	12,228
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	79,864
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	760,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	44,735
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,462,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	737,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	7,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	318,806
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	55,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military aero-engines	15,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	27,177
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	26,413
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor process equipment	802,894
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	4,010
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25,480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	327,883
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,955
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	civil NBC detection software, civil NBC detection systems, components for civil NBC detection systems	511,324
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for metal alloy materials	200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor process equipment	1,095,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	105,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	11,048
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	276,895
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	36,309
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	11,002
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	19,496
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	4,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,925,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,231,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,475,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	455,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	8,937,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,462,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,256,111
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military aero-engines	37,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	22,520
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	27,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	140,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for weapon cleaning equipment, weapon cleaning equipment	1,934,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	20,514
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	17,607
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military electronic equipment	50
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	992
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,608

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	479
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	53,727
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for equipment for the production of gas turbines, technology for military aero-engines	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for equipment for the production of gas turbines, technology for military aero-engines	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	calibration equipment for guidance/navigation equipment	5,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	biotechnology equipment	2,635
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	15,540
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat naval vessels	132,960
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	32,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	38,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	957,024
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	21,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	382
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,738
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment	281,269
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,933
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,500,000
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	342,671

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	304
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	19,104
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	5,430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	11,767
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military radars	260,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	civil NBC detection software, civil NBC detection systems, components for civil NBC detection systems	1,012,717
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	208,014
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	516,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	294
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,558
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	118,052
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	32,761
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	24,580
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	electronics cooling fluids	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,270,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	5,847
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	84,000
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	17,607

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	896
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures	2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,411
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	6,686
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,955
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	22,665
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,462,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	12,787,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	392,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	2,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	392,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	392,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	893,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	893,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,644
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17,140
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	67,294
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	19,400

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military radars	6,900,996
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	pyrotechnics/fuels and related substances	562,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,925,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	13,162,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for imaging cameras	1,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military aero-engines	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	30,151
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	5,790
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	185,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	135,530
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	15,601,440
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	71,160
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	general purpose integrated circuits	468,040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	13,570
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	6,003
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	120,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	1,240,986
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	23,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	23,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for lasers	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	27,468
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	magnetometers	9,974
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	84,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	27,356
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	25,482
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	25,482
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography	20
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,040,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography	1,315
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,834
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	120,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	dimensional measuring equipment	10,275
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	2,398,682

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	3,006
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	39,970
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	388,044
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	970,110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,294,871
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	37,662
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	292,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	4,708
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	7,279
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	225
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	12,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,790
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	336,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	16,875,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	13,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	1,680
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (China)	military communications equipment	2,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	84,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	61,690
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	16,604
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	126,390
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7,380
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicle control systems, submersible vehicles	2,350,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for mass spectrometers, mass spectrometers	342,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	70,221
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	22,390
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20,175
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	65,650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	9,525,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	242,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	61,875
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,725,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	11,425,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	12,500

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,925,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,010,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military patrol/assault craft, unfinished products for military patrol/assault craft	755,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	6,200,480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	21,645
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for equipment employing cryptography	3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	25,430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	797,562
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	19,354
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	26,860
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	932,608
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	24,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	932,608
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	932,608
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	857,999
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	895,303
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	820,695

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	932,608
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	857,999
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	857,999
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	932,608
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	919,872
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20,065
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	41,846
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	submersible equipment	311,407
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	200,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,339
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	26,860
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	11,110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	13,860
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	bomb suits	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	1,600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	33,887,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,900,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	760,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	260,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	30,380
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	19,803
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	7,435
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	145,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	290,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	chemicals used for chemical/materials production	124,623
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17,281
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	13,861
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	28,976
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	16,764
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	9,775
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9,528
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	37,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	84,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17,280
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,702
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	2,398,682
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military helicopters	52,360
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20,320

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	18,297
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	15,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military aero-engines	60,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	68,650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,465
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	40,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	40,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloys in powder form	2,232
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	51,448
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,949
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	high speed pulse generators, instrumentation cameras	30,760
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	high speed pulse generators	19,050
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	40,261
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	9,425,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,043,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, general naval vessel components, military guidance/navigation equipment, radar equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	93,778
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	microwave components	100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,462,500

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	14,625,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,850,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	21,417
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	25,412,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20,320
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	23,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,425
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	dimensional measuring equipment	24,139
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	4,177
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	submersible equipment	92,395
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	62,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat aircraft	299,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	30,610
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	26,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	63,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	software for cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, military training equipment	20,610

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	1,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	6,000,480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	22,622
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, general naval vessel components, military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	93,778
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor process equipment	721,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	11,000,480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	8,190
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	836,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	2,166,865
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	467,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,597,317
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,597,317
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,190,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	1,214,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat naval vessels	9,112
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat naval vessels	2,748
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	dimensional inspection equipment, dimensional measuring equipment, machine tools	5,052,410
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	3,811

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	29,645
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	13,125
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	29,060
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	760,424
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloys in powder form	7,317
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	2,895,398
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	2,895,398
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	28,437
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	22,162,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	3,172,712
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for lasers	3,172,712
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	47,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for submersible equipment, submersible equipment	472,860
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	118,579
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	363,677
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	18,942
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	radiation hardened TV camera lenses, radiation hardened TV cameras	22,660
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	radiation hardened TV cameras	22,660
SIEL	ISSUE (China)	lasers	44,430

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	small arms ammunition	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9,480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	784,848
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	helium-3	392,424
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	62,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	12,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	microwave components	44,956
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	calibration equipment for guidance/navigation equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, magnetometers	26,947
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	30,937
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	44,430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for combat aircraft	9,006
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	microwave components	50,280
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	1,978,791
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	focal plane arrays	400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	gravity gradiometers	2,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	machine tools	1,160,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	6,450,048
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	2,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	44,208
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	26,181
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	257,584
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	guidance/navigation equipment	66,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5,800,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	21,110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	1,830,863
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	aromatic polyamide-imides	600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	5,210
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	5,210
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	174,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	microwave components	48,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	3,975
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	2,760,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	1,140,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor process equipment	820,192
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	1,561
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17,812

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	145,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software	9,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	20,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	582,612
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	36
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	21,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,877
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	23,229
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military aero-engines	174,370
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	instrumentation cameras	28,226
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	30,030
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	9,362
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	2,100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	15,524
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	900,002
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	29,312,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	27,912,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	108,680

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	27,325,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	33,887,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,925,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials	2,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	588,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	582,612
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	1,680
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	4,482
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	15,056
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17,280
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	15,056
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,074
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	12,560
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, radar equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	90,275
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military support aircraft	4,610
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for lasers	5,053
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	inertial equipment	19,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	30,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	17,812

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	lasers	37,037
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	components for military aero-engines	146,113
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	68
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	13,760
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	8,510
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	imaging cameras	40,980
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	electronics cooling fluids	40,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography	60,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	2,859
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for military aero-engines	1,235,358
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	inertial equipment	13,106,924
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	telecommunications software	18,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	imaging cameras	32,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military helmets	244
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	inertial equipment	3,750,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for military aero-engines	1,476
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for military training aircraft	371
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military guidance/navigation equipment	974,628

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment	8,637
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	5,738
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	5,738
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography	2,516
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	191,540
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	body armour	2,450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	instrumentation cameras	40,676
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military patrol/assault craft	11,200,637
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	body armour, civil body armour	20,150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	cryptographic software	40,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	body armour	324,405
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	51,275
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military aircraft ground equipment	10,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	578,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for military support aircraft	2,950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for assault rifles, components for machine guns, components for pistols, equipment for the use of machine guns, training small arms ammunition	430,263
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	161,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	56,423
SIEL	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for artillery	10,737

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military aero-engines	93,764
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	high performance air traffic control software	80
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	56,423
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Colombia)	NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	14,570
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	24,349
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Colombia)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	9,566
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	40,315
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas	1,036,738
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	79,631
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	751,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	987
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	1,653

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	3,472
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	military support vehicles	32,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	6,239
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	53,571
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	2,291
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	59,538
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	17,859
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	1,474
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	339

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	equipment employing cryptography	54,514
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives	12,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	528,921
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, military helmets	1,162,225
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for pistols, pistols (1)	386
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	32,955
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	4,602
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	submersible equipment	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	body armour, components for body armour, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets	23,640
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	inertial equipment	15,612
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	inertial equipment	15,612
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for pistols, pistols (1)	483
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military radars	545,542
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of depth charges, military equipment for initiating explosives	5,920
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	submersible equipment	56,390
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	toxins	11,367
SIEL	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	21,208

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	7
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	assault rifles (600), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), sporting guns (150), weapon sights	1,758,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	1,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	1,162,225
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	33,150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military support aircraft	463
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (200), weapon sights	1,771,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military support aircraft	3,762
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for submersible vehicles	1,744
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	military aero-engines	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	9,115
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military helicopters, military guidance/navigation equipment	43,428,430
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	21,979
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military helicopters	1,761,871
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	39,212
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,168
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	general military vehicle components	12,657

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	assault rifles (100), components for assault rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sights	230,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	8,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	software for equipment employing cryptography	99,711
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	assault rifles (600), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (350), weapon sights	1,713,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military training aircraft	860
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	2,937
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military radars	7,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	imaging cameras	35,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	16,337
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment	32,785
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,089
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	general military aircraft components	1,535
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	training small arms ammunition	7,704
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	12,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	543
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	540
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for radio jamming equipment, electronic warfare equipment, radio jamming equipment	960,500

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	inertial equipment	2,239
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,636
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for ballistic test equipment	1
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	3,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	submersible equipment	324,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	submersible equipment	324,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Egypt)	civil NBC detection systems	21,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	2,152
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Egypt)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	294,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Egypt)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	168,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	1,172,633
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment	49,999
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Egypt)	weapon cleaning equipment	19,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1,483,602
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	5,235,920
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	8,520
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	materials testing equipment	2,133
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	26
SIEL	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	6,000

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	submersible equipment	694,890
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Egypt)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	4,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	60,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	1,625
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Egypt)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	40,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	machine tools	72,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	machine tools	71,706
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	cryptographic software	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	military communications equipment	60,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military communications equipment	30
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	1,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Egypt)	equipment employing cryptography	17,528
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Eritrea)	inertial equipment	960,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Eritrea)	body armour, military helmets	8,640
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Fiji)	devices for initiating explosives	37,720
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	equipment employing cryptography	2,608
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for general industrial production equipment, lubricants, valves	310
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for electronic measurement equipment	34,859
SIEL	ISSUE (Iran)	components for industrial gas turbines	542,068

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	gas detection equipment	17,386
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	equipment employing cryptography	940
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	electronic measurement equipment	500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for industrial gas turbines, industrial gas turbines	12,565,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	electrical test equipment	1,037
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for electronic measurement equipment	24,546
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for welding equipment	133,203
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	64,779
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	general laboratory equipment, seals	15,725
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	accessories for pressure monitoring equipment, pressure monitoring equipment, technology for pressure monitoring equipment	65,911
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	55,036
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	32,134
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	7,770,350
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for petrochemical plant, components for pneumatic systems, seals	4,604
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	accessories for transducers, transducers	810
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	59,390
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	30,894
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	85,576

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	41,970
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	205,514
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	surface coating equipment	1,035,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	79,930
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	299,588
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	534,161
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	793,901
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	equipment employing cryptography	38,835
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for industrial gas turbines	473,708
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	equipment employing cryptography	5,395
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	5,077
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for military electronic equipment	402,518
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	general laboratory equipment	8,092
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	materials analysis equipment	49,382
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	862,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	biochemicals	11,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	biochemicals	1,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	biochemicals, general laboratory equipment	8,669
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	biochemicals, general laboratory equipment	4,026

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	chemicals	677,952
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	biochemicals	991
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	chemicals, components for biotechnology equipment, components for filtration equipment, general laboratory equipment	20,510
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	biochemicals	428
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	611,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	1,632,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	civil aero-engines	10,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	1,244,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for civil aircraft	625,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	components for equipment for the use of industrial gas turbines, equipment for the use of industrial gas turbines	40,178
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	valves	571,038
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iran)	steam systems	34,965
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	710,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment	175,560
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	212,480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for aircraft missile protection systems	26,203
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights	23,790
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	deuterium compounds	155,635
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	30,099

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment	28,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment for the use of military communications equipment	39,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	5,226
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for military support aircraft	577,835
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for body armour, military helmets	125,416
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	26,498
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	body armour, components for body armour	22,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	blank/inert ammunition, components for blank/inert ammunition, components for naval guns, equipment for the use of naval guns, technology for equipment for the use of naval guns, technology for naval guns	1,181,290
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	296,905
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	software for spectrophotometers, spectrophotometers	5,076
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	294,784
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	35,040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	1,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	4,602
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	X-ray accelerators	3,986,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	technology for military training aircraft	100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,455,500
SIEL	ISSUE (Iraq)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	1,373,505

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	2,485
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	11,451
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	software for equipment for the use of naval guns	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for naval gun installations/mountings, inertial equipment	3,746,981
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings	3,466,981
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	2,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	42,514
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	civil NBC protection equipment	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, civil body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	45,520
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for body armour	320
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	7,329
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, imaging cameras, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	431,560
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Iraq)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment, military communications equipment	15,390
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	X-ray generators	5,321,590
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	24,983
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	technology for anti-riot/ballistic shields, technology for body armour, technology for military helmets	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	X-ray generators	1,435,270
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment for the production of military helmets	369,500

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	inertial equipment	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	inertial equipment	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	426,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	ballistic test equipment	107,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	80,948
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,308,725
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	X-ray generators	2,168,101
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for body armour	292,800
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Iraq)	bomb suits, components for demolition charges, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	9,055
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Iraq)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, military communications equipment, military laser protection equipment	15,790
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	cryptographic software	100,848
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Iraq)	cryptographic software	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for body armour	597,800
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Iraq)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	28,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography, high performance air traffic control software	667,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for military support vehicles	4,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	bomb suits, military helmets	469,907
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	33,384

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography	51,378
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for air-to-surface missiles	17,927
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general military vehicle components	6,525
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	ballistic test equipment, software for ballistic test equipment, technology for ballistic test equipment	23,069
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military cameras/photographic equipment	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1,150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	216,534
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	361,620
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	electronics cooling fluids	84,646
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	10,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	6,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	2,040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	2,320
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	dimensional measuring equipment	35,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	dimensional measuring equipment	1,400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	nuclear grade graphite	19,331
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	7,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	32,889
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	22,700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military training equipment	28,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment	404,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	98,559
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	70,013
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	12,950,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	5,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	9,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	22,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	329,293
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	420,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	262,809
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	weapon sights	62
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	106,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	15,192
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	4,400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	biotechnology equipment	36,060
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	10,063

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for unmanned air vehicles	73,070
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	nickel powders	21,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	small arms ammunition	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	42,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	107,785
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	333,402
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	133,496
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	11,028,324
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	21,308
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for the use of composite structures	2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	14,684
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	232,146
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	2,765
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	609,559
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	8,135
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	14,968
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	120,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	dimensional measuring equipment	870,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	110,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	fibre prepregs	69,860
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	constituents of propellants	1,140
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	nickel powders	92,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	8,081,269
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	3,524
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	210,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	rangefinding equipment	5,161
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	4,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for advanced telecommunications equipment	264,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	9,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	triggered spark gaps	116,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military communications equipment	21,646
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	273
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military electronic equipment	3,891
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	66,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	130,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	electronics cooling fluids	1,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	210,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	99,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	80,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	nuclear grade graphite	97,385
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	47,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	civil NBC protection equipment	1,967
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for aircraft missile protection systems	69,700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	armoured plate, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	145,007
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for unmanned air vehicles, launching/ground support equipment for unmanned air vehicles	98,566
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	3,530
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	391
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for combat naval vessels	1,576
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for combat naval vessels	7,666
SIEL (Transshipment)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for small arms ammunition	2,395
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	664
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	37,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	16,212

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	electronic countermeasure equipment	10,906,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	24,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	1,550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	36,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	13,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1,200,025
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	270,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	13,755,692
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	11,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	gyroscopes	14,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	4,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for global positioning satellite receivers	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	aircraft military communications equipment	17,796
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	diver location sonars, software for diver location sonars	418,824

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	28,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	650,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for civil aero-engines	1,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	lasers	113,295
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	200,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	13,875
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	7,765,450,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	5,225
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,015
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	47,276
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	electronics cooling fluids	81,101
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	unfinished products for military support aircraft	11,926
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	pressure transducers	11,164
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	7,648
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	22,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for aircraft missile protection systems	9,906
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	gyroscopes	460,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	nickel powders	3,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1,750,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	constituents of propellants	51
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	4,593
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	600,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	gyroscopes	37,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	2,425,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	4,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	120,939
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	6,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	190,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	helium-3	43,245
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	lasers	80,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military communications equipment	23,546
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military support aircraft	22,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for surface-to-surface missiles	21,133
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloys in powder form	200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	150,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	8,360
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	3,026
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	25,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	2,263
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	130,997
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military support aircraft	2,677
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for surface launched rockets, test models for surface launched rockets	34,797
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	628
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, pressure transducers	505,292
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, electronics cooling fluids, pressure transducers	987,140
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	nickel powders	9,662
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	nuclear grade graphite	9,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	420,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	755,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	110,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military support vehicles	34,800

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	106,778
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general purpose integrated circuits	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	4,264
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, pressure transducers	738,370
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	26,880
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	596
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	general military vehicle components	21,035
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	5,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software	3,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, pressure transducers	344,443
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for equipment employing cryptography	14,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1,314
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	6,720
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	8,459
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military aero-engines	92,456
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	550,000

SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the use of military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	19,315
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1,450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	inertial equipment	53,600
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	8,987
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, bomb suits, components for body armour	5,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	132,573
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,198
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military support aircraft	505,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military electronic equipment	266,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	9,064
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	80,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	accelerometers	2,886
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military aero-engines	3,188
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	83,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	3,015

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	765,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	131,581
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	679
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1,177,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	133,323
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	2,250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for unmanned air vehicles	65,393
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	266,663
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	18,119
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	300,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	21,336
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	12,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	rebreathing swimming equipment	17,760
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	4,254
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	small arms ammunition	80,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloys in particulate form	1,316

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the use of military electronic equipment	17,602
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	163,485
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military communications equipment	5,600
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	11,979
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the use of decoying/countermeasure equipment	45,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	16,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the use of weapon sights	8,170
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	military electronic equipment	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	8,889
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general purpose integrated circuits	1,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	11,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military parametric technical databases, software for equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	2,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military airborne equipment	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general military vehicle components	19,006
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software	210
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for body armour, components for military support vehicles	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	200,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for small arms ammunition	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	7,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloys in powder form	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	24,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for air-to-surface missiles, test models for air-to-surface missiles	45,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military support aircraft	2,080
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	34,591
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	42,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	17,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military communications equipment	33,990
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	13,974
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	525,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software	26,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	973,013
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	4,645
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general purpose integrated circuits	330,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	3,318
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	11,600

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic countermeasure equipment	11,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	software for equipment employing cryptography	13,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	NBC detection equipment, civil NBC detection systems, components for NBC detection equipment, components for civil NBC detection systems, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of chemical agent detection equipment	89,546
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	triggered spark gaps	360,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	3,851
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	55,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	pressure transducers	500
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	1,850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	14,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	108,675
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	targeting equipment	9,699
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	5,660
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	33,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	biotechnology equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	20,040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	beryllium alloys, beryllium manufactures	3,066
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	2,931,805

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	78,140
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	gyroscopes	13,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	3,468
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	23,270
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	15,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloys in powder form	11,347
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for civil aero-engines	40
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	9,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	324,950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	19,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1,150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military communications equipment	9,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	31,014
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	general military vehicle components	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general purpose integrated circuits	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	25,808
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for unmanned air vehicles	58,125

SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	8,755
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for combat aircraft	55,357
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	45,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	15,098
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for small arms ammunition	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	5,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	197,550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	22,350
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	180,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military communications equipment	180,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	1,060,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	74,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military combat vehicles	2,497
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	biotechnology equipment	35,750
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	laser radar equipment	3,200,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	armoured plate	11,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	high power RF weapon systems	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	lasers	188,825
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	3,900,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military electronic equipment, military electronic equipment	38,242
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	35,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	pressure transducers	740
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	53,644
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	102,626
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	350,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	350,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	118,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	instrumentation cameras	21,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	anti-friction bearings	42,025
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	machine tools	117,766
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	325,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	anti-armour ammunition	8,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,105
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	378

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	7,105
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	aircraft military communications equipment	67,328
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	18,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	65,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	9,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	547,537
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	62,125
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	125,475
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	54,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software	6,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	2,300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for combat naval vessels	6,261
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for combat naval vessels	10,310
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, military electronic equipment	235,838
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for combat aircraft	5,196
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	machine tools	155,015

SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	focal plane arrays	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	general naval vessel components	8,764
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	12,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	18,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	5,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for sniper rifles	793
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military support aircraft	415,895
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	109,416
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	948
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	218,334
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	20,739
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	8,274
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	52,700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for combat naval vessels	10,957
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for equipment employing cryptography	3,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	28,114
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	22,350
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	11,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	19,760

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	water cannons	67,188
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	105,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	154,077
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	26,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	training small arms ammunition	1,990
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	8,650,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	219,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	lasers	306,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	25,824
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	10,878
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military communications equipment	27,738
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	20,086
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	7,105
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for civil NBC protection equipment	40,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras, weapon night sights	1,913,407
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	military equipment for initiating explosives	400

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for electronic warfare equipment	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	46,017
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for unmanned air vehicles	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	520
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for submarines	2,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	lasers	74,610
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	software for military aero-engines	11,878
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	general military vehicle components	32,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography	255,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	dimensional measuring equipment	4,002,167
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	dimensional measuring equipment	1,305,970
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	165,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	targeting equipment, technology for targeting equipment	8,759
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	288,270
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	234,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	3,796

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military radars	9,550
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military helicopters	7,481
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for targeting equipment	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	aircraft military communications equipment	3,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	4,495
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military communications equipment	25,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	weapon sights	224,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Israel)	direct view imaging equipment	8,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Israel)	signal generators	18,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Korea, North)	components for electronic measurement equipment, electronic measurement equipment	8,340
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	cryptographic software	638
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	7,460
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	assault rifles (30), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of pistols, pistols (30), small arms ammunition	103,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	body armour, components for body armour	5,220
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	military combat vehicles, military support vehicles	145,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	components for combat aircraft	52,866
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour	1,528,800
SIEL	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	2,600

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	targeting equipment	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	971,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	imaging cameras	6,952
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	3,390,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	accessories for improvised explosive device disposal remotely operated vehicles, bomb suits, civil explosive detection/identification equipment, gun mountings, improvised explosive device disposal remotely operated vehicles, military helmets, sporting guns (9)	1,833,981
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	1,090
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	472
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	501,771
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	38,875
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	assault rifles (35), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, hand grenades, pistols (21), small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment	72,647
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	inertial equipment	9,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	military support vehicles	11,000
SIEL	ISSUE (Libya)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	17,940

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	combat shotguns (5)	4,601
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	improvised explosive device jamming equipment	255,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	2,764
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	6,873
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	NBC detection equipment	78,460
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	11,822
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	pistols, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition	38,850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	962
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Libya)	military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	2,330,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	232,954
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	693
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	4,389
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,460
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	1,367
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	X-ray accelerators	1,994,757
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	imaging cameras	21,080
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	57,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	25,013
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives	24,304
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography	13,813
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	civil body armour, components for body armour	1,138
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	X-ray accelerators, technology for X-ray accelerators	13,341,333
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	X-ray accelerators, components for X-ray accelerators, software for X-ray accelerators, technology for X-ray accelerators	5,012,667
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Libya)	cryptographic software	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	bomb suits, improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, military helmets	67,534
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Libya)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	10,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	body armour, components for body armour	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	27
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Libya)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Occupied Palestinian Territories)	equipment employing cryptography	5,539
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (4), weapon sights	42,600

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	2,029
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for electronic measurement equipment, electronic measurement equipment	11,298
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat naval vessels	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, software for equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military airborne equipment	4,408,971
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	software for equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military airborne equipment	6,123
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	24,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat naval vessels	1,577
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat helicopters	375
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles	2,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the production of artillery ammunition	8,143,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military airborne equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military support aircraft, military communications equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	761,553
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat naval vessels	173
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	workshop tools	6,272
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for general laboratory equipment, general laboratory equipment	1,210
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	119
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	4,705
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat helicopters	1,600
SIEL	ISSUE (Pakistan)	electronic warfare equipment	8,874

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	naval electrical/electronic equipment	31,464
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	small arms ammunition	306
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for small arms ammunition, rifles (2), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (3)	4,831
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	215,145
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	radio jamming equipment	236,158
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military training equipment, components for training equipment for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, military training equipment, technology for military training equipment	74,346
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military support aircraft	276
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	electronic measurement equipment, software for electronic measurement equipment	585
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	6,450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	electrical test equipment	41,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	imaging cameras	78,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	pyrotechnics/fuels and related substances	160,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	small arms ammunition	250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	131,801
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	imaging cameras	9,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	17,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	89,960

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	ballistic test equipment, components for ballistic test equipment, software for ballistic test equipment	52,766
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	NBC decontamination chemical mixtures	1,568
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	accessories for materials analysis equipment, components for materials analysis equipment, materials analysis equipment, technology for materials analysis equipment	17,277
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars	342,540
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	55,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, sniper rifles (5), technology for sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	45,201
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	2,628
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	technology for combat aircraft	214,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	1,890,078
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	49,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	397
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	2,080
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	32,966
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for sporting guns, sporting guns (1)	500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military support aircraft	67
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	pistols (1)	750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	pistols (1)	750

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for gas processing equipment	42,866
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	930
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for general industrial production equipment	217
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	26,639
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	13,133
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	11,829
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	14,494
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for general industrial production equipment	202
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars	103,428
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	accessories for materials processing equipment	1,550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	imaging cameras	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	1,157
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	2,472,333
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	body armour	400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	2,080
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	32,966
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for pumps	3,293
SIEL	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	2,014

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	197
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	valves	261
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	sporting guns (8), weapon sights	6,313
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	6,435,040
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars, equipment for the use of military radars, technology for equipment for the use of military radars, technology for military radars	2,967,465
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	1,390
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	weapon night sights	24,034
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	2,689
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	4,164
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	3,651
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	13,558
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	662
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	3,916
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars	96,333
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military helmets	1,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	6,488
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	anti-armour ammunition	2,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	2,342

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars	568,292
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	145,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	19,752
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military airborne equipment	1,142
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military radars	929,727
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat helicopters	4,227
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	cryptographic software	1,184
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general military aircraft components	1,450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	1,565
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	530
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for naval electrical/electronic equipment	34,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	unfinished products for assault rifles	41,825
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	417
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars	5,939,219
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (1), technology for sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	10,308
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars	310,286
SIEL	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the use of pressure monitoring equipment	4,125

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general naval vessel components	2,642
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	31,977
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	small arms ammunition	600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	9,450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	9,670
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	10,644
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	7,446
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military support aircraft	113
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military communications equipment	551
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	22,280
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military guidance/navigation equipment	5,400
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military communications equipment	60,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for naval guns	43
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aircrew breathing equipment	15,291
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	354
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military helmets	59,655
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for sniper rifles, direct view imaging equipment, gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (3), weapon sights	45,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general naval vessel components	1,250

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	128
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for unmanned air vehicles	3,626
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	13,110
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	99
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general laboratory equipment	1,632
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	610,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for machine tools, machine tools	1,701,938
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, sniper rifles (1), weapon sights	9,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	inertial equipment	2,532
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat naval vessels	7,888
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	4,665
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the production of artillery ammunition	3,100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	25,485
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	materials testing equipment	3,489
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military support aircraft	10,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general laboratory equipment	5,035
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	2,287
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	aircraft military communications equipment	7,152
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat helicopters	1,879

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	lubricants, non-ferrous metals	8,061
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	software for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment	215
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aircraft ground equipment	68,098
SIEL (Transshipment)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	exploding grenade ammunition	24,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	small arms ammunition	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military radars	389,510
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	accessories for spectrometers, components for spectrometers, lasers, spectrometers	24,671
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	1,609
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	decoying/countermeasure equipment	235,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	52
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	radio jamming equipment	180,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	10,165
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	anti-armour ammunition	3,477
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	small arms ammunition	1,560
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7,216
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	naval engines	420,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	188
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	731
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	1,625

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	442
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	8,755
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military support aircraft	342,177
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment employing cryptography	3,078,920
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general military aircraft components	1,829
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	25,615
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	radio jamming equipment	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general military aircraft components	4,074
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	539
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	14,378
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	radio jamming equipment	80,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines	442
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	power supplies	68,960
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	power supplies	68,960
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	industrial generators	34,480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	small arms ammunition	60,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	aircraft military communications equipment	12,893
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	animal pathogens	1,288

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	32,441
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	9,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for submarines	10,584
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	41,580
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft	170,952
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	152,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the production of pistols, equipment for the production of rifles	1,067
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the production of rifles	7,124
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the production of rifles	18,717
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment	135,869
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, improvised explosive device disruptors, non-military firing sets	17,501
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military electronic equipment, technology for military electronic equipment	5,194
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military parachutes and equipment, military parachutes and equipment	140,699
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military helicopters	5,820
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military support aircraft	882
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military support aircraft	79
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	military aero-engines	6,525
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general naval vessel components	37,017
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	2,760

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	17,026
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	48,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	military helicopters	195,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	helium-3	32,567
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for assault rifles	630
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	body armour	150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	103
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	bomb suits	14,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	550,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	small arms ammunition	1,600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	12,300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	6,152
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	unmanned air vehicles	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	body armour	100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	6,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	1,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	10,797
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	military guidance/navigation equipment	330,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	191
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	technology for composite structures	3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	3,665,885
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment	380,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment	16,432
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	magnetometers	2,277
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	241,773
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	226
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	machine tools	290,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	semiconductor process equipment	21,102
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	1,650,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	animal pathogens	10
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	unmanned air vehicles	17,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	unmanned air vehicles	17,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for biotechnology equipment	4,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment	3,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	2,231,236
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	dimensional measuring equipment	7,336
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	small arms ammunition	121,080
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	high acceleration centrifuges	214,410
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	tungsten in particulate form	181,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	23,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	military helicopters	195,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, sniper rifles (6)	27,650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	radiation hardened integrated circuits	208,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	33,550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12,741
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	technology for general military aircraft components	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	19,188
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	sniper rifles (1)	3,145
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	sniper rifles (1)	3,145

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	unmanned air vehicles	17,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	1,250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	body armour, components for body armour	10,010
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	dimensional measuring equipment	21,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	68,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment	8,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	2,022,463
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	63
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	263
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	fibrous/filamentary materials	64,350
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	382,539
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	body armour	150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	9,972
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,962
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	23,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	385,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment for the use of military communications equipment	27,320

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	122
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	144
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	15,351
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, sniper rifles (30), weapon cleaning equipment	136,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	24,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	3,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	dimensional measuring equipment	8,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	1,784,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	zirconium alloys	2,670
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	body armour	400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for body armour	220
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	79,868
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	375
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	space qualified solar devices	75,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for small arms ammunition	210,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	162,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	fibrous/filamentary materials	137,270
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	13,344

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	144
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	140,445
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	23,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	rebreathing swimming equipment	6,261
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	general purpose integrated circuits	317
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	millimetric wave components, signal analysers	93,390
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	fibrous/filamentary materials	2,540,132
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	military aircraft ground equipment	13,660
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	1,539,683
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	60,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	5,295
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	42,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	165
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	hydrophones	14,200,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	3,500

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	semiconductor process equipment	450,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	dimensional measuring equipment	175,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	4,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	machine tools, numerical control software, software for machine tools	662,728
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	238
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,245
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	microwave components	1,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	9,972
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	focal plane arrays	1,760,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	15,351
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	149
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for sporting guns	3,435
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	small arms ammunition, sporting guns (1), weapon sights	24,200

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	sporting guns (5)	5,700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	hydrophones	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	980,666
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	technology for combat helicopters	10
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,693,150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	44,028
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	fibrous/filamentary materials	8,155
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, sniper rifles (42), weapon cleaning equipment	155,989
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	157,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	6,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	4,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	sporting guns (6)	4,724
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	79
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	13,536
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	6,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment	14,890
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment	9,063
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	global positioning satellite receivers	1,095,660
SIEL	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	79

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	135
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	450,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	450,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	zirconium alloys	200,650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	16,355,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	165
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	35,822
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	58,481
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	26,852
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	15,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment	13
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment, software for computer analogue-to-digital equipment	20,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	26,975
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	17,969,636
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	10,000
SIEL	ISSUE (Russia)	software for semiconductor device manufacturing processes	4,150

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	51,961
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	radiation hardened integrated circuits	456,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	general naval vessel components	455
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	animal pathogens	10
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras, weapon night sights	39,265
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	22,126
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	focal plane arrays	96,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	115,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	deuterium solutions	104
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	11,242
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment	448
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon night sights, weapon sights	103,213
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	420,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	581,980
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	22,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	573,228
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	1,885
SIEL	ISSUE (Russia)	accelerometers	2,000

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	830,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	guidance/navigation equipment, inertial equipment	49,550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	71,005
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	309,840
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	430,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	61
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	5,235,920
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	23,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	radiation hardened TV camera lenses	3,550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	3,520,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	5,765
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	15,351
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	480
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,534,181
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	5,269,650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	218,521
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	gyro-astro compasses	333,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	38,750
SIEL	ISSUE (Russia)	microwave components	400

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	6,815
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	sporting guns (66)	24,124
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	8,359,450
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters	937,695
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	microwave components	44,039
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,707
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	18,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	dimensional measuring equipment	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	rotary position encoders	4,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	925,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	63
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment	200,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicle control systems, submersible vehicles	1,211,454
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	beryllium manufactures	2,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	sporting guns (5)	3,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	47,758
SIEL	ISSUE (Russia)	components for sporting guns	1,517

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	imaging cameras	4,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	168,490
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	submersible equipment	63,807
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	weapon sights	65
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,534,181
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography	160,476
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	5,476
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	2,601,668
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, components for body armour, military helmets	15,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	radio jamming equipment	29,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition	970,001
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software	2,276
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	6,189
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military support aircraft	13,815
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software enabling equipment to function as military training equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for the simulation of military operation scenarios	1

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for air-to-surface missiles	61,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,658
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	21,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	170
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	128
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military training equipment	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military training equipment	19,185
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	2,202
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	126
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,068
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	direct view imaging equipment	18,954
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat naval vessels	6,621
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military communications equipment	49,447
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	1,995
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, technology for combat aircraft	2,475,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	890

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft	131,448
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,331
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military airborne equipment	746,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	39,490
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	39,490
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	39,490
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	46,150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	52,650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	39,490
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	crowd control ammunition, hand grenades, illuminators, signalling devices, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training crowd control ammunition	3,809,075
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	284,308
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	532
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment	2,732,397
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software	30,086
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	30,086
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for production installations for decoying/countermeasure equipment	14,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for production installations for decoying/countermeasure equipment	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for production installations for decoying/countermeasure equipment	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for production installations for decoying/countermeasure equipment	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for production installations for decoying/countermeasure equipment	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft	6,753
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	297
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for production installations for decoying/countermeasure equipment	258,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for turrets, turrets	3,941,291
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for equipment for the production of decoying/countermeasure equipment, equipment for the production of decoying/countermeasure equipment	974,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	decoying/countermeasure equipment, inert decoying/countermeasure equipment	276,950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment	6,429
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat naval vessels	20,317
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military communications equipment	12,890
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for turrets	2,790

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	submersible equipment	18,950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	aircraft military communications equipment	2,945
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for turrets	44,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment	21,633
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	39,550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	2,512
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	103,358
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	330
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	electronics cooling fluids	81
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	1
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,232
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	command communications control and intelligence software	120,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for air-to-surface missiles	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	143
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	366
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	196

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	224
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	880
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions	65,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles	3,622
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	1,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military training aircraft	40
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	94
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	914
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	447
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	1,133
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military aircraft ground equipment	2,752
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	16,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	243,605
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles	41,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment	13,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	978

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	illuminators	74,371
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for naval communications equipment	51,444
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	5,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft	2,930
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	pressure transducers	9,690
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	85,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9,742
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	biotechnology equipment	9,415
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	7,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	78,583
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	524,235
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	2,526
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,261
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	476,957
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	graphite materials, nuclear grade graphite	18,497

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for machine guns	21,744
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	tear gas/irritant ammunition	215,712
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	140,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,375
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	370,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,817
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	1,964
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,980
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	441,376
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,272,892
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	4,123
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	471,460
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for turrets	3,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for turrets	1,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for electronic warfare equipment	537,767
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,675

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	315
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	223
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	gun silencers	600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,060
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,037
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	49,168
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for semiconductor process equipment	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium solutions	111
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,052
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	68,964
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	combat aircraft, military airborne equipment	1,582,666,650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	695,830
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military radars	79,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,248
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles	51,820
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,919

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	1,234,972
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	bomb suits, components for military equipment for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of improvised explosive device disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disruptors, military equipment for initiating explosives, military helmets, night vision goggles	1,152,383
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	weapon night sights	25,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat naval vessels	47,700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	blank/inert ammunition	196,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	932
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	sporting guns	5,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	1,248
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	submersible equipment	675,973
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	direct view imaging equipment	9,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour	774
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	11,465
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for equipment employing cryptography	247,541
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,115

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	42,893
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	18,752
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,415
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,435
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	inertial equipment	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	ballistic test equipment	26,381
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	136,584
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	56,382
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	52,682
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	weapon cleaning equipment	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	12,976
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for targeting equipment	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	160,663
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment	4,726
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment	215
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment	4,726
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	non-military firing sets	6,620,757

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	2,717
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	biotechnology equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	1
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	materials analysis equipment	10,950
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (2), weapon sights	23,250
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	weapon night sights	64,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	94,809
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition	970,001
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	gun silencers	400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	toxic gas monitoring equipment	344
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	26,921
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for civil unmanned air vehicles	0
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	205,509
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	417,742
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	96
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	189
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	60

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	119
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	286,838
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	201
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	73
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat naval vessels	7,022
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,115
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	509,057
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	239,719
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	781
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	11,277
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for military aero-engines	200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	18,872
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	105,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	bomb suits, military helmets	96,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for naval communications equipment	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	body armour, components for body armour	2

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	100,006
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	submersible equipment	33,020
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment for the production of machine guns	12,760
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	576
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for naval guns, equipment for the use of naval guns, naval guns, weapon mountings	319,990
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	gun silencers, sporting guns (20)	10,360
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines	175,299
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	1,046
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	502
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	anti-armour ammunition, blank/inert ammunition, crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition	20,510
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military helicopters	580,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	59,121
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for weapon sight mounts, equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts	27,923
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	composite materials production equipment	76,590
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	bomb suits, civil NBC detection systems, components for improvised explosive device disposal remotely operated vehicles, equipment for the use of civil NBC detection systems, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, improvised explosive device detection equipment, military communications equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military support vehicles	2,652,357

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	227
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	toxins	87,840
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	4,743
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	7,575
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	758
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment	31,711
SIEL (Transshipment)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition	6,550,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	137,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12,179
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	880
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	122,004
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	small arms ammunition	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	33,842
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	26,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	13,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	4,460
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	1,293

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	969
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	892
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	2,327
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	1,406
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	1,309
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for naval communications equipment	18,890
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for naval communications equipment	80,167
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	667
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	frequency changers	321
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment, targeting equipment	261,372
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	targeting equipment	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	54,174
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment	41,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	552
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	20,940
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,221
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	891

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	weapon night sights	6,178,373
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,219
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	18,401
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	11,575
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,338
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12,038
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	weapon night sights	161,280
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for submersible equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	342,854
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	32,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,645
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, technology for improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	93,852
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	130,773
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	580
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	381
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military equipment for initiating explosives	4,221,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for improvised explosive device disruptors	42,286
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	1,476

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	66,343
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	body armour	309,677
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	569,900
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition	1,349,840
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	36,469
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for software for military guidance/navigation equipment	50
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	778,682
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles	13,422
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	acoustic seabed survey equipment	90,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	bellows sealed valves	5,591
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,422
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for recognition/identification equipment	262,664
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military electronic equipment	7,700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	31,145
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	electronics cooling fluids	31,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	96,058

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	138,012
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	biotechnology equipment	2,120
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	weapon sights	70
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	29,955
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	570,524
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	162
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	545,284
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	9,861,331
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military communications equipment	9,600
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	32,074
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	18,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12,536
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	instrumentation cameras	138,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	24,097
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military communications equipment	1,785
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating military operation scenarios, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	566,960

SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367,560
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,009
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, technology for improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	295,294
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367,560
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	non-military firing sets	20,955
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,989
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	379
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	106,920
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography	1,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	21,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	aircraft military communications equipment	3,698
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	deuterium compounds	141
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	fire location equipment, recognition/identification equipment, software for fire location equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment	19,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for bombs	8,254,258
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12,476
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	615,001

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	17,742
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,027
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, military laser protection equipment	1,530
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	radio jamming equipment	45,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	16,314
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	weapon night sights, weapon sights	17,553
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	radio jamming equipment	104,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,560
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,640
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles	1,066,560
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles	76
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software	1,142
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,397
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras	20,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military communications equipment	750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	83,771
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	instrumentation cameras	69,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software	1,013,879
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,550
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,808
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment, military communications equipment, rebreathing swimming equipment, technology for military communications equipment	11,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military airborne equipment	1,927
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	6,551
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,529
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	17,058
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,640
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	military image intensifier equipment, weapon night sights	85,500
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	weapon night sights	85,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,520,061
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,776
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	51,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	322
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,516

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	874
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives	7,737
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	18,491
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	civil unmanned air vehicles	50,143
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	1,639
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,158
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	general military aircraft components	21,675
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,012
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	bomb suits, components for body armour, components for bomb suits, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military helmets, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	63,330
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	41,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	bomb suits, explosive ordnance disposal equipment	114,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	assault rifles (25), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, pistols (25), small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment	57,925
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	assault rifles (25), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, pistols (25), small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment	57,925
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	bomb suits	7,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	84,041
SIEL	ISSUE (Somalia)	components for military support vehicles, military support vehicles, military trailers	359,750

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	27,810
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	military helmets	712
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	158,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	14,859
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	military helmets	4,304
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	decoying/countermeasure equipment	122,700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	military equipment for initiating explosives, non-military firing sets	950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	body armour, components for body armour	19,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	military support vehicles	45,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	body armour, military helmets	6,440
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	military support vehicles	245,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	military support vehicles	464,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	equipment employing cryptography	11,959
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	components for military support vehicles, military support vehicles	1,218,850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	equipment employing cryptography	338,835
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	equipment employing cryptography	415,316
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	108,665
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Somalia)	body armour, improvised explosive device disruptors	21,100
SIEL	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1,400,000

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (100), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, military helmets, rifles (100), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (100), weapon sights	699,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	body armour, components for body armour, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets	23,640
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	components for military patrol/assault craft	59,968
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (150), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, military helmets, rifles (150), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	578,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	fibrous/filamentary materials	333,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	32
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	fibrous/filamentary materials	308,700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	body armour, components for body armour, components for rifles, military helmets, rifles (300), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	505,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (350), body armour, combat shotguns (50), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (100), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,166,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	equipment employing cryptography	10,346
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	technology for military training aircraft	150
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	body armour, military helmets	3,228
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	2,006,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (300), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (750), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,707,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (250), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,309,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	technology for military airborne equipment	20
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon night sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	equipment employing cryptography	3,428
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	fibrous/filamentary materials	207,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	fibrous/filamentary materials	950,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	fibrous/filamentary materials	214,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), weapon sights	1,788,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), weapon sights	1,788,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,788,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (175), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	987,225
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	190,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), combat shotguns (300), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), weapon sights	1,779,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (300), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	components for pistols, pistols (100), small arms ammunition	135,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	body armour, military helmets	12,250
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	combat shotguns (97), components for combat shotguns, components for rifles, rifles (247), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	430,598
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	small arms ammunition	2,775
SIEL	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	small arms ammunition	4,311

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	3,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	components for assault rifles	3,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,797,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	weapon sights	65
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	4,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,315,969
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan)	equipment employing cryptography	138,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan)	software for equipment employing cryptography	604
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	7,382,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan)	equipment employing cryptography	3,558
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	2,700,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	142,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	33,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	38,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	2,008
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	software for equipment employing cryptography	30
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	software for equipment employing cryptography	45

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	22,883
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	25,650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	military support vehicles, military trailers	1,530,215
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Syria)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	6,130
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Syria)	body armour, military helmets	126,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Syria)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	47,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Syria)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	38,162
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	equipment employing cryptography	3,486
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	equipment employing cryptography	5,911
SIEL (Transshipment)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition	272,233
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment	72,065
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	equipment employing cryptography	6,850
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for military support vehicles	399,332
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	equipment employing cryptography	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	equipment employing cryptography	31,819
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	equipment employing cryptography	5,472
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	cryptographic software	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	equipment employing cryptography	570,000
SIEL	ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	26,643

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	7,077
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	submersible equipment	14,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	X-ray accelerators	960,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9,326
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	diver location sonars, software for diver location sonars	1,228,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	civil NBC detection systems	34,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	equipment employing cryptography	3,216
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	equipment employing cryptography	57,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	high performance air traffic control software	32,880
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	X-ray generators	905,198
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	X-ray generators	905,198
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	X-ray generators	905,198
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	equipment employing cryptography	1,636
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	components for military helicopters	3,616
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	equipment employing cryptography	10,846
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	equipment employing cryptography	83,739
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	imaging cameras	16,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	inertial equipment	854,106
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	small arms ammunition	8,240
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for the development of composite laminates, technology for the development of composite structures, technology for the production of composite laminates, technology for the production of composite structures, technology for the use of composite laminates, technology for the use of composite structures	3
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for targeting equipment	9,732
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography	4,675
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	technology for targeting equipment	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	technology for targeting equipment	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	technology for targeting equipment	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment for the use of weapon sights	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for biotechnology equipment	8,800
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	4,222
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	non-military firing sets	8,100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography	69,773
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	lasers	31,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-air missiles	714,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for military helicopters	547,700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	weapon sights	4,267
SIEL	ISSUE (Ukraine)	machine tools	104,450

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	weapon sights	80,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	rebreathing swimming equipment	3,507
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	small arms ammunition	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for military helicopters	397,700
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography	938
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	weapon sights	7,500
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	imaging cameras	59,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	technology for imaging cameras	600
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	small arms ammunition	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	weapon sights	218
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	391,338
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography	98,833
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography	17,969,636
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	body armour	7,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography	18,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	15,053
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	rebreathing swimming equipment	3,507
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	military training equipment	25,030
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography	1,300
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	inertial equipment	2,850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for military support aircraft	22,828
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	X-ray accelerators	3,141,190
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	body armour, components for body armour	1,443
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	inertial equipment	28,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	human pathogens	25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography	2,841
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military support aircraft	3,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment	194,508
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military diving apparatus, equipment for the use of military diving apparatus, military diving apparatus	595,316
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	21,989
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	human pathogens	25

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	2
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment	152,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	radio jamming equipment	28,950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	biotechnology equipment	99
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	human pathogens	25
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	civil NBC protection clothing	48,750
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	radio jamming equipment	28,950
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	small arms training equipment, software enabling equipment to function as small arms training equipment	336,223
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	small arms training equipment, software enabling equipment to function as small arms training equipment	665,767
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	lasers	796,850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels, technology for military auxiliary/support vessels	1,080,000
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography	8,678
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography	3,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military equipment for initiating explosives	30,302
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	zirconium	200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	towed hydrophone arrays	22,400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	weapon night sights	173,973
SIEL	ISSUE (Vietnam)	imaging cameras	89,250

(Permanent)			
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	civil NBC protection equipment	100
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	marine position fixing equipment	20,850
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	4,218
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military helicopters	11,367
SIEL (Temporary)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, imaging cameras, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts	1,355,013
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	NBC clothing, NBC protective/defensive equipment	2,625
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	10,618
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	131,258
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas	90,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	imaging cameras	70,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	2,500
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	imaging cameras	5,000
SIEL (Transshipment)	ISSUE (Yemen)	assault rifles (400), components for assault rifles, weapon cleaning equipment	570,125
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Yemen)	components for military support aircraft	20,408
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Yemen)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	987,225
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Yemen)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	18,650
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	12,187

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	3,596
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	26,603
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	6,025
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	32,541
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	22,511
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	11,384
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	20,530
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	27,052
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	567
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	473,531
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	35,953
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	487,617
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	42,325
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	45,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	technology for cryptographic software	6,710
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	148,703
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	54,026
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	904
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	27,809
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	3,452
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	10,073
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	6,265
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	13,242
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1,834
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	85,239
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	10,961
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	2,124
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	300,400
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	2,876
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disruptors	19,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	7,885
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	2,230
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software	1,362
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1,699

SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software	732
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	33,836
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	4,593
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	4,535
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1,325
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	3,755
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software	1,080
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software	990
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software	4,200
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1,166
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1,821
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	1,143
SIEL (Permanent)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography	300

Application Type	Country Outcome	Goods Summary
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OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, components for test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, software for the use of military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, software for the use of test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, technology for the use of military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, technology for the use of test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for mine clearance vehicles, technology for the use of mine clearance vehicles
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan)	components for military aero-engines, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military support aircraft, military guidance/navigation equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MN; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed or modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Burma), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of.), ISSUE (Eritrea), ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Somalia), ISSUE, (Sudan, South), ISSUE (Zimbabwe)</p>	<p>software for equipment employing cryptography</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Burma), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Cuba), ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Somalia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Sudan), ISSUE (Sudan, South), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)</p>	<p>accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Vietnam)</p>	<p>technology for military communications equipment</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Tunisia)</p>	<p>aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft</p>

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Iraq)	components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes, components for military training aircraft, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military distress signalling equipment, military parachutes, technology for the development of ejector seats, technology for the development of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the development of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the development of military parachutes, technology for the development of military training aircraft, technology for the production of ejector seats, technology for the production of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the production of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the production of military parachutes, technology for the production of military training aircraft, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military training aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, non-military firing sets
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Afghanistan), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina)	triggered spark gaps
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Belarus), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Egypt)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Cuba), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	inertial equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Fiji)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Belarus), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Central African Republic), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Russia)	towed hydrophone arrays

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	software for inertial equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	lasers
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Cuba), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Eritrea)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Israel)	artillery ammunition, components for NBC detection equipment, components for artillery, components for combat naval vessels, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, signalling devices, smoke canisters, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, technology for NBC detection equipment, technology for artillery, technology for combat naval vessels, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval engines, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for signalling devices, technology for smoke canisters, technology for weapon control equipment, training artillery ammunition, weapon control equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Russia)	animal pathogens
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Argentina), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	sporting guns
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	aircraft cannons, components for aircraft cannons
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for recognition/identification equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military training aircraft, military guidance/navigation equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Bahrain)</p>	<p>accessories for military cameras/photographic equipment, accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, aircraft military communications equipment, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for ejector seats, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military containers, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military parachutes and equipment, components for military radars, components for military scenario simulation equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, ejector seats, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft head-up/down displays, equipment for the use of military aircraft pressure refuellers, equipment for the use of military aircrew breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of military containers, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military parachutes and equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military scenario simulation equipment, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, general military aircraft components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up/down displays, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military cameras/photographic equipment,</p>
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<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Bahrain)</p>	<p>components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for inertial equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, inertial equipment</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Burma), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Ukraine)</p>	<p>heading sensors for hydrophone arrays</p>

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Burma), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Syria), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Yemen)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Pakistan)	military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military utility vehicles
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Uzbekistan), ISSUE (Vietnam)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Yemen)	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt)	components for military radars, components for weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, software for military radars, software for weapon control equipment, technology for military radars, technology for weapon control equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Yemen)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Pakistan)	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for missile scoring equipment, decoy flares, missile scoring equipment, software for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat naval vessels, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military patrol/assault craft, general naval vessel components
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	software for the use of test equipment for inertial equipment, test equipment for inertial equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam), ISSUE (Yemen)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)</p>	<p>aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, components for equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for test equipment for aerial target equipment, components for test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for training airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military training aircraft, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of training airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, training airborne electronic warfare equipment</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)</p>	<p>aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, aircraft radars, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video recording equipment, components for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, components for weapons simulators, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft radars, equipment for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military video recording equipment, equipment for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of weapons simulators, military aircraft navigation equipment, military training aircraft, military video recording equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of aircraft radars, technology for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military video recording equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of weapons simulators, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aircraft radars, test equipment for military aircraft navigation equipment, test equipment for military video recording equipment, test equipment for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, test equipment for weapons simulators, training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, weapons simulators</p>

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)</p>	<p>accessories for airborne targeting equipment, accessories for bombing computers, accessories for film processing equipment, accessories for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasures equipment, accessories for military cameras, accessories for military image intensifier equipment, accessories for military imaging radar equipment, accessories for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, accessories for military photographic equipment, accessories for military video processing equipment, accessories for military video recording equipment, accessories for night vision goggles, accessories for optical target acquisition equipment, accessories for optical target designator equipment, accessories for optical target surveillance equipment, accessories for optical target tracking equipment, accessories for sensor data recorders, accessories for sensor integration equipment, accessories for simulators for military training aircraft, accessories for training equipment for military training aircraft, accessories for weapon control systems, airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne refuelling equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, bomb handling equipment, bombing computers, chaff equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for airborne targeting equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for aircrew protective masks, components for anti-g/pressure suits, components for automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, components for bombing computers, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for film processing equipment, components for helmet mounted display equipment, components for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for liquid oxygen converters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military cameras, components for military containers, components for military flying helmets, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military imaging radar equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military parachutes, components for military parachutist equipment, components for military photographic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video processing equipment, components for military video recording equipment, components for night vision goggles, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for optical target designator equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment, components for optical target tracking equipment, components for sensor data recorders, components for sensor integration equipment, components for simulators for military training aircraft, components for training equipment for military training aircraft, components for weapon control systems, control equipment for air-to-air missiles, control equipment for bombs, control equipment for decoy flares, control equipment for fragmentation rockets, control equipment for practice bombs, ejector seats, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, film processing equipment, handling equipment for air-to-air missiles, handling</p>
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		equipment for bombs, handling equipment for decoy flares, handling equipment for fragmentation rockets, handling equipment for practice bombs, helmet mounted display equipment, imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasures equipment, launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, launching equipment for bombs, launching equipment for decoy flares, launching equipment for fragmentation rockets, launching equipment for practice bombs, liquid oxygen converters, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft navigation equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military cameras, military containers, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military imaging radar equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, military parametric technical databases, military photographic equipment, military video processing equipment, military video recording equipment, night vision goggles, optical target acquisition equipment, optical target designator equipment, optical target surveillance equipment, optical target tracking equipment, sensor data recorders, sensor integration equipment, simulators for military training aircraft, software enabling equipment to function as military training aircraft, software for military training aircraft, software for the evaluation of weapon systems, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the modelling of weapon systems, software for the simulation of military operation scenarios, software for the simulation of weapon systems, software for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military training aircraft, test equipment for military training aircraft, test models for the development of military training aircraft, training equipment for military training aircraft, weapon control systems
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for aircraft cannons, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons, software for aircraft cannons, technology for aircraft cannons
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	accessories for military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military communications equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	acoustic seabed survey equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, underwater telecommunications systems
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Vietnam)	command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Yemen)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Yemen)	software for inertial equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Belarus), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	inertial equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Belarus), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Belarus), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Burma), ISSUE (Eritrea), ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Somalia), ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Burma), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	acoustic seabed survey equipment, equipment employing cryptography, guidance/navigation equipment, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles, underwater sonar navigation systems
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of cryptographic software, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the production of cryptographic software, technology for the production of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	biological agent detection equipment, software for the use of biological agent detection equipment, technology for the use of biological agent detection equipment, technology for the use of software for the use of biological agent detection equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	software for the use of biological agent detection equipment, technology for the use of biological agent detection equipment

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	technology for the production of military aero-engines
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	metal alloy cylindrical forms
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, frequency synthesisers
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for the use of equipment employing cryptography

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for periscopes, components for weapon night sights, periscopes, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for weapon night sights
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	lasers
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for military communications equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	accessories for semiconductor process equipment, components for semiconductor process equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	technology for NBC detection equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of digital cellular radio system, technology for the development

		of frequency agility techniques, technology for the development of spread spectrum techniques
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of digital cellular radio system, technology for the development of frequency agility techniques, technology for the development of spread spectrum techniques
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment for the use of military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	fibrous/filamentary materials
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, equipment for the use of military radars, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military radars
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Egypt)	components for marine position fixing equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Vietnam), ISSUE (Yemen)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Fiji), ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Fiji), ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Israel)	accessories for semiconductor process equipment, components for semiconductor process equipment, software for the use of semiconductor process equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Russia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Russia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military utility helicopters, equipment for the production of military utility helicopters, equipment for the use of military utility helicopters, technology for the development of military utility helicopters, technology for the production of military utility helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, test equipment for military utility helicopters, unfinished products for military utility helicopters
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Vietnam)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Russia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	diver location sonars, software for diver location sonars
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	components for body armour, components for military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the production of body armour, equipment for the production of goods treated for signature suppression for military use, equipment for the production of military aircrew protective equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for body armour, technology for goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for military aircrew protective equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Vietnam)	lasers
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (China), ISSUE (Vietnam)	technology for civil aero-engines

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Colombia)</p>	<p>components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the production of ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for signalling devices, components for test models for ejector seats, components for test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for test models for military aircrew protective equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the production of ejector seats, equipment for the production of military aircrew protective equipment, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military aircrew protective equipment</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Colombia)</p>	<p>technology for unmanned air vehicles</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Colombia)</p>	<p>aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Colombia)</p>	<p>military guidance/navigation equipment</p>

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia)	aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for military aero-engines, military aero-engines
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia)	components for military electronic equipment, components for military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military electronic equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Cuba), ISSUE (Egypt)	towed hydrophone arrays

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of artillery, components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of artillery, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Colombia), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of.)	underwater television cameras
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of.), ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of.), ISSUE (Tunisia)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of.), ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Egypt)</p>	<p>NBC filters, chaff, chaff equipment, command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for chaff equipment, components for command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for corvettes, components for defensive systems against NBC agents, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for fast attack craft, components for frigates, components for heavy machine guns, components for military distress signalling equipment, components for military inflatable craft, components for military navigation equipment, components for naval acoustic equipment, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun mountings, components for naval radars, components for naval sonar equipment, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for surface-to-air missiles, components for surface-to-surface missiles, control equipment for surface-to-air missiles, control equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, defensive systems against NBC agents, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of corvettes, equipment for the use of fast attack craft, equipment for the use of frigates, equipment for the use of naval radars, equipment for the use of surface-to-air missiles, general naval vessel components, handling equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, heavy machine guns, launching equipment for surface-to-air missiles, launching equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, military distress signalling equipment, military inflatable craft, military navigation equipment, naval acoustic equipment, naval communications equipment, naval electrical equipment, naval electronic equipment, naval engines, naval gun mountings, naval radars, naval sonar equipment, semi-automatic pistols, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, test equipment for military communications equipment, test equipment for naval radars, test equipment for surface-to-air missiles</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Egypt)</p>	<p>equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Egypt)</p>	<p>components for guided missile decoying equipment, components for weapon control systems, decoy flares, equipment for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control systems, software for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, software for the use of weapon control systems, technology for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, technology for the use of weapon control systems, test equipment for guided missile decoying equipment, test equipment for weapon control systems</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Egypt)</p>	<p>accessories for ground based radars, accessories for naval radars, components for ground based radars, components for naval radars, equipment for the use of ground based radars, equipment for the use of naval radars, software for ground based radars, software for naval radars, technology for ground based radars, technology for naval radars, test equipment for ground based radars, test equipment for naval radars</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Egypt)</p>	<p>components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for general military aircraft components, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components</p>

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt)	imaging cameras
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Eritrea), ISSUE (Somalia), ISSUE (Tunisia)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Vietnam), ISSUE (Yemen)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Somalia)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Tunisia)	underwater television cameras
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for launching equipment for torpedoes, components for mine countermeasures equipment, components for mine sweeping equipment, components for naval mines, components for torpedoes, components for training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, equipment for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, equipment for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of mine sweeping equipment, equipment for the use of naval mines, equipment for the use of torpedoes, equipment for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, launching equipment for torpedoes, mine countermeasures equipment, mine sweeping equipment, software for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, software for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, software for the use of mine sweeping equipment, software for the use of naval mines, software for the use of torpedoes, software for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, technology for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, technology for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of mine sweeping equipment, technology for the use of naval mines, technology for the use of torpedoes, technology for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, test equipment for launching equipment for torpedoes, test equipment for mine countermeasures equipment, test equipment for mine sweeping equipment, test equipment for naval mines, test equipment for torpedoes, test equipment for training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, torpedoes, training equipment for mine sweeping equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Russia)	inertial equipment

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Russia)	aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia)	fibrous/filamentary materials
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	inertial equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for aircraft missile protection systems, technology for aircraft missile protection systems

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	imaging cameras
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, components for sporting guns, military helmets, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	body armour, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Eritrea), ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of,), ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Fiji), ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq)	goods specified by the following entries of "the Main Order" - ML1 ML2 ML3 ML4 ML5 ML6 ML7 ML8 ML9 ML10 ML11 ML12 ML13 ML14 ML15 ML16 ML17 ML18 ML19 ML20 ML21 ML22 PL5017 except for those listed in the additional conditions to the licence

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq)	components for radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment, radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq)	devices for initiating explosives, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for military support aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Libya)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Iraq), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for military transport aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of cryptographic software, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	biotechnology equipment, components for biotechnology equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	technology for the development of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for the production of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for the use of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the production of ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the production of ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for equipment for the production of ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military aircrew protective equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military parachutes and equipment, components for military training equipment, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, general military aircraft components, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military parachutes and equipment, military training equipment, software for combat aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for production installations for combat aircraft, test models for combat aircraft, unfinished products for combat aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, software for aerial target equipment, technology for aerial target equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	metal alloy cylindrical forms
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for naval communications equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of naval communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, naval communications equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for naval communications equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military training aircraft, test models for military training aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	imaging cameras
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Libya)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Pakistan)	cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Israel), ISSUE (Tunisia)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Libya)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Libya)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Congo, Democratic Republic of.), Zimbabwe, ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE (Tunisia)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft, components for frigates, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for naval engines, equipment for the use of naval engines, naval engines, software for the use of naval engines, technology for the use of naval engines, test equipment for naval engines
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat helicopters, devices containing military pyrotechnic materials, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, pyrotechnic signalling devices, software for the use of combat helicopters, software for the use of equipment for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of devices containing military pyrotechnic materials, technology for the use of equipment for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of pyrotechnic signalling devices, unfinished products for combat helicopters
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general naval vessel components, technology for the use of general naval vessel components
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, general naval vessel components, technology for the use of equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, technology for the use of general naval vessel components
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military electronic equipment, components for naval navigation equipment, components for naval radars, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment, naval navigation equipment, naval radars
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aero-engines

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines, technology for the production of military aero-engines, technology for the use of military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military parachutes, ejector seats, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military distress signalling equipment, military parachutes, technology for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of general military aircraft components, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aero-engines
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for artillery, components for mortars, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for turrets, components for weapon control equipment

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Pakistan)</p>	<p>anti-aircraft guns, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for fire location equipment, components for general naval vessel components, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for naval hull penetrators/connectors, components for periscopes, components for projectile launchers, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, counter-countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, counter-countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, counter-countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, counter-countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of fire location equipment, equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, equipment for the use of military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military imaging radar sensor equipment,</p>
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equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of naval communications equipment, equipment for the use of naval electrical/electronic equipment, equipment for the use of naval gun installations/mountings, equipment for the use of naval hull penetrators/connectors, equipment for the use of periscopes, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of sensor integration equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, fire location equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military cameras/photographic equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military imaging radar sensor equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, naval gun installations/mountings, naval guns, naval hull penetrators/connectors, periscopes, projectile launchers, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, sensor integration equipment, targeting equipment, technology for anti-aircraft guns, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for fire location equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military imaging radar sensor equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for naval hull penetrators/connectors, technology for periscopes, technology for projectile launchers, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment, technology for sensor integration equipment, technology for targeting equipment, technology for weapon control equipment, technology for weapon night sights, technology for weapon sights, weapon control equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military electronic equipment, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military electronic equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the production of ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for signalling devices, ejector seats, equipment for the production of ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for equipment for the production of ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military aircrew protective equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, signalling devices, technology for combat aircraft, technology for devices containing military pyrotechnic materials, technology for ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military combat vehicles, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military support aircraft, components for military support vehicles, components for military training aircraft, components for military underwater remotely operated vehicles, components for naval engines, components for submarines, components for tanks, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat naval vessels, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military electronic equipment, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for submarines
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	general naval vessel components, technology for general naval vessel components
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan)	components for air defence systems, components for aircraft carriers, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for military communications equipment, components for military radars, components for military support vehicles, components for military trailers, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for submarines, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of air defence systems, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, components for signalling devices, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military electronic equipment, components for military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military electronic equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Pakistan), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment, components for biotechnology equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia)	cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of cryptographic software, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia)	technology for the production of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia)	small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia)	biotechnology equipment, components for biotechnology equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia)	components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for inertial equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, inertial equipment

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Uzbekistan), ISSUE (Vietnam)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Ukraine)	non-military detonators
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Turkmenistan), ISSUE (Ukraine), ISSUE (Uzbekistan)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	air guns
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Russia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	imaging cameras

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)</p>	<p>airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne surveillance equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft cannons, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft missile protection systems, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, chaff, chaff equipment, components for airborne surveillance equipment, components for airborne targeting equipment, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft missile protection systems, components for aircraft radars, components for chaff equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for laser rangefinders, components for liquid oxygen converters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft head-up displays, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military video processing equipment, components for military video recording equipment, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for weapon control systems, components for weapon sights, decoy flares, ejector seats, environmental test facilities for combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, imaging countermeasures equipment, laser rangefinders, launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, launching equipment for bombs, liquid oxygen converters, military aero-engines, military aircraft flight data recorders, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up displays, military aircraft navigation equipment, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, military video processing equipment, military video recording equipment, optical target acquisition equipment, recognition/identification equipment, software for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, software for the use of airborne surveillance equipment, software for the use of airborne targeting equipment, software for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, software for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for the use of aircraft radars, software for the use of combat aircraft, software for the use of ejector seats, software for the use of environmental test facilities for combat aircraft, software for the use of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, software for the use of imaging countermeasures equipment, software for the use of laser rangefinders, software for the use of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, software for the use of launching equipment for bombs, software for the use of liquid oxygen converters, software for the use of military aero-engines, software for the use of military aircraft flight data recorders, software for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, software for the use of military aircraft head-up displays, software for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, software for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, software for the use of military image intensifier equipment, software for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for the use of military video processing equipment, software for the use of military video recording equipment, software for the use of optical target acquisition equipment, software for the use of optical target tracking equipment, software for the use of test equipment for combat aircraft, software for the use of test equipment for military aero-engines, software for the use of training equipment for combat aircraft, software for the use of weapon control systems, software for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of airborne surveillance equipment, technology for the use of airborne targeting equipment, technology for the use of</p>
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		<p>aircraft cannons, technology for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, technology for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, technology for the use of aircraft radars, technology for the use of aircrew protective masks, technology for the use of anti-g/pressure suits, technology for the use of chaff, technology for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of decoy flares, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of environmental test facilities for combat aircraft, technology for the use of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for the use of imaging countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of laser rangefinders, technology for the use of launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, technology for the use of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, technology for the use of launching equipment for bombs, technology for the use of liquid oxygen converters, technology for the use of military aero-engines, technology for the use of military aircraft flight data recorders, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aircraft head-up displays, technology for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military video processing equipment, technology for the use of military video recording equipment, technology for the use of optical target acquisition equipment, technology for the use of optical target tracking equipment, technology for the use of test equipment for combat aircraft, technology for the use of test equipment for military aero-engines, technology for the use of training equipment for combat aircraft, technology for the use of weapon control systems, technology for the use of weapon sights, test equipment for combat aircraft, test equipment for military aero-engines, training equipment for combat aircraft, weapon control systems, weapon sights</p>
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for the development of air-to-surface missiles, technology for the use of air-to-surface missiles
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	general military aircraft components
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aero-engines

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)</p>	<p>airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne surveillance equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft cannons, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft missile protection systems, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warning equipment, chaff, chaff equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for airborne surveillance equipment, components for airborne targeting equipment, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft missile protection systems, components for aircraft radars, components for aircrew protective masks, components for anti-g/pressure suits, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for chaff equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for electronic countermeasures equipment, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the use of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the use of ejector seats, components for guided missile decoying equipment, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for laser rangefinders, components for laser warning detectors, components for liquid oxygen converters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft head-up displays, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military flying helmets, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military imaging radar equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military video processing equipment, components for military video recording equipment, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor data recorders, components for test equipment for combat aircraft, components for weapon control systems, components for weapon sights, decoy flares, ejector seats, electronic countermeasures equipment, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of ejector seats, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, guided missile decoying equipment, guided missile detection equipment, imaging countermeasures equipment, laser rangefinders, laser warning detectors, launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, launching equipment for bombs, liquid oxygen converters, materials for reduced electromagnetic reflectivity for military use, military aero-engines, military aircraft flight data recorders, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up displays, military aircraft navigation equipment, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military containers, military field generators, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military imaging radar equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, military parametric technical databases, military video processing equipment, military video recording equipment, optical target acquisition equipment, production technology for combat aircraft, recognition/identification equipment, sensor data recorders, signature suppression coatings for military use, signature suppression fittings for military use, signature suppression treatments for military use, software for the production of airborne electronic warfare equipment, software for the production of airborne surveillance equipment, software for the production of airborne targeting equipment, software for the production of aircraft cannons, software for the production of aircraft missile protection systems, software for the production of aircraft radars, software for the production of aircrew protective masks, software for the production of anti-g/pressure suits, software for the production of chaff, software for the production of chaff equipment, software for the production of combat aircraft, software for the production of decoy flares, software</p>
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for the production of ejector seats, software for the production of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, software for the production of equipment for the use of combat aircraft, software for the production of equipment for the use of ejector seats, software for the production of guided missile decoying equipment, software for the production of guided missile detection equipment, software for the production of imaging countermeasures equipment, software for the production of laser rangefinders, software for the production of launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, software for the production of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, software for the production of launching equipment for bombs, software for the production of liquid oxygen converters, software for the production of military aero-engines, software for the production of military aircraft flight data recorders, software for the production of military aircraft ground equipment, software for the production of military aircraft head-up displays, software for the production of military aircraft navigation equipment, software for the production of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, software for the production of military containers, software for the production of military field generators, software for the production of military flying helmets, software for the production of military image intensifier equipment, software for the production of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for the production of military parachutes, software for the production of military parametric technical databases, software for the production of military video processing equipment, software for the production of military video recording equipment, software for the production of optical target acquisition equipment, software for the production of recognition/identification equipment, software for the production of signature suppression fittings for military use, software for the production of signature suppression treatments for military use, software for the production of test equipment for combat aircraft, software for the production of test equipment for military aero-engines, software for the production of unfinished products for combat aircraft, software for the production of weapon control systems, software for the production of weapon sights, software for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, software for the use of airborne surveillance equipment, software for the use of airborne targeting equipment, software for the use of aircraft cannons, software for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for the use of aircraft radars, software for the use of anti-g/pressure suits, software for the use of chaff equipment, software for the use of combat aircraft, software for the use of ejector seats, software for the use of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, software for the use of equipment for the use of combat aircraft, software for the use of equipment for the use of ejector seats, software for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, software for the use of guided missile detection equipment, software for the use of imaging countermeasures equipment, software for the use of laser rangefinders, software for the use of launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, software for the use of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, software for the use of launching equipment for bombs, software for the use of liquid oxygen converters, software for the use of military aero-engines, software for the use of military aircraft flight data recorders, software for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, software for the use of military aircraft head-up displays, software for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, software for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, software for the use of military field generators, software for the use of military image intensifier equipment, software for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for the use of military parachutes, software for the use of military parametric technical databases, software for the use of military video processing equipment, software for the

use of military video recording equipment, software for the use of optical target acquisition equipment, software for the use of recognition/identification equipment, software for the use of test equipment for combat aircraft, software for the use of test equipment for military aero-engines, software for the use of weapon control systems, software for the use of weapon sights, technology for the production of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the production of airborne targeting equipment, technology for the production of aircraft cannons, technology for the production of aircraft military communications equipment, technology for the production of aircraft missile protection systems, technology for the production of aircraft radars, technology for the production of aircrew protective masks, technology for the production of anti-g/pressure suits, technology for the production of chaff, technology for the production of chaff equipment, technology for the production of combat aircraft, technology for the production of decoy flares, technology for the production of ejector seats, technology for the production of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for the production of equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the production of equipment for the use of ejector seats, technology for the production of goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for the production of guided missile decoying equipment, technology for the production of guided missile detection equipment, technology for the production of imaging countermeasures equipment, technology for the production of laser rangefinders, technology for the production of launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, technology for the production of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, technology for the production of launching equipment for bombs, technology for the production of liquid oxygen converters, technology for the production of materials for reduced electromagnetic reflectivity for military use, technology for the production of military aero-engines, technology for the production of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the production of military aircraft head-up displays, technology for the production of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the production of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the production of military containers, technology for the production of military field generators, technology for the production of military flying helmets, technology for the production of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for the production of military parachutes, technology for the production of military parametric technical databases, technology for the production of military video processing equipment, technology for the production of military video recording equipment, technology for the production of optical target acquisition equipment, technology for the production of recognition/identification equipment, technology for the production of signature suppression coatings for military use, technology for the production of signature suppression fittings for military use, technology for the production of signature suppression treatments for military use, technology for the production of test equipment for combat aircraft, technology for the production of test equipment for military aero-engines, technology for the production of weapon control systems, technology for the production of weapon sights, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of airborne targeting equipment, technology for the use of aircraft cannons, technology for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, technology for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, technology for the use of aircraft radars, technology for the use of aircrew protective masks, technology for the use of anti-g/pressure suits, technology for the use of chaff, technology for the use of chaff equipment, technology for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of decoy flares, technology for the use of ejector seats,

		<p>technology for the use of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for the use of equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of equipment for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, technology for the use of guided missile detection equipment, technology for the use of imaging countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of laser rangefinders, technology for the use of launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, technology for the use of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, technology for the use of launching equipment for bombs, technology for the use of liquid oxygen converters, technology for the use of materials for reduced electromagnetic reflectivity for military use, technology for the use of military aero-engines, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aircraft head-up displays, technology for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military containers, technology for the use of military field generators, technology for the use of military flying helmets, technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military parametric technical databases, technology for the use of military video processing equipment, technology for the use of military video recording equipment, technology for the use of optical target acquisition equipment, technology for the use of recognition/identification equipment, technology for the use of signature suppression coatings for military use, technology for the use of signature suppression fittings for military use, technology for the use of signature suppression treatments for military use, technology for the use of test equipment for combat aircraft, technology for the use of test equipment for military aero-engines, technology for the use of weapon control systems, technology for the use of weapon sights, test equipment for combat aircraft, test equipment for military aero-engines, unfinished products for combat aircraft, weapon control systems, weapon sights</p>
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, general military aircraft components
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	<p>components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for landing craft, components for military search and rescue aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, equipment for the production of airborne refuelling equipment, equipment for the production of landing craft, equipment for the production of military search and rescue aircraft, equipment for the production of military transport aircraft, equipment for the production of military utility aircraft, equipment for the use of airborne refuelling equipment, equipment for the use of landing craft, equipment for the use of military search and rescue aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, equipment for the use of military utility aircraft, technology for the use of airborne refuelling equipment, technology for the use of landing craft, technology for the use of military search and rescue aircraft, technology for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military utility aircraft</p>

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	airborne refuelling equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for ground based radars, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft head-down displays, components for military aircraft head-up displays, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military cameras, components for military communications equipment, components for military transport aircraft, components for tanker aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft navigation equipment, military communications equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military communications equipment, simulators for military communications equipment, software for the use of equipment for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of simulators for military communications equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of simulators for military communications equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	ballistic test equipment, components for ballistic test equipment, software for the use of ballistic test equipment, technology for the use of ballistic test equipment, test equipment for armoured plate, test equipment for body armour, test equipment for constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, test equipment for military helmets
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	command and control vehicles, command communications control and intelligence equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, software for the use of command and control vehicles, technology for the use of command and control vehicles, technology for the use of command communications control and intelligence equipment

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	assault rifles, blank ammunition, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, training small arms ammunition
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for the development of civil unmanned air vehicle engines, technology for the development of civil unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of control equipment for unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of guidance equipment for unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of remote control equipment for unmanned air vehicles
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for test equipment for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of combat aircraft, test equipment for combat aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	technology for the development of air-to-surface missiles, technology for the production of air-to-surface missiles, technology for the use of air-to-surface missiles
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines, components for military support aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military combat vehicles, equipment for the production of military combat vehicles, equipment for the use of military combat vehicles, military combat vehicles, technology for military combat vehicles
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military radars, components for military training equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aero-engines
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes and equipment, components for military training aircraft, military parachutes and equipment

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for the use of military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, aerial target equipment, aircraft cannon ammunition, aircraft cannons, aircraft military communications equipment, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for aircraft cannon ammunition, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for ejector seats, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for fire location equipment, components for fuze setting devices, components for general military aircraft components, components for global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military containers, components for military field generators, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, components for weapon sights, countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image

recording/processing equipment, countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, ejector seats, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft cannon ammunition, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons, equipment for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of decoying/countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of fire location equipment, equipment for the use of fuze setting devices, equipment for the use of global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft head-up/down displays, equipment for the use of military aircraft pressure refuellers, equipment for the use of military aircrew breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of military containers, equipment for the use of military field generators, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of military mobile repair shops and related equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of sensor integration equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of test models for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of test models for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of test models for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of weapon mountings, equipment for the use of weapon sights, fire location equipment, fuze setting devices, general military aircraft components, global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up/down displays, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military cameras/photographic equipment, military containers, military field generators, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing

equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, military training equipment, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, sensor integration equipment, signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, software for aerial target equipment, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for combat aircraft, software for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for decoying/countermeasure equipment, software for determining the effects of weapons, software for electronic countermeasure equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, software for fire location equipment, software for fuze setting devices, software for global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, software for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, software for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, software for military aero-engines, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military image intensifier equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, software for military radars, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, software for military training equipment, software for rangefinding equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment, software for sensor integration equipment, software for targeting equipment, software for weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, technology for aircraft cannon ammunition, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for ejector seats, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for fire location equipment, technology for fuze setting devices, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military containers, technology for

		<p>military field generators, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment, technology for sensor integration equipment, technology for software for determining the effects of weapons, technology for targeting equipment, technology for test models for combat aircraft, technology for test models for military support aircraft, technology for test models for military training aircraft, technology for weapon control equipment, technology for weapon mountings, technology for weapon sights, test models for combat aircraft, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft, unfinished products for combat aircraft, unfinished products for military support aircraft, unfinished products for military training aircraft, weapon control equipment, weapon mountings, weapon sights</p>
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	<p>software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment</p>
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	<p>components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military support aircraft, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment</p>
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	<p>military aircrew breathing equipment</p>
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	<p>components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components</p>

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)</p>	<p>accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, aerial target equipment, components for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military radars, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, military aero-engines, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military radars, military training aircraft, military training equipment, technology for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)</p>	<p>aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military parachutes and equipment, signalling devices, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for equipment for the use of military helicopters, software for military aero-engines, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military helicopters, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military helicopters, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for signalling devices, technology for software for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for software for equipment for the use of military helicopters, technology for software for military aero-engines, technology for software for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for software for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for software for military helicopters</p>

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)</p>	<p>Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating military operation scenarios, Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, armoured plate, artillery ammunition, attack alerting/warning equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for fire location equipment, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military containers, components for military field generators, components for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, components for military radars, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, components for naval guns, components for pistols, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, environmental test facilities for military auxiliary/support vessels, equipment for the production of military auxiliary/support vessels, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of fire location equipment, equipment for the use of military auxiliary/support vessels, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of sensor integration equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, explosives, fire location equipment, general naval vessel components, global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military auxiliary/support vessels, military communications equipment, military containers, military diving apparatus, military electronic equipment, military field generators, military guidance/navigation equipment, military imaging radar sensor equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, military scenario simulation equipment, military software, military training equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, naval engines, naval gun installations/mountings, naval guns, pistols, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, sensor integration equipment, signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, small arms ammunition, small arms training equipment, software for determining the effects of weapons, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for military communications equipment, targeting equipment, tear gas/riot control agents, technology for military auxiliary/support vessels, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for production installations for military auxiliary/support vessels, test models for military auxiliary/support vessels, weapon control equipment, weapon mountings, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)</p>	<p>technology for software for air-to-surface missiles</p>

<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)</p>	<p>air-to-surface missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for equipment for the use of air-to-surface missiles, components for inert air-to-surface missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military training equipment, components for test equipment for air-to-surface missiles, equipment for the use of air-to-surface missiles, inert air-to-surface missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military training equipment, software for air-to-surface missiles, software for inert air-to-surface missiles, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, software for military communications equipment, software for military electronic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military training equipment, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for inert air-to-surface missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military training equipment, technology for replica air-to-surface missiles, test equipment for air-to-surface missiles</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)</p>	<p>aircraft military communications equipment, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military containers, components for military field generators, components for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, electronic warfare equipment, environmental test facilities for combat aircraft, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, general military aircraft components, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military cameras/photographic equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military field generators, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military imaging radar sensor equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for combat aircraft, software for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, software for general military aircraft components, software for goods treated for signature suppression for military use, software for military aero-engines, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military containers, software for military field generators, software for military image intensifier equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military imaging radar sensor equipment, software for military</p>

		<p>infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, software for military parametric technical databases, software for military radars, software for rangefinding equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment, software for signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, software for targeting equipment, software for test models for combat aircraft, software for weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military imaging radar sensor equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, technology for military parametric technical databases, technology for military radars, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment, technology for signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, technology for targeting equipment, technology for test models for combat aircraft, technology for weapon control equipment, test models for combat aircraft, weapon control equipment</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)</p>	<p>aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft missile protection systems, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft missile protection systems, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military airborne equipment, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up/down</p>

		<p>displays, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military cameras/photographic equipment, military communications equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, sensor integration equipment, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for aircraft missile protection systems, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for decoying/countermeasure equipment, software for electronic countermeasure equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military communications equipment, software for military electronic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military image intensifier equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military radars, software for sensor integration equipment, software for targeting equipment, software for weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for aircraft missile protection systems, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military radars, technology for sensor integration equipment, technology for targeting equipment, technology for weapon control equipment, weapon control equipment</p>
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)</p>	<p>cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography</p>

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, aerial target equipment, components for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military radars, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, military aero-engines, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military radars, military training aircraft, military training equipment, technology for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military electronic equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military electronic equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military containers, components for military training equipment, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, military parametric technical databases, military training equipment, software for air-to-air missiles, software for combat aircraft, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for combat aircraft, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military training equipment, technology for training air-to-air missiles

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military training aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military support aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for equipment for the production of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines, technology for software for military aero-engines, test equipment for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for combat aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	cryptographic software

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	airborne refuelling equipment, aircraft cannons, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warning equipment, chaff equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for fire control equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, fire control equipment, guided missile decoying equipment, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military containers, military electronic equipment, military flying helmets, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes and equipment, software for airborne refuelling equipment, software for aircraft cannons, software for aircrew protective masks, software for anti-g/pressure suits, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for chaff equipment, software for combat aircraft, software for ejector seats, software for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, software for fire control equipment, software for guided missile decoying equipment, software for military aero-engines, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military containers, software for military flying helmets, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military parachutes and equipment, technology for airborne refuelling equipment, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for aircrew protective masks, technology for anti-g/pressure suits, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for chaff equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for fire control equipment, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military containers, technology for military flying helmets, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military parachutes and equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for military training aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, technology for military training aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	accessories for military training equipment, components for military training equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, equipment for the use of munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, software for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia)	bombs, components for bombs, components for military containers, equipment for the use of bombs, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military containers, military parametric technical databases, military software, military training equipment, software for bombs, technology for bombs, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of bombs

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	mixtures containing chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for military radars, military software, technology for military radars
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for naval engines, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military helicopters, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of naval engines, general military aircraft components, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for naval engines
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew protective equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Saudi Arabia), ISSUE (Vietnam)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Somalia)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	components for military airborne cargo handling equipment, military airborne cargo handling equipment, technology for the production of military airborne cargo handling equipment, unfinished products for military

Dual Use)		airborne cargo handling equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka)	body armour, components for body armour, equipment employing cryptography, military helmets
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Sri Lanka), ISSUE (Vietnam)	bomb suits, civil body armour, components for bomb suits, components for civil body armour, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, demolition devices, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military helmets, mine detection equipment, non-military firing sets
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Sudan), ISSUE (Sudan, South)	bomb suits, components for bomb suits, components for devices for initiating explosives, components for improvised explosive device disposal equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military helmets, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, non-military firing sets
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Sudan, South)	body armour, components for body armour, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military helmets, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, non-military firing sets
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	general naval vessel components, technology for general naval vessel components
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military helicopters, military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military training aircraft
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Tunisia)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Tunisia), ISSUE (Ukraine)	small arms ammunition

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Turkmenistan)	components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, inertial equipment, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military parachutes and equipment, signalling devices, software for equipment for the use of military helicopters, software for military aero-engines, software for military helicopters, software for the use of inertial equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military helicopters, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military helicopters, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for signalling devices, technology for the use of inertial equipment, unfinished products for military helicopters
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Ukraine)	americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones, linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers, radioactive sources, technology for the use of devices for initiating explosives, technology for the use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology for the use of non-military detonators, technology for the use of non-military firing sets
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of cryptographic software, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, radio jamming equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, radio jamming equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	equipment employing cryptography, radio jamming equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for generating hopping codes, equipment for generating spreading codes, equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, impulse radio equipment, non-cryptographic information security equipment, software for cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment for generating hopping codes, software for equipment for generating spreading codes, software for equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, software for impulse radio equipment, software for non-cryptographic information security equipment, technology for cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, technology for cryptographic software, technology for digital cellular radio system, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment for generating hopping codes, technology for equipment for generating spreading codes, technology for equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, technology for impulse radio equipment, technology for non-cryptographic information security equipment, technology for software for cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment for generating hopping codes, technology for software for equipment for generating spreading codes, technology for software for equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, technology for software for impulse radio equipment, technology for software for non-cryptographic information security equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Vietnam)	components for military diving apparatus, military diving apparatus, rebreathing swimming equipment
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	equipment employing cryptography
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ISSUE (Zimbabwe)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography

**Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills**

I should be grateful for the following information regarding Government export licence approval for weaponised, as opposed to surveillance, UAVs, their software, technology and components.

1. Please could you list the countries to which the Government has given export licence approval for weaponised UAVs, their software, technology or components since coming into office, stating in the case of each country and each licence:

- a) the nature of the goods approved for export;
- b) the number of licences approved by country;
- c) their value by country;
- d) the date each licence was approved; and
- e) any end-user undertakings sought and given.

2. Please could you state whether the present Government has given any export licence approval for Brimstone, its software, technology or components and, if so, please could you provide the same information as in paragraph 1 above.

3. Please could you also state whether any export licence applications for Brimstone, its software, technology or components have been submitted to your department and are awaiting decision.

I should be grateful for your reply by Thursday 29 May.

I am copying this letter to the Foreign Secretary

12 May 2014

**Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills**

I should be grateful for your letter on the volume of weapons being exported under Government licences for counter-piracy which you said in your Oral Evidence that you would be sending to me by the end of March.

Please could I have your letter as soon as possible, and certainly no later than Thursday 29 May.

12 May 2014

**Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills**

Thank you for letters to me of 24 April regarding licence suspensions for Egypt and Ukraine, your letters to the Foreign Secretary of the same date regarding licence suspensions for Russia, sniper rifles and Ukraine, and G4S and Israel, and your letter to me of 28 April regarding the recent update to the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. I am replying to all six letters on behalf of the Government as the subject matter for

each falls primarily within my Ministerial responsibility. I apologise for the slight delay in doing so.

Egypt – suspended licences

On 19 July 2013 we reviewed all extant licences against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export licensing Criteria in lights of the deteriorating situation in Egypt. As a result of this review we revoked 5 Standard Individual Export Licensing (SIELs) because we assessed that the proposed export would be in breach of Criterion 2, i.e. that there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression.

On 21 August 2013, the EU Foreign Affairs Council stated that the “Member States agreed to suspend export licences on equipment which might be used for internal repression and reassess export licences for equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP”. This is a lower threshold than that set out in the Consolidated Criteria (“might be used” rather than “clear risk”) and as a result we reviewed all extant licences. On 27 August we suspended 39 SIELs and removed Egypt as a permitted destination from 9 OIELs (one of these OIELs was reinstated as on further inspection it was judged not to fall within the terms of the EU suspension). A further review was carried out in October; following this review 24 licences were reinstated as our assessment was that there was no longer a risk that the goods might be used for internal repression; two were revoked as we determined that there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression and that the licences therefore breached Criterion 2. Two had expired since being suspended so no further action was required. Sixteen licences remain suspended, these actions were completed on 25 October.

Information about these licences can be found at Annex 1.

Ukraine – suspended licences

On 4 February 2014, in response to the worsening situation in Ukraine, we revoked one export licence. The reason for revocation was that the export was no longer consistent with Criterion 2, i.e. we assessed that there was now a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression.

On 20 February, at the EU Foreign Affairs Council, the “Member States agreed to suspend export licences on equipment which might be used for internal repression and reassess export licences for equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP”. As with Egypt this is a lower threshold than that set out in the Consolidated Criteria (“might be used” rather than “clear risk”) and as a result we reviewed all extant licences. On 25 February we suspended 22 SIELs and on 26 February we removed Ukraine as a permitted destination from 5 OIELs. In each case the reason for suspension was that the proposed export was inconsistent with EU suspension. None of these licences have subsequently been revoked or reinstated although three have now expired.

Information about all these licences is at Annex 2.

Ukraine – sniper rifles

Following a thorough search of our records, and having consulted our Post in Kiev and weapons specialists in MOD, I have been unable to verify any of the claims regarding the UK made in the article to which you refer. What I can say is that:

We are not aware of the existence of any UK-made weapon known as an “AVX sniper rifle”, and we have no record of having granted any export licence for a weapon described in these terms.

The phrase “AK variant” is routinely used to describe weapons; however these are not made in the UK. The images we have seen from Ukraine appear to show marksmen using Dragonov SVD sniper rifles which are a derivative of the AK series of weapons and are produced by Russia and in other former communist states under licence.

We have no record of ever having granted any export licence where the Crimean Territorial Department of Internal Forces was named as end-user, consignee or third party on the licence application.

Since 2010 we have granted 17 licences for export of a total of 83 sniper rifles to Ukraine. The stated end-use in each case was for hunting or sports shooting and the end-users were authorised gun dealers or private individuals. Information about these licences is given at Annex 3.

The only licence granted for supply of sniper rifles to the Ukrainian government was in November 2000. This was for 10 rifles and the end-user was named as “the Security Service of the Ukraine”.

We do have concerns about the use of hunting and sporting weapons in the recent disturbances in Ukraine, including those described as “sniper rifles”. That is why the majority of the suspended licences listed in Annex 3 were for such weapons, or for components or silencers for such weapons. However I have seen nothing that would persuade me that the media report you refer to is accurate.

Russia – suspended licences

Information regarding suspended licences for Russia is provided in Annex 4. In each case the suspension was made because the export would be in breach of the policy announced in Parliament by the Foreign Secretary on 18 March, namely that the items were for direct export to Russia and were destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine, or were for export to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia where there is a clear risk that the end product will be used against Ukraine. This

suspension covers both military and dual use rated exports. Fifteen SIELs were suspended for direct exports and thirteen for indirect exports; in addition Russia was removed as a permitted destination from 6 OIELs (Russia was the only permitted destination for three of these licences and therefore they were revoked). All the suspensions took place on 19 March. No licences have been subsequently revoked or reinstated although one licence has now expired.

On 28 April the US government announced a package of measures against Russia. As part of these measures the Departments of State and Commerce will “deny pending applications for licences to export or re-export any high technology [military or dual-use] item...to Russia or occupied Crimea that contribute to Russia’s military capabilities”. Further information on these measures is available here <http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/content/article/9-bis/carousel/666-commerce-department-announces-expansion-of-export-restrictions-on-russia> and here: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/225241.htm>

I understand that Germany is currently not granting new export licences for military goods, or for dual-use items where the end-user is the armed forces or internal security forces of Russia, and that extant licences are being reassessed. Please note that Germany has no legal power to suspend licences for military goods. I am not aware of specific announcements by other EU Member States or NATO members, although privately many have told us they are taking a “cautious” approach.

G4S, Israel and the OECD

I believe that the news report you refer to relates to the complaints process under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. As you may know, the Guidelines are voluntary standards for responsible business conduct in areas including human rights, employment and the environment. Unfortunately, the news report does not reflect the complaints process accurately. Each government that adheres to the OECD Guidelines is required to maintain a National Contact Point (NCP) to consider complaints under the Guidelines. The UK NCP is maintained by the UK Government to meet this requirement. It is not part of the OECD and has no wider responsibilities for OECD functions. The UK NCP is staffed by a small team of officials based in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), and operates independently of BIS Ministers in its consideration of complaints.

The UK NCP does not usually comment on a complaint before it makes an Initial Assessment but all its Initial Assessments are published at <http://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-national-contact-point-statements>. The NCP generally expects to make an Initial Assessment within 3 months of receiving a complaint, although I understand that a spike in its caseload at the end of last year has led to some assessments taking a little longer. I would be happy to provide a copy of the Initial Assessment to the Committees once it has been published.

Consolidated Criteria

In respect of your three questions regarding my Written Ministerial Statement of 25 March 2014:

1. The Criteria are entitled “The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria” because they bring together (i.e. consolidate) the EU and UK variants of these Criteria, including the amendments that were necessary to allow us to ratify the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). It does not purport to be an EU document; it is intended to set out how the UK will apply the eight Criteria. In addition, my Statement represents an update to the previous Criteria and does not represent a substantive change in policy in any way. Retaining the name of the “old” Criteria is intended to reflect this continuity in policy.
2. The statement you refer to was a general statement that formed part of the introductory text, it did not form part of the Consolidated Criteria itself. Licence applications have always been assessed against the eight Criteria and not against general statements contained in the introductory text.
3. The reference to the “guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers agreed by the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council” was omitted because the commitments it contains have been largely superseded since they were agreed in November 1991, most notably by EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and the ATT. We therefore felt they were of little direct relevance today. The “OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers” are now referred to in Criterion 1(f). The “EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports” was replaced by the EU Common Position and it is therefore not appropriate to refer to this document.

Annex 1

Licence Suspensions and Revocations for Egypt

Licence Type	Destination Country	Goods Summary	Rating	Date of action taken	Reason
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for machine guns	ML1a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for machine guns	ML1a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Germany	components for ground vehicle military communications	ML6a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2

SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	United States	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013, Licence Revoked on 25th October 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Russia	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013, Licence Revoked on 25th October 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military parachutes and equipment, military parachutes and equipment	ML10h1	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	general military vehicle components	ML6a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military combat vehicles	ML6a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence expired whilst suspended, no further reviewing required.	
SIEL	Egypt	components for military	ML5b	Suspended	

(Permanent)		radars		27th August 2013; Unsuspected 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military radars	ML5b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspected 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	training small arms ammunition	ML3a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspected 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military communications equipment	ML11a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspected 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	military aircrew protective equipment	ML10g	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspected 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military training aircraft	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspected 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military support aircraft	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspected 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military support aircraft	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspected 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military training aircraft	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspected 25th October 2013	
SIEL	Egypt	general military aircraft	ML10a	Suspended	

(Permanent)		components		27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters, military guidance/navigation equipment	ML10b, ML11a	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	military aero-engines	ML10d	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	cryptographic software	5D002c1	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence expired whilst suspended, no further reviewing required.	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1 a, 5D002a	Suspended 27th August 2013, Licence Revoked on 25th October 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1 a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence expired whilst suspended, no further reviewing required.	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment	ML21c, ML22a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for missile scoring equipment, decoy flares, missile scoring equipment, software for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment	ML14, ML21a, ML22a, ML4b1	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft	ML10a, ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspen- ded 25th October 2013	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	components for military aero-engines	ML10d	Suspended 27th August 2013, reinstated on 28th August 2013	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for general military aircraft components, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components	ML10a, ML10f, ML10g, ML11a, ML17n, ML22a, ML4a, PL5017	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspen- ded 25th October 2013	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft	1A001c, ML10, ML10b, ML10d, ML10f, ML10g, ML11a,	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspen- ded 25th October 2013	

		<p>military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft</p>	<p>ML15d, ML22a, ML5b, PL5017</p>		
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>Egypt</p>	<p>components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for aircraft missile protection systems, technology for aircraft missile protection systems</p>	<p>ML11a, ML21a, ML22a, PL5017</p>	<p>Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspending 25th October 2013</p>	
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>Egypt</p>	<p>components for military radars, components for weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of military</p>	<p>ML11a, ML21a, ML22a, ML5a, ML5b,</p>	<p>Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspending 25th October</p>	

		radars, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, software for military radars, software for weapon control equipment, technology for military radars, technology for weapon control equipment	ML5d, PL5017	2013	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1 a, 5E002b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	

Annex 2

Licence Revoked for Ukraine

Date of revocation: 04/02/2014;

Reason for revocation: Criterion 2 (clear risk the goods might be used for internal repression)

Application Type	Goods Annual Report Summary	Goods Rating	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	ML13	398,620.12

Licences Suspended for Ukraine

1. Standard Individual Export Licences

Date of suspension: 25/02/2014;

Reason for suspension: agreement by Member States at the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU on 20/02/2014 to “suspend licences for equipment which might be used for internal repression”.

Application Type	Goods Annual Report Summary	Goods Rating	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers, sporting guns (15), sporting guns (20)	ML1	19200
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers	ML1	119000
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers	ML1	140000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (2)	ML1	112000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (1)	ML1	65000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (1)	ML1	69805
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (1)	ML1	198000
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (1)	ML1	2500
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (20)	ML1	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (10)	ML1	10000

SIEL (Permanent)	components for rifles	ML1	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (5)	ML1	16000
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (3)	ML1	16000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, sniper rifles (3)	ML1	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (2), sporting guns (20), sporting guns (5), sporting guns (6)	ML1	37500
SIEL (Permanent)	rifles (1), rifles (2), rifles (3), rifles (4)	ML1	19588
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (5)	ML1	22500
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (3), sporting guns (1), sporting guns (3), sporting guns (6)	ML1	36500
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers	ML1	80000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sporting guns	ML1	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles	ML1	8400
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	ML13	346000

2. Open Individual Licences re-issued without Ukraine as a permitted destination

Date of suspension: 26/02/2014;

Reason for suspension: agreement by Member States at the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU on 20/02/2014 to “suspend licences for equipment which might be used for internal repression”.

Application Type	Action	Goods Annual Report Summary	Goods Rating
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	sporting guns	ML1
OITCL	Re-issued	gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1, ML3
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the production of military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	ML11, ML18, ML21, ML22
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21, ML22

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21, ML22
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Annex 3

Export licences for sniper rifles for Ukraine, 2010-2013

Date Licence Granted	Goods Description	Quantity	Total Licensed Value (£)	End-User
28/09/2010	Stock System, Rifle Calibre .300, Rifle Calibre .308, 700 Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	6	15000	Arm Elit
14/01/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338	10	36000	Arm Elit
27/06/2011	Hunting Rifle Calibre .308	5	15000	Arm Elit
30/06/2011	NATO Model Rifle Calibre 7.62 x 51	5	15000	Arm Elit
06/07/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308, Ammunition Calibre .300, Ammunition	15	113400	Arm Elit
19/08/2011	Hunting Rifle Calibre .308	5	15000	Arm Elit
26/09/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	6	18000	Arm Elit
27/10/2011	Semi Automatic Rifle Calibre .308, Spare Magazine, Suppressor.	3	11605	Arm Elit
14/03/2012	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .300	1	2500	Arm Elit
15/08/2012	Repeating Target Rifle (6.5x47mm) with 2 spare barrels.	3	1500	Private Individual
21/12/2012	Bolt Action Rifle. Calibre .338	3	16000	Arm Elit
07/01/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338 with interchangeable spare barrels in calibre .300 & .308	3	30000	Arm Elit
15/04/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	5	22500	Arm Elit
12/04/2013	Desert Tactical Arms SRS Chassis System with	6	24000	Arm Elit

	Conversion Kit, Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308 22" Barrel			
23/07/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338 with Spare Barrel Calibre .338	3	7000	Private Individual
26/07/2013	Bolt Action Rifle .338	1	5300	Private Individual
24/09/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .22-250, Bolt Action Rifle Calibre 6.5-284	3	36500	Arm Elit

Annex 4

Licences Suspended for Russia

1. Standard Individual Export Licences for direct export

Application Type	Goods Annual Report Summary	Goods Rating	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for the use of combat aircraft	ML10, ML11, ML22	275,051.98
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	ML6	296,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17	7,513,132.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	ML6	21,379.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	ML6	28,240.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	ML6	228,120.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	ML9	22,472.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002, 5D002	636,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	ML4, ML4	12,640.63
SIEL (Permanent)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17	7,513,132.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	6A002	11,040,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17	7,513,132.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	ML13	7,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	6A002	389,389.00

SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	6A002	96,000.00
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2. Standard Individual Export Licences for incorporation in third countries and onward supply to Russia

Application Type	End User Countries	Goods Annual Report Summary	Goods Rating	Total Goods Value
SIEL (Permanent)	France	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	ML10	£216,050.44
SIEL (Permanent)	France	components for military aero-engines	ML10	£99,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	general military vehicle components	ML6	£80,189.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	components for military aircrew protective equipment	ML10	£51,950.00
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	general military vehicle components	ML6	£265,644.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11	£148,566.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	military aircraft head-up/down displays	ML10	£330,620.96
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	general military vehicle components	ML6	£4,743.60
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	general military vehicle components	ML6	£230.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11	£132,164.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	targeting equipment	ML5	£20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11	£22,315.67
SIEL (Permanent)	South Africa	components for military helicopters	ML10	£20,480.00

3. Open Individual Licences revoked or re-issued without Russia

Application Type	Action	Goods Annual Report Summary	Goods Rating
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Revoked	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	imaging cameras	6A003

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	ML11, ML17, ML22, ML4, ML6
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Revoked	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Revoked	technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for anti-armour missiles, technology for anti-ship missiles, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for fire control equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for general military vehicle components, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for laser rangefinders, technology for laser warning detectors, technology for military combat vehicles, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for optical target acquisition equipment, technology for optical target surveillance equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for tanks, technology for turrets, technology for weapon night sights, technology for weapon sights	ML22
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	1C202, 1A201, 6A001, 8A002

14 May 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Thank you for your letter of 28 April on the subject of barrel bombs, and their position under international law.

There have been regular reports of the use of barrel bombs by the regime of President Assad in Syria. I raised the issue on 22 February this year, following a UN Security Council resolution to allow greater humanitarian access to Syria.

I called on the Assad regime to cease the indiscriminate use of aerial bombardment across Syria, including the barbaric use of barrel bombs, and immediately adhere to the obligations set by the Security Council and allow free and unfettered access for all humanitarian agencies.

Behind my statement was a condemnation of the flagrant abuse of the principles of International Humanitarian Law, specifically regarding the indiscriminate use of weapons, and the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian objects. A barrel bomb, or indeed any weapon, is used unlawfully if it is deliberately targeted at civilians or civilian objects, or used in an indiscriminate, disproportionate fashion with insufficient precautions taken in attack. However, in principle the air-delivery of weapons is no less capable of being carried out indiscriminately than any other means of delivery.

HMG does not consider that barrel bombs as a category of conventional weapon are specifically prohibited under international law. There may nonetheless be circumstances in which a barrel bomb or other improvised explosive device is equipped with chemical weapons, in which case the use of such would be prohibited in all circumstances under the Chemical Weapons Convention. HMG does not currently have any plans to bring the issue of barrel bombs to the UN Convention on certain Conventional Weapons, or any other fora.

We will continue to condemn President Assad's flagrant abuses of international humanitarian law, including the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian objects.

19 May 2014

**Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills**

I attach the letter I wrote to you on 16 April on the DSEi exhibition, and the two letters I wrote to you on 17 April on the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty and on Arms Export Licence Revocations.

The Clerk to the Committees has advised me that your Department's officials are claiming that none of the hard copies of these three letters have been received by your Department which seems strange given that you have replied to a number of other letters I sent to you at the same time.

In accordance with our usual practice as a back-up copies of these three letters were also emailed to your Department.

I attach a copy of the relevant email sent to Mr Ian Webster on 23 April

No doubt you will wish to make your own inquiries as to what has happened to this correspondence within your Department. However, as the matters concerned are all relevant to the Committees' forthcoming Report, I should be grateful for your replies to all three letters no later than 2 June.

20 May 2014

**Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Justine Greening, MP,
 Secretary of State for International Development**

I refer you to my letter to you of 24 April about DFID's role in the arms export control process to which Alan Duncan replied with his letter of 8 May.

I am sorry to say that Alan's reply is most disappointing.

Given that Criteria 8 forms part of both the EU's and the UK's Criteria for arms exports, the Committees attach considerable importance to the way in which your Department discharges its role in the UK's arms export controls process. It is therefore a matter of concern that though the Government stated in CM 8707, published last October, that officials would be submitting advice to Ministers last Autumn on DFID's role in the export control process, no such advice had in fact been submitted by the time of Alan's reply to me in May this year.

The Committees will wish to include in their Report on their current inquiry which is now being drafted their scrutiny of your Department's role in arms exports controls. I therefore need to have your promised update no later than 2 June.

I am copying this letter to the Chair of the International Development Committee, Sir Malcolm Bruce, to whom I would be grateful if you could copy your reply, and also to Alan Duncan.

20 May 2014

**Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague, MP, First
 Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs**

In your letter of 24 April you asked me to make public which precursor chemicals that have been or could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons have been declared by the Syrian regime.

As my earlier response made clear, the information provided by Syria in its declarations to the OPCW is classified under the Chemical Weapons Convention's confidentiality regime.

Article 4 states:

“Each State Party shall treat information which it receives from the Organisation in accordance with the level of confidentiality established for that information.” All declarations received by the OPCW are confidential.

For operational reasons and with Syria's agreement the OPCW have put some of this information into the public domain. I attach a table with these details.

Full details of the chemicals listed in the Syrian declaration were provided to you by officials at a confidential briefing on 29 April.

My officials are seeking OPCW agreement that further information contained in the Syrian declaration can be placed in the public domain.

Annex

	CHEMICAL NAME	QUANTITY TO BE DESTROYED (metric tonnes)
1	TRIETHYLAMINE	30
2	TRIMETHYL PHOSPHITE (TMP)	60
3	DIMETHYL PHOSPHITE (DMP)	5
4	MONOISOPROPYLAMINE	40
5	DI-ISOPROPYL AMINOETHANOL	5
6	2-CHLOROETHANOL	5
7	BUTAN-1-OL	5
8	METHANOL	3
9	HYDROGEN FLUORIDE	60
10	PHOSPHORUS PENTASULPHIDE	10
11	PHOSPHORUS TRICHLORIDE	30
12	PHOSPHORUS OXYCHLORIDE	15
13	HYDROCHLORIC ACID	45
14	PROPAN-2-OL	120
15	HEXAMINE	80
16	SODIUM-O-ETHYL METHYL PHOSPHONOTHIONATE	130
17	N (2-CHLOROETHYL)-N- ISOPROPYL PROPAN-2-AMINE (SALT)	40
18	N (2-CHLOROETHYL)-N- ISOPROPYL PROPAN-2-AMINE (SOLUTION 23-64%)	90

19	N (2-CHLOROETHYL)-N-ETHYL PROPAN 2 AMINE (SOLUTION 23-64%)	25
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4 June 2014

**Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Alan Duncan, MP, Minister
of State for International Development**

Thank you for your letter to Secretary of State Justine Greening on 20 May 2014. I am responding as Minister responsible for DFID's role in the UK's arms export licencing process, in particular Criterion 8 (C8).

I wish to reassure you that my Department treats the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licencing Criteria with the utmost seriousness, and I am therefore pleased to update you on DFID's work on Criterion 8. Officials in my department have conducted a review of C8 in consultation with other government departments. I have recently approved a revision to the methodology for its application.

DFID will strengthen its application of Criterion 8 by:

1. Improving the data and indicators used to calculate the C8 thresholds;
2. Focusing our analysis on the least developed countries and those where C8 is most relevant;
3. Ensuring the cumulative value of licenses to each country is included in our assessment;
4. Involving DFID country offices more closely in decisions on open licences.

An explanation of all these changes is attached to this letter. DFID officials will begin implementation immediately and will review the effectiveness of this revised approach after 12 months. A full report will be annexed to the 2015 UK Annual Review on Arms Export Controls.

Alongside the review of C8, my officials have also looked into whether DFID could formally contribute to the consideration of other criteria. My view is that the expertise required for assessment of these other Criteria already sits within other departments. DFID offices work closely with colleagues from other departments both in London and overseas, and their knowledge is therefore already available informally. DFID will continue to focus on the assessment of Criterion 8.

Annex

**Revision to Methodology for Criterion 8 of the Consolidated EU and National Arms
Export Licencing Criteria**

1. This note provides details of a revision to the UK Government's methodology for assessing export licenses against Criterion 8 (C8) of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licencing Criteria.

2. The Department for International Development has responsibility for assessing Criterion 8 of the cross-HMG export licensing system, which asks whether a proposed export “would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country.”

3. The 2007 UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report outlined the current methodology and data necessary to take decisions on the application of Criterion 8 (Annex C of the report). Following a review of the application of Criterion 8, a revision to this methodology is proposed for three main reasons:

- a. The cumulative impact of exports to a single country is not captured;
- b. ‘Open’ licences are sometimes approved which allow exporters to export as much as they want to a defined country;
- c. More countries are considered than necessary, including many which are unlikely ever to raise concerns under C8.

4. The revision to the methodology is detailed below, the core of which remains the same, with four changes designed to strengthen the process.

How the Methodology Currently Operates

5. The methodology laid out in 2007 addressed exports to all IDA-recipient countries. A baseline threshold of 2.5% of combined public health and education spending in the recipient country is calculated and adjusted according to a series of development indicators (see Table 1 below). DFID views any export license application above this adjusted threshold for a more detailed examination. DFID may also ask to see applications in respect of other countries ad hoc.

6. Four changes will be made to improve the robustness of the process:
- I. Improving the data and indicators used to calculate the C8 thresholds.
 - II. Focusing analysis on the least developed countries and those where C8 is most relevant.
 - III. Ensuring the cumulative value of licenses to each country is included in the assessment.
 - IV. Involving DFID country offices more closely in C8 decisions regarding open licences.

Alteration to indicators

7. Annex C in the 2007 Annual Report laid out the list of indicators used to calculate the adjusted threshold. One of these original indicators¹, for which data was scarce, will be replaced with an assessment of the country against a corruption indicator published by the World Bank.

¹ No.12, whether a country is ‘off or on track’ with its IFI programmes

8. The data underlying the thresholds will continue to be updated annually, where available, to maintain relevance. The full list of indicators is detailed at the end of this note in Table 1.

Focusing analysis on the least developed countries

9. The existing methodology for Criterion 8 involves the consideration of export licence applications for the 82 countries on the World Bank's IDA list. This includes a number of countries where the risk of Criterion 8 concerns emerging is considered very low. By excluding countries considered particularly low risk from the analysis, the revised methodology will allow DFID to focus on licences for fewer countries in greater detail.

10. In order to determine which countries to consider, DFID will undertake an assessment each year of the risk of Criterion 8 concerns emerging for each country, using the indicators in Table 1. Indicators are assigned a binary trigger value, giving each country a score of "1" or "0" for each indicator. Any country that receives a score of 4 or less is considered particularly low risk, and will be removed from the analysis of Criterion 8 for that year. The detail of this assessment is in Table 2 at the end of this note.

11. For 2014, this assessment generates the following list of 47 countries that will continue to be assessed under Criterion 8:

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Occupied Palestinian Territories*, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan*, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

* Countries may be added to the list on an ad hoc basis where deemed necessary, or where the lack of data makes an assessment of risk difficult (as in the case of both the Occupied Palestinian Territories and South Sudan).

Ensuring the cumulative value of licences to each country is included in our assessment

12. The existing methodology assesses licences individually against a threshold. Under the revised methodology DFID will also consider licences cumulatively, so as to

take into account the impact of all arms exports to a given country rather than of each individual export.

Involving our country offices more closely in C8 decisions regarding open licences

13. Open licences have no financial value attached to them and therefore cannot be assessed against numerical thresholds. They are currently considered by DFID advisers in London, with support from country offices used on an ad hoc basis. Under the revised methodology, open licenses will be considered by both DFID advisers in London and in country (where appropriate and available) in each instance. This will strengthen the assessment of open licenses, incorporating local expertise into the consideration of factors including the nature of the goods being exported, previous licences approved, and the wider risk of Criterion 8 concerns in each country.

Table 1: Updated indicators for adjusted threshold

Indicator	Definition	Trigger	Amber Adjustment	Red Adjustment
CORE DATA FOR BASELINE THRESHOLD				
Health and Education spending	2.5% of Health and Education Expenditure	2.5%	-	-
INDICATORS FOR ADJUSTED THRESHOLD				
1. Military expenditure	Military Expenditure as a percentage of GDP compared to the low income country average	Red: >2.5% Amber: >2.0%	0.8	0.6
2. Military spending compared to social sector spending	Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP compared to Health and Education spending as a percentage of GDP.	Red: >60% Amber: >50%	0.8	0.6
3. EU or bilateral aid (ODA)	ODA as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI)	Red: >4.0% Amber: >2.3%	0.8	0.6
4. Public finances (deficit)	Overall public deficit as a percentage of GDP after grants	Red: >5% Amber: >3.5%	0.8	0.6
5. Public finances (revenue)	Recurrent revenue yield as a percentage of GDP	Red: <10% Amber: <15%	0.9	0.8
6. Balance of payments (international reserves)	International foreign exchange reserves in terms of a months' imports	Red: <1.5 months' imports Amber: < 2.5 month's imports	0.8	0.6
7. Balance of payments (trend in int'l reserves)	Downward trend in reserves: if over last year, if reserves at or below 2.5 months' imports	Red: Fall Amber: Same level	0.95	0.9
9. External debt: HIPC ratios	Trends in a country's external debt relative to HIPC sustainability ratios: NPV of debt to fiscal revenue as %	Red: > 250 Amber: > 238	0.85	0.7

Indicator	Definition	Trigger	Amber Adjustment	Red Adjustment
8. External debt: credit rating	Institutional Investor Credit Rating	Red: < 15 Amber: < 20	0.8	0.6
10. GNI	Gross National Income per capita PPP dollars	Red: <\$1,000 Amber <\$1,500	0.85	0.7
11. HDI	UNDP Human Development Index (HDI)	Red: < 0.400 Amber: < 0.500	0.8	0.6
12. Corruption	Whether the country is highly corrupt according to the World Bank Corruption Indicators.	Red or amber: < -1	N/A	0.5
13. DFID	Whether the country has a DFID Country Office in place	Red or amber: Country Office	N/A	0.5

Table 2: Indicators and triggers for country list

Indicator	Trigger	Result
1. Military Expenditure as a % of GDP	Greater or less than 2%	>2% = 1 <2% = 0
2. ODA as % of GNI	Greater or less than 2.3%	>2.3% = 1 <2.3% = 0
3. Military Expenditure as a % of Health and Education Spending	Greater or less than 50%	>50% = 1 <50% = 0
4. Public finances: deficit as % of GDP	Greater or less than 3.5%	>3.5% = 1 <3.5% = 0
5. Public finances: government revenue as % of GDP	Greater or less than 15%	<15% = 1 >15% = 0
6. International foreign exchange reserves in terms of a months' imports	Greater or less than 2.5 months	<2.5 = 1 >2.5 = 0
7. Balance of payments (trend in int'l reserves)	Rise or Fall	<0 = 1 >0 = 0
8. NPV of debt to fiscal revenue as %	Greater or less than 238%	>238% = 1 <238% = 0
9. Institutional Investor Credit Rating	Greater or less than 20	<20 = 1 >20 = 0
10. GNI	Greater or less than \$1500	<\$1500 = 1 >\$1500 = 0

Indicator	Trigger	Result
11. HDI	Greater or less than 0.5	<0.5 = 1 >0.5 = 0
12. World Bank Corruption Index	Greater or less than -0.6	<-0.6 = 1 >-0.6 = 0
13. DFID Country Office presence	Yes or No	Yes = 3 No = 0
Notes: - Indicator 13 – DFID country office presence – has been more heavily weighted than other indicators in order to ensure that all DFID priority countries are retained on the list.		

6 June 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

Thank you for your two letters dated 12 May 2014 concerning “weaponised” Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and licences for maritime anti-piracy respectively. Thank you also for your letter dated 16 April 2014 concerning the Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi) trade fair and your two letters dated 17 April 2014 about arms export licence revocations and the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty respectively. Please accept my apologies for the delay in responding to these letters. I am writing one consolidated reply and will address each issue in turn.

“Weaponised” UAVs and Brimstone

Let me start by clarifying that the UK does not classify “weaponised” UAVs separately from “non-weaponised” UAVs and that many components will be common to both. Consequently, in the context of your request we have searched our records for all ‘military’ UAVs and components falling within control entry ML10c1 (previously ML10c) in the UK Strategic Export Control Lists and for related software and technology. We then sought to identify from the detailed goods description any licences that were for items intended for “weaponised” UAVs.

On this basis we have found no record of any export licences granted by the present Government for “weaponised” UAVs, their software, technology or components.

I can also confirm that no licences have been granted by this Government for the Brimstone missile, its software, technology or components. However we have granted one export licence for software for modelling, simulating and evaluating the Brimstone Missile System. Information about this licence is included at Annex A.

Finally, there are no applications for Brimstone, its software, technology or components, currently awaiting decision.

Licences for Maritime Anti-Piracy

The Committees raised concerns at the December 2013 hearing about the volume of weapons licensed for use by Private Marine Security Companies (PMSCs). Mr Mike Gapes MP quoted export data for the period April 2012 to June 2013, indicating that “a total of 30,000 assault rifles, 2,536 pistols and 11,000 rifles were supplied to a number of countries on the East Coast of Africa and to the Arab world, and also to South Africa and Russia”. Mr Gapes went on to ask “whether such quantities...seem reasonable in terms of the need, which clearly exists, for anti-piracy work”. He also asked if there was “evidence of diversion of any of these weapons away from the purposes for which they were supplied”. My officials committed to look at these points.

Firstly, let me be clear that I stand by what I said in December. There is no evidence of diversion. All the British security companies involved in anti-piracy activities are subject to a code of conduct and rigorous pre-licensing checks. Holders of the Open General Trade Control Licence (Marine Anti-Piracy) are also subject to post-licensing audits. The vast majority of Private Marine Security Companies are British and they play an important role in ensuring the safety of shipping off the coast of East Africa.

My officials have examined all the exports of automatic weapons and small arms during 2012 and 2013 in support of the Marine Anti-Piracy (MAP) sector. They looked at weapons, accessories and ammunition falling within control entries ML1a, ML1b, ML1d, ML3a and PL5017 as outlined in Schedule 1 of the Open General Trade Control Licence (Marine Anti-Piracy).

As well as looking at the quantity of items licensed over the two year period they also identified what was actually exported. The investigation showed that the overall percentage of goods shipped against licences granted for automatic weapons and small arms was only some 1.8 per cent of the total figure licensed in 2012 and 2013. Although 181,708 individual items were licensed over the two year period, only 3,273 were shipped (2,332 assault rifles; 83 combat shot guns; 6 machine guns; 63 pistols; 623 rifles; 166 sporting guns).

It is clear from contacts with exporters that they have routinely been applying for licences to cover volumes of exports vastly in excess of what is actually exported. This is because they have no firm estimate of likely exports over the two year validity period of each licence at the point they apply for licences.

The volumes listed in many of these licences are not therefore an accurate prediction of the eventual level of exports. Although the overall volume shipped is proportionate to the activities of British PMSCs - and there is no evidence of diversion - this is not a satisfactory situation. My officials will be working with the suppliers of automatic

weapons and small arms to PMSCs over the next few months to put new licensing arrangements in place to closely align the volumes licensed and actual exported volumes. These arrangements will enable the UK Government to exercise greater supervision of these exports and will include regular reporting of volumes exported to be included in the routine quarterly publication of export licensing data.

We also announced a review of the mainstay licensing cover for PMSCs, the Open General Trade Control Licence (Marine Anti-Piracy), at a recent meeting of the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG). SCEG is the trade association for the sector. Our aim will be to ensure that the licence remains fit for purpose and it is our intention to put a revised version in place by the end of this year.

DSEi trade fair

During the 2013 DSEi exhibition the event organisers, Clarion, found literature that allegedly breached UK export controls on the stands of two companies based overseas (Tianjin Myway International Trading Company and Magforce International). The literature contained pictures of certain Category A goods, in this case paramilitary items including electric shock batons, electric-shock belts and leg irons. Clarion expelled the two companies from the exhibition and the literature in question was confiscated and passed to HM Revenue and Customs.

Simply displaying pictures of Category A goods in a brochure may not necessarily constitute an offence. In order to prove a criminal offence in such cases it may be necessary to prove a link between the display of literature and the eventual movement of the goods between two overseas countries. You will recall that this issue was addressed at some length in my letters to you of 13 February and 26 March 2012.

As you will be aware, HM Revenue and Customs is responsible for investigating potential breaches of UK strategic export controls. HMRC is also responsible for referring cases to the Crown Prosecution Service. I am assured that HMRC fully and properly considered the alleged breaches at DSEi 2013, as they would in any case where potential breaches are detected, or where there are credible allegations of an offence.

In these cases HMRC determined that further action was neither appropriate nor viable, and therefore did not take specific steps to draw this matter to the attention of the Crown Prosecution Service.

Government departments worked closely with Clarion at the DSEi exhibition to ensure exhibitors complied with UK law. The fact that this literature was detected and confiscated, and that the exhibiting companies were expelled from the exhibition, was the result of effective co-operation between officials and the event organisers and I view this as a positive outcome.

Arms export licence revocations

In your letter dated 17 April 2014, you requested details of all licence revocations made in the period 14 May 2013 to the present, listed by country.

The information you requested is attached in Annex B. The data provided is split into two sections:

- a list of 17 revoked licences - either Standard Individual Export Licences or Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) for single destinations
- a list of 8 licences where specific countries have been removed from extant multiple destination OIELs or Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs)

Please note that data for licences revoked or countries removed in 2014 are not currently in the public domain. This includes two licences for Venezuela revoked in the last few days because of concerns about internal repression.

US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty and US Export Control Reform

There is potential for confusion in using the word “compliant” in respect of the Treaty and the US Export Control Reform (ECR) initiative. The intent of the Treaty was to enhance bilateral defence equipment cooperation by creating an exemption to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (the ITAR relates to those items appearing on the United States Munitions List (USML)). One of the objectives of ECR is to enhance US defence cooperation with a wider range of partners by moving less-sensitive military items from the USML to the Commerce Control List (CCL). By definition items which have moved from the USML to the Commerce Control List (CCL) under ECR are not eligible for an ITAR exemption.

The real question therefore is whether the utility of the Treaty could be overtaken by ECR unless substantive changes are made. This is because the number of Treaty-eligible items is being reduced under ECR while specific exemptions within the Treaty mean certain other technologies were excluded from the start. There has been good dialogue between our two governments on maintaining a special place for the Treaty but at the moment US resources are focused on the implementation of ECR. The British Government’s long term objective is to move the Treaty to the mainstream of our defence and security relationship.

Annex A

	STANDARD INDIVIDUAL LICENCE (PERMANENT) FOR SOFTWARE RELATED TO BRIMSTONE				
Goods Description	Goods Summary	Destination	Goods Value (£)	Date of Approval	End User Undertaking provided?

CD containing version of the Dual Mode Brimstone UOR standard DIMODS 6 DoF Mathematical Model	Software for modelling / simulating / evaluating weapon systems	United States	20000	31-Jul-2012	Yes
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Annex B

LICENCES REVOKED					
Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Refusal Reason
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Venezuela	28/05/2014	2,7
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Venezuela	28/05/2014	2,7
SIEL	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Russia	12/05/2014	4
OIEL	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for anti-armour missiles, technology for anti-ship missiles, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for fire control equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for general military vehicle components, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for laser rangefinders, technology for laser warning detectors, technology for military combat vehicles, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for optical target acquisition equipment, technology for optical target surveillance equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for tanks, technology for turrets, technology for weapon night sights, technology for weapon sights	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
SIEL	body armour, components for body armour	ML13d	Ukraine	04/02/2014	2
SIEL	software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment, radio jamming equipment	5D001c, 5A001f2	Nigeria	15/11/2013	2
SIEL	radio jamming equipment	5A001f2	Nigeria	15/11/2013	2
SIEL	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	United	25/10/2013	2

			States		
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Egypt	25/10/2013	2
SIEL	equipment for the use of military helicopters, components for military helicopters	PL5017, ML10b	Russia	25/10/2013	2
SIEL	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Germany	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	components for machine guns	ML1a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	components for machine guns	ML1a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
	COUNTRIES REMOVED FROM EXTANT LICENCES				
Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Refusal Reason
OIEL	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	Russia	24/03/2013	4
OIEL	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	ML11a, ML17d, ML22a, ML4b1, ML6a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	1C202a, 3A201a1, 6A001a2d, 8A002a2, 8A002a3, 8A002a4, 8A002c, 8A002i2	Russia	19/03/2014	4
OIEL	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21c, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OIEL	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21c, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OIEL	sporting guns	ML1a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OIEL	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the production of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment,	ML11a, ML18a, ML21a, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2

	military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment				
OITCL	gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML1d, ML3a	Ukraine	25/02/2014	2

6 June 2014

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

On 17 April 2014 I wrote to you requesting a list of **all** export licence revocations for the period 14 May 2013 to the present. You replied to that request on 6 June, providing in an annex to your letter providing a total of 14 SIEL revocations and 3 OIEL revocations for single destinations and 7 OIEL and 1 OITCL revocations where specific countries have been removed from extant multiple destination OIELs or OITCLs.

However, on examining the ECO Pivot reports for Quarter 3 (July–September) and Quarter 4 (October–December) 2013 there appear to be some discrepancies between the data supplied in your letter of 6 June and the information contained in the Pivot Report. For example:

The Pivot report for Q3 2013 lists the following revocations not included in the list provided as an annex to your letter of 6 June:

Continental Shelf: SIEL for towed hydrophone arrays;

Pivot Report for Q4 2013 lists the following revocations not included in the list provided as an annex to your letter of 6 June:

Belgium: OIEL for components for military aero-engines and military aero-engines;

Latvia: OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment;

Malaysia: OIEL for components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines;

Morocco: OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment;

Nigeria: 2 SIELs for radio jamming equipment refused and a SIEL for radio jamming equipment and software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment;

Russia: SIELs for components for military helicopters and equipment for the use of military helicopters and an OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment;

Tunisia: OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment;

Turkey: OIEL for components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines;

United Arab Emirates: OIELs for: military engineer vehicles; software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of military communications equipment; and components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines;

Please would you explain why the above, and any other revocations, for arms export licences were not included in the annex to your letter of 6 June and please provide a full and comprehensive list of revocations for the period 6 June 2014 to the present.

12 June 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Michael Fallon, MP, Minister of State for Business and Enterprise, Department of Business, Innovation and Skills

I am writing to let you know about a notice we sent to exporters last week. Please see a copy annexed below.

The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills has been migrating to a new desktop computer system. This will bring considerable benefits but while it is bedding in we have some temporary performance problems with the online export licensing system.

We are still handling the majority of licence applications within published target times - and there is no evidence that exporters have any lost business due to slower processing times - but we are keen to keep our customers up to date as some are experiencing short delays. Typically, applications are taking four days longer than in the period just before migration to the new desktop computer system, although more than 80 per cent of applications are being handled within twenty-five working days.

BIS are working hard to rectify the performance issues and a number of technical fixes have been implemented this week. The early signs are that these will put us back on track very soon. In the meantime we have asked exporters to contact our helpline if they are concerned that they may lose export business. We will then prioritise their applications.

Both technical (IT) and export licensing personnel are actively managing the situation to minimise the risk to export business. I will write to you again before the end of next week with a further update.

Annex

Text of Notice to Exporters

Notice to Exporters 2014/16 – Impact of new computer system on SPIRE licensing service

11 June 2014

The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills has just migrated to a new desktop computer system. Although this will bring considerable performance benefits for BIS and the Export Control Organisation, the migration has had a significant short term impact on the performance and availability of the ECO SPIRE system.

While we are still meeting our licensing performance targets, we are currently experiencing a backlog in processing licence applications and delivering other advisory services. This means that regrettably, in order to prioritise licence applications, we will not be able accept new enquiries for advice about Control List Classifications until further notice. For information about how you can assess your exports please refer to see the GOV.UK guidance <https://www.gov.uk/do-your-goods-need-an-export-licence>.

Please accept our apology for any delays you are experiencing and bear with us while we work to clear the backlog. If you are in danger of losing export business because of these delays then please contact the ECO Helpline on 0207 215 4594 or email eco.help@bis.gsi.gov.uk and we will strive to prioritise your application. To speed up the process please avoid contacting us about non-urgent cases at this time.

16 June 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Michael Fallon, MP, Minister of State for Business and Enterprise, Department of Business, Innovation and Skills

I am writing to update you on the performance of the online export licensing system, further to my letter on this subject last week.

The technical fixes we have introduced appear to have almost fully resolved the IT problems we faced as our new computer system is bedded in. We have also increased staff resourcing on export licensing, including through weekend working. As a result we are now reducing the numbers of licences subject to delays.

It is currently taking us around 22 days to approve 70% of licence applications, compared to our target of 20 days. But the majority of licence applications are still being handled within published target times and there remains no evidence that exporters have lost business due to slower processing times.

We will continue to do all we can to restore service levels to their target rates as soon as possible. We will also keep exporters updated and continue to advertise that exporters can contact our helpline if they are concerned that they may lose export business, so we can then prioritise their applications.

I will write to you again if there are significant changes to report.

27 June 2014

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable, MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills

Thank you for your letter of 12 June 2014 regarding discrepancies between the list of revoked licences I supplied to you in my letter of 6 June and the data published in the ECO's Pivot Reports for Q3 and Q4 2013.

First of all I should note that the following SIELs were included in my letter of 6 June and that there is no discrepancy with respect to these revocations:

- 2 SIELs for Nigeria – one for “*software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment, radio jamming equipment*” and one for “*radio jamming equipment;*” and
- 1 SIEL for Russia for “*components for military helicopters and equipment for the use of military helicopters*”.

Turning now to the other licences you have identified it appears that in each case an error in the way that certain cases are processed within the SPIRE licensing system, or an error in the automated process by which the Pivot report is generated from the SPIRE data, has led to these licences being incorrectly reported in the Pivot Report as revoked. In fact no revocations took place in these cases. Clearly these errors are unacceptable. For some of the cases we need to do further work to identify the exact causes of the error and we may need to make changes to the SPIRE system or to the process for generating the Pivot Reports in order to prevent similar errors in future.

These errors affect 4 licences as follows:

- 1) Continental Shelf: SIEL for *towed hydrophone arrays* – this was one of 4 SIEL licences for *towed hydrophone arrays* converted from a Temporary Export to a Permanent Export licence during the period in question. It is not clear why one of the 4 licences is showing as revoked, as no revocation took place. Further investigation is required;

2) Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL) for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for *military engineer vehicles*. When an OIEL nears its expiry date an exporter may request a short extension to the licence to allow exports to continue while a new (replacement) application is processed. In a few such cases the exporter will ask us to remove some of the goods lines from the extended licence. The way this request is processed within SPIRE causes the whole licence to appear in the Pivot Report as revoked, when in fact only specific goods lines have been removed;

3) A single OIEL for Latvia, Morocco, Russia, Tunisia and UAE for *software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment*. As above, these lines were removed from an extended licence;

4) A single OIEL for Belgium, Malaysia, Turkey and UAE for *military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines, military containers, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the production of military aero-engines, test equipment for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, test equipment for military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aero-engines, technology for software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines*. In this case the exporter had asked for the coverage of the licence to be amended shortly after it was issued. The amendment has caused the licence to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.

Since my previous response to you there have been 7 revocations for Thailand. Annex A provides further detail. These will be published in the April – June 2014 pivot report in October 2014.

In light of the discrepancies described above I have included one further “revocation” in Annex A. This is not an actual revocation based on any change in circumstances in the destination country or any change in policy, but will nevertheless appear as a revocation in the Q2 (April – June) 2014 pivot report.

This particular licence was originally issued with Latvia as the end-user destination but subsequently reissued for the Central African Republic after it became apparent that an error was made by the exporter when submitting the original application. As the goods were being detained at the port by HM Revenue & Customs the most expedient way of amending the licence was to revoke and reissue the licence under the same SPIRE reference. The April – July 2014 pivot report is likely to show a licence for the Central African Republic as revoked, as this is the destination now showing under the live SPIRE reference. Annex A provides further detail.

While there is a statement on the Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics website explaining why data found in these reports may differ from data published

elsewhere it is of course of the utmost importance that our published reports are as accurate as possible. I am therefore grateful to you for bringing these errors to my attention. Please be assured that we will take the steps necessary to prevent these errors happening in the future.

I hope you find this information helpful.

Annex.

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Revoke Reason
SIEL	small arms ammunition	ML3a	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	civil body armour, body armour, components for body armour	1A005, ML13d	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	civil body armour	1A005	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	components for body armour	ML13d2	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	anti-riot/ballistic shields	PL5001b	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	body armour	ML13d1	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	tear gas/irritant ammunition	ML3a	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	military support vehicles, components for military support vehicles	ML6a	Central African Republic	11/06/2014	Licence was converted from a licence to export to Latvia to a licence to export to CAR

30 June 2014