



# House of Commons

## Committees on Arms Export Controls

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**Scrutiny of arms Exports and Arms Control (2014): Scrutiny of the Government's UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 published in July 2013, the Government's Quarterly Reports from October 2012 to September 2013, and the Government's policies on arms exports and international arms control issues**

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### **First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of Session 2014–15**

Second Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee of Session 2014-15

Second Report of the Defence Committee of Session 2014-15

Fourth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Session 2014-15

Second Report of the International Development Committee of Session 2014-15

### ***Volume II***

*Memorandum from the Chair of the Committees*

*Oral and additional written evidence is contained in Volume III, available on the Committees' website at [www.parliament.uk/caeccomm](http://www.parliament.uk/caeccomm)*

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## The Committees on Arms Export Controls

The four House of Commons Select Committees that comprise the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) are: the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, the Defence Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the International Development Committee. The CAEC's task is to scrutinise the UK Government's arms export control procedures and legislation, individual arms export licence decisions, arms export policies, and the UK's role in international arms control agreements.

### Current membership

**BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS:** Mr Adrian Bailey\*§, William Bain, Mr Brian Binley, Paul Blomfield, Katy Clark\*, Mike Crockett\*, Caroline Dinenege, Julie Elliott, Rebecca Harris, Ann McKechnie\*, Mr Robin Walker\*, Nadhim Zahawi\*

**DEFENCE:** Rory Stewart§, Mr Julian Brazier\*, Rt Hon Jeffrey M. Donaldson, Mr James Gray\*, Mr Dai Havard, Mr Adam Holloway\*, Mrs Madeleine Moon, Sir Bob Russell\*, Bob Stewart\*, Ms Gisela Stuart\*, Derek Twigg\*, John Woodcock

**FOREIGN AFFAIRS:** Rt Hon Sir John Stanley\* (Chair of the Committees' concurrent meetings), Rt Hon Sir Richard Ottaway§, Mr John Baron, Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell\*, Rt Hon Ann Clwyd\*, Mike Gapes\*, Mark Hendrick\*, Sandra Osborne, Andrew Rosindell, Mr Frank Roy, Nadhim Zahawi\*

**INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT:** Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Bruce\*§, Hugh Bayley, Fiona Bruce, Sir Tony Cunningham, Fabian Hamilton\*, Pauline Latham, Jeremy Lefroy\*, Sir Peter Luff\*, Mr Michael McCann, Fiona O'Donnell, Chris White\* [Richard Burden\*—*left Committee 4/11/2013*]

\* Member who participated in the inquiry leading to this Report

§ Chair of a participating Committee

### Powers

The Committees are departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in Standing Order No 152. The powers of the Committees to work together and agree joint reports are set out in Standing Order No. 137A. These Standing Orders are available on the Internet via [www.parliament.uk](http://www.parliament.uk).

### Publication

The Reports and evidence of the Committees are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committees (including news items) are on the internet at <http://www.parliament.uk/caecomm>

### Committee staff

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# Glossary of Acronyms

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ATAS	Academic Technology Approval Scheme
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
BIS	Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
BTWC	Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
CAAT	Campaign Against Arms Trade
CAEC	Committees on Arms Export Controls
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CBW	Chemical and Biological Weapons
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
COARM	EU Council of Ministers Working Group on Conventional Weapons
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DFID	Department for International Development
DSEi	Defence and Security Equipment International (Trade Exhibition)
DTCT	UK/US Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty
ECO	Export Control Organisation (within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills)
EGAD	Export Group for Aerospace and Defence
EU	European Union
FAC	Foreign Affairs Committee
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
GTRP	Global Threat Reduction Programme
ICT	Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU
ITAR	(US) International Traffic in Arms Regulations
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
OGEL	Open General Export Licence
OGTCL	Open General Trade Control Licence
OIEL	Open Individual Export Licence
OITCL	Open Individual Trade Control Licence
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPTs	Occupied Palestinian Territories
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSJA	Overseas Security and Justice Assistance
PMSC	Private Maritime and Security Company
PQ	Parliamentary Question
PSC	Private Security Company
P5	The 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SIEL	Standard Individual Export Licence
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SITCL	Standard Individual Trade Control Licence
SITL	Standard Individual Transshipment Licence
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UKTI DSO	United Kingdom Trade & Investment Defence & Security Organisation
UKWG	United Kingdom Working Group on Arms
UNROCA	United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
WA	Wassenaar Arrangement
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMDFFZ	Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone
WMS	Written Ministerial Statement

## Definition of Export Control Organisation licences

### **SIEL**—Standard Individual Export Licence

SIELs generally allow shipments of specified items to a specific consignee up to the quantity specified by the licence. Licences permitting permanent export are generally valid for two years from the date of issue. Where the export is temporary, for example for the purposes of demonstration, trial or evaluation, the licence is generally valid for one year only and the items must be returned before the licence expires.

### **OIEL**—Open Individual Export Licence

OIELs are specific to an individual exporter and cover multiple shipments of specified items to specified destinations and/or, in some cases specified consignees. OIELs covering the export of items entered on the Military List are generally valid for two years, while OIELs covering other items are generally valid for three years.

### **SITCL**—Standard Individual Trade Control Licence

A Standard Individual Trade Control Licence is specific to a named trader and covers involvement in trading of a set quantity of specific goods between a specific source and destination country with a specified consignor, consignee and end-user. SITCLs will normally be valid for two years.

### **OITCL**—Open Individual Trade Control Licence

An OITCL is specific to a named trader and covers involvement in trading of specific goods between specific source and destination countries and/or specified consignors, consignees and end-users. OITCLs are generally valid for two years.<sup>1</sup>

### **OGTL**—Open General Transshipment Licence

An OGTL is required for the transshipment of controlled goods through the UK en route from one country to another pre-determined destination.

### **OGEL** – Open General Export licence

Open General Licences (OGLs) are pre-published export, trade or transshipment licences in the public domain.

### **SITL**—Standard Individual Transshipment Licence

A SITL is used for transshipment of goods when an OGTL cannot be used.

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<sup>1</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1st April 2012–30th June 2012, pp 3–4



# 1 Introduction

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1. The four House of Commons Select Committees that comprise the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC)<sup>2</sup> are: the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, the Defence Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the International Development Committee. All members of the four Select Committees are entitled to attend Committee meetings of the CAEC, although for practical purposes each of the four Committees usually nominates four members to serve on the CAEC.

2. The CAEC's task is to scrutinise the UK Government's arms export control procedures and legislation, individual arms export licence decisions, arms export policies, and the UK's role in international arms control agreements. To achieve this, the Committees have scrutinised in detail the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 (HC 561)<sup>3</sup> presented to the House of Commons on 12 July 2013 by the four Secretaries of State. The Committees' questions on the Government's Annual Report and the Government's answers are reproduced in full in Annex 2. The Committees have also scrutinised in detail the Government's all important information placed quarterly on the website of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) on individual arms export licence decisions; the Committees' questions on those decisions and the Government's answers for the period Q4 2012 to Q3 2013 are reproduced in full in Annex 1. The Committees were, in addition, able to scrutinise the Government's policies and performance on arms export controls as a result of information received in the Committees' informal meetings and from a range of other sources and reports. The Committees were grateful to those who submitted formal Written Evidence to our latest inquiry; these memoranda are reproduced in full in Volume III of the Report at Ev w75–138. A great deal of important Written Ministerial evidence was also submitted in the course of the inquiry, mostly in response to questions from the Committees. This is listed at Annex 3 and reproduced in full in Volume III of the Report at Ev w138–510. A debate on the CAEC's last Report was held in the House of Commons on 21 November 2013 during which a number of key issues were raised.<sup>4</sup>

3. The Committees' scrutiny for this inquiry included five Oral evidence sessions held first with the UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG)<sup>5</sup> and the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD)<sup>6</sup> on 4 November 2013; second, with the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable on 18 December 2013; third with the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, William Hague, on 8 January 2014; fourth with the former Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Peter Hain MP on 7 April; and finally, the Committees took evidence "in camera" from companies that had been granted arms export licences to export dual-use chemicals to Syria on 12 May 2014. The complete texts of the Committees' questions and the witnesses' answers in the Oral evidence sessions can be found in

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<sup>2</sup> From April 1999 to March 2008 the Committees were known as the "Quadripartite Committee".

<sup>3</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012*, HC 561, 12 July 2013

<sup>4</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, cols 403–430WH

<sup>5</sup> The UK Working Group on Arms comprises Action on Armed Violence, Amnesty UK, Article 36, Omega Research Foundation, Oxfam and Saferworld.

<sup>6</sup> The Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) comprise representatives from defence and aerospace industries.

Volume III of the Report at Ev w1–74. As the final evidence session was held “in camera”, at the Government’s insistence, the transcript for this session is not reproduced in this Report.

4. The Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendation in the Introduction to their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

**The Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that the giving of Oral evidence to the Committees by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Foreign Secretary at the last two annual Oral evidence sessions of the Committees reflects the importance that the Government rightly attaches to arms export and arms control policies. The Committees continue to recommend that given the far-reaching significance of arms export and arms control decisions for the Government’s foreign, trade, defence and international development polices, Oral evidence should continue to be given to the Committees on Arms Export Controls by both Secretaries of State.<sup>7</sup>

**The Government’s Response:**

The Government will continue to make Ministers and senior officials available for Oral Evidence Sessions. A decision on whether the Ministers giving evidence will be the Secretaries of State will be taken nearer the time of the next Oral Evidence Session.<sup>8</sup>

**5. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that the giving of Oral Evidence to the Committees by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Foreign Secretary at the last two annual Oral evidence sessions of the Committees reflects the importance that the Government rightly attaches to arms export and arms control policies.**

**6. I propose that the Committees continue to recommend that given the far-reaching significance of arms export and arms control decisions for the Government’s foreign, trade, defence and international development polices, Oral Evidence should continue to be given to the Committees on Arms Export Controls by both Secretaries of State.**

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<sup>7</sup> Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of Session 2013-14, *Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Controls (2013): Scrutiny of the Government’s UK Strategic Exports Controls Annual report 2012, the Government’s Quarterly reports from October 2011 to September 2012, and the Government’s policies on arms exports and international arms control issues*, HC 205, para 33

<sup>8</sup> Government Response to the Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of Session 2013-14, *Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Controls (2013): Scrutiny of the Government’s UK Strategic Exports Controls Annual report 2012, the Government’s Quarterly reports from October 2011 to September 2012, and the Government’s policies on arms exports and international arms control issues*, Cm8707, p 1

## 2 The Government's "United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012" (HC 561)

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7. For its 2013 United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report the Government introduced a new format. Prior to the 2012 report the United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report contained only 4 main sections, namely Domestic Policy; International Policy; Export licensing Decisions; and Military Equipment, together with a number of annexes. The new format of the report comprises 7 sections – UK and EU Policy Developments in 2012; International Policy in 2012; Export Licensing Case Studies; Export Licensing Data and Performance Against Targets During 2012; Compliance and Enforcement; Gifted Equipment; and Government to Government Exports, together with an increased number of annexes.

8. The Committees put a series of questions to the Government relating to its United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report for 2012 published in July 2013.<sup>9</sup> The questions and the Government's answers can be found at Annex 2. Specific issues raised by the Committees appear in the relevant subject sections.

9. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011* in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that neither the quarterly updates on the Countries of Concern in the Government's annual Human Rights report nor the quarterly updating of statistical data about export licensing on the BIS and FCO websites in themselves meet the entirety of the Committees' scrutiny requirements, particularly given the substantial time lapse between the year covered by the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report and the Report's publication — usually 6-18 months. The Committees recommend that the Government inform the Committees directly and promptly of all material developments and changes to the Government's arms export and arms control policies.<sup>10</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' recommendation. The Government is already active in informing the Committees directly of significant relevant policy developments and is committed to continuing to do so.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Export Control: United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012*, HC 561

<sup>10</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 34

<sup>11</sup> Cm8707, p 1

10. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking three questions about the Government's Annual Report. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

Section 2 International Policy in 2012

Why are there no sub-sections on:

The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

The Chemical Weapons Convention

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Sub-Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons

A Middle-East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone

The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012–2015

all of which raise proliferation issues?

Will the Government include its policies on all the above in its 2013 Annual Report?

**The Government's answer:**

The Annual Report is intended to highlight the Government's work on export controls, not the whole range of its work on proliferation issues. The Government does not intend to include contributions on all these issues in its 2013 Annual Report although it may do so on a case-by-case basis where there have been significant developments relevant to export controls. The Government regularly provides public information on proliferation issues. The subjects listed above have been covered in some depth in the Government's Response to the Committees' Annual Report published on 8 October and most, if not all, of these issues have been the subject of previous correspondence with the Committees which is readily (and freely) available in the public domain to parliamentarians, media and other interested parties.

**The Committees' question:**

Annex D UK Return to EU Annual Report 2012

- a) In future UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports will the Government include in this Annex a description of each of the numbered EU Common Military List categories?

- b) Does the government make a UK Return to the EU Annual Report in respect of items on the EU Dual-Use List? If so, will the Government include its Return in this Annex?

**The Government's answer:**

- a) The numbered categories of the EU Common Military List are essentially the same as the categories of the UK Military List. The current version of the EU Common Military List can be found here <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:090:0001:0037:EN:PDF>
- b) No such return is required for the EU Annual Report.

**The Committees' question:**

Annex E International Commitments and Sanctions Regimes

E.1 Export Control Commitments in 2012

Will the Government in its subsequent Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports include the year in which each Commitment was concluded?

**The Government's answer:**

Yes.<sup>12</sup>

**11. I propose that the Committees conclude that all international arms control measures raise proliferation issues either directly or indirectly and require parliamentary scrutiny alongside the Government's national strategic export controls policies as is done by the Committees themselves in their own Reports to Parliament. The Committees, therefore, recommend that the Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Control Annual Report should include the Government's policies on all international arms control measures including:**

**The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty**

**The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction**

**The Chemical Weapons Convention**

**The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention**

**The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**

**The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty**

**Sub-Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons**

**A Middle-East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone**

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<sup>12</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

**The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012–2015.**

**I propose that the Committees further recommend that the title of the Government's Annual Report should be widened accordingly.**

## 3 The Committees' Report of 2012–13 (HC 205)

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### The Committees' Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707)

12. The Committees' last Report (HC 205), published in July 2013, was in 3 volumes. Volume I (which was printed) contained a summary and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations; Volume II, the bulk of the Report, took the form of evidence from the Chairman to the Committees and was published on the internet; and Volume III contained both oral and written evidence, was also published on the internet.<sup>13</sup>

13. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the timeliness of the Government's Response (Cm8707) to the Committees' 2013 Report (HC 205) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that as their 2012 Report (HC 419) was published on 13 July 2012 and as the Government's Response (Cm8441) was published in October 2012 and did not defer the responses to any of the Committees' recommendations, the Government has achieved a welcome improvement in the timelines of its Responses to the Committees' Report. The Committees recommend that this improvement is maintained.<sup>14</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the conclusion and will, as always, endeavour to provide timely and detailed responses to the CAEC.<sup>15</sup>

14. The Government's Response (Cm8707) to the Committees' July 2013 Report was published in October 2013.<sup>16</sup> The Government stated that it would provide further information or update the Committees on 3 of its Recommendations on the following subjects below:

- International Development (Para 60 of the Committees' Report)
- Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance (Para 87 of the Committees' Report)
- Exports of gifted equipment (Para 96 of the Committees' Report)

The Government provided the Committees with the updated version of the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance when it was published in February 2014 and continued to notify the Committees of notification of exports of gifted equipment throughout the year. However, there was a significant delay within the Department for

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<sup>13</sup> See the Committees' website at <http://www.parliament.uk/caecomm>

<sup>14</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 35

<sup>15</sup> Cm8707, p 1

<sup>16</sup> Cm8707

International development in providing the Committees with its promised update of its role in arms export controls. This is dealt with in more detail in paragraphs 173–175 below.

**15. I propose that the Committees conclude that as its 2013 Report (HC 205) was published on 17 July 2013 and as the Government's Response (Cm8707) was published in October 2012 and only had three deferred responses to the Committees' Recommendations, the Government has broadly maintained the improvement made in the previous year in the timeliness of its responses to the Committees Report. The Committees recommend that this improvement is maintained.**



## 4 The Committees' questions on the Government's quarterly information on arms export licences

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16. The Export Control Organisation (ECO), within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, publishes details of the arms export licences that have been granted, refused or appealed for each Quarter. These are known as the Pivot reports. The information in these reports is of great importance, and the Quarterly reports are subject to detailed scrutiny by the Committees. This invariably results in the Committees putting a series of detailed questions to the Government, to which the Government provides answers to the CAEC.

17. Continuing the Committees' policy of publishing their unclassified questions on the Government's quarterly arms export licences reports and the Government's unclassified answers, the Committees' questions and the Government's answers for Quarter 4 of 2012 and Quarters 1, 2 and 3 of 2013 are contained in Annex 1. Key information from the Government's answers to the Committees' questions on the quarterly Pivot reports is included in the various country headings in section 10 of this Report.

18. The Committees' Recommendation on the Committees' questions on the Government's quarterly information on arms export licences in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees continue to recommend that the Government, in its Quarterly arms export licence reports, and in its answers to the Committees' questions on those reports, should provide the maximum disclosure of information on a non-classified basis consistent with safeguarding the UK's security and trade interests. The Committees conclude that it is disappointing that the Government only noted, rather than accepted, this same recommendation made in the Committees' 2012 Report.<sup>17</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government accepts this recommendation which coincides with current practice.<sup>18</sup>

**19. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's acceptance of the Committees' previous Recommendation that the Government's answers to the Committees' questions on the Government's published quarterly reports of arms export licences granted, refused or appealed should provide the maximum disclosure of information on a non-classified basis consistent with safeguarding the UK's security and trade interests is welcome and recommend that the Government continues this practice.**

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<sup>17</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 36

<sup>18</sup> Cm8707, p 2

## 5 Arms export control legislation and procedures

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### Extra-territoriality

20. The Committees' previous scrutiny of extra-territoriality can be found at paragraphs 19–27 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraph 37 of the Report.

21. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on extra-territoriality in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that it is not justifiable to enable a UK person to escape UK criminal jurisdiction by engaging in arms export or arms brokering activities overseas which would be a criminal offence if carried out from the UK. The Committees, therefore, continue to recommend that extra-territoriality is extended to the remaining military goods in Category C.<sup>19</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government has set out its position in relation to extra-territorial controls on brokering of Category C goods on a number of occasions, most recently in the Response to the Committees' Report of the 2012-13 Session (paragraph 8 of Cm 8441) and in the Business Secretary's oral evidence to the Committees on 19 December 2012. We remain unconvinced that there is a compelling public interest in applying controls on UK persons outside the UK engaged in brokering of Category C goods between non-embargoed destinations that would outweigh the administrative burdens placed upon UK nationals engaged in legitimate business activity. We will continue to consider amending the scope of Category B in order to bring under control brokering of additional items by UK persons overseas where necessary and where justified by evidence of a need to act.<sup>20</sup>

22. The Export Control Order 2008 defines the following categories:

- **Category A goods** consist of cluster munitions, and specially designed components therefor; and certain paramilitary goods whose export the Government has already banned because of evidence of their use in torture. These include electric shock batons, electric-shock belts, leg irons and sting sticks.
- **Category B goods** consist of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Long Range Missiles (LRMs) with a range over 300km (Note: this includes Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs)) and Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) and accessories, ammunition, and specially designed components therefore. "Production" equipment specially designed for

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<sup>19</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 37

<sup>20</sup> Cm8707, p 2

MANPADS, field test equipment specially designed for MANPADS and specialised training equipment and simulators for MANPADS are also covered in this category.

- **Category C goods** consist of all goods contained within Schedule 1 of the Export of Goods, Transfer of Technology and Provision of Technical Assistance (Control) Order 2003 that do not fall into either of the two categories above, and certain substances for the purpose of riot control or self-protection and related portable dissemination equipment.<sup>21</sup>

23. In its Written Evidence the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) said that it believed that an extension of the extra-territoriality trade controls would fail to achieve the desired results and would in practice be easily evaded by illegal arms brokers, whilst subjecting companies to two different jurisdictions for the same transaction. It stated that, in its view, a more productive approach would be to improve the level of control on the export of defence material by encouraging states to sign and ratify the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). It continued by stating that the ATT seeks to address the problem and the Government should be encouraged to provide outreach and assistance to those countries that request it to bring their export control systems up to a comparable level of the UK's.<sup>22</sup>

24. When we asked EGAD about its reservations to the extension of extra-territoriality in the Oral Evidence session on 4 November 2013, Michael Bell, Export Controls Consultant, reiterated EGAD's objection in principle to "having a situation where somebody is subject to two different jurisdictions for the same action." He added that it was "extremely hard to bring successful prosecution against extraterritorial breaches or violations of export controls" and that the only people who would suffer would be those who were compliant with the legislation.<sup>23</sup>

25. On 3 April 2014 the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees answering a number of questions that he had put to him regarding the Arms Trade Treaty. In responding to a question relating to what domestic legislative and regulatory steps were required to achieve full UK compliance in law with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty the Foreign Secretary stated:

On 19 March the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) laid before Parliament an Order amending UK trade (brokering) controls to ensure that they are fully compliant with Article 10 of the ATT. The Export Control (Amendment) Order 2014 (S.I. 2014 No. 702) adds to Category B of the trade controls those items listed in Article 2.1 of the ATT that are not already included in Category B, namely: battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles; large calibre artillery systems; combat aircraft and attack helicopters; certain warships; and certain missiles and their launchers. As a result, brokering of these items by UK persons will be subject to control wherever in the world those persons are located. The amending Order comes into force on 9 April.<sup>24</sup>

The introduction of this legislation, therefore, extends the ambit of extra-territoriality for brokering of arms to a wider range of arms now included in Category B, but still does not extend

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<sup>21</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Review of Export Control Legislation (2007) Supplementary Guidance Note on Trade ("Trafficking and Brokering") in Controlled Goods (in effect from 6 April 2009), January 2009, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090609093704/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file49827.pdf>

<sup>22</sup> Ev w95

<sup>23</sup> Q 35

<sup>24</sup> Ev w208 – Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 3 April 2014

to all Category C goods, for example certain substances for the purpose of riot control or self-protection and related portable dissemination equipment.

26. Over a long period successive Governments have agreed a substantial number of offences committed overseas for which a British citizen could be prosecuted in this country. The Acts of Parliament concerned and the criteria used by the Government in deciding whether or not to take extra-territorial jurisdiction in respect of particular offences are set out in Annex 7.

**27. I propose that the Committees continue to recommend that it is not justifiable to enable a UK person to escape UK criminal jurisdiction by engaging in arms export or arms brokering activity overseas which would be a criminal offence if carried out from the UK.**

**28. I propose that the Committees further conclude that the fact that the Government has now been obliged, in order to achieve compliance with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty, to extend extra-territoriality to the brokering by UK persons worldwide of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, certain warships, and certain missiles and their launchers is welcome.**

**29. I propose that the Committees continue to recommend that extra-territoriality is extended to the remaining military goods in Category C.**

**30. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether in order to achieve full UK compliance with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty the Government is obliged to extend extra-territoriality not only to UK persons engaged in arms brokering activities worldwide, but also to UK persons engaged in direct arms export activities worldwide, and, if so, when it will be introducing the relevant legislation.**

### **“Brass Plate” companies**

31. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of “Brass Plate” companies can be found at paragraphs 28–33 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraph 38 of the Report.

32. The Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendation on brass plate companies in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that it is most regrettable that the Government have still to take any action against “Brass Plate” arms exporting and arms brokering companies who have the benefit of UK company registration but carry out arms exporting and arms brokering activities overseas in contravention of UK Government policies. The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response to this Report what steps it will take to discontinue the UK registration of such companies.<sup>25</sup>

#### **The Government’s Response:**

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<sup>25</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 38

The Government confirms that existing export control legislation does, in certain circumstances, allow enforcement action to be taken against brass plate companies and their officers. However there needs to be sufficient evidence to justify any such action. The Government also continues to pursue utilising other legislation to discontinue the UK registration of such companies on public interest grounds.<sup>26</sup>

33. During the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees' Report of last year Nia Griffith MP stated that some "brass-plate" companies had the benefit of UK company registration but export arms and carry out arms-brokering activities in contravention of UK Government policies. She called for the UK Government to pay "significantly more attention" to the issue of "brass-plate" companies and for a concerted strategy to pursue these companies "more rigorously", closing loopholes and collecting evidence "in order to get the necessary detail and put the measures that are needed in place to enable us to discontinue the UK registration of such companies."<sup>27</sup> The BIS Minister, Michael Fallon, responded to the debate by stating that:

The existing legislation would, in certain circumstances, allow enforcement action to be taken against those and their officers, but sufficient evidence is necessary to justify such action. We continue to pursue with other relevant agencies the possibility of using other legislation to discontinue the UK registration of such companies on public interest grounds. I hope that that is helpful. It is a complex issue, which raises difficult questions about the nature of any evidence that may be disclosed in any proceedings.<sup>28</sup>

**34. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that it is most regrettable that the Government have still to take any action against "Brass Plate" arms exporting companies who have the benefit of UK company registration but carry out arms exporting and arms brokering activities overseas in contravention of UK Government policies.**

**35. I propose that the Committees again recommend that the Government sets out in its Response to this Report what steps it will take to discontinue the UK registration of such companies.**

**36. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states the number of such companies whose UK registration the Government has discontinued on public interest, or on any other grounds, in the present Parliament, and also states the names of the companies so de-registered.**

## Arms brokers

37. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms brokers can be found at paragraphs 34–44 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations at paragraphs 39 and 40 of the Report.

38. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation on arms broker in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

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<sup>26</sup> Cm8707, p 2

<sup>27</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, cols 415–416WH

<sup>28</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 428WH

### **The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that as 4 of the 19 individuals and companies who are listed as having received criminal convictions for arms export offences in the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports for 2010 and 2011 had previously received Government SPIRE registration, as had Mr Gary Hyde and Mr Michael Ranger both of whom have since received criminal convictions, the Government's reliance on its SPIRE registration system to regulate arms brokers falls far short of what is required. The Committees further conclude that as the BIS Secretary of State has now acknowledged to the Committee that:

- a) SPIRE registration does not constitute Government approval of an arms broker;
- b) the only check that the Government makes for SPIRE registration "is to ensure that any person registering on behalf of an entity is properly authorised by that entity to act on its behalf"; and
- c) it is possible to apply for a licence on SPIRE without "registering" to use the system

the Government's regulation of arms brokers is patently inadequate. The Committees continue therefore to repeat their recommendation that the Government carries out a full review of the case for a pre-licence register of arms brokers.<sup>29</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government questions the Committees' conclusion that "regulation of arms brokers is patently inadequate". On the contrary, the fact that a number of individuals have been successfully prosecuted for illegal brokering activity is evidence of robust regulation and enforcement.

The Government does not rely on SPIRE to regulate arms brokers. Brokering is regulated through the relevant provisions of the Export Control Order 2008. Any person wishing to carry out a controlled brokering activity must do so under the authority of a trade control licence granted by the Secretary of State. SPIRE is simply the means by which companies and other entities or persons apply for Standard and Open Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs, OITCLs) or register for Open General Trade Control Licences (OGTCLs). As such SPIRE holds details of all those companies, entities and persons that have ever been authorised to engage in brokering of military goods. It performs one of the functions of a register, i.e. it contains a list of known brokers. The Government would never claim that SPIRE registration "constitutes Government approval of an arms broker". Indeed we would be wary of "approving" an arms broker in isolation from other considerations such as the risks associated with particular transactions. Our focus has always been on the assessment of proposed transactions against the Consolidated Criteria and either granting or refusing licences for those transactions, as appropriate.

A number of those persons or their associated companies convicted of export or brokering offences were granted licences for legitimate export or brokering activity many years

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<sup>29</sup> HC (2012-13) 205, para 39

before they engaged in the illegal activity for which they were subsequently prosecuted. Those licences were granted because there were no grounds for refusal against the Consolidated Criteria at the time the licence application was made. If a pre-licensing register had existed at that time it is not at all clear that we would have had sufficient grounds on which to refuse entry to the register given that we would have to provide the applicant with reasons for any such refusal which would be subject to appeal and, potentially, judicial review. The activities that led to conviction were undertaken without a licence – either because one was not granted or one was never applied for. If a person is willing to export or broker without a licence it is unlikely that they would seek registration.

However, the Business Secretary has now decided to take a fresh look at the evidence for and against a register. As he stated in his letter to the Committees of 30 July this will involve a public consultation to run in the autumn and will address a number of questions including:

- What should be the criteria for acceptance onto the register?
- Should the register be made public?
- How would a register help to prevent illegal brokering activity?

What would be the additional costs to business of complying with a registration scheme on top of the costs already incurred in complying with the licensing requirements? What offsetting benefits would a register bring?

We will also consider the administrative costs to Government of setting up and maintaining a register. In addressing these questions we will seek to learn lessons from those countries that have introduced registration of brokers.

We will publish the conclusions of this review.<sup>30</sup>

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether, when the Arms Trade Treaty comes into force, the UK Government will be compliant, or non-compliant, with the provisions of the Treaty relating to the regulation of arms brokers and, if non-compliant, what action it will take.<sup>31</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

Article 10 of the Arms Trade Treaty requires States Parties to “take measures, pursuant to its national laws, to regulate brokering taking place under its jurisdiction for conventional arms covered under Article 2(1). Such measures may include requiring brokers to register or obtain written authorization before engaging in brokering.”

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<sup>30</sup> Cm8707, pp 3–4

<sup>31</sup> HC (2012-13) 205, para 39

Any persons in the UK, and in certain circumstances UK persons overseas, are already required to obtain “written authorisation” in the form of a trade control licence before engaging in any controlled brokering activity.

In the context of the ATT we interpret “under its jurisdiction” to mean brokering by UK persons anywhere in the world. Therefore we need to ensure that a licence is required by UK persons brokering the items listed in Article 2(1) of the Treaty wherever in the world those persons are located.

As a result we will add to Category B of the trade controls those items in Article 2(1) of the Treaty that are not already specified in Category B, namely; main battle tanks and armoured fighting vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, certain missiles and rockets and their launchers, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, and certain warships. We will do this through an amendment to the Export Control Order 2008. This amendment will be made before the UK ratifies the Treaty. We therefore expect the UK to be fully compliant with the Treaty when it comes into force.

Separately from this, and as noted above, the Business Secretary has committed to review the evidence for and against a pre-licence register of brokers in addition to the requirement to obtain written authorisation (i.e. a licence) (see response to paragraph 39). However this is not necessary in order for the UK to comply with the ATT’s obligations on arms brokering.<sup>32</sup>

39. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 the BIS Minister, Michael Fallon, said in regard to arms brokers:

[The Business Secretary] has decided that now is an appropriate time to look again at the issue of a pre-licensing register of arms brokers. We will therefore be launching a public consultation to help in gathering the necessary evidence to allow the Government to decide whether to introduce such a register. There will, of course, be an emphasis on the relative costs and benefits, alongside the likely effectiveness of such a register. The public consultation is now planned for early next year.<sup>33</sup>

40. In a follow-up letter to the Westminster Hall debate Michael Fallon wrote to the Chairman of the Committees. With regard to the pre-licence register of arms brokers he stated:

You [the Chairman of CAEC] made a comment about HMG changing policy on the pre-licence register of arms brokers. You said, “we will be paying close attention to the welcome and long-awaited change of policy on a pre-licence register of arms brokers that the Minister has just announced.” I want to clarify that I made reference to a public consultation as a means to a fresh consideration of this issue. This is not a change of policy in itself although the consultation may result in a change in due course.<sup>34</sup>

41. In the Oral Evidence session on 18 December 2013 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, when asked about the proposed consultation on a pre-licence register of arms brokers said that

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<sup>32</sup> Cm8707, pp 4–5

<sup>33</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, 428WH

<sup>34</sup> Ev w192 – Letter from Michael Fallon to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 2 December 2013



the CAEC Committees had persuaded him that the register was a “serious issue” and that he was sorry that the consultation had not yet started. He gave a “clear understanding” that the consultation would be undertaken “as soon as possible in the New Year”. He said that there was a need to get the “rest of Government on side” and that legal opinion was required on “some of the more complex issues”. The Business Secretary admitted that the Government had been slow to implement the consultation, but that an “absolute deadline” had been set to ensure that it would be done before the end of March.”<sup>35</sup> When asked what the consultation would cover the Business Secretary said that the consultation would “cover as much ground as possible” and included the industry and campaigning groups. Chris Chew, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation, BIS, said that it would be a public consultation, but that BIS could be proactive and send the consultation to specific companies and to people who have brokering licences. He added that the consultation would also be sent to NGOs that have “regularly expressed an interest in the subject” to enable them to comment. When asked how long the consultation would last Chris Chew responded that the usual procedure was to consult for between 6 and 12 weeks, however for this specialised subject a shorter consultation might be more appropriate.<sup>36</sup>

42. The Business Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees on 3 February 2014. The section of his letter referring to the pre-licence register of arms brokers was as follows:

I reaffirm my commitment to launch a public consultation on a proposal for a pre-licensing register of arms brokers in March of this year. The consultation will help us to gather the necessary evidence to allow me to decide whether or not to introduce such a register. There will be an emphasis on the relative costs and benefits alongside its likely effectiveness. As a part of this evidence gathering exercise we also intend to enquire about the use and effectiveness of registers in other Member States of the EU. According to previous submissions to the Committees by the UK Working Group on Arms the following countries maintain a register of arms brokers: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania and Spain. We also want to seek the views of major EU arms manufacturing and exporting countries who do not have registers, in particular, Germany, France, Italy and Sweden.<sup>37</sup>

43. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills finally launched its document “A Pre-Licence register of Arms Broker – Call for Evidence” on 17 April 2014.<sup>38</sup> The Committees’ response to the call for evidence is in the letter sent by the Chairman of the Committees to the Department on 22 May 2014.

**44. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government’s acceptance of the Committees’ repeated Recommendation that it carries out a full review of the case for a pre-licence register of arms brokers is welcome.**

**45. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government both completes its public consultation and announces its policy conclusion before the end of October 2014 at the latest.**

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<sup>35</sup> Q 79

<sup>36</sup> Qq 81–84

<sup>37</sup> Ev w199 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 3 February 2014

<sup>38</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *A Pre-Licence Register of Arms brokers – Call for Evidence BIS/14/662*, 17 April 2014

## EU dual-use controls

46. The Committees' previous scrutiny of EU dual-use controls can be found at paragraphs 45–50 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 41 of the Report.

47. The Committees' Recommendation on EU dual-use controls in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report:

- a) sets out what information it currently has as to the extent the European Commission has, or has not, accepted the Government's concerns about certain proposals in the EU Commission's Green Paper *The dual-use export control system of the European Union: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world*;
- b) states whether the Commission's forthcoming dual-use legislation will be decided upon by Qualified Majority Voting and, if so, what steps the Government is taking to try to ensure that EU dual-use legislation is not enacted which will be detrimental to the British Government's arms export control policies and procedures; and
- c) explains whether the Government agrees with the European Commission's view that: "it has been commonly accepted that dual-use export controls constitute an exclusive competence of the European Union and form an integral part of the EU's Common Commercial Policy."<sup>39</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

- a) The European Commission has not published any proposals in relation to possible amendment of the EU export control regime for dual-use items and therefore we are unable to say whether they have or have not accepted the Government's views set out in our response to the Green Paper.

The Commission received more than 100 responses to the Green Paper. A summary of the views expressed are contained in the Commission Staff Working Document (CSWD)

[http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc\\_150459.pdf](http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150459.pdf) In developing formal proposals it is likely the Commission will want to demonstrate that they have taken account of a wide range of the views expressed by respondents. This process is ongoing and they continue to seek the views of stakeholders on the issues raised in the Green Paper – for example the Member States met in Dublin in May and an exporter conference was held in Brussels in June specifically to discuss these issues. The Government is fully engaged in these ongoing discussions.

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<sup>39</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 41

- b) As a measure falling within the EU’s Common Commercial Policy any proposal to amend or replace Council Regulation 428/2009 (the ‘Dual-Use Regulation’) will be subject to the Ordinary Legislative Procedure meaning that the agreement of both the European Parliament and the Council will be required. Strictly speaking the Council acts by Qualified Majority Voting on matters falling within the Common Commercial Policy; however by convention decisions relating to the Dual-Use Regulation are taken by consensus. We expect this arrangement to continue.
- c) The Government does accept this view. Since 1994 the EU has adopted legislation applying export controls to dual-use items under the Common Commercial Policy which is exclusive EU competence. That these controls fall within the Common Commercial Policy was confirmed by a ruling of the European Court of 17 October 1995 (Case C-83/ 94).<sup>40</sup>

48. Following publication of the Government’s *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking two questions about EU dual-use controls. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees’ question:**

Has the EU’s analysis of the responses to the consultation on the EU Commission’s Green Paper, “The dual-use export control system of the European Union: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world”, been published? If so, please provide the link to the analysis and inform the Committees of any responses the Government made to it.

**The Government’s answer:**

A link was provided in the Government’s response to the Committees’ Annual Report for 2012 (Cm 8707). The Government does not intend to make any formal response to this document.

**The Committees’ question:**

When does the Government now expect the EU Commission’s Report on Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 (the so-called “Dual-use Regulation”) to be made to the EU Council and the European Parliament? Please inform the Committees of any response the Government makes to that Report when published.

**The Government’s answer:**

We expect the report to be submitted before the end of the year. Should we make a formal response to that report we will of course provide a copy to the Committees.<sup>41</sup>

**49. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report:**

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<sup>40</sup> Cm8707, pp 5-6

<sup>41</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees’ questions on the Government’s *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government’s answers

- a) whether the EU Commission's Report on Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 (the so-called "Dual-Use Regulation") has now been published, and
- b) whether the Government has made, or will be making, a response to that Report.

## EU end-use control of exported military goods

50. The Committees' previous scrutiny of EU end-use control of exported military goods can be found at paragraphs 51–55 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 42 of the Report.

51. The Committees' Recommendations on EU end-use control of exported military goods in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### The Committees' Recommendations:

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report sets out what information it currently has as to the extent the European Commission has, or has not, accepted the Government's concerns about the adequacy of the Commission's military end-use proposals in the Commission's Green Paper *The dual-use export control system of the European Union: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world* with particular reference to ensuring that military end-use control:

- a) can be applied to the export of complete items which are to be used as complete items; and
- b) will permit preventing the export of unlisted items that are to be modified for military purposes, either in the destination country or in an intermediate destination.

The Committees further recommend that the Government states whether it has provided to the Commission the draft text it has offered to the Commission on a) and b) above.<sup>42</sup>

### The Government's Response:

The Green Paper did not contain any proposals in relation to the military end-use control – rather, the Government's response to the Green Paper highlighted what we believe to be the limitations of the current military end-use control which is set out in Articles 4(2) to 4(4) of Council Regulation 428/2009. We have no information on the Commission's thinking on this issue. We have not provided any text to the Commission.<sup>43</sup>

**52. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether it remains concerned about the current limitations of EU end-use control of exported military goods with particular reference to ensuring that military end-use controls:**

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<sup>42</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 42

<sup>43</sup> Cm8707, p 6

- a) can be applied to the export of complete items which are to be used as complete items; and
- b) will permit preventing the export of unlisted items that are to be modified for military purposes, either in the destination country or in an intermediate destination.

If so, I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what action it is taking with the EU to remove the above limitations of EU end-use control of exported military goods.

## Torture end-use control and end-use control of goods used for capital punishment

53. The Committees' previous scrutiny of torture end-use control and end-use control of goods used for capital punishment can be found at paragraphs 56–65 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 43 of the Report.

54. The Committees' Recommendations on Torture end-use control and end-use control of goods for capital punishment in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows (the Recommendation relating to UK subsidiaries can be found at paragraph 65 below):

### The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) what is the current position on the European Commission's review of the Torture Regulation and what steps it is taking to hasten that review;
- b) whether the Government has yet made any submission to the Commission relating to this Review;
- c) whether, in the context of the EU Torture Regulation, the Government still considers that list-based controls are more likely to be effective than end-use controls, and whether it has considered pressing for both; and
- d) whether the Government intends to introduce new end-use controls on torture and death-penalty goods and, if so, by what date.<sup>44</sup>

### The Government's Response:

- a) The Commission has initiated preparatory work on a broad review of the Torture Regulation, including consultation with an informal Experts Group\*, and has indicated that it intends to convene a meeting later this year for formal discussion with Member States on its proposals.

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<sup>44</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 43

\*The following link provides more information on the informal Experts Group: <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2718>).

- b) The Government does not have full information as yet on the scope or form of the Commission's review. We have however provided some information on an informal basis to the Commission to aid its preparatory work. We will consider the need for any formal submission to the Commission once we have full details on the form and scope of the review.
- c) The Government continues to believe that list-based controls are more likely to be effective than horizontal end-use controls, which can have uncertain impacts on legitimate trade and be problematic to enforce. However, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive and we remain ready to engage positively with the Commission should they seek to consider a potential torture end-use control.
- d) We have no current plans to legislate at national level for end-use controls on torture and death-penalty goods. Experience has shown us that list-based controls are more likely to be effective than horizontal end-use controls. However, list-based and end-use controls are not mutually exclusive and we remain ready to engage positively with the Commission should they seek to consider an EU-wide torture end-use control.<sup>45</sup>

55. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking two questions about torture end-use control and end-use control of goods used for capital punishment. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

What UK and/or EU export controls are currently in place over the export of pancuronium bromide to the USA for the use in executions by lethal injection?

**The Government's answer:**

As stated in both the Government's response to the Committees' questions on the Government's Annual Report for 2011 (Section 1, paragraph 1.3 (a)), and in the Annual Report for 2012, the UK control on the export to the United States of the drug pancuronium bromide was made permanent on 16 April 2012. There are no EU controls on the export of this drug to the USA.

**The Committees' question:**

Has the EU Commission now commenced its review of Council Regulation (EC) 1236/2005 (the so-called "Torture Regulation)? Please inform the Committees of any response the Government makes to this review.

**The Government's answer:**

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<sup>45</sup> Cm8707, pp 6-7

Please see the Government's response to Recommendation 43 of the Committees' Annual Report for 2012 (Cm 8707).<sup>46</sup> [The Government Response to recommendation 43 is at paragraph 53.]

56. In its Written Evidence the UK Working Group (UKWG) stated that it was disappointed by the UK Government's decision to "abandon its commitment to introduce new end-user controls on torture and death-penalty equipment". It continued:

In the 2008 review of UK export control legislation the introduction of new end-user controls was deemed a policy priority and one that received widespread and unanimous support from NGOs, the CAEC and defence industry representatives. We are dismayed that the UK Government has dropped this policy without consultation with the original stakeholders.<sup>47</sup>

UKWG stated that:

end-user controls on torture and death-penalty equipment would both enhance a system of list-based controls and bring UK export control policy into line with its international legal obligations to prohibit torture and ill-treatment. End-user controls in this area were widely accepted to be an important safety net to allow the UK Government to take action on areas of trading activity where there is universal agreement that involvement in such activities is unacceptable. By scrapping this commitment, the UK Government is sending a signal to would-be exporters that it will permit UK involvement in the facilitation of torture, ill-treatment and capital punishment as long as the equipment is not covered by an export control list.<sup>48</sup>

57. UKWG went on to say that a torture end-use clause would also help by mitigating the danger of relying purely on list-based controls, which tend to be reactive in nature and slow to respond to new and emerging technologies or unforeseen items and called for the UK Government to reverse its decision to abandon the introduction of new end-user controls on equipment for use in torture or for use in carrying out the death penalty.<sup>49</sup>

**58. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report:**

- a) whether the British Government is represented on the informal Experts Group being consulted by the EU Commission in its review of the EU Torture Regulation and, if so, by whom;**
- b) whether the EU Commission's intended meeting last year with Member States for formal discussion on its proposals for the EU Torture Regulation took place, and whether the UK Government was present at the meeting;**

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<sup>46</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

<sup>47</sup> Ev w130

<sup>48</sup> Ev w131

<sup>49</sup> Ev w131

- c) **whether the Commission’s proposals for the EU Torture Regulation have now been published and, if so, what the UK Government’s response to them has been; and**
- d) **whether it will reconsider its policy of not legislating at national level for end-use controls on torture and death penalty goods.**

## Re-export controls and undertakings

59. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of re-export controls and undertakings can be found at paragraphs 66–71 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Recommendation at paragraph 44 of the Report.

60. The Committees’ Recommendation on re-export controls and undertakings in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states whether it has any information about controlled goods with export licence approval from the Government having subsequently been re-exported for undesirable uses or to undesirable destinations contrary to the Government’s re-export controls and undertakings which became compulsory from July 2010 and, if so, provides the Committees with details.<sup>50</sup>

### **The Government’s Response:**

We are aware of one case, as follows: two sniper rifles were exported under a UK licence to France and the rifles were exported from France to a defence exhibition in Armenia in 2012.<sup>51</sup>

61. **I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states whether, in addition to the sniper rifles to France case in 2012, it has any information about controlled goods with export licence approval from the Government having subsequently been re-exported for undesirable uses or to undesirable destinations contrary to the Government’s re-export controls and undertakings which became compulsory from July 2010 and, if so, provides the Committees with details in its Response.**

## Licensed production overseas

62. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of licensed production overseas can be found at paragraphs 72–76 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Recommendation at paragraph 45 of the Report.

63. The Committees’ Recommendation on licensed production overseas in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

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<sup>50</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 44

<sup>51</sup> Cm8707, p 8



The Committees recommend that the Government states whether it has any information that, during the lifetime of the present Government, breaches of UK arms control policies may have occurred as a result of the export of UK-designed goods, including components, from licensed production facilities overseas, and, if so, provides the Committees with details.<sup>52</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government has no evidence that any such breaches have occurred.<sup>53</sup>

**64. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states whether it is still the case that the Government has no evidence that, during the lifetime of the present Government, breaches of UK arms control policies may have occurred as a result of the export of UK-designed goods, including components, from licensed production facilities overseas. If this is no longer the case, the Committees further recommend that the Government provides details of such breaches in its Response to this Report.**

### **Use of UK subsidiaries to export arms**

65. The Committees' Recommendation on relating to UK subsidiaries (within the section on Torture end-use control and end-use control of goods for capital punishment in their 2013 Report (HC 205)) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) whether it is the case that wholly owned or majority owned subsidiaries of UK companies that are domiciled in other countries are not subject to UK export controls and, if so, whether the Government has any plans to bring forward amending legislation; and
- b) whether UK parent companies are subject to UK strategic export controls legislation in respect of transfers made by their subsidiaries domiciled in other countries and, if not, whether the Government has any plans to bring forward amending legislation.<sup>54</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) A subsidiary of a UK company incorporated under the jurisdiction of a foreign country is not subject to UK export or trade controls. It is inherently problematic to attempt to enforce UK export controls outside of the UK's legal jurisdiction and the Government has no plans to bring forward relevant amending legislation.
- b) UK trade controls may apply to the activities of any person within the UK involved in the supply of military and certain other goods between overseas destinations, to the

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<sup>52</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 45

<sup>53</sup> Cm8707, p 8

<sup>54</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 43

extent defined in Part 4 of the Export Control Order 2008. In certain circumstances the controls may also apply to the activities of a UK person overseas. These controls apply regardless of whether or not the activity is conducted by or through an overseas subsidiary. However, a UK company is not accountable under UK export or trade controls simply by virtue of the fact that an activity is carried out by a subsidiary incorporated under the jurisdiction of a foreign country. The Government has no plans to bring forward amending legislation to make UK companies accountable under UK law for the activities of subsidiaries in another country's legal jurisdiction.<sup>55</sup>

66. On 4 November 2013 the *Guardian* newspaper reported that a UK company had circumvented UK licensing requirements by shipping teargas and other crowd-control equipment to the Maldives using its Singapore-based and registered subsidiary. The report stated that the goods were sold by a subsidiary company of Survitec Group three weeks before the Maldives police provoked international condemnation by preventing voting in a rerun of the presidential elections. The shipment, it was reported, was worth £61,500, and included 250 smoke grenades, 200 stun grenades, 900 teargas projectiles and grenades, 100 pepper spray refills and 800 rubber bullets, including 300 multiple projectile cartridges. The newspaper report stated that Department for Business, Innovation and Skills had admitted that Survitec did not require a UK export licence because "the shipment was sold by its Singapore-based and registered subsidiary, WH Brennan" and was outside UK legal jurisdiction. The article quoted Oliver Sprague of Amnesty International as saying that: "It is a serious flaw in the UK's export licensing system that weapons exported by a UK subsidiary company, despite being owned by a UK company, are not captured by UK controls."<sup>56</sup>

67. When the Committees asked the Business Secretary, in the Oral Evidence session on 18 December 2013, about the above example and asked what was the point of the UK having controls over British companies if they could use a subsidiary company in another country to circumvent UK legislation the Business Secretary said:

We do not apply our law extraterritorially. The issue that you raised is, from an ethical point of view, very strong, but it would apply to any aspect of an activity by a British subsidiary overseas. You referred to selling weapons to the Maldives, but if a subsidiary of a British company behaved badly overseas in relation to their labour force or their environmental standards or whatever, the British Government do not have legal sanctions over them.<sup>57</sup>

When asked if he considered this to be a "serious flaw" in current legislation the Business Secretary replied: "It is a frustration and a 'flaw,' [...], but it can be remedied only by fundamentally changing the whole basis on which we operate law in the UK."<sup>58</sup> He continued:

One of the things I did was that in October I launched with the Foreign Secretary a set of principles for British companies operating overseas. It was an action plan under United

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<sup>55</sup> Cm8707, pp 7–8

<sup>56</sup> "UK-owned firm sends teargas to Maldives police: Amnesty raises alarm over alleged licensing flaw Stun grenades and rubber bullets in consignment", *The Guardian*, 4 November 2013

<sup>57</sup> Q 114

<sup>58</sup> Q 115

Nations auspices to set standards on human rights that we expect British companies to honour when they are operating overseas. It does not have legal sanctions, and we could not make those legal sanctions unless we completely overthrew the basic principles we have in the way we apply law in the UK.<sup>59</sup>

**68. I propose that the Committees conclude that it is a significant loophole in UK arms export controls that a UK company can circumvent those controls by exporting military and dual-use goods using an overseas subsidiary. The Committees recommend that the Government states whether it will close this loophole, and, if so, by what means and in what timescale.**

## The Consolidated Criteria and EU Council Common Position

69. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position can be found at paragraphs 77–86 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendations at paragraph 46 of the Report.

70. The Committees' Recommendations on the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendations:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether it will be consulting publicly on its updating of the UK Government's Consolidated Criteria on arms exports and when it will be carrying out this updating. The Committees further recommend that the Government confirms in its Response that it will adhere to the policy unequivocally endorsed by the Foreign Secretary to the Committees on 7 February 2012 that "The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licenses where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression."<sup>60</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

As stated in the Government's Annual Report published on 12 July, we intend to review the UK's Consolidated Criteria in order to bring it in to line with the EU Common Position. Two factors made it desirable to delay doing so in 2012: firstly, the EU had been reviewing the Common Position for several months during 2012: this review process was completed provisionally in late 2012. Secondly, progress on the Arms Trade Treaty made a further delay desirable in the event that the EU Common Position would have to be changed to bring it into line with any additional requirements contained in an Arms Trade Treaty. In view of these factors the preferred option was to await the outcome of each and then return to the issue. We are now studying the impact of the ATT on the EU Common Position and in light of that will be updating the Criteria.

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<sup>59</sup> Q 117

<sup>60</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 46

All export licensing applications are assessed on a case by case basis against the Consolidated European Union and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. This policy was stated by the then Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Peter Hain in the House of Commons on 26 October 2000 and the Government will continue to adhere to this policy until updated Criteria are formally announced. With regard to exports that might be used for internal repression, the UK's longstanding policy is set out in the Consolidated Criteria. The Government will not grant an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.<sup>61</sup>

71. In its *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Government stated that it intended to review the UK's Consolidated Criteria in order to bring it in to line with the EU Common Position. It said that the review would be delayed because the EU had been reviewing the Common Position during 2012 and that progress on the Arms Trade Treaty made a further delay desirable in the event that the EU Common Position would have to be changed to bring it in line with any additional requirements contained in the Arms Trade Treaty.<sup>62</sup>

72. UK Working Group (UKWG) notified the Committees in its Written Evidence that it had been informed that Member States had provisionally agreed new guidance for Criteria seven (risk of diversion) and eight (compatibility with the technical and economic capability of the recipient country) and that the EU Council Working Group on Conventional Arms (COARM) had issued a revised User's Guide on a trial basis, with Member States expected to use the new guidance on a trial basis. However, it was open for further revision and no new version of the User's Guide would be published until this new guidance was finalised.<sup>63</sup> UKWG recommended that the UK Government should persuade EU Member States to publish the provisional results of the review of Criteria 7 and 8 without further delay, and if not, publish the new guidance unilaterally.<sup>64</sup>

73. When the Committees asked the Foreign Secretary when the final review of the Common Position by the EU would be completed he replied:

The External Action Service of the EU is managing the review of the common position, so the time scales are in their hands; the time scales are set in Brussels. The review of the legal text is complete, and all the member states of the EU are satisfied that the current eight criteria have stood the test of time and do not need amendment at this stage. That was announced at the end of 2012. We are also all agreed that there are practical steps we need to take to improve co-ordination at EU level. We agreed to look at the EU users' guide to bring it up to date. It needs updating in the light of the recent adoption of the arms trade treaty. Those are the things that are now being worked on, and we will keep you up to date. We are working on bringing the criteria into line with the ATT and the EU common position.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Cm8707, pp 8–9

<sup>62</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Export Control: United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012*, HC 561

<sup>63</sup> Ev w122

<sup>64</sup> Ev w107

<sup>65</sup> Q 183

When asked if the UK Government would publish the provisional review the Foreign Secretary stated that it was “up to the EU to decide”, but he did not see any reason why it should not be published and “we would be in favour of doing so.”<sup>66</sup>

74. The Foreign Secretary was questioned as to whether the UK was using the revised users’ guide incorporating the changes to criteria seven and eight. The Foreign Secretary replied: “In the case of the UK implementing changes to criterion eight, for instance, it does not make that much difference because we already have a sophisticated methodology for criterion eight, but we are already implementing at national level the changes on this.”<sup>67</sup> Richard Tauwhare, Head of Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, added: “The revised guidance was agreed on a provisional basis for criteria seven and eight. Now all the member states are giving it a trial run to see how it works, and we are doing the same. It is working well. We are also going on, in Brussels, to look at the user guide on the other criteria to see what might need updating with them.”<sup>68</sup>

75. On 25 March 2014 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, made a Written Ministerial Statement headed “Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria”.<sup>69</sup> The full text of this WMS is in Annex 6. The Government’s new Arms Export Licensing Criteria replaces those set out in the Written Answer given by, the then Minister of State in the FCO, Peter Hain, on 26 October 2000,<sup>70</sup> which were headed differently as “The UK’s Consolidated Criteria”. The full text of Peter Hain’s Written Answer is in Annex 5.

76. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary on 28 April 2014 requesting information on certain aspects of the newly issued UK Consolidated Criteria. The text of the letter was as follows:

Following your Written Ministerial Statement on 25 March 2014, the Committees on Arms Export Controls have the following questions relating to the new Consolidated Criteria for Arms Export Licensing which replaced those announced by the then Minister of State at the FCO, Peter Hain, on 26 October 2000:

- 1) Why are the new Criteria entitled “Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria” when the text:
  - a) has substantial differences from the EU Council’s Common Position on arms exports not least under the UK Government’s sub-heading “Other factors”,
  - b) is not an EU document, and
  - c) is clearly the UK’s national variant of the EU Common Position?
- 2) Why has the policy statement in the previous Criteria announced on 26 October 2000 by the then Minister of State at the FCO, Peter Hain, that “An export licence will not be

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<sup>66</sup> Q 184

<sup>67</sup> Q 187 [William Hague]

<sup>68</sup> Q 187 [Richard Tauwhare]

<sup>69</sup> HC Deb, 25 March 2014, cols 9–14

<sup>70</sup> HC Deb, 26 October 2000, cols 199–203W

issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed ... by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression or international aggression” been omitted?

3) Why has the statement in the previous Criterion One (d) that the Government will not issue an export licence if approval would be inconsistent with ... “The Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers agreed by the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council, and the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports” been omitted?<sup>71</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 14 May 2014. The relevant section of the Business Secretary’s letter was as follows:

### **Consolidated Criteria**

In respect of your three questions regarding my Written Ministerial Statement of 25 March 2014:

1. The Criteria are entitled “The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria” because they bring together (i.e. consolidate) the EU and UK variants of these Criteria, including the amendments that were necessary to allow us to ratify the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). It does not purport to be an EU document; it is intended to set out how the UK will apply the eight Criteria. In addition, my Statement represents an update to the previous Criteria and does not represent a substantive change in policy in any way. Retaining the name of the “old” Criteria is intended to reflect this continuity in policy.
2. The statement you refer to was a general statement that formed part of the introductory text, it did not form part of the Consolidated Criteria itself. Licence applications have always been assessed against the eight Criteria and not against general statements contained in the introductory text.
3. The reference to the “guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers agreed by the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council” was omitted because the commitments it contains have been largely superseded since they were agreed in November 1991, most notably by EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP and the ATT. We therefore felt they were of little direct relevance today. The “OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers” are now referred to in Criterion 1(f). The “EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports” was replaced by the EU Common Position and it is therefore not appropriate to refer to this document.<sup>72</sup>

77. The issue of the omission by the present Government of the previous Government’s policy statement in the UK’s Consolidated Criteria on 26 October 2000 that: “An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed [...] by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression or international aggression” is dealt with in detail under the heading “Arms exports and internal repression” at paragraphs 390 to 398.

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<sup>71</sup> Ev w222 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 28 April 2014

<sup>72</sup> Ev w474 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 14 May 2014

78. I propose that the Committees conclude that it is misleading for the Government to have entitled its new Criteria the “Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria” when the text:

- a) has substantial differences from the EU Council’s Common Position on arms exports;
- b) is not an EU document;
- c) includes the policy statement that “The Government will thus continue when considering licence applications to give full weight to the UK’s national interest, including:
  - i. The potential effect on the UK’s economic, financial and commercial interests, including our long-term interests in having stable, democratic trading partners;
  - ii. The potential effect on the UK’s international relations;
  - iii. The potential effect on any collaborative defence production or procurement project with allies or EU partners;
  - iv. The protection of the UK’s essential strategic industrial base”; and
- d) is clearly the UK Government’s national variant of the EU Common Position on arms exports.

I propose that the Committees therefore recommend that the Government should clearly differentiate between the UK’s Consolidated Criteria on arms exports and the EU’s Common Position on arms exports.

79. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response when it will be providing the Committees with its update on the EU User’s Guide following the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty.

80. I propose that the Committees further conclude that the fact that Government was obliged by provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty to introduce the risk of gender-based violence, in addition to violence against children, into the Criteria for the first time is welcome.

81. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government’s insertion into the Criteria that it will “not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international law” is welcome.

82. However, I propose that the Committees also conclude that the Government’s deletion of the policy in the October 2000 UK Consolidated Criteria that: “An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed.... by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression” represents a substantive weakening of the UK’s arms export controls and recommend that this wording is re-instated.

**83. I propose that the Committees finally conclude that the Government's assertion in relation to the new Arms Export Criteria announced on 25 March 2014 that: "None of these amendments should be taken to mean that there has been any substantive change in policy" is not sustainable.**



## 6 Organisational and operational issues

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### Export Control Organisation (ECO)

#### *Remit, responsibilities, structure and staffing*

84. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Export Control Organisation – remit and responsibilities can be found at paragraphs 87–90 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 47 of the Report.

85. The Committees' Recommendation on the Export Control Organisation – remit and responsibilities in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether the present remit and responsibilities of the Export Control Organisation fully meet the Government's policy objectives, and, if not, what changes it will be making.<sup>73</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The present remit and responsibilities of the Export Control Organisation fully meet the Government's policy objectives and there are no plans to make changes.<sup>74</sup>

**86. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether it remains satisfied that the present remit, responsibilities, structure and staffing of the Export Control Organisation fully meet the Government's policy objectives, whether it has any plans to make changes, and, if so, what those changes are.**

#### *Charging for processing arms export licences*

87. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Export Control Organisation – charging for processing arms export licences can be found at paragraphs 91–99 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion at paragraph 48 of the Report.

88. The Committees' Conclusion on the Export Control Organisation – charging for processing arms export licences in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that it would be undesirable to make the Export Control Organisation financially dependent on fee income from arms exporters and that the

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<sup>73</sup> HC (2012-13) 205, para 47

<sup>74</sup> Cm8707, p 9

Government's decision not to introduce a charging regime for arms export licences is therefore welcome.<sup>75</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusion that charging was no longer a viable option at the time it was being considered.<sup>76</sup>

**89. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that it would be undesirable to make the Export Control Organisation financially dependent on fee income from arms exporters, and recommends that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether it remains the Government's policy not to introduce a charging regime for arms export licences.**

**Performance**

90. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Export Control Organisation – performance can be found at paragraphs 100–112 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 49 of the Report.

91. The Committees' Recommendation on the Export Control Organisation – performance in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report:

- a) sets out its reply to the criticisms made of the Export Control Organisation (ECO) by the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) in the course of the Committees' inquiry;<sup>77</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) The Export Control Organisation has to ensure a careful balance between striving to offer a licensing service that meets the needs of UK companies and ensuring the UK's global security interests are maintained. Sometimes the issues are very clear, such as deciding to revoke licences for Egypt where exports might be used for internal repression. On other occasions decisions are less clear cut and countries of concern may be priority markets for export campaigns. There is no avoiding this issue: we have to strike a balance between the service we provide to UK exporters and promoting global security and human rights.

When the Arab Spring began, Ministers asked to see submissions on a significantly greater range of licence applications which might pose risks to human rights. There are robust internal processes in place, backed up by the new secondary target mentioned

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<sup>75</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 48

<sup>76</sup> Cm8707, p 9

<sup>77</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 49

below, such that there are typically now only a very few cases that have been outstanding for more than sixty days.

(Responding to CAEC Report Volume II, paragraphs 103-105.)

ECO is committed to working closely with EGAD and other trade associations to improve all aspects of its service to exporters and to address issues of concern.

ECO is one of the few export control organisations to set licensing targets and publish performance data. ECO currently works to two main targets for processing licence applications. Our primary target is to turn around 70% of SIEL applications within 20 working days. Contrary to EGAD's claim that ECO is failing to meet targets, current performance is running at around 85% (year to date for 2013 is 79%).

We listened to industry concerns that, although the old secondary target of completing 95% of licence applications within 60 working days was being met, this still left a sizeable number of licence applications (around 850 applications per annum) that were taking more than 3 months to process. We therefore, increased the secondary target from 95% to 99% with effect from July 2013. The new secondary target will further improve the efficiency of the licensing system by turning around 5000 or so of the applications that currently miss the 70% target, within a backstop of 60 working days for most cases. These cases tend to be the more difficult cases which often require additional scrutiny because of their destination. Current performance is on target at around 99%.

Our current median processing time is in the order of 13 days.

ECO is striving to reduce bureaucracy and ensure that UK companies do not experience unnecessary disadvantages in relation to international competitors. The most significant step is to develop a strategy to encourage exporters to shift from individual to open licences. By making open licences more attractive and simpler to use, more exporters would use them and thus need to apply less frequently for licences. Open licensing already gives the UK an edge over many other countries but they are catching up; the US is seeking to emulate aspects of the UK's open licensing. The open licensing strategy we are developing, with the subsequent roll out of new and simpler products, is aimed at recovering this edge over other nations.

(Responding to CAEC Report Volume II, paragraphs 105, 106 and 109.)

Open General Export Licences (OGLs) are pre-published licences with prescribed terms and conditions. They have been created to recognise the reduced risk in the export of less restricted goods to less sensitive destinations. To use a particular OGL, exporters need to satisfy themselves that it meets their business needs and that they can comply with the terms and conditions. This is dependent on the individual exporter's circumstances and we may recommend that exporters consider an OGL as a simpler alternative to a SIEL or an OIEL. Advice to exporters is based on an assessment of the information given by the exporter. ECO emphasises that exporters ensure they can comply with all conditions. We signpost additional guidance and on line tools to assist them. The text of the standard letter that we use is included below.

*"After initial assessment it seems that you may be able to export the items on your application (as listed below) using the following Open General Licence (OGL) ( Insert OGL Name )*

*( Insert goods description from SPIRE ) - rated ( Insert rating from SPIRE )*

*Our suggestion that this OGL may be applicable is based generally on goods rating, end-user and destination; no other conditions are taken into consideration by ECO when making this suggestion. Therefore you should look at the OGL carefully to determine for yourself whether your items are within its scope, and that you can meet any other conditions of the licence.*

*ECO provides the online 'OGEL Checker' tool designed to help exporters decide if they might be able to use an OGL by checking each of the licence conditions: <http://www.ecochecker.bis.gov.uk>.*

*Full details of all the OGLs that are currently available are found on our website via <https://www.gov.uk/open-general-licences-an-overview>*

*Please note that your SIEL application will not be progressed until we hear from you on this matter. If we do not hear from you through SPIRE within 10 working days, we will withdraw your application.*

*If you are unable to use the OGL, can you please explain why not as this may help in the development of future OGLs to try to make them more suitable to the needs of exporters."*

The correct use of OGLs can save exporters the time and cost of applying for multiple SIELs, although there may be added compliance costs. In addition ECO estimate that OGLs significantly reduce the number of SIELs processed annually, thus enabling licensing resources to be targeted at the higher risk export licence applications.

ECO is not aware of the particular case cited by EGAD where an exporter questioned a 'No Licence Required' assessment. We make in excess of 18,000 licence assessments per annum and employ rigorous processes and checks to eradicate errors; we have not detected any deterioration in standards. However, we continue to review our processes and procedures to drive out errors and we will develop further guidance and training for exporters to help them to improve licence applications.

(Responding to CAEC Report Volume II, paragraphs 107-108.).

ECO's resources are primarily focused on turning around licence applications in line with published targets. While we aim to respond to Control List Classification enquiries within 20 working days, this is a non-statutory advisory service and there are other measures we are taking to enable exporters to obtain goods ratings in a timely manner. This includes using the online Goods Checker and Control List Classification Search Tool. Exporters can also enhance their understanding of export controls by attending ECO training programmes. The feedback from exporters attending these programmes is excellent. In addition, each time an exporter applies for a SIEL, we provide an attachment to the licence listing all the control entries for goods appearing on that licence, thereby further increasing the exporter's knowledge of the 'licensability' of their

goods. We are also strengthening our links with trade associations to extend business outreach activities. (Responding to CAEC Report Volume II, paragraph 110.)

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report:

- b) states whether it considers ECO to be under-funded and under-staffed and, if so, what specific action it will take to rectify this;<sup>78</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- b) BIS, in line with other Government Departments, has cut its budget to help the aim of reducing the deficit. The Export Control Organisation has not been affected disproportionately. Resources have not been reduced in the last year and there are no plans to do so in the year ahead. ECO is meeting its targets. Further improvements will involve reviewing processes, prioritising the workload and enhancing the functionality of the SPIRE system. In some areas, notably in the FCO, export control resources have increased and this has had a positive impact on long outstanding casework.

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report:

- c) states what further improvements to its efficiency the Export Control Organisation it intends to make under its Service Improvement Project over and above those set out in paragraph 96 of the Chairman's Memorandum [HC 205 Vol. II], and the date by which the Government intends to implement each of these improvements;

<sup>79</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- c) We recognise that the focus on targets is not enough. We need to become a more customer focused organisation and will concentrate our service improvements in a few key areas alongside our focus on targets:
  - A. Improving our relationship with clients who experience difficulties and responding more quickly to their needs.
  - B. A stronger focus on raising business awareness in partnership with other parts of Government and a new partnership with business organisations.
  - C. Ensuring export controls are factored into export campaigns right from the start.
  - D. Providing greater transparency in the way the controls operate.
  - E. Cutting bureaucracy by creating an attractive and simple open licensing offer to UK exporters.

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<sup>78</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 49

<sup>79</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 49

**The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report:

- d) Further confirms that in determining arms export licence applications the Government will adhere strictly to its arms export control policies as set out in the UK’s Consolidated Criteria, the EU Council’s Common Position and the Foreign Secretary’s statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012 that it remains the Government’s policy that: “We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.”<sup>80</sup>

**The Government’s Response:**

- d) the Government confirms that it continues to adhere strictly to the terms of the Consolidated Criteria as set out in the statement to Parliament on 26 October 2000.<sup>81</sup>

92. The performance target for the processing of SIELs is to process 70% of applications within 20 working days and 95% within 60 working days. (A new target of 99% licence applications processed within 60 working days was introduced in July 2013.)<sup>82</sup>

Table 1: Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) Processing Performance

	<b>2013</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2006</b>
Number finalised	13,726	16,876	15,734	16,723	14,187	12,729	9,647	-
Finalised within 20 working days	77.8%	71%	66%	63%	73%	73%	79%	82%
Finalised within 60 working days	97.8%	95%	94%	94%	94%	95%	98%	99%

Source: *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012*, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011*, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010*, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009*, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2007*, HC Deb 11 June 2014, col 214W.

The Government has a target of processing 60% of appeals within 20 working days from receipt of all relevant information from the appellant and 95% in 60 working days. These targets do not apply to appeals concerning goods that are controlled solely because of UN Sanctions. Of the 22 appeals decided in 2012, none fell in this category.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>80</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 49

<sup>81</sup> Cm8707, pp 9–13

<sup>82</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012*, HC 561, p 29

<sup>83</sup> HC (2013–14) 561, p 30

Table 2: Appeals Performance

	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006
Appeals finalised within 20 working days	7%	23%	26%	51%	68%	69%	61%	58%
Appeals finalised within 60 working days	39%	60%	71%	93%	91%	90%	100%	83%

Source: *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012*, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2011*, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010*, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009*, *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2007*, HC Deb 11 June 2014, col 214W.

93. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking three questions about the Export Control Organisation – performance. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

Why do performance targets not apply to applications for licences to export goods that are subject to control solely because of United Nations Sanctions or to appeals in relation to such applications?

**The Government's answer:**

Licence applications and appeals relating to sanctions are often particularly complex and therefore difficult to assess, especially where it is necessary to determine whether the proposed export is subject to an exemption in the sanctions. In addition, in many cases it is necessary to seek prior approval from the relevant UN sanctions committee before granting the licence and this adds to the time required to process the licence application or appeal.

**The Committees' question:**

In Table 4.10 what are the reasons for the deterioration of appeals finalised within both 20 working days and 60 working days over the period 2010–2012?

**The Government's answer:**

Appeals performance in 2012 was affected by the same factors that led to the reduction in performance from 2010 to 2011 and described in the Government's response to the Committees' questions on the Government's Annual Report for 2011.

**The Committees' question:**

What actions are being taken to achieve the target of processing 60% of appeals within 20 working days (currently 23%) and 95% of appeals within 60 working days (currently 60%)?

**The Government's answer:**

**We are working to improve response times to appeals against a backdrop of increasing numbers of export licence applications and finite resources. We have recently refocused resources to bring about an improvement.**<sup>84</sup>

94. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2014, Michael Fallon, BIS Minister, stated that until recently the ECO had been working to two main targets; a primary target of 70% of SIEL applications to be processed within 20 working days and a secondary target of 95% of these applications to be processed within 60 working days. He informed Members that the year-to-date performance up to the end of October 2013 was 80.2% on the primary target. The BIS Minister said that following industry concerns he had announced a new secondary target of completing 99% of applications within 60 working days.<sup>85</sup> In the Oral Evidence session held on 18 December 2013, Edward Bell, Head of ECO, BIS, stated that, at that time, ECO was at 80% on the primary target and 98.5% on the secondary target.<sup>86</sup>

95. In its Written Evidence the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) stated that it was working to inform exporters better on how to complete licence applications more thoroughly and to ensure all necessary data was provided at the initial stage, in order to reduce delays in the process and prevent, what it considered to be, the current unacceptably high level of returned application and delayed shipments.<sup>87</sup>

96. When EGAD was asked during the Oral Evidence session in November 2013 whether the deterioration in the time taken to process appeals (see table 2 above) was of concern, David Hayes, Chairman of EGAD, replied: “[...] yes, although the number of appeals as an absolute figure was low.” He continued by stating that it was a question of resource. He believed that with a finite amount of resource if the focus was on other activities, such as meeting the targets for SIEL processing, other areas, such as appeals processing, would suffer.<sup>88</sup> Edward Bell, Head of ECO, told us on 18 December 2013 in the Oral Evidence session that:

There is one area where we've still got some work to do and that is the handling of appeals. [...] Looking at 2012, we had around 22 appeals and only five, I'm afraid, were completed within the target of 20 working days. So we've got to do some work there. Some of those cases are quite complex. They will involve going to Ministers and as a consequence will take extra time to process. But it is an area that we really do need to improve.<sup>89</sup>

When questioned further about the reason for the declining trend in the processing of appeals over the last five years, Edward Bell replied: “I think this is about the resources.” He continued: “I think because the focus has been elsewhere in terms of the processing time for licences. We do need now—we will do it urgently—to focus on appeals.” Mr Bell said:

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<sup>84</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

<sup>85</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, cols 426–427WH

<sup>86</sup> Q 122

<sup>87</sup> Ev w94

<sup>88</sup> Q 30

<sup>89</sup> Q 122



These do tend to be complex cases. They will often involve the review of classified information, so we have to ensure that the people taking the appeals have the appropriate clearances. I think we just have to hold up our hands and say, “Look, it has not been working. We need to improve the performance and we will improve the performance in the coming year”.

When pressed further about whether, as claimed by EGAD, it was a lack of resource, Mr Bell said: “I think it is a combination of factors. I think it is about the complexity of the cases and ensuring that we have sufficient people who have appropriate security clearance to take those cases. So it is not just about resources, but resources are certainly a feature. The question is security clearance, rather than the number of people available to do the work.”<sup>90</sup>

97. Prior to the evidence session with the Foreign Secretary on 8 January 2014 the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees. The relevant text relating to the ECO performance was as follows:

The Government is committed to managing all transfers of strategic goods responsibly, to ensure that none fall into the wrong hands. At the same time, we support a responsible defence and security industry that helps meet the UK’s legitimate needs as well as those of other states. The sector is important for the economy, employing over 600,000 and generating exports of over £11.5 billion in 2013. Export controls provide a vital service to the industry by ensuring that its legitimacy is not compromised by its products being misused.

As a further improvement to that service, in July we raised one of the already-tough targets for processing licence applications from 95% to 99% within 60 working days; we are currently achieving 98.4%. Over 17,000 applications were processed during 2013, a figure that continues to increase by some 5% each year.

All applications are rigorously assessed on a case by case basis against the Consolidated Criteria, taking into account all relevant factors. A licence will not be issued if to do so would be inconsistent with any of the Criteria. Close Ministerial scrutiny of decisions has continued, with over 300 submissions considered by FCO Ministers during 2013, up from 39 in 2010.<sup>91</sup>

98. The Chairman of the Committees submitted two Written Parliamentary Questions (WPQs) requesting details of the processing performance of both SIEL approvals and appeals by ECO for 2013. The answers to the WPQs were as follows:

### **Exports: Licensing**

**Sir John Stanley:** To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills how many standard individual export licences were finalised in 2013; and what proportion of those licences were finalised within (a) 20 and (b) 60 working days. [199009]

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<sup>90</sup> Qq 122–128

<sup>91</sup> Ev w194 – Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 January 2014

**Michael Fallon:** 13,578 Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) were granted in 2013 and 148 applications for SIELs were refused. 77.8% of these licences were finalised in 20 working days and 97.8% were finalised in 60 working days.

**Sir John Stanley:** To ask the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills what proportion of export licence appeals were finalised within (a) 20 and (b) 60 working days in 2013. [199010]

**Michael Fallon:** In 2013 four out of 56 (7%) appeals cases were finalised within 20 working days and 22 out of 56 (39%) were finalised within 60 working days.

Officials continue to review procedures to streamline the handling of appeals, including additional resources and revised arrangements for consulting Ministers and advisers in other Government Departments. We expect an improvement in performance during 2014.<sup>92</sup>

99. On 19 June the BIS Minister Michael Fallon wrote to the Chairman of the Committees as follow:

I am writing to let you know about a notice we sent to exporters last week. Please see a copy annexed below.

The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills has been migrating to a new desktop computer system. This will bring considerable benefits but while it is bedding in we have some temporary performance problems with the online export licensing system.

We are still handling the majority of licence applications within published target times - and there is no evidence that exporters have any lost business due to slower processing times - but we are keen to keep our customers up to date as some are experiencing short delays. Typically, applications are taking four days longer than in the period just before migration to the new desktop computer system, although more than 80 per cent of applications are being handled within twenty-five working days.

BIS are working hard to rectify the performance issues and a number of technical fixes have been implemented this week. The early signs are that these will put us back on track very soon. In the meantime we have asked exporters to contact our helpline if they are concerned that they may lose export business. We will then prioritise their applications.

Both technical (IT) and export licensing personnel are actively managing the situation to minimise the risk to export business. I will write to you again before the end of next week with a further update.<sup>93</sup>

Annex

Text of Notice to Exporters

Notice to Exporters 2014/16 – Impact of new computer system on SPIRE licensing service

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<sup>92</sup> HC Deb, 11 June 2014, Col 214W

<sup>93</sup> Ev w506 – Letter from Michael Fallon to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 16 June 2014

11 June 2014

The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills has just migrated to a new desktop computer system. Although this will bring considerable performance benefits for BIS and the Export Control Organisation, the migration has had a significant short term impact on the performance and availability of the ECO SPIRE system.

While we are still meeting our licensing performance targets, we are currently experiencing a backlog in processing licence applications and delivering other advisory services. This means that regrettably, in order to prioritise licence applications, we will not be able to accept new enquiries for advice about Control List Classifications until further notice. For information about how you can assess your exports please refer to see the GOV.UK guidance <https://www.gov.uk/do-your-goods-need-an-export-licence>.

Please accept our apology for any delays you are experiencing and bear with us while we work to clear the backlog. If you are in danger of losing export business because of these delays then please contact the ECO Helpline on 0207 215 4594 or email [eco.help@bis.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:eco.help@bis.gsi.gov.uk) and we will strive to prioritise your application. To speed up the process please avoid contacting us about non-urgent cases at this time.

On 27 June 2014 the BIS Minister Michael Fallon wrote further to the Chairman of the Committees as follows:

I am writing to update you on the performance of the online export licensing system, further to my letter on this subject last week.

The technical fixes we have introduced appear to have almost fully resolved the IT problems we faced as our new computer system is bedded in. We have also increased staff resourcing on export licensing, including through weekend working. As a result we are now reducing the numbers of licences subject to delays.

It is currently taking us around 22 days to approve 70% of licence applications, compared to our target of 20 days. But the majority of licence applications are still being handled within published target times and there remains no evidence that exporters have lost business due to slower processing times.

We will continue to do all we can to restore service levels to their target rates as soon as possible. We will also keep exporters updated and continue to advertise that exporters can contact our helpline if they are concerned that they may lose export business, so we can then prioritise their applications.

I will write to you again if there are significant changes to report.<sup>94</sup>

**100. I propose that the Committees conclude that the substantial increase in scrutiny by FCO Ministers of arms export licence applications — up from 39 in 2010 to over 300 in 2013 — is welcome.**

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<sup>94</sup> Ev w507 – Letter from Michael Fallon to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 27 June 2014

101. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reason for the serious deterioration of the Export Control Organisation's performance on appeals in 2013 and the specific steps the Government is taking to ensure that ECO meets its target of processing 60% of appeals within 20 working days from receipt of all relevant information from the appellant and 95% in 60 working days.

102. I propose that the Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government states what specific steps it has taken to improve the Export Control Organisation's performance on appeals and what have been the actual results.

103. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it remains its policy "to develop a strategy to encourage exporters to shift from individual to open licences", and, if so, what assessment it has made of the risk of an increase in breaches of the Government's arms export control policies as a result.

### **Review of ECO**

104. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Government's review of the ECO can be found at paragraphs 113–115 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 50 of the Report.

105. The Committees' Recommendation on the Export Control Organisation review in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response to this Report what further progress it has made in its review of the Export Control Organisation over and above that stated to the Committees in paragraph 112 of the Chairman's Memorandum [HC 205 Vol. II].<sup>95</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

Service improvements have led to significantly better performance. In 2011 the Government completed 65.4% of SIELs within 20 working days, against a target of 70%. For 2012, this increased to 71%. For the year to end July 2013, performance has further increased to 79%, with current performance now running at around 85%.<sup>96</sup>

106. Following publication of the *Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about the review of the Export Control Organisation. The question and answer were as follows:

#### **The Committees' question:**

With regard to the Government's updated website, what are the specific usability improvements that have been put in place, what are the ones in the pipeline in addition to

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<sup>95</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 50

<sup>96</sup> Cm8707, p 13

better navigation, and when will the additional facility to identify which Open General Trade Control Licences may be applicable be in place?

**The Government's answer:**

The Government Digital Service (GDS) within the Cabinet Office is responsible for transforming government digital services including the design and development of GOV.UK. Further information about the projects involved is available on the Cabinet Office website <http://digital.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/projects/>

The Export Control Organisation (ECO) is working closely with GDS to refine and condense the amount of export control policy and licence application information to further improve search results. ECO has recently launched: <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/export-control-organisation> to enable exporters to readily establish whether a licence is required and how to apply. This ECO Landing Page web address will feature on all future ECO promotional material.

ECO plans to make further improvements to the OGEL Checker tool to better enable exporters to identify appropriate OGTLs and OGELs. Technical and budget issues have prevented further work at this time but we will revisit this in the New Year.<sup>97</sup>

107. In its Written Evidence to the Committees' inquiry in 2013 EGAD had said that it had been "deeply concerned" that the Businesslink.gov.uk website (on which the ECO web pages resided) was to be replaced by the new cross-government website GOV.UK. It stated that this would be the third "radical change" to the ECO website since 2008 and it was concerned that companies who had just familiarised themselves with the current website would be faced with a new system. EGAD considered that this would be an additional burden on both ECO staff and industry. EGAD believed that the key issue for industry would be how easy those unfamiliar with the system would find it to search for the export control-related information they might be seeking.<sup>98</sup>

108. When the Committees asked David Hayes, EGAD, at the Oral Evidence session on 4 November 2013, whether his earlier expressed fears of the new website had been allayed or had been justified he replied "a little of both". He continued:

Now that we have had experience of it, there is a lot of information in there, and much of it is valuable. Unfortunately, the downside is that it is very difficult to find the information. It is difficult for us, as seasoned practitioners, to find the information, so for people who need it more than we do, because they are new to the compliance world and are desperately trying to find a source of help, it has to be said that it is not particularly user-friendly.<sup>99</sup>

His colleague, Susan Griffiths, Head of Export Control UK, MBDA UK Ltd, added:

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<sup>97</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

<sup>98</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, EV w47

<sup>99</sup> Q 34 [David Hayes]

when you are used to using it on a regular basis you become familiar with it and can find a way around it and navigate it. Some time ago, they had something like an A to Z on the website that was extremely useful, and new exporters could find the information readily and easily. If they were to go back to something like that, just as an example, it would help enormously.<sup>100</sup>

109. When the Committees questioned the Business Secretary about the ECO website at the Oral Evidence session on 18 December 2013 he said: “There have been a whole lot of issues around the establishment of gov.uk. I think it is now in a much better state than it was when it was originally launched, but I think we are aware that there has been some dissatisfaction in the process.”<sup>101</sup> Chris Chew, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation, BIS, added:

Gov.uk is structured in a very different way from the previous departmental websites and we had no choice in that; we had to fit to the structure that was given to us. That created some issues with how we organised the information and also the way you search for information is different. I think there has been a learning curve, certainly for us in how we present that information, but also for exporters in how they access it. We have very recently made some changes to the information that is on there and we continue to review it and to try to improve it, so it is an ongoing process. We know there have been some difficulties but we are committed to working to improve it and that is what we are doing.<sup>102</sup>

**110. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report what specific steps it has taken, and will be taking, to make the ECO website more user-friendly to exporters.**

### ***Transparency of arms export licensing***

111. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of the transparency of arms export licensing can be found at paragraphs 116–123 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Recommendation at paragraph 51 of the Report.

112. The Committees’ Recommendation on the transparency of arms export licensing in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government, in fulfilment of its transparency policy on arms exports, sets out in its Response to this Report:

- a) whether a facility is now in operation on SPIRE to obtain additional information on arms exports and, if not, when it will be;
- b) whether the Government has decided on the mechanism for making this additional information public, and, if not, by what date it intends to do so; and

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<sup>100</sup> Q 34 [Susan Griffiths]

<sup>101</sup> Q 129 [Vince Cable]

<sup>102</sup> Q 129 [Chris Chew]

- c) whether it is still the Government's policy to appoint an independent reviewer to scrutinise the operation of the Export Control Organisation's licensing process and, if not, the reasons why this policy has been abandoned.<sup>103</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

- a) and b) As set out in the Business Secretary's letter to the Chairman of the Committees of 30 July 2013 [see paragraph 114 below], users of Open General and Open Individual licences will be required to make reports on their usage of those licences on an annual basis. They will provide information on the destination country, type of end-user, and the number of times the licence has been used for that country/end-user type. The revised reporting requirements will apply from 1 January 2014 and the facility to collect this information will be available on SPIRE from that date. The first year's data will be published in 2015 via the 'Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics' website. In determining the detail of how the reporting will operate, the Business Secretary has sought to strike a balance between providing greater transparency and ensuring that Government does not place an unnecessary burden on businesses seeking to grow through exports.
- c) Government's position on an "Independent Reviewer" – including the reasons why we are not, at this time, taking forward this specific proposal – remains as explained in the Business Secretary's letter to the Chairman of the Committees of 21 January 2013.<sup>104</sup>

113. On 7 February 2012 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable announced by a Written Ministerial Statement (WMS) that all open export licences would require the exporter to report periodically on transactions undertaken under these open licences and that the Government would publish the information.<sup>105</sup> On 13 July 2012 the Business Secretary issued a further WMS on this subject. The WMS stated that the data on the usage of open licences would include a description of the items exported or transferred, the destination, value and/or quantity, and some information about the end-user. The data would be published in aggregated form quarterly and annually.<sup>106</sup> A Notice to Exporters was issued on 1 July 2013 stating that the Transparency Initiative would be slightly delayed, but made no mention of any changes in what information would be reported upon or the frequency of reporting.<sup>107</sup> However, on 18 July 2013 the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, stated in the House: "I have none the less established that we should dispense with some procedures relating to quarterly reporting, and we will do so."<sup>108</sup> This was followed by a Notice to Exporters issued by ECO on 31 July 2013 stating that: "the Secretary of State announced to Parliament on Thursday 18 July 2013 that

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<sup>103</sup> HC (2012-13) 205, para 51

<sup>104</sup> Cm8707, p 13

<sup>105</sup> HC Deb, 7 February 2012, cols 7–9WS

<sup>106</sup> HC Deb 13 July 2012, cols 69–70WS

<sup>107</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Notice to Exporters 2013/15: Progress towards implementing the strategic export control Transparency Initiative*, 1 July 2013

<sup>108</sup> HC Deb, 18 July 2013, col 1295

reporting requirements on the use of Open Licences under the Transparency Initiative would be scaled back significantly”.<sup>109</sup>

114. On 30 July 2013 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, wrote to the Chairman of the Committees to update the Committees on a number of issues prior to the release of the Government’s official response to the Committees’ last report (HC 205). The section of the letter relating to the Transparency Initiative was as follows:

**Transparency Initiative**

This Government is committed to greater openness and transparency as this provides the means for Parliament and the public to hold us to account. At the same time it is important that we do not impose unnecessary burdens on business or put UK companies at a disadvantage over foreign competitors. In making the final preparations for the launch of the Transparency in Export Licensing Initiative it was clear to me that we had not struck the right balance between these two objectives. As I told Sir Bob Russell MP in the house on 18 July “I have ...established that we should dispense with some procedures relating to quarterly reporting and we will do so.”

As a result, users of Open general and Open individual licences will be required to make reports on their usage of those licences on an annual basis, rather than quarterly as originally envisaged. In addition, exporters will now have to provide information on the destination country, type of end-user, and the number of times the licence has been used for that country/end-user type. They will not have to provide ratings or descriptions of the specific items exported. The revised reporting requirement will apply from 1 January 2014, with the first year’s data being published in 2015.<sup>110</sup>

115. Following publication of the *Government’s United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking two questions about transparency of arms export licensing. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees’ question:**

The Government’s Report, published on 12 July 2013, states: “It is intended that the first reports of open licence usage would be published, in line with standard practice, 3 months after the end of the Quarter to which they relate, i.e., October 2013.” However, on 18 July the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, stated in the House: “I have none the less established that we should dispense with some procedures relating to quarterly reporting, and we will do so.” This was followed by a Notice to Exporters issued by ECO on 31 July 2013 stating that: “the Secretary of State announced to Parliament on Thursday 18 July 2013 that reporting requirements on the use of Open Licences under the Transparency Initiative would be scaled back significantly”. Why did the Government announce in the House of Commons on 18 July a less transparent policy on open licence usage than that set out in its Annual Report published 6 days previously?

**The Government’s answer:**

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<sup>109</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Notice to Exporters 2013/18: Important Changes to the Strategic Export Control Transparency Initiative*, 31 July 2013

<sup>110</sup> Ev w145 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 30 July 2013



Plans are reviewed regularly to ensure that we have the right balance between the benefits of greater transparency and minimising the burdens on business. In making the final preparations for the launch of the Transparency Initiative we reviewed its scope and the potential for it to impose unacceptable burdens on business. The original proposals did not strike that balance and, as soon as this was established, a statement was made in the House on 18 July. This statement superseded any previous statements made.

Although the annual report was published in July 2013 it is intended to be a report of the Government's strategic export control policy and practice during the 2012 calendar year. Occasionally it will be appropriate to make reference to events in 2013, such as the adoption by the UN of the Arms Trade Treaty; however these references will always be the exception rather than the rule. The statements in the 2012 Annual Report regarding the Transparency Initiative are a true reflection of the Government's actions and intent during 2012. In any event, the final version of the annual report was cleared by Ministers at the end of June and submitted to the publishers on 4 July 2013. This was the cut off point for making changes to the report and still ensuring we laid it in Parliament before summer recess.

**The Committees' question:**

Will the Government make public the same information relating to standard licence usage as it now going to do for open licence usage?

**The Government's answer:**

We have no plans at this time to extend reporting to actual usage of standard licences.<sup>111</sup>

116. UK Working Group (UKWG) expressed "alarm and dismay" at the Government's announcement to "roll back from a number of significant commitments it had previously made in the field of transparency in export licensing". It informed the Committees in its Written Evidence that in a face-to-face meeting between Government officials and UKWG on 11 July officials had confirmed that the implementation of the Conclusions of the Transparency Initiative, announced by the BIS Secretary of State in his Statement on 13 July 2012, was proceeding as planned. UKWG continued in its submission to say:

This continuing failure to provide information on the volume or value of UK exports of controlled goods under specific open licences means that Parliament and the public will continue to be deprived of access to key information on arms transfers that the UK Government was, until recently, prepared to collect and disclose. Moreover, it is difficult to understand why the Government itself no longer wishes exporters to provide regular information relating to exports and transfers under open licences when timely access to such information could assist the Government in making informed decisions on future licence applications.

The Government justifies its decision to significantly scale back reporting under open licences on the grounds that "[m]any companies have expressed concerns that this would

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<sup>111</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

place an unacceptable administrative burden on exporters”.<sup>112</sup> However this is at odds with the published feedback from companies, communicated as follows in the Conclusions following the Review of Transparency in Export Licensing of July 2012: “Exporters generally accept the rationale for this initiative and are generally supportive provided that the administrative burden is kept to a minimum and that what they consider to be truly sensitive information is protected”.<sup>113</sup> This gives the clear impression that exporters’ concerns could be handled appropriately and that the majority had accepted the proposals advanced by BIS. Indeed it is worth noting that exporting companies are already required to keep records of transfers made under open licences, so they already have this data available; the question would be one of packaging and delivery of this information to BIS.

UKWG said that “serious questions must be asked as regards the process that resulted in the decision to abandon so much of the proposed changes, particularly given the published responses from the defence industry and that significant time and resources were clearly expended within Government in order to deliver greater transparency.”<sup>114</sup>

117. When UKWG was questioned by the Committees on 4 November 2013 about the outcome of the Transparency Initiative Roy Isbister, Team Leader, Small Arms and Transfer Controls, Saferworld, said that UKWG was “disappointed by the outcome of this whole process and by the way that the process has been managed.” He said that he did not understand how the change in the information that would be published had happened. He informed the Committees that a Freedom of Information request had been submitted by Action on Armed Violence asking what further contact there had been with industry on this subject and that the Government had replied that their records had been searched and that there was no record of correspondence or e-mails on this. He added: “A transparent process was producing a significant improvement in transparency, but the process disappeared behind closed doors and, all of a sudden, the transparency of the outcome has disappeared. We would like to know why.” He concluded by saying that the information that would be entering the public domain is basic to standard inventory control, so it is not that industry would not have this information. It is required to make it available to the Government in the event of an audit, so it is hard to understand where things have gone wrong.”<sup>115</sup>

118. The Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) stated in its Written Evidence that it was initially positive about the proposed scope of the information that would be published under the Transparency Initiative. However, it expressed its unhappiness that industry was being asked to pay the cost of providing duplicate information “due to the Government’s inability to modify and interrogate effectively the information that it already has on its own IT systems.”<sup>116</sup> When questioned in the Oral Evidence session on 4 November 2013 whether EGAD had been consulted on the change in reporting requirements David Hayes, Chairman of EGAD, said that he was not aware that EGAD had been consulted on the change from quarterly to annual

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<sup>112</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Notice to Exporters 2013/18: Important Changes to the Strategic Export Control Transparency Initiative*, 31 July 2013

<sup>113</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Transparency in Export Licensing: Government Response, July 2012*, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/32009/12-920-transparency-export-licencing-government-response.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32009/12-920-transparency-export-licencing-government-response.pdf)

<sup>114</sup> Ev w118

<sup>115</sup> Q 18

<sup>116</sup> Ev w96

reporting. He said that a number of companies had been involved in testing the SPIRE system, “but at no stage was it proposed to us that these things would change.”<sup>117</sup>

119. In the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees’ 2013 Report Ann McKechin MP said she was “concerned and severely disappointed” at the decision to roll back on the requirement of exporters to report on the volume and value of open licence transactions. She added that she was astonished that the Government had taken direct steps, at short notice, to “close down debate and scrutiny based on the flimsy claim that it is too burdensome on industry, for which there is no evidence from the industry. [...] Such an excuse just will not wash, given the level of public debate and the need for greater, not less, transparency.”<sup>118</sup> In response the BIS Minister, Michael Fallon, said that:

We remain committed to greater openness and transparency in licensing as that provides the means for Committees, the House and the public to hold us to account. At the same time, in generating more information for disclosure, we should not create unnecessary red tape for businesses.

In the most recent initiative, we have sought to increase transparency by requiring exporters to provide us with information about their export and trade activity under certain open licences. While the final preparations were being made for that, it became clear that we had not struck the right balance between the twin objectives of increasing transparency and avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic burdens.

In particular, the Government became concerned that the proposed reporting of each export would put our exporters at a disadvantage in relation to exporters from other countries, notably the United States. Clear evidence emerged that the proposed rules might lead to some of our companies relocating some operations overseas, with negative consequences for British jobs.<sup>119</sup>

120. In a follow-up letter to the Westminster Hall debate, Michael Fallon, the responding Minister, wrote the Chairman of the Committees about the Transparency Initiative as follows:

Regarding the Transparency Initiative the Hon. Member [Ann McKechin] asked:

“Where is the evidence that exporters in the United Kingdom have said at any point that they will take their business elsewhere?”

The department has received strong representation from the trade association EGAD (Export Group for Aerospace and Defence) about the additional administrative burdens the original proposal as would have imposed on its members. However, the point came home forcefully in a case raised with the Secretary of State by Sir Bob Russell MP. A company in Sir Bob’s constituency made it clear that the additional reporting requirements represented a significant extra burden over and above those imposed by the United States. The company is considering moving some of its operations to the US with a consequent loss of jobs in the UK. As a result, SoS decided to strike a better balance

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<sup>117</sup> Q 28

<sup>118</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 412WH

<sup>119</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 427WH

between transparency and red tape and by changing the scope of the Transparency Initiative. The modified arrangements still represent a significant increase in transparency over and above existing reporting levels.<sup>120</sup>

121. When the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, was asked at the Oral Evidence session on 18 December 2013 about the Transparency Initiative he said that; “Our starting point is that we should have as much transparency as possible in the process”. In explaining the changes to the amount of information that would now be published he stated:

When we published the details of how the information will be collected, there was a fairly substantial push-back from many of the companies involved, in whose view it would add substantially to paper-filling and bureaucracy without adding much enlightenment. [...]The combination of the general reaction from exporters and particular cases of that kind persuaded me that we should have more transparency, but we should reduce some of the detail—in particular, the quarterly reporting.<sup>121</sup>

The Business Secretary added:

What has happened is basically a good process. We put out an idea—how to make the system more transparent. We got some feedback and reacted to it. We came out with a compromise—that is the word you used—between the interests of more transparency for the public and the interests of the exporters themselves, who are, I think legitimately, concerned about not having too much bureaucracy. We will see how it goes. We can adapt it further when the system is up and running. But it is a more transparent set of arrangements than we had originally.<sup>122</sup>

When it was put to the Business Secretary that people who would have expected to have been consulted about the changes to the timing and details of the information to be published, and who might have had some input, were not, he conceded: “That is a fair point.”<sup>123</sup> Edward Bell, Head of the Export Control Organisation, BIS, said: “There was certainly a public consultation and companies, trade associations and NGOs responded to that. That public consultation led to the original proposals. Subsequent to that, there were certainly strong representations from trade associations and companies [...]” He added:

I think we ought to have a look at this once current arrangements, which were announced by the Secretary of State in July, have been in place and have been bedded in, partly, to ensure that the IT works properly. To make reporting and additional reporting work, it is important that the IT is robust and it is simple for companies to report.

I think we should keep it under review. I propose that we look at this in about a year, to see how it is working and to revisit the issue at that stage.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Ev w192 – Letter from Michael Fallon to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 2 December 2013

<sup>121</sup> Q 56

<sup>122</sup> Q 57

<sup>123</sup> Q 58

<sup>124</sup> Q 59 [Edward Bell]

122. The Business Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees on 3 February 2014. The section of his letter referring to the Transparency Initiative was as follows:

[...] I would like to reaffirm that we intend to review the reporting requirements under the Transparency Initiative after twelve months — January 2015 — and will update the Committees at the next evidence session at the turn of the year.<sup>125</sup>

**123. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government failed to discharge its consultation obligations satisfactorily before making a significant change of policy on the transparency of arms export licensing with the Business Secretary’s decision in 2013 that the users of Open General and Open Individual Licences would be required to report on their usage of those licences only on an annual, rather than on an annual and quarterly, basis as previously stated on 13 July 2012.**

**124. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Business Secretary provides his promised update of his review of the reporting requirements under the Government’s Transparency Initiative before his next evidence session with the Committees, which the Committees plan to have this coming Autumn.**

### **Powers to create new categories of export licences**

125. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of powers to create new categories of export licence can be found at paragraphs 124–128 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraph 52 of the Report.

126. The Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendation on powers to create new categories of export licence in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that Article 26 of the Export Control Order 2008 enabling the Secretary of State to create new types of arms export licences without Parliamentary approval is unsatisfactory and could be used in a way that would significantly diminish the ability of Parliament to scrutinise the Government’s arms export policies. The Committees recommend that the Government should amend the Export Control Order 2008 accordingly.<sup>126</sup>

#### **The Government’s Response:**

The Government does not accept the Committees’ Recommendation.

Article 26 permits the Secretary of State to grant “individual” and “general” licences. It is not clear what “new types” of licence might be created under article 26. In any event, and given that the Government currently receives more than 18,000 individual licence applications each year covering a very wide range of circumstances, it is important that the Secretary of State is able to exercise his licensing powers in a flexible and timely manner.

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<sup>125</sup> Ev w199 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 3 February 2014

<sup>126</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 52

We would be wary of placing any limitation on his ability to do so. We repeat our previous commitment to inform the Committees when any new general licence is granted.<sup>127</sup>

**127. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that Article 26 of the Export Control Order 2008 enabling the Secretary of State to create new types of arms export licences without Parliamentary approval is unsatisfactory and could be used in a way that would significantly diminish the ability of Parliament to scrutinise the Government's arms export policies. The Committees recommend that the Government should amend the Export Control Order 2008 accordingly.**

**128. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report lists since the Export Control Order 2008 came into effect the individual licences and the general licences that have been created under Article 26 stating in each case:**

- a) the date the licence was created;**
- b) the reason for its creation;**
- c) to whom it has been granted; and**
- d) what goods were authorised to be exported under each licence and to whom.**

## **Priority Markets for UK arms exports**

129. The Committees' previous scrutiny of Priority Markets for UK arms exports can be found at paragraphs 129–131 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion at paragraph 53 of the Report.

130. The Committees' Conclusion on Priority Markets for UK arms exports in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that it is fundamentally anomalous, not least in terms of public perceptions, for countries listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as being of human rights concerns, such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, then to be listed by the United Kingdom Trade and Investment Organisation within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills as Priority Markets for arms exports.<sup>128</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government questions the Committees' conclusion. It has confidence in the UK's thorough and robust export licensing system to distinguish between exports for legitimate defence and security purposes, and exports which pose unacceptable risks to human rights.

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<sup>127</sup> Cm8707, p 14

<sup>128</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 53

UK Trade and Investment Defence and Security Organisation will continue to consult extensively before any new priority markets list is submitted for Secretary of State BIS' approval.<sup>129</sup>

131. On 17 April 2014 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, wrote to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls and the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee informing them of the UKTI DSO's priority markets for 2014/15. The text of the letter was as follows:

In view of the previous interest of the Committees on Arms Export Controls and Foreign Affairs Committee, I am writing to advise that the UK Trade and Investment Defence & Security Organisation (UKTI DSO) has completed a review of priority markets for 2014/15, consulting Ministers and officials from relevant Whitehall departments.

The review concluded that the list should be as shown at Annex A. This includes a brief explanation of why each country is included in the list.

I should explain that the identification of DSO priority markets is an administrative tool to allow DSO to focus its efforts better to help UK companies export in the increasingly competitive Defence and Security Sectors. The purpose of the exercise is to serve as an indication to UKTI DSO and industry of those countries where there are significant, addressable opportunities for UK exporters to win business orders. The list itself has not been adjusted to take account of export licensing and other restrictions that limit export potential.

One country, Saudi Arabia, is an FCO Human Rights Country of Concern. The Government is confident that the UK's Export Licensing process is robust enough to address any human rights and democracy concerns arising from individual product sales. As you know, all export licences are considered case-by-case against the Consolidated Criteria in light of circumstances at the time the application is made, and depending on the end use of the goods. The Government provided further details concerning Saudi Arabia in the 'Priority markets for the UK' section of our consolidated response to the CAEC Annual report for 2012 and this information remains valid. The Government also continues to have concerns about human rights in Bahrain. Although many export licences are approved, equipment for internal security and crowd control may require consideration by Ministers. All applications, including for aviation goods, are considered against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. In relation to C2<sup>130</sup> concerns, a licence will not be approved if there is a clear risk goods might be used for internal repression.

You will wish to note that previous Priority Market lists have treated Europe/the EU and NATO as 'single markets'. However, in assessing which were the most significant individual markets on which DSO should focus its trade promotion activities, this year's review concluded that treating the EU and NATO as groups was not helpful, and instead decided to assess individual member countries on their merits. Doing so does not in any way detract from the fact that Europe as a whole remains a significant market for UK

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<sup>129</sup> Cm8707, p 14

<sup>130</sup> In this instance C2 refers to UK Consolidate Criterion Two

defence and security exports, with average annual sales exceeding £900million (spread across 15 countries). Nor does this mean that UKTI DSO will do less on the Brussels-based shared defence procurement mechanisms (EDA and NATO). It is solely an attempt to give a more accurate prioritised picture of where DSO is concentrating its sale promotion efforts.<sup>131</sup>

## Annex A

### Recommended List of DSO Priority Markets 2014/15

Market	Summary of Reason for Inclusion
Australia	Significant market with opportunities in defence & security sectors coupled with increasing defence and security collaboration. Important route into other markets in Asian region.
Bahrain	Large single Air sector prospect, although no additional significant opportunities.
Brazil	Growth market for UK defence security exports. Opportunities for industrial defence partnership. Opportunities arising from the Olympics and Cyber Security capacity building.
France	Inward investment opportunities in all DSO sectors. Potential to be UK's key collaborative defence manufacturing partner in Europe.
India	Large and growing market for UK all defence and many security sector exports. Potential Disaster Relief market interest. UK agreed to transfer technology in 2013 (subject to our international obligations) and widened the scope of our exports market. Opportunity to collaborate with India on research to produce military equipment.
Indonesia	Important market for UK defence exports. Still has significant opportunities and high demand for DSO support from UK companies.
Japan	Large market for both defence and security. Third largest market for UK security exports. High demand from UK industry for DSO support. Relaxing of Japan's arms export policies enabling greater opportunities for international collaborative projects. Opportunities arising from the Olympics.

<sup>131</sup> Ev w211 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls and the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committees dated 17 April 2014



Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Largest market for UK defence exports. Still has significant opportunities and high demand for DSO support from UK companies.
Kuwait	High value G2G <sup>132</sup> Security programme.
Malaysia	Significant G2G potential for high value opportunities in the defence Air and Sea sectors. High demand for DSO support.
Oman	Continued export opportunities in support of previous platform sales. Significant new export opportunities across Land, Sea, Air and Security sectors provide large and balanced market for UK exporters. Applications for equipment for use in internal security may require consideration by Ministers.
Qatar	Very large opportunities in defence Air sector. Increasing interest in UK defence and security products and services.
South Korea	Growth market for UK defence exports in the Air and Sea sectors. High demand for DSO support from UK exporters. In Top 10 Security exports market.
Turkey	Growth market for UK defence & security exports with opportunities for industrial defence partnership & further exports targeted by UK companies. Large defence market of regional importance bordering EU.
UAE	Significant opportunities for defence Air and Sea sectors. High demand for DSO support. Large volume of export licences approved.
USA	Largest market for defence Land, Sea and Air sectors. Largest market for Security sector. Key defence partner. Industrial partner and investor opportunities, for both export and inward investment.

The countries added to the 2014/15 were Bahrain and France, while Canada, Libya and Thailand were deleted from the previous list.

**132. I propose that the Committees conclude that:**

- a) the decision of the Business Secretary to write on 17 April 2014 to the Committees with the outcome of the Government's review of Priority Markets for 2014/15 and with an explanation of why each country is included in the list is welcome;**
- b) the removal of Libya from the list is welcome; and**

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<sup>132</sup> G2G – Government to Government

- c) **the decision to assess individual EU and NATO member countries on their arms export merits rather than as groups is welcome.**

133. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report why Canada has been deleted from the Priority Markets List.

134. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government needs to explain to Parliament and the wider public more fully why Saudi Arabia is listed by the Business Department as a Priority Market for arms exports whilst simultaneously being listed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as being a country of major human rights concern, and also why Bahrain has now been added to the Business Department's Priority Markets List notwithstanding the continuing concerns about human rights in that country.

## Trade exhibitions

135. The Committees' previous scrutiny of trade exhibitions can be found at paragraphs 132–138 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 54 of the Report.

136. Article 21 of the Export Control Order 2008 states: "no person to whom this article applies shall directly or indirectly ... do any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of any category A goods, where that person knows or has reason to believe that such action or actions will, or may, result in the removal of those goods from one third country to another third country."<sup>133</sup>

137. The Committees' Recommendation on trade exhibitions in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) whether it agrees that it is of the utmost importance that all defence and security equipment exhibitions licensed or facilitated by UK Government Departments, organisations and bodies do not display, promote or market Category A goods including goods that could be used for torture; and
- b) whether it is satisfied with the adequacy of its legal powers to enforce the legislation relating to defence and security equipment exhibitions licensed or facilitated by UK Government Departments and also with the sufficiency of the BIS Guidance on the Impact of UK Trade Controls on Exhibitions and Trade Fairs.<sup>134</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

- a) The Government agrees.

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<sup>133</sup> Export Control Order 2008 (Si 2008/3231), Section 21 (2)

<sup>134</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 54

- b) The Government is satisfied with the adequacy of its powers to enforce the export and trade controls, including in relation to activity undertaken at exhibitions and trade fairs.<sup>135</sup>

138. UK Working Group (UKWG) stated in its submission that it was disappointed to note that, despite several companies having been ejected from recent arms exhibitions in the UK, at no point to date have any of the exhibiting companies been prosecuted for prohibited activities nor, as far as it knows, has this even been seriously considered. This is despite the wording of Article 21 of the Export Control Order 2008 (see above).<sup>136</sup>

139. The biennial Defence & Security Equipment International exhibition (DSEi) was held at the Excel Centre in London between 10 and 13 September 2013. Over 1,300 exhibitors comprising a range of military and security companies took part in the event.<sup>137</sup>

140. On 10 September 2013 the Business Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees with an update on the DSEi. The relevant section of his letter was as follows:

#### **Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi)**

You will be aware that DSEi is taking place this week at the ExCel exhibition centre. While Clarion Defence and Security Ltd — in association with the Defence Trade Associations — organises the exhibition and is responsible for inviting UK and international companies to exhibit at the exhibition, we have agreed a Memorandum of Understanding with Clarion, to address compliance with UK export and trade controls. Clarion has committed to work with ECO and compliance agencies to ensure that all exhibitors comply with UK, EU and international laws and regulations related to the export of defence, security and dual use equipment. ECO, along with HMRC, Border Force and the Metropolitan Police will maintain a presence at the ExCel throughout the exhibition and will not hesitate to take action in the event of non-compliance.<sup>138</sup>

141. Human rights campaigners discovered that two companies, the French firm MagForce International and the Chinese company Tian Jin MyWay International Trading, were offering leg irons and electric shock batons in catalogues on display at the exhibition. (Leg irons and electric shock batons are both Category A items.) The UK Government's own website states: "The controls on Category A goods cover 'any act calculated to promote' the movement of such goods with no exemption for general advertising or promotion."<sup>139</sup> It was only after the incident was raised in Parliament by Caroline Lucas MP<sup>140</sup> that the organisers took action, ordering both the Chinese and French companies to dismantle their stalls before ejecting them from the exhibition. Companies at the previous four DSEi exhibitions, in 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011, were found, by members of the public, to be promoting other Category A goods, such as cluster

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<sup>135</sup> Cm8707, pp 14–15

<sup>136</sup> Ev w127

<sup>137</sup> "This year's DSEi arms fair needs to be the last", *The Guardian*, 5 September 2013

<sup>138</sup> Ev w153 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 10 September 2013

<sup>139</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Trade controls on military goods for trade fairs and exhibitions*, [www.gov.uk/trade-controls-military-goods-on-trade-fairs-and-exhibitions](http://www.gov.uk/trade-controls-military-goods-on-trade-fairs-and-exhibitions)

<sup>140</sup> HC Deb, 11 September 2013, Cols 981-982

munitions. (See Ev w134: Annex B of UKWG's submission for a full list of companies advertising prohibited equipment at UK exhibitions from 2005–2013.)

142. UKWG considered that the repeated discovery of companies breaching the regulations around permitted promotional activity showed inadequate compliance checks both before and during the fair by the exhibition organisers and HM Revenue and Customs. It said it should not be the job of civil society or MPs to identify these breaches. UKWG also expressed concern that Rostec (See paragraph 144 below) had been exhibiting at DSEi and questioned what message had been sent by the UK Government about its commitment to the Arms Trade Treaty. UKWG stated that when deciding who could exhibit at DSEi, the UK Government should consider the international obligations and standing of the states in which potential exhibitors are based.<sup>141</sup>

143. The UK Government invited official delegations from 67 countries to DSEi in 2013<sup>142</sup>; of these, eight were from countries that abstained or were absent from the UN General Assembly vote on adopting the ATT and who had not yet signed the treaty.<sup>143</sup> UKWG suggested that a company from any state that had not signed the ATT should be prohibited from attending any UK arms fair. At a minimum, any OGELs issued to allow companies to automatically participate at DSEi should exclude companies originating from non-ATT signatory states.<sup>144</sup> UKWG also called for any state that had not signed and ratified the Cluster Munitions Convention and any company that had not signed a written guarantee that they (or any subsidiary or partner) do not produce cluster munitions or their components to be prohibited from attending future military or defence trade events in the UK.<sup>145</sup>

144. Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), in its Written Evidence to the Committees, highlighted that nine of the UK Government invitees to DSEi 2013 were also on the FCO list of countries with the most serious wide-ranging human rights concerns. These were Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. Two others on the list, Israel and Russia, had pavilions to display their wares. The invitation list also included Algeria, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were new to the list in 2013 while Libya was back, having been omitted from the 2011 invitations. CAAT pointed out that the companies exhibiting at DSEi included Rostec (Russian Technology State Corporation); Rostec owns 100% of Rosoboronexport, the Russian state agency which supplied the equipment to Syria's President Assad.<sup>146</sup>

145. When the Committees asked UKWG about the promotion of banned goods at exhibitions, Oliver Sprague, Programme Director, Military Security and Police, Amnesty International UK, said that there had been “a long-standing track record of failure [of companies] to comply and of companies promoting illegal or banned goods.” He said that the promotion of such goods “should have been quite easy to spot” by the authorities. He questioned whether the DSEi trade fair was able to operate within the law. He continued: “I would say, yet again, that the

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<sup>141</sup> Ev w128

<sup>142</sup> Countries invited to DSEi 2013, UK Trade and Investment, Defence and Security, , 12 September 2013, <http://www.ukti.gov.uk/defencesecurity/item/603020.html>

<sup>143</sup> The eight countries were Bahrain, India, Indonesia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.

<sup>144</sup> Ev w125

<sup>145</sup> Ev w128

<sup>146</sup> Ev w84

enforcement of the controls has not been good enough. I think that serious questions need to be asked about how the fair is run in future.” Mr Sprague suggested that all product brochures should be screened in advance and that “a person whose responsibility is enforcement should be responsible for looking at all the promotional and display materials before they go live in the fair.” He pointed out that at every DESi exhibition since 2005 there had been problems with display material.<sup>147</sup> When David Hayes, EGAD, was asked about the banned goods being promoted at DSEi he said:

There are incidents at these fairs and exhibitions that should not happen, and it would help, when these incidents do happen, if there was perhaps a little more transparency around what happened and precisely how it was dealt with, and what was happening to the individual companies involved. [...] The fact that every now and again companies step out of line is clearly something that we do not wish to tolerate, but some greater transparency for all of us around what actually happens when these transgressions are identified would be helpful.<sup>148</sup>

146. When the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, was questioned about companies promoting banned goods at the DSEi exhibition he stated:

To ensure that past episodes are not repeated, or are at least minimised, a memorandum of understanding was drawn up with the organisers this year to have a tight set of rules. The basic outcome is that if an exhibitor—there are 1,300 of them; it is not a small exhibition—breaks the rules, as last year a Russian operation did, they are stopped immediately and action is taken to prevent illegal activity taking place.<sup>149</sup>

When asked whether product brochures should be screened before exhibitions Chris Chew, Head of Policy, ECO, commented: “With 1,300 or more exhibitors, that is potentially quite a daunting task. If each exhibitor brought 10 different brochures it would be problematic. It is clear that we need to do more in advance of the show to identify where problems might lie, but I don’t think we can say anything other than we need to work harder.”<sup>150</sup> His colleague Edward Bell, Head of Export Control Organisation, added:

I was keen to put a memorandum of understanding in place with Clarion this year. It is a good mechanism. During the exhibition we have a strong presence of personnel from the Export Control Organisation, HMRC and the police. That is why we picked up the infringements. Yes, we need to work harder at that, but we put a good mechanism in place this year to hold Clarion to account.<sup>151</sup>

147. When asked whether other sanctions, apart from being ejected from the exhibition, could be applied, the Business Secretary said that if companies had committed a criminal offence then action could be taken. Edward Bell added that the offending material from the DSEi exhibition had been given to HMRC. When asked whether governments should collectively highlight to exhibitors that if they break the rules then legal sanctions could be enforced against them, Chris

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<sup>147</sup> Q 2

<sup>148</sup> Q 26

<sup>149</sup> Q 88

<sup>150</sup> Q 89 [Chris Chew]

<sup>151</sup> Q 89 [Edward Bell]

Chew said that the Government should examine that option in relation to the next exhibition and that the Memorandum of Understanding should be revisited to see whether the Government could reinforce those messages.<sup>152</sup>

148. The Business Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees on 3 February 2014. The section of his letter referring to the DSEi was as follows:

We also intend to provide an update at the time of our review [of the Transparency Initiative — January 2015] of the Memorandum of Understanding with the organiser of Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi) 2015 and to update you on our progress in improving the timescales in relation to appeals against licence refusals.<sup>153</sup>

149. Caroline Lucas MP asked a Written Parliamentary Question asking “on arms trade fairs, what the specific roles and responsibilities are of (a) his Department, (b) other government departments, (c) Clarion Events and (d) other parties for ensuring compliance with and enforcing the Export Control Order 2008 in respect of (i) the Defence and Security Equipment International arms fair and (ii) an alleged breach of arms control legislation at that arms fair in 2013; and if he will place a copy of the memorandum of understanding between his Department's Export Control Organisation and Clarion Events in the Library. The Business Minister, Michael Fallon replied:

The Export Control Organisation in BIS is responsible for ensuring that Clarion Events make exhibitors aware of their responsibilities in respect of export and trade controls.

Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) are responsible for the enforcement of UK export controls.

The Metropolitan Police are responsible for policing and security at the exhibition.

Clarion Events is responsible for organising the exhibition and making exhibitors aware of their responsibilities in respect of export and trade controls.

The Export Control Organisation within BIS has set in place a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Clarion which sets out their role and responsibilities, and those of the exhibitor companies, in respect of export control legislation. Details of the support activities undertaken between Clarion and Government Departments, compliance authorities and agencies are also included. The MoU will be reviewed ahead of the next exhibition in 2015. A copy of the MoU will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses.<sup>154</sup>

150. The *Independent* newspaper, in an article on 22 March 2014, said that anti-arms campaigners had launched a private prosecution against two defence companies for allegedly marketing torture equipment at the DSEi fair held in London in September 2013. The article claimed that the private proceedings had been taken because UK state bodies had failed to act on allegations that laws banning the export and promotion of illegal weaponry had been broken by Magforce International (a French company) and Tian Jin MyWay International Trading (a Chinese company). Despite the fact that details of the alleged offences having been passed on to

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<sup>152</sup> Qq 91–93

<sup>153</sup> Ev w199 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 3 February 2014

<sup>154</sup> HC Deb, 26 February 2014, Cols 347–348W

HMRC six months previously no charges had been brought prior to the expiry of a prosecution deadline.<sup>155</sup>

151. On 16 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary requesting more details about the actions taken, or not taken, by the UK Government in relation to the breaches in displaying arms materials at the DSEi. The text of the letter was as follows:

In its edition of March 22 “the Independent” newspaper carried an article headed “‘Torture gear’ displays at weapons fair backfire”. I attach a copy of this article for convenience.

Please could you tell me whether your Department, or any other Government department took specific steps to draw to the attention of the Crown Prosecution Service possible criminal offences committed by Magforce International and Tianjin Myway at the DSEi exhibition in London last year.

If so, please could you tell me what those specific steps were.

If not, please could you explain why no such steps were taken.

I should be grateful for your reply by May 8.

I am copying this letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence.

Attachment at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/torture-gear-brochures-at-worlds-largest-weaponry-fair--backfire-9208852.html><sup>156</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 6 June 2014. The section of his letter relating to trade exhibitions was as follows:

DSEi trade fair

During the 2013 DSEi exhibition the event organisers, Clarion, found literature that allegedly breached UK export controls on the stands of two companies based overseas (Tianjin Myway International Trading Company and Magforce International). The literature contained pictures of certain Category A goods, in this case paramilitary items including electric shock batons, electric-shock belts and leg irons. Clarion expelled the two companies from the exhibition and the literature in question was confiscated and passed to HM Revenue and Customs.

Simply displaying pictures of Category A goods in a brochure may not necessarily constitute an offence. In order to prove a criminal offence in such cases it may be necessary to prove a link between the display of literature and the eventual movement of the goods between two overseas countries. You will recall that this issue was addressed at some length in my letters to you of 13 February and 26 March 2012.

As you will be aware, HM Revenue and Customs is responsible for investigating potential breaches of UK strategic export controls. HMRC is also responsible for referring cases to

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<sup>155</sup> “‘Torture gear’ displays at weapons fair backfire”, *The Independent*, 22 March 2014

<sup>156</sup> Ev w210 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 16 April 2014

the Crown Prosecution Service. I am assured that HMRC fully and properly considered the alleged breaches at DSEi 2013, as they would in any case where potential breaches are detected, or where there are credible allegations of an offence.

In these cases HMRC determined that further action was neither appropriate nor viable, and therefore did not take specific steps to draw this matter to the attention of the Crown Prosecution Service.

Government departments worked closely with Clarion at the DSEi exhibition to ensure exhibitors complied with UK law. The fact that this literature was detected and confiscated, and that the exhibiting companies were expelled from the exhibition, was the result of effective co-operation between officials and the event organisers and I view this as a positive outcome.<sup>157</sup>

**152. I propose that the Committees conclude that though the Government agreed without qualification the Committees' previous Recommendation "that it is of the utmost importance that all defence and security equipment exhibitions licensed or facilitated by UK Government Departments, organisations and bodies do not display, promote or market Category A goods including goods that could be used for torture", the Government failed to achieve this policy once again at the biennial Defence and Security Equipment International exhibition (DSEi) held in London in September 2013.**

**153. In view of the self-evident lack of clarity in the present criminal legislation as shown by the Business Secretary's reply to the Committees of 6 June 2014, I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will amend the relevant legislation to make it clear beyond doubt that a breach of the Government's policy "that it is of the utmost importance that all defence and security equipment exhibitions licensed or facilitated by UK Government Departments, organisations or bodies do not display, promote or market Category A goods, including goods that could be used for torture" constitutes a criminal offence.**

**154. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will ensure that the Committees are informed of the outcome of the Government's review of the Memorandum of Understanding between Clarion Defence and Security Ltd and the Export Control Organisation as early as possible in January 2015.**

## **Enforcement**

155. The Committees' previous scrutiny of enforcement can be found at paragraphs 139–145 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraph 55 of the Report.

156. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on enforcement in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

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<sup>157</sup> Ev w499 – letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 June 2014



The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it considers that enforcement by the UK Border Force with HMRC of compliance with the terms of all arms export licences is fully satisfactory and, if not, what further enforcement action it will take. The Committees conclude that the Government's continued publication of individuals and companies convicted of arms export offences and their sentences is essential.<sup>158</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government considers that the work undertaken by HMRC, Border Force and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to enforce strategic export controls, is satisfactory and effective. Over the past three years, HMRC and Border Force have continued to deploy resources to enforce strategic export controls, and both organisations work closely together, and with other agencies, to ensure that noncompliance is identified, that all breaches of controls are assessed and appropriate action taken.

In 2012-13 the number of seizures of controlled goods increased by 99% on the previous year, to a total of 280. Additionally, HMRC and the CPS secured three prosecutions on trafficking and brokering offences with sentences totalling twelve and a half years. This brings to seven the total number of arms brokering prosecutions achieved by HMRC and the CPS and we remain one of only two countries in the world - the other being the USA - successfully to prosecute this type of offence. The changing international security environment constantly generates new risks, as do changes in smuggling techniques. As a consequence, HMRC, Border Force and the CPS are always looking to identify what further enforcement or compliance activity may be required, such as strengthening relationships with new international partners, and providing additional educational outreach to exporters.

The Government confirms it will continue to publish details of individuals and companies convicted of arms export offences and any sentences imposed by the courts.<sup>159</sup>

157. Following publication of the *Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking two questions about enforcement. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

What are the reasons why the number of warning letters where breaches of licence conditions were found during visits rose from 45 in 2011 to 101 in 2012?

**The Government's answer:**

There are a number of reasons why the number of warning letters will vary from year to year, not least the complex nature of compliance audits themselves. It is too early to tell whether the increase is due to a trend of increasing non-compliance. We continue to explore ways of improving our compliance procedures to support businesses that have been found to be non-compliant.

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<sup>158</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 55

<sup>159</sup> Cm8707, p 15

**The Committees' question:**

Is the increase in the number of seizures of strategic goods in breach of licensing requirements or sanctions and embargoes from 141 in 2011–12 to 280 in 2012–13 due to increased effectiveness of the authorities or to increased attempts to breach the licensing requirements or both?

**The Government's answer:**

The Government believes this increase is the result of a combination of factors.

- The range of goods in scope has increased steadily over the last few years as a result of the introduction of new sanctions, for example those directed against Iran and Syria, and other new strategic export regulations and restrictions. These developments increase the potential for greater non-compliance through accident (lack of awareness of the new rules) or design. This appears to be supported by the general increase in the number of voluntary disclosures, 'no further action' and warning letters we have issued in recent years, and also a general increase in the number of 'technical' offences we have encountered.
- The increase in results has also been achieved by good strategic analysis by HMRC which has considerably improved the national picture of the most sensitive commodities and ports of highest risk. Expanded training and development of Border Force front line staff has also resulted in heightened awareness of strategic export control risks and increased front-line activity.

The Government, in line with previous answers to the Committees, attributes the majority of seizures to administrative errors on the part of exporters. The Government has no reason to believe there has been an increase in wilful non-compliance by exporters.<sup>160</sup>

158. In their Written Evidence Neil Cooper and Gerald Walther of the University of Bradford expressed concern that the Export Control Organisation (ECO) had appeared to have responded to the twin problems of limited staff resources and pressure to meet the 70% target for SIELs by encouraging companies to apply for Open Export Licences. They stated that reports from the defence industry raised concerns about the rigour with which the Open Licensing System was being policed. They provided the following tables showing the results of HMRC visits to open licence holders from 2007 to 2012.

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<sup>160</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

Table 3: Results of HMRC visits to open licence holders

	Number of companies and sites holding open licences	Number of HMRC visits	Number of misuses (% of visits)
2007	1600 (approx.)	587	220 (37%)
2008	1600 (approx.)	675	219 (32%)
2009	1800 (approx.)	836	290 (35%)
2010	1900 (approx.)	821	273 (33%)

Source: Ev w80, table 1.1

Table 4: Results of HMRC visits to open licence holders in 2011

	Number of visits	% Compliant	% Not fully compliant
First time visits	216	70	30
Routine visits	445	73	27
Revisits	59	73	27

Source: Ev w80, table 1.2

Table 5: Results of HMRC visits to open licence holders in 2012

	Number of visits	% Compliant	% Not fully compliant
First time visits	100	70	30
Routine visits	101	74	26
Revisits	99	77	23

Source: Ev w80, table 1.3

Neil Cooper and Gerald Walther point out that that a significant proportion of visits to open licence holders still reveal examples of non-compliance. They also expressed concern that the number of visits has fallen from over 800 in 2009 and 2010 to 300 in 2012. They questioned why, given the levels of non-compliance recorded, the number of visits had fallen and believed it raised concerns about the rigour with which the open licensing system was being policed. It was also noted that despite ECO's commitment to greater transparency recent reports had failed to distinguish between different categories of misuse, and that data on the number of unlicensed shipments discovered during compliance visits had stopped.<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> Ev w81

159. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's confirmation that it will continue to publish details of individuals and companies convicted of arms export offences and the sentences imposed by the courts is welcome, but recommends that the Government in its Response to this Report explains why there were just 3 successful prosecutions for strategic export offences in 2012–13 and 1 in 2011–12 compared with 8 in 2010–11.

160. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response why HMRC visits to Open Export Licence holders have declined from over 800 in 2009 and in 2010 to 300 in 2012.

161. I propose that the Committees also recommend that the Government should restore reporting on:

- a) the number of unlicensed shipments discovered during compliance visits; and
- b) the categories of misuse discovered during compliance visits to Open Individual and Open General Licence holders as was done up to and including the Government's Strategic Export Controls 2011 Report.

162. In its scrutiny of the Government's arms exports for the Quarter July to September 2013, the Committees asked the following question:

“Why was an incorporated SIEL to Brazil [via the United States] for components for military training aircraft refused?”

The Government Response was:

“We refused the SIEL under Criterion 7 because we assessed there was a risk that the goods might be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.” [The further classified information relating to this licence application given to the Committee cannot be published.]

I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what is the standard wording it uses in its export licence application forms in which all applicants state in writing that the information in their application is accurate, and what are the penalties in current legislation if a licence applicant knowingly includes false information in their application.

### **Compound penalties**

163. The Committees' previous scrutiny of compound penalties can be found at paragraphs 146–148 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 56 of the Report.

164. A Compound Penalty is the term used by HM Revenue and Customs to describe the means by which HMRC can offer an exporter the chance to settle a case which would justify being

referred to the CPS for prosecution by means of paying a financial penalty, therefore saving the taxpayer and company time and legal fees.<sup>162</sup>

165. The Committees' Recommendation on compound penalties in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response:

- a) states what improvements to the compound penalties system it has identified and when it will implement them; and
- b) clarifies whether the Government is using compound penalties as an alternative to civil penalties only, or as an alternative to both criminal and civil proceedings.<sup>163</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) HMRC considers that the compound penalty regime could be better publicised in order to help maximise its deterrent effect. HMRC plans to achieve this as part of its ongoing contribution to wider Government outreach to industry. HMRC periodically evaluates the compound penalty system to ensure that it remains effective, proportionate and appropriately deployed. The Government believes that the compound penalty regime continues to play a useful role in the strategic export control enforcement framework.
- b) HMRC offers compound penalties in lieu of criminal prosecution only. This enables certain breaches to be dealt with efficiently and in a proportionate manner. When considering whether to offer a compound penalty, HMRC takes account of a number of factors including the extent of any evidence to deliberately evade the controls, the level of co-operation with investigators, and attempts voluntarily to improve compliance.<sup>164</sup>

166. **I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report:**

- a) **whether there is any authority independent of the Government, such as the Crown Prosecution Service, authorising in the case of each breach of the criminal law on arms export controls the use of a compound penalty instead of a criminal prosecution and, if not, whether the Government will establish one;**
- b) **for what specific breaches of the criminal law on arms export controls HMRC currently allows a compound penalty to be offered;**
- c) **whether refusal of an offer of a compound penalty automatically results in a criminal prosecution, and, if not, why not; and**

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<sup>162</sup> Department for Business Innovation and Skills, *Compound Penalty Cases*, <http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/prosecution/compound-penalty-cases/>

<sup>163</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 56

<sup>164</sup> Cm8707, pp 15–16

- d) **the number of compound penalties offered by HMRC and the total sum paid to HMRC in compound penalties in the latest year for which figures are available.**

## Crown Dependencies

167. The Committees' previous scrutiny of Crown Dependencies can be found at paragraphs 149–154 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraphs 57 and 58 of the Report.

168. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the Crown Dependencies in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the Government's statement that "UK Strategic Export Control legislation has already been applied in the Crown Dependencies by the Crown Dependencies themselves" is welcome.<sup>165</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusion.<sup>166</sup>

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government monitors enforcement by the Crown Dependencies of the UK Government's arms export controls and policies and notifies the Committees of any breaches.<sup>167</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Crown Dependencies are not part of the UK but are self-governing dependencies of the Crown with autonomy for domestic affairs. This means they have their own directly elected legislative assemblies, and their own administrative, fiscal and legal systems with their own courts of law. The Crown Dependencies are not represented in the UK Parliament.

With regard to export controls, as a matter of policy the Crown Dependencies choose to align their export controls with UK standards but it is an area within their domestic competence. That said, the Crown Dependencies have a strong working relationship with the UK authorities and as part of that relationship have kept and will continue to keep the UK Government apprised of their standards of export controls and policies in relation to arms.

Given both the constitutional position and the strong working relationship between the UK authorities and the Crown Dependencies, it would not be appropriate for the UK

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<sup>165</sup> HC (2012-13) 205, para 57

<sup>166</sup> Cm8707, p 16

<sup>167</sup> HC (2013-14) 205, para 58

Government to report to a UK parliamentary committee on matters relating to the Crown Dependencies' domestic competence.<sup>168</sup>

169. I propose that the Committees conclude that they do not accept the Government's view that it would not be appropriate for it to report to a UK Parliamentary Committee any breaches of the UK Government's arms export controls and policies by a Crown Dependency on the grounds that any such breaches fall within the Crown Dependencies' domestic competences because:

- a) successive UK Governments have submitted evidence to UK Parliamentary Committees, such as the Foreign Affairs Committee, on matters relating to a Crown Dependency's domestic competence; and
- b) the financing of arms export transactions and arms export controls have overseas as well as domestic ramifications.

I propose that the Committees therefore repeat their previous Recommendation that the Government monitors enforcement by Crown Dependencies of the UK Government's arms export controls and policies and notifies the Committees of any breaches.

## Combating bribery and corruption

170. The Committees' previous scrutiny of combating bribery and corruption can be found at paragraphs 155–159 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 59 of the Report.

171. The Committees' Recommendation on the combating of bribery and corruption in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response:

- a) states the names of the individuals and companies against whom it has taken action under the provisions of the Bribery Act 2010 in relation to their arms export dealings; and
- b) provides its assessment as to whether the provisions of the now concluded Arms Trade Treaty will be of any practical help in combating bribery and corruption in the international arms trade.<sup>169</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

- a) There have been three prosecutions to date under the Bribery Act; none relate to arms exports.
- b) It is the Government's assessment that by establishing internationally agreed standards for transfers of convention arms and through international reporting, the

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<sup>168</sup> Cm8707, p 16

<sup>169</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 59

Arms Trade Treaty will be of practical help in combating bribery and corruption in the international arms trade.<sup>170</sup>

**172. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states, since its last Response in Cm8707, the names of any individuals and any companies against whom it has taken action under the provision of the Bribery Act 2010 in relation to their arms export dealings or financing.**

## International Development

173. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports and international development can be found at paragraphs 160–164 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 60 of the Report.

174. The Committees' Recommendation on arms exports and international development in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

Now that a global Arms Trade Treaty has been adopted, the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the outcome of the Department for International Development's consideration of its role in the UK arms export control system.<sup>171</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

DFID is in the process of assessing its role in the Arms Export Control Process. Officials will be submitting advice to Ministers in the Autumn, and will update the Committees as soon as possible thereafter.<sup>172</sup>

175. On 24 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Secretary of State for International Development following up the Committees' Recommendation in their 2013 Report. The text of the letter was as follows:

The Committees in its 2013 Report (HC205) at paragraph 164 made the following Recommendation:

Now that a global Arms Trade Treaty has been adopted, the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the outcome of the Department for International Development's consideration of its role in the UK arms export control system.

The Government's Response (Cm8707) was:

DFID is in the process of assessing its role in the Arms Export Control Process. Officials will be submitting advice to Ministers in the Autumn, and will update the Committees as soon as possible thereafter.

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<sup>170</sup> Cm 8707, p 17

<sup>171</sup> HC (2013-14) 205, para 164

<sup>172</sup> Cm8707, p 17



Please could you state whether officials have submitted their advice to Ministers, and if so, when will the Committees receive this update.<sup>173</sup>

The DFID Minister, Alan Duncan, replied on 8 May 2014 as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 24 April, to Justine Greening, Secretary of State for International development, about DFID's role in the arms export control process. I am replying on behalf of the Secretary of State.

The process to assess DFID's role has taken longer than anticipated. My officials are designing an update to the methodology used by the Government in relation to Criterion 8. They are preparing to submit advice on this to ministers shortly, and on DFID's wider role in the UK arms export control system. I apologise for the delayed timing and will update the Committees as soon as possible.<sup>174</sup>

The Chairman of the Committees wrote again to Justin Greening on 20 May 2014 as follows;

I refer you to my letter to you of 24 April about DFID's role in the arms export control process to which Alan Duncan replied with his letter of 8 May.

I am sorry to say that Alan's reply is most disappointing.

Given that Criteria 8 forms part of both the EU's and the UK's Criteria for arms exports, the Committees attach considerable importance to the way in which your Department discharges its role in the UK's arms export controls process. It is therefore a matter of concern that though the Government stated in CM 8707, published last October, that officials would be submitting advice to Ministers last Autumn on DFID's role in the export control process, no such advice had in fact been submitted by the time of Alan's reply to me in May this year.

The Committees will wish to include in their Report on their current inquiry which is now being drafted their scrutiny of your Department's role in arms exports controls. I therefore need to have your promised update no later than 2 June.

I am copying this letter to the Chair of the International Development Committee, Sir Malcolm Bruce, to whom I would be grateful if you could copy your reply, and also to Alan Duncan.<sup>175</sup>

The DFID Minister Alan Duncan replied to the Chairman of the Committees on 6 June 2014 as follows:

Thank you for your letter to Secretary of State Justine Greening on 20 May 2014. I am responding as Minister responsible for DFID's role in the UK's arms export licencing process, in particular Criterion 8 (C8).

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<sup>173</sup> Ev w221 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Justine Greening dated 24 April 2014

<sup>174</sup> Ev w236 – Letter from Alan Duncan to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 8 May 2014

<sup>175</sup> Ev w492 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Justine Greening dated 20 May 2014

I wish to reassure you that my Department treats the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licencing Criteria with the utmost seriousness, and I am therefore pleased to update you on DFID's work on Criterion 8. Officials in my department have conducted a review of C8 in consultation with other government departments. I have recently approved a revision to the methodology for its application.

DFID will strengthen its application of Criterion 8 by:

1. Improving the data and indicators used to calculate the C8 thresholds;
2. Focusing our analysis on the least developed countries and those where C8 is most relevant;
3. Ensuring the cumulative value of licenses to each country is included in our assessment;
4. Involving DFID country offices more closely in decisions on open licences.

An explanation of all these changes is attached to this letter. DFID officials will begin implementation immediately and will review the effectiveness of this revised approach after 12 months. A full report will be annexed to the 2015 UK Annual Review on Arms Export Controls.

Alongside the review of C8, my officials have also looked into whether DFID could formally contribute to the consideration of other criteria. My view is that the expertise required for assessment of these other Criteria already sits within other departments. DFID offices work closely with colleagues from other departments both in London and overseas, and their knowledge is therefore already available informally. DFID will continue to focus on the assessment of Criterion 8.

Annex

#### **Revision to Methodology for Criterion 8 of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria**

1. This note provides details of a revision to the UK Government's methodology for assessing export licenses against Criterion 8 (C8) of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria.
2. The Department for International Development has responsibility for assessing Criterion 8 of the cross-HMG export licensing system, which asks whether a proposed export "*would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country.*"
3. The 2007 UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report outlined the current methodology and data necessary to take decisions on the application of Criterion 8 (Annex C of the report). Following a review of the application of Criterion 8, a revision to this methodology is proposed for three main reasons:
  - a) The cumulative impact of exports to a single country is not captured;
  - b) 'Open' licences are sometimes approved which allow exporters to export as much as they want to a defined country;

- c) More countries are considered than necessary, including many which are unlikely ever to raise concerns under C8.
- 4. The revision to the methodology is detailed below, the core of which remains the same, with four changes designed to strengthen the process.

### **How the Methodology Currently Operates**

- 5. The methodology laid out in 2007 addressed exports to all IDA-recipient countries. A baseline threshold of 2.5% of combined public health and education spending in the recipient country is calculated and adjusted according to a series of development indicators (see Table 1 below). DFID views any export license application above this adjusted threshold for a more detailed examination. DFID may also ask to see applications in respect of other countries ad hoc.
- 6. Four changes will be made to improve the robustness of the process:
  - I. Improving the data and indicators used to calculate the C8 thresholds.
  - II. Focusing analysis on the least developed countries and those where C8 is most relevant.
  - III. Ensuring the cumulative value of licenses to each country is included in the assessment.
  - IV. Involving DFID country offices more closely in C8 decisions regarding open licences.

#### **I. Alteration to indicators**

- 7. Annex C in the 2007 Annual Report laid out the list of indicators used to calculate the adjusted threshold. One of these original indicators<sup>176</sup>, for which data was scarce, will be replaced with an assessment of the country against a corruption indicator published by the World Bank.
- 8. The data underlying the thresholds will continue to be updated annually, where available, to maintain relevance. The full list of indicators is detailed at the end of this note in Table 1.

#### **II. Focusing analysis on the least developed countries**

- 9. The existing methodology for Criterion 8 involves the consideration of export licence applications for the 82 countries on the World Bank's IDA list. This includes a number of countries where the risk of Criterion 8 concerns emerging is considered very low. By excluding countries considered particularly low risk from the analysis, the revised methodology will allow DFID to focus on licences for fewer countries in greater detail.

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<sup>176</sup> No.12, whether a country is 'off or on track' with its IFI programmes

10. In order to determine which countries to consider, DFID will undertake an assessment each year of the risk of Criterion 8 concerns emerging for each country, using the indicators in Table 1. Indicators are assigned a binary trigger value, giving each country a score of “1” or “0” for each indicator. Any country that receives a score of 4 or less is considered particularly low risk, and will be removed from the analysis of Criterion 8 for that year. The detail of this assessment is in Table 2 at the end of this note.
11. For 2014, this assessment generates the following list of 47 countries that will continue to be assessed under Criterion 8:

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Occupied Palestinian Territories\*, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan\*, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

\* Countries may be added to the list on an ad hoc basis where deemed necessary, or where the lack of data makes an assessment of risk difficult (as in the case of both the Occupied Palestinian Territories and South Sudan).

**III. Ensuring the cumulative value of licences to each country is included in our assessment**

12. The existing methodology assesses licences individually against a threshold. Under the revised methodology DFID will also consider licences cumulatively, so as to take into account the impact of all arms exports to a given country rather than of each individual export.

**IV. Involving our country offices more closely in C8 decisions regarding open licences**

13. Open licences have no financial value attached to them and therefore cannot be assessed against numerical thresholds. They are currently considered by DFID advisers in London, with support from country offices used on an ad hoc basis. Under the revised methodology, open licenses will be considered by both DFID advisers in London and in country (where appropriate and available) in each instance. This will strengthen the assessment of open licenses, incorporating local expertise into the consideration of factors including the nature of the goods being exported, previous licences approved, and the wider risk of Criterion 8 concerns in each country.

*Table 1: Updated indicators for adjusted threshold*

Indicator	Definition	Trigger	Amber Adjustment	Red Adjustment
CORE DATA FOR BASELINE THRESHOLD				

Indicator	Definition	Trigger	Amber Adjustment	Red Adjustment
Health and Education spending	2.5% of Health and Education Expenditure	2.5%	-	-
INDICATORS FOR ADJUSTED THRESHOLD				
1. Military expenditure	Military Expenditure as a percentage of GDP compared to the low income country average	Red: >2.5% Amber: >2.0%	0.8	0.6
2. Military spending compared to social sector spending	Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP compared to Health and Education spending as a percentage of GDP.	Red: >60% Amber: >50%	0.8	0.6
3. EU or bilateral aid (ODA)	ODA as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI)	Red: >4.0% Amber: >2.3%	0.8	0.6
4. Public finances (deficit)	Overall public deficit as a percentage of GDP after grants	Red: >5% Amber: >3.5%	0.8	0.6
5. Public finances (revenue)	Recurrent revenue yield as a percentage of GDP	Red: <10% Amber: <15%	0.9	0.8
6. Balance of payments (international reserves)	International foreign exchange reserves in terms of a months' imports	Red: <1.5 months' imports Amber: < 2.5 month's imports	0.8	0.6
7. Balance of payments (trend in int'l reserves)	Downward trend in reserves: if over last year, if reserves at or below 2.5 months' imports	Red: Fall Amber: Same level	0.95	0.9
9. External debt: HIPC ratios	Trends in a country's external debt relative to HIPC sustainability ratios: NPV of debt to fiscal revenue as %	Red: > 250 Amber: > 238	0.85	0.7
8. External debt: credit rating	Institutional Investor Credit Rating	Red: < 15 Amber: < 20	0.8	0.6
10. GNI	Gross National Income per capita PPP dollars	Red: <\$1,000 Amber <\$1,500	0.85	0.7
11. HDI	UNDP Human Development Index (HDI)	Red: < 0.400 Amber: < 0.500	0.8	0.6
12. Corruption	Whether the country is highly corrupt according to the World Bank Corruption Indicators.	Red or amber: < -1	N/A	0.5
13. DFID	Whether the country has a DFID Country Office in	Red or amber:	N/A	0.5

Indicator	Definition	Trigger	Amber Adjustment	Red Adjustment
	place	Country Office		

Table 2: Indicators and triggers for country list

Indicator	Trigger	Result
1. Military Expenditure as a % of GDP	Greater or less than 2%	>2% = 1 <2% = 0
2. ODA as % of GNI	Greater or less than 2.3%	>2.3% = 1 <2.3% = 0
3. Military Expenditure as a % of Health and Education Spending	Greater or less than 50%	>50% = 1 <50% = 0
4. Public finances: deficit as % of GDP	Greater or less than 3.5%	>3.5% = 1 <3.5% = 0
5. Public finances: government revenue as % of GDP	Greater or less than 15%	<15% = 1 >15% = 0
6. International foreign exchange reserves in terms of a months' imports	Greater or less than 2.5 months	<2.5 = 1 >2.5 = 0
7. Balance of payments (trend in int'l reserves)	Rise or Fall	<0 = 1 >0 = 0
8. NPV of debt to fiscal revenue as %	Greater or less than 238%	>238% = 1 <238% = 0
9. Institutional Investor Credit Rating	Greater or less than 20	<20 = 1 >20 = 0

Indicator	Trigger	Result
10. GNI	Greater or less than \$1500	<\$1500 = 1 >\$1500 = 0
11. HDI	Greater or less than 0.5	<0.5 = 1 >0.5 = 0
12. World Bank Corruption Index	Greater or less than -0.6	<-0.6 = 1 >-0.6 = 0
13. DFID Country Office presence	Yes or No	Yes = 3 No = 0
Notes: Indicator 13 – DFID country office presence – has been more heavily weighted than other indicators in order to ensure that all DFID priority countries are retained on the list.		

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176. I propose that the Committees conclude that it is regrettable that though the Government stated in its previous Response that the Department for International Development (DFID) was in the process of assessing its role in the Arms Export Control Process and that officials would be submitting advice to Ministers in the Autumn of 2013, and would update the Committees as soon as possible thereafter, the Committees did not receive the promised update until 6 June 2014.

177. I propose that the Committees conclude that the decision of the Department for International Development (DFID) to strengthen its application of Criterion 8 (“whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country”) is welcome.

178. I propose that the Committees further conclude that DFID’s undertaking to make a full report in 2015 on the effectiveness of its revised methodology for assessing arms export licence applications against Criterion 8 is also welcome.

179. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government should state in its Response whether it agrees that DFID, whilst making Criterion 8 its prime focus of involvement in the arms export controls process, should also keep under review being involved formally in the assessments under other Criteria such as Criterion 3 (Internal situation in the country of final destination) and Criterion 4 (Prevention of regional peace, security and stability) given that in a number of countries DFID has more staff present than any other British Government Department.

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<sup>177</sup> Ev w494 – Letter from Alan Duncan to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 June 2014

## 7 Arms Exports Agreements

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### UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty

180. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty can be found at paragraphs 165–172 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 61 of the Report.

181. The Committees' Recommendation on the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend in relation to the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty (DTCT) that the Government in its Response:

- a) states how many UK members of the DTCT Approved Community have been registered to use the Treaty-specific UK Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for exports under the Treaty;
- b) lists the complete membership of the Treaty Approved Community;
- c) states whether, in accordance with the Government's Transparency Initiative, the detailed implementation of public reporting of transactions undertaken under this Treaty's OGEL licences on the Government's Strategic Export Controls website was completed by April 2013 as planned and, if not, when it will be;
- d) states the reasons, notwithstanding its Transparency Initiative, the Government is not requiring exporters to declare that a particular export was made under the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty;
- e) states what specific steps it will take to make the Treaty more user-friendly; and
- f) states how satisfactorily or not the Treaty is working as far as British companies are concerned.<sup>178</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

- a) 15 UK members of the DTCT Approved Community have been registered to use the Treaty-specific UK Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for exports under the Treaty.
- b) At the time of writing there are 14 members of the Approved Community. Membership is on a facility basis and at this stage there are 14 companies and 14 facilities. These are:

1. Aish Technologies Ltd

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<sup>178</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 61



2. E W Simulation Technology Ltd
  3. Level Peaks Associates
  4. MS Instruments PLC
  5. Nautilus International Risk Consultants Ltd
  6. 3SDL Ltd
  7. Cox PowerTrain Ltd
  8. BAE Global Combat Systems Incorporated, Telford
  9. Communications Audit UK Ltd
  10. Aspire Consulting
  11. RJD Technology Ltd
  12. Envitia
  13. Beechwood Equipment Ltd
  14. Ebeni Ltd
- c) Please see the response to the Committees' questions at paragraph 51 above. [See Government Response to transparency of arms export licensing at paragraph 112 above] As a consequence, information about exports made under the Open General Export Licence (Exports under the US-UK Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty) for the calendar year 2014 will be published in 2015.
- d) Any transfer made under the OGEL (Exports under the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty) will by definition be a transfer under the Treaty. However an exporter may choose to use a different licence to make Treaty-related exports, such as a SIEL or an OIEL. In the Government's view requiring exporters to declare that a particular export was made under the Treaty would place an additional, and unnecessary, administrative burden upon them.
- e) A significant programme of industrial engagement has taken place in the UK to raise awareness of the Treaty (with corresponding support to US companies from the British Embassy in Washington, D.C.) and its potential benefits. We continue to work with our US Government counterparts to reduce the scope of the key Treaty inhibitors in order to increase UK Industry interest and uptake. This includes ongoing work on narrowing the Exempt Technologies List (ETL). We are aiming for a virtuous circle whereby the more the Treaty is used, the greater the trust and confidence in transatlantic transactions via this mechanism, and where feedback from UK industry feeds into attempts by both governments to improve Treaty effectiveness.
- f) The Treaty could be working more satisfactorily than at present because the first UK Industry-to-US Government transaction has yet to take place. But expectations prior

to Exchange of Notes in April 2012 were that this Treaty would take time to reach optimum utility, not least against a backdrop of industry desire to be on the right side of ITAR compliance (the Treaty is, officially, an ITAR waiver). There is a highly encouraging flow of applications to the United Kingdom Approved Community (a total of 53 UK facilities have now been through the process). Building on this progress, securing the first UK Industry-US Government transaction is a top MOD priority for 2013-14 and the department is looking at a range of possibilities.<sup>179</sup>

182. When the Committees questioned EGAD, in the Oral Evidence session on 4 November 2013, about the effectiveness of the Treaty for British industry David Hayes, EGAD, said:

It rapidly became apparent to us that the greater the success of the export control reforms to which you referred, Chair, the less would be the relevance of the treaty. A lot of the activities being undertaken by UK companies that would previously potentially have fallen under the treaty will now transfer to the responsibility of the Department of Commerce in the United States and therefore be outside the scope of the treaty. Couple that with the requirements and constraints of the treaty itself, and you end up with something that conceptually started life as a good idea but, as a result of the constraints that were then put around it, combined with developments that took place at the same time in the US export control system more broadly, so we have ended up with something that has little operational relevance or use to industry. That is why the uptake is so low.<sup>180</sup>

183. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary on 17 April 2014 with a number of questions relating to an analysis produced by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). The text of the letter was as follows:

I attach a copy of the RUSI Analysis of 22 January 2014 by Doctor Joanna Spear of the recent changes made by the US Government to the export controls for the US defence industry.

Please could you tell me whether the British Government considers these changes to be compliant with the terms of the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty.

Please could you also state whether the British Government considers that the US Government's export control changes will have an adverse or beneficial impact on UK defence exports and in what specific ways.

Please may I have your reply by 8 May.

Attachment at: <https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C52DFF7E0C0F8C/><sup>181</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 6 June. The section relating to the UK/US defence Trade Cooperation Treaty was as follows:

US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty and US Export Control Reform

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<sup>179</sup> Cm8707, pp 17–19

<sup>180</sup> Q 39

<sup>181</sup> Ev w214 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 17 April 2014

There is potential for confusion in using the word “compliant” in respect of the Treaty and the US Export Control Reform (ECR) initiative. The intent of the Treaty was to enhance bilateral defence equipment cooperation by creating an exemption to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (the ITAR relates to those items appearing on the United States Munitions List (USML)). One of the objectives of ECR is to enhance US defence cooperation with a wider range of partners by moving less-sensitive military items from the USML to the Commerce Control List (CCL). By definition items which have moved from the USML to the Commerce Control List (CCL) under ECR are not eligible for an ITAR exemption.

The real question therefore is whether the utility of the Treaty could be overtaken by ECR unless substantive changes are made. This is because the number of Treaty-eligible items is being reduced under ECR while specific exemptions within the Treaty mean certain other technologies were excluded from the start. There has been good dialogue between our two governments on maintaining a special place for the Treaty but at the moment US resources are focused on the implementation of ECR. The British Government’s long term objective is to move the Treaty to the mainstream of our defence and security relationship.

The ECR process is not yet complete and we are therefore only able to draw interim conclusions about the impact on UK defence exports. The British Government welcomes the continuing efforts by the US Administration to reform export controls and expects the movement of certain items from the US Munitions List (USML) to the Commerce Control List (CCL) will eventually help to simplify and enhance trade between our two nations, resulting in a net benefit to UK exports.

However it is important to acknowledge that one of the motivations for the ECR initiative was to enhance the international competitiveness of US defence exporters. This could make it harder for UK firms to win business against their US competitors. But we recognise that a more efficient system for processing and granting U.S. export licences could be a huge boon for our industries where they are regularly sending goods back and forth to the United States or working regularly with U.S. affiliates or subsidiaries. We will carefully assess the impact on wider UK national interests.<sup>182</sup>

**184. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report:**

- a) **the names of the companies and facilities of the UK members of the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty (DTCT) additional to the 14 members listed in the Government’s previous Response (Cm8707);**
- b) **the names of the companies and facilities amongst the original 14 members who are now no longer members and why they have withdrawn in each case;**
- c) **whether any narrowing of the Exempt Technologies List (ETL) has been achieved, and, if so, in what specific ways;**

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<sup>182</sup> Ev w499 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 June 2014

- d) **each specific UK Industry-to-US Government transaction that has now taken place, if any, under the DTCT;**
- e) **its response to the view of the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) about the UK/US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty the “we have ended up with something that has little operational relevance or use to industry. That is why the uptake is so low.”; and**
- f) **what specific steps it will be taking to achieve its objective to move the US–UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty to the mainstream of the UK–US defence and security relationship.**

## **US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)**

185. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) can be found at paragraphs 173–179 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Recommendation at paragraph 62 of the Report.

186. The Committees’ Recommendation on the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response sets out fully its response to the criticisms of the US International Traffic in Arms regulations (ITAR) made by the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) in EGAD’s written and oral evidence to this inquiry, and says what specific action the Government is taking to address each of those criticisms.<sup>183</sup>

### **The Government’s Response:**

US technology plays an important role in providing UK Armed Forces with battle-winning technology. The US administration’s export control reform mentioned at Paragraphs 176, 177 and 178 [of HC (2013–14) 205, Vol. II] demonstrates a welcome willingness to address the concerns raised by their allies as well as industry, including domestic, as to the limitations of the current system and their intention to concentrate their controls on the most sensitive technology. Once fully implemented the reform will significantly improve our access, and that of our NATO allies, to critical US technology. The Government will continue to discuss issues relating to the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) with the appropriate US authorities. These discussions will take into account representations made to us by industry, in particular the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) and its US Export Controls Issues Sub-Group. This dialogue has achieved results: as referenced in paragraph 173, and as a direct result of the Government’s intervention, the US agreed to a UK-specific solution to meet the ITAR rule change on Dual and Third Country Nationals. On the matter of MOD acquisition and the formation of any Government-Owned Contractor-Operated (GOCO) organisation, the

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<sup>183</sup> HC (2013-14) 205, para 62

US Government is engaging with Defence Equipment & Support (DE&S) officials to discuss the ITAR position under any such move. The impact of the US export control reform on the US-UK Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty is also being discussed at government-to-government level.<sup>184</sup>

187. EGAD stated in its Written Evidence that it was aware that UK Government officials were endeavouring to keep abreast of developments in the US on Export Control Reform, which could have considerable commercial and bureaucratic consequences for UK businesses trading with companies in the US. EGAD said that it was important that the UK Government took an active role in discussing the implications in the context of the Wassenaar Arrangement and considered ways in which it could seek to amend UK national legislation to ensure that the UK Defence Industry was not at a competitive disadvantage in the increasingly crucial global marketplace.<sup>185</sup>

188. When the Committees questioned EGAD on 4 November 2013 about the US reforms to export controls David Hayes, EGAD, provided an example of how it would affect UK companies. He said:

[...] with effect from 15 October, US suppliers of a range of aerospace items that we would regard as military for UK purposes will be able to export from the US to 36 countries without applying formally for an export licence, under arrangements that the US calls licence exceptions, which you can regard as being conceptually akin to OGELs. One of those countries is Turkey, which is on our doorstep and not the doorstep of the United States. That gives US exporters of this type of equipment a clear advantage over UK exporters, who currently cannot supply the equivalent items to Turkey under open licence.<sup>186</sup>

When asked what could be done through UK legislation to address these matters, without weakening existing controls, David Hayes replied:

The UK has the option to amend military OGELs to add countries very simply. I do not underestimate the difficulties of adding Turkey to general licences, and the terms of those licences would probably need to be reviewed carefully, particularly in relation to the ultimate end user of the goods, but there is no reason why that avenue should not be explored, with the safeguards necessary to implement it being added to the licences at the same time.<sup>187</sup>

189. In an analysis paper on the US Defence export control reforms the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) stated that the reforms had involved revising the categorisation of hundreds of individual defence items, completed systems and services. Defence items considered to provide a critical military or intelligence advantage would continue to be controlled by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and remain on the US Munitions List (USML). Requests to export items on the USML would always require licenses that undergo inter-agency review and would be processed by the State Department before being

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<sup>184</sup> Cm8707, p 19

<sup>185</sup> Ev w95

<sup>186</sup> Q 37

<sup>187</sup> Q 38 [David Hayes]

sent for Congressional review. Items and services considered less critical to US national security, or that are available from other sources, would be moved onto the Commerce Control List (CCL) and would be subject to scrutiny and control via the US Export Administration Regulations. Items on the CCL will potentially require less time to obtain licenses and more military items on the list would now be eligible for a licence exception to sell to NATO allies and countries that abide by all four international export regimes.

190. RUSI stated that the export control changes reflect the threats to the US from advanced states and therefore required “higher fences around fewer items” of very advanced technology. Other reasons for the change in US export controls was to aid the US defence industries which had complained about losing business to foreign defence firms. RUSI stated that “introduced a paradigm shift in the process of export licensing because now the onus is on US defense firms to determine whether their items and materiel are ‘specially designed’.” The analysis claimed that there are concerns that the US Congress would now have less statutory involvement in arms export decisions as fewer items now fall under the USML and that the ability to use the controls to deny exports to human rights abusers has been diminished. Further concerns have been raised that the export control reforms have resulted in the US no longer being in step with multilateral export regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Arms Trade Treaty.<sup>188</sup>

**191. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response to this Report the specific ways, if any, the recent US defence export control reforms have put the UK defence industry at a competitive disadvantage to the US defence industry in making exports to third countries.**

**192. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking to ensure that there is a level playing field for the UK defence industry when competing with the US defence industry for export controls to third countries whilst maintaining adherence to UK national arms export policies.**

## **UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty**

193. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of the UK–France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty can be found at paragraphs 180–185 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Recommendation at paragraph 44 of the Report.

194. The Committees’ Recommendation on UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend in relation to the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty that the Government in its Response states:

- a) how many UK companies have been registered to use the Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for exports under the Treaty;

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<sup>188</sup> “The United States Implements Defence Export Control reforms”, *RUSI*, 22 January 2014, <https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C52DFF7E0C0F8C/>

- b) the reasons, notwithstanding its Transparency Initiative, the Government is not requiring exporters to declare that a particular export was made under the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty; and
- c) how satisfactorily or not the Treaty is working as far as British companies are concerned.<sup>189</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) The assumption under the UK/France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty was that the UK would continue to operate its current export licensing arrangements as these were compatible with the Treaty objectives. Hence, there has been no need to create a specific Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for exports under the Treaty with UK exporters able to make use of existing licences. These companies are required to meet all the terms and conditions of these OGELs which include a registration requirement.
- b) The Treaty does not introduce any special mechanism for the licensing of UK exports to France. In the Government's view, requiring exporters to declare that a particular export was made under the Treaty would place an additional, and unnecessary, administrative burden upon them.
- c) While it is for industry to judge how the Treaty is working for them, they are able to express views through the UK-France High Level Working Group which oversees capability and equipment issues associated with the Lancaster House Treaty. Industry representatives have indicated a broad level of satisfaction with progress, particularly when considering joint programmes such as complex weapons and Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles.

On export licensing specifically, the UK and French Governments, in conjunction with respective trade associations, held two successful Treaty-related awareness seminars in Paris in 2011 and London in 2012 which were well attended by industry.<sup>190</sup>

195. When asked in the Oral Evidence session with EGAD on 4 November 2013 whether the UK-France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty was working, Susan Griffiths, Head of Export Control UK, MBDA UK Ltd, informed the Committees:

I would say yes. Negotiations have been ongoing, and rightly, so quick decisions have not been made. There is still a lot of negotiation going on, in which we [EGAD] have been heavily involved, and lots of consideration. There is recognition by both sides that, while we are trying to move forward on this, there are some small steps to take. There could be some advantage to this, but it is obviously being considered at a very slow pace with the agreement of both sides. There has been good engagement between the Government and industry on this, and we hope for a satisfactory conclusion.<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 63

<sup>190</sup> Cm8707, p 19–20

<sup>191</sup> Q 45

196. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report provides a further update on the specific steps the Government is taking to ensure that the UK/France Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty is working satisfactorily for the UK defence industry.

197. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific issues relating to the Treaty are under negotiation between the British and French Governments.

## The Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU

198. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU can be found at paragraphs 186–191 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 64 of the Report.

199. The Committees' Recommendation on the Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### The Committees' Recommendation:

The Committees recommend in relation to the EU Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU that the Government in its Response states:

- a) how many times it has raised concerns about possible breaches of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports in relation to ICTs in the EU Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports, and in relation to which EU Member States and what defence-related products;
- b) how many UK companies have been approved to use Open General Export Licences under the EU ICT Directive;
- c) how many companies in the EU have been approved to use Open General Export Licences under the EU ICT Directive and how many of these are British companies; and
- d) how satisfactorily or not the EU ICT Directive is working as far as British companies are concerned.<sup>192</sup>

### The Government's Response:

- a) The UK has not raised any such concerns.
- b) The ICT Directive permits the UK to operate a system very close to its current export licensing arrangements which includes the use of Open General Export Licences (OGELs). Current UK OGELs meet our commitments under the Directive with

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<sup>192</sup> HC (2013-14) 205, para 64



regard to the establishment of “general licences” (OGEL equivalent licences) that are required to be put in place by all Member States. These OGELs remain available for all companies to use and do not require any form of prior approval. There is, however, one new general licence created under the ICT Directive for Certified Companies that does require Government approval. Under these new arrangements, a company needs to pass a certification test as set out in Article 9 of the Directive to be able to receive goods under the equivalent certified company general licences put in place by other Member States. One UK company has been certified under these arrangements.

- c) The only information that we have available on EU companies is in relation to the certified company general licence (OGEL equivalent). Details of these certified companies can be found on the European Commission website CERTIDER – <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/certider>. This shows 18 approved companies – one of which is from the UK. The UK is unaware more generally of the number of companies operating in Member States that have been permitted to use other general licences which are subject to the individual arrangements of the respective Member States.
- d) Government contacts with industry indicate broad satisfaction that UK export licensing arrangements have been preserved under the Directive and that our established simplified procedures can continue to be used. Industry representatives have expressed some concern in particular about the transparency of the arrangements that have been put in place in other Member States under the Directive. This is the main reason for low demand for certification applications across the EU. It has proved difficult to establish whether becoming certified will provide any benefit to companies. This lack of visibility on the scope of licences and the conditions attached to their use is an issue that the UK has already raised in meetings on the ICT Directive in Brussels. It would also be fair to say that the simplified measures contained in the ICT Directive represent a step change for almost all Member States other than the UK. As such, it is still too early to judge what benefits will eventually filter through to UK industry through the quicker receipt of goods, as we understand that a rather cautious approach has been taken by many Member States so far.<sup>193</sup>

200. EGAD were asked in the Oral Evidence session how well arms transfers within the EU under the ICT Directive were working for British companies. David Hayes replied: “As far as British companies are concerned, from the point of view of exporting, it was never that significant a change for us, because our open licensing system has always facilitated export from the UK to our European partners. It was more important for multinational companies to be able to get exports from the EU into the UK under the directive.”<sup>194</sup> Susan Griffiths added:

I would say that uptake is a bit slow, primarily because some EU countries have not yet established global licensing. We are therefore trying to see a broader aspect of where the balance is, because they have been introduced differently in different EU countries.

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<sup>193</sup> Cm8707, pp 20–21

<sup>194</sup> Q 46 [David Hayes]

The benefit for some EU countries has been a change in their own national export licensing. In general, however, it is early days to see how balanced the introduction has been, because they are not always equal. For the UK, we have possibly seen a slight increase in the ability to get licences in a quicker way from those countries, but because there is an onus on the importing side as well, the uptake in some countries has been very small.<sup>195</sup>

Bernadette Peers, Compliance Manager, Strategic Shipping Company Ltd, continued:

The problem is partly a lack of awareness throughout the EU. The UK is very good at doing awareness and advertising to industry that something is available, and we have had a lot of dialogue between industry and Government, from the outset all the way through to getting the directive. That was not the case in the EU, and trying to find sources of information to make use of the directive is difficult. Few UK companies are certified, and we are going to go through the process in order to push the message out. The message as to the benefits of the directive is even more limited across the rest of the EU, because people just do not understand it or know about it.<sup>196</sup>

**201. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states the name of the one UK company that had achieved certification for a general licence under the Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU as referred to by the Government in its last Response (Cm 8707), and the names of any additional UK companies which have been so certified.**

**202. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific proposals it has made in meetings on the ICT Directive in Brussels to improve visibility throughout the EU on the scope of general licences and the conditions attached to their use.**

**203. I propose that the Committees also recommend that the Government states what specific steps it is taking to raise awareness of the potential benefits of the Intra-Community Transfer (ICT) Directive on arms transfers within the EU for UK defence industry companies whilst maintaining adherence to UK national arms control policies.**

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<sup>195</sup> Q 46 [Susan Griffiths]

<sup>196</sup> Q 46 [Bernadette Peers]

## 8 Arms Control Agreements

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### Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

204. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) can be found at paragraphs 192–212 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraphs 65 and 66 of the Report.

205. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the Arms Trade Treaty in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the adoption by the UN of the first ever international arms trade treaty applying to conventional arms as a whole in the Arms Trade Treaty of 2013 is most welcome and congratulates Ministers and their officials, under both the previous Labour Government and the present Coalition Government, on their contribution to this unprecedented international achievement. The Committees also welcome the fact that the UK was amongst the first of the countries to sign the Arms Trade Treaty when it became open for signature on 3 June 2013. The Committees recommend in its Response that the Government states by what date the UK will also ratify the Treaty.<sup>197</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is proud of the achievement of the Arms Trade Treaty and is grateful for the support received from Members of both Houses during the negotiating process.

The UK plans to ratify the Treaty before the end of the year, after the Treaty has completed 21 sitting days before both Houses in line with the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (CRAG Act). The Treaty and an Explanatory Memorandum were laid before Parliament under Command Paper number 8680 on 15 July.

Since parts of the Treaty are exclusive EU competence, the European Commission has brought forward a Council Decision authorising Member States to ratify. This Council Decision is currently undergoing parliamentary scrutiny.<sup>198</sup>

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) what changes it will be making to its arms export controls:
  - i. primary legislation;
  - ii. secondary legislation;
  - iii. Government administrative procedures and guidance; and

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<sup>197</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 65

<sup>198</sup> Cm8707, p 21

iv. Government policy

to ensure the UK Government is fully compliant with all provisions in the Arms Trade Treaty stating, in each case, the date the change will come into effect; and

- b) what steps it will be taking to ensure that the ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty by the minimum of 50 countries necessary to bring it into force is achieved in the shortest possible time.<sup>199</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) i. The UK already implements a robust and effective system for control of transfers of conventional arms. No primary legislation is required for UK ratification.
- ii. The only changes to secondary legislation required are described in the response to paragraph 40 [Cm 8707, page 4] above.
- iii. The treaty is consistent with our national systems for control of transfers of conventional arms and will be implemented through existing procedures.
- iv. Government policy is unchanged;

we will continue to assess exports of conventional arms on a case by case basis, against the Consolidated Criteria. The Criteria will be updated as set out in the response to paragraph 46 [Cm 8707, page 8] above.

- b) The UK is committed to bringing the Arms Trade Treaty into force as soon as possible. We are lobbying States at all levels to sign and ratify the ATT as a matter of urgency. We are funding projects to promote the ATT, to assist ratification and to support effective implementation. We will also donate £100,000 to the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation that has been established to support early ratification.<sup>200</sup>

206. In its Written Evidence UK Working Group welcomed the fact that that the UK has commenced the ratification proceedings in anticipation of EU procedures being completed and urged the Government to maintain outreach to other states to sign and ratify as soon as possible. It recommended that:

that the Government does everything possible to strengthen the international norms embedded in the Treaty. The UK should make the strongest possible interpretative statement upon ratifying the Treaty, for example, making it clear that the UK will continue to regulate a comprehensive list of arms, equipment and munitions beyond the minimum scope allowed by the Treaty and calling on other States Parties to do likewise.

It urged the UK Government to “work proactively to ensure that as many States as possible are able to quickly sign, ratify and begin to properly implement the Treaty.” UKWG believed that the UK Government should offer technical and legal assistance to all states which may need it, to

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<sup>199</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 66

<sup>200</sup> Cm8707, p 21

assist in signing the Treaty and said that the UK should be a significant donor for ATT implementation purposes and to encourage other states to be generous in this regard.<sup>201</sup>

207. When the Committees asked UKWG about what new legislation would be required in the UK to implement the ATT Oliver Sprague, Amnesty International, answered that UKWG had not yet seen the secondary legislation that would be introduced but understood that the UK Government would be amending Category B of the current brokering controls in order to be “more in line with the ATT scope.” He welcomed this amendment as it would mean that a greater number of Category C goods would be moved to Category B and they would be subject to full extra-territorial controls. He added that there would be a secondary benefit which would be helpful in policy terms. He stated:

It relates to issues of enforcement—not only trafficking and brokering controls, but arguably in tackling the brass-plate phenomenon, in that an operative provision in the implementation section of the ATT requires all Governments that are signatories to offer full co-operation in terms of legal and investigative help.

It has been a problem in the past [...] that it has been difficult to prosecute or to enforce some of these controls because they involve overseas investigations, and it is difficult to get information. The ATT therefore has a built-in tool that will allow you to do that, because all signatory states will be required to co-operate in those matters. I can see a future benefit to the ATT in terms of the enforcement policy of UK controls in that respect.<sup>202</sup>

Roy Isbister, Saferworld, thought that there would be no change to primary legislation, but:

there are two elements within the criteria section of the ATT that are slightly interesting when compared with UK and EU controls, and those relate to gender-based violence and transnational organised crime. It is arguable, but I think that there could be some revision of language to reflect more accurately what the Arms Trade Treaty says on those issues, but there is still a bit of a conversation going on, certainly at the EU level, on whether or not it should be changed.<sup>203</sup>

208. In the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees’ 2013 Report the BIS Minister, Michael Fallon, said that “the treaty will be relatively straightforward to ratify because we already have a highly developed export control system.” He said that the Government hoped to complete the ratification in the “next few months”. The UK Government and its partners were actively lobbying other governments to encourage them to sign and ratify the ATT as soon as possible and hoped that the Treaty would achieve the 50 ratifications that it needed to be brought into force soon. He added that the UK Government was providing funding to support states that needed to introduce new legislation or regulations to bring their export controls up to the higher standard required by the Treaty.<sup>204</sup>

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<sup>201</sup> Qq 116–119

<sup>202</sup> Q 1 [Oliver Sprague]

<sup>203</sup> Q 1 [Roy Isbister]

<sup>204</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 426WH

209. Prior to his evidence session on 8 January 2014 the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees. The relevant text relating to the Arms Trade Treaty was as follows:

Negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty were successfully concluded with the near-universal UN adoption of a robust and effective text on 2 April. For the first time in history, this Treaty sets clear, high, common standards for the regulation of the trade in conventional arms globally. This could not have been done without the combined effort of successive Governments, parliament and civil society. I am most grateful for the support of your Committees in our work to achieve this important goal. As the Prime Minister said: “We should be proud of the role Britain has played to secure this ambitious agreement, working with international partners to secure this momentous step that will make our world safer for all.”

We are now working to secure the 50 ratifications required to bring the Treaty into force as soon as possible. Nationally, our Parliamentary procedures for ratification were completed on 4 November. The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills are taking forward, in consultation with industry, a minor expansion of our extra-territorial controls on brokering. Our ratification will then only require authorisation from the European Council (as the Treaty includes some matters of EU exclusive competence) which we hope will be forthcoming before the Spring.

Internationally, we are encouraging other nations to sign or ratify as soon as possible and providing assistance where necessary: we have given £350,000 in this Financial Year to help states implement the Treaty.

We will also update the Consolidated Criteria to bring them fully into line with both the Arms Trade Treaty and the EU Common Position. I will write to you on this in more detail shortly. The update will clarify that we will not grant a licence where there is a clear risk of serious violations of international humanitarian law. We will also state that we will take account of the risk of serious acts of gender based violence.

However, the updated criteria will not include any change to the risk threshold for Criterion 2. We will continue to apply the standard in the EU Common Position, as set out in the current consolidated criteria: we will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression.<sup>205</sup>

210. In the Oral Evidence session on 8 January 2014 The Foreign Secretary said that Parliament had completed its procedures on 4 November 2013.<sup>206</sup> He added that the UK Government could not ratify the Treaty until agreement has been achieved in the European parliament because the Treaty covers matters of EU competence. He did say, however, that he expected ratification “by spring of this year [2014].” He said that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills was leading on secondary legislation and that the current plan was to “roll the amendments together

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<sup>205</sup> Ev w194 – Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 January 2014

<sup>206</sup> Miscellaneous No.3 (2013) Arms Trade Treaty, Adopted at New York on 2 April 2013 and Opened for Signature at New York on 3 June 2013 (Cm 8680)

with other changes, such as the ones on the military list, and updates to the Consolidated Criteria.<sup>207</sup>

211. On 25 March the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary asking for further information in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty. The Text of the Chairman's letter was as follows:

I should be grateful if you could provide the following information in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty:

1. The steps that have been taken by the Government so far to achieve UK ratification of the Treaty.
2. The steps that remain to be taken and the timetable for them.
3. Whether for UK ratification to have legal effect in the UK, it is necessary for all other EU member states to achieve ratification.
4. The Government's timetable for making the changes in secondary legislation that will be required to achieve full UK compliance in law with the terms of the Arms Trade Treaty.<sup>208</sup>

212. On 2 April 2014 17 European Union Member States, including the UK, ratified the Arms Trade Treaty, bringing the total number of countries that had ratified the Treaty to 31. Fifty countries are required to ratify the Treaty to bring it into effect.<sup>209</sup> The Foreign Secretary said in an FCO Press release said:

This Treaty will help make the world safer, by placing human rights and international humanitarian law at the heart of decisions about the arms trade. For the first time, countries have agreed international rules governing everything from small arms to warships. If these rules are implemented globally and effectively, they have the power to stop the arms from reaching terrorists and criminals, and fuelling conflict and instability around the world.

Our work does not stop here. We urge other countries - particularly the largest arms exporters - to ratify the Treaty and ensure it enters into force as quickly as possible. We will continue to support other nations in their plans to implement the Treaty, and Mexico's efforts to plan the first Conference of States Parties.<sup>210</sup>

213. The Foreign Secretary replied on 3 April to the Chairman's letter of 25 March as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 25 March, asking for additional information in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

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<sup>207</sup> Q189

<sup>208</sup> Ev w206 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to William Hague dated 25 March 2014

<sup>209</sup> "World's leading arms exporters push for change with landmark UN treaty", *The Guardian*, 2 April 2014

<sup>210</sup> "Foreign Secretary welcomes UK ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty", *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Notice*, 2 April 2014

I am pleased to announce that on 27 March 2014 I signed the instrument of ratification, and on 2 April 2014 the United Kingdom formally deposited its ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty in New York. The ratification was marked by a joint event in which we deposited our ratification alongside 16 EU Member States and El Salvador, at a stroke more than doubling the total number of ratifications which now stands at 31.

In terms of the domestic legislative and regulatory steps needed to ensure the Treaty could enter into force in the UK, two processes have taken place. On 19 March the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) laid before Parliament an Order amending UK trade (brokering) controls to ensure that they are fully compliant with Article 10 of the ATT. The Export Control (Amendment) Order 2014 (S.I. 2014 No. 702) adds to Category B of the trade controls those items listed in Article 2.1 of the ATT that are not already included in Category B, namely: battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles; large calibre artillery systems; combat aircraft and attack helicopters; certain warships; and certain missiles and their launchers. As a result, brokering of these items by UK persons will be subject to control wherever in the world those persons are located. The amending Order comes into force on 9 April.

On 25 March an update to the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria was announced to Parliament in a Written Ministerial Statement by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Dr Vince Cable. This was necessary before ratification to ensure the UK was compliant with provisions of the ATT such as Article 7(4), which obliges State Parties to take into account the risk of conventional arms being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of Gender based Violence. The update also brings the Criteria into line with EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

These two changes are sufficient to ensure the UK export control policy and practice are fully compliant with the provisions of the ATT.

The UK does not require other EU Member States to ratify in order for the Treaty to have legal effect in the UK. This is because the UK has signed up to the Treaty as a State. The ATT cleared parliamentary scrutiny under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act (CRaG) on 5 November 2013. But we were unable to ratify until we received authorisation from the EU Council of Ministers. This was necessary because the Treaty is mixed competence (it covers issues of trade for which the EU has competence). The Plenary of the European Parliament voted on this on 5 February 2014. The majority of MEPs voted in support of ratification. The Council decision was approved by the Council of Ministers on 3 March.

The UK is ready for entry into force of the Treaty (which will happen ninety days after 50 ratifications have been deposited). The collective ratification event on 2 April has brought this closer and the UK is rightly proud of its role. We will, of course, continue to encourage states to sign and ratify the Treaty so that it can enter into force soon and start having a substantive impact on arms flows around the world.

I would like to extend my thanks and the warm appreciation that the Foreign Office has for the role that Parliament and the CAEC have played in supporting and canvassing for



this Treaty. The unified front of civil society, government, industry and Parliament enabled the UK to lead convincingly and from the outset of the process.<sup>211</sup>

**214. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty is welcome.**

**215. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) the total number of ratifications now achieved and the countries who have ratified;**
- b) the countries which the Government considers to be the 20 largest arms exporters in view of the Foreign Secretary's statement on 2 April 2014 that the UK Government would be urging the largest arms exporters to ratify; and**
- c) the specific steps the Government is taking both bilaterally and internationally to persuade individual countries to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty with particular reference to non-ratifying P5 countries and countries amongst the largest arms exporters.**

## **EU Council Common Position**

216. On December 2008, the EU Council agreed a Common Position (2008/944/CFSP) defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment with which all EU Member States should comply. The EU Common Position provides some degree of protection for the UK defence industry from having its competitiveness undermined by other EU Member States whose governments might otherwise have a less stringent policy on prohibiting arms exports which might violate human rights, facilitate internal repression or promote armed conflict than the UK Government. The full text of the EU Council Common Position is set out in Annex 4.

217. The Chairman of the Committees in submitting the Committees' response to the Balance of Competencies Review highlighted the importance of this aspect of the EU Common Position. The Committees' response letter of 20 August 2013 stated:

Without such EU-wide controls and policies, UK arms exporters would be placed at a competitive disadvantage to arms exporters from other EU Member States who had laxer national controls and policies than those of the UK Government.

**218. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government when considering its future policy towards the EU should have in mind the significance of the EU Common Position in helping to maintain a fair competitive position in the EU for the UK defence industry.**

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<sup>211</sup> Ev w208 – Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 3 April 2014

## Cluster Munitions

219. The Committees' previous scrutiny of cluster munitions can be found at paragraphs 213–225 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraph 67 of the Report.

220. The Committees' Recommendation on cluster munitions in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that in its Response the Government states:

- a) how many countries have now signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions and which countries it is currently urging to become signatories;
- b) how many countries have now ratified the Convention and which of the countries that are now only signatories it is currently urging to ratify the Convention;
- c) what steps it is taking to encourage the United States, Russia, China and Israel to become signatories and/or to ratify the Convention;
- d) whether the Government is satisfied or not with the progress by the financial institutions in producing voluntary codes of conduct against the indirect financing of the production of cluster munitions and their components; and
- e) whether the Government continues to consider a Government Code of Conduct or Government legislation against the indirect financing of the production of cluster munitions and their components as policy options.<sup>212</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

- a) and b) An up to date list of all the countries that have signed and ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions can be found here.

[http://unog.ch/80256EE600585943/\(httpPages\)/67DC5063EB530E02C12574F8002E9E49?OpenDocument](http://unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/67DC5063EB530E02C12574F8002E9E49?OpenDocument)

- c) The Government believes that active diplomatic efforts by the UK and other states to globalise the Convention and support clearance work in affected countries are the areas in which the UK Government can add most value to our shared goal of globalising the ban on cluster munitions and tackling their humanitarian impact. We will continue to use all appropriate bilateral and multilateral opportunities to promote the universalisation of the Convention and its ambition of a world free of cluster munitions.
- d) and e) Indirect financing – such as the purchase of shares in or the provision of loans to large multinational conglomerates that amongst often many other activities may be involved in the manufacture of cluster munitions – is not captured by the

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<sup>212</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 67

prohibitions of the Act. We consider this form of indirect financing an issue for individual institutions to consider under their own investment charters and social corporate responsibility agendas.<sup>213</sup>

221. Following publication of the *Government's United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about cluster munitions. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

Is the UK Government still on track to destroy the remainder of its cluster munitions by the end of 2013?

**The Government's answer:**

Yes, as stated at the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Lusaka in September.<sup>214</sup>

222. The Fourth Meeting of States Parties (4MSP) took place in Lusaka, Zambia, from 9 to 13 September 2013 and gathered some 464 delegates from 58 States parties, 18 Signatory states, 30 Observer states and 12 international organizations.<sup>215</sup> The main outcomes of the Meeting were:

- that the meeting welcomed progress in implementing the Vientiane Action Plan;
- recognised the crucial role of timely and efficient clearance of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants;
- recognised the importance of identifying all cluster munition contaminated areas;
- recognised that transparency of national reporting was an obligation and important tool in the promotion of the Convention; and
- agreement that the formation of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) would commence immediately (however a decision on the funding model for the ISU was delayed until the next meeting).<sup>216</sup>

223. In its Written Evidence UKWG expressed concern that the Government appeared to have rejected its previous commitment to end indirect investments in cluster-munition producers.

224. UKWG informed the Committees that an increasing number of UK-based financial institutions continued to strengthen their policies on investments in companies involved in the production of cluster munitions. In discussions between financial institutions and members of UKWG, it said that all companies had strongly supported the idea of a jointly-developed,

<sup>213</sup> Cm8707, p 23

<sup>214</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

<sup>215</sup> Fourth meeting of State Parties, *Convention on Cluster Munitions*, <http://www.clusterconvention.org/meetings/msp/4msp/>

<sup>216</sup> Fourth Meeting of States Parties: Final Document, Convention on Cluster Munitions, CCM/MSP/2013/6, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/K13/540/89/PDF/K1354089.pdf?OpenElement>

industry-wide Code of Conduct to end indirect finance and had expressed disappointment that thus far the Government appeared to have abandoned previous commitments to help to facilitate its development. UKWG considered that it is important that the Government engaged with financial institutions and non-governmental organisations through a multi-stakeholder process to provide guidance. It said that financial institutions had indicated that they would benefit from government guidance and leadership on this issue to harmonise policies and practice.<sup>217</sup>

225. In Oral Evidence Oliver Sprague, Amnesty International, informed the Committees that:

The previous Government committed themselves to developing with civil society and financial institutions a voluntary code of conduct to end the practice of indirect financing of cluster munitions. When in Opposition, the current Government tabled a specific amendment in the House of Lords to ensure that indirect financing was captured under the terms of the Act. They withdrew that amendment because agreement was reached on a ministerial statement on the need to develop a voluntary code of conduct. In other words, when it was announced that a voluntary code of conduct would be developed and that the Government would seek to work with civil society and the industry to develop that, the amendment was withdrawn.

All parties at the time recognised that indirect finance was a problem that needed to be tackled, and we remain disappointed that the current Government have not honoured that commitment and have left it up to the banks to develop their own code of conduct. I have met representatives of a number of high street banks—a month ago, I was in the offices of a very large household name that has revised and strengthened its policy, and its message to me was simple. The banks are crying out for the Government to get together with all the financial institutions and civil society NGOs to start the process, because they think that developing policies in these tricky areas in isolation is not helpful. What is needed is everybody to get together, because each financial institution will have a different set of problems that it needs to address, as it is a complicated area.<sup>218</sup>

226. UKWG called for the setting up of a meeting of all relevant parties to “thrash out some of the issues.” When asked which would be the lead Department Oliver Sprague told the Committees that it would be the Foreign and Commonwealth Office because it was dealing with international treaties. He added that as the issue touched on financial issues that the Treasury might also be involved in any future discussions on the indirect financing of cluster munitions.<sup>219</sup>

227. When the Committees asked the Foreign Secretary about the Government’s policy on developing a code of conduct on the indirect financing of cluster munitions he replied:

On cluster munitions, [...] direct financing is clearly prohibited; indirect financing is not. We think that a voluntary approach is preferable to Government intervention, but we do not rule out, as I think I said last year, the Government’s taking a more active role. I would like to see how things develop. I welcome the steps taken on a voluntary basis by a number of British financial institutions, but we will continue to monitor this closely. We will look

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<sup>217</sup> Ev w130

<sup>218</sup> Q 22

<sup>219</sup> Qq 22–23

at it again with the financial sector, if necessary, to see when and whether there is scope and need for the Government to act.<sup>220</sup>

**228. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Evidence they have received clearly points to both financial institutions and civil society NGOs wishing to see the Government involved in developing a code of conduct on the indirect financing of cluster munitions.**

**229. I propose that the Committees recommend that in the light of the Foreign Secretary's statement to the Committees that: "We will look at it again with the financial sector, if necessary, to see when and whether there is scope and need for the Government to act.", the Government states in its Response whether it will act in helping to develop a Code of Conduct on the indirect financing of cluster munitions.**

### **Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)**

230. The Committees' previous scrutiny of small arms and light weapons (SALW) can be found at paragraphs 226–230 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 68 of the Report.

231. The Committees' Recommendation on the Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) what steps it is taking to achieve full implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects;
- b) what steps it is taking to achieve full implementation of the EU's Small Arms and Light Weapons Strategy; and
- c) how far the UN Programme and the EU Strategy will, or will not, be superseded by the small arms and light weapons elements of the Arms Trade Treaty when it comes into force.<sup>221</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

- a) The UK remains firmly committed to achieving full implementation of the UN Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. The UK contributes by funding programmes through the EU, DfID and NGOs, supporting projects to destroy existing stockpiles and provide secure storage, and by funding education.
- b) The UK remains firmly committed to achieving full implementation of the EU's Small Arms and Light Weapons Strategy. The introduction of the EU strategy

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<sup>220</sup> Q 190

<sup>221</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 68

outlines the relationship between itself and the United Nations Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons:

“The United Nations Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, adopted on 20 July 2001, reaffirms the need for complementarity at global, regional and national levels in its implementation. By developing a strategy for combating the accumulation of and illicit trade in SALW and their ammunition, the EU wishes to fall into line with this essential complementarity and to provide a contribution.”

- c) It is difficult to prejudge the impact of the Arms Trade Treaty on existing arms control provisions. We believe that the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the EU Strategy on Small Arms and Light Weapons are complementary and mutually reinforcing. We hope that as States Parties implement the Arms Trade Treaty they will draw on these and other existing instruments to ensure robust controls.<sup>222</sup>

232. Following publication of the Government’s United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012 the Committees wrote to the Government asking two questions about small arms and light weapons. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees’ question:**

What progress has been made in enhancing the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument to promote international co-operation in marking and tracing illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons?

**The Government’s answer:**

The UN Programme of Action Review Conference held in August 2012 agreed an Implementation Plan for the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) for the period 2012-2018. At the Review Conference, States resolved to increase their efforts to achieve full and effective implementation of the ITI. More details about the Implementation Plan can be found at <http://www.poa-iss.org/RevCon2/Documents/RevCon-DOC/CRP3-ITI-IP.pdf>

**The Committees’ question:**

Has a voluntary sponsorship fund to boost assistance to less developed states in dealing with illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons been established? If so, what is the size of the fund and what amount has the British Government contributed to it?

**The Government’s answer:**

A voluntary fund to boost assistance to less developed states in dealing with illicit small arms and light weapons has been established. The UK has pledged to donate £100,000 to the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) and has allocated a further £250,000 to fund projects devoted to supporting

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<sup>222</sup> Cm8707, pp 23–4

ATT implementation. The EU will also provide considerable funding to support ATT implementation.<sup>223</sup>

233. The Fifth Biennial Meeting of States to Consider Implementation of the Programme of Action (the Fifth Biennial Meeting of States) will take place in New York from 16 - 20 June 2014. The meeting will include a segment on the International Tracing Instrument, a separate instrument agreed to by Member States in 2005 on the marking and tracing of small arms.<sup>224</sup>

**234. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what were its objectives at the Fifth Biennial Meeting in New York in June 2014 to consider Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, together with the International Tracing Instrument, and how far progress was made with each of those objectives or not.**

## Landmines

235. The Committees' previous scrutiny of landmines can be found at paragraphs 231–234 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 69 of the Report.

236. The Committees' Recommendation on landmines in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend in its Response that the Government states:

- a) which countries have yet to accede to the Ottawa Landmines Convention; and
- b) what steps it is taking to try to secure the accession of the remaining countries to the Convention.<sup>225</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

- a) An up to date list of all the countries that have signed and ratified the Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines can be found here.

[http://unog.ch/80256EE600585943/\(httpPages\)/6E65F97C9D695724C12571C0003D09EF?OpenDocument](http://unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/6E65F97C9D695724C12571C0003D09EF?OpenDocument)

- b) The Government continues to use all appropriate bilateral and multilateral opportunities to promote the universalisation of the Convention and its ambition of a world free of anti-personnel landmines.<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>223</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

<sup>224</sup> Fifth biennial Meeting of States 2014, *United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs*, <http://www.poa-iss.org/bms5/>

<sup>225</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 69

<sup>226</sup> Cm8707, p 24

237. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about landmines. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

What is the area of land in the Falkland Islands that is still to be cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance and then released?

**The Government's answer:**

There are around 20,000 landmines remaining, covering an area of approximately 20km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>227</sup>

**238. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the countries which have significant holdings of anti-personnel landmines and have not signed and ratified the Ottawa Landmines Convention. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking with each of those countries to secure their ratification of the Landmines Convention.**

## Barrel bombs

239. On 28 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary asking if the use of barrel bombs was contrary to international law. The text of the letter was as follows:

Please could you state whether the Government considers that the use of barrel bombs is contrary to international law, and, if so, please could you also state the provisions in question.

If not, please could you state whether the Government would be willing to press for barrel bombs to be brought within the ambit of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons or any other international arms control agreement..<sup>228</sup>

The Foreign Secretary replied on 19 May 2014 as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 28 April on the subject of barrel bombs, and their position under international law.

There have been regular reports of the use of barrel bombs by the regime of President Assad in Syria. I raised the issue on 22 February this year, following a UN Security Council resolution to allow greater humanitarian access to Syria. I called on the Assad regime to cease the indiscriminate use of aerial bombardment across Syria, including the barbaric use of barrel bombs, and immediately adhere to the obligations set by the Security Council and allow free and unfettered access for all humanitarian agencies.

Behind my statement was a condemnation of the flagrant abuse of the principles of International Humanitarian Law, specifically regarding the indiscriminate use of weapons,

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<sup>227</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

<sup>228</sup> Ev w222 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to William Hague dated 28 April 2014



and the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian objects. A barrel bomb, or indeed any weapon, is used unlawfully if it is deliberately targeted at civilians or civilian objects, or used in an indiscriminate, disproportionate fashion with insufficient precautions taken in attack. However, in principle the air-delivery of weapons is no less capable of being carried out indiscriminately than any other means of delivery.

HMG does not consider that barrel bombs as a category of conventional weapon are specifically prohibited under international law. There may nonetheless be circumstances in which a barrel bomb or other improvised explosive device is equipped with chemical weapons, in which case the use of such would be prohibited in all circumstances under the Chemical Weapons Convention. HMG does not currently have any plans to bring the issue of barrel bombs to the UN Convention on certain Conventional Weapons, or any other fora.

We will continue to condemn President Assad's flagrant abuses of international humanitarian law, including the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian objects.<sup>229</sup>

**240. I propose that the Committees conclude that, like cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines, barrel bombs have been used indiscriminately against civilians.**

**241. I propose that the Committees recommend that as the use of cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines has been banned under international Conventions, the Government should reconsider its position that "it does not currently have any plans to bring the issue of barrel bombs to the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons or any other fora."**

## The Wassenaar Arrangement

242. The Wassenaar Arrangement was established in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations. Participating States seek, through their national policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities. The decision to transfer or deny transfer of any item is the sole responsibility of each Participating State. All measures with respect to the Arrangement are taken in accordance with national legislation and policies and are implemented on the basis of national discretion.

243. Representatives of Participating States meet regularly in Vienna where the Wassenaar Arrangement's Secretariat is located. The Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>229</sup> Ev w490 – Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls date 19 May 2014

<sup>230</sup> "Introduction", Wassenaar Arrangement, <http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html>

244. The name comes from Wassenaar, a town located in a suburb of the Hague, Netherlands, where an agreement was reached in 1995 to start a new type of multilateral co-operation.<sup>231</sup>

245. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Wassenaar Arrangement can be found at paragraphs 235–240 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 70 of the Report.

246. The Committees' Recommendation on the Wassenaar Arrangement in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

**The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response states:

- a) how far its objectives for the Wassenaar Arrangement were fulfilled at the Plenary meeting in December 2012;
- b) what steps it is taking to encourage China to make an application for membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and
- c) which other significant arms exporting countries, in addition to China, should desirably become members of the Wassenaar Arrangement;
- d) what the Government wishes to see achieved at the Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting in December 2013; and
- e) what outcome the Government wishes to see from the review of the Wassenaar Arrangement export control lists and what input it will be making to this review.<sup>232</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) The Government was satisfied with the outcome of the December 2012 Plenary meeting as outlined in its Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls published on 12 July. Securing agreement for a strategic look at issues related to the regime's future membership in 2013 was a significant achievement at the December 2012 Plenary. This represented the culmination of several months of collaborative work led by the UK. We were pleased that the States that participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement welcomed the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty. The Government hopes that the Arrangement will play a useful role in the effective implementation of this new treaty.
- b) The Government supports the continuing efforts of Ambassador Griffiths, Head of the Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, in this area, which were outlined in the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Committees of 8 April. China has yet to respond formally to Ambassador Griffiths.
- c) The Foreign Secretary's letter of 8 April outlined the UK position, which is that the Government considers it is desirable for all the major arms exporters and

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<sup>231</sup> "Frequently Asked Questions", Wassenaar Arrangement, <http://www.wassenaar.org/faq/index.html>

<sup>232</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 70

technology holders to be within the Arrangement. However not all Participating States are in favour of a significantly expanded membership. Furthermore, not all major arms exporters/technology holders currently wish to join the Arrangement. This highlights the importance of the strategic look at membership agreed at the December 2012 Plenary.

- d) As in previous years the Government will use the opportunity of the plenary in December to work with other Participating States to ensure the Arrangement continues to fulfil its aims:
- a. ensuring that transfers of conventional arms and transfers in dual-use goods and technologies are carried out responsibly and in furtherance of international and regional peace and security;
  - b. enabling the exchange of information that will enhance transparency;
  - c. enhancing cooperation between Participating States.
- e) The Government looks forward to the strategic and comprehensive review of the control lists as an opportunity to ensure that the lists remain coherent and clear for the exporters and government officials who use them on a daily basis. At the same time, the Government wants to ensure that the control lists keep pace with technology as it develops, proposing new controls as appropriate or amending or deleting existing controls that no longer have strategic relevance, as we have done in previous years.<sup>233</sup>

247. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about the Wassenaar Arrangement. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

What are the specific issues relating to the future membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement at which participating states will be looking at in 2013?

**The Government's answer:**

The Government's Response to the Committees' Annual Report (Cm 8707) and the Foreign Secretary's letter of 8 April provided an update on membership issues. The General Working Group is being held on 21-24 October and the Plenary will be held in December. We will update the Committees in 2014.<sup>234</sup>

248. The 19th Plenary meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement was held in Vienna on 3–4 December 2013. The Public Statement issued at the conclusion of the Plenary session stated that Participating States had agreed to “conduct further work on addressing new challenges, including emerging technologies of concern, to keep pace with advances in technology, research and innovation.” The Participating States had worked to make the existing control lists more

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<sup>233</sup> Cm8707, pp 25–26

<sup>234</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

readily understood and user-friendly for licensing authorities and exporters. Progress had been made on a comprehensive and systematic review of the Wassenaar Lists. New export controls had been agreed in a number of areas, including surveillance and law enforcement/intelligence gathering tools and Internet Protocol network surveillance systems or equipment, which may be detrimental to international and regional security and stability.<sup>235</sup>

**249. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government provides the Committees with its promised update on Wassenaar Arrangement membership issues no later than in its Response to this Report.**

**250. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) whether the comprehensive review of the Wassenaar controls list has now been completed or is still on-going; and
- b) whether the Wassenaar Arrangement's new export controls on surveillance and law enforcement/intelligence gathering tools and Internet Protocol network surveillance systems or equipment require any amendments to UK primary or secondary legislation to ensure UK compliance.

## **The UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)**

251. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) can be found at paragraphs 241–244 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraph 71 of the Report.

252. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the UN Register of Conventional Weapons in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that the Government is right to include in its annual report for the UN Register of Conventional Arms Government military equipment it gifts, as well as sells, to other States, and recommends that it encourages other Governments to do likewise. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what progress it is making in widening the categories of military equipment that are to be reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.<sup>236</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusion.

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<sup>235</sup> Wassenaar Arrangement, *Public Statement 2013 Plenary Meeting*, <http://www.wassenaar.org/>

<sup>236</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 71

The UK continues to advocate a widening and broadening of the categories. We will continue to do so each time the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) sits to evaluate the Register.<sup>237</sup>

253. Following publication of the 2012 UNROCA report the Committees undertook and analysis of the UK's reported information. Following the analysis the Committees asked the UK Government a series of questions about apparent discrepancies between the UNROCA report figures and the ECO quarterly reports of approved arms export licences. The Committees' questions were as follows:

**Ghana:** The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot reports for the number of sniper rifles approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 – Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 30 sniper rifles approved during this period, however the figure given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 4080 sniper rifles exported to Ghana from the UK in that year.

**Madagascar:** The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles and assault rifles approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 – Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 750 (+ one unspecified quantity) combat shotguns, 1100 rifles and 3850 assault rifles approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1300 combat shotguns, 1500 rifles and 5850 assault rifles exported to Madagascar from the UK in that year.

**Maldives:** The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 – Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 360 combat shotguns, 1570 rifles, 4850 assault rifles and 380 pistols approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1350 combat shotguns, 4390 rifles, 10500 assault rifles and 1230 pistols exported to the Maldives from the UK in that year.

**Mauritius:** The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 – Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 560 combat shotguns, 3434 rifles, 6743 assault rifles and 565 pistols approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1354 combat shotguns, 5408 rifles, 10978 assault rifles and 1560 pistols exported to Mauritius from the UK in that year.

**Oman:** The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols

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<sup>237</sup> Cm8707, p 26

approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 – Q4 2012 and the Government’s return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 1320 combat shotguns, 3575 rifles, 6441 assault rifles and 1151 pistols (+one unspecified quantity) approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1600 combat shotguns, 6270 rifles, 12957 assault rifles and 2245 pistols exported to Oman from the UK in that year.

**South Africa:** The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the Pivot reports for the number of shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 – Q4 2012 and the Government’s return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The Pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 487 shotguns, 3700 rifles, 6545 assault rifles and 810 pistols approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 950 shotguns, 5501 rifles, 10319 assault rifles and 1352 pistols exported to South Africa from the UK in that year.<sup>238</sup>

The Government answers were as follows:

**Ghana:** Both the Government’s pivot reports and the returns to UNROCA are based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods. The reported quantities should therefore be consistent in both reports. However the two reports are compiled using different procedures and we have identified a technical error which has led to errors in a small number of cases, as explained below.

The figure of 20 sniper rifles in the Government’s pivot reports is correct (under “Mil” 20 x 1 licence). The figure in the UNROCA report is incorrect. We have informed UNROCA of the discrepancy and they confirmed they will correct the Report.

**Madagascar:** Please see the Government’s response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.

We have reviewed the data and found the following:

For combat shotguns the correct figure is 1500 units. Under “Mil” the unspecified licence has been amended to 200 and this will show up in our next quarterly pivot release. Other licences to tally in the pivot report under “Mil” include 150 x 8 licences and 100 x 1 licence. We have amended our records and informed UNROCA of the discrepancy;

For rifles, both reports are correct and show a figure of 1500 units (tally under “Mil” 200 x 6 licences and 100 x 1 licence; under “Mil & Other” 100 x 2 licences);

For assault rifles, both reports are correct and show a figure of 5850 units (tally under "Mil" 150 x 1 licence, 200 x 3 licences; 300 x 2 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 450 x 1 licence, 600 x 5 licences; under "Mil and Other" 200 x 2 licences and 300 x 1 licence).

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<sup>238</sup> See: Annex 1 – The Committees’ quarterly licence questions (2013 Q3)

**Maldives:** Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.

We reviewed the data and found the figures in both the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA Report to be correct, as follows:

For combat shotguns, both reports show a figure of 1350 units (tally under "Mil" 150 x 8 licences, 100 x 1 licence, 50 x 1 licence)

For rifles, both reports show a figure of 4390 units (tally under "Mil" 40 x 1 licence, 100 x 5 licences, 150 x 3 licences, 200 x 6 licences, 300 x 2 licences; under "Mil and Other" 100 x 16 licences)

For assault rifles, both reports show a figure of 10,500 units (tally under "Mil" 100 x 2 licences, 150 x 2 licences; 200 x 1 licences, 300 x 1 licences, 350 x 2 licences, 400 x 1 licence, 450 x 3 licences, 600 x 4 licences, 700 x 1 licence, 750 x 1 licence; under "Mil and Other" 200 x 16 licences)

For pistols, both reports show a figure of 1230 units (tally under "Mil" 30 x 6 licences, 50 x 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil & Other" 50 x 16 licences)

**Mauritius:** Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.

We reviewed the data and found the figures in both the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA Report to be correct, as follows:

For combat shotguns, both reports show a figure of 1354 units (tally under "Mil" 50 X 1 licence, 150 x 6 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 4 x 1 licence for smoothbore weapon. Please note UNROCA do not have a smoothbore weapon category and it was therefore added as a combat shotgun to ensure it was reported);

For rifles, both reports show a figure of 5408 units (tally under "Mil" 3 x 1 licence, 5 x 1 licence, 6 x 1 licence, 40 x 1 licence, 100 x 3 licences, 150 x 1 licence, 200 x 5 licence, 204 x 1 licence, 300 x 2 licences, 800 x 1 licence; under "Mil and Other" 100 x 23 licences);

For assault rifles, both reports show a figure of 10978 units (tally under "Mil" 9 x 1 licence, 100 x 3 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 300 x 3 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 569 x 1 licence, 600 x 4 licences, 700 x 1 licence, 800 x 1 licence; under "Mil and Other" section 175 x 2 licences, 200 x 19 licences, 400 x 1 licence);

For pistols, both reports show a figure of 1560 units (tally under "Mil" 30 x 6 licences, 50 x 1 licence, 80 x 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil and Other" 50 x 21 licences).

**Oman:** Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.

We have reviewed the data and found the following:

For combat shotguns, the figures in the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA report are correct. Both reports show a figure of 1600 units (tally under "Mil" 50 X 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences, 150 x 5 licences, and 200 x 3 licences);

For rifles, the figure of 6420 in the Government's pivot reports is correct (tally under "Mil" 40 x 1 licence, 50 x 1 licence, 100 x 7 licences, 150 x 3 licences, 200 x 8 licences; under "Mil & Other" 80 x 1 licence, 100 x 35 licences). The figure in the UNROCA report is incorrect. We have informed UNROCA of the discrepancy and they confirmed they will make the necessary corrections;

For assault rifles, the figure of 13107 in the Government's pivot reports is correct (tally under "Mil" 7 x 1 licence, 100 x 5 licences, 150 x 4 licences, 200 x 3 licences, 300 x 3 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 400 x 1 licence, 600 x 4 licences; under "Mil & Other" 100 x 1 licence, 175 x 2 licences, 200 x 33 licences, 300 x 1 licence). The figure in the UNROCA report is incorrect. We have informed UNROCA of the discrepancy and they confirmed they will make the necessary corrections;

For pistols, both reports show a figure of 2245 units (tally under "Mil" 2 X 1 licence, 4 x 1 licence, 19 x 1 licence, 30 x 3 licences, 50 x 1 licence, 80 x 1 licence and 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil & Other" 50 x 36 licences).

**South Africa:** Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.

We reviewed the data and found the figures in both the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA Report to be correct, as follows:

For shotguns, both reports have a figure of 950 units (tally under "Mil" 50 X 1 licence and 150 x 6 licences);

For rifles, both reports have a figure of 5501 units (tally under "Mil" 1 X 1 licence, 100 x 6 licences, 150 x 2 licences, 200 x 6 licences, 350 x 2 licences, 1000 x 1 licence; under "Mil & Other" 100 x 17 licences);

For assault rifles, both reports have a figure of 10319 units (tally under "Mil" 2 X 1 licence, 10 x 1 licence, 12 x 1 licence, 20 x 1 licence, 100 x 3 licences, 150 x 6 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 300 x 2 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 400x 1 licence, 450 x 1 licence, 500 x 1 licence, 800 x 1 licence and 600 x 3 licences; under "Mil & Other" 175 x 1 licence, 200 x 12 licences and 300 x 4 licences);

For pistols, both reports have a figure of 1352 units (tally under "Mil" 1 X 1 licence, 4 x 1 licence, 23 x 1 licence, 30 x 4 licences, 44 x 1 licence, 50 x 2 licences, 55 x 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil & Other" 5 x 1 licence and 50 x 16 licences).<sup>239</sup>

**254. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government reviews its procedures for compiling its returns to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) to avoid errors in its returns in future.**

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<sup>239</sup> See: Annex 1 –The Committees' quarterly licence questions (2013 Q3)



255. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific progress it is making in achieving a widening and broadening of the categories of military equipment that are to be reported to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

## The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

256. The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects as amended on 21 December 2001 (CCW) is usually referred to as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It is also known as the Inhumane Weapons Convention. The purpose of the Convention is to ban or restrict the use of specific types of weapons that are considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately. The structure of the CCW – a chapeau Convention and annexed Protocols – was adopted in this manner to ensure future flexibility. The Convention itself contains only general provisions. All prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific weapons or weapon systems are the object of the Protocols annexed to the Convention.<sup>240</sup>

257. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The question and answer were as follows:

### The Committees' question:

What were the Government's policy objectives at the meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons held in November 2012 and how far have these objectives been achieved? Does the Government consider that any additions should be made to the existing five protocols which are as follows:

- Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments
- Protocol II on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices
- Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons
- Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons
- Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War

### The Government's answer:

The UK's main objective at the November 2012 meeting was to support Australia in maintaining dialogue on practical measures to combat the unlawful manufacture and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) under Protocol II. The UK delivered an expert presentation on its Counter-IED approach at the conference. Our work with Australia is continuing in advance of this year's meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention in November.

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<sup>240</sup> United Nations Office at Geneva, *The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons*, [http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/\(httpPages\)/4F0DEF093B4860B4C1257180004B1B30?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4F0DEF093B4860B4C1257180004B1B30?OpenDocument)

More broadly, the UK's main objective remains to encourage the universalisation of the Convention and to achieve adherence to the existing protocols. The Government is not currently considering any additions to these protocols.<sup>241</sup>

**258. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what were its objectives at the meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in November 2013 and what was the outcome of the meeting.**

**259. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response which countries are now Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and to each of its 5 Protocols.**

**260. I propose that the Committees also recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking to encourage the universalisation of the Convention and to achieve adherence to the existing Protocols.**

### **The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)**

261. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) can be found at paragraphs 245–252 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 73 of the Report.

262. In 1995 the Conference on Disarmament adopted the Shannon Mandate (named after Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon) to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally effective verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.<sup>242</sup> The use of the word "cut-off" (i.e. preventing future production) has raised the question as to how the Treaty would also cover existing stocks of fissile material. The primary debate that surfaced during the Shannon discussions centred on the inclusion of rules that would cover both existing stockpiles and the future production of fissile material.<sup>243</sup> Pakistan has been the only country blocking the start of negotiations for more than three years because of a 2008 agreement by the world's key nuclear technology suppliers to lift long-standing restrictions on nuclear trade with India. Pakistan has maintained that a fissile material ban must cover existing stocks of fissile material instead of only halting future production.<sup>244</sup>

263. The Committees' Recommendation on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response:

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<sup>241</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

<sup>242</sup> International Panel on Fissile Materials, *Banning the production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty*, 2008, Pp 2–3

<sup>243</sup> United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, *A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: Understanding the Critical Issues*, 2010, p 2

<sup>244</sup> "Pakistan's Nuclear Buildup Vexes FMCT talks", Arms Control Association, <http://www.armscontrol.org/>

- a) what specific routes to starting negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva the British Government and the other P5 countries are actively investigating; and
- b) whether it will give further consideration to setting a deadline for the start of negotiations on the FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament and to transferring the responsibility for starting the negotiations to the UN, or to another international forum, if that deadline is not met.<sup>245</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

- a) We are actively engaging with other member states, including the rest of the P5, to agree a programme of work which would allow negotiations to start. We supported the formation of the FMCT group of government experts during last year's UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. We are hopeful that the group will provide the impetus for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in a manner consistent with the Shannon Mandate (document CD/1299), which was adopted by the Conference in 1995 and set out the agreed scope of the proposed FMCT. We also submitted our views on a FMCT to the UN in May – a copy of which is available in the Library of the House.
- b) We believe that setting an arbitrary deadline for the start of FMCT negotiations would be counterproductive. The UK has consistently stated that we could only support negotiation of a FMCT in the consensus-based Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the practical, step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, through existing mechanisms such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Conference on Disarmament, is the most effective means to increase stability and reduce nuclear dangers. We will continue to work together with P5 colleagues and non-nuclear weapon states to strengthen mutual confidence and make further progress toward our goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.<sup>246</sup>

**264. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response by what date it expects the negotiations on the text of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty to start and, if it is unable to provide an expected date, to state what specific steps it will take to get negotiations started.**

### **The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)**

265. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) can be found at paragraphs 253–258 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 73 of the Report.

266. The Committees' Recommendation on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

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<sup>245</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 72

<sup>246</sup> Cm8707, pp 26–27

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Government has stated that the main missile technology exporters who remain outside the Missile Technology Control Regime include China, Israel, India and Pakistan. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response with which of those countries it has had, or will be having, discussions about membership of the MTCR.<sup>247</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

MTCR outreach is arranged and led by the MTCR Chair, currently held by Germany; MTCR Partners are encouraged to send representatives to the outreach meetings. The UK was represented on the outreach visits this year to Pakistan and UAE in February and to India in August.<sup>248</sup>

267. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its 27th Plenary Meeting in Rome from 14 to 18 October 2013 to review and evaluate its activities and to further intensify its efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD delivery means. MTCR partners reiterated the concept that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security, as recognized in UNSC Resolution 1540. They proceeded to a thorough exchange of information on existing developments and potential missile proliferation developments that took place since their last plenary meeting in Berlin. Within the framework of the MTCR mandate, members conducted extensive discussions on various country issues including DPRK and Iran and expressed concerns associated with global missile proliferation activities in particular regarding ongoing missile programs in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and South Asia, which could fuel missile proliferation activities elsewhere. They confirmed their commitment to implement relevant UNSC resolutions on non-proliferation.<sup>249</sup>

268. Partners welcomed the fact that the MTCR's Guidelines and control lists constitute an international export control standard that is increasingly adhered to by non-members of the MTCR and included in UN documents. They also agreed to redouble their efforts to inform and assist interested parties that are supportive of missile non-proliferation and of the objectives and purposes of the MTCR and called on all countries to exercise extreme vigilance to prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to WMD missile programmes of proliferation concern, in accordance with their national legislation and consistent with international law. Partners noted the rapid evolution of relevant technologies and the related need to take forward looking actions to address these developments. They recognized that the Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex is a cornerstone of the work done by the MTCR to prevent illegal transfers of missile technologies. Partners also discussed procurement activities and strategies in support of programs for WMD delivery means; the risk

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<sup>247</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 73

<sup>248</sup> Cm8707, p 27

<sup>249</sup> *Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime, Rome, Italy, 14-18 October 2013*, Missile Technology Control Regime, <http://www.mtcr.info/english/press/italy2013.htm>

of intangible technology transfers and the challenges it entails; key technology trends in missile programs; and catch-all controls for non-listed items.<sup>250</sup>

269. **Following the Government's statement to the Committees that it considers that the main missile technology exporters who remain outside the Missile Technology Control Regime include China, Israel, India and Pakistan, I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it has any further countries to add to this list.**

270. **I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking in respect of each of its named main missile technology exporters currently outside the MTCR to encourage them to become Missile Technology Control Regime members.**

## **The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction**

271. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction can be found at paragraphs 259–264 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraph 74 of the Report.

272. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that the UK's expenditure of £322 million by the previous and present Governments from 2002 to 2012 in the Global Threat Reduction Programme—this being the UK's contribution to the G8-based Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction—has been fully merited and very necessary. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what its Global Threat Reduction Programme planned expenditure will be in 2013–14, 2014–15 and 2015–16.<sup>251</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

As part of the G8 Presidency in 2013, the UK is Chair of the Global Partnership (GP) Against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction. A key objective of the UK is to agree new, targeted GP projects and programmes, by identifying gaps and priorities, coordinating GP partners and recipients, and matching funds and expertise to specific requirements, particularly in the nuclear, radiological and biological fields.

The Government plans to continue delivering projects through the Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP) as part of the UK's commitment to the Global Partnership,

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<sup>250</sup> *Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime, Rome, Italy, 14-18 October 2013*, Missile Technology Control Regime, <http://www.mtcr.info/english/press/Italy2013.htm>

<sup>251</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 74

and in order to address national security priorities. Future expenditure on projects delivered through GTRP is subject to approval of requirements and projects; it is expected to be approximately £14.5M in 2013-14, and in 2014-15 and 2015-16 to exceed £10M per year, based on current estimates.<sup>252</sup>

273. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

Will the Government be publishing on the Export Control Organisation's website entities of potential WMD concern in countries in addition to Iran, for instance Syria?

**The Government's answer:**

The Government has no immediate plans to publish any additional information about entities of potential WMD concern in countries in addition to Iran. We will continue to publish the information for Iran.<sup>253</sup>

**274. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response its updated expenditure figures for its expenditure under the Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP) in 2013–14, 2014–15, 2015–16 and 2016–17.**

**275. I propose that the Committees conclude that the security importance of reducing, and where possible eliminating, Russia's WMD stockpiles including of chemical weapons is such, that this programme should continue to be funded and recommends that the Government states in its Response whether it concurs with this view.**

**276. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government should resume producing its Annual Report "Global Threat Reduction Programme" (the last Report was in 2010) on its policies and funding contributions in relation to The G8 (currently G7) Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction with details of the specific projects that the UK is funding.**

## The Nuclear Suppliers Group

277. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Nuclear Suppliers Group can be found at paragraphs 265–270 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 75 of the Report.

278. The Committees' Recommendation on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

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<sup>252</sup> Cm8707, p 27

<sup>253</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

The Government has stated that the major technology holders who remain outside of the Nuclear Suppliers Group include India, Pakistan and Israel, and that suppliers of dual-use technology who are not members include the UAE, Malaysia and Singapore. The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response with which of those countries it has had, or will be having, discussions about membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.<sup>254</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

Outreach is led by the Troika, formed of the current NSG chair with the previous and incoming chairs (respectively the Czech Republic, USA and unconfirmed).

NSG Participating Governments do not normally attend in support. The Troika recently conducted an outreach meeting in India. It also met with a Pakistani delegation in Turkey and is investigating the possibility of an outreach visit to Islamabad. India, Pakistan, the UAE, Malaysia and Singapore attended a technical outreach meeting hosted by the USA in San Francisco, 2-3 May 2013. The UK made a presentation at the meeting. The UK discusses NSG membership with interested states bilaterally.<sup>255</sup>

**279. Following the Government's statement to the Committees that it considers that the major nuclear technology holders who remain outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) include India, Pakistan and Israel, and that it also considers that suppliers of dual-use technology who are not members include the UAE, Malaysia and Singapore, I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it has any further countries to add to either its list of major technology holders outside the NSG or its list of suppliers of dual-use technology outside the NSG.**

**280. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking in respect of each of its named major nuclear technology holders currently outside the NSG to encourage them to become Nuclear Suppliers Group members, and also what specific steps it is taking in respect of each of its named suppliers of dual-use technology to cease being suppliers of technology that could facilitate nuclear proliferation.**

### **The Nuclear Security Summit**

281. The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) was held in The Hague on 24 and 25 March 2014. The Nuclear Security Summit 2014 is a world summit, aiming at preventing nuclear terrorism around the globe.

282. Since the previous summit in 2012, seven more states had removed all or most of these dangerous materials from their territories, and more than a dozen others had taken important new steps to reduce quantities and to better secure the materials they held. Today, the number of

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<sup>254</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 75

<sup>255</sup> Cm8707, pp 27–28

states with one kilogram or more of weapons-usable nuclear materials stands at 25, a 22 percent reduction in just two years.<sup>256</sup>

283. The first summit was held in Washington, D.C., in 2010. More than three dozen presidents and prime ministers attended, along with high-level officials from additional states, elevating the issue of nuclear materials security to the head-of-government level in states both with and without weapons-usable nuclear materials. The 2012 Summit, which was held in Seoul, sustained this high-level attention to the urgency of securing the materials that could be used by terrorists to build a nuclear weapon. The third summit, hosted by the Netherlands, was held in March and a fourth—and perhaps final—summit has been announced for 2016 in the United States.<sup>257</sup>

284. Going into the summit it was identified that the lack of an effective global system for securing weapons-usable nuclear materials was a major challenge. Despite progress since 2012, there was still no effective global system for how nuclear materials should be secured. Because each state considered materials security an exclusively sovereign, not shared, responsibility, approaches to nuclear security varied widely with little sense of accountability, even though poor security in any one state could affect all other states. Several factors addressed by the NTI Index<sup>258</sup> underscore this fundamental deficit:

- The existing legal foundation for global nuclear security remains weak. A key legal agreement related to nuclear security—the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment—provides an important initial foundation for nuclear materials security. However, the 2005 Amendment still has not entered into force. A separate agreement, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, commits states to criminalize acts of nuclear terrorism. However, each of those agreements has limitations: they are not universally implemented; they have no enforcement or accountability mechanisms; and the CPPNM and 2005 Amendment cover only civilian materials, which make up only 15 percent of global stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials.
- Participation in international peer review is still limited. Of the 25 states with weapons-usable nuclear materials, only 18 have invited a peer review in the past five years, and 6 have never invited a peer review, even though it is a critical tool for strengthening a state's security practices and assuring others about the effectiveness of an individual state's security.
- The vast majority of global stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials—approximately 85 percent—is military or other non-civilian material and remains outside any of the existing international nuclear security mechanisms.<sup>259</sup>

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<sup>256</sup> *2014 and 2016 Nuclear Security Summits*, NTI Nuclear materials : Security Index, <http://ntiindex.org/the-road-ahead/2014-and-2016-nuclear-security-summits/>

<sup>257</sup> *2014 and 2016 Nuclear Security Summits*, NTI Nuclear materials : Security Index, <http://ntiindex.org/the-road-ahead/2014-and-2016-nuclear-security-summits/>

<sup>258</sup> The 2014 Nuclear Threat Initiative Nuclear Materials Security Index is the second edition of a unique public assessment of nuclear materials security conditions around the world. Developed with the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the NTI Index was created to assess the security of nuclear materials around the world and to encourage governments to take actions and provide assurances about the security of the world's deadliest materials.

<sup>259</sup> *2014 Findings*, NTI Nuclear materials : Security Index <http://ntiindex.org/data-results/2014-findings/>



285. Following the conclusion of the 2014 Summit a communique was issued that stated that 58 world leaders made concrete agreements to prevent terrorists getting their hands on nuclear material that could be used to make a nuclear weapon. The communique said that this will further reduce the threat of a nuclear attack. It went on to state that new agreements had been made on:

- reducing the amount of dangerous nuclear material in the world that terrorists could use to make a nuclear weapon (highly enriched uranium and plutonium);
- improving the security of radioactive material (including low-enriched uranium) that can be used to make a ‘dirty bomb’;
- improving the international exchange of information and international cooperation.<sup>260</sup>

286. On 26 March the Prime Minister on returning from the Summit made a Statement to the House in which he said:

On combating nuclear terrorism, which was the subject of the summit in The Hague, the meeting reaffirmed our determination to push through reforms of global security systems to ensure that vulnerable nuclear material does not fall into the wrong hands. This initiative, launched by President Obama back in 2010, has led to a remarkable amount of nuclear material being secured and reduced across the world, which should be commended.<sup>261</sup>

The Prime Minister went on to say that:

We have seen 12 countries worldwide removing all highly enriched uranium from their territory, and 15 metric tons of highly enriched uranium have been down-blended to low-enriched uranium since 2012, which is the equivalent to approximately 500 nuclear weapons, so good progress has been made.<sup>262</sup>

**287. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what are the specific reforms of global security systems to ensure that vulnerable nuclear material does not fall into the wrong hands which the Government is determined to push through, and what are the specific steps it is taking to achieve such reforms.**

## The Australia Group

288. The Australia Group (AG) is an informal forum of countries which, through the harmonisation of export controls, seeks to ensure that exports do not contribute to the development of chemical or biological weapons. Co-ordination of national export control measures assists Australia Group participants to fulfil their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to the fullest extent possible. The principal objective of Australia Group participants is to use licensing measures to

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<sup>260</sup> “Outcome of NSS 2014: a major step towards a safer world”, Nuclear Security Summit 2014, <https://www.nss2014.com/en/news/outcome-of-nss-2014-a-major-step-towards-a-safer-world>

<sup>261</sup> HC Deb, 26 March 2014, col 349

<sup>262</sup> HC Deb, 26 march 2014, col 363

ensure that exports of certain chemicals, biological agents, and dual-use chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and equipment, do not contribute to the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBWs). The Group achieves this by harmonising participating countries' national export licensing measures. The Group's activities are especially important given that the international chemical and biotechnology industries are a target for proliferators as a source of materials for CBW programmes. Export licensing measures also demonstrate the determination of Australia Group participants to avoid not only direct but also inadvertent involvement in the spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons, and to express their opposition to the use of these weapons. It is also in the interests of commercial firms and research institutes and of their Governments to ensure that they do not inadvertently supply chemicals, chemical equipment, biological agents or biological equipment for use in the manufacture of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Global chemical and biological industries have firmly supported this principle.<sup>263</sup> A list of members of the Australia Group can be found at <http://www.australiagroup.net/en/participants.html>.

289. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Australia Group can be found at paragraphs 271–274 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 76 of the Report.

290. The Committees' Recommendations on the Australia Group in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendations:**

The Committees recommend that, as the Government has said that the Australia Group focus is on those countries that have large or developing chemical industries, for example China, India and Pakistan, or those which act as transshipment hubs, such as Singapore and Vietnam, it states in its Response what steps it is taking to ensure UK participation in Australia Group outreach visits to those countries. The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it is satisfied with the interface between the Australia Group and those organisations responsible for implementing and monitoring the Chemical Weapons Convention.<sup>264</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government endeavours to ensure participation in Australia Group outreach visits when it can, resources permitting. In 2012 the Government sent a representative from the UK to join an Australia Group outreach visit to India and sent British Embassy representation to an outreach visit to Vietnam. So far in 2013, the Government has led an outreach visit to Pakistan on behalf of the Australia Group and has also sent representatives from the UK to join outreach visits to Malaysia and China. A British Embassy representative attended the last outreach visit to India in May 2013.

All members of the Australia Group (which is an informal forum of countries, and does not exist as an entity outside its membership of states) are also members of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention

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<sup>263</sup> "The Australia Group", The Australia Group, [www.australiagroup.net](http://www.australiagroup.net)

<sup>264</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 76

(CWC). Therefore the interface between Australia Group and organisations responsible for implementing and monitoring the Chemical Weapons Convention are the States Parties themselves. All AG members have the opportunity to actively participate in and influence both BTWC and CWC meetings and negotiations in Geneva and The Hague, and the effective implementation and monitoring of these Conventions.<sup>265</sup>

**291. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response which of the countries currently outside the Australia Group that it has said have large or developing chemical industries, for example China, India and Pakistan, or act as transshipment hubs for chemicals, such as Singapore and Vietnam, it would wish to see as members of the Australia Group, and what specific steps it is taking to achieve Australia Group membership by the countries concerned.**

### **The Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS)**

292. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) can be found at paragraphs 275–277 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 77 of the Report.

293. The Foreign Secretary in his letter to the Committees of 12 November 2012, in reply to a question relating to the ATAS in the Government's Response to the Committees' 2012 report, said about the ATAS:

The Government is satisfied with its current policy. The effectiveness of the scheme is continually assessed to ensure that counter proliferation objectives are met. The Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) was set up in 2007, replacing the Voluntary Vetting Scheme (VVS) for overseas students. ATAS is designed to prevent those students who pose the greatest risk from studying potential WMD proliferation subjects. In order to give the broadest and most efficient coverage, ATAS is built into the Tier 4 student visa requirement. There is currently no legal basis for the scheme to include UK students.<sup>266</sup>

294. The Committees' Recommendation on the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report:

- a) whether it remains satisfied that the UK's Academic Technology Approval Scheme remains effective in preventing those foreign students who pose the greatest risk from studying potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation subjects at UK Institutions of Higher Education; and

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<sup>265</sup> Cm8707, p 28

<sup>266</sup> See: HC (2013–14) 205, Ev w116

- b) whether it will consider introducing legislation to extend the Scheme to include those UK students who pose the greatest risk.<sup>267</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government's position remains as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Committees of 12 November 2012. We have no plans to consider legislation to extend the Scheme to include UK students.<sup>268</sup>

**295. I propose that the Committees again recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) whether it remains satisfied that the UK's Academic Technology Approval Scheme continues to be effective in preventing those foreign students, who pose the greatest risk, from studying potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation subjects at UK Institutions of Higher Education; and
- b) whether it will consider introducing legislation to extend the scheme to include any UK students who similarly pose the greatest risk.

## **The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)**

296. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) can be found at paragraphs 278–282 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 78 of the Report.

297. The Committees' Recommendation on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) how far it considers that its objectives for the Chemical Weapons Review Conference as set out in the Written Answer of FCO Minister Alistair Burt on 26 March 2013 were, or were not, fulfilled; and
- b) what specific steps it will take to try to secure accession to the Convention by those 8 states who have not done so thus far, namely Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria.<sup>269</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) The Government was pleased that the majority of the objectives outlined in Minister Alistair Burt's Written Answer to Sir John Stanley of 26 March 2013 were achieved. It was not possible, however, to secure agreement on the next steps on

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<sup>267</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 77

<sup>268</sup> Cm8707, p 29

<sup>269</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 78

the treatment of incapacitating chemical agents in a CWC context in light of developments in science and technology.

- b) The Government led outreach in conjunction with partners focussed on securing accession by the above 8 states. This included working alongside the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in offering technical assistance and advice on acceding to the Convention and National Implementation. The Government saw immediate positive results with Somalia acceding to the Convention on 29 May 2013.<sup>270</sup>

**298. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the countries that have still to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the dates of accession of any country that has acceded since Somalia's accession on 29 May 2013.**

**299. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states to which of the non-acceding countries it has participated in outreach on the Chemical Weapons Convention since the beginning of 2013.**

### **The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)**

300. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) can be found at paragraphs 283–288 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraphs 79 and 80 of the Report.

301. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the Government's statement that establishing a verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention remains a long-term UK and EU aim is welcome, but that the absence of any such regime, because of US opposition in particular, is a matter of deep concern.<sup>271</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusion.<sup>272</sup>

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response

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<sup>270</sup> Cm8707, p 29

<sup>271</sup> HC (2013-14) 205, para 79

<sup>272</sup> Cm8707, p 29

- a) lists which States have signed but not ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and which States have neither signed nor ratified the BTWC;
- b) sets out what specific steps it will take to try to secure accession to the BTWC by those States who have not done so thus far;
- c) whether it is aware of States with holdings of biological or toxin weapons and, if so, which those States are; and
- d) whether it considers the civil population to be at risk from State or non-State holdings of biological or toxin weapons and, if so, what steps it is taking both nationally and internationally to mitigate that risk.<sup>273</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) The following states have signed but not ratified the BTWC:

1. Central African Republic
2. Côte d'Ivoire
3. Egypt
4. Haiti
5. Liberia
6. Burma
7. Nepal
8. Somalia
9. Syrian Arab Republic
10. United Republic of Tanzania

The following states have neither signed nor ratified the BTWC:

1. Andorra
2. Angola
3. Chad
4. Comoros
5. Djibouti
6. Eritrea
7. Guinea
8. Israel
9. Kiribati
10. Mauritania
11. Micronesia (Federated States of)
12. Namibia
13. Niue
14. Samoa
15. South Sudan
16. Tuvalu

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<sup>273</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 80

- b) The Government, both on its own and with the EU, actively engages with non-State Parties to encourage them to become members of the BTWC. EU projects under Council Decision 2012/421/CFSP include awareness-raising workshops and support for states acceding to or ratifying the BTWC as well as support for states to implement the BTWC. Recently the Government has co-funded the attendance of Burma at the August 2013 BTWC Meeting of Experts and we will also continue to encourage non-members attending as observers to accede to the BWC.
- c) The Government does not generally comment on specific states by name.
- d) In 2010 the National Security Strategy identified as a Tier One Risk: "International terrorism affecting the UK or its interests, including a biological attack by terrorists"; and as a Tier Two Risk: "An attack on the UK or its Overseas Territories by another state or proxy using biological weapons."

### Nationally

The National Counter Terrorism Security Officer (NaCTSO) co-ordinates the delivery of protective security to hazardous sites and substances in the UK. Part 7 of the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001 addresses the issue of security relating to Pathogens and Toxins held legitimately within the UK.

There are approximately 220 sites within the UK which hold Schedule 51 substances. This list is maintained and managed by NaCTSO. Guidelines for security standards are set by NaCTSO, in consultation in conjunction with other relevant Government departments. This allows for a consistent national approach to the security of sites holding dangerous pathogens and toxins.

### Internationally

NaCTSO is currently actively involved in the EU CBRN Action plan B2 action2. The main objective of this is to initiate a draft document for B2 implementation. This entails the consolidation of feedback from member states regarding biosecurity regulations to initiate exchanges for European harmonisation, specifically for processes to verify facility security arrangements. The UK believes that steps taken to implement the WHO's International Health Regulations and comparable programmes of the OIE [International Office of Epizootics (World Organisation for Animal Health)] and FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations] will help improve national, regional and international surveillance capabilities for the early detection and identification of outbreaks of infectious disease whether they are natural, deliberate or accidental. We are supporting these efforts and programmes through a range of means such as direct funding, provision of training and capacity building assistance. In 2014 and 2015 the special topic for the BTWC intersessional meetings will be Article VII; this deals with assistance in the event of a State Party 'being exposed to danger as a result of a violation of the Convention'. Virtually nothing has been done to give practical effect to this Article, but it is generally taken to mean humanitarian and medical counter measures. The UK intends to build on its proposals first made on this Article at the Seventh Review Conference in 2011 as set out in its Working Paper -<http://daccess->

ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/640/45/PDF/G1164045.pdf?OpenElement’  
In order to mitigate biological risks and threats, as part of the UK contribution to the Global Partnership, the UK continues to implement biological security and engagement projects in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Middle East and North Africa. In order to maximise efficiency and effectiveness, the UK works in close cooperation with other Global Partnership members and international organisations, including the US Departments of State and Defense, the World Health Organisation, World Organisation for Animal Health, and Food and Agriculture Organisation.

Current projects are focused on:

- improving biosafety and biosecurity;
- improving disease surveillance, diagnostics and reporting systems (in the areas of human, animal and plant health);
- increasing awareness of the need to comply with international treaty obligations (e.g. BTWC) and, thorough educational programmes, of the risks posed by dual-use science.

These projects also provide broader benefits to UK health security, such as gaining first-hand knowledge of disease surveillance in different national contexts, access to new or different strains or biological agents of concern, and experience of diseases caused by these agents. These cooperative projects consequently improve the capability of the UK agencies to respond to deliberately and/or naturally occurring biological related health events in the UK.<sup>274</sup>

**302. I propose that the Committees conclude that the detailed response given by the Government to the Committees’ question on the Government’s 2013 Annual Report on strategic exports as to “whether it considers the [UK] civil population to be at risk from state or non-state holdings of biological or toxin weapons and, if so, what steps it is taking both nationally and internationally to mitigate that risk” is welcome.**

**303. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it still remains its long-term aim to establish a verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and, if so, what specific steps it is taking to try to realise this aim.**

**304. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response lists which states have now signed, but not ratified, the BTWC and which states have neither signed nor ratified the BTWC.**

**305. I propose that the Committees also recommend that the Government states what specific steps it has taken since the beginning of 2013 to try to secure accession to the BTWC by those states who have not done so thus far.**

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<sup>274</sup> Cm8707, pp 29–32



## The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

306. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) can be found at paragraphs 289–295 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 81 of the Report.

307. The Committees' Recommendation on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response in specific terms:

- a) the extent to which it considers that the commitments made at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, and in the 2010 NPT Action Plans have, or have not, been fulfilled; and
- b) what are the Government's objectives for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.<sup>275</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

- a) The UK stands by the commitments that we made at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in 2010, we will continue to work on our 2010 NPT Action Plan commitments, and encourage other states to reaffirm their commitment to the Action Plan.

With regard to what extent these commitments and the Action Plan have been fulfilled, we would argue that there has been a mixed performance. There has been progress in some areas, for example, Andorra, Bahrain, the Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Gambia, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Morocco, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Togo and Vietnam have all ratified the Additional Protocol since 2010 (Action 28). There is work in progress, for example, within the P5 discussions continue on reporting and the development of the P5 glossary of key nuclear terms (Action 5, Action 21). There are also more challenging areas, for example, on the conference on the establishment of Middle East Weapons of Mass Destructions Free Zone, where the UK government regretted the postponement of the conference in November 2012 and continues to work closely with the Facilitator and Co-Convenors in order to hold the conference as soon as possible this year.

As we said in the UK General Statement at the 2013 NPT Preparatory Committee, "We are at the half-way point of this Review Cycle, half-way to the 2015 Review Conference. The big success of the 2010 Review Conference was the consensus outcome on a cross-pillar action plan, and a clear commitment from all states parties to the grand bargain of the NPT. We must continually remind ourselves of that achievement and strive to replicate that success in this PrepCom and the rest of this review cycle. My government is clear in its wish to strengthen the international non-proliferation architecture, with the NPT at its core. But the NPT continues to face pressures and challenges, the nuclear ambitions of the DPRK and

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<sup>275</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 81

Iran, the risk of a nuclear terrorist attack, the spread of sensitive nuclear technology as more countries seek to embark on a civil nuclear path.

We must work together to ensure that the NPT is strengthened across its 3 pillars during this review cycle, to ensure that it can remain fit for purpose, and continue to bring benefits to all its states parties, in terms of enhanced security and cooperation on civil nuclear energy... This PrepCom is also an opportunity for States Parties to reaffirm their unconditional support for the NPT and their commitment to implement the 2010 Action Plan.”

- b) In an article in the Huffington Post published on 24 April 2013, the Foreign Office Minister responsible for Counter Proliferation, Alistair Burt, set out the UK’s priorities for the Non Proliferation Treaty. “We want to encourage action to deter non-compliance of the NPT. We want to continue our push for a Treaty that is universal. We want to reiterate our commitment to work with other countries to achieve our long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. And we want to do all of this whilst underlining that we should continue to support the responsible global expansion of civil nuclear industries.” These remain valid.<sup>276</sup>

308. On 29 April 2014 Hugh Robertson, Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office wrote to the Chairman of the Committees enclosing the UK’s national report to the 2014 Nuclear Non-Proliferation preparatory Commission. The text of the letter is as follows (the report can be found at Annex 8):

I have pleasure in enclosing the United Kingdom’s national report to the 2014 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Commission, in line with the commitment made by the UK and other Nuclear Weapons States in the NPT Action Plan agreed in 2010.

This report will be tabled by the UK delegation to the NPT Preparatory Committee in New York this week. I have arranged for a copy to be made available in the Library of the House. I am also sending the report to Sir Richard Ottaway.<sup>277</sup>

309. The key points in the United Kingdom’s national report to the 2014 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Commission were:

- That the UK considers the NPT to be the cornerstone of global efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and is committed to the step-by-step process agreed by consensus at the 2000 RevCon and reaffirmed at the 2010 RevCon;
- The Government will maintain only the minimum credible nuclear deterrent, under full political control;
- the UK will only consider using our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies;
- the UK had strengthened its negative security assurance to state that the UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT;

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<sup>276</sup> Cm8707, pp 32–33

<sup>277</sup> Ev w223 – Letter from Hugh Robertson to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 29 April 2014

- the UK had taken steps to lower the operational status of its deterrent system;
- the UK Government stated that the security and safety of its nuclear weapons was given the very highest priority;
- since the 2010 NPT Review Conference the UK has unilaterally decided to cut its stockpile of nuclear warheads, as outlined in the SDSR [Strategic Defence and Security Review]. (Today it has fewer than 225 warheads, all of a single type.); and
- in 2013 the UK extended the scope of its security regulation to cover civil nuclear sites under construction in order to take account of the UK's new nuclear build programme.

**310. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states as fully as possible in its Response what are now its objectives for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2015 and what specific steps it is taking to try to ensure that its objectives are realised.**

### **The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)**

311. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) can be found at paragraphs 296–297 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 82 of the Report.

312. The Committees' Recommendation on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking with each of the remaining 8 countries whose signature and ratification is necessary to enable the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to enter into force—namely China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the USA—to try to persuade them to ratify the CTBT.<sup>278</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The UK has taken every available opportunity to press for all states outside the CTBT to sign or ratify the Treaty as appropriate. This includes repeated calls for China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the USA to accede to the Treaty. To this end, the UK will be attending the Article XIV Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT this September, which will renew calls for the remaining states to join. As of July 2013, 159 states have ratified the Treaty.<sup>279</sup>

313. The Committees had an informal meeting on 10 February 2014 with the Head of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), Dr Lassina Zerbo.

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<sup>278</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 82

<sup>279</sup> Cm8707, p 33

314. On 27 February the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary asking about Iran and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The text of the letter was as follows:

I should be grateful if you could tell me the British Government's position on whether or not the issue of Iran's ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty should be brought within the framework of the negotiations taking place with Iran to ensure that Iran does not become a holder of nuclear weapons.

Please could you tell me in your reply the reasons for the policy position that the UK Government has taken on this issue.<sup>280</sup>

The Foreign Secretary replied on 20 March 2014 as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 27 February, seeking the UK government position on whether Iranian ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) should be brought within the framework of E3+3 negotiations with Iran.

The purpose of the E3+3 negotiations with Iran is to reach a negotiated comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue which ensures the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. This will require Iran to take significant action to limit its nuclear programme, and increased monitoring and verification of its activities. As part of a comprehensive solution, it is important that all unresolved issues set out in the UNSC resolutions are addressed.

Iranian ratification of the CTBT would be a further step in reassuring the international community about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. It would also bring the Treaty closer to entry into force. Dr Lassina Zerbo, the Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBT Organisation, is encouraging Iran to consider ratification of the CTBT and to transmit data from the International Monitoring System's Primary Seismic Station in Tehran to the International Data Centre in Vienna. These would be welcome steps. I believe, however, that adding CTBT ratification to the E3+3 negotiations at this stage would risk further complicating an already complex negotiation. Securing Iranian commitments to limit Iran's programmes to a point well short of conducting a test must remain the priority.<sup>281</sup>

**315. I propose that the Committees again recommend that the Government states in its Response what specific steps it is taking with each of the remaining 8 countries whose signature and ratification is necessary to enable the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to enter into force—namely China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the USA—to try to persuade them to ratify the CTBT.**

### Sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons

316. The Committees' previous scrutiny of sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons can be found at paragraphs 298–301 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 83 of the Report.

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<sup>280</sup> Ev w202 – Letter from Chairman of the Committees on Arms Exports to William Hague, dated 27 February 2014

<sup>281</sup> Ev w205 – letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 20 March 2014

317. The Committees' Recommendation on the sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response:

- a) what specific action it is taking to reduce the requirement for short-range nuclear weapons assigned to NATO in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area, and developments in the broader security environment;
- b) whether it supports the implementation of the US B-61 Life Extension Programme in Europe; and
- c) whether it favours US and Russian holdings of short-range nuclear weapons being reduced to zero on both sides, as achieved for intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the 1987 INF Treaty, in future negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons between the US and Russia.<sup>282</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has dramatically reduced the number, types and readiness of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and will continue to adapt its strategy in line with the changing security environment.

NATO's Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR), adopted at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, emphasised that nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation play an important role in the achievement of NATO's objectives, as the security and stability provided by the effective control of weapons is a precursor to a world without nuclear weapons. It set out NATO's support for US/Russian bilateral arms control measures, and indicated that Allies would consider further reducing NATO's requirement for tactical nuclear weapons in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account Russia's larger stockpile.

The Government is committed to the long term objective of a world without nuclear weapons and would therefore be supportive of the eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, including those held by the US and Russia in Europe, provided that this is achieved in a manner that does not risk compromising the security of the UK and its Allies. In this context, the Government strongly welcomed the commitment that President Obama set out in his speech in Berlin on 19 June, to work with NATO Allies to seek bold reductions in US and Russian short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. We will continue to play a key role in helping to build the right environment for bilateral US-Russia discussions to make progress. We are working closely with NATO Allies to develop and exchange transparency and confidence-building ideas with the Russian Federation, not least through our active role within NATO's new Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation Committee, which is currently exploring such measures.

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<sup>282</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 83

The DDPR also underlined the Alliance’s commitment that ‘all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent shall remain safe, secure and effective for as long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance’. The forward deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe provides a contribution to the deterrence of potential adversaries, the assurance of vulnerable Allies, and the sharing of risks and responsibilities across the Alliance, as well as providing leverage in arms control efforts vis-à-vis the Russian Federation. With the weapons nearing the end of their service lives, it is therefore appropriate that the US embark upon the B-61 Life Extension Programme to maintain NATO’s appropriate nuclear force posture and to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of NATO’s arsenal. The Life Extension Programme will also be helpful in maximising the potential impact of future arms control discussions by avoiding the capability ending without any commensurate reciprocal steps from Russia.<sup>283</sup>

**318. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether:**

- a) **it remains both the Government’s and NATO’s policy “that [NATO] Allies would consider further reducing NATO’s requirement for tactical nuclear weapons in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account Russia’s larger stockpile.”;**
- b) **it remains the Government’s policy that it would be supportive of the eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, including those held by the US and Russia in Europe, provided that this is achieved in a manner that does not risk compromising the security of the UK and its Allies;**
- c) **it remains the Government’s view that it is appropriate that the US embark upon the B-61 Life Extension programme to maintain NATO’s appropriate nuclear force posture and to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of NATO’s arsenal; and**
- d) **it is the Government’s policy that dialogue with the Russian Government on sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons should continue, notwithstanding events in Ukraine.**

## **A Middle-East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone**

319. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of a Middle-East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone can be found at paragraphs 302–312 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Recommendation at paragraph 84 of the Report.

320. The Committees’ Recommendation on a Middle-East Weapons of Mass Destruction Zone in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) **when it expects the planned regional conference to discuss a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone to take place;**

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<sup>283</sup> Cm8707, pp 34–35

- b) what are the current positions of Iran and Israel on attending this conference; and
- c) what steps it is taking to try to ensure this Conference takes place.<sup>284</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) The UK government made clear in our statement to the 2013 NPT PrepCom that we hope the regional conference on the establishment of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone will take place as soon as possible in 2013, and we continue to work closely with the Facilitator, fellow co-convenors and regional partners in pursuit of this objective.
- b) The Facilitator, Mr Laajava, has continued his consultations and discussions with all states of the region, including Iran and Israel, he has also proposed multilateral consultations in order to agree arrangements for the Conference between the states of the region. The UK fully supports his work in this regard.

As we have commented previously, Iran has announced it would be willing to attend the Conference but has set out a series of expectations on format and process which may be difficult for all regional states to agree. Israel has publicly stated that it has yet to make its final decision on whether to attend any conference.

- c) The Foreign Secretary and other FCO Ministers have discussed the Conference with counterparts in the Middle East. The UK statement to the 2013 NPT PrepCom made clear our support for the objective of establishing such a Zone and our full support for the facilitator of the Conference, Mr Laajava of Finland. The British Government supports the objective of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, and the convening of a conference as soon as possible.

Senior British officials meet regularly with representatives of the UN and the other co-convenors (the US and Russia) to discuss progress and provide support to Mr Laajava. British Officials have also travelled to the region to promote constructive engagement and support for the work of the Facilitator.<sup>285</sup>

321. Responding to a question from Jeremy Corbyn MP on 26 March 2014 as to whether he would give an assurance that “the Government will resolutely work to get a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone conference under way as a way of reducing and trying to prevent any nuclear proliferation in that region”, the Prime Minister answered: “I can confirm that we will be working towards that goal and will continue the excellent work the Foreign office does on it.”<sup>286</sup>

**322. I propose that the Committees conclude that the failure to hold a regional conference on the establishment of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in 2013, as the Government had hoped, was most disappointing.**

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<sup>284</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 84

<sup>285</sup> Cm8707, pp 34–35

<sup>286</sup> HC Deb, 26 March 2014, cols 361–362

**323. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response states the latest position on the holding of such a Conference, and on the willingness of Iran and Israel to attend.**

## **The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy**

324. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the National Counter-Proliferation Strategy can be found at paragraphs 313–316 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 85 of the Report.

325. The Committees' Recommendation on the National Counter-Proliferation Strategy in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government sets out in its Response:

- a) any amendments or updating it wishes to make to the National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012–15 since its publication in 2012; and
- b) what it considers to be the successes and failures of the National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012–15 to date.<sup>287</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

- a) Following an intelligence-based assessment exercise earlier this year the National Counter Proliferation Strategy for 2012-15 was reviewed by the Cross-Whitehall Counter Proliferation Implementation Committee (CPIC). CPIC concluded that the strategic risks and objectives contained in the strategy remained correct and that there was not a need for amendments or updates. The strategy has been used as the basis for CPIC's annual business planning, helping to prioritise Counter Proliferation work across Whitehall.
- b) The strategy has successfully focussed work across Whitehall in line with its three objectives of
  - CBRN Security;
  - Preventing State WMD Proliferation; and
  - Supporting, strengthening and extending the rules-based international system for counter proliferation.

There has been progress in all three areas. Examples, one from each work strand, include:

- the UK's Chairmanship (as part of the 2013 G8 Presidency) of the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, a body which is now coordinating around £1bn/year worth of its

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<sup>287</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 82



members' counter-proliferation programmes to the highest priority CBRN security projects globally;

- the UK played a leading role in the firm and united international response to the DPRK nuclear test of February 2013 (including the adoption of UNSCR 2094); and
- UK lobbying and support for technical assistance programmes has delivered progress towards universal adherence to both the Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons and Toxins Conventions.

There also remain serious challenges (for example, Iran continues to advance its nuclear programme in violation of UNSCRs and defiance of IAEA resolutions, ensuring the security, and eventual destruction, of Syria's chemical weapons stocks, delivery of a 2015 Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference that reaffirms the NPT as the cornerstone of international nuclear non-proliferation), as would be expected at this stage of a three-year strategy. We shall continue to monitor performance against the strategy.<sup>288</sup>

**326. I propose that the Committees conclude that they do not agree with the Government's Response in Cm8707 that there was not a need for amendments or update to the Government's National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012–15 published in 2012.**

**327. I propose that the Committees further conclude that the key Government policy area of Counter-Proliferation is in constant change and recommends that the Government makes a full report on its National Counter-Proliferation Strategy annually.**

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<sup>288</sup> Cm8707, p 36

## 9 Arms export control policies

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### Arms exports and human rights

328. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports and human rights can be found at paragraphs 317–319 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion at paragraph 86 of the Report.

329. The Committees' Conclusion on arms exports and human rights in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees continue to conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time rather than claiming, as the Government continues to do, that these two policies "are mutually reinforcing".<sup>289</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees conclusion and refers to its previous responses, most recently in Cm 8441 which was its reply to the Committees' previous Annual Report (HC 419). These responses can be found on pages Ev173-174 of the Committees' current report.<sup>290</sup>

The responses referred to were:

The Government is committed to both a thriving British defence and security industry and some of the strictest export controls in the world. The Government believes that its security, prosperity and values agendas are mutually reinforcing. Effective arms export controls prevent arms exports which could undermine our own security or the promotion of UK values of human rights and democracy, and enable continued UK prosperity by allowing the UK's defence and security industries to compete effectively in the global defence market. The UK already has one of the most rigorous and transparent arms export control systems in the world. All controlled military goods, are assessed on a case by case basis, against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Exports Licensing Criteria, (Consolidated Criteria). Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are mandatory considerations for all export licence applications.<sup>291</sup>

and

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<sup>289</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 86

<sup>290</sup> Cm8707, p 37

<sup>291</sup> Government Response to the Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of the Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees of Session 2010-11, *Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Reports for 2010. Licensing policy and review of export control legislation*, Cm 8079, pages 4–5

Increasing defence and security exports does not by definition mean ignoring the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. All countries have the right to an effective, secure defence and the Government will use its export licensing powers to ensure that the UK only permits responsible defence exports.<sup>292</sup>

**330. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that, whilst the promotion of arms exports and the upholding of human rights are both legitimate Government policies, the Government would do well to acknowledge that there is an inherent conflict between strongly promoting arms exports to authoritarian regimes whilst strongly criticising their lack of human rights at the same time rather than claiming, as the Government continues to do, that these two policies “are mutually reinforcing”.**

**331. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will report to the Committees all breaches of its human rights policies and its international human rights commitments with the use of British Government approved exports of controlled goods, software, technology and components as and when any such breaches occur.**

### **Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance**

332. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance can be found at paragraphs 320–324 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Recommendation at paragraph 87 of the Report.

333. The Committees’ Recommendation on Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response by what date its review of the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance will be completed, and whether it has accepted the Committees’ previous recommendation that the requirement on officials in the current OSJA Guidance merely to consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria if military and security equipment is being exported in an OSJA Programme should be replaced by a requirement to adhere strictly to the Licensing Criteria and procedures.<sup>293</sup>

#### **The Government’s Response:**

The Government’s review of the Overseas and Security Justice Assistance (OSJA) Guidance is now complete. Revised Guidance will be published shortly that will make clear that an assessment under the Consolidated Criteria will be required, in addition to any OSJA assessment, if the assistance provided involves the provision of controlled

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<sup>292</sup> Committees on Arms Export Controls, Session 2012–13, *Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2011, the Government’s Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues*, HC 419, Annex 11, page 267

<sup>293</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 87

equipment. We will ensure a copy of the revised Guidance is provided to the Committees as soon as this has been finalised.<sup>294</sup>

334. On 26 February 2014 the Foreign Secretary wrote informing the Committees of the update to the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance which included notification that the Committees' Recommendation (above) had been implemented.<sup>295</sup> The text of the latter was as follows:

I am writing to inform the Committees of the publication of revised Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Guidance.

The Guidance remains a vital tool for assessing the human rights implications of our overseas assistance work in the security and justice sectors. The Committees recommended that the Guidance should be updated to refer more clearly to the additional assessments against the EU and National Consolidated Criteria that need to be undertaken if the assistance involves the provision of equipment which is controlled under Export Control legislation.

A review of the Guidance has provided the opportunity to make amendments in response to the Committees' recommendation. A revised version of the Guidance is attached and is available on the [www.gov.uk](http://www.gov.uk) website. In particular, new paragraph 11 states:

"It is important to stress that an assessment under this guidance is not in itself sufficient when the provision of licensable equipment is envisaged as part of a project. A further assessment under the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria will be required. Please contact the FCO's Arms Export Licensing Department for further advice on how such an assessment will need to be undertaken. There is also no requirement to undertake an OSJA assessment if the assistance to be provided consists solely of the provision of licensable equipment and an assessment under the EU Consolidated Criteria has been or will be undertaken."

I hope this amendment to the Guidance addresses the Committees' concerns. I have also made a Written Ministerial Statement announcing publication of the revised Guidance and have written in similar terms to Sir Richard Ottaway and Sir Malcolm Rifkind. Let me take this opportunity to thank you for your engagement in the review process.<sup>296</sup>

In the related Ministerial Written Statement the Foreign Secretary stated:

[...] we have made some minor amendments to the guidance to clarify key points, including defining more clearly the circumstances in which the guidance should be applied and highlighting the additional assessments against the EU and national consolidated criteria that need to be undertaken if the assistance involves the provision of equipment which is controlled under export control legislation.<sup>297</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> Cm8707, p 37

<sup>295</sup> The updated OSJA can be found at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-security-and-justice-assistance-osja-guidance>

<sup>296</sup> Ev w201 – Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 26 February 2014

<sup>297</sup> HC Deb, 28 February 2014, col 38WS

335. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's acceptance of their recommendation that the requirement on officials in the previous Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance merely to consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria if military and security equipment is being exported in an OSJA programme should be replaced by a requirement to adhere strictly to the licensing criteria and procedures is welcome.

336. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government keeps the implementation of the revised OSJA Human Rights Guidance under close scrutiny and reports to the Committees any uses of goods exported from the UK in an OSJA programme in breach of UK or international human rights policies.

## Surveillance technology and equipment

337. The Committees' previous scrutiny of surveillance technology and equipment can be found at paragraphs 325–328 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 88 of the Report.

338. The Committees' Recommendation on surveillance technology and equipment in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government states what progress has been made both within the EU and within the Wassenaar Arrangement to prevent exports of surveillance technology and equipment to repressive regimes who may use this technology and equipment to suppress human rights.<sup>298</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The EU adopted measures in sanctions to prohibit the supply to Syria and Iran of certain specified equipment and software for "monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications". These measures were adopted on 18 January 2012 (through Council Regulation 36/2012) and 23 March 2012 (through Council Regulation 264/2012) respectively.

The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) adopted controls on mobile phone intercept and monitoring equipment on 14 December 2011, which is yet to be incorporated into the EU Dual-Use Regulation.

The UK submitted a formal proposal to the WA on 4 March 2013 concerning Advanced Persistent Threat software and related equipment (offensive cyber tools), which is currently being discussed, and a decision is due at the WA plenary meeting scheduled for December 2013.<sup>299</sup>

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<sup>298</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 88

<sup>299</sup> Cm8707, p 37

339. Privacy International, in its written evidence, stated that ten years ago the value of the global surveillance industry was negligible; today, industry experts value it at around \$5 billion a year. It stated:

New technologies allow the financial transactions, communications activity and geographic movements of millions of people to be captured, analysed and stored both cheaply and efficiently. The emerging information and communications infrastructures of developing countries are being hijacked for surveillance purposes, and the information thereby collected is facilitating unlawful interrogation practices, torture and extrajudicial executions.

It continued by stating that: “Regulatory oversight in the form of export controls is urgently required if the UK wants to meet its human rights commitments and foreign policy objectives.”<sup>300</sup>

340. When the Committees put a series of questions to the Government on surveillance technology and equipment following its Response to the Committees Recommendations in its 2012 Report the Government said:

The Government’s current view is that such concerted action at international level is by some measure the best option, if further regulation is required. A unilaterally imposed national restriction on the export from the UK of surveillance equipment without international support is unlikely to be effective, as it could be more easily circumvented given the likelihood that many of the companies which manufacture such equipment will have offices in other EU and third countries.<sup>301</sup>

341. The Guardian newspaper reported on 19 November 2013 that a large number of British companies were selling surveillance technologies to developing countries “with promises that ‘off the shelf’ equipment will allow them to snoop on millions of emails, text messages and phone calls”. The article went on to say that the market had “raised concerns among human rights groups and ministers”. It said that ministers were “poised to announce new rules about the sale of such equipment from Britain.” Privacy International was quoted in the article as stating that: “There is a culture of impunity permeating across the private surveillance market, given that there are no strict export controls on the sale of this technology, as there are on the sale of conventional weapons.”<sup>302</sup>

342. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 Ann McKechin MP said:

There are disturbing stories about the hacking of dissidents not only in their own country, but in the UK, where some are currently taking refuge. Some fairly small, relatively unknown companies are now involved in the sector, and given that the equipment is exceptionally portable and that technical specifications can change rapidly, the detection of illegal exports is bound to be difficult.

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<sup>300</sup> Ev w88

<sup>301</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 88, Ev w357

<sup>302</sup> “Private firms selling mass surveillance systems around the world, documents show”, *The Guardian*, 19 November 2013

The power and reach of such equipment is considerable. A Dubai-based company markets a product called Cerebro, a DIY system similar to the Tempora programme run by GCHQ, that has the ability to tap information from fibre-optic cables carrying internet traffic and to analyse texts, mobile calls, billing data, e-mails and social networks in real time.<sup>303</sup>

343. When this subject was raised in the Oral Evidence session with BIS on 18 December the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, stated that BIS was aware of the “problems around surveillance equipment” and that his Department “had been engaged” with the Foreign Office in trying to update the Wassenaar convention”.<sup>304</sup> Chris Chew, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation, said:

On 4 December, the participating states of the Wassenaar arrangement agreed to adopt new controls on two specific technologies. One is software tools that allow someone to insert what is effectively a virus on someone’s computer or smartphone, which extracts data or tracks their movements without their knowledge. The second is equipment or software that extracts data from internet traffic and can extract information about who you communicate with and what your social networks are. Those controls were agreed and the 41 participating states of the Wassenaar arrangement have committed to introducing those controls. The UK, along with France, has been instrumental in reaching that agreement and it is something that we worked very hard to achieve. We now need to get those changes implemented in EU law through the EU dual-use regulation, and we will be working hard to make that happen.<sup>305</sup>

When asked when the changes would be implemented, Chris Chew replied:

There is a window of opportunity between now and the European Parliament elections in May next year, because it needs the approval of the European Parliament. If we cannot do it in that time, we will have to start from whenever the European Parliament first sits after the May election, so it would be the second half of the year. So there is a small window of opportunity to do it in the next four or five months, but if not it would be the second half of the year.<sup>306</sup>

344. When the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, was asked, in the Oral Evidence session on 8 January 2014, whether he shared the concerns that were being raised about surveillance equipment being used in countries with bad human rights records he replied:

We agree that action is necessary to strengthen export controls in this area, over certain cyber security-related equipment and software. These products have legitimate uses in defending networks, and tracking and disrupting criminals. Many of the exports listed under cryptographic headings are also, for instance, equipment for mobile telephone networks that have a cryptographic aspect to them. Sometimes when you see that several billion pounds of cryptographic material has been exported, it is an item of that kind, but we have to recognise that such equipment can also be used to conduct espionage, to track

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<sup>303</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 412WH

<sup>304</sup> Q 119 [Vince Cable]

<sup>305</sup> Q 119 [Chris Chew]

<sup>306</sup> Q 120

and disrupt political opponents and to restrict freedom of expression. We need to move the policy on, on this subject. That is why the UK has been leading work in the Wassenaar arrangement, which resulted in agreement last month to adopt new controls on specific technologies of concern. These are going to be implemented through the EU's controls on dual-use items. We also made further proposals to the relevant countries as necessary. We are also helping industry to produce guidance on the potential risks posed by cyber-security exports. Our policy is moving forward on this as technology is changing, and we are also open to further suggestions and ideas about what we should do.<sup>307</sup>

When asked if any international action on surveillance equipment was pending or had taken place the Foreign Secretary replied:

It is under way and we are at the forefront of it. We are leading it. We are putting forward proposals. Officials in the FCO and BIS are doing a very good job on this. We are working with other member states, with the European Commission and the European Parliament to implement these changes, I hope, before the European Parliament elections in May. If that does not prove possible, we certainly want them adopted later this year. We are pushing for changes in this area, and successfully so.<sup>308</sup>

345. On 24 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, regarding The text of the letter was as follows:

It was reported in The Independent on 7 January that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) will be investigating supplies to Israeli security services from G4S.

Please could you tell me if the British Government is co-operating with the OECD in its investigation. If so, please could you state what information has been submitted by the Government to the OECD in connection with its investigation.<sup>309</sup>

The Business Secretary, Vince Cable replied on behalf of the Foreign Secretary replied on 8 May in a letter covering a number of requests for information The relevant part of the letter relating to the OECD and G4S was as follows:

G4S, Israel and the OECD

I believe that the news report you refer to relates to the complaints process under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. As you may know, the Guidelines are voluntary standards for responsible business conduct in areas including human rights, employment and the environment. Unfortunately, the news report does not reflect the complaints process accurately. Each government that adheres to the OECD Guidelines is required to maintain a National Contact Point (NCP) to consider complaints under the Guidelines. The UK NCP is maintained by the UK Government to meet this requirement. It is not part of the OECD and has no wider responsibilities for OECD functions. The UK NCP is staffed by a small team of officials based in the Department for Business,

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<sup>307</sup> Q 163

<sup>308</sup> Q 164

<sup>309</sup> Ev w215 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to William Hague dated 24 April 2014



Innovation and Skills (BIS), and operates independently of BIS Ministers in its consideration of complaints.

The UK NCP does not usually comment on a complaint before it makes an Initial Assessment but all its Initial Assessments are published at <http://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-national-contact-point-statements>. The NCP generally expects to make an Initial Assessment within 3 months of receiving a complaint, although I understand that a spike in its caseload at the end of last year has led to some assessments taking a little longer. I would be happy to provide a copy of the Initial Assessment to the Committees once it has been published.<sup>310</sup>

**346. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **whether it is the Government's policy that EU Council Regulations 36/2012 and 264/2012 prohibiting the supply to Syria and Iran of certain specified equipment and software for "monitoring or interception of internet or telephone communications" should be extended to other countries, and, if so, to which other countries;**
- b) **whether the EU has now agreed to incorporate fully into the EU Dual-Use Regulation the new controls over the export of mobile phone intercept and monitoring equipment agreed at the Wassenaar Arrangement meeting in December 2011, and, if not, what steps the Government is taking to have this incorporation implemented by the EU at the earliest possible date;**
- c) **what are the specific new controls and what are the specific technologies of concern agreed by the states participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement at their meeting in December 2013 referred to by the Foreign Secretary in his Oral Evidence of 8 January 2014;**
- d) **whether the EU has now agreed to incorporate fully into the EU Dual-Use Regulation the new controls over the export of the specific surveillance technologies and equipment of concern agreed at the Wassenaar Arrangement meetings in December 2013, and, if not, what steps the Government is taking to have this incorporation implemented by the EU at the earliest possible date; and**
- e) **whether the Government will make subject to UK export controls those items of surveillance technology and equipment agreed at the Wassenaar Arrangement meetings in December 2011 and December 2013 if not yet incorporated into the EU Dual-Use Regulation.**

## **Cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components**

347. Cryptographic equipment is used to encrypt data such that only users with a valid encryption key can decrypt an encrypted message into plain, readable text.

348. The Committees latest Report (HC 205) contained a list of extant arms export licences to the FCO's main countries of human rights concern in Annex 13 of Volume II. That list of extant

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<sup>310</sup> Ev w474 – letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 14 May 2014

licences showed that 23 of the FCO's 27 countries of human rights concern had received UK Government approval for the export of cryptographic equipment, cryptographic technology, cryptographic software and cryptographic components, including China, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. Tables 6 and 7, below, show the number of extant SIEL and OIEL licences for cryptographic software, technology and components to the FCO's countries of human rights concern and the Committees' additional countries of concern, as of May 2013.<sup>311</sup>

Table 6 - Extant licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to FCO Countries of Human Rights Concern (May 2013)

	Number of licences (OIELs and SIELs)	Value of SIELs (£) <sup>312</sup>
Afghanistan	16	2,304,195
Belarus	4	0
Burma	1	0
China	194	571,796,383
Colombia	11	81,482
Congo, Democratic Republic of	13	315,564
Eritrea	2	0
Fiji	1	0
Iran	6	80,258,212
Iraq	20	1,728,540
Israel	109	7,807,876,744
Libya	16	5,517,567
Occupied Palestinian Territories	1	5,539
Pakistan	22	8,760,228
Russia	39	22,071,765
Saudi Arabia	53	13,869,907
Somalia	9	713,315
Sri Lanka	6	10,346
Sudan	7	216,262
Turkmenistan	4	0
Uzbekistan	6	0
Vietnam	22	7,209,190
Yemen	4	0
Zimbabwe	41	2,705,940
<b>Total</b>	<b>607</b>	<b>8,525,441,180</b>

Source: Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 10 May 2013 (see HC (2013–14) 205 Ev w170)

<sup>311</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, cols 407–408WH

<sup>312</sup> The value of OIELs is not provided as they are open licences of unlimited quantity and value for the goods exported under these licences.

Table 7 – Extant licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to CAEC Countries of interest (May 2013)

	Number of licences (OIELs and SIELs)	Value of SIELs (£) <sup>313</sup>
Argentina	19	7,040,727
Bahrain	22	7,322,159
Egypt	31	365,410
Madagascar	5	865
Tunisia	15	782,489
<b>Total</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>15,511,651</b>

Source: Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 10 May 2013 (see HC (2013–14) 205 Ev w170)

349. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, stated that the two recipients of the largest approvals for cryptographic exports to the Government's top countries of human rights concern were China, with almost 200 extant licence approvals (with a value of £571million) and Israel with 109 extant licence approvals (with a value of over £7.8billion). The Chairman commented that for China "It would seem highly likely that there is a real risk that some cryptographic exports that may be going into the private sector initially end up being utilised by security services in China" and that for Israel "it seems highly likely that some of that massive cryptographic export to Israel will be used, sooner or later, to the advantage of the Israeli security services in operations against Palestinians."<sup>314</sup>

350. When the Foreign Secretary was asked about the granting of export licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to countries of human rights concern he replied:

The majority of such licences are for commercial equipment for commercial end use: building public mobile phone networks; internet infrastructure; or building virtual private networks for private companies. We would not grant a licence if there was a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression.<sup>315</sup>

When asked specifically about whether the any of the 194 cryptographic licences to China might have a clear risk or might be used to facilitate internal repression the Foreign Secretary said:

We go through each of these licences individually. Something that is to build a virtual private network for a private company is not something where there is a clear risk of it being used for internal repression in China. The majority of licences are for things of that kind, [...] <sup>316</sup>

When pressed on the fact that it was difficult to make a distinction between the public and private sector in China the Foreign Secretary responded:

<sup>313</sup> The value of OIELs is not provided as they are open licences of unlimited quantity and value for the goods exported under these licences.

<sup>314</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 408WH

<sup>315</sup> Q 180

<sup>316</sup> Q 181

China has become a more complex economy and society. That is one point. Secondly, given that it is now the second biggest economy in the world, it is not surprising that it shows up to a large extent in export figures. Thirdly, we are able to analyse to a good level of detail the uses to which particular technologies can be put, and we are very mindful of that in assessing each licence.<sup>317</sup>

351. The Committees analysed the extant arms export licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components from the updated list of extant licences provided by the Business Secretary, Vince Cable in the Annexes to his letter of 12 May 2014.<sup>318</sup>

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<sup>317</sup> Q 182

<sup>318</sup> Ev w239 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 12 May 2014

Table 8 - Extant licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to FCO Countries of Human Rights Concern 2014

	<b>Number of licences (OIELs and SIELs)</b>	<b>Value of SIELs</b>
Afghanistan	12	1,304,064
Belarus	4	120,000
Burma	5	4,632
Central African Republic (CAR)	1	0
China	232	636,310,330
Colombia	14	56,851
Congo, Democratic Republic of	21	340,849
Eritrea	3	0
Fiji	2	0
Iran	4	47,778
Iraq	32	5,874,040
Israel	139	7,830,601,148
Libya	34	7,529,576
Occupied Palestinian Territories	0	0
Pakistan	22	14,146,706
Russia	42	77,305,028
Saudi Arabia	58	19,525,839
Somalia	10	973,675
South Sudan	5	24,966
Sri Lanka	6	1,329,743
Sudan	4	7,525,162
Turkmenistan	9	156,736
Uzbekistan	4	0
Vietnam	17	20,519
Yemen	3	0
Zimbabwe	57	2,617,091
<b>Total</b>	<b>738</b>	<b>8,605,814,734</b>

Source: Ev w239 – Annex to letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 12 May 2014

Table 9 – Extant licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to CAEC Countries of concern 2014

	Number of licences (OIELs and SIELs)	Value of SIELs
Argentina	15	25,408,417
Bahrain	27	32,475,493
Egypt	28	5,404,393
Tunisia	11	1,223,537
Ukraine	12	18,163,905
<b>Total</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>82,675,745</b>

Source: Ev w239 – Annex to letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 12 May 2014

352. Analysis of the extant licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components reveals the following highlights:

- i. The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to China has risen from £571m (194 licences) to £636m (232 licences) – a increase of 11.2% in value and 19.6% in quantity;
- ii. The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Iran has fallen from £80.2m (6 licences) to £47,000 (4 licences);
- iii. The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Iraq has risen from £1.7m (20 licences) to £5.87m (32 licences) – a increase of 340% in value;
- iv. The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Pakistan has risen from £8.76m (22 licences) to £14.1m (22 licences) – a increase of 61.5% in value;
- v. The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Russia has risen from £22m (39 licences) to £77.3m (42 licences) – a increase of 350% in value;
- vi. The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Saudi Arabia has risen from £13.9m (53 licences) to £19.5m (58 licences) – a increase of 40.7% in value;
- vii. The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Sri Lanka has risen from £10,346 (6 licences) to £1.33m (6 licences);
- viii. The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Sudan has risen from £216,262 to £7.5m; and
- ix. The value of cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to Vietnam has fallen from £7.2m (22 licences) to £20,519 (17 licences)

The total number of extant arms export licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components has risen from 607 to 738 (an increase of 21.6%) from 2013 to 2014, however the value of these licences has only risen from £8,525,441,180 to £8,605,814,734 (0.1%)

– Note that the increase in value is significantly distorted by the single extant licence to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories to the value of £7.7bn.)

**353. I propose that the Committees conclude that the scale of the Government’s approval of export licences for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components both to the Government’s principal Countries of Human Rights concern and to the Committees on Arms Export Controls’ additional countries of concern is a matter of considerable disquiet, particularly given the fact that each and every one of the items involved by virtue of being subject to export licensing has an actual or possible military use.**

**354. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether Ministers themselves will give greater scrutiny to export licence applications for cryptographic equipment, software, technology and components to the Government’s principal Countries of Human Rights concern and to the Committees’ additional countries of concern.**

### Sniper rifles

355. The Committees scrutiny of extant Government approved exports of sniper rifles as at May 2014 showed that of the FCO’s current list of 28 countries of top human rights concern there were extant sniper rifles to 3 of those countries. These countries were, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka.

356. The Committees scrutiny also showed that as of May 2014 of the Committees’ 5 additional countries of concern, there were extant sniper rifle licences to 2 of those countries. These were Bahrain and Egypt.

357. The Committees have made particular scrutiny of the export of sniper rifles to Ukraine since the first quarter of 2011. On 24 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary as follows:

In your Oral Evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 March on Ukraine we had the following exchange:

**Q7: Sir John Stanley:** “Foreign Secretary, there were widespread reports in the press, on which the Foreign Office declined to comment following the change of Government in Kiev, that British personnel—whether Government personnel or Government-approved personnel—had gone to Kiev to give expert ballistic advice as to the location of sniper positions from which those demonstrating peacefully were killed in Kiev. Against that background, do you have any regrets to express to the Committee that in each quarter of 2011, the British Government gave export licence approval to sniper rifles to Ukraine, and did so again in 2012 and in 2013?”

**Mr Hague:** “We have to base our decisions on the information available at the time, of course, and that will always be the way. We will always have the benefit of hindsight on some of these things. I would have to look at the details of any applications before giving any detailed opinion about that, but I am satisfied that all our export licence decisions are based on the information available at the time.”

I attach in Ukrainian a copy of the article that appeared in “Minding Russia” on the internet on 24 February 2014. I also reproduce immediately below what we have been told is the article’s translation into English:

#### Rada Commission Determines Who Shot People in Kiev

Author Voronz, Vsk, 23/02/2014 - 13:22

The Verkhovna Rada [parliamentary] commission to investigate the massacre in Kiev, chaired by Hennadiy Moskal, deputy from the Bitkivshchina [Fatherland] Party, has determined that the sniper rifles with which people were shot in Kiev on the morning of 20 February were purchased for the Crimean Territorial Department of Internal Forces, UNIAN reported, citing a statement from commission chairman Moskal.

This special sub-division was created personally by Stanislav Shulyak, a commander of the Ukrainian internal troops; its commander is Col. Sergei Asavalyuk, Moskal stated.

According to Moskal's report, soldiers from the Crimean special division were captured on video by journalists, and their radio chatter was recorded. Information about the purchase of 80 British AVK type sniper rifles for this sub-division is contained in the *Vestnik gosudarstvennykh zakupok Ukrainy* [Bulletin of State Purchases of Ukraine].

Please could you tell the Committees whether the statement in the article that 80 British AVK type sniper rifles were purchased for the Crimean Territorial Department of Internal Forces is correct, and whether the fact that this information is contained in the *Vestnik gosudarstvennykh zakupok Ukrainy* [Bulletin of State Purchases of Ukraine] is also correct. If so, please could you state on what date or dates the Government gave export licence approval for the export of these sniper rifles from the UK to the Ukraine.

Finally, please could you provide details of all UK Government export licence approvals of sniper rifles to Ukraine from the beginning of 2010 giving the same information as in the Table to my letter to the Business Secretary of March 6, a copy of which is attached for convenience, i.e. providing the following information in respect of each licence approved namely: date of licence approval, type of sniper rifle, quantity, value, usage (i.e. how many were exported to Ukraine), stated end-use, stated end-user.

#### **Annex 1 – original Ukrainian article**

Комісія Ради в'яснила, хто расстреливал людей в Києве

Автор Voronz, Vsk, 23/02/2014 - 14:22

Москаль Гена

*Комісія Верховної Ради по расследованию бойни в Києве под председательством депутата от партии «Битківщина» Геннадія Москаля в'яснила, что снайперские винтовки, из которых были расстреляны люди в Києве утром 20 февраля, были закуплены для Крымского территориального управления внутренних войск Украины.*

Об этом сообщает УНІАН со ссылкой на заявление председателя комиссии Москаля.



Это спецподразделение было создано лично командующим внутренних войск Украины Станиславом Шуляком, его командующим является полковник Сергей Асавалюк, заявил народный депутат.

По сообщению депутата от партии «Батькивщина», бойцы крымского спецназа были отсняты на видео журналистами, а их радиопереговоры записаны». Данные о закупке 80 английских снайперских винтовок типа АВК для данного подразделения есть в «Вестнике государственных закупок Украины».

Смотрите также: Снайперы "Беркута" убивают безоружных людей на Институтской. ВИДЕО попавшего под обстрел<sup>319</sup>

358. The Business Secretary, Vince Cable, replied on 14 May 2014. The relevant section of his letter was as follows:

### **Ukraine – sniper rifles**

Following a thorough search of our records, and having consulted our Post in Kiev and weapons specialists in MOD, I have been unable to verify any of the claims regarding the UK made in the article to which you refer. What I can say is that:

We are not aware of the existence of any UK-made weapon known as an “AVX sniper rifle”, and we have no record of having granted any export licence for a weapon described in these terms.

The phrase “AK variant” is routinely used to describe weapons; however these are not made in the UK. The images we have seen from Ukraine appear to show marksmen using Dragonov SVD sniper rifles which are a derivative of the AK series of weapons and are produced by Russia and in other former communist states under licence.

We have no record of ever having granted any export licence where the Crimean Territorial Department of Internal Forces was named as end-user, consignee or third party on the licence application.

Since 2010 we have granted 17 licences for export of a total of 83 sniper rifles to Ukraine. The stated end-use in each case was for hunting or sports shooting and the end-users were authorised gun dealers or private individuals. Information about these licences is given at Annex 3.

The only licence granted for supply of sniper rifles to the Ukrainian government was in November 2000. This was for 10 rifles and the end-user was named as “the Security Service of the Ukraine”.

We do have concerns about the use of hunting and sporting weapons in the recent disturbances in Ukraine, including those described as “sniper rifles”. That is why the majority of the suspended licences listed in Annex 3 were for such weapons, or for components or silencers for such weapons. However I have seen nothing that would persuade me that the media report you refer to is accurate.<sup>320</sup>

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<sup>319</sup> Ev w220 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to William Hague dated 24 April 2014

<sup>320</sup> Ev w474 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 14 May 2014

**Annex 3**

Export licences for sniper rifles for Ukraine, 2010-2013

Date Licence Granted	Goods Description	Quantity	Total Licensed Value (£)	End-User
28/09/2010	Stock System, Rifle Calibre .300, Rifle Calibre .308, 700 Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	6	15000	Arm Elit
14/01/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338	10	36000	Arm Elit
27/06/2011	Hunting Rifle Calibre .308	5	15000	Arm Elit
30/06/2011	NATO Model Rifle Calibre 7.62 x 51	5	15000	Arm Elit
06/07/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308, Ammunition Calibre .300, Ammunition	15	113400	Arm Elit
19/08/2011	Hunting Rifle Calibre .308	5	15000	Arm Elit
26/09/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	6	18000	Arm Elit
27/10/2011	Semi Automatic Rifle Calibre .308, Spare Magazine, Suppressor.	3	11605	Arm Elit
14/03/2012	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .300	1	2500	Arm Elit
15/08/2012	Repeating Target Rifle (6.5x47mm) with 2 spare barrels.	3	1500	Private Individual
21/12/2012	Bolt Action Rifle. Calibre .338	3	16000	Arm Elit
07/01/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338 with interchangeable spare barrels in calibre .300 & .308	3	30000	Arm Elit
15/04/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	5	22500	Arm Elit
12/04/2013	Desert Tactical Arms SRS Chassis System with Conversion Kit, Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308 22" Barrel	6	24000	Arm Elit

23/07/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338 with Spare Barrel Calibre .338	3	7000	Private Individual
26/07/2013	Bolt Action Rifle .338	1	5300	Private Individual
24/09/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .22-250, Bolt Action Rifle Calibre 6.5-284	3	36500	Arm Elit

**359. I propose that the Committees recommend that, given the utility of sniper rifles for internal repression, particularly in situations of conflict or potential conflict, the Government should give closer scrutiny to export licence applications for sniper rifles to countries where human rights abuses are prevalent or are likely to increase.**

## Tasers

360. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the export of Tasers can be found at paragraphs 329–332 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 89 of the Report.

361. The Committees' Recommendation on the export of Tasers in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees continue to recommend that the Government specifically reports breaches of export controls in relation to Tasers, and on the enforcement action taken, in the next UK Strategic Export Controls Annual report following any breach, stating in each case to where the Tasers were exported or were due to be exported.<sup>321</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government confirms that it will continue to report on breaches of export controls, and on enforcement action taken, including in relation to Tasers, in the UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report. This reporting will include details relating to prosecutions, confiscation proceedings, seizures, disruptions and compound penalties.<sup>322</sup>

**362. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government's confirmation that it will continue to report on breaches of export controls, and on enforcement action taken, including in relation to Tasers, in the UK Strategic Export Annual Report, and that this reporting will include details relating to prosecutions, confiscation proceedings, seizures, disruptions and compound penalties is welcome.**

<sup>321</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 89

<sup>322</sup> Cm8707, p 38

## Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) “Drones”

363. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) “Drones” can be found at paragraphs 333–337 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendations at paragraph 90 of the Report.

364. The Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendations on the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) “Drones” in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees’ Conclusion and Recommendations:**

The Committees conclude that the Foreign Secretary’s statement to the Committees with regard to the export from the UK of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones that “we want to have a tough, strong export control regime at all times into the future” is welcome. In the light of that policy, the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) what specific action it is taking within the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to ensure that the MTCR is not weakened in relation to drones, components of drones and drone technology; and
- b) whether it considers that any changes to UK export controls in relation to drones, components of drones and drone technology are necessary to achieve the Government’s stated policy, and, if so, what those changes are and the date by which they will be implemented.

The Committees further recommend that the Government states its policy on approving export licences for drones.<sup>323</sup>

### **The Government’s Response:**

- a) The Government actively contributes to the MTCR’s technical working group, which updates the regime’s control lists to account for all relevant proliferation threats, including UAVs.
- b) The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the MTCR both control UAVs. The WA controls all UAVs “specially designed or modified for military use” as well as civil UAVs with specific characteristics. The MTCR’s controls apply to UAVs with a range greater than 300kms. The UK’s export controls are wholly in line with both these regimes, which form the authoritative multilateral controls for UAVs. Updates to control lists are agreed within each of the regimes on a consensus basis and these are then reflected in UK export controls lists.

Export licenses for UAVs are approved in accordance with the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, which include an explicit requirement to comply with the UK’s commitments under the regimes. More information can be found here:

<http://www.mtcr.info/english/guidetext.htm>

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<sup>323</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 90

<http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/index.html>

<https://www.gov.uk/assessment-of-export-licence-applications-criteria-and-policy>.<sup>324</sup>

365. In its written submission to this inquiry Reprieve stated that it had identified a number of licences granted to UK companies for the export of components to the United States which appeared to have been used on weaponised UAVs. It stated that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) had confirmed, in correspondence with Reprieve, that some licences had been granted for the export of goods which had been intended for use by the US Government in weaponised UAVs. BIS had indicated that in granting these licences it had applied the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria including :

- “the respect for human rights” (Criterion 2);
- refraining from issuing export licenses which would “provoke or prolong armed conflicts” or “aggravate existing tensions or conflicts” in the country of final destination (Criterion 3);
- refraining from issuing export licenses where there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export “aggressively against another country” (Criterion 4); and
- the behaviour of the buyer country with regard to ... respect for international law (Criterion 6).

366. Reprieve wrote that the Export Control Act 2002 states that controls may be imposed for military equipment and technology if their exportation or use is "capable of having a relevant consequence". "Relevant consequences" include "the carrying out anywhere in the world of (or of acts which facilitate) (a) acts threatening international peace and security; (b) acts contravening the international law of armed conflict; ... (d) breaches of human rights". It continued:

The US’s use of drones in non-war zones, such as Pakistan and Yemen, is inconsistent with these criteria. In particular, it is in breach of the international law of armed conflict. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force by one state against another, other than in certain very limited circumstances. The US’s use of drones in areas where there is no armed conflict, including Pakistan and Yemen, fall so far short of the international humanitarian and human rights law requirements for legality, that none of those exceptions – such as arguments of ‘state consent’ or ‘self-defence’ - could render them lawful.

367. Reprieve also stated that it was aware of certain components being exported to the US for use in Predator and Reaper UAVs which did not appear on the Consolidated List, and therefore did not currently require export licences. Reprieve was greatly concerned, because, it said, that it undermines the entire purpose of the export licensing regime, in that components specifically intended for use on weapons capable of carrying out great destruction may be exported free from any governmental scrutiny at all. Reprieve informed the Committees that it had spoken to BIS on this issue and that BIS had indicated it did not intend to add such components to the list

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<sup>324</sup> Cm8707, pp 38–39

because this export control would operate solely at the national level and therefore could easily be circumvented and would have no effect on the export of these products from other parts of the European Union. Reprieve did not accept that properly implemented controls could be easily circumvented purely because those same controls are not in place elsewhere in the EU. Reprieve called for the UK Government to consider and put in place its export controls on the basis of its own priorities and international obligations, rather than adopting a passive approach which would result in the lowest standard of regulation being applied across all EU countries.<sup>325</sup>

368. On 12 May 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary requesting information regarding export licence approval for weaponised UAVs. The text of the letter was as follows:

I should be grateful for the following information regarding Government export licence approval for weaponised, as opposed to surveillance, UAVs, their software, technology and components.

1. Please could you list the countries to which the Government has given export licence approval for weaponised UAVs, their software, technology or components since coming into office, stating in the case of each country and each licence:

- a) the nature of the goods approved for export;
- b) the number of licences approved by country;
- c) their value by country;
- d) the date each licence was approved; and
- e) any end-user undertakings sought and given.

2. Please could you state whether the present Government has given any export licence approval for Brimstone, its software, technology or components and, if so, please could you provide the same information as in paragraph 1 above.

3. Please could you also state whether any export licence applications for Brimstone, its software, technology or components have been submitted to your department and are awaiting decision.<sup>326</sup>

The Business Secretary, Vince Cable, replied on 6 June 2014. The relevant section of his letter dealing with UAVs was as follows:

#### **“Weaponised” UAVs and Brimstone**

Let me start by clarifying that the UK does not classify “weaponised” UAVs separately from “non-weaponised” UAVs and that many components will be common to both. Consequently, in the context of your request we have searched our records for all ‘military’ UAVs and components falling within control entry ML10c1 (previously ML10c) in the UK Strategic Export Control Lists and for related software and technology. We then

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<sup>325</sup> Ev w75

<sup>326</sup> Ev w474 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 12 May 2014

sought to identify from the detailed goods description any licences that were for items intended for “weaponised” UAVs.

On this basis we have found no record of any export licences granted by the present Government for “weaponised” UAVs, their software, technology or components.

I can also confirm that no licences have been granted by this Government for the Brimstone missile, its software, technology or components. However we have granted one export licence for software for modelling, simulating and evaluating the Brimstone Missile System. Information about this licence is included at Annex A.

Finally, there are no applications for Brimstone, its software, technology or components, currently awaiting decision.<sup>327</sup>

#### Annex

<b>STANDARD INDIVIDUAL LICENCE (PERMANENT) FOR SOFTWARE RELATED TO BRIMSTONE</b>					
<b>Goods Description</b>	<b>Goods Summary</b>	<b>Destination</b>	<b>Goods Value (£)</b>	<b>Date of Approval</b>	<b>End User Undertaking provided?</b>
CD containing version of the Dual Mode Brimstone UOR standard DIMODS 6 DoF Mathematical Model	Software for modelling / simulating / evaluating weapon systems	United States	20000	31-Jul-2012	Yes

369. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) the circumstances, if any, in which it considers the giving of Government export licence approval to the export of weaponised, as opposed to surveillance, UAVs, their software, technology or components would be compatible with the Government’s national and international human rights undertakings and with international law; and
- b) the end-use undertakings it would seek from recipients of UK exports of weaponised UAVs, their software, technology or components before giving Government export licence approval.

<sup>327</sup> Ev w499 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 June 2014

## Arms exports to counter piracy

370. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to counter piracy can be found at paragraphs 338–341 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 91 of the Report.

371. The Committees' Recommendation on arms exports to counter piracy in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether there have been any breaches to date in the conditions the Government has attached to licences of exported arms to be used by private security companies for counter-piracy purposes, and, if so, what are the breaches that have occurred and by which private security companies.<sup>328</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

During 2012 eight Maritime Anti-Piracy companies were found to be non-compliant with the terms of their licence. These breaches occurred as a result of a change in policy by the Sri Lankan Government which forced all private security companies operating from Sri Lanka to use a "floating armoury" outside their territorial waters rather than land-based armouries for the storage of weapons. The use of floating armouries was not, at that time, permitted by the licence. We believe, however, that the companies concerned retained sufficient controls over the goods whilst located on these particular armouries such that there was no increased risk of loss or diversion. Given the sensitivity of such activities – and the underlying cause of the non-compliance – the Government considers that disclosing the names of the companies who were found to be non-compliant would not be justified. As the Minister of State for Business and Enterprise, the Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, explained in his letter to the Chairman of the Committees of 7 July 2013, the use of floating armouries is becoming increasingly common and it is important that our licensing policy evolves to take account of this fact. We are now granting licences for export or trade activity in support of maritime counter-piracy operations involving the use of floating armouries subject, of course, to careful and detailed risk assessment.<sup>329</sup>

372. The letter and Annex that the Chairman of CAEC received from the Business Minister, Michael Fallon, dated 7 July 2013 was as follows:

I am writing to bring you up to date on export licensing matters relating to counter-piracy efforts. I know that you take a close interest in this area and wanted me to inform you that my Department will soon begin issuing UK trade licences authorising the use of floating armouries for the storage of controlled equipment, particularly firearms.

As you know, UK Private Security Companies (PSCs) have a strong presence in the region, which is encouraging because these companies are comprised of highly disciplined ex-UK

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<sup>328</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 91

<sup>329</sup> Cm8707, p 39



forces personnel and a high standard of security is provided. This is also a commercial success story.

The biggest difficulty facing PSCs is a logistical one relating to the storage of controlled goods. While initially the land-based armouries, operating primarily under government or police oversight, were welcoming and accommodating of PSCs engaged in counter-piracy efforts, increasingly storage has been problematic. This is due to a combination of armouries reaching capacity, armouries operating restrictive hours not conducive to twenty four hour operations, spiralling costs due to excessive demand and, also, the Sri Lankan MOD choosing to close its land-based naval armoury to commercial companies and offering only an off-shore vessel outside their territorial waters.

The available solution to this problem is the operation of off-shore vessels designed to store controlled goods like firearms securely, and in some cases, accommodate personnel as well. Whilst authorising transfers of controlled goods to platforms operating in international waters is not new to us — we have long supported UK exports of strategic goods to the UK Continental Shelf — the difference here is that the goods include weapons, which represent new challenges for us when it comes to assessing the risks.

We have been working with our advisors, principally officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to find a way to manage these risks. We have decided to adopt a case by case approach and assess a range of points for each vessel. These points are set out in an annex to this letter.

We have focused initially on a vessel called the *MV Mahanuwara*, which is operated by a company called Avant Garde Maritime Services of Sri Lanka, which is operated under the authorisation and the protection of the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence. Having collected and assessed the information set out in the annex our advisors and my officials concur that the risks of allowing PSCs to use this vessel, as a short term storage solution, is acceptable. We will therefore begin authorising licences for the use of this vessel with immediate effect.

We will then move to assess other vessels that the UK PSCs have expressed an interest in using. We are working with officials at the Department of Transport and the Home Office to determine any additional conditions that they may wish to place on UK-flagged vessels. This is due to be discussed this month at a cross-Government Ministerial Working Group on Counter-Piracy. UK vessels should be inherently lower risk but you will appreciate that they will need to comply with DfT guidance on the use of armed guards and relevant Home Office firearms legislation.

Please do let me know if you or any members of the CAEC have any questions arising from this letter.

Annex

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION HMG WILL REQUIRE TO ASSESS THE RISK OF FLOATING ARMOURIES AGAINST THE CONSOLIDATED CRITERIA

- The vessel name and International Maritime Organisation (IMO) number.
- Details of the flag under which the vessel operates.

- The size/class of the vessel and a description.
- The vessel's minimum and maximum crew complements.
- The location(s) where the vessel operates including ports.
- Details of the operation and accessibility to the vessel's armoury.
- Details of which personnel, apart from the crew, will be allowed access to the vessel and under what circumstances.
- Details of the insurance of the vessel.
- The maximum armoury capacity of the vessel and the types of weapons they will be permitted to be stored.
- Details of the plans for disposal of surplus/abandoned equipment.
- Details of the protection measures for the vessel.
- Details of what legislation and regulations the vessel is subject to, including details of any inspections undertaken to date.
- Details of any circumstances under which the vessel may lease capacity to other organisations.
- Details about any circumstances under which weapons may be leased to other organisations.

Licence holders will be required to monitor these points, and to notify ECO of any changes. As with all activity undertaken under a UK trade licence, records of transactions will be kept and inspected by ECO officials during each compliance audit. We are also exploring the viability of conducting on-vessel inspections. Companies will be required to report on licence use on a quarterly basis.<sup>330</sup>

373. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about arms exports to counter piracy. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

Why are companies who are being assessed for counter-piracy Open General Trade Licences or Individual Trade Control Licences not being assessed against the Foreign Secretary's policy statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012 that the export would not be permitted of controlled goods "which might be used to facilitate internal repression", as well as against the UK's Consolidated Criteria?

**The Government's answer:**

Please refer to the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 October, which confirms that our policy is to assess against the Consolidated Criteria.<sup>331</sup>

374. The Export Control Organisation, within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills published on its website a list of companies who are registered to use Open General Trade Control Licences (Maritime Anti-piracy). Companies registered to use the licence need to meet all the terms and conditions of the licences and are subject to compliance audits conducted by

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<sup>330</sup> Ev w140 – Letter from Michael Fallon to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 7 July 2013

<sup>331</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

ECO's Compliance Unit. At the time of the Committees' last report (HC 205) there were 55 companies registered to use the licence; this year the number has increased to 88.<sup>332</sup> A complete list of these companies can be found at Annex X of this Report.

375. Since April 2012 the Government has indicated in its quarterly reports on arms export licences those goods that have been licensed for anti-piracy operations. The table below shows the total number of various categories of goods that have been licensed from April 2012 until 30 September 2013:

Table 10 – Arms exports licence approvals for goods for use in anti-piracy operations April 2012 – 30 September 2013

Country	Assault Rifles	Combat shotguns	Machine guns	Pistols	Rifles	Sniper rifles	Sporting Guns
Comoros	1,900	300	0	110	1,150	0	0
Djibouti	1,100	150	0	130	200	0	300
Egypt	700	150	0	60	0	200	700
Ghana	0	0	0	0	0	20	0
Kenya	300	100	0	50	101	0	200
Madagascar	4,900	750	0	490	1,000	204	300
Maldives	6,150	550	0	490	1,600	200	850
Mauritius	5,119	700	0	420	3,254	1	716
Oman	3,700	900	0	240	1,250	200	600
Russia	17	0	0	0	0	19	0
Seychelles	12	0	22	0	0	0	0
South Africa	7,519	850	6	776	3,151	357	1,528
Sri Lanka	2,360	500	0	180	910	200	100
Tanzania	600	150	0	30	200	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>34,377</b>	<b>5,100</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>2,976</b>	<b>12,816</b>	<b>1,401</b>	<b>5,294</b>

Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Quarterly pivot reports 2012 Q2 – 2013 Q3

376. When we questioned the NGOs about the proliferation of arms export licence approvals for anti-piracy operations Oliver Sprague (Amnesty UK) informed the Committees that in addition to the SIEL licences, highlighted in the table above, there was also an Open General Export Licence (OGEL) for the supply of ML1 and ML2<sup>333</sup> goods for anti-piracy operations. He stated that over 85 UK private military security companies had registered to use the OGEL. He continued:

As a general rule, we would be opposed to the idea that you could have an open general licence to allow the transfer of assault rifles and combat shotguns for private military security companies operating overseas. It seems to be a very lax licensing regime for those sorts of activities, not least because we have long-standing concerns about the conduct of

<sup>332</sup> Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Open general trade control licence (maritime anti-piracy): list of registered companies, <http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/eco/docs/eco-ogtcl-maritime-anti-piracy-registrations-list.pdf>

<sup>333</sup> ML1 goods are smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20mm, other firearms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7mm or less and accessories; ML2 goods are smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20mm, other armament or weapons with a calibre greater than 12.7mm, projectors and accessories.

private military security companies operating overseas stemming from real concerns about accountability and oversight. We have seen from numerous examples, not just relating to anti-piracy, that there is an accountability gap. When things go wrong, what legal recourse is available to ensure that the perpetrators of atrocities are held to account?

Mr Sprague continued by saying that:

It seems to us that the only eligibility requirement at the moment for these licences is that you need to be signed up to the international voluntary code of conduct on private military companies.

We have long argued that a voluntary regulatory approach to something as serious as the provision of private and military security companies is wholly inadequate and that we need a legal framework and a licensing system. In general terms, we are concerned about the proliferation of the huge number of small arms and light weapons and their related ammunition for private military companies engaged in anti-piracy.<sup>334</sup>

When pressed further Mr Sprague said:

It is certainly the case that the current reporting requirements on the open general anti-piracy licence fall well below the international standards to which the UK Government subscribe. The international marking and tracing regime for small arms and light weapons, of which the UK was a big supporter, has a requirement to keep records for 20 years. The ATT [Arms Trade Treaty] says that records for small arms exports must be kept for a mandatory 10 years. The reporting requirement on the OGEL is that companies are required to keep records for only four years, which is five times less than under the international agreement that we have signed up to, and it is clearly at odds with requirements under the ATT. We simply do not know what is being exported under those licences.<sup>335</sup>

377. When we questioned the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, about whether he had any evidence of diversion of goods licensed for anti-piracy operations he said: “There is no evidence of diversion” and that the proper procedures that were followed were “entirely correct.”<sup>336</sup> When asked if all of the weapons exported for the purposes of anti-piracy were going to British companies, Edward Bell, Head of Export Control Organisation, BIS, told the Committees that they “are going to British companies in all cases and rigorous terms are applied to the licences for all these shipments.” When asked whether other countries were supplying weapons for anti-piracy operations to their own nationals, related companies or other Governments Chris Chew, Head of Policy, ECO, said: “As far as we are aware, around 70% or 80% of the private security companies operating in this sector are UK companies. So the vast majority of the weapons are going to UK companies, and they are being supplied by UK companies.”<sup>337</sup> When pressed further about other countries supplying arms for anti-piracy operations Mr Chew said: “There is a small number, and we have had some discussions with some of our international partners, but

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<sup>334</sup> Q 19

<sup>335</sup> Q 21 [Oliver Sprague]

<sup>336</sup> Q 62

<sup>337</sup> Q 64

because of the different ways in which we license these activities it is difficult at the moment to make any fair comparison—but the vast majority of the activity is UK-based.”<sup>338</sup>

378. The Committees were surprised at the reaction of Edward Bell when he was informed of the numbers of the weapons that had been licensed for anti-piracy operations by his Department. He said to the Committees: “having now heard about the volumes, I would like to do a bit more digging around that. [...] I certainly will have a closer look at the volumes involved.”<sup>339</sup>

379. When the Foreign Secretary was asked, in the Oral evidence session on 8 January 2014, about the apparently large volume of arms being granted licences for anti-piracy operations he said:

[...] we do have to bear certain things in mind. One is that the vast majority of the private maritime security companies operating in the Indian Ocean are British, so probably a large proportion of the volume of such weapons is coming through our licensing system rather than that of another country. Secondly, a proportion of the weapons is in maintenance at any one time. Thirdly, the companies need a degree of operational flexibility; they will always have more such weapons than they are deploying. Furthermore, approximately 4,500 ships transit the high-risk area every month. Once you think about that figure—4,500 ships every month—it puts these figures into something of the right perspective, but that does not mean we should not have a look at this and satisfy ourselves and the Committee on the point you raise about the overall quantity.<sup>340</sup>

380. When asked what controls exist for monitoring shipments of counter-piracy weapons once they had been shipped the Foreign Secretary said: “There are a lot of controls.” He continued by stating that companies had to meet strict conditions and keep detailed records, in addition to training staff. He said that the UK offices of the companies were regularly inspected by BIS and that they had to sign up to an international code of conduct for private security service providers. When asked specifically about the 5,00 assault rifles and 3,200 rifles that had been authorised for shipment to Mauritius the Foreign Secretary replied:

There are 4,500 ships per month transiting through that area, which is close by Mauritius. We do not have evidence of the diversion of any of these weapons. If we did, we would take it extremely seriously. It is important to point out that, so far, this policy has been a contributing factor to the huge reduction in pirate attacks in recent times. It is one of the factors. Not a single merchant ship carrying private armed security guards has been hijacked. This is part of a successful policy overall. We have to be very vigilant about it. You are quite right to ask these questions, but we are vigilant about it. It is a successful policy, so far, and we have not seen evidence of any diversion.<sup>341</sup>

381. The Business Secretary wrote to the Chairman of CAEC on 3 February. The section of his letter referring to maritime anti-piracy was as follows:

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<sup>338</sup> Q 65

<sup>339</sup> Q 63 [Edward Bell]

<sup>340</sup> Q 158

<sup>341</sup> Q 159

On the issue of export licences for maritime anti-piracy, while we do not have any concerns as to the decision-making process, we committed to look again at the volumes of goods involved in these licences. I can confirm that this work is underway and I will write to you about this matter by the end of March.<sup>342</sup>

382. On 12 May 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary requesting information regarding the volume of arms export licences for counter-piracy. The text of the letter was as follows:

I should be grateful for your letter on the volume of weapons being exported under Government licences for counter-piracy which you said in your Oral Evidence that you would be sending to me by the end of March.<sup>343</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 6 June 2014. The section relating to licences for maritime anti-piracy was as follows:

#### **Licences for Maritime Anti-Piracy**

The Committees raised concerns at the December 2013 hearing about the volume of weapons licensed for use by Private Marine Security Companies (PMSCs). Mr Mike Gapes MP quoted export data for the period April 2012 to June 2013, indicating that “a total of 30,000 assault rifles, 2,536 pistols and 11,000 rifles were supplied to a number of countries on the East Coast of Africa and to the Arab world, and also to South Africa and Russia”. Mr Gapes went on to ask “whether such quantities...seem reasonable in terms of the need, which clearly exists, for anti-piracy work”. He also asked if there was “evidence of diversion of any of these weapons away from the purposes for which they were supplied”. My officials committed to look at these points.

Firstly, let me be clear that I stand by what I said in December. There is no evidence of diversion. All the British security companies involved in anti-piracy activities are subject to a code of conduct and rigorous pre-licensing checks. Holders of the Open General Trade Control Licence (Marine Anti-Piracy) are also subject to post-licensing audits. The vast majority of Private Marine Security Companies are British and they play an important role in ensuring the safety of shipping off the coast of East Africa.

My officials have examined all the exports of automatic weapons and small arms during 2012 and 2013 in support of the Marine Anti-Piracy (MAP) sector. They looked at weapons, accessories and ammunition falling within control entries ML1a, ML1b, ML1d, ML3a and PL5017 as outlined in Schedule 1 of the Open General Trade Control Licence (Marine Anti-Piracy).

As well as looking at the quantity of items licensed over the two year period they also identified what was actually exported. The investigation showed that the overall percentage of goods shipped against licences granted for automatic weapons and small arms was only some 1.8 per cent of the total figure licensed in 2012 and 2013. Although 181,708 individual items were licensed over the two year period, only 3,273 were shipped

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<sup>342</sup> Ev w199 - Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 3 February 2014

<sup>343</sup> Ev w474 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 12 May 2014

(2,332 assault rifles; 83 combat shot guns; 6 machine guns; 63 pistols; 623 rifles; 166 sporting guns).

It is clear from contacts with exporters that they have routinely been applying for licences to cover volumes of exports vastly in excess of what is actually exported. This is because they have no firm estimate of likely exports over the two year validity period of each licence at the point they apply for licences.

The volumes listed in many of these licences are not therefore an accurate prediction of the eventual level of exports. Although the overall volume shipped is proportionate to the activities of British PMSCs - and there is no evidence of diversion - this is not a satisfactory situation. My officials will be working with the suppliers of automatic weapons and small arms to PMSCs over the next few months to put new licensing arrangements in place to closely align the volumes licensed and actual exported volumes. These arrangements will enable the UK Government to exercise greater supervision of these exports and will include regular reporting of volumes exported to be included in the routine quarterly publication of export licensing data.

We also announced a review of the mainstay licensing cover for PMSCs, the Open General Trade Control Licence (Marine Anti-Piracy), at a recent meeting of the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG). SCEG is the trade association for the sector. Our aim will be to ensure that the licence remains fit for purpose and it is our intention to put a revised version in place by the end of this year.<sup>344</sup>

**383. I propose that the Committees conclude that it is a matter of much concern that both Ministers and their officials in the Business Department appeared to have been unaware of the volume of weapons for which the Department had given export licence approval to Private Marine Security Companies for counter-piracy purposes, 34,377 assault rifles, 5,100 shotguns, 28 machine guns, 2,976 pistols, 12,816 rifles, 1,401 sniper rifles, and 5,294 sporting guns in the period April 2012 to September 2013 alone, until this was brought to their attention by the Committees in the Oral Evidence session on 18 December 2013, notwithstanding the fact that all the information referred to by the Committees came from the Business Department's own quarterly arms export licence reports.**

**384. I propose that the Committees conclude that it is also a matter of much concern that the Business department in the two-year period 2012 and 2013 gave licence approval to private Marine Security Companies to export automatic weapons and small arms for counter-piracy purposes vastly in excess of the number actually needed and shipped – 181,708 individual items approved for export but only 3,273 (1.8%) actually shipped comprising 2,332 assault rifles; 83 combat shotguns; 6 machine guns; 63 pistols; 623 rifles; and 166 sporting guns.**

**385. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) whether the Business Secretary's change of policy to put new licensing arrangements in place to closely align the volumes licensed and actual exported volumes has been put into effect and, if not, the date by which it will be;**

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<sup>344</sup> Ev w499 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 June 2014

- b) that it will inform the Committees when the revised version of the Open General Trade Control (Marine Anti-Piracy) licence has been put in place;
- c) whether the vessel *MV Mahanuwara* operated by Avant Garde Maritime Services of Sri Lanka and under the authorisation and protection of the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence is still being used as an armoury for weapons for counter-piracy exported with Government approval from the UK;
- d) what other vessels, and under what flags, are currently being used as armouries for weapons for counter-piracy exported with Government approval from the UK;
- e) whether the Government remains satisfied that none of the weapons it has approved for export for counter-piracy purposes has been diverted for other purposes;
- f) whether it has any evidence that any of the weapons the Government has approved for export for counter-piracy purposes have been used to facilitate internal repression in Sri Lanka or in any other authoritarian country;
- g) how many security companies currently registered to use Open General Export Licences for the export of weapons for counter-piracy from the UK are also UK registered companies, in what other countries and territories are the non-UK registered companies domiciled, and whether the Government have any plans to terminate the OGEL registration of some of the companies as the piracy threat diminishes; and
- h) what prohibitions the Government has put in place, if any, to prevent Private Marine Security Companies who have been given Government export licence approval to export weapons for counter-piracy purposes from the UK subsequently transferring or on-selling from outside the UK's jurisdiction some or all of such weapons to third parties.

## The licensing of security services

386. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the licensing of security services can be found at paragraphs 342–344 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 92 of the Report.

387. The Committees' Recommendation on the licensing of security services in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:

- a) whether the governance mechanism to monitor compliance with the International Code of Conduct for private security service providers has now been established, and, if so, what the details of the mechanism are; and



- b) whether it remains the Government's position that it has no plans to extend legislation, other than the requirement for export or trade control licences, to UK-based Private Military and Security Companies.<sup>345</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

- a) On 22 February 2013 International Code of Conduct (ICoC) stakeholders reached agreement to establish an independent governance and oversight mechanism in the form of a Geneva-based association governed by Swiss law to be known as the ICoC Association. The mechanism is intended to ensure the effective implementation of the ICoC through the certification and monitoring of private security providers, as well as through the adoption of a complaint procedure.

136 companies worldwide have applied to be founding members of the Association, including 51 from the UK. The launch conference of the Association took place in Geneva on 19-20 September, and the UK is a founding member.

- b) The Government's position remains as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 30 September 2012.<sup>346</sup>

388. The Foreign Secretary's letter of 30 September 2012, referred to in the Government's Response above, was as follows:

Where UK-based Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are involved in the export from the UK, or the movement overseas, of military goods, they require export or trade control licences in the usual way. However, the provision of security services per se does not fall within the ambit of the UK's current strategic export controls legislation and the Government has no plans to extend that legislation to encompass them. ·

The question of how best to regulate the private security industry is one that has been considered carefully by both the previous Government and this one. Following a full public consultation, the Government decided against statutory regulation. Nevertheless were main committed to promoting high standards of conduct by PMSCs internationally, as I made clear in my Written Ministerial Statement of 16 September 2010 (copy attached for information).

Following my statement, the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG) was established on 21 June 2011 as the Government's Industry Partner for the regulation and accreditation of private security providers.

The SCEG is working with the Government on developing the UK's national accreditation process. This is likely to involve certification by nationally accredited independent auditors to internationally recognise professional standards derived from the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICOC). The Government will use its leverage as a key buyer of private security services to promote compliance with the ICOC and to encourage other PMSC clients to do likewise. The ICOC now has over 460

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<sup>345</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 92

<sup>346</sup> Cm8707, pp 39–40

signatory companies from 60 different countries. At an international level, the UK, along with the Swiss, US and Australian governments is now working with nongovernmental and industry partners to establish a mechanism to monitor compliance with the code. We hope to be in a position to establish the governance mechanism in early 2013.<sup>347</sup>

**389. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response**

- a) how many UK-registered Private Marine Security Companies are now members of the International Code of Conduct Association and the names of those companies; and**
- b) whether it remains the Government's position that it has no plans to extend legislation, other than the requirement for export or trade control licences, to UK-based Private Military and Security Companies.**

### **Arms exports and internal repression**

390. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports and internal repression can be found at paragraphs 345–351 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusions at paragraph 93 of the Report. The Government's Response is in Cm8707, pages 39–40.

391. The Government's policy on arms exports and internal repression has been the subject of exhaustive exchanges between the Committees and the Government for most of the present Parliament.<sup>348</sup> The wording of the key statements are set out in chronological order below.

392. In a Written Answer on 26 October 2000<sup>349</sup>, the then Minister of State in the FCO, Peter Hain, stated on behalf of the then Government the UK's Consolidated Criteria against which arms export licence applications would be approved or refused. In his Answer he made two policy statements with regard to arms exports and internal repression. The first was: "An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by [...] concern that the goods might be used for internal repression." The second was that the Government will "not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression." There was thus established two tests — the what might be termed the "broad test", namely "concern that the goods might be used for internal repression", and what might be termed the "narrow test" — namely "if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression."

393. The limitations of the narrow test — the clear risk test — were highlighted by the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, in the Westminster Hall debate on 20 October 2011 when he said "We could say, "Well, there's a bit of a risk, but it's not a clear risk, so we can sell." We would probably draw the line at Chairman Kim Jong Il in North Korea, President Mugabe and

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<sup>347</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, Ev w97

<sup>348</sup> See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, *Session 2012–13, Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2011, the Government's Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues*, HC 419, paras 186–191; and HC (2013–14) 205, Ev 345–368

<sup>349</sup> The Written Answer can be found in full at Annex 5

the Burmese military junta, but for everyone else, we could say, “Well, the risk isn’t clear. Let’s get on and sell.”<sup>350</sup>

394. The two test policy was accurately endorsed by the then Foreign office Minister, Alistair Burt in his Press Statement of 18 February 2011 in which he said: “The longstanding British position is clear: We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.”<sup>351</sup>

395. It was further accurately endorsed by the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, himself on 7 February 2012 in Oral Evidence to the Committees. The key exchange was:

**Chair:** Secretary of State, I want to start with what is a major policy issue, if not the major policy issue for our Committees, which is whether there has been a change in Government policy on the approval of arms export licences for arms and ammunition and military equipment that could be used for internal repression. The Committees took a deliberate decision in our report of last April to publish in full, as Annex 1, the Written Answer that was given by the then Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Peter Hain, on 26 October 2000 in which he set out in full the consolidated criteria for arms exports.

As far as arms exports that involve weapons that could be used for internal repression are concerned, your junior Minister, Alistair Burt, in his press release statement on 18 February last year, entirely accurately and correctly summarised the previous Government’s position carried forward by the present Government on policy in this area. He summarised that accurately in these words: “The longstanding British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.” Foreign Secretary, has that policy changed, or is it as correctly stated by Mr Alistair Burt?

**Mr Hague:** That is still the policy. The “or”, as you have pointed out on other occasions, is important.

**Chair:** It is profoundly important, Foreign Secretary, and I am glad that you have acknowledged that.<sup>352</sup>

Significantly the Foreign Secretary chose to highlight the importance of the comma between the two halves of the final sentence separating the broad test from the narrow “clear risk” test.

396. Coming before the Committees again on 8 January 2014 the Foreign Secretary made an extraordinary re-interpretation of his evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012. He said:

The “clear risk” applies to both parts of the sentence, in line with our long-established policy. [...] To be absolutely clear about that, it is the long-standing policy to follow

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<sup>350</sup> HC Deb, 20 October 2011, col 344WH

<sup>351</sup> Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Notice, “Foreign Office Minister comments on review of arms exports”, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=553955182#>

<sup>352</sup> See: Committees on Arms Export Controls, Second Report of Session 2010–12, *Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly Reports for July to December 2010 and January to September 2011, the Government’s Review of arms exports to the Middle East and North Africa, and wider arms control issues*, HC 419, Q 109

criterion two of the consolidated criteria. We will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression, so “clear risk” applies to the whole of the sentence of two years ago.<sup>353</sup>

This was even more confusing as the Foreign Secretary had written to the Chairman of the Committees only a couple of days earlier and said, when referring to the test for suspending arms export licences to Egypt that the Government had “applied suspension to ‘equipment which might be used for internal repression’.”<sup>354</sup>

397. On 25 March 2014 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, announced the Government’s revised Consolidated Criteria in a Written Ministerial Statement.<sup>355</sup> The wording of the previous broad test which had been in place since 2000 namely that “concern that the goods might be used for internal repression” was omitted. The Business Secretary claimed in his Statement that: “None of these amendments should be taken to mean that there has been any substantive change in policy.”<sup>356</sup>

398. On 7 April 2014 the Committees took Oral Evidence from the previous Foreign Office Minister Peter Hain. When asked whether the previous Government had had a two-test policy on arms exports and internal repression — a broad test and a narrow test — Peter Hain answered:

I agree with you that there was the broad test that related to concern, which is stated in the preamble to my written ministerial statement, [...] and then there was a narrow test that related to clear risk.<sup>357</sup>

When asked if there had been a change of policy by the present Government Peter Hain answered:

In the statement issued by the Business Secretary last month, yes, it has. It has been relaxed in the sense that the broader test that I applied no longer exists. [...] then there is a repeat of the second test, as it were, the narrow test, which is welcome, but the broader test has been dropped. So I do think the policy has changed. It is a more relaxed approach to arms exports.<sup>358</sup>

He followed that statement by saying later: “By omitting the broader test of concern, we have relaxed the policy.”<sup>359</sup>

399. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary on 28 April 2014 and included the following question:

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<sup>353</sup> Q 130

<sup>354</sup> Ev w194 – Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 January 2014

<sup>355</sup> HC Deb, 25 March 2014, 9–14WS

<sup>356</sup> HC Deb, 25 March 2014, 10WS

<sup>357</sup> Q 191

<sup>358</sup> Q 196

<sup>359</sup> Q 197

Why has the policy statement in the previous Criteria announced on 26 October 2000 by the then Minister of State at the FCO, Peter Hain, that “An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed ... by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression or international aggression” been omitted?<sup>360</sup>

The Business Secretary replied to the question on 14 May 2014 as follows:

The statement you refer to was a general statement that formed part of the introductory text, it did not form part of the Consolidated Criteria itself. Licence applications have always been assessed against the eight Criteria and not against general statements contained in the introductory text.<sup>361</sup>

400. I propose that the Committees conclude that the evidence of the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, that: “Licence applications have always been assessed against the eight Criteria and not against general statements contained in the introductory text” is in direct contradiction with the evidence of the former Foreign Office Minister, Peter Hain, who when asked if there had been a change of policy by the present Government, answered: “In the statement issued by the Business Secretary last month, yes, it has. It has been relaxed in the sense that the broader test that I applied no longer exists. [...] then there is a repeat of the second test, as it were, the narrow test, which is welcome, but the broader test has been dropped. So I do think the policy has changed. It is a more relaxed approach to arms exports.” He subsequently added: “By omitting the broader test of concern, we have relaxed the policy”.

401. I propose that the Committees further conclude that, contrary to the Government’s claim when the Business Secretary announced the revised Criteria for the Government’s approval or refusal of arms exports that: “None of these amendments should be taken to mean that there has been any substantive change in policy.”, the omission of the wording in the previous Consolidated Criteria that: “An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by [...] concern that the goods might be used for internal repression” does constitute a substantive change of policy.

402. I propose that the Committees further conclude that the Government’s welcome decision to use the broad test of “equipment which might be used for internal repression” rather than the narrow test of a “clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression” when exercising its power to suspend arms export licences as stated in the Foreign Secretary’s letter to the Chairman of the Committees on 6 January 2014 makes it even more anomalous and regrettable that the Government has omitted the broad test from its revised Criteria for arms exports.

403. As the broad test that: “An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by [...] concern that the goods might be used for internal repression” which has been Government policy since October 2000 provides an important safeguard against military and dual-use goods, components, software and technology being exported from the UK from being used for internal repression, I propose that the Committees

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<sup>360</sup> Ev w222 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 28 April 2014

<sup>361</sup> Ev w474 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls 14 May 2014

**recommend that this now omitted wording is re-introduced into the Government's arms exports controls policy.**

## **The Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review**

404. The Committees' previous scrutiny of the Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review can be found at paragraphs 352–368 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 94 of the Report.

405. The Committees' Recommendation on the Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that in its Response to this Report the Government states:

- a) how many arms export licence applications to date have been suspended using the Government's new suspension mechanism; and
- b) the nature of the goods and country of export destination in each case.<sup>362</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

a) and b) Use of the suspension mechanism has been considered on several occasions but pursued in only one instance, in respect of Egypt. EU Member States agreed on 21 August to suspend all export licensing for equipment which might be used for internal repression and to reassess export licences of equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. The Business Secretary announced on 28 August that the UK had suspended 48 extant licences as a result of this agreement. This suspension will be kept under review until such time as conditions in Egypt indicate that it is appropriate to lift these restrictions. The suspended licences cover a wide range of equipment including spares for helicopters and aircraft, specialist software and communications equipment.<sup>363</sup>

406. In its Written Evidence to the Committees UK Working Group (UKWG) stated that despite the UK Government's announcement of the outcome of its review of the UK arms transfer control system in the light of events in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which claimed to have established more robust procedures, UKWG had seen "little evidence of an impact on actual decision making" and that there still appeared to be tendency for the Government to react to events after they had happened rather than to evaluate risks ahead of time.<sup>364</sup> UKWG highlighted that the FCO had identified eight countries from the MENA region<sup>365</sup> and that the Committees had identified an additional three countries from the MENA region in their 2013 Report as of concern to it.<sup>366</sup> UKWG did not argue that all licences issued for

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<sup>362</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 94

<sup>363</sup> Cm8707, p 40

<sup>364</sup> Ev w111

<sup>365</sup> The eight countries of human rights concern in the MENA region identified by the FCO were: Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, The Palestinian Occupied Territories, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen.

<sup>366</sup> The three countries of concern for the CAEC within the MENA region were: Bahrain, Egypt and Tunisia)

arms exports to these countries were problematic, however it suggested that “little has changed in terms of UK licensing practice as a consequence of the Arab Spring or subsequent transfer control reviews.”<sup>367</sup>

407. When we questioned UKWG in more depth about this issue at the Oral Evidence session On 4 November 2013 Roy Isbister (Saferworld) said:

Looking at the MENA region as a whole, there is little indication that there has been a change in the pattern of exports. I have some figures showing, for example, that licences to the MENA region as a proportion of total licences issued increased from 9.5% in 2008 to 30% in 2012, and that, by value, arms licences—SIELS—to the Middle East were over 50% of total arms exports in 2012. [...] <sup>368</sup>

**408. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it has any additions or amendments to make to its previous statements on the outcome of its Arab Spring arms export policy review.**

### Arms export licence revocations

409. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of arms export licence revocations can be found at paragraphs 369–378 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Recommendation at paragraph 95 of the Report.

410. In their 2011 Report (HC 686) the Committees recommended that: “The Government provides us with full details on arms export licences it has revoked since the beginning of January 2011 when the recent uprisings and demonstrations in the Middle East and North Africa started.”<sup>369</sup> The information requested was provided in the Government’s Response (Cm8079) to the Committees’ Report and is set out in full on pages 21–45 of that Response.<sup>370</sup> In the case of each and every one of the 158 arms export licence revocations listed, the reason given by the Government for the revocation was that the licence now contravened both Criteria 2 (internal repression) and Criteria 3 (provoking or prolonging armed conflict). The Government cited the end user countries to be Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar and Tunisia.

411. During the period of 7 November 2012 to 7 May 2013 the Chairman of the Committees wrote a number of letters to the Foreign Secretary requesting details of any further arms export revocations since the Government’s initial response in Cm 8079. In total the Government had made a total of 209 revocations of extant arms export licences to 16 countries as follows:

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<sup>367</sup> Ev w112

<sup>368</sup> Q 8

<sup>369</sup> Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2010–12, *Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation*, HC 686, para 135

<sup>370</sup> Government Response to Committees on Arms Export Controls, First Joint Report of Session 2010–12, *Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation*, Cm 8079, pp21–45

Table 11: Revocations of extant arms export licences from January 2011 to May 2014

Country	Number of revocations
Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar	2
Argentina	37
Bahrain	39
Bahrain/Egypt	4
Belarus	1
China	3
Egypt	43
Iraq	1
Libya	72
Mauritius	1
Oman	2
South Africa	1
Syria	1
Tunisia	1
Zambia	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>209</b>

Source: Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010–12, *Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm8079, Annex 1; Letter from the Foreign Secretary to the CAEC Chairman dated 6 December 2012, Annex B; and letter from Foreign Secretary to CAEC Chairman dated 16 May 2013 (See HC (2013–14) 205 Ev w262)*

412. The Committees' Recommendation on arms export revocations in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government informs them of all strategic export licence revocations as soon as each revocation is made stating in each case as in Annex 1 of the Government's Response to the Committees' 2011 Report (Cm8079):

- a) the End-user Country;
- b) the Annual Report Summary;
- c) the rating; and



d) the reason for revocation.<sup>371</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

Revocations brought about by a change in policy, such as with Argentina in April 2012, or by a change in the political situation such as with Egypt in July 2013, are already announced at the time of revocation. But other revocations of a routine nature will continue to be made public, with all other licensing decisions, in the Quarterly Reports.<sup>372</sup>

413. On 17 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary requesting details of all arms export licence revocations between 14 May 2013 and 10 April 2014. The text of the letter was as follows:

**Arms export licence revocations for the period 14 May 2013 to the present**

Please could you provide details of **all** licence revocations made in the period 14 May 2013 to the present, by country.

Please could you provide the information in the same format as in Annex 1 of Cm 8079 (SIELS/OIELS/etc., End User Country, Annual Report Summary, Rating, Reason for Revocation). Please could you also include the date of revocation in each case.

I should be grateful for this information by 8 May.<sup>373</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 6 June 2014. The section of his letter relating to revocations was as follows:

**Arms export licence revocations**

In your letter dated 17 April 2014, you requested details of all licence revocations made in the period 14 May 2013 to the present, listed by country.

The information you requested is attached in Annex B. The data provided is split into two sections:

- a list of 17 revoked licences - either Standard Individual Export Licences or Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) for single destinations
- a list of 8 licences where specific countries have been removed from extant multiple destination OIELs or Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs)

Please note that data for licences revoked or countries removed in 2014 are not currently in the public domain. This includes two licences for Venezuela revoked in the last few days because of concerns about internal repression.<sup>374</sup>

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<sup>371</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 95

<sup>372</sup> Cm8707, p 41

<sup>373</sup> Ev w211– Letter from the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 17 April 2014

<sup>374</sup> Ev w499 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 June 2014

## Annex

<b>LICENCES REVOKED</b>					
<b>Licence Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary</b>	<b>Goods Rating</b>	<b>End User Countries</b>	<b>Revoke Date</b>	<b>Refusal Reason</b>
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Venezuela	28/05/2014	2,7
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Venezuela	28/05/2014	2,7
SIEL	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Russia	12/05/2014	4
OIEL	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for anti-armour missiles, technology for anti-ship missiles, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for fire control equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for general military vehicle components, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for laser rangefinders, technology for laser warning detectors, technology for military combat vehicles, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for optical target acquisition equipment, technology for optical target surveillance equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for tanks, technology for turrets, technology for weapon night sights, technology for weapon sights	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
SIEL	body armour, components for body armour	ML13d	Ukraine	04/02/2014	2
SIEL	software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment, radio jamming equipment	5D001c, 5A001f2	Nigeria	15/11/2013	2
SIEL	radio jamming equipment	5A001f2	Nigeria	15/11/2013	2

SIEL	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	United States	25/10/2013	2
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Egypt	25/10/2013	2
SIEL	equipment for the use of military helicopters, components for military helicopters	PL5017, ML10b	Russia	25/10/2013	2
SIEL	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Germany	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	components for machine guns	ML1a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	components for machine guns	ML1a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
	<b>COUNTRIES REMOVED FROM EXTANT LICENCES</b>				
<b>Licence Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary</b>	<b>Goods Rating</b>	<b>End User Countries</b>	<b>Revoke Date</b>	<b>Refusal Reason</b>
OIEL	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	Russia	24/03/2013	4
OIEL	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	ML11a, ML17d, ML22a, ML4b1, ML6a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	1C202a, 3A201a1, 6A001a2d, 8A002a2, 8A002a3, 8A002a4, 8A002c, 8A002i2	Russia	19/03/2014	4
OIEL	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21c, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2

OIEL	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21c, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OIEL	sporting guns	ML1a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OIEL	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the production of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	ML11a, ML18a, ML21a, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OITCL	gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML1d, ML3a	Ukraine	25/02/2014	2

414. Recent revocations to Egypt, Russia and the Ukraine can be found at paragraphs 550, 473 and 568 respectively.

415. Following analysis of the list of revocations provided by the Business Secretary's on 6 June 2014 against the quarterly pivot reports the Chairman of the Committees wrote the following letter to the Business Secretary:

On 17 April 2014 I wrote to you requesting a list of **all** export licence revocations for the period 14 May 2013 to the present. You replied to that request on 6 June, providing in an annex to your letter providing a total of 14 SIEL revocations and 3 OIEL revocations for single destinations and 7 OIEL and 1 OITCL revocations where specific countries have been removed from extant multiple destination OIELs or OITCLs.

However, on examining the ECO Pivot reports for Quarter 3 (July–September) and Quarter 4 (October–December) 2013 there appear to be some discrepancies between the data supplied in your letter of 6 June and the information contained in the Pivot Report. For example:

The Pivot report for Q3 2013 lists the following revocations not included in the list provided as an annex to your letter of 6 June:

**Continental Shelf:** SIEL for towed hydrophone arrays;

Pivot Report for Q4 2013 lists the following revocations not included in the list provided as an annex to your letter of 6 June:

**Belgium:** OIEL for components for military aero-engines and military aero-engines;

**Latvia:** OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment;

**Malaysia:** OIEL for components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines;

**Morocco:** OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment;

**Nigeria:** 2 SIELs for radio jamming equipment refused and a SIEL for radio jamming equipment and software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment;

**Russia:** SIELs for components for military helicopters and equipment for the use of military helicopters and an OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment;

**Tunisia:** OIEL for software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of software for military communications equipment;

**Turkey:** OIEL for components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines;

**United Arab Emirates:** OIELs for: military engineer vehicles; software for military communications equipment and technology for the use of military communications equipment; and components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment and test equipment for military aero-engines;

Please could you explain why the above, and any other missing revocations, for arms export licences were not included in the annex to your letter of 6 June and please provide a full and comprehensive list of revocations for the period 13 May 2013 to the present.<sup>375</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 30 June 2014 as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 12 June 2014 regarding discrepancies between the list of revoked licences I supplied to you in my letter of 6 June and the data published in the ECO's Pivot Reports for Q3 and Q4 2013.

First of all I should note that the following SIELs were included in my letter of 6 June and that there is no discrepancy with respect to these revocations:

- 2 SIELs for Nigeria – one for “software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment, radio jamming equipment” and one for “radio jamming equipment;” and

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<sup>375</sup> Ev w505 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 12 June 2014

- 1 SIEL for Russia for “components for military helicopters and equipment for the use of military helicopters”.

Turning now to the other licences you have identified it appears that in each case an error in the way that certain cases are processed within the SPIRE licensing system, or an error in the automated process by which the Pivot report is generated from the SPIRE data, has led to these licences being incorrectly reported in the Pivot Report as revoked. In fact no revocations took place in these cases. Clearly these errors are unacceptable. For some of the cases we need to do further work to identify the exact causes of the error and we may need to make changes to the SPIRE system or to the process for generating the Pivot Reports in order to prevent similar errors in future.

These errors affect 4 licences as follows:

1) Continental Shelf: SIEL for *towed hydrophone arrays* – this was one of 4 SIEL licences for *towed hydrophone arrays* converted from a Temporary Export to a Permanent Export licence during the period in question. It is not clear why one of the 4 licences is showing as revoked, as no revocation took place. Further investigation is required;

2) Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL) for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for *military engineer vehicles*. When an OIEL nears its expiry date an exporter may request a short extension to the licence to allow exports to continue while a new (replacement) application is processed. In a few such cases the exporter will ask us to remove some of the goods lines from the extended licence. The way this request is processed within SPIRE causes the whole licence to appear in the Pivot Report as revoked, when in fact only specific goods lines have been removed;

3) A single OIEL for Latvia, Morocco, Russia, Tunisia and UAE for *software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment*. As above, these lines were removed from an extended licence;

4) A single OIEL for Belgium, Malaysia, Turkey and UAE for military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines, military containers, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the production of military aero-engines, test equipment for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, test equipment for military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aero-engines, technology for software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines. In this case the exporter had asked for the coverage of the licence to be amended shortly after it was issued. The amendment has caused the licence to be reported as revoked, but no actual revocation took place.

Since my previous response to you there have been 7 revocations for Thailand. Annex A provides further detail. These will be published in the April – June 2014 pivot report in October 2014.

In light of the discrepancies described above I have included one further “revocation” in Annex A. This is not an actual revocation based on any change in circumstances in the

destination country or any change in policy, but will nevertheless appear as a revocation in the Q2 (April – June) 2014 pivot report.

This particular licence was originally issued with Latvia as the end-user destination but subsequently reissued for the Central African Republic after it became apparent that an error was made by the exporter when submitting the original application. As the goods were being detained at the port by HM Revenue & Customs the most expedient way of amending the licence was to revoke and reissue the licence under the same SPIRE reference. The April – July 2014 pivot report is likely to show a licence for the Central African Republic as revoked, as this is the destination now showing under the live SPIRE reference. Annex A provides further detail.

While there is a statement on the Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics website explaining why data found in these reports may differ from data published elsewhere it is of course of the utmost importance that our published reports are as accurate as possible. I am therefore grateful to you for bringing these errors to my attention. Please be assured that we will take the steps necessary to prevent these errors happening in the future.

I hope you find this information helpful.<sup>376</sup>

Annex.

Licence Type	Goods Summary	Goods Rating	End User Countries	Revoke Date	Revoke Reason
SIEL	small arms ammunition	ML3a	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	civil body armour, body armour, components for body armour	1A005, ML13d	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	civil body armour	1A005	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	components for body armour	ML13d2	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	anti-riot/ballistic shields	PL5001b	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	body armour	ML13d1	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	tear gas/irritant ammunition	ML3a	Thailand	13/06/2014	2
SIEL	military support vehicles, components for military support vehicles	ML6a	Central African Republic	11/06/2014	Licence was converted from a licence to export to Latvia to a licence to export to CAR

416. A full list of revocations from 2011 to present can be found at Annex 11.

417. **I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

<sup>376</sup> Ev w508 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 30 June 2014

- a) **the standard wording it uses to the exporters of controlled goods regarding its right to revoke export licences for controlled goods that it has approved;**
- b) **the grounds on which the Government has the right to revoke export licences for controlled goods that it has approved;**
- c) **the means by which the Government protects itself from financial liabilities if it exercises its right to revoke export licences for controlled goods that it has approved; and**
- d) **what specific steps have been taken to deal with the errors, rightly described as “unacceptable” by the Business Secretary in his letter to the Committees’ Chairman of 30 June 2014, whereby extant licences are being described in the Government’s Quarterly arms export Report as having been revoked when they have not been, and by what date these errors will have been eliminated for the future”.**

### Arms export licence suspensions

418. Included in the package of changes proposed in the framework of the post-Arab Spring review of the UK defence and security export policy, the Foreign Secretary announced on 13 October 2011 a new procedure to:

Allow immediate licensing suspension to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or stability. Applications in the pipeline would be stopped and no further licenses issued, pending Ministerial or departmental review.<sup>377</sup>

419. The UKWG informed the Committees in its Written Evidence that it welcomed this initiative initially, as it “could enhance the UK’s export control system’s capacity to respond more quickly to quickly changing circumstances by placing an immediate freeze on arms transfers that risk exacerbating instability; this would be especially useful in situations where the rapidly changing circumstances in the recipient country prevented adequate risk assessments from taking place.” UKWG stated that in follow-up discussions with officials it was now clear that in its current form the suspension mechanism was not fit for purpose and required radical overhaul. The fundamental flaw in the system was that it appeared only to apply to new and pending license applications and not to extant export licences. This meant that in situations where the Government had decided that an unfolding crisis made it impossible to make a meaningful assessment of new licence applications, existing licences could nevertheless continue to be honoured. For example, in a situation where the Government had decided to suspend licence applications to a country’s internal security units due to immediate concerns about the use of equipment in internal repression in a rapidly unfolding crisis, licences already granted to those same units would still be valid and transfers could continue. UKWG said that for the suspension mechanism to be meaningful, it must clearly apply to the whole arms transfer process and so must place an immediate freeze on all arms transfers, including all extant licences and any pending shipments due to take place.<sup>378</sup>

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<sup>377</sup> FCO Announcement, *Foreign Office review of export policy*, 13 October 2011, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-review-of-export-policy>

<sup>378</sup> Ev w117 – AEC007 –UKWG, paras 80–81



420. The UKWG also stated that it was unclear about how the suspension mechanism was triggered and the thresholds that were used when deciding to apply it. For example, despite the rapidly unfolding conflict and deteriorating security situation that took place in Mali in March 2012, the suspension mechanism appeared to have not been used. In fact, to date, as far as the UKWG understands, it has only been used in response to the very serious situation in Egypt in August 2013.<sup>379</sup> It believed that this suggested that the threshold that triggered the suspension mechanism had been set at a very high level, once armed conflict and instability had already reached crisis point; it therefore did not serve as the flexible response to rapidly developing and unfolding situations that UKWG had expected. UKWG recommended that for the process to be effective the Government must significantly enhance and expand its licence suspension process to capture all stages of the arms transfer process. As well as current licence applications, the suspension must also apply to all extant licences and deliveries pending. It also recommended that the Government should outline its criteria and the threshold for invoking the suspension process.<sup>380</sup>

421. When the NGOs were questioned about the export licence suspension mechanism on 4 November 2013 Oliver Sprague (Amnesty UK) said:

As the UK Working Group, we have serious concerns about how the licence suspension mechanism is going to work. When we had initial discussions about it, it was meant to be an early warning system. It was meant to put an immediate freeze on deteriorating situations where it was impossible to ascertain proper risk assessment in licensing. It was supposed to be very much an early warning mechanism. It was not used in Mali, and it was used in Egypt only when, as far as we were concerned, it had already reached crisis point. It was not an early warning mechanism at all. It was imposed after the situation had already deteriorated to a pretty serious extent.

I guess that that is not the only concern that we have with it. We question the logic of applying suspension only to pending licence applications. We think that that is a fundamental flaw. If you are going to suspend licensing, you should be suspending arms transfers, not just licensing. If there are pending shipments or extant licences, then you must have the ability to suspend those as well. To focus only on licence applications makes it entirely possible that a shipment to an end user who is already licensed will go ahead, even though a pending licence application to the same end user is subject to suspension.<sup>381</sup>

422. When asked how the current suspension system could be improved Oliver Sprague said:

Use it as it was intended, which is as an early warning mechanism. It was needed because it was argued that to revoke licences was quite a problematic process—that you had to cancel a licence and then go through the entire process of reapplying for the licence even if the decision to cancel it was, in hindsight, slightly ill-judged.

The idea of a suspension mechanism, where you would put a temporary freeze on something while a situation was developing and unfolding, and answers were being sought, seems to be inherently sensible, so our advice would be to use it as it was originally

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<sup>379</sup> "UK suspends Egypt military export licences", *The Guardian*, 28 August 2013

<sup>380</sup> Ev w117

<sup>381</sup> Q 12 [Oliver Sprague]

intended: to lower the threshold for it being used; to use it when situations are deteriorating, and information about the conduct of the security forces is questionable or unknown; and to apply it to all of the transfer process. Apply it not only to pending licence applications but to extant licences and pending deliveries.<sup>382</sup>

423. Roy Isbister (Saferworld) added:

The only case that we are aware of where the suspension mechanism has been applied is Egypt. In that case, it seems that it has been applied to extant licences, which is not how it was explained to us; it also took a long time. As I said, five licences were revoked on 19 July, but the actual suspensions did not take place until 28 August. That is a pretty slow early warning mechanism.

It has been quite confused since then. It was applied in a way that seems different from the message that we were given. There is also the change that Olly mentioned, with approximately 24 licences being unsuspended in the last couple of days. If you look at the notice to exporters, it says that the suspension mechanism has been modified. I shall quote from it, if I may. It states that we have “agreed to modify the way the suspension is applied. In future we will not adopt a blanket approach to the Egyptian organisations listed in paragraph (1) but consider each extant licence and new licence application on its merits.” As far as I can see, that is a standard licensing policy. I do not understand how it is a suspension mechanism, but apparently the mechanism has been modified, not stopped. I do not understand how the Government are operating.<sup>383</sup>

424. Prior to the evidence session with the Foreign Secretary on 8 January 2014 the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees. The relevant text relating to the suspension of licences was as follows:

Recent events in Egypt highlighted the importance of responding quickly to a deteriorating security situation in a country. This was the first time we have deployed the Suspension Mechanism. In two important respects Egypt was a special case. First, we suspended extant licences as well as pending licence applications; this was an addition to the policy announced to Parliament by the Business Secretary on 7 February 2012, which referred only to suspension of pending licence applications. Secondly, we applied suspension to “equipment which might be used for internal repression”. This is of course a lower threshold than Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria, where the test is a “clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression”.<sup>384</sup>

425. The Business Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees on 3 February. The section of his letter referring to the licence suspension mechanism was as follows:

I have asked my officials to work with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence to review the Government’s licensing suspension mechanism. Following the recent Egypt suspension it is my intention to widen the scope to include extant as well as new licences. To paraphrase the Foreign Secretary, when he appeared

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<sup>382</sup> Q 14

<sup>383</sup> Q 12 [Roy Isbister]

<sup>384</sup> Ev w194 – Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 January 2014

before the CAEC on the 8 January, there is now a greater willingness on the part of the Government to suspend licensing and we will not hesitate to do so if it proves impossible or extremely difficult to apply the Consolidated Criteria.<sup>385</sup>

426. The Government, following its decision to extend its suspension mechanism to extant arms export licence for Egypt, also decided to extend its suspension mechanism to extant arms export licences for Russia and Ukraine. This is dealt with in more detail in the section on Russia at paragraph 472 and the section on Ukraine at paragraph 567.

427. **I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government’s decision to apply the broad test of “equipment which might be used for internal repression” rather than the narrow test of “clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression” for deciding whether arms export licences should be suspended is welcome. The Committees further conclude that the Government’s decision to apply its suspension mechanism not just to arms export licences applications that are under consideration but also to those that have been approved and are extant is also welcome.**

428. **I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response:**

- a) **the standard wording it uses to the exporters of controlled goods regarding its right to suspend export licences for controlled goods that it has approved;**
- b) **the grounds on which the Government has the right to suspend export licences for controlled goods that it has approved; and**
- c) **the means by which the Government protects itself from financial liabilities if it exercises its right to suspend export licences for controlled goods that it has approved.**

## Exports of gifted equipment

429. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of exports of gifted equipment can be found at paragraphs 379–383 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Recommendations at paragraph 96 of the Report.

430. The Committees’ Recommendations on exports of gifted equipment in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that they are informed of all gifts of military goods requiring Parliamentary approval at the same time as the relevant Main or Supplementary estimate, or departmental Minute is laid. The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response to this Report whether all gifted military goods are subject to the same arms export policy as commercial military goods, namely compliance with:

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<sup>385</sup> Ev w199 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 3 February 2014

- a) the Government's stated policy that "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression."; and
- b) the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

and whether it is satisfied that this is still the case with all approved gifts of military goods that have not yet left the UK Government's control.<sup>386</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

In response to the Committees' recommendation, copies of Departmental Minutes relating to gifts that require Parliamentary approval will be sent to the Committees as they are laid in Parliament.

All proposals to gift controlled goods are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour. We are satisfied that this is the case with gifts that have not yet left the Government's control.

On one occasion such an assessment was not possible: this was in 2011 and related to the gifting of body armour to the Libyan Interim National Council. On this occasion a statement was made to the House setting out the reasons for not carrying out the assessment. The details were footnoted in Table 2.4 of the Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls 2011.<sup>387</sup>

431. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking two questions about exports of gifted equipment. The questions and answers were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

The Government's Report states that all proposals from Government sponsors to gift controlled goods are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour. Please confirm therefore that all proposals to gift controlled goods are assessed not only against the UK's Consolidated Criteria but also against the Foreign Secretary's policy statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012 that the export would not be permitted of controlled goods "which might be used to facilitate internal repression".

**The Government's answer:**

Please refer to the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 October. The statement in the Annual Report is correct.

**The Committees' question:**

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<sup>386</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 96

<sup>387</sup> Cm8707, p 41

The Government's Report states: "As a matter of policy, all proposals to gift controlled military equipment are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria by relevant Government departments in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour." Why are Government gifts of military equipment not also being assessed against the Foreign Secretary's policy statement to the Committees on Arms Export Controls on 7 February 2012 that exports would not be permitted of goods "which might be used to facilitate internal repression"?

**The Government's answer:**

Please refer to the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 October which clarifies this point.<sup>388</sup>

432. Since May 2013 the Government has laid Department Minutes for the gifting of equipment to other Governments as follows:

- 16 May 2013 – Jordan
- 27 June 2013 – Lebanon
- 15 July 2013 - Syria
- 18 November 2013 - Syria
- 18 November 2013 – Pakistan
- 18 November 2013 – Somaliland
- 18 November 2013 – Somaliland Police
- 23 January 2014 – Syria
- 6 February 2014 - Syria
- 12 February 2014 – Lebanese Armed Forces
- 20 March 2014 - Afghanistan
- 9 June 2014 - Syria

**433. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will assess all proposals to gift controlled goods not only against its Criteria for Arms Exports announced on 25 March 2014, but also against the "lower threshold" Criterion which the Government is using to suspend licences for arms exports, namely "equipment which might be used for internal repression" as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of the Committees of 6 January 2014.**

**434. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Departmental Minutes relating to gifts that require Parliamentary approval state in respect of each item to be gifted which are on the Government's export controls Military List or Dual-Use List and which are not.**

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<sup>388</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

## 10 Arms exports to Countries of concern

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### **Extant arms export licences to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's (FCO) Countries of Human Rights concern worldwide, and to the Additional Countries of concern to the Committees**

435. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Countries of concern can be found at paragraphs 384–386 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusions at paragraphs 97–100 of the Report.

436. In their 2012–13 inquiry the Committees on Arms Export Controls took a new initiative and asked the Government for the first time for details of the Government's approved extant arms export licences for each of the 27 countries listed by the FCO in its Human Rights Annual Report as being its countries of top human rights concern. These were: Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Fiji, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Libya, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. The Committees also asked the Government for details of the Government approved extant arms export licences for an additional 5 Countries of concern to the Committees. These were: Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Madagascar and Tunisia.

437. The Committees' Conclusions and Recommendation on arms exports to Countries of concern in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that in his letter of 10 May 2013, the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, states that there are over 3,000 Standard Individual and Open Individual Export Licences (SIELs and OIELs) that remain extant to the FCO's 27 Countries of human rights concern. According to the Business Secretary's letter the total value of the UK's SIELs to these 28 Countries is some £12,331,621,526 as set out below. The Government does not provide values for OIELs because of their open nature.

Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs)	Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs)
Afghanistan	23,847,337	80	Pakistan	49,802,833	219
Belarus	128,042	11	Russia	86,329,387	271
Burma	3,332,192	8	Saudi Arabia	1,863,182,251	417
China	1,486,415,462	1163	Somalia	1,914,694	26
Colombia	20,089,524	53	South Sudan	0	0
Cuba	0	3	Sri Lanka	8,084,759	49
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0	0	Sudan	7,642,480	14
Democratic Republic of Congo	2,127,980	20	Syria	143,867	3
Eritrea	960,031	6	Turkmenistan	1,022,016	17
Fiji	35,555	4	Uzbekistan	7,405,718	19
Iran	803,440,351	62	Vietnam	13,371,242	74
Iraq	15,915,430	69	Yemen	64,784	10
Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories	7,878,776,714	381	Zimbabwe	2,992,390	46
Libya	54,583,388	49	<b>Total</b>	<b>12,331,621,526</b>	<b>3,074</b>

It should be stressed that a considerable number of the above extant licences will be for dual-use goods or military goods not readily usable for internal repression.<sup>389</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusions.<sup>390</sup>

#### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that in his letter of 20 May 2013, the Business Secretary, states that there are around 400 Standard Individual and Open Individual Export Licences (SIELs and OIELs) that remain extant to the 5 additional Countries of concern highlighted

<sup>389</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 97

<sup>390</sup> Cm8707, p 42

by the Committees (Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Madagascar and Tunisia). According to the Business Secretary’s letter the total value of the UK’s SIELs to these 5 countries is some £111,657,154 as set out below. The Government does not provide values for OIELs because of their open nature.

Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences	Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs)
Argentina	7,543,100	57	Madagascar	24,348,066	40
Bahrain	13,630,375	105	Tunisia	7,062,299	51
Egypt	59,073,314	134	<b>Total</b>	<b>111,657,154</b>	<b>387</b>

It should be stressed that a considerable number of the above extant licences will be for dual-use goods or military goods not readily usable for internal repression.<sup>391</sup>

**The Government’s Response:**

The Government notes the Committees’ conclusions.<sup>392</sup>

**The Committees’ Recommendation:**

With regard to the other 16 Countries of concern<sup>393</sup> which are: Belarus, Burma, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Fiji, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Vietnam and Zimbabwe, the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 772 extant UK export licences to these countries:

- a) contravenes the Government’s stated policy that: “We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression”; or
- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms export Criteria set out in the UK’s Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position.<sup>394</sup>

**The Government’s Response:**

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for these countries contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government’s Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a

<sup>391</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 98

<sup>392</sup> Cm8707, p 42

<sup>393</sup> The Committees made individual recommendations on 16 of the 27 FCO’s Countries of concern and the 5 Committees’ countries of concern. This recommendation refers to the remaining 16 Countries of concern.

<sup>394</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 100



reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence.

The Government has access to a wide range of daily reporting including from its global network of Missions overseas. This enables the Government to respond swiftly to changes in risk.

Several of countries referred to above are subject to EU and/or UN arms embargoes which the Government takes fully into account when making export licensing decisions.<sup>395</sup>

438. In the Westminster Hall debate on the Committees' last Report (HC 205) held on 21 November 2013, the Chairman stated that: "the Committees' scrutiny of the Government's extant licences, particularly in countries where there is significant internal repression, will continue intensively."<sup>396</sup>

439. When the Committees questioned the Foreign Secretary, in the Oral Evidence session on 8 January 2014, about the 3,074 extant licences, to the values of over £12bn (as of May 2013<sup>397</sup>) to the FCO's Countries of concern he said that the items were not covered by sanctions and that they met the Consolidated Criteria. He continued by stating that "a huge amount of work goes into testing licences against the Consolidated Criteria". The Foreign Secretary stated that there had been a ten-fold increase in the number of licence applications referred to Ministers for decision in the last three years. He said:

There is no complacency. We are very rigorous about it. We do not hesitate to turn down licences, but we do so in a way that is consistent, that is justified under the law and under the criteria, that can be defended and that is not obstructing normal trade, which these licensing systems are not intended to do.<sup>398</sup>

Richard Tauwhare, Head of Arms Policy Unit, FCO, continued:

When we are considering the risks against the criteria, we go into a great deal of detail, particularly for those countries which are of human rights concern, not only those on the FCO's list but any country where we know there are human rights concerns. We go into a lot of detail. We ask the post. We look at NGO evidence as well. We routinely monitor what Amnesty, Human Rights Watch and others are saying, and we take all of that into account in the advice we give to Ministers. After the event, posts have a standing requirement to keep an eye on developments in human rights in their countries and to report back to us if there are any developments that might affect our licensing.<sup>399</sup>

440. When the Foreign Secretary was asked if he had been surprised that the Committees had discovered that there had been over 3,000 extant licences with a total value of over £12billion for arms export licences to Countries of concern the Foreign Secretary replied: "Not really [...]. This is a large industry for this country and it is a legitimate trade. We do not have a trade ban with

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<sup>395</sup> Cm8707, p 43

<sup>396</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 408WH

<sup>397</sup> See: HC (2013–14) 205, Ev 209

<sup>398</sup> Q 176

<sup>399</sup> Q 177 [Richard Tauwhare]

those countries of concern, so trade takes place between the UK and those countries. They involve some of the biggest economies in the world.<sup>400</sup> He continued:

Whatever the state of our relations with these countries, we do not hold back from speaking about our human rights concerns, but it is not the policy of this Government, or of previous British Governments, to prevent trade with countries that are of human rights concern. Specific sanctions may apply to some of them and we implement those sanctions, but that is different from obstructing all trade with them.<sup>401</sup>

441. On 10 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary requesting details of all extant licences to the FCO's Countries of Human Rights concern and, in addition, to Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia and Ukraine. The text of the letter was as follows:

**1) Extant licences for the FCO Countries of Human Rights concern**

Please could you state which UK strategic export control licences are currently extant, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence, to each of the 28 countries<sup>402</sup> listed as Countries of Human Rights concern in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 2013 Human Rights and Democracy Report namely:

Afghanistan  
Belarus  
Burma  
Central African Republic (CAR)  
China  
Colombia  
Cuba  
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)  
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)  
Eritrea  
Fiji  
Iran  
Iraq  
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories  
Libya  
Pakistan  
Russia  
Saudi Arabia  
Somalia  
South Sudan  
Sri Lanka  
Sudan  
Syria  
Turkmenistan

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<sup>400</sup> Q 178

<sup>401</sup> Q 179

<sup>402</sup> The FCO increased its Countries of Human Rights Concern from 27 in its 2012 Human Right Report to 28 in its 2013 Report with the addition of the Central African Republic.

Uzbekistan  
Vietnam  
Yemen  
Zimbabwe

## 2) Extant licences for other countries

Please could you state which UK strategic export control licences are currently extant, stating the application type, annual report summary and goods value in the case of each licence, to each of the five following countries:

Argentina  
Bahrain  
Egypt  
Tunisia  
Ukraine<sup>403</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 12 May 2014.<sup>404</sup> Details of the extant licences can be found at Annex 9. A summary of the extant licences is included in the Table 12 below.

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<sup>403</sup> Ev w209 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 10 April 2014

<sup>404</sup> Ev w239 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 12 May 2014

Table 12 – Extant arms export licences to FCO Countries of Human Rights concern May 2014

Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs)	Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs)
Afghanistan	19,222,964	72	Pakistan	49,745,940	255
Belarus	5,458,753	13	Libya	44,308,072	71
Burma	3,273,826	10	Russia	131,542,677	285
Central African Republic (CAR)	197,000	4	Saudi Arabia	1,677,486,389	486
China	1,688,716,748	1146	Somalia	4,261,022	33
Colombia	32,494,783	65	South Sudan	1,795,580	13
Cuba	0	4	Sri Lanka	49,645,755	79
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	8,340	1	Sudan	10,225,162	7
Democratic Republic of Congo	2,173,287	27	Syria	217,792	5
Eritrea	968,640	7	Turkmenistan	5,154,652	28
Fiji	37,720	5	Uzbekistan	3,171,133	14
Iran	41,826,894	53	Vietnam	28,447,422	74
Iraq	32,458,255	80	Yemen	1,596,408	12
Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories	7,912,249,591	470	Zimbabwe	2,636,291	60
			<b>Total</b>	<b>11,915,310,330</b>	<b>3,379</b>

Source: Ev w239 - Annex to letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 12 May 2014

It should be stressed that a number of the above extant licences will be for dual-use goods or military goods not readily usable for internal repression.

Table 13 – Extant arms export licences to Additional Countries of concern to the Committees—May 2014

Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences	Country	Value of SIELs (£)	Number of extant licences (SIELs and OIELs)
Argentina	26,586,517	64	Tunisia	2,005,887	43
Bahrain	49,663,146	115	Ukraine	21,902,281	70
Egypt	65,825,601	129	<b>Total</b>	<b>165,989,231</b>	<b>421</b>

Source: Ev w239 – Annex to letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 12 May 2014

It should be stressed that a number of the above extant licences will be for dual-use goods or military goods not readily usable for internal repression.

442. The changes of note in the number and value of extant arms export licences to the FCO's countries of human rights concern were as follow:

- i. Whilst the number of extant licence to China has fallen slightly the value of current extant licences has risen by £200m in the last year;
- ii. The value of extant licences to Colombia has risen 62% (from £20.1m to £32.4m);
- iii. The value of extant licences to Iran has dropped from £803m to £41m;
- iv. The value of extant licences to Iraq has risen from £15.9m (69 licences) to £32m (80 licences);
- v. The number of extant licences to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories has risen from 381 (value £7.878billion) to 470 (value £7.912billion) – 23%;
- vi. The value of extant licences to Russia has increased from £86m (271 licences) to £131m (285 licences) – arise of 52.3%;
- vii. The value of extant licences to Somalia has risen from £1.9m to £4.26m (22.5%);
- viii. The value of extant licences to Sri Lanka has risen from £8.1m (49 licences) to £49.6m (79 licences) – a rise of 614%;
- ix. The value of extant licences to Turkmenistan has risen from £1m (17 licences) to £5.1m (28 licences) – a rise of 504%; and
- x. The value of licences to Vietnam has risen from £13.4m to £28.4m (213%).

Whilst the number of extant licences has risen slightly by 305 (9.9%) the value of the extant licences has fallen by £41,631,119 (3.3%).

**443. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it is satisfied that each of the 3,375 extant arms export licences to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 28 Countries of Human Rights concern, valued at £11.9 billion, and each of the 421 extant arms export licences to the Committees' Additional 5 Countries of**

concern, valued at £166 million, are currently compliant with all of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria with particular reference to:

- a) **Criterion One (Respect for the UK's international obligations and commitments, in particular sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations);**
- b) **Criterion Two (The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law);**
- c) **Criterion Three (The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts);**
- d) **Criterion Four (Preservation of regional peace, security and stability); and**
- e) **Criterion Six (The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law).**

### **Extant arms export licences to certain individual countries within the FCO's list of 28 Countries of Human Rights concern**

444. Specific evidence given to the Committees in relation to 12 of these 28 countries and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations in relation to those countries follows immediately below.

#### ***Afghanistan***

445. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Afghanistan can be found at paragraphs 461–468 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendations at paragraphs 113 and 114 of the Report.

446. The Committees' Recommendations on Afghanistan in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report lists the items of military equipment and their values that it has gifted or it intends to gift to the Government of Afghanistan and its agencies as British military forces withdraw.<sup>405</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

We publish details in the Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls of controlled military equipment gifted by the Government. There were no gifts of controlled military equipment to Afghanistan in 2012 and to date in 2013 that remains case.

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<sup>405</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 113

If gifting equipment is an option, the Government only agrees to requests from foreign governments to gift them military equipment where to do so would assist our foreign and security policy aims. Gifting is not a frequent occurrence.

All proposals to gift controlled goods are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria in the same way as commercial applications.

Where gifts of controlled items are approved these are reported in the Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls, including the value.<sup>406</sup>

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of its items of gifted military equipment and none of the 80 extant UK export licences to Afghanistan or any goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists gifted, or planned to be gifted, to Afghanistan:

- a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or
- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Afghanistan for: body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, components for all-wheel vehicles with ballistic protection, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for machine guns, machine guns, small arms ammunition, components for pistols, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, general military vehicle components, military support vehicles and technology for military support vehicles.<sup>407</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Afghanistan contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

There is an arms embargo in place for Afghanistan with sanctions applying to those individuals designated under the UN's 'Consolidated List'. All extant licences for Afghanistan were approved in accordance with the sanctions in place or for use by the

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<sup>406</sup> Cm8707, p 53

<sup>407</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 114

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/Diplomatic Missions/United Nations/Recognised NGO.

As stated in the Government's Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls published on 12 July, "As a matter of policy, all proposals to gift controlled military equipment are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria by relevant Government departments in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour." Therefore the Government is satisfied that no gifting package, or planned gifting package, contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above].<sup>408</sup>

**447. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Afghanistan for assault rifles, body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for pistols, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, general military vehicle components, gun silencers, machine guns, military support vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition and technology for military support vehicles are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licensing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four and Six.**

## **China**

448. A declaration by the Madrid European Council on 27 June 1989 established an arms embargo on China.<sup>409</sup>

449. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to China can be found at paragraphs 479–487 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendations at paragraphs 117 and 118 of the Report.

450. The Committees' Recommendations on China in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 1163 extant UK export licences to China:

- a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or
- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

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<sup>408</sup> Cm8707, p 54

<sup>409</sup> Department for Business, innovation and Skills, 2013 Q4 Pivot Report, page 68, [https://www.exportcontroldb.bis.gov.uk/sdb/fox/!STREAM?id=s39sxUg\\_ploBu6ph5&stid=s39sxU6\\_ploBu6ph5&app\\_mnem=sdb&mode=view&xfsessionid=sid\\_s39sxU5\\_ploBu6ph5](https://www.exportcontroldb.bis.gov.uk/sdb/fox/!STREAM?id=s39sxUg_ploBu6ph5&stid=s39sxU6_ploBu6ph5&app_mnem=sdb&mode=view&xfsessionid=sid_s39sxU5_ploBu6ph5)



including those extant licences to China for: body armour, components for equipment employing cryptography, components for ground vehicle communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production of equipment employing software, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, software for cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for the production of military communications equipment, weapon sights.<sup>410</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for China contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

- As the Committees note below there is an EU arms embargo in place against China. The UK interpretation of Arms Embargo on China, given in Parliament on 3 June 1998, is that it applies to:
  - Lethal weapons, such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles. Specially designed components for these and ammunition.
  - Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms.
  - Any equipment which might be used for internal repression.

All extant licences for China were approved in accordance with the UK's interpretation of the embargo.<sup>411</sup>

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it will seek to widen the EU arms embargo on China to include:

- a) all military goods; and

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<sup>410</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 117

<sup>411</sup> Cm8707, p 56

- b) all listed goods which “might be used to facilitate internal repression” contrary to the UK Government’s stated policy.<sup>412</sup>

**The Government’s Response:**

The EU arms embargo already covers any equipment which might be used for internal repression and the Government has no plans to seek to widen it further.<sup>413</sup>

451. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response whether it remains the Government’s policy to continue to support the maintenance of the EU embargo on China but not to widen the military or dual-use goods to which it applies.

452. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to China for components for equipment employing cryptography, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production of equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for military communications equipment, technology for the production of military communications equipment and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government’s Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One and Two.

**Iran**

453. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of arms exports to Iran can be found at paragraphs 404–406 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Recommendation at paragraph 103 of the Report.

454. The Committees’ Recommendation on Iran in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

**The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 62 extant UK export licences to Iran:

- a) contravenes the Government’s stated policy that: “We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression”; or
- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK’s Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

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<sup>412</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 118

<sup>413</sup> Cm8707, p 56

including those extant licences to Iran for: cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.<sup>414</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Iran contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

Sanctions against Iran now include wide restrictions on trade including the export of 'dual use' goods and goods that could contribute to Iran's nuclear programme as well as an arms embargo. There are also wide restrictions targeting the investment in Iran's energy including the supply of key equipment and the purchase of oil and gas. Furthermore there are wide prohibitions on dealings with large sections of the financial sectors including the freezing of funds and economic resources of certain individuals and entities, as well as restrictions on the provision of insurance to the Government of Iran and restrictions on the transfer of funds with Iranian banks.

All extant licences for Iran were approved in accordance with the sanctions in place.<sup>415</sup>

455. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about Iran. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

Please list each new set of EU sanctions on Iran being referred to, and the specific licensing changes made by the present Government, or its predecessor, following each new set of sanctions.

**The Government's answer:**

A list of the amendments to EU sanctions on Iran that were implemented in 2012 is given below. More details of the specifics of these amendments can be found at [http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf). The relevant UK legislation is the Export Control (Iran Sanctions) Order 2012 as referred to in the Annual Report (<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukxi/2012/1243/article/4/made>) [See *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* HC (2013-14) 561, page 3]. Detailed information on how export licensing applications are assessed is provided in Annex A of the Annual Report [See *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* HC (2013-14) 561, page 38]. Our international obligations under EU sanctions regimes are considered as part of the assessment under Criterion 1 of the Consolidated Criteria.

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<sup>414</sup> HC (2013-14) 205, para 103

<sup>415</sup> Cm8707, pp 45-46

COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 amended by:  
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 350/2012 of 23 April 2012  
Council Regulation (EU) No 708/2012 of 2 August 2012  
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 709/2012 of 2 August 2012  
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 945/2012 of 15 October 2012  
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1016/2012 of 6 November 2012  
Council Regulation (EU) No 1067/2012 of 14 November 2012  
Council Regulation (EU) No 1263/2012 of 21 December 2012  
Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1264/2012 of 21 December 2012

COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 amended by:  
Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP of 23 January 2012  
Council Decision 2012/152/CFSP of 15 March 2012  
Council Decision 2012/169/CFSP of 23 March 2012  
Council Decision 2012/205/CFSP of 23 April 2012  
Council Decision 2012/457/CFSP of 2 August 2012  
Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP of 15 October 2012  
Council Decision 2012/687/CFSP of 6 November 2012.<sup>416</sup>

**456. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Iran for equipment employing cryptography are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four and Seven.**

### ***Iraq***

457. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Iraq can be found at paragraphs 407–409 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 104 of the Report.

458. The Committees' Recommendation on Iraq in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 69 extant UK export licences to Iraq:

- a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or
- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

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<sup>416</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

including those extant licences to Iraq for: assault rifles, small arms ammunition, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, cryptographic software equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights, software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment and, weapon night sights.<sup>417</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Iraq contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

There is an embargo on arms and related materiel against Iraq, which provides exemptions for equipment required by the Iraqi Government. All extant licences for Iraq were approved in accordance with the sanctions in place.<sup>418</sup>

**459. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Iraq for anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour, components for military support vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of ground vehicle communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for anti-riot/ballistic shields, technology for body armour, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four, Six and Seven.**

### ***Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories***

460. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories can be found at paragraphs 410–416 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 105 of the Report.

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<sup>417</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 104

<sup>418</sup> Cm8707, pp 46–47

461. The Committees' Recommendation on Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 381 extant UK export licences to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories:

- a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or
- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories for: all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection; body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, components for pistols, components for body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for equipment employing cryptography, components for military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, general military vehicle components, military support vehicles, small arms ammunition, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, weapon sights, military communications equipment and components for small arms ammunition.<sup>419</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.<sup>420</sup>

462. On 30 July 2013 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, wrote to the Chairman of the Committees including within his letter updating a number of issues, the announcement that an Open General Export Licence (OGEL) licence had been issued for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project. The relevant part of the Business Secretary's letter was as follows:

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<sup>419</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 105

<sup>420</sup> Cm8707, p 47

The Government has carefully considered the case for an OGEL for JSF against the Consolidated Criteria in light of the fact that Israel is a confirmed export customer. Israel is expected to take delivery of its first aircraft in 2016 but it is not expected to be operationally deployed before 2018. At this time we do not believe there is a clear risk that the JSF would be used for internal repression, would aggravate existing internal tensions or conflict, or be used aggressively against another state. As none of the relevant thresholds for refusal have been reached, and given the huge potential benefits for UK industry, I believe that an OGEL is the most appropriate licence.<sup>421</sup>

463. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 the issue of arms export licences for cryptographic equipment to Israel; was raised by Sir John Stanley MP and Ian Murray MP and in particular a single approved licence valuing the cryptographic equipment at £7.7 billion. In reply, the BIS Minister. Michael Fallon, said:

The licence was for “equipment employing cryptography” and “software for equipment employing cryptography” with a value of £7.7 billion.

The licence was granted in the first quarter of 2013, and it permits the export of equipment and software for building public mobile phone networks in residential areas and for small businesses. Those items are subject to export control because of their encryption—information security—capability. That capability, it must be said, is a standard feature of the mobile phone network. The goods are for purely commercial end use.

Again, we assessed the application against the consolidated and the national criteria. A licence would not have been issued where there was a clear risk that the proposed exports might be used for internal repression or to provoke or prolong internal conflict, or where they could be used aggressively against another state.

I appreciate that the value of the licence appears extremely high and may not represent a realistic goal on the part of the exporter. The exporter has confirmed to us that the value of the licence was based on an expectation of a large number of orders over the two-year validity period of the licence. Given the nature of the goods and the end use, that was not considered to be a particular concern.<sup>422</sup>

464. On 24 April the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary asking about information regarding the OECD’s investigation of supplies to the Israeli security services from G4S. the text of the letter was as follows:

It was reported in The Independent on 7 January that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) will be investigating supplies to Israeli security services from G4S.

Please could you tell me if the British Government is co-operating with the OECD in its investigation. If so, please could you state what information has been submitted by the Government to the OECD in connection with its investigation.<sup>423</sup>

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<sup>421</sup> Ev w145 – Letter from Vince Cable tot the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 30 July 2013

<sup>422</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, cols 425–426WH

<sup>423</sup> Ev w215 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to William Hague dated 24 April 2014

The Business Secretary replied on 14 May 2014 in letter replying to a number of different requests for information. The section of the Business Secretary's letter relating to Israel was as follows:

#### **G4S, Israel and the OECD**

I believe that the news report you refer to relates to the complaints process under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. As you may know, the Guidelines are voluntary standards for responsible business conduct in areas including human rights, employment and the environment. Unfortunately, the news report does not reflect the complaints process accurately. Each government that adheres to the OECD Guidelines is required to maintain a National Contact Point (NCP) to consider complaints under the Guidelines. The UK NCP is maintained by the UK Government to meet this requirement. It is not part of the OECD and has no wider responsibilities for OECD functions. The UK NCP is staffed by a small team of officials based in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), and operates independently of BIS Ministers in its consideration of complaints.

The UK NCP does not usually comment on a complaint before it makes an Initial Assessment but all its Initial Assessments are published at <http://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-national-contact-point-statements>. The NCP generally expects to make an Initial Assessment within 3 months of receiving a complaint, although I understand that a spike in its caseload at the end of last year has led to some assessments taking a little longer. I would be happy to provide a copy of the Initial Assessment to the Committees once it has been published.<sup>424</sup>

**465. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories for anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for equipment employing cryptography, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, general military vehicle components, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for military communications equipment, technology for small arms ammunition, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, water cannon and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three and Four.**

**466. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether the entirety of the extant export licences to Israel for cryptographic equipment, software and technology valued at £7.8billion are fully compliant with arms export Criterion 2 (Respect for Human Rights) notwithstanding the fact that when the Committees asked in respect of an export licence application to Israel in Quarter 3 of 2013:**

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<sup>424</sup> Ev w474 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 14 May 2014



“Why was a SIEL [Standard Individual Export Licence] for equipment employing cryptography refused?”, the Government’s answer was: “We refused this SIEL under Criterion 2 because the exporter did not provide sufficient information or assurances over potential ultimate recipients and end-use. We therefore assessed there was a clear risk that the export might be used for internal repression.”

467. I propose that the Committees also recommend that the Government sends the Committees, when published, the Initial Assessment made by the UK National Contact Point of the complaint made under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises with regard to supplies to Israel security services from G4S.

## **Libya**

468. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of arms exports to Libya can be found at paragraphs 417–422 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Recommendation at paragraph 106 of the Report.

469. The Committees’ Recommendation on Libya in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 49 extant UK export licences to Libya:

- a) contravenes the Government’s stated policy that: “We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression”; or
- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK’s Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Libya for: gun mountings, military helmets, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of pistols, pistols, small arms ammunition, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, hand grenades, combat shotguns, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, military combat vehicles, military support vehicles, command communications control and intelligence software, military communications equipment, military software, software for military communications equipment.<sup>425</sup>

### **The Government’s Response:**

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Libya contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government’s Response

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<sup>425</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 106

to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown in Libya itself during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

There is a UN arms embargo against Libya. There are exemptions to the embargo for supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, protective clothing for use by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers, arms and related material intended solely for security or disarmament assistance to the Libyan authorities and other sales or supply of arms and related materiel. Procedures vary: some exports must be approved in advance by the Sanctions Committee while others require notification and the absence of a negative decision.

All extant licences for Libya were approved in accordance with the sanctions in place.<sup>426</sup>

470. Following publication of the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking a question about Libya. The question and answer were as follows:

**The Committees' question:**

In deciding whether or not to approve arms export licence applications to Libya what account is the Government taking of the Report of Experts to the UN on 9 March 2013 of what has happened to the Gaddafi arms stockpiles, to which the UK was a contributor? The Experts' Report stated: "The proliferation of weapons from Libya has continued at a worrying rate and has spread into new territory: West Africa, the Levant and, potentially, even the Horn of Africa. Since the uprising and the resulting collapse of the security apparatus, including the loss of national control over weapons stockpiles and the absence of any border controls, Libya has over the past two years become a significant and attractive source of weaponry in the region. Illicit flows from the country are fuelling existing conflicts in Africa and the Levant and enriching the arsenals of a range of non-State actors, including terrorist groups."

**The Government's answer:**

The Government takes into account reports from a wide variety of sources including the UN when assessing export licensing applications. Criterion 7 of the Consolidated Criteria requires the Government to assess the risk of diversion and this is something we take account of for Libya, as with all destinations worldwide.<sup>427</sup>

**471. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Libya for anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for all-wheel**

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<sup>426</sup> Cm8707, p 48

<sup>427</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

**drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of pistols, hand grenades, military combat vehicles, military support vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three, Four, and Seven.**

### **Russia**

472. On 18 March 2014 the Foreign Secretary announced in the House of Commons that the Government was suspending arms exports licences to Russia.<sup>428</sup> The Export Control Organisation (ECO) subsequently issued a Notice to Exporters announcing that it had suspended a number of licences for incorporation in third countries of military and dual-use goods exported from the UK before subsequently being exported to Russia.<sup>429</sup>

473. On 24 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary requesting details of the arms export licences to Russia that had been suspended. The text of the letter was as follows:

#### **Russia – suspended licences**

In the debate on Ukraine on 18 March, you said: “We believe that in the current circumstances there is a compelling case for EU member states to act on defence export licences. The UK will now, with immediate effect, suspend all extant licences and application processing for licences for direct export to Russia for military and dual-use items destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine. We will also suspend licences for exports to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia where there is a clear risk that the end product will be used against Ukraine. All such licences were reviewed following the Prime Minister's statement on 10 March, and so we are able to act immediately. We encourage other European nations to take similar action.”

Please could you provide details of all licence suspensions, and of any subsequent revocations or re-instatements, to Russia made in the period 10 March 2014 to the present.

Please could you provide the information in the same format as in Annex 1 of Cm 8079 (SIELS/OIELS/etc., End User Country, Annual Report Summary, Rating, Reason for Revocation). Please could you state the date of suspension and the date of any subsequent revocation or re-instatement in each case.

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<sup>428</sup> HC Deb, 18 March 2014, col 658

<sup>429</sup> Notice to Exporters 2014/06: UK suspends all licences and licence applications for export to Russian military that could be used against Ukraine. *Export Control Organisation*, 18 March 2014

Please could you also state which other NATO and EU Members States have taken action similar to the British Government with such details as you can provide of the specific action taken by individual countries.<sup>430</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 14 May 2014. The relevant section of his letter was as follows:

**Russia – suspended licences**

Information regarding suspended licences for Russia is provided in Annex 4. In each case the suspension was made because the export would be in breach of the policy announced in Parliament by the Foreign Secretary on 18 March, namely that the items were for direct export to Russia and were destined for units of the Russian armed forces or other state agencies which could be or are being deployed against Ukraine, or were for export to third countries for incorporation into equipment for export to Russia where there is a clear risk that the end product will be used against Ukraine. This suspension covers both military and dual use rated exports. Fifteen SIELs were suspended for direct exports and thirteen for indirect exports; in addition Russia was removed as a permitted destination from 6 OIELs (Russia was the only permitted destination for three of these licences and therefore they were revoked). All the suspensions took place on 19 March. No licences have been subsequently revoked or reinstated although one licence has now expired.

On 28 April the US government announced a package of measures against Russia. As part of these measures the Departments of State and Commerce will “deny pending applications for licences to export or re-export any high technology [military or dual-use] item...to Russia or occupied Crimea that contribute to Russia’s military capabilities”. Further information on these measures is available here <http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/content/article/9-bis/carousel/666-commerce-department-announces-expansion-of-export-restrictions-on-russia> and here: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/225241.htm>

I understand that Germany is currently not granting new export licences for military goods, or for dual-use items where the end-user is the armed forces or internal security forces of Russia, and that extant licences are being reassessed. Please note that Germany has no legal power to suspend licences for military goods. I am not aware of specific announcements by other EU Member States or NATO members, although privately many have told us they are taking a “cautious” approach.<sup>431</sup>

**Annex 4**

Licences Suspended for Russia

**1. Standard Individual Export Licences for direct export**

Application Type	Goods Annual Report Summary	Goods Rating	Total Goods Value (£)
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<sup>430</sup> Ev w217 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to William Hague dated 24 April 2014

<sup>431</sup> Ev w474 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 14 May 2014

SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for the use of combat aircraft	ML10, ML11, ML22	275,051.98
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	ML6	296,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17	7,513,132.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	ML6	21,379.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	ML6	28,240.00
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	ML6	228,120.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	ML9	22,472.00
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002, 5D002	636,400.00
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	ML4, ML4	12,640.63
SIEL (Permanent)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17	7,513,132.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	6A002	11,040,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	ML17	7,513,132.00
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	ML13	7,500.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	6A002	389,389.00
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	6A002	96,000.00

## 2. Standard Individual Export Licences for incorporation in third countries and onward supply to Russia

Application Type	End User Countries	Goods Annual Report Summary	Goods Rating	Total Goods Value
SIEL (Permanent)	France	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	ML10	£216,050.44
SIEL (Permanent)	France	components for military aero-engines	ML10	£99,600.00
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	general military vehicle components	ML6	£80,189.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	components for military aircrew protective equipment	ML10	£51,950.00
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	general military vehicle components	ML6	£265,644.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11	£148,566.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	military aircraft head-up/down displays	ML10	£330,620.96

SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	general military vehicle components	ML6	£4,743.60
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	general military vehicle components	ML6	£230.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11	£132,164.00
SIEL (Permanent)	France	targeting equipment	ML5	£20,000.00
SIEL (Permanent)	Italy	military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11	£22,315.67
SIEL (Permanent)	South Africa	components for military helicopters	ML10	£20,480.00

### 3. Open Individual Licences revoked or re-issued without Russia

Application Type	Action	Goods Annual Report Summary	Goods Rating
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Revoked	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	imaging cameras	6A003
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	ML11, ML17, ML22, ML4, ML6
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Revoked	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Revoked	technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for anti-armour missiles, technology for anti-ship missiles, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for fire control equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for general military vehicle components, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for laser rangefinders, technology for laser warning detectors, technology for military combat vehicles, technology for military	ML22

		infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for optical target acquisition equipment, technology for optical target surveillance equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for tanks, technology for turrets, technology for weapon night sights, technology for weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	1C202, 1A201, 6A001, 8A002

474. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved and still extant arms export licences to Russia valued at £132 million, including for body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, weapon night sights and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three, and Four.

### **Saudi Arabia**

475. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Saudi Arabia can be found at paragraphs 423–430 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraph 107 of the Report.

476. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on Saudi Arabia in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees have noted the Government's answer that it applies the same stated policy on arms exports and internal repression to Saudi Arabia as it does to the other states in the region and to states worldwide. However, the Committees conclude that that does not appear to have been so in the case of the deployment of Saudi forces in British armoured vehicles to Bahrain to protect installations, thereby enabling Bahraini security forces to end, sometimes violently, predominantly peaceful demonstrations. The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 417 extant UK export licences to Saudi Arabia:

- a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or

- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Saudi Arabia for: body armour, anti riot/ballistic shields, components for body armour, military helmets, components for all-wheel vehicles with ballistic protection, general military vehicle components, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for military support vehicles, components for military communications equipment, crowd control ammunition, hand grenades, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training crowd control ammunition, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, gun silencers, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, components for machine guns, machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military combat vehicles and military support vehicles.<sup>432</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

The Government questions the Committees' conclusion about its policy towards Saudi Arabia. As Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Alistair Burt made clear before the Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 June 2013, "there is no connection between the work done by the Saudi authorities to protect certain places in Bahrain and the behaviour of Bahraini security forces subsequently. That the Bahraini forces were able to go off and do their job is clear, but they could have handled it in a completely different manner. They could have handled it in the manner demanded by the international community." As stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 December 2012, the Government applies the same stated policy on arms exports and internal repression to Saudi Arabia as it does to the other states in the region and to states worldwide.

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Saudi Arabia contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.<sup>433</sup>

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<sup>432</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 107

<sup>433</sup> Cm8707, p 49



477. The Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) in their 2013–14 Report entitled *The UK's relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain* (HC 88) referred to arms export to Saudi Arabia. The FAC noted that several submissions to the inquiry highlighted a perceived contradiction between the UK Government designating Saudi Arabia as a “Country of concern” in its Human Rights report while at the same time promoting it as a priority market for arms exports.<sup>434</sup> The Report stated that witnesses had highlighted fears about equipment being used both in internal repression and in external action, such as the intervention in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s alleged bombing of Yemen in 2009. The FAC concluded that: “The government must adhere strictly to its existing policy to ensure that defence equipment sold by UK firms are not used for human rights abuses or internal repression.”<sup>435</sup> The Government’s response to the FAC’s conclusion was as follows:

[...] The export of arms and controlled goods to all destinations, including Saudi Arabia, is assessed on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria.

The Criteria include the requirement that exports of all UK controlled goods are only permitted if, after a thorough assessment, there is no clear risk that they might be used for internal repression. Any evidence of the misuse of similar UK or non-UK supplied goods in the end user destination is factored into this assessment. There are rigorous pre-licence checks and, for open licences, compliance audits at the exporters' premises in the UK. We will continue to scrutinise carefully all arms sales to Saudi Arabia.<sup>436</sup>

**478. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Saudi Arabia for anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, command communications control and intelligence software, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for body armour, components for ground vehicle communications equipment, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for sniper rifles, components for weapon sight mounts, crowd control ammunition, cryptographic software, CS hand grenades, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the production of machine guns, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, ground vehicle communications equipment, gun mountings, gun silencers, hand grenades, military communications equipment, radio jamming equipment, small arms ammunition, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, software for radio jamming equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, tear gas/irritant ammunition, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government’s Arms Export Licencing Criterion: Two.**

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<sup>434</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2013–14, *The UK's relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain*, HC88, para 68

<sup>435</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2013–14, *The UK's relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain*, HC88, para 78

<sup>436</sup> Foreign And Commonwealth Office, *Government Response to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2013-2014 (HC88)* ; *The UK's relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain*, page 8

## **Sri Lanka**

479. Arms exports to Sri Lanka for counter-piracy are at paragraph 375 above.

480. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Sri Lanka can be found at paragraphs 493–500 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendations at paragraphs 120 and 121 of the Report.

481. The Committees' Recommendations on Sri Lanka in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response how the statement made by the FCO Minister Alistair Burt on 20 February 2013 that during the period 1 July–30 September 2012 only 2 arms export licences were approved to the Sri Lankan military can be reconciled with the information put on the BIS website for licences approved to Sri Lanka in this period as reproduced in paragraph 496 of the Memorandum from the Chairman of the Committees in Volume II.<sup>437</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

As the Committees will be aware the Government does not publish the details of specific end users in its Quarterly Reports. Mr Burt correctly stated that only 2 arms export licences were approved to the Sri Lankan military during the period in question. Other licences for military list equipment were issued during that period but these were for the export of goods and equipment to Private Security Companies (PSCs) involved in counter-piracy work.<sup>438</sup>

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees further recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 49 extant UK export licences to Sri Lanka:

- a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or
- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Sri Lanka for: acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, military helmets, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, military support vehicles, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for body

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<sup>437</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 120

<sup>438</sup> Cm8707, p 57

armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sights, combat shotguns and equipment employing cryptography.<sup>439</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Sri Lanka contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.<sup>440</sup>

482. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 Ian Murray MP questioned the Prime Minister's recent trade mission to Sri Lanka and said that "the perception may be that arms sales are at the top of agenda." He added: "It may only be a perception, but the Government should work hard to ensure that that perception is not carried through in practice."<sup>441</sup> In responding to the debate the Business Minister, Michael Fallon, replied:

[...] during the recent Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, he [the Prime Minister] was the first foreign leader since independence in 1948 to give the local population the chance to be heard by an international audience. He shone a light on some of the human rights concerns in the aftermath of the recent prolonged civil conflict and demonstrated our commitment to reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka.

Again, we assesses all export licence applications to Sri Lanka case by case, in accordance with the consolidated and the national criteria. Decisions on Sri Lanka, of course, take into account alleged violations of international humanitarian and human rights law during the military conflict that ended in 2009, as well as the nature of the equipment—in other words, would it be used in a manner inconsistent with the criteria?<sup>442</sup>

483. Following the Government's Quarterly report on arms exports from July to September 2013, The Committees put its question to the Government on exports to Sri Lanka as follows:

Given the large number of arms previously approved for maritime security companies why were SIEL licences approved for 1760 assault rifles, 450 combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, 80 pistols, 360 rifles, small arms ammunition, 200 sniper rifles and weapon sights to private maritime securities company for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances have been received that these goods will not be diverted?

The Government response was:

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<sup>439</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 121

<sup>440</sup> Cm8707, pp 57–58

<sup>441</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 418WH

<sup>442</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 425WH

The equipment in these SIELs was intended for anti-piracy purposes in maritime security by civilian/commercial end users. The Government has not sought any assurances about the equipment not being used for internal repression as we have seen no evidence that private security companies have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Sri Lanka. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.

However, as stated at the Business Secretary's Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG is reviewing the SIELs issued for private security companies.

To qualify for a licence, Private Security Companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.

**484. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Sri Lanka for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, components for rifles, equipment employing cryptography, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, sporting guns and weapons sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One and Two.**

## *Syria*

### *Conventional arms exports and gifted equipment*

485. In May 2011 the EU imposed sanctions on Syria. The sanctions included an embargo on the supply of arms, military equipment and equipment that might be used for internal repression. In January and June 2012 further EC Council decisions specified in more detail the items and services banned under the arms embargo. In November 2012 the EU decided to extend restrictive measures until 1 March 2013; these measures were extended for a further three months in February 2013, but eased restrictions on the provision of non-lethal support and technical assistance for the protection of civilians. In April 2013 the EU decided to allow the supply of certain equipment to Syrian opposition forces, such as "non-lethal equipment to the Syrian national Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary forces when intended for the protection of civilians."<sup>443</sup>

486. A further extension of the EU arms embargo on Syria was prevented by Britain and France. On 28 May 2013 the FCO issued a press notice announcing that the EU arms embargo to Syria would not be renewed. The Foreign Secretary stated: "It was important for Europe to send a

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<sup>443</sup> "EU arms embargo on Syria", SIPRI, [http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu\\_arms\\_embargoes/syria\\_LAS/eu-embargo-on-Syria](http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/syria_LAS/eu-embargo-on-Syria)

clear signal to the Assad regime that it has to negotiate seriously, and that all options remain on the table if it refuses to do so. Tonight EU nations have done just that.”<sup>444</sup>

487. On 3 June 2013 the Prime Minister made a Statement to the House of Commons in which he stated:

unless we do more to support the official opposition, the humanitarian crisis will continue, the political transition that we want to see will not happen, and the extremists will continue to flourish. That is why I believe it is right to lift the EU arms embargo on the Syrian opposition. There must be a clear sense that Assad cannot fight his way to victory or use the talks to buy more time to slaughter Syrians in their own homes and on their streets.

I regret to say that the EU arms embargo served the extremists on both sides. It did not stop Assad massacring his people, it did not stop the Russians sending him arms, and it did not stop Islamist extremists getting their hands on weapons either. It just sent a signal that for all its words, the EU had no real ability to support the reasonable opposition that could be the basis of an inclusive transition. That is why the Foreign Secretary and the French Foreign Minister secured agreement to lift the arms embargo in Brussels last week.

The Prime Minister continued:

The EU has agreed a common framework for those who, in the future, may decide to supply it [the Syrian opposition] with military equipment, and there are clear safeguards to ensure that any such equipment would be supplied only for the protection of civilians, and in accordance with international law. That does not mean that we in the UK have made any decision to send arms, but we now have the flexibility to respond if the situation continues to deteriorate.<sup>445</sup>

488. On 19 June 2013 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Prime Minister requesting the full text of the EU agreed “common framework for those who, in future, may decide to supply it [the Syrian National Coalition] with military equipment and the full details of the “clear safeguards to ensure that any such equipment would be supplied only for the protection of civilians, and in accordance with international law” both of which were referred to in the Prime Minister’s Statement on 3 June 2013.<sup>446</sup> The Foreign Secretary replied on 11 July 2013 as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 19 June to the Prime Minister about his statement to the House on 3 June on Syria.

With regards to your request for the fullest available text on the agreed EU common framework, I enclose a copy of the EU Council declaration agreed by the Foreign Affairs Council on 27 May, which may also be found at the following link at [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137315.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137315.pdf)

You also ask for details on the issue of safeguards referred to by the Prime Minister in his statement. Our priority remains advancing a political transition that ends the conflict in

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<sup>444</sup> FCO Press release, “ Foreign Secretary’s statement on Syria arms embargo”, 28 May 2013

<sup>445</sup> HC Deb, 3 June 2013, Cols 1233–34

<sup>446</sup> Ev w138 - Letter from Chairman of CAEC to David Cameron, dated 19 June 2013

Syria, allows refugees to return to their homes, and prevents further radicalisation in the country. We will do all we can to ensure that the forthcoming US-Russia Geneva conference delivers that outcome.

I want to be clear that the UK has not yet made a final decision to provide lethal equipment to the National Coalition, but we now have the flexibility to respond in the future if the situation continues to deteriorate and if the Assad regime refuses to negotiate. We have said we would only provide lethal equipment in carefully controlled circumstances, and in accordance with our obligations under national and international law.

When the Foreign Affairs Council agreed to end the EU arms embargo and return decisions on arms provision to member states on 27 May, Ministers also agreed a framework of safeguards to guide those member states which might decide to provide arms: arms could only be sent to the National Coalition; they should be intended for the protection of civilians; there should be safeguards to ensure delivery to the right hands; and existing obligations under the EU Common Position for arms exports (CP944) remained in place.

I have explained to Parliament that with every week that passes we are coming closer to the collapse of Syria and a regional catastrophe which will affect the security of the UK. We will therefore continue to increase our efforts to press for an end to the conflict, provide life-saving assistance and work to ensure that Syria achieves the political transition its people deserve. There are no simple solutions to the crisis, but we must help the Syrian people find a way to end the bloodshed and begin to build a new future.<sup>447</sup>

489. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Syria can be found at paragraphs 431–448 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraphs 108 to 110 of the Report

490. The Committees' Recommendations on Syria in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that when the Government in its quarterly reports on the BIS website publishes export licence approvals of dual-use items that are frequently associated with military use, such as hydrophone arrays, hydrophones and towed-hydrophone arrays, it should make clear whether or not these are for civil use only, in order to avoid misleading the public.<sup>448</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' recommendation. However "dual-use" items are by definition items which "can be used for both civil and military purposes" and in practice the vast majority of export licences granted for dual-use items are for civil end-use. It would be impractical for the Government to produce footnotes for each individual licence

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<sup>447</sup> Ev w141 – Letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Chairman of Committees on Arms Export Controls, dated 11 July 2013

<sup>448</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 108

in its Quarterly Reports but it does so for those licences which may be of public interest. In this case we do not agree that the reference to "hydrophone arrays" was likely to mislead the public. The Quarterly Report also contains details of the sanctions in place for specific destinations.<sup>449</sup>

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that neither of the 3 extant UK export licences to Syria or any goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists gifted, or planned to be gifted, to those in Syria:

- a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or
- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including the extant licences to Syria for components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection.<sup>450</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Syria contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

In May 2011 the EU adopted restrictions against Syria on the supply of arms and related materiel under Council Decision. There have been a number of revisions to these restrictive measures in 2012 and 2013. All extant licences for Syria were approved in accordance with the sanctions in place. [...]

As stated in the Government's Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls published on 12 July, "As a matter of policy, all proposals to gift controlled military equipment are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria by relevant Government departments in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour." Therefore the Government is satisfied that no gifting package contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above].<sup>451</sup>

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<sup>449</sup> Cm8707, pp 49–50

<sup>450</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 109

<sup>451</sup> Cm8707, pp 49–50

**The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committee further recommend that in its Response the Government states:

- a) whether, since the BIS Secretary of State's letter of 10 May 2013, any UK Strategic Export Control licences for goods to Syria have been approved stating the application type, Annual Report summary and goods value in the case of each licence;
- b) whether, since the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Foreign Secretary on 15 April and his Oral Statement on 20 May, any additional non-lethal equipment, or any goods subject to UK Strategic Export Controls have been gifted to Syria, and, if so, to state the nature of the equipment and goods, and their value; and
- c) the Government's present policy on the supply, whether by sale or gift, and whether directly or indirectly, of goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists to Syria.<sup>452</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

a)

<i>Application Type</i>	<i>Goods</i>	<i>Total Goods Value (£)</i>
SITCL	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection for use by UN personnel	117,783
SITCL	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection for use by UN personnel	919,432
OITCL	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection for use by diplomatic personnel	Unable to give a value for open licences

- b) On 15th July 2013, the Foreign Secretary laid a minute before Parliament detailing plans to provide the Syrian opposition with equipment to help protect against chemical weapons attack. The Foreign Secretary made a written statement on the gift on 16th July 2013 and also wrote to the chairs of the Public Accounts Committee, the Committee on Arms Export Controls, the Defence Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee to alert them to the minute. The gift comprises 5,000 commercially available escape hoods, medical pre-treatment tablets (sufficient to treat up to 5,000 people for 6 months) and chemical weapons detector paper. The approximate total cost of the equipment in the gift is £656,800, which will be met by the Government's Conflict Pool Fund.
- c) Robust and effective measures that control the export of military and dual-use equipment (as defined in the UK 'Consolidated Control List') to Syria and all other destinations remain in place. Licensable goods for export to Syria continue to be assessed against the Consolidated Criteria. These measures have not changed as a

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<sup>452</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 109



result of ending the EU Arms Embargo on 27 May [2013] at the EU Foreign Affairs Council.

Specifically, the Foreign Secretary agreed with his counterparts on 27 May that with all arms and internal repression items the following conditions would apply:

- The sale, supply, transfer or export of military equipment or of equipment which might be used for internal repression will be for the Syrian National Coalition and intended for the protection of civilians;
- Member States shall require adequate safeguards against misuse of authorisations granted, in particular relevant information concerning the end-user and final destination of the delivery; and
- Member States shall assess the export licence applications on a case-by-case basis, taking full account of the criteria set out in Council Common Position 2008/944.CFSP of 8 December 2008 (i.e. broadly the Consolidated Criteria) defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

To fully meet the commitments made at the Foreign Affairs Council on 27 May the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills has laid before Parliament legislation to ensure that equipment that could be used for internal repression (as defined in Annex II of EU Document 17464/09) will continue to be treated as licensable goods. This legislation is in addition to existing robust and effective measures that control the export of military and dual-use equipment to Syria and all other destinations.<sup>453</sup>

491. UK Working Group, in its written submission, said that it was concerned at the UK Government's role in the loosening of the embargo, and had concluded that the actual supply of arms to any of the warring parties would be very hard to justify under existing UK and EU legislation.<sup>454</sup>

492. Since May 2013 the Government has laid Department Minutes for the gifting of equipment to Syria as follows:

- 15 July 2013 - Syria
- 18 November 2013 - Syria
- 23 January 2014 – Syria
- 6 February 2014 - Syria
- 1 May 2014 – Syria
- 9 June 2014 - Syria

Details of each Departmental Minute can be found in Annex 16.

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<sup>453</sup> Cm8707, pp 51–52

<sup>454</sup> Ev w110

493. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 Ann McKechnie MP said that she was “not convinced that, given the fragmented, chaotic and fast-changing situation in Syria, any arms exports could safely meet the criteria on end use. There is a real risk of weapons falling into the hands of the Syrian Government or extremist opposition groups.”<sup>455</sup> Nia Griffith MP added later in the debate that many of her constituents were concerned about the possibility of the UK Government supplying arms to the Syrian opposition. She said that people in the UK did not want to see arms going to rebel forces when it was not known who they were or which groups they consist of. She called for the re-instatement of a full arms embargo to Syria, similar to that which existed prior to the EU decision in May 2013 to allow the supply of arms to the Syrian opposition.<sup>456</sup>

494. When the UK Working Group (UKWG) was asked by the Committees in the Oral Evidence session on 4 November 2013 about the lifting of the EU arms embargo of equipment to the Syrian opposition Martin Butcher (Oxfam) said:

While the process was ongoing for the lifting of the embargo, we were quite disappointed that the Government, at the same time as they were working hard to agree the Arms Trade Treaty and establish that global norm, were pushing to have the embargo on Syria lifted. [...] even after the embargo was lifted, the conclusion that we came to after going through the consolidated criteria point by point is that it is extremely hard to see how all of the hurdles set out in those criteria could be overcome to supply arms to any party in the conflict. There is the obvious risk of the diversion of arms. Even the groups that recognise the authority of General Idris and his supreme command work on the ground closely with a wide spread of other groups that do not—and on occasion even groups that are part of al-Qaeda. There are clear human rights concerns across a spread of opposition groups, although the Government are preponderant as a problem in that area.<sup>457</sup>

495. On 11 December 2013 the US and UK Governments announced that they had suspended the supply of all non-lethal aid to the Syrian opposition after Islamist fighters had seized control of the headquarters and stores belonging to western-backed opposition forces.<sup>458</sup> The FCO Minister Hugh Robertson was quoted as saying: “It does make sense to suspend aid until we know exactly what’s happening.”<sup>459</sup>

496. Prior to the Oral Evidence session with the Foreign Secretary on 8 January 2014 the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees. The relevant text relating to Syria was as follows:

The EU arms embargo to Syria was lifted as a powerful political signal that there could be no equivalence between the legitimate moderate Opposition and the Assad regime. The UK does not supply lethal weapons to any party in Syria.<sup>460</sup>

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<sup>455</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 411WH

<sup>456</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 416WH

<sup>457</sup> Q 5

<sup>458</sup> “Syria: US and UK suspend aid after Islamist fighters seize weapons stores”, *The Guardian*, 11 December 2013

<sup>459</sup> “US and UK suspend non-lethal aid for Syria rebels”, *BBC News online*, 11 December 2013

<sup>460</sup> Ev w194 - Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 January 2014

497. When the Committees questioned the Foreign Secretary about this on 8 January 2014 he stated:

So far, none of the political signals from the rest of the world to the Assad regime has been successful in bringing an end to this horror. That does not mean that it is wrong to try them. We have passed presidential statements at the UN Security Council, because we have not been able to pass resolutions there. Many countries in the world have said many things about the Assad regime and its loss of legitimacy. We also took this action on the EU arms embargo. None of those things has yet succeeded in changing the behaviour of the Assad regime, but it does not mean that it is wrong to try them.<sup>461</sup>

When asked about the current UK position regarding the supply of arms to Syrian opposition groups the Foreign Secretary said: “Under our current policy there is no question of arming.” He went on to confirm that lethal support has not been provided in the past and that the current policy is that it will not be provided at present, however the UK Government had provided non-lethal support to Syrian opposition groups. The foreign Secretary said:

[...] we have given some non-lethal equipment; for instance, in August last year we gave them escape hoods, in order to escape chemical attack, detector paper for chemical attack and nerve agent pre-treatment tablets. Typically, we have given them equipment that might save lives—that they could use to save lives—but that is not lethal to anybody else. The latest equipment we were proposing to send to them included commercially available medical and communications equipment.<sup>462</sup>

498. The Foreign Secretary was asked whether the supply of even non-lethal equipment to the Syrian opposition was inconsistent with the Consolidated Criteria in that it could “provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts”. He replied:

No, for several reasons. Unless there is a moderate opposition able to function in Syria—one that is committed to a democratic non-sectarian future for Syria—the conflict there will be even longer than it might otherwise be. It will become even harder to bring about a political solution. If Syria faces a choice only between Assad and extremists, there will not be a political solution. By helping a moderate opposition, we are trying to keep alive the possibility of a political solution, and we are also only sending equipment that helps to save lives. We are not sending equipment that is being used to prolong a conflict; we are sending equipment that is being used, hopefully, to try to create the circumstances in which conflict can be brought to an end.<sup>463</sup>

499. On 1 May 2014 the Foreign Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement (WMS) relating to the gifting of non-lethal equipment to Syrian opposition forces. The WMS was as follows:

On 18 November 2013 I laid a departmental minute before the House of Commons on the gifting of non-lethal equipment to the supreme military council of the Free Syrian Army, which is closely aligned to the Syrian National Coalition. The gift consists of commercially

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<sup>461</sup> Q 142

<sup>462</sup> Qq 143–144

<sup>463</sup> Q 149

available communications equipment, such as laptops with satellite internet connection, mobile telephones and push-to-talk radios; commercially available vehicles, such as pick-up trucks; fuel; portable generators less than 3 MW in power; logistics supplies such as clothing, rations and tents; and individual medical kits. The total cost of the gift is £1 million, which will be met by the Government's conflict pool fund. Use of these funds has been approved by me and the Secretaries of State for Defence and for International Development. During the period of 14 parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which the minute was laid before the House of Commons, no Member signified an objection, either by giving notice of a parliamentary question or of a motion in relation to the minute, or by otherwise raising the matter in the House.

Following fighting at Bab al-Hawa on 7 December 2013, UK Government plans to deliver equipment to the supreme military council in Syria were temporarily put on hold. I am now lifting the hold on those plans to deliver equipment to the supreme military council of the Free Syrian Army in Syria. Both the UK Government and the supreme military council are confident that the equipment can be delivered safely. This resumption of delivery clearly demonstrates our continued and long-standing support for the National Coalition and the supreme military council of the Free Syrian Army, who represent the majority of Syrians who support a political settlement and a democratic, pluralist future for their country. I wrote to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 28 March confirming my intention to resume the delivery of non-lethal equipment to the supreme military council of the Free Syrian Army in Syria. They have raised no objections and deliveries of non-lethal equipment will begin as soon as is practical.

The UK is committed to doing all that it can to alleviate the humanitarian suffering and to promote a political settlement to end the conflict. Our support to the National Coalition and the supreme military council, with their vision for a democratic and pluralistic future for Syria, contributes to these goals. This is the UK's second gift to the supreme military council. In August 2013 we sent them equipment to protect them from chemical weapons attack. This gift has been scrutinised to ensure that the provision of this equipment is consistent with export controls and complies with our international obligations. Recipients have been carefully selected to prevent equipment from being given to those involved in extremist activities or human rights violations.<sup>464</sup>

**500. I propose that the Committees conclude that the decision of the UK Government, together with the French Government, to end the EU arms embargo on Syria in May 2013 has thus far had no discernible impact on President Assad or on contributing to a peace settlement in Syria.**

**501. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government lists in its Response the items of equipment, which would be categorized as controlled goods if exported commercially, that have been gifted to Syria during the present Parliament stating in each case:**

- a) the quantity;**
- b) the recipient to whom it was gifted; and**

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<sup>464</sup> HC Deb, 1 May 2014, cols 63–64WS

- c) **whether the Government has any information as to whether the item has been on-sold or transferred to a third party, and, if so, the name of the third party.**

**502. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Syria for body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and components for body armour are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two, Three and Four.**

### *Dual-use chemical exports*

503. The United Nations chemical weapons inspectors confirmed that on 21 August 2013 the nerve agent sarin had been used in an attack on the Ghouta agricultural belt around Damascus. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon told the UN Security Council that he believed the attack constituted a war crime. The UN report, he said, detailed the "most significant confirmed use of chemical weapons against civilians since Saddam Hussein used them" in Halabja in 1988.<sup>465</sup>

504. A complete account of the Committees' scrutiny of Government approved dual-use chemical exports to Syria was set out in the Chairman's letter to the Business Secretary of 9 September 2013. The Chairman's letter of 9 September 2013 was as follows:

Since the start of the civil war in Syria, the Committees on Arms Export Controls have been scrutinising in detail the Government's approval of export licences for both military and dual-use goods to that country.

With statements from both the British and the US Governments that sarin has been used in chemical attacks in Syria, I am returning to the Government's approval in January 2012 of export licences to Syria for potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride both of which are stated to be precursor chemicals in the manufacture of nerve gas.

I am setting out in full the exchanges between the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) and Ministers on this key issue to date.

In March 2012, I tabled a Written Parliamentary Question to yourself asking "Which UK strategic export control licences to Syria are currently extant; and what the nature and quantity of the licensed goods or services are under each licence". Your Minister Mark Prisk answered on March 27 that there were 9 such licences of which 7 were Standard Individual Licences and 2 were Open Individual Licences. Of the 7 Standard Individual Licences 2 were for "chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes", with the goods valued at £10,000 and £10,200 respectively.

Following publication of the Committees 2012 Report (HC 419) on July 13, I wrote to the Foreign Secretary five days later on July 18 putting to him a total of 55 requests for further information about the 9 extant UK Government approved arms export licences to Syria. Of these 55 requests, 10 related to the two Standard Individual Export Licences (SIEL) for "Chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes".

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<sup>465</sup> "Syria chemical attack: What we know", *BBC News*, 24 September 2013

The 10 items of further information that the Committees required were:

1. The names of the individual chemicals for which UK Government export licence approval was given.
2. The reasons why each of the chemicals concerned are subject to export licence approval.
3. The internal repression purposes to which each of the chemicals concerned could be put.
4. The quantities of each of the chemicals concerned for which export licence approval was given.
5. The names of the individuals, companies or organisations to whom the chemicals were being exported.
6. The extent to which those named individuals, companies or organisations are subject to the influence, ownership or control of the Syrian Government.
7. The last known location in Syria of the chemicals for which UK Government export licence approval was given.
8. The dates of approval of each of the chemical export licences concerned, whether any have now been revoked and, if so, on what date.
9. Which, if any, of the chemical export licence applications concerned were put to Ministers for approval.
10. Copies of each of the chemical export licence applications concerned and of each of the approval decisions with any conditions attached – to be provided to the Committees on a classified or non-classified basis as necessary.

You replied to the Committees' requests for these 10 items of information in your letter to me of 6 September 2012 as follows:

“These licences were issued on 17 and 18 January 2012 and authorised the export of dual-use chemicals to a private company for use in industrial processes. The chemicals were sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride.

These chemicals have legitimate commercial uses – for example, sodium fluoride is used in the fluoridation of drinking water and the manufacture of toothpaste; and potassium fluoride has applications in the metallurgical industry and the manufacture of pesticides. However they could also be used as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons which is why they are included on the Australia Group chemical weapons precursors list and are listed in Annex 1 of Council Regulation 428/2009,<sup>[466]</sup> meaning a licence is required for their export from the EU.

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<sup>466</sup> EC Regulation 428/2009 is the Dual-Use regulation which lists all the chemicals which EU Member States consider to have both a civil and a military use and are, therefore, subject to Government export controls.

In these cases the chemicals were to be used for metal finishing of aluminium profiles used for making aluminium showers, windows, etc. Each licence application was assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, including whether there was a clear risk that they might be used for internal repression or be diverted for such an end-use. The licences were granted because at the time there were no grounds for refusal.

Subsequently, the European Union imposed new sanctions on Syria via Council Regulation (EU) No 509/2012 which came into force on 17 June 2012. The sanctions included prohibitions on the sale, supply, transfer or export of certain dual-use items and chemicals (including sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride) which might be used for internal repression or in the manufacture of items which might be used for internal repression. As a result, these licences were revoked on 30 July 2012”.

On 18 March this year [2013], I wrote again to you about the chemicals approved by the Government for export to Syria as follows:

“Thank you for your letter of 6 September 2012 responding to the Committees on Arms Exports’ request for further information relating to extant arms export licences to Syria.

However, the answer provided to the Committees’ question relating to the two SIELs for “chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes” has raised a further question. Your response stated that these licences had been revoked on 30 July 2012 as a result of the Council Regulation (EU) No 509/2012 imposing new sanctions on Syria coming into force on 17 June 2012. The Committees wish to know if the goods covered by these two licences were shipped to Syria before the licences were revoked.”

You replied to my letter on April 10 2013 as follows:

“Thank you for your letter of 18 March requesting further information about extant arms export licences to Syria.

Both licence records showed that there were some goods remaining to be exported and that was why those licenses were revoked on 30 July 2012, to prevent export of the chemicals caught by the new EU sanctions on Syria which came into force on 17 June 2012. However, revocation could not prevent the shipment of chemicals already exported against those licences and, unfortunately, we do not have data showing what quantity of chemicals covered by these SIELs had already been shipped.”

Please could you now respond to the following further questions and requirements for further information:

Please provide the Committees, numbered item by numbered item, with each of the 10 items of information originally requested about the two “chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes” SIELs as detailed in my original letter of 18 July 2012 to the Foreign Secretary much, if not most of which, was not provided in your reply to me of 6 September 2012. Please also provide the name of the company to whom your Department gave licence approval on 17 and 18 January 2012 to export potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride to Syria. The company’s name cannot credibly be withheld from the

Committees on grounds of commercial confidentiality given that both licences were revoked over a year ago.

Please also provide the name(s) of the company or companies to whom FCO Minister Alistair Burt has now stated five further export licences for sodium fluoride to Syria were issued between 2003 and the start of the conflict.

Syria has long been known to be a holder of chemical weapons and your Department were clearly fully aware that sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride are precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons as you specifically stated this in your letter to me of 6 September 2012. Given that Syria was a known holder of chemical weapons, given that there was a civil war in Syria and given that both sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride were known by your Department to be precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons, do you agree on reflection that both of these licences should have been refused?

You said in your letter to me of 6 September 2012 “The licence was granted because there were no grounds for refusal.”

You also stated that “Each licence application was assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export licensing Criteria, including whether there was a clear risk that they might be used for internal repression or be diverted for such an end-use.” However, this is not an accurate or complete statement of the Government’s policy on arms exports where the goods might be used for internal repression. The Foreign Secretary’s statement of policy to the Committees on 7 February 2012 was as follows: “The long-standing British position is clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression.” The policy of not issuing export licences “which might be used to facilitate internal repression” is a substantially different, and materially tighter export control policy than “a clear risk that they might be used for internal repression”. Do you and all your Department accept that the Foreign Secretary’s statement of Government policy to the Committees on 7 February 2012 is the definitive Government policy on arms exports and internal repression? If so, why was that policy not complied with in relation to the export licence applications for potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride both of which “might be used to facilitate internal repression”?

On what date was the Government first aware that the EU’s proposed Regulation for new sanctions on Syria was going to prohibit the export to Syria of both potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride? Why were these licences for potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride not revoked immediately at that date instead of only being revoked on 30 July 2012 - 6 weeks after the Regulation came into force on 17 June 2012?

On September 3 2013 your Department’s “Statement on exports to Syria” stated in respect of the licences for sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride that “the chemicals were not exported to Syria.” In addition, the previous day the Secretary of State for Defence stated in the House with regard to these two licences that “no such chemicals were exported” (Hansard 2 September 2013 Col. 10).

Both your Department’s statement and that of the Secretary of State for Defence in the House are in direct contradiction with what you said in your letter to me of 10 April this



year when you said: “Both licence records showed that there were some goods remaining to be exported and that was why those licences were revoked on 30 July 2012, to prevent export of the chemicals caught by the new EU sanctions on Syria which came into force on 17 June 2012. However, revocation could not prevent the shipment of chemicals already exported against those licences and, unfortunately, we do not have data showing what quantity of chemicals covered by these SIELs had already been shipped.”

Please provide the Committees with the evidence you clearly had when you wrote to me on 10 April this year that some quantities of the potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride had already been exported.

Please provide details of all previous export licence approvals to Syria of potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride stating the value and quantity in each case and the date of licence approval.

Please provide details of all previous export licence approvals to Syria of all other chemicals included on the Australia Group chemical weapons precursor list and/or are listed in Annex 1 of EU Council Regulation 428/2009 stating the value and quantity in each case and the date of licence approval.

Please list from open sources the countries, in addition to Syria, which are holders of chemical weapons. In respect of each of those other countries, please provide details of export licence approvals from 2003 of all chemicals included on the Australia Group chemical weapons precursors list and/or are listed in Annex 1 of the EU Council Regulation 428/2009 stating the value and quantity in each case and the date of licence approval.<sup>467</sup>

505. On 10 September 2013 the Business Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees with an update on the export licences for chemicals to Syria. The relevant section of his letter was as follows:

#### **Export licences for chemicals for Syria**

I wrote to you on the 6 September last year about two licences to export dual use chemicals to Syria issued on the 17 and 18 January 2012. You will recall that the licences were for sodium fluoride (1000kg) and potassium fluoride (1000kg) and that they were subsequently revoked in July 2012 following the imposition of EU sanctions. HMRC has confirmed that the licences were not used before revocation. The chemicals are not listed by the Chemical Weapons Convention but are subject to export controls by virtue of our membership of the Australia Group and are listed in Annex I of Council regulation 428/2009.

I stand by what I wrote last year that the two licence applications in question were subject to proper assessment against the Consolidated EU and national Arms Export Licensing Criteria and were determined to be for legitimate commercial use. There was therefore no clear basis on which to refuse licences as this predated EU sanctions. Although the chemicals in question can be used as precursors for chemical weapons they also have a

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<sup>467</sup> Ev w148 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 9 September 2013

large number of commercial applications and the volumes licensed are consistent with commercial use.

In the light of the recent and shocking use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria I asked my officials to determine whether any other licences for chemicals had been granted for Syria over the last ten years. They identified five other licences, all for sodium fluoride, issued in July 2004, September 2005, March 2007, February 2009 and May 2010 (for, respectively, 50kg, 2000kg, 50kg, 2000kg and 50kg). These licences all pre-date the conflict in Syria. They were issued to two UK exporters for despatch to two Syrian companies. I am confident that each application was properly assessed to determine end use and that the exports were for legitimate commercial purposes, namely cosmetics and healthcare products. The volumes of sodium fluoride covered by these licences are consistent with commercial use.

I want to assure you there is no evidence that exports of chemicals from the UK have been deployed in Syrian weapons programmes and I have determined that there has been no breach of controls or international obligations. The Government remains confident that UK export controls continue to be among the most stringent in the world.<sup>468</sup>

506. The Chairman of the Committees wrote a further letter to the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, on 11 September 2013 regarding the 5 additional licences to export dual-use chemicals to Syria approved between July 2004 and May 2010 as follows:

Thank you for your letter of September 10.

Please may I have your answers to the following further questions on British Government approval of export licences of chemicals to Syria?

In your letter to me of 6 September 2012, you acknowledged that the Government knew when your Department gave licence approval on January 17 and 18 that year for sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride exports to Syria that both chemicals could be used as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons.

In your latest letter, you say that 5 further licences were approved for the export of sodium fluoride for cosmetics and healthcare products as follows:

July 2004	50kg
September 2005	2000kg
March 2007	50kg
February 2009	2000kg
May 2010	50kg

With regard to these 5 further licences:

1. What quantity for each licence was actually exported from the UK to Syria?

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<sup>468</sup> Ev w153 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 10 September 2013

2. What were the names of the two UK exporters to whom the export licences were granted?
3. What were the names of the two Syrian companies to whom the sodium fluoride were exported under these licences?
4. Please provide full details of the cosmetics and healthcare products for which the sodium fluoride exported under these licences was apparently going to be used in Syria?<sup>469</sup>

507. On 11 October 2013 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, replied as follows:

[The answers to numbered sub-paragraphs 1–5 immediately below relate to the two licences to export dual-use chemicals to Syria issued in January 2012.]

Thank you for your letters of 9 and 11 September.

In your letter of 9 September you ask seven specific questions. Here are the answers.

### **1. Points raised in previous correspondence.**

1. Names of the chemicals: One licence was for sodium fluoride and the other for potassium fluoride.

2. and 3. Reasons why they are controlled and the purposes to which they were put. The two chemicals are subject to export control and are listed in the Australia Group chemical weapons precursor list and Annex I of Council regulation (EC) 428/2009 because they are capable of use as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons. They are not however listed in the Schedules of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

They have legitimate commercial uses such as the manufacture of toothpaste, the fluoridation of drinking water, production in the metallurgical industry, and in the manufacture of pesticides. In these cases the stated end-use for both chemicals was in metal finishing of aluminium profiles used for making aluminium showers, window frames, etc. This is a credible and legitimate use for these chemicals and consistent with the quantities licensed.

4. Quantities: The licences were for 1000kg in each case.

5. Names of end-user: The end-user was Awad Ammora Co. & Partners, Nashabia, Damascus, Syria.

6. Extent to which the end-user is under the influence of the Syrian Government. The Government has no specific evidence that the end-user is subject to the influence, ownership or control of the Syrian government. It should be noted that there is older media reporting, ultimately derived from the Iraq Survey Group, indicating that the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq was seeking to procure aluminium tubes for its nuclear programme from Awad Ammora in late 2002 or early 2003, and linking the company to alleged efforts by the Iraqi regime to fund Palestinian organisations via the UN oil-for-

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<sup>469</sup> Ev w155 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 11 September 2013

food programme. However none of these reports provide evidence of a link to any chemical weapons programme in Syria. The Government was aware of these reports when the licences were granted in 2012 and appropriate checks were carried out which confirmed that there were no grounds for refusing these licence applications.

7. Last known location in Syria. The goods were not exported. HMRC has confirmed that no exports of either chemical were declared under the revoked licences and we have written confirmation from the exporter that the licences were not used and no goods were shipped before the licences were revoked.

8. Dates of approval and revocation. Both licence applications were submitted on 1 August 2011; the licences were granted on 17 and 18 January 2012; and both were revoked on 30 July 2012.

9. Ministerial involvement in decision-making. The process was as follows. Each application was reviewed by advisers in MOD (including defence Intelligence and DSTL at Porton Down), in the FCO (including the regional Desk and POST, the Sanctions Team, and the Australia Group desk officer) and in the Chemical Weapons Convention UK National Authority in DECC. No concerns about end-use were identified by any of these reviews and accordingly neither licence application was put to Ministers for approval.

10. Copies of the licences and any conditions. All the relevant information that I am ready to disclose is contained within this letter and its attachment.

I am not disclosing the assessments that supported the decisions to approve these two licences. To do so would be likely to inhibit the free and frank provision of advice and the free and frank exchange of views for the purpose of deliberation. I have carefully considered the arguments in favour of disclosure, in particular that transparency in policy making may improve engagement between the public and government, and it is desirable that the public can satisfy themselves that decisions are taken on the basis of the best available information. However BIS, as the statutory licensing authority, makes decisions on export licence applications based on advice received from other Government Departments, and it is my view that releasing the advice received for specific export licence applications would impact adversely on the quality of the advice provided by other Departments and on the ultimate decisions taken.

After giving the matter careful consideration, and consulting the companies concerned, I have also decided not to disclose either the licence application forms or the names of the UK companies to which these licences were granted. I have taken the same decision in respect of the companies to which the other five licences covered in this letter were granted. I recognise that there is a public interest in knowing that the Government acted properly in this matter. But the companies behaved responsibly by applying for export licences and were engaged in legitimate transactions. We have taken into account strong feedback from some of the companies that they should not be exposed to reputational damage when they have acted in an entirely proper way. Their licence applications were submitted in confidence and it is important that the Government respects that fact and maintains that confidence in the integrity of the system.

## **2. Should the licences granted in January 2012 have been refused?**

Each licence application was assessed on its own merits against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria taking into account all relevant information available to us at the time. The stated end-use of these chemicals was a legitimate commercial application. The media reporting about the end-user I referred to above did not suggest any link to chemical weapons. There was no information from either open or classified sources available at the time, and none that we have received since, to link the end-user to any chemical weapons programme in Syria, and we did not — and do not — have any information to indicate that Syria was actively seeking to acquire these chemicals for use in the manufacture of chemical weapons. Given the nature of the stated end-use and the lack of evidence that would justify refusal, the licences were granted. Having reviewed the information on which these decisions were based, I am satisfied that this was the correct decision.

### 3. Grounds for refusal

The position set out in your letter appears to be an over-interpretation of the statement made by the Foreign Secretary in the course of giving oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February 2012. I know that the Foreign Secretary is writing to you to set the record straight on this very important point.

The Government's policy remains as set out in the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, announced by the then Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Peter Hain, in the House of Commons on 26 October 2000. There has been no change to this policy. Specifically with regard to exports that might be used for internal repression, the Government continues to assess applications against Criterion 2 in full, which states that: “[The Government will] not issue an export licence if there is a *clear risk* [my emphasis] that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.”

### 4. Delay in revoking licences

EU discussions about additional sanctions against Syria continued throughout the second half of 2011 and beyond (the original EU sanctions regulation was adopted on 9 May and amended on 10 occasions before the end of the year). In parallel with this, the participating states of the Australia Group (AG) had agreed in June 2011 that they should take steps to control the export to Syria of chemicals potentially usable in the manufacture of chemical weapons, over and above those included on the AG chemical weapons precursors list. There were also discussions within the EU about how to implement these additional controls. However the actual decision to pursue sanctions targeted against the manufacture and use of chemical weapons was not finally taken until 23 April 2012 (Council decision 2012/206/CFSP). Article 1 of the decision said:

*“The sale, supply, transfer or export of certain other equipment, goods and technology which might be used for internal repression or for the manufacture and maintenance of products which could be used for internal repression, to Syria by nationals of Member States or from the territories of Member States or using their flag vessels or aircraft, shall be prohibited, whether originating or not in their territories.*

*“The Union shall take the necessary measures in order to determine the relevant items to be covered by this paragraph.”*

Negotiation of the Regulation that would implement this provision — and which would include the list of items covered by it — began shortly thereafter. It was clear from an early stage in the negotiation of the Regulation that it was likely to include both potassium fluoride and sodium fluoride, but this could not be known for certain until the text was finalised at working group level on 12 June. The Regulation was finally adopted by the Council on 15 June and came into force on 17 June. This is the earliest we could have revoked the licences. I accept that the fact the licences were not revoked immediately after that date was an oversight, and that we should have acted more quickly following the entry into force of the Regulation.

Since that time we have reviewed our procedures to ensure that revocations take place as soon as possible after the adoption of any EU sanctions or other restrictive measures. For example, following the decision at the 21 August Foreign Affairs Council to suspend certain export licensing for Egypt, we reviewed and suspended 48 extant licences by 28 August.

### **5. Clarification of earlier remarks on export of the chemicals**

There is no contradiction between my letter of 10 April and the statements on 2 and 3 September, though I can see there was scope for confusion. Let me explain why.

As you know, a Standard Individual Export licence (SIEL) permits the export of a specified quantity of items to a named recipient and is usually valid for up to 2 years. The licence is valid until the full quantity of items is shipped — at which point it is said to be “exhausted” — or until the 2-year validity period is reached — at which point it is said to be “expired”. A licence which neither exhausted nor expired is “extant”. An extant licence is therefore one which is wholly or partially unused and of course only an extant licence can be revoked. The licensing database (SPIRE) shows a licence’s status, but for extant licences it does not show with any certainty what quantity — if any — has been shipped or what quantity remains to be shipped.

My statement of 10 April the “unfortunately, we do not have data showing what quantities of chemicals covered by these SIELs had already been exported” was meant to reflect this uncertainty. It was not meant to suggest that we had actual evidence that some quantities has actually been exported. We had no such evidence, and as my answer to point 1.7 above makes clear, no chemicals were in fact exported.

To avoid confusion in the future, we will, when revoking licences, always ask HMRC to check its records and we will contact the exporter directly to seek confirmation of licence use. We adopted this approach when we recently revoked export licences for Egypt.

### **6. Details of previous export licences.**

The five licences for sodium fluoride that I referred to in my letter of 10 September are the only other licences granted since 2003 for the export to Syria of chemicals included on the Australia Group chemical weapons precursor list and listed in Annex 1 of Council regulation 428/2009. Information regarding these five licences is given in Annex 1 to this letter. In each case the end-use was for the manufacture of toothpaste.

### **7. Countries holding stockpiles of chemical weapons**

There are four states that have acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, have declared their stockpiles, and are now participating in OPCW-verified destruction programmes: Iraq, Libya, Russia and the United States. The information requested in respect of these states is at Annex 2.

For states not party to the Chemical Weapons Convention open source reporting is not a reliable guide because states not party to the CWC have no obligation to declare any stockpiles they may have. While it is clear that Syria maintains significant CW stockpiles, open source material does not reliably confirm the existence or non-existence of stockpiles in those other states that have not ratified or acceded to the CWC, namely Angola, Burma, DPRK, Egypt, Israel and South Sudan. I have however also included information in respect of export licences granted to these states in Annex 2. I want to emphasise that by providing this information the Government is not confirming that it believes that any of these states does or does not possess chemical weapons — the information is provided for the sake of completeness only.

Please note that all chemicals included on the Australia Group chemical weapons precursor list are included in entry 1C350 of Annex I to Council Regulation 428/2009, with the exception of 3 chemicals which are listed at ML7c1 and ML7c2 of the Military List. Furthermore some chemical weapons precursors not included on the Australia Group list are listed at entry 1C450 of Annex I of Council regulation 428/2009. Annex 3 therefore includes all licences granted for the supply to the 10 states named above of chemicals listed in entries 1C350, 1C450, ML7c1 and ML7c2. Note also that all chemicals listed in entry 1C350 may be exported to the USA under the terms of the EU General Export Authorisation No. EU001. This accounts for the relatively small number of individual licences granted for the USA.

### **Your letter of 11 September.**

All the information you requested in your letter of 11 September — with the exception of the exporter names which I am not disclosing for the reasons given above — is included in Annex 1.

### **Conclusions**

You are right to question me about granting licences for the export of chemicals to Syria given the public interest which the issue has raised. I hope that this letter reassures you that the Government takes its responsibilities very seriously, is acting effectively to promote global security and responsible exporting, and is ready to make changes to our procedures when this is necessary.<sup>470</sup>

### **Annex 1 — Details of 5 licences for export to Syria of sodium fluoride granted between 2004 and 2010**

[All the information in Annex I is incorporated into the Table on page 253 headed “British Government approvals of dual-use, i.e. civil or military use, chemicals to Syria 2004–2012”

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<sup>470</sup> Ev w162 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 4 October 2013

which gives all the publicly available information about all 7 of the Government approved licences.]

**Annex 2 — details of licences granted to specified destinations for chemicals listed in the Australia Group chemical weapons precursors list and/or listed in Annex I of Council regulation 428/2009**

	Destination	Good Rating	Chemical name	Goods Quantity	Total Goods Value (£)	Date licence granted
1	Burma	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	500g	19.4	15/08/2005
2	DPRK	1C350.50	Sodium sulphide	500g	8.15	04/02/2003
3	Egypt	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	200L	1262	25/04/2003
4	Egypt	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	1200L	11844	25/04/2006
5	Egypt	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	1000kg	17600	06/08/2007
6	Egypt	1C350.46	Polyethanolamine	1025L	2480	08/06/2009
7	Egypt	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	1000L	6128	01/10/2009
8	Egypt	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	50L	304.2	06/01/2011
9	Egypt	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	300kg	2715	30/08/2011
10	Egypt	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	200kg	1810	25/11/2011
11	Egypt	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	2000kg	18100	17/11/2011
12	Egypt	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	66L	6.5	16/11/2012
13	Egypt	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	25kg	270	25/03/2013
14	Egypt	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	2000kg	8000	19/04/2013
15	Egypt	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	6000kg	30000	10/05/2013
16	Iraq	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	50g	13.57	17/04/2008
17	Israel	1C350.16	Dimethylamine	600 tonnes	275000	14/11/2003
18	Israel	1C350.46	Polyethanolamine	120 tonnes	39000	18/03/2004
19	Israel	1C450a5	Cyanogen Chloride	1kg	5500	08/04/2005
20	Israel	1C350.46	Polyethanolamine	200 tonnes	170000	11/10/2005
21	Israel	1C350.24	Hydrogen Fluoride	32.4kg	660	08/10/2009
22	Israel	1C350.24	Hydrogen Fluoride	32.4kg	660.98	29/01/2010



23	Israel	1C350.9	Thionyl chloride	500ml	33.67	04/04/2013
24	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	100L	1796	06/02/2003
25	Libya	1C450b8	Methyldiethanolamine	64000kg	134824.01	18/08/2003
26	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	10L	271.8	12/05/2004
27	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	200L	2400	24/05/2004
28	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	100L	958.82	18/06/2004
29	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	3000ml	50.58	07/06/2005
30	Libya	1C350.45	Sodium cyanide	3kg	621	07/04/2006
31	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	6L	115.68	03/04/2006
32	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	20L	331.4	28/07/2006
33	Libya	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	500g	125.61	05/02/2008
34	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	6L	46.87	11/07/2008
35	Libya	1C350.46	Triethanolamine	1L	21.46	04/08/2008
36	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	1L	27.30	12/08/2009
		1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	1kg	31.34	
37	Libya	1C350.24	Hydrofluoric acid	10L	472.3	12/12/2012
38	Russia	1C350.17	Diethyl ethyl phosphonate	6kg	300	28/01/2004
39	Russia	1C450b4	2-Diethylaminoethyl chloride hydrochloride	140kg	1903.19	02/12/2013
40	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	2700kg	10500	01/04/2004
41	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	6400kg	12837.5	29/10/2004
42	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	10000kg	38900	19/11/2004
43	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	1600kg	3209.4	10/02/2005
44	Russia	1C350.2	Phosphoryl Chloride	1.5L	1469.59	28/09/2005
45	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	25000kg	52567	11/11/2005
46	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	20kg	2	17/11/2005
		1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	20kg	2	
47	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyl chloride hydrochloride	700kg	8750	08/02/2006

48	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	20000kg	28300	1-/01/2006
49	Russia	1C450b1	Dilsopropyl methylphosphonate	100g	71	21/02/2006
50	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	19000kg	39235	15/05/2006
51	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	28400kg	58646	11/07/2006
52	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	45000kg	175050	15/08/2006
53	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	19200kg	39744	31/08/2007
54	Russia	1C350.14	Potassium Fluoride	20kg	257	12/10/2007
55	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	45000kg	175050	09/01/2008
56	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	1000kg	12650	19/03/2008
57	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	1000kg	12400	10/06/2008
58	Russia	1C350.3	Dimethyl methylphosphonate	10kg	624	26/01/2009
59	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	500kg	6200	15/01/2009
60	Russia	1C350.48	Disopropylamine	100L	662	23/03/2009
61	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	1000kg	15500	11/05/2009
62	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	45000kg	123750	07/09/2009
63	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	1000kg	15500	17/03/2010
64	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	45000kg	123750	13/04/2010
65	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	1000kg	15500	11/05/2009
66	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	2000kg	31000	29/09/2010
67	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	50kg	1100	09/02/2011
68	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	45000kg	145332	01/08/2011
69	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly chloride hydrochloride	2000kg	33000	14/10/2011
70	Russia	1C450b4	2-(Diethylamino)ethyly	2500kg	38750	30/07/2012

			chloride hydrochloride			
71	Russia	1C350.43	Sodium Fluoride	45000kg	140445	07/03/2013
72	Russia	1C450b4	Diethylaminoethylchloride hydrochloride	3500kg	42000	10/05/2013
73	USA	1C350.41	Mixture of Potassium hydrogen difluoride and hydrogen fluoride	350kg	2768.5	28/01/2003
74	USA	1C350.46	Polyethanolamine	1,560,000kg	450000	10/11/2003
75	USA	1C350.48	Disopropylamine	34800kg	45600	21/07/2005
76	USA	1C350.24	Hydrogen Fluoride	500000kg	850000	17/08/2010

508. The letter to the Chairman of the Business Secretary of 11 October 2013 immediately above constituted a revised version of his original reply dated 4 October 2013, because the Business Secretary had been informed that the original contained a statement that may be misleading. The statement in question related to one of the named end-users in Syria of UK Government approved exports of dual-use chemicals – Awad Ammora. The Business Secretary explained this revision in a further letter to the Chairman of the Committees on 11 October 2013 which read as follows:

I wrote to you on 4 October in response to your letters of the 9 and 11 September. I am now sending you a revised version of my response. I have been informed that the original contained a statement that may be misleading. I want to be completely open with the committee over this sensitive issue and I am therefore sharing my latest information with you.

I refer to the section of my letter (“1. Points raised in previous correspondence”), specifically point 6 (“Extent to which the end-user is under the influence of the Syrian Government”).

The closing sentence of my original letter reads, “The Government was aware of these reports when the licences were granted in 2012 and appropriate checks were carried out which confirmed that there were no grounds for refusing these licence applications”. This refers to media reports about the end user for the licences issued in January 2012.

In fact, although officials did have access to information about the end user, from open and classified sources some of which dated back to 2001, we cannot confirm definitively that officials did in fact investigate the contents of the 2004 media reports. That said, officials assessing the licence applications did make proper checks based on the information dating back to 2001. They have confirmed to me categorically that there was no evidence at the time the licences were assessed — and there is no evidence now — of any links between the end user and chemical weapons programmes. I therefore remain

confident that checks made were appropriate and that there were no grounds for refusing the applications.<sup>471</sup>

The checks and media reports to which the Business Secretary refers immediately above related to the Syrian company Awad Ammora. The Business Secretary's original description of these media reports are in paragraph 507 above.

509. On 23 October 2013 the Chairman of the Committees wrote a further letter to the Business Secretary as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 11 October in reply to my letters of 9 and 11 September on the licence approvals given by both the present and previous Governments between 2004 and 2012 for the export of dual-use chemicals to Syria which could be used as precursor chemicals for the manufacture of chemical weapons, including sarin.

The Committees on Arms Export Controls will be pursuing further a number of issues raised by the information in your reply. However, there is one answer you gave that I must take up with you immediately as it is of significance not just for the Committees' current inquiry but for the House of Commons as a whole. It is your refusal to provide the Committees with the names of the companies who were given Government licence approval to export to Syria the dual-use chemicals sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride, which can be used to manufacture sarin.

Under Standing Orders, House of Commons Select Committees are empowered "to send for persons, papers and records" (S.O. 152(4)). The effect of your decision to refuse to provide the Committees with the names of the companies concerned is to deny the Committees the ability to take Evidence from those companies.

Your reply of 11 October in my view provides no substantive justification for refusing to provide the Committees with the names of the companies.

The Committees fully accept that the companies concerned, in applying for export licences for the export of these dual-use chemicals to Syria, were acting in an entirely proper way.

With regard to "possible reputational damage", the prime object of the Committees' scrutiny of this key issue, is not the companies but the Government—your own Department in particular.

There is no way that revealing the names of these companies will be prejudicial to their future exports of sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride to Syria. An EU embargo on the export of these chemicals to Syria is now in place. The Prime Minister revealed on 29 August 2013 that there had been at least 14 previous uses of chemical weapons in Syria prior to the appalling attack on 21 August. It is self-evident that there are not going to be any further British Government approvals for the export of sodium fluoride or potassium fluoride to Syria for the foreseeable future.

In the light of the above, I ask you to reconsider your decision to refuse to provide the Committees with the names of the companies who were given Government licence

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<sup>471</sup> Ev w173 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 11 October 2013

approval to export sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride to Syria between 2004 and 2012, and to provide the Committees with the names of the companies concerned.<sup>472</sup>

510. The Business Secretary replied to the Chairman of the Committees further on 25 October 2013 explaining his reasons for not disclosing the names of the British companies which applied for the licences to supply dual-use chemicals to Syria as follows:

Thank you for your letter of the 23 October about the disclosure of the names of the exporters granted licences for dual use chemicals for Syria between 2004 and 2012.

In deciding whether to disclose the names of the exporters we thought it was important to establish whether they were willing to be publicly interrogated on this issue, given that they had shared information with us on a confidential basis. We used the framework provided by the Freedom of Information (FoI) Act as a basis on which to make this decision.

Two of the three exporters raised compelling objections. In particular they argued, and we agreed, that they were reputable British companies that had done nothing wrong. Specifically they were engaging in the legitimate trade of sodium fluoride used for the manufacture of toothpaste, not chemical weapons. One company cited the potential risk of physical danger to their employees both in the UK and in their US parent company. They also cited commercial confidentiality and reputational damage which might have an impact on their financial interests. I judged on this basis that the balance of the argument was not in favour of public disclosure in this case.

In withholding the names of the exporters it was never my intention to obstruct the work of the Committees on Arms Export Controls. I therefore would like to explore with you the possibility of disclosure on a confidential basis to enable you to see the exporters in closed session. As we originally contacted the companies under the FoI framework we would be obliged to go back to them to take their views if you are amenable to this proposal. Clearly we would need to discuss the exact terms of a confidential disclosure but it would be helpful to know whether you agree to this in principle.<sup>473</sup>

511. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 Ann McKechin MP noted that the Government's export ban of dual-use chemicals to Syria had been implemented a couple of months after the original decision to grant the export licences. She questioned the manner in which the original decision to grant the two licences in January 2012 had been made. She commented:

Although there is no evidence to suggest that the applicant companies did not act in good faith, it cannot be satisfactory, given the nature of the ongoing Syrian conflict, which commenced before the export licence was granted, to believe that exports capable of dual use should continue as normal between the two countries.<sup>474</sup>

In his reply to the debate the Business Minister, Michael Fallon, said:

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<sup>472</sup> Ev w176 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 23 October 2013

<sup>473</sup> Ev w177 - Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 25 October 2013

<sup>474</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 410WH

I would like to take this opportunity to state categorically that the Government have done nothing to assist Syria's chemical weapons programme. Doing so would, of course, be illegal under the Chemical Weapons Act 1996, and there is no evidence that exports from the UK have contributed to Syria's chemical weapons programme.<sup>475</sup>

He continued by saying: "The exporter has confirmed that shipments were not made prior to those sanctions coming into force, so no goods were actually exported under those licences."<sup>476</sup> The Minister stated:

All the licences were rigorously assessed against the criteria to determine that the end users intended to use the products for legitimate civilian commercial activity. We had no grounds to refuse the applications for our two licences, based on the information available and the circumstances prevailing at the time.<sup>477</sup>

512. When the Committees questioned the Business Secretary, in the Oral Evidence session on 18 December 2013, about his Department's process of approving the two licences for dual-use chemicals to Syria in January 2012 he said:

under the international classification, the chemicals are dual-use products. I think my Department quite reasonably did not refer them to Ministers by applying a bit of common sense. After all, toothpaste and cleaning fluids for windows are not, by most people's understanding, chemical weapons. Domestos is a weapon of mass destruction because it contains chlorine; nitrogenous fertilisers are weapons of mass destruction, as the IRA demonstrated. We would not in normal circumstances regard these standard products, manufactured in hundreds of factories all over the world on a large scale, as subject to risk. I think it was perfectly reasonable that my officials showed a little common sense in applying the licensing criteria.<sup>478</sup>

513. When the Foreign Secretary was asked about the licence approval process for the two licences for dual-use chemicals to Syria in January 2012, and specifically that at the time of the approval Syria was known to be major holder of chemical weapons, the chemicals were precursors for the production of sarin gas, that Syria was not a signatory, or had not ratified, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and that a civil war was in progress in Syria at the time, why the licence had been approved he said: "These were considered, and I think considered correctly, by officials at the time, because they were not covered by the sanctions at the time."<sup>479</sup> When asked specifically about the dual-use chemicals being precursor for sarin gas he replied: "These would not be considered by Ministers at the time."<sup>480</sup>

514. On 20 January 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary asking if he had reconsidered providing the names of the companies who had been granted licences for dual-use chemicals to Syria to enable the Committees to take evidence in public from those companies. The text of the letter was as follows:

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<sup>475</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 423WH

<sup>476</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 423WH

<sup>477</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 424WH

<sup>478</sup> Q 99

<sup>479</sup> Q 136

<sup>480</sup> Q 137

At your Oral Evidence session with the Committees on December 18, I put to you the reasons why we would wish you to reconsider your prohibition on the companies that were given licence approval to export dual-use chemicals to Syria by both the present and the previous Government giving evidence in public to the Committees. You said that you would reflect on this.

I should be grateful to know the outcome of your reflection at an early date as the Committees wish to decide their next step.<sup>481</sup>

The Business Secretary replied to the Chairman of the Committees on 3 February 2014. The section of his letter referring to the names of the companies granted licences for dual-use chemicals for Syria was as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 20 January 2014 about the names of the companies granted licences to export dual-use chemicals to Syria.

I have of course given further consideration to my earlier decision not to make public the names of the companies granted licences to export sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride to Syria between 2004 and 2012. In doing so I have reviewed the arguments put forward by you and your Committee, as well as the companies themselves, regarding the harm to their legitimate commercial interests that disclosure might cause, and the potential harm to employees. I find that these latter arguments remain compelling. I have also taken account of the fact that export licence applications are made in confidence. As a result, I still believe that on balance the argument is not in favour of public disclosure.

Let me make it clear once again that I do not wish to obstruct the work of the Committees. You have acknowledged that the companies have not done anything wrong and, indeed, acted responsibly by applying for export licences. Your concern rather is to hold the Government, rather than the exporters, to account. It is absolutely right that you should do so and I therefore repeat my offer to disclose the names of the companies on a confidential basis so that you can meet them “in camera”.<sup>482</sup>

515. With regard to the Business Secretary’s claim that he had to act within the framework of the Freedom of Information Act,<sup>483</sup> the Committees took advice from the Clerk of the House who confirmed “that House of Commons Select Committees are not governed or circumscribed by the Freedom of Information Act with regard to the evidence they seek in the course of their inquiries.”<sup>484</sup>

516. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary on 6 March 2014 as follows:

Thank you for your letter of January 3 (assumed to be in error for February 3 when it was received).

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<sup>481</sup> Ev w199 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 20 January 2014

<sup>482</sup> Ev w199 - Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 3 February 2014

<sup>483</sup> See: Ev w177 – Letter from Vince cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 25 October 2013

<sup>484</sup> Ev w191 – Letter from the Clerk of the House to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 28 November 2013

It is regrettable that you continue to refuse to put into the public domain the names of the companies that were given UK Government approval to export to Syria dual-use chemicals which could be used as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of sarin. The effect of your decision, as you are clearly aware, is to prevent the Committees on Arms Export Controls from taking Oral Evidence in public from the companies concerned.

Given the position you have adopted the Committees will therefore be taking Evidence from the companies “in camera” as you have proposed.

The information already obtained by the Committees regarding the 7 Government approved export licences for dual-use chemicals to Syria is set out in the Table below.

**British Government approvals of exports of dual-use, i.e. civil or military use, chemicals to Syria 2004-2012**

	Date of licence approval	Type of chemical	Qty (kg)	Value (£)	Usage	Stated end-use	Stated end-user
1	15/7/2004	Sodium Fluoride	50	228.5	Unknown – No records available	Manufacture of toothpaste	MADA for Industry & Commerce
2	28/9/2005	Sodium Fluoride	2,000	6,220	2,000kgs exported – but not known on which date or in how many shipments as records no longer available	Manufacture of toothpaste	Kaadani & Sioufi
3	15/3/2007	Sodium Fluoride	50	695	Unknown – No records available	Manufacture of toothpaste	MADA for Industry & Commerce
4	3/2/2009	Sodium Fluoride	2,000	6,220	Five shipments totalling 2,000kg: 13/2/2009 – 150kg 18/6/2009 – 1,000kg 15/4/2009 – 100kg 3/7/2009 – 100kg 13/1/2011 – 650kg	Manufacture of toothpaste	Kaadani & Sioufi
5	11/5/2010	Sodium Fluoride	50	345	One shipment of 50kg on 16/8/2010	Manufacture of toothpaste	MADA for Industry & Commerce
6	17/1/2012	Sodium Fluoride	1,000	10,000	No shipments made	Metal finishing of aluminium profiles for aluminium showers, window frames	Awad Ammora Co. & Partners, Nashabia, Damascus, Syria



7	18/1/2012	Potassium fluoride	1,000	10,200	No shipments made	Metal finishing of aluminium profiles for aluminium showers, window frames	Awad Ammora Co. & Partners, Nashabia, Damascus, Syria
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Sources: Written Answer from the Business Minister Mark Prisk to the Chairman of CAEC, Sir John Stanley, on 27 March 2012, col. 1137W and the letters from Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, to the Chairman of CAEC, Sir John Stanley, dated 4 October 2013 (Ev w162) and 11 October 2013 (Ev w173).

Please could you provide the name of the company which was given the Government export licence approval in each case.<sup>485</sup>

The Business Secretary's reply of 25 March 2014 providing the names of the companies concerned was marked "CONFIDENTIAL" and cannot therefore be published.

517. The Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary on 24 April 2014 requesting clarification about the Government's refusal to release information about what precursor chemicals that have been or could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons had been declared by the Syrians. The text of the letter was as follows:

In the Oral Evidence you gave to the Foreign Affairs Committee on March 18 on Syria, we had the following exchange:

**Q19 Sir John Stanley** "Foreign Secretary, you will be aware that the Committees on Arms Export Controls, of which this Committee is a part, has been pursuing the issue of the precursor chemicals for which British Government export licence approval was given between 2004 and 2012—precursor chemicals that could be used in the manufacture of sarin. Subsequently, in the reports that have been made by the OPCW [Organisation of Prohibited Chemical Weapons] of the Syrian declarations of chemical weapons, there are references to precursor chemicals for the manufacture of chemical weapons. Could you, by letter to the Committee, give us the information that is available to your Department as to precisely which precursor chemicals that have been or could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons have now been declared by the Syrians?"

**Mr Hague:** "Yes, absolutely. I will update the Committee on that, particularly if there is any new information. I will update the Committee in any case."

Notwithstanding your reply, you declined to provide the information I had requested. In your follow-up letter to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee you said: "Sir John Stanley asked for details of precursor chemicals that have been or could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons that have now been declared by the Syrians. This information is proliferation sensitive and classified under the Chemical Weapons Convention's confidentiality regime, so I cannot include it in a letter."

<sup>485</sup> Ev w203 –Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 6 March 2014

I fail to understand how the withholding of this information can be justified on grounds of confidentiality given the following two factors.

First, the precursor chemicals that can be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons have been put by Governments into the public domain internationally for many years. For example they are listed in EU Council Regulation (EC) No 2432/2001 of 20 November 2001 amending and updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology and are also listed in the Australia Group Export Control List: Chemical Weapons Precursors.

Second, Ministers have already put a substantial quantity of detailed information into the public domain on the Government's approval of exports of dual-use chemicals to Syria in the period 2004 – 2012 as set out in the Table I attached to my letter of 6 March to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, a copy of which I attach for convenience.

In the light of these factors I should be grateful if you would reconsider your position of refusing to make public to the Committees on Arms Export Controls as to precisely which precursor chemicals that have been or could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons, have now been declared by the Syrians.<sup>486</sup>

[The table attached to the Chairman's letter to the Foreign Secretary is that in paragraph 516 above.]

The Foreign Secretary replied on 4 June 2014 as follows:

In your letter of 24 April you asked me to make public which precursor chemicals that have been or could be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons have been declared by the Syrian regime.

As my earlier response made clear, the information provided by Syria in its declarations to the OPCW is classified under the Chemical Weapons Convention's confidentiality regime.

Article 4 states:

"Each State Party shall treat information which it receives from the Organisation in accordance with the level of confidentiality established for that information." All declarations received by the OPCW are confidential.

For operational reasons and with Syria's agreement the OPCW have put some of this information into the public domain. I attach a table with these details.

Full details of the chemicals listed in the Syrian declaration were provided to you by officials at a confidential briefing on 29 April.

My officials are seeking OPCW agreement that further information contained in the Syrian declaration can be placed in the public domain.<sup>487</sup>

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<sup>486</sup> Ev w217 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to William Hague dated 24 April 2014

<sup>487</sup> Ev w492 – Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 4 June 2014

## Annex

	CHEMICAL NAME	QUANTITY TO BE DESTROYED (metric tonnes)
1	TRIETHYLAMINE	30
2	TRIMETHYL PHOSPHITE (TMP)	60
3	DIMETHYL PHOSPHITE (DMP)	5
4	MONOISOPROPYLAMINE	40
5	DI-ISOPROPYL AMINOETHANOL	5
6	2-CHLOROETHANOL	5
7	BUTAN-1-OL	5
8	METHANOL	3
9	HYDROGEN FLUORIDE	60
10	PHOSPHORUS PENTASULPHIDE	10
11	PHOSPHORUS TRICHLORIDE	30
12	PHOSPHORUS OXYCHLORIDE	15
13	HYDROCHLORIC ACID	45
14	PROPAN-2-OL	120
15	HEXAMINE	80
16	SODIUM-O-ETHYL METHYL PHOSPHONOTHIONATE	130
17	N (2-CHLOROETHYL)-N- ISOPROPYL PROPAN-2-AMINE (SALT)	40
18	N (2-CHLOROETHYL)-N- ISOPROPYL PROPAN-2-AMINE (SOLUTION 23-64%)	90
19	N (2-CHLOROETHYL)-N-ETHYL PROPAN 2 AMINE (SOLUTION 23-64%)	25

518. In his letter to the Chairman of the Committees of 25 March 2014 the Business Secretary stated that there were 3 companies which had been given approval to export dual-use chemicals to Syria since 2004 – 2 companies in the period 2004–2010 and a further company in 2012. The Committees were required by the Business Secretary to keep the names of the companies “CONFIDENTIAL”. The Committees took Oral Evidence on 12 May 2014 from two of these companies who were given Government approval to export dual-use chemicals to Syria in the period 2004–2010. The evidence was taken “in camera” in accordance with the pre-condition stipulated by the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, before he agreed to give the companies names to the Committees. Both of these companies turned out to be brokers rather than manufacturers of chemicals in the UK with both companies having single-figure numbers of staff in this country.

519. The Committees used their best endeavours to take Oral Evidence from the third company to whom the Business department, at official level only, had given approval in January 2012 to export the dual-use chemicals sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride to Syria — both of which can be used as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons. However, the company concerned appears currently to have only one member of staff in the UK working as a Personal Assistant. The executive from whom the Committees sought to take evidence was stated by the company not to be in the UK during the entire period from the receipt of the Business Secretary’s letter in March 2014 to the finalisation of the Committees’ Report in July.

The Committees were therefore unable to take evidence from the company in question. The company appears to be a “Brass Plate” company.

520. On 9 July 2014 the Foreign Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement as follows:

**The Historical Role of UK Companies in Supplying Dual Use Chemicals to Syria**

**The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (William Hague):** Following Syria’s accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) last year, and as part of the process to eliminate its chemical weapons (CW) programme, Syria provided a confidential declaration to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which lists a number of states from which it obtained supplies of goods used in its CW programme.

The information in Syria’s declaration is classified under the terms of the CWC. However, I wish to inform the House that a review of our own files suggests that there were a number of exports of chemicals to Syria by UK companies between 1983 and 1986 which were likely to have been diverted for use in the Syrian programme.

These exports were:

- several hundred tonnes of the chemical dimethyl phosphite (DMP) in 1983 and a further export of several hundred tonnes in 1985;
- several hundred tonnes of trimethyl phosphite (TMP) in 1986;
- a smaller quantity of hydrogen fluoride (HF) in 1986 through a third country.

All these chemicals have legitimate uses, for example in the manufacture of plastics and pharmaceuticals. However, they can also be used in the production of sarin. DMP and TMP can also be used for the production of the nerve agent VX. That is why the export of such goods is strictly prohibited under the UK export regime introduced since the 1980s and progressively strengthened.

From the information we hold, we judge it likely that these chemical exports by UK companies were subsequently used by Syria in their programmes to produce nerve agents, including sarin.

Some of the companies involved no longer exist. Furthermore, some of the chemicals in question may have been sourced by a UK chemical trader, rather than produced in the UK.

The review of our records also confirmed an export of ventilation fans by a UK company to Syria in 2003. The fans were not controlled goods. Following an enquiry by the exporter, officials considered the export under licensing procedures, and insufficient grounds for refusal were found. Syria appears to have diverted these fans for use in a chemical weapons facility.

In the early 1980s, the exported chemicals were not subject to any international or UK export controls. However, knowledge of these exports, and growing concerns that Iraq

under Saddam Hussein was developing a chemical weapons capability, helped prompt the introduction of tighter controls, both in the UK and internationally.

The Export of Goods (Control) Order was amended to control DMP in July 1985, and TMP and HF in June 1986.

There has been a complete overhaul of export control legislation, policy and practice since the 1980s, designed to ensure that such exports could not happen today. The UK operates a robust export control regime, and takes international obligations on this issue very seriously.

Key instruments and legislation include:

- The Chemical Weapons Convention. The Chemical Weapons Act 1996 implements the provisions of the Convention which imposes specific controls on the transfer of certain chemicals including DMP and TMP.
- The development of the Australia Group, of which the UK was an original member in 1985. As a matter of routine, all changes to the Australia Group control lists are reflected in UK national export controls. It controls trade in HF as well as DMP and TMP.
- The Export Control Act 2002. Replacing legislation passed in 1939, the current legislation provides for controls on the export and brokering of listed goods and technologies, in addition to controls on unlisted items where it is believed they may be intended for use in weapons of mass destruction programmes.

Furthermore, the EU has developed EU wide controls on the export of dual use goods, including chemicals. Our ability to control exports is underpinned by the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, adopted by the UK in 2000 and updated in March 2014. The Criteria set a clear basis for the assessment of export licences. This is undertaken on a case by case basis taking account of all available information.

Today, the UK is playing its full part in the international effort to eliminate Syria's programme. As the House is already aware, the UK is accepting 150 tonnes of B precursors from the Syrian chemical stockpile for destruction. I can today also inform the House that in addition to those chemicals, a further 50 tonnes of the industrial chemicals hydrogen chloride and hydrogen fluoride will also be destroyed in specialised commercial facilities in the UK. We expect the ship transporting all these chemicals to arrive in the UK next week. The Members of Parliament in whose constituencies destruction will take place have been informed.<sup>488</sup>

**521. I propose that the Committee conclude that given the fact that Syria was a known holder of chemical weapons and a known non-signatory of the Chemicals Weapons Convention, banning the manufacture or use of chemical weapons, and given also the nature of the Assad**

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<sup>488</sup> HC Deb, 9 July 2014, cols 18-19W5

**regime, the decision of the previous Government to give 5 export licence approvals for a dual-use chemical to Syria between July 2004 and May 2010 was highly questionable.**

**522. I propose that the Committees further conclude that the decision of the present Government to give 2 export licence approvals for dual-use chemicals to Syria in January 2012 after the civil war had started in Syria in 2011 was irresponsible.**

**523. I propose that the Committees also conclude that given that:**

- a) Syria was a known holder of chemical weapons;**
- b) that Syria was a known non-signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention;**
- c) the nature of the Assad regime;**
- d) that a civil war was raging in Syria;**
- e) that sodium and potassium fluoride were both listed by the Australia Group and the EU in its Dual-Use Regulations as precursor chemicals in the manufacture of chemical weapons; and**
- f) the company concerned appears to be a “Brass Plate “ one**

**the present Government’s claim that at the time the two dual-use chemical export licences for sodium fluoride and potassium fluoride to Syria were approved in January 2012 “there were no grounds for refusal” is grossly inaccurate.**

**524. I propose that the Committees also conclude that, given the factors a) to f) in paragraph 523 above, there was a serious failure of due process within the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills in that neither of the licence applications for the export of sodium fluoride or potassium fluoride to Syria in January 2012 was put to Ministers for approval.**

**525. I propose that the Committees conclude that the arguments advanced by the Government against the Committees taking evidence from the dual-use chemical export licence applicant companies in public were either invalid or outweighed by the public interest that parliamentary proceedings should be conducted in public unless there are compelling reasons for not doing so.**

**526. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government should state in its Response whether it will adopt a policy of a very strong presumption against approving licence applications for dual-use chemical exports to countries that:**

- a) are known holders of chemical weapons;**
- b) have not signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention; and**
- c) are not participating in an Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-verified destruction programme.**

**and for any proposals to approve such licence applications being put to Ministers for decision.**

527. I propose that the Committees further recommend that the Government states in its Response whether the OPCW has agreed that further information contained in the Syrian declaration of its chemical weapons and the chemicals used, including precursor chemicals, in their manufacture can be placed in the public domain, and, if so, to provide the Committees with that information.

528. Following the Written Ministerial Statement made by the Foreign Secretary on 9 July 2014 on “The Historical Role of UK Companies in Supplying Dual Use Chemicals to Syria”, the Committees also recommend that the Government states in its response whether the existing export controls over dual-use chemicals need to be widened and strengthened, and, if so, in what ways.

### **Uzbekistan**

529. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of arms exports to Uzbekistan can be found at paragraphs 501–504 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Recommendation at paragraph 122 of the Report.

530. The Committees’ Recommendation on Uzbekistan in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 19 extant UK export licences to Uzbekistan or any goods on the Strategic Exports Control lists gifted, or planned to be gifted, to Uzbekistan:

- a) contravenes the Government’s stated policy that: “We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression”; or
- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK’s Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position.<sup>489</sup>

#### **The Government’s Response:**

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Uzbekistan contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government’s Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government’s answers to the Committees’ Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees’ Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.

As stated in the Government’s Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls published on 12 July, “As a matter of policy, all proposals to gift controlled military equipment are

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<sup>489</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 122

assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria by relevant Government departments in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour.” Therefore the Government is satisfied that no gifting package, or planned gifting package, contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government’s Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above].<sup>490</sup>

**531. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Uzbekistan for body armour and components for body armour are currently compliant with the following of the Government’s Arms Export Licencing Criterion: Two.**

### **Yemen**

532. The Committees’ previous scrutiny of arms exports to Yemen can be found at paragraphs 455–460 in Volume II of the Committees’ previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees’ Recommendation at paragraph 112 of the Report.

533. The Committees’ Recommendation on Yemen in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government’s Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that neither of the 10 extant UK export licences to Yemen:

contravenes the Government’s stated policy that: “We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression”; or

is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK’s Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including the extant licence to Yemen for body armour.<sup>491</sup>

#### **The Government’s Response:**

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Yemen contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government’s Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government’s answers to the Committees’ Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees’ Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.<sup>492</sup>

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<sup>490</sup> Cm8707, p 58

<sup>491</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 112

<sup>492</sup> Cm8707, p 53



534. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Yemen for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles and components for body armour are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criterion: Two.

### **Extant arms export licences to the 5 Additional Countries of concern to the Committees**

535. In addition to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's 28 Countries of Human Rights concern listed in the FCO's Human Rights Annual Report 2013 (Cm8842) published in April 2014, the Committees have concerns about arms export to 5 additional countries – Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia and Ukraine.

536. Specific evidence given to the Committees in relation to these 5 countries and the Committees' Conclusions and Recommendations in relation to those countries follow immediately below.

#### **Argentina**

537. On 26 April 2012, the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, announced a tightening of arms export controls to Argentina in a Written Ministerial Statement. The Business Secretary's Written Ministerial; Statement was as follows:

Export Control Policy

#### **The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (Vince Cable):**

I would like to inform the House of a change of policy on the licensing of exports of, and trade by British persons (trafficking and brokering) in, controlled goods and technology to military end-users in Argentina. Previous policy dating from 1998 required the refusal of licences for exports and trade which would enhance Argentine military capabilities but permitted licences for goods which maintained existing capability. In practice this has meant the authorisation of the export and trade of components for maintenance purposes.

The Government have reviewed this policy in the light of recent actions by the Argentine Government aimed at harming the economic interests of the Falkland Islanders. We are determined to ensure that no British licensable exports or trade have the potential to be used by Argentina to impose an economic blockade on the Falkland Islanders or inhibit their legitimate rights to develop their own economy.

New restrictions on the export and trade of licensable goods with the Argentine military will now be introduced with immediate effect. In future no licences shall be granted for any military or dual-use goods and technology being supplied to military end-users in Argentina, except in exceptional circumstances. We will review extant licences for military goods to the Argentine armed forces with a view to revoking any that are not consistent

with the revised policy. This decision will not affect licences for items intended for end-users other than the Argentine military.<sup>493</sup>

538. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Argentina can be found at paragraphs 469–478 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraphs 115 and 116 of the Report.

539. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendations on Argentina in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

**The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation:**

The Committees conclude that it is reprehensible that the Government, given the relatively recent history of British ships being sunk in the Falklands War by missiles supplied by a fellow NATO member and the statement by the Argentinian Foreign Minister, as reported on 5 February 2013, regarding Argentinian control of the Falkland Islands, when he said "I don't think it will take another 20 years", is unwilling to lobby other Governments to make the same change in arms exports policy to Argentina as that announced by the British Government on 26 April 2012. The Committees recommend that the Government should do so.<sup>494</sup>

**The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees conclusion but questions its recommendation. Our policy remains as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 December 2012 and as reiterated by him at the Oral Evidence Session with the Committees on 19 December 2012.<sup>495</sup>

[The policy stated by the Foreign Secretary in his letter of 6 January 2012 was as follows:

There is no UN, EU or any other international embargo against arms exports to Argentina. Therefore states would consider any exports to Argentina in the light of their own export controls and decide whether to approve export of such equipment. As stated in Cm 8441, the Government encourages all countries to take a responsible approach to export licensing and would expect them to take the Argentine government's actions into consideration when assessing applications.<sup>496</sup>

[In Oral Evidence on 19 December 2012 the Foreign Secretary said:

"Our policy was changed in response to the steady change in Argentine actions, which have been aimed at harming the economic interests of the Falkland Islands. We have a particular interest in that as the United Kingdom. We expect all countries to take the actions of the Argentine Government into account when considering export licence applications, but they have to make their own assessments of that.

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<sup>493</sup> HC Deb, 26 April 2012, 43WS

<sup>494</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 115

<sup>495</sup> Cm8707, p 55

<sup>496</sup> See: HC205 Ev w139

Let us take Spain, for example. I just take this for the sake of argument—I do not know whether Spain exports any relevant equipment to Argentina that they should not export to Argentina. It would be a long argument for no particular benefit. I do not think that other EU countries would readily adopt this position, nor are there exports on a huge scale—from what one can see—to Argentina at the moment, so I do not think that that would be a very productive use of our time, as things stand.”<sup>497]</sup>

### **The Committees’ Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 57 extant UK export licences to Argentina:

- a) contravenes the Government’s stated policy that: “We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression”; or
- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK’s Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Argentina for: cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography.<sup>498</sup>

### **The Government’s Response:**

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Argentina contravenes its policies both as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government’s Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above] and as announced on 26 April 2012. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government’s answers to the Committees’ Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees’ Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.<sup>499</sup>

540. Following publication of the Government’s *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* the Committees wrote to the Government asking two questions about Argentina. The questions and answers were as follows:

### **The Committees’ question:**

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<sup>497</sup> See: HC 205, Q 159

<sup>498</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 116

<sup>499</sup> Cm8707, p 55

How is the Secretaries of State's statement that "43 licences for Argentina were subsequently revoked but the licensing of exports for purely commercial or private use has continued" <sup>[500]</sup> to be reconciled with the Government's approval after the 43 licence revocations in 2012 of export licences to Argentina for SIELs for small arms ammunition, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and OIELs for cryptographic equipment.

**The Government's answer:**

All licences for Argentina issued after 26 April 2012 took into account the policy announced by the Business Secretary on that date as well as the Consolidated Criteria. This is addressed in detail on pages 7 and 17 of the Annual Report. Licences for the equipment quoted above were for commercial and private end use.<sup>501</sup>

**The Committees' question:**

Why was the value of arms export licences to Argentina in 2012 nearly 5 times greater than it was in 2011, notwithstanding the fact that in April 2012 the Business Secretary announced that the Government would no longer grant licences for any military or dual-use goods and technology for military end-users in Argentina, other than in exceptional circumstances?

**The Government's answer:**

The value of export licences issued for military list goods was several times smaller in 2012 than in 2011 as a result of the policy specifically directed at military end users. The export of dual-use and military list goods to civil and commercial end users was unaffected by the policy.<sup>502</sup>

**541. I propose that the Committees continue to conclude that it is reprehensible that the Government, given the relatively recent history of British ships being sunk in the Falklands War by missiles supplied by a fellow NATO member and the statement by the Argentinian Foreign Minister, as reported on 5 February 2013, regarding Argentinian control of the Falkland Islands, when he said "I don't think it will take another 20 years", is unwilling to lobby other Governments to make the same change in arms exports policy to Argentina as that announced by the British Government on 26 April 2012. The Committees recommend that the Government should do so.**

**542. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response which other NATO member countries, and other arms exporting countries to Argentina have now made the same change in arms exports policy to Argentina as that announced by the British Government on 26 April 2012.**

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<sup>500</sup> HC (2013–14) 561, page 1

<sup>501</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

<sup>502</sup> Annex 2 — The Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012* (HC 561) and the Government's answers

543. Following the Government's arms exports Quarterly Report for July–September 2013, the Committees put the following questions to the Government regarding exports to Argentina:

Given the current political tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina and the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of 26 April 2012, the Committees wish know why was an OIEL including artillery ammunition, components for artillery, components for combat naval vessels, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, signalling devices, smoke canisters, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, technology for artillery, technology for combat naval vessels, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval engines, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for signalling devices, technology for smoke canisters, technology for weapon control equipment, training artillery ammunition and weapon control equipment approved?

The Government response was:

The OIEL was approved because all items in the licence are for the sole use of a non-Argentinean naval mission and are not to be re-exported or sold for export to a Third Party. We had no Criteria concerns.

I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response explains:

- a) what use the non-Argentinian naval mission has for items such as artillery ammunition and components for artillery;
- b) how export approval of the above goods for export to Argentina can be reconciled with the Business Secretary's change of policy on arms exports to Argentina in his Written Ministerial Statement of 26 April 2012 in which he said: "In future no licences will be granted for military or dual-use goods for military end users in Argentina unless there are compelling exceptional reasons to do so"; and

- c) **why the Government approved the above goods to be exported to Argentina rather than to the country of the non-Argentinian naval mission referred to.**

## **Bahrain**

544. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Bahrain can be found at paragraphs 388–397 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 101 of the Report.

545. The Committees' Recommendation on Bahrain in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 105 extant UK export licences to Bahrain:

- a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or
- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Bahrain for cryptographic software, components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition, command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, components for pistols, pistols, weapon sights, components for machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns, gun silencers and weapon sight mounts.<sup>503</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Bahrain contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. As was shown in Bahrain itself during 2011, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees'

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<sup>503</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 101

Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.<sup>504</sup>

546. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 the Chairman of the Committees raised the issue of arms exports to Bahrain when he said:

I do not need to recite the serious human rights abuses that took place in Bahrain in the wake of the Arab spring. They have been well documented and were all too observable by any and all of us on television, where we saw police vehicles being driven towards and into those demonstrating peacefully in Bahrain. Against that same human rights background, it is extraordinary that the Government's existing approved arms export licences to Bahrain include licences for small arms ammunition, pistols, gun silencers, assault rifles and machine guns, to cite just a few of 105 extant Government-approved arms export licences to Bahrain.<sup>505</sup>

In responding to the debate the BIS Minister, Michael Fallon, said:

Since the events of the Arab spring, the Government continue to monitor the situation in Bahrain closely. We assess all export licence applications case by case against the consolidated and the national criteria. The assessment considers all those factors, including the risk of the proposed exports being used for internal repression and in any developing internal tensions.

Since February 2011, we have approved a number of licences for the Bahrain air force, navy and defence force where we have been satisfied that there is no clear risk of items being used in human rights abuses or internal repression. We have refused licences for the Bahrain internal security forces where we have not been satisfied about the risk in respect of internal repression.

We reacted quickly to the events of the Arab spring in 2011, reviewing all licences to Bahrain and revoking those no longer in line with the criteria. In total, 23 single licences and seven open licences were revoked.<sup>506</sup>

**547. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Bahrain for anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for gun mountings, components for machine guns, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of machine guns, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, general military vehicle components, gun mountings, gun silencers, hand grenades, machine guns, military communications equipment, pistols, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for telecommunications jamming equipment, sporting guns, technology for military communications equipment, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, telecommunications jamming equipment, weapon**

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<sup>504</sup> Cm8707, p 44

<sup>505</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 407WH

<sup>506</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, cols 424–425WH

**night sights and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: Two, Four, and Seven.**

## **Egypt**

548. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Egypt can be found at paragraphs 398–403 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 102 of the Report.

549. The Committees' Recommendation on Egypt in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 134 extant UK export licences to Egypt:

- a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or
- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Egypt for cryptographic software, components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment, body armour, military helmets, components for military combat vehicles, components for pistols, pistols, acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for military communications equipment, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for sniper rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon sights, components for machine guns, combat shotguns, components for rifles, rifles, general military vehicle components, ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment and military communications equipment.<sup>507</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

In light of the changing circumstances in Egypt, five licences were revoked on 19 July [2013]. Details of these licences can be found below. The actions of the military and police in crowd control and the possibility of further clashes indicated a real likelihood that some exports might be used for internal repression and therefore we reviewed all extant licences for Egypt in line with long-standing Government policy.

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<sup>507</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 102



Annual Report Summary	Rating	Reason for revocation
Components for military communications equipment	ML11	Criterion 2
Components for machine guns	ML1a	Criterion 2
Components for machine guns	ML1a	Criterion 2
Ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Criterion 2
Ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Criterion 2

[A complete list of all the Government's Revocations, suspensions, un-suspensions and reinstatements of arms exports licences to Egypt are at Annex 11.]

As referred to in paragraph 94 above [see the Government's Response to the Government's Arab Spring arms export policy review above], the Government also suspended 48 licences on 28 August as a result of the EU agreement of 21 August which announced the suspension of exports which might be used for internal repression. These licences were for a wide range of equipment including spares for helicopters and aircraft, specialist software and communications equipment.

There remain many extant licences for Egypt but the Government is satisfied that these licences do not contravene a) and b) above. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.<sup>508</sup>

550. On 30 July 2013 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, wrote to the Chairman of the Committees to update the Committees on a number of issues prior to the release of the Government's official response to the Committees' last report (HC 205). The section of the letter relating to licence revocations to Egypt was as follows:

#### **Export Licence revocations for Egypt**

As I announced on 19 July I have revoked 5 export licences for Egypt. This followed a review of all extant licences for Egypt in the light of the recent actions of the military and police in crowd control and the possibility of further violent clashes in which the military will play an active role. While at the time the licences were granted they were assessed to be fully consistent with the Consolidated Criteria we judge that there is now a clear risk that the specific equipment in the 5 revoked licences might contribute to internal repression.

The revoked licences were for armoured personnel carrier components, radios and base station, vehicle aerials, machine gun components, components for tracked armoured fighting infantry vehicles and communications equipment for tanks. The armoured personnel carrier components were for the Ministry of Interior, the other equipment was for the Egyptian Ministry of Defence and the Army. The Annex to this letter identifies the 5 specific licences that have been revoked.

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<sup>508</sup> Cm8707, p 45

The Government did consider a suspension of licensing for Egypt. However it was decided that we were still able to make informed assessments against the Criteria and therefore a suspension was unnecessary.

### Annex – Export Licence Revocations for Egypt

Four of the revoked licences were include in the list of extant licences provided to the Committees on 10 May 2013 and reproduced on page Ev 570 of Vol II of the Committees report, as follows:

Application Type	Goods (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine guns	128,662
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine guns	181,820
SIEL (Permanent)	ground vehicle military communications equipment	142,880
SIEL (Permanent)	ground vehicle military communications equipment	764,850

The fifth revoked licence was for supply of components to Germany for incorporation into other equipment that was ultimately to be supplied to Egypt:

Application Type	Goods (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	ground vehicle military communications equipment	3050

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551. On 23 August 2013 the Export Control Organisation, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, issued a Notice to Exporters announcing that on 21 August, in response to increasing levels of violence in Egypt, the member States of the European Union had agreed to suspend all export licensing to Egypt for equipment which might be used for internal repression. The Notice stated that ECO was currently reviewing extant licences to determine which ones considered to be for equipment that might be used for internal repression, and therefore subject to suspension.<sup>510</sup> On 28 August ECO issued a further Notice to Exporters, announcing the suspension of export licensing for Egypt of any equipment which might be used for internal repression. It stated that following an initial review ECO had suspended 48 extant licences for Egypt.<sup>511</sup>

<sup>509</sup> Ev w145 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 30 July 2013

<sup>510</sup> Export Control Organisation, *Notice to Exporters 2013/23: EU suspend all export licensing to Egypt of any equipment which might be used for internal repression*, 23 August 2013

<sup>511</sup> Export Control Organisation, *Notice to Exporters 2013/24: Suspension of extant licences for Egypt and changes to OGELs*, 28 August 2013

552. On 10 September the Business Secretary again wrote to the Chairman of the Committees, providing more information relating to the suspension of export licensing to Egypt. The relevant section of his letter was as follows:

### **Suspension of export licensing for Egypt**

At the Foreign Affairs Council on the 21 August EU Member States agreed to suspend export licensing for any equipment which might be used for internal repression and to reassess export licences of equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP.

Following advice from the FCO we moved quickly to suspend 48 extant licences (the initial figure was 49 but one was reinstated following investigation). These licences cover a wide range of equipment, including spares for helicopters and other aircraft, specialist software and communications equipment. This followed a decision in July to revoke five licences for crowd control equipment. In addition we have republished a number of Open General Export licences to exclude Egyptian end users.

The suspension applies to new licence applications as well as extant ones and will continue until further notice. This has been communicated directly to the licence holders affected by the suspension and there have been wider communications through a BIS press statement and an ECO Notice to Exporters.

We are now assessing whether any of the suspended licences should be permanently revoked. I expect advice on this in the near future.

The application of the licensing suspension is wide and all activities of the Egyptian Army, Air Force and Internal Security Forces or Ministry of the Interior are being interpreted as ones which might, at this time, involve internal repression. This reflects the decision of the FAC [the EU Foreign Affairs Council] to apply suspension to all licences “which might be used for internal repression” — which you will appreciate is a lower threshold than that set out in Criterion 2.

HMRC is keeping a watch for any attempts to export to these entities, The FCO will continue to monitor the situation in Egypt very closely to determine how long the suspension should remain in place.

I feel sure that, in the light of recent and continuing violence in Egypt, you will support these measures.<sup>512</sup>

553. On 25 October 2013 ECO issued a further Notice to Exporters that announced the outcome of the review of extant licences to Egypt. ECO announced that of the 48 suspended licences: 24 had had the suspension lifted as they were not judged that they might be used for internal repression; 7 licences would be revoked as there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression; and the remaining 16 licences would remain suspended because they might be used for internal repression.<sup>513</sup>

554. In its Written Evidence UK Working Group (UKWG) stated that:

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<sup>512</sup> Ev w153 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 10 September 2013

<sup>513</sup> Notice to Exporters 2013/27: Egypt – results of the review of licences, *Export Control Organisation*, 25 October 2013

In 2011, the Government argued that it could not have been expected to anticipate the Arab Spring and that rather than being criticised it should be commended for responding rapidly—by revoking over 150 licences for exports to a range of countries (including approximately 56 licences for exports to Egypt)—as circumstances changed. Regardless of whether this defence was valid in 2011—and the CAEC and others, including the UKWG, took issue with it at the time—it surely is not in 2013. We hoped that the Arab Spring would have functioned as a wake-up call on export licensing policy to the region (and indeed more broadly), yet only two years later the exact same pattern is being repeated. The UK Government has shown little capacity to evaluate risk in advance (as required by the Consolidated Criteria) but instead is once again playing catch-up, firstly by revoking five licences, and then nine days later by suspending 48 licences, with the Government also “considering whether further extant licences should be revoked”.<sup>514</sup>

555. UKWG did not argue that all licences issued for arms exports to these countries were problematic, however it suggested that “little has changed in terms of UK licensing practice as a consequence of the Arab Spring or subsequent transfer control reviews.”<sup>515</sup>

556. When the Committees questioned UKWG in about changes in the Government’s licensing practice since the Arab Spring, Roy Isbister (Saferworld) said at the Oral Evidence session on 4 November 2013:

Using Egypt as an example, and drawing on the work of the Committee and the information that it revealed in its report earlier this year, we struggle to understand how that policy is working in Egypt. If you were going to argue in 2011 that you could not see it—that is, what happened—coming, we could argue about whether it was a valid argument, but it is very difficult to make that argument in 2013. We were certainly arguing for a tight policy on exports to countries such as Egypt. When the level of civil disturbance lifted again, we saw the Government start by revoking five licences. More than a month later, and only after an EU Council conclusion, the Government suspended 48—it turned out to be 47—more licences. It is a slow way of operating. Again, we are not sure why those licences were issued in the first place.<sup>516</sup>

He continued:

It would be helpful in cases like this, if the Government think that there is a big enough change to provoke this response, if they not only gave the number of licences being refused, suspended or revoked, but said what is still licensed for transfer to Egypt. We understand that nothing was being licensed to the army, the air force or the Ministry of the Interior, but quite a number of open licences were never suspended. Open licences do not name the permitted end user, so how did the Government know that this equipment was not going to those end users?

We see now that some of those suspended licences—around half of them—have been opened up again. What has changed in Egypt to give the Government the extra confidence that this is appropriate? Looking at Egypt as an example, there are a lot of unanswered

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<sup>514</sup> Ev w113

<sup>515</sup> Ev w112

<sup>516</sup> Q 8

questions, and we would like much more detail about how the Government are operating their export policy.<sup>517</sup>

557. When we questioned UKWG on licence suspensions Roy Isbister (Saferworld) said:

The only case that we are aware of where the suspension mechanism has been applied is Egypt. In that case, it seems that it has been applied to extant licences, which is not how it was explained to us; it also took a long time. As I said, five licences were revoked on 19 July, but the actual suspensions did not take place until 28 August. That is a pretty slow early warning mechanism.

It has been quite confused since then. It was applied in a way that seems different from the message that we were given. There is also the change that Olly [Oliver Sprague, Amnesty UK] mentioned, with approximately 24 licences being unsuspended in the last couple of days. If you look at the notice to exporters, it says that the suspension mechanism has been modified. I shall quote from it, if I may. It states that we have “agreed to modify the way the suspension is applied. In future we will not adopt a blanket approach to the Egyptian organisations listed in paragraph (1) but consider each extant licence and new licence application on its merits.” As far as I can see, that is a standard licensing policy. I do not understand how it is a suspension mechanism, but apparently the mechanism has been modified, not stopped. I do not understand how the Government are operating.<sup>518</sup>

558. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 Nia Griffith MP stated that there was a need to re-examine “exactly which arms are being transferred to Egypt, who the end-users are, to what use are those arms are being put and what licences there are for Egypt.” She asked the Minister to re-examine those matters and to attempt to set out a clear strategy to ensure that those items are not misused or diverted. She asked what the “UK policy is for arms exports to Egypt, because the situation there is extremely volatile.”<sup>519</sup> In responding to the debate the BIS Minister, Michael Fallon, said:

[...] in response to increasing levels of violence in Egypt, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union agreed to suspend all export licensing to Egypt for equipment that might be used for internal repression. That is a lower threshold than the consolidated criteria that we applied, whereby the test is whether there is a clear risk that goods might be used for internal repression. The UK fully supported the Foreign Affairs Council decision and, as a precautionary measure, we applied that suspension to all licences to the Egyptian army, air force and internal security forces. That resulted in 47 extant licences being suspended and a hold placed on new applications for those entities.

As the situation in Egypt has become clearer, we have been able to revert to a case-by-case assessment. As a result, following a further review, on 25 October we decided permanently to revoke seven of the suspended licences, because we then judged that there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression. A further 24 licences were removed from suspension, because we no longer judged that the goods might be used for

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<sup>517</sup> Q 8

<sup>518</sup> Q 12 [Roy Isbister]

<sup>519</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 416WH

internal repression. The remaining 16 licences will remain suspended until we are in a position to determine whether they should be revoked or restored.

I am pleased that we took firm action to revoke licences in July and that our precautionary action in the light of the Foreign Affairs Council decision, at a time when we were considering further unilateral action, allowed time for a proper assessment of conditions on the ground, which in turn means that we can now consider each case properly on its own merits.

I suggest to the House that that is a good example of how a responsive and rational export licensing system operates in a very difficult situation, but I assure hon. Members that the Government will continue to monitor conditions in Egypt and we will keep the terms of the licensing suspension under review. We will continue to assess the situation against the European Union consolidated criteria, taking particular care to consider the nature of the goods and the identity and track record of the end user.<sup>520</sup>

559. Prior to the evidence session with the Foreign Secretary on 8 January 2014 the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chairman of the Committees. The relevant text relating to the suspension of licences to Egypt was as follows:

Recent events in Egypt highlighted the importance of responding quickly to a deteriorating security situation in a country. This was the first time we have deployed the Suspension Mechanism. In two important respects Egypt was a special case. First, we suspended extant licences as well as pending licence applications; this was an addition to the policy announced to Parliament by the Business Secretary on 7 February 2012, which referred only to suspension of pending licence applications. Secondly, we applied suspension to “equipment which might be used for internal repression”. This is of course a lower threshold than Criterion 2 of the Consolidated Criteria, where the test is a “clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression”.

These specific steps were the result of the conclusions reached jointly with our EU Partners on 21 August. We moved quickly, on a precautionary basis, to suspend all licences, both extant and pending, for the Egyptian army, air force and internal security forces. After five weeks, when the situation became clearer, we refined our approach to distinguish between licences which failed the Criterion 2 test (i.e. “clear risk”) and were revoked or refused; those where there was not a “clear risk” the equipment might be used for internal repression but which nevertheless failed the lower-threshold EU test (‘might be used for internal repression’) and which were kept suspended; and those we judged the equipment would not be used for internal repression, which we re-instated or approved.<sup>521</sup>

560. On 24 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary requesting details of the arms export licences to Egypt that had been suspended and/or re-instated or revoked since 14 May 2013 when this information was last obtained from the Department. The text of the letter was as follows:

### **Egypt –suspended licences**

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<sup>520</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, cols 422–423WH

<sup>521</sup> Ev w194 – Letter from William Hague to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 January 2014

The Foreign Secretary in his letter to me of 6 January provided an update to your own letters to me of 30 July 2013 and 10 September 2013 on arms export licences to Egypt that had been suspended and in some cases subsequently re-instated.

Please could you provide details of all licence suspensions, and of any subsequent revocations or re-instatements, to Egypt made in the period 14 May 2013 to the present.

Please could you provide the information in the same format as in Annex 1 of Cm 8079 (SIELS/OIELS/etc., End User Country, Annual Report Summary, Rating, Reason for Revocation). Please could you state the date of suspension and the date of any subsequent revocation or re-instatement in each case.<sup>522</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 14 May 2014 in letter replying to a number of different requests. The section of the Business Secretary's letter relating to Egypt was as follows:

### **Egypt – suspended licences**

On 19 July 2013 we reviewed all extant licences against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export licensing Criteria in lights of the deteriorating situation in Egypt. As a result of this review we revoked 5 Standard Individual Export Licensing (SIELs) because we assessed that the proposed export would be in breach of Criterion 2, i.e. that there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression.

On 21 August 2013, the EU Foreign Affairs Council stated that the “Member States agreed to suspend export licences on equipment which might be used for internal repression and reassess export licences for equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP”. This is a lower threshold than that set out in the Consolidated Criteria (“might be used” rather than “clear risk”) and as a result we reviewed all extant licences. On 27 August we suspended 39 SIELs and removed Egypt as a permitted destination from 9OIELs (one of these OIELs was reinstated as on further inspection it was judged not to fall within the terms of the EU suspension). A further review was carried out in October; following this review 24 licences were reinstated as our assessment was that there was no longer a risk that the goods might be used for internal repression; two were revoked as we determined that there was a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression and that the licences therefore breached Criterion 2. Two had expired since being suspended so no further action was required. Sixteen licences remain suspended, these actions were completed on 25 October.

Information about these licences can be found at Annex 1.<sup>523</sup>

### Annex 1

#### Licence Suspensions and Revocations for Egypt since 14 May 2013

Licence Type	Destination Country	Goods Summary	Rating	Date of action taken	Reason
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<sup>522</sup> Ev w216 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 24 April 2014

<sup>523</sup> Ev w474 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 14 May 2014

SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for machine guns	ML1a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for machine guns	ML1a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Germany	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Revoked 19th July 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence subsequently surrendered by exporter	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military aero-engines	ML10d	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence expired whilst suspended, no further reviewing required.	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military aero-engines	ML10d	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	software for military guidance/navigation equipment	ML21a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence subsequently surrendered by exporter, no further reviewing required.	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August	



				2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	United States	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013, Licence Revoked on 25th October 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Russia	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013, Licence Revoked on 25th October 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military parachutes and equipment, military parachutes and equipment	ML10h1	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL	Egypt	general military vehicle	ML6a	Suspended	

(Permanent)		components		27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military combat vehicles	ML6a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence expired whilst suspended, no further reviewing required.	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military radars	ML5b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military radars	ML5b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	training small arms ammunition	ML3a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military communications equipment	ML11a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	military aircrew protective equipment	ML10g	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military training aircraft	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military support aircraft	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October	

				2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military support aircraft	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military training aircraft	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	general military aircraft components	ML10a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters, military guidance/navigation equipment	ML10b, ML11a	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	components for military helicopters	ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	military aero-engines	ML10d	Suspended 27th August 2013	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	cryptographic software	5D002c1	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence expired whilst suspended, no further reviewing required.	
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1 a, 5D002a	Suspended 27th August 2013, Licence Revoked on 25th October 2013	Criterion 2
SIEL (Permanent)	Egypt	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1 a	Suspended 27th August 2013; Licence expired whilst suspended, no further reviewing required.	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	software for military communications equipment, technology	ML21c, ML22a	Suspended 27th August 2013;	

		for the use of software for military communications equipment		Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for missile scoring equipment, decoy flares, missile scoring equipment, software for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment	ML14, ML21a, ML22a, ML4b1	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft	ML10a, ML10b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	components for military aero-engines	ML10d	Suspended 27th August 2013, reinstated on 28th August 2013	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector	ML10a, ML10f, ML10g, ML11a, ML17n, ML22a, ML4a, PL5017	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	

		seats, technology for general military aircraft components, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components			
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	1A001c, ML10, ML10b, ML10d, ML10f, ML10g, ML11a, ML15d, ML22a, ML5b, PL5017	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspen- ded 25th October 2013	

OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for aircraft missile protection systems, technology for aircraft missile protection systems	ML11a, ML21a, ML22a, PL5017	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	components for military radars, components for weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, software for military radars, software for weapon control equipment, technology for military radars, technology for weapon control equipment	ML11a, ML21a, ML22a, ML5a, ML5b, ML5d, PL5017	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Egypt	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1 a, 5E002b	Suspended 27th August 2013; Unsuspended 25th October 2013	

561. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Egypt for acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for radio jamming equipment, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, general military vehicle components, military communications equipment, pistols, radio jamming equipment, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for military communications equipment, sporting guns and weapon sights are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: One, Two and Three.

562. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government in its Response provides an update of Annex 1 to the Business Secretary's letter of 14 May 2014 listing the Government's subsequent revocations, suspensions, un-suspensions and re-instatements of export licences to Egypt.

563. The Committees scrutiny has established that there were 9 countries in Africa and the Middle East to which the Government gave approval in July to September 2013 of Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs) for goods that could be used for internal

repression all with destinations which included Egypt. The Committees questions in relation to each of the 9 countries were:

**Ghana:** Why were OITCLs approved which included acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights when the destination countries included Egypt?

**Mozambique:** Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights approved?

**Nigeria:** Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights approved?

**Oman:** Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

**Saudi Arabia:** Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for combat shotguns, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved?

**Seychelles:** Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

**Singapore:** Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved?

**South Africa:** Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

**Tanzania:** Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns,

**components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?**

The Government's response to each of the 9 questions was: "The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities." I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response why, when the EU Foreign Affairs Council agreed on 21 August 2013 to suspend export licences to Egypt for equipment which might be used for internal repression, the Government continued to approve OITCL licences for the above goods with Egypt as a destination after that date.

### **Tunisia**

564. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to Tunisia can be found at paragraphs 449–454 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Recommendation at paragraph 111 of the Report.

565. The Committees' Recommendation on Tunisia in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

#### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

The Committees recommend that the Government in its Response to this Report states whether it is satisfied that none of the 51 extant UK export licences to Tunisia:

- a) contravenes the Government's stated policy that: "We will not issue licences where we judge there is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke or prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might be used to facilitate internal repression"; or
- b) is currently in contravention of any of the arms exports Criteria set out in the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the EU Common Position

including those extant licences to Tunisia for: cryptographic software, components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, small arms ammunition, command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment, weapon night sights, military support vehicles, components for military support vehicles, anti-armour ammunition and small arms ammunition.<sup>524</sup>

#### **The Government's Response:**

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<sup>524</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 111



The Government is satisfied that none of the currently extant licences for Tunisia contravenes its policy as outlined in paragraph 46 above [see the Government's Response to the Consolidated Criteria and EU Common Position above]. However, as was shown during the Arab Spring, including for Tunisia itself, circumstances can and do rapidly change, leading to a reassessment of risk and, in some cases, a different decision using the same criteria. In such cases the Government would revoke the licence. The Government's answers to the Committees' Quarterly Questions, which can be found at Volume 2, Annex 1 of the Committees' Annual Report, provide more detail about individual licences.<sup>525</sup>

**566. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Tunisia for components for military communications equipment, components for military support vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military communications equipment and small arms ammunition are currently compliant with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: Two and Seven.**

## **Ukraine**

### **Arms exports**

567. In response to the deteriorating political situation and increasing violence within the Ukraine the EU Foreign Affairs Council introduced targeted sanctions against certain individuals from that country. On 20 February 2014 the EU Council also agreed to reassess export licences of equipment covered by the EU Common Position on arms exports. As a result of the review the ECO issued a Notice to Exporters on 24 February announcing that all extant licences to the Ukraine were being examined to determine which covered equipment that could be used for internal repression and would therefore be subject to suspension.<sup>526</sup>

568. On 24 April the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Business Secretary requesting details of the arms export licences to Ukraine that had been suspended. The text of the letter was as follows:

#### **Ukraine – suspended licences**

The ECO Notice to Exporters (2014/04) issued on 24 February 2014 announced a review of strategic export licences to Ukraine in the light of the recent levels of violence and internal repression in the country. Please could you provide details of any licences that have been suspended as a result of that review.

Please could you provide details of all licence suspensions, and of any subsequent revocations or re-instatements, to Ukraine made in 2014.

Please could you provide the information in the same format as in Annex 1 of Cm 8079 (SIELS/OIELS/etc., End User Country, Annual Report Summary, Rating, Reason for

<sup>525</sup> Cm8707, pp 52–53

<sup>526</sup> Export Control Organisation, *Notice to Exporters 2014/04: EU suspends all export licensing to Ukraine for any equipment which might be used for internal repression*, 24 February 2014

Revocation). Please could you state the date of suspension and the date of any subsequent revocation or re-instatement in each case.<sup>527</sup>

The Business Secretary replied on 14 May 2014. The relevant section of his letter was as follows:

### **Ukraine – suspended licences**

On 4 February 2014, in response to the worsening situation in Ukraine, we revoked one export licence. The reason for revocation was that the export was no longer consistent with Criterion 2, i.e. we assessed that there was now a clear risk that the goods might be used for internal repression.

On 20 February, at the EU Foreign Affairs Council, the “Member States agreed to suspend export licences on equipment which might be used for internal repression and reassess export licences for equipment covered by Common Position 2008/944/CFSP”. As with Egypt this is a lower threshold than that set out in the Consolidated Criteria (“might be used” rather than “clear risk”) and as a result we reviewed all extant licences. On 25 February we suspended 22 SIELs and on 26 February we removed Ukraine as a permitted destination from 5 OIELs. In each case the reason for suspension was that the proposed export was inconsistent with EU suspension. None of these licences have subsequently been revoked or reinstated although three have now expired.

Information about all these licences is at Annex 2.<sup>528</sup>

## **Annex 2**

### Licence Revoked for Ukraine

Date of revocation: 04/02/2014;

Reason for revocation: Criterion 2 (clear risk the goods might be used for internal repression)

Application Type	Goods Annual Report Summary	Goods Rating	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	ML13	398,620.12

### Licences Suspended for Ukraine

#### 1. Standard Individual Export Licences

Date of suspension: 25/02/2014;

Reason for suspension: agreement by Member States at the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU on 20/02/2014 to “suspend licences for equipment which might be used for internal repression”.

<sup>527</sup> Ev w216 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 24 April 2014

<sup>528</sup> Ev w474 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 14 May 2014

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Goods Rating</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers, sporting guns (15), sporting guns (20)	ML1	19200
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers	ML1	119000
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers	ML1	140000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (2)	ML1	112000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (1)	ML1	65000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (1)	ML1	69805
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (1)	ML1	198000
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (1)	ML1	2500
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (20)	ML1	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (10)	ML1	10000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for rifles	ML1	6000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (5)	ML1	16000
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (3)	ML1	16000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, sniper rifles (3)	ML1	30000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (2), sporting guns (20), sporting guns (5), sporting guns (6)	ML1	37500
SIEL (Permanent)	rifles (1), rifles (2), rifles (3), rifles (4)	ML1	19588
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (5)	ML1	22500
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (3), sporting guns (1), sporting guns (3), sporting guns (6)	ML1	36500
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers	ML1	80000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sporting guns	ML1	15000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles	ML1	8400
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	ML13	346000

## 2. Open Individual Licences re-issued without Ukraine as a permitted destination

Date of suspension: 26/02/2014;

Reason for suspension: agreement by Member States at the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU on 20/02/2014 to “suspend licences for equipment which might be used for internal repression”.

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Action</b>	<b>Goods Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Goods Rating</b>
OIEL (Military /	Re-issued	sporting guns	ML1

Dual Use)			
OITCL	Re-issued	gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1, ML3
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the production of military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	ML11, ML18, ML21, ML22
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21, ML22
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Re-issued	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21, ML22

569. I propose that the Committees recommend that the Government states in its Response the reasons it considers its approved extant arms export licences to Ukraine for body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of weapon sights, small arms ammunition and weapon sights are currently compliant the decision of the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 20 February 2014 on arms exports to Ukraine and with the following of the Government's Arms Export Licencing Criteria: Three and Four.

### *Sniper rifles*

570. On 24 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees wrote to the Foreign Secretary as follows:

In your Oral Evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 March on Ukraine we had the following exchange:

**Q7: Sir John Stanley:** "Foreign Secretary, there were widespread reports in the press, on which the Foreign Office declined to comment following the change of Government in Kiev, that British personnel—whether Government personnel or Government-approved personnel—had gone to Kiev to give expert ballistic advice as to the location of sniper positions from which those demonstrating peacefully were killed in Kiev. Against that background, do you have any regrets to express to the Committee that in each quarter of 2011, the British Government gave export licence approval to sniper rifles to Ukraine, and did so again in 2012 and in 2013?"

**Mr Hague:** "We have to base our decisions on the information available at the time, of course, and that will always be the way. We will always have the benefit of hindsight on some of these things. I would have to look at the details of any applications before giving

any detailed opinion about that, but I am satisfied that all our export licence decisions are based on the information available at the time.”

I attach in Ukrainian a copy of the article that appeared in “Minding Russia” on the internet on 24 February 2014. I also reproduce immediately below what we have been told is the article’s translation into English:

Rada Commission Determines Who Shot People in Kiev

Author Voronz, Vsk, 23/02/2014 - 13:22

The Verkhovna Rada [parliamentary] commission to investigate the massacre in Kiev, chaired by Hennadiy Moskal, deputy from the Bitkivshchina [Fatherland] Party, has determined that the sniper rifles with which people were shot in Kiev on the morning of 20 February were purchased for the Crimean Territorial Department of Internal Forces, UNIAN reported, citing a statement from commission chairman Moskal.

This special sub-division was created personally by Stanislav Shulyak, a commander of the Ukrainian internal troops; its commander is Col. Sergei Asavalyuk, Moskal stated.

According to Moskal's report, soldiers from the Crimean special division were captured on video by journalists, and their radio chatter was recorded. Information about the purchase of 80 British AVK type sniper rifles for this sub-division is contained in the *Vestnik gosudarstvennykh zakupok Ukrainy* [Bulletin of State Purchases of Ukraine].

Please could you tell the Committees whether the statement in the article that 80 British AVK type sniper rifles were purchased for the Crimean Territorial Department of Internal Forces is correct, and whether the fact that this information is contained in the *Vestnik gosudarstvennykh zakupok Ukrainy* [Bulletin of State Purchases of Ukraine] is also correct. If so, please could you state on what date or dates the Government gave export licence approval for the export of these sniper rifles from the UK to the Ukraine.

Finally, please could you provide details of all UK Government export licence approvals of sniper rifles to Ukraine from the beginning of 2010 giving the same information as in the Table to my letter to the Business Secretary of March 6, a copy of which is attached for convenience, i.e. providing the following information in respect of each licence approved namely: date of licence approval, type of sniper rifle, quantity, value, usage (i.e. how many were exported to Ukraine), stated end-use, stated end-user.

**Annex 1 – original Ukrainian article**

Комісія Рады выяснила, хто расстреливал людей в Києве

Автор Voronz, Вск, 23/02/2014 - 14:22

Москаль Гена

*Комиссия Верховной Рады по расследованию бойни в Киеве под председательством депутата от партии «Батькивщина» Геннадия Москаля выяснила, что снайперские винтовки, из которых были расстреляны люди в Киеве утром 20 февраля, были закуплены для Крымского территориального управления внутренних войск Украины.*

Об этом сообщает УНІАН со ссылкой на заявление председателя комиссии Москаля.

Это спецподразделение было создано лично командующим внутренними войсками Украины Станиславом Шуляком, его командующим является полковник Сергей Асвалюк, заявил народный депутат.

По сообщению депутата от партии «Батькивщина», бойцы крымского спецназа были сняты на видео журналистами, а их радиопереговоры записаны». Данные о закупке 80 английских снайперских винтовок типа АВК для данного подразделения есть в «Вестнике государственных закупок Украины».

Смотрите также: Снайперы "Беркута" убивают безоружных людей на Институтской. ВИДЕО попавшего под обстрел<sup>529</sup>

571. The Business Secretary replied to the Chairman's letter on 14 May 2014. The relevant section of his letter was as follows:

#### **Ukraine – sniper rifles**

Following a thorough search of our records, and having consulted our Post in Kiev and weapons specialists in MOD, I have been unable to verify any of the claims regarding the UK made in the article to which you refer. What I can say is that:

We are not aware of the existence of any UK-made weapon known as an “AVX sniper rifle”, and we have no record of having granted any export licence for a weapon described in these terms.

The phrase “AK variant” is routinely used to describe weapons; however these are not made in the UK. The images we have seen from Ukraine appear to show marksmen using Dragonov SVD sniper rifles which are a derivative of the AK series of weapons and are produced by Russia and in other former communist states under licence.

We have no record of ever having granted any export licence where the Crimean Territorial Department of Internal Forces was named as end-user, consignee or third party on the licence application.

Since 2010 we have granted 17 licences for export of a total of 83 sniper rifles to Ukraine. The stated end-use in each case was for hunting or sports shooting and the end-users were authorised gun dealers or private individuals. Information about these licences is given at Annex 3.

The only licence granted for supply of sniper rifles to the Ukrainian government was in November 2000. This was for 10 rifles and the end-user was named as “the Security Service of the Ukraine”.

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<sup>529</sup> Ev w220 – Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to William Hague dated 24 April 2014

We do have concerns about the use of hunting and sporting weapons in the recent disturbances in Ukraine, including those described as “sniper rifles”. That is why the majority of the suspended licences listed in Annex 3 were for such weapons, or for components or silencers for such weapons. However I have seen nothing that would persuade me that the media report you refer to is accurate.<sup>530</sup>

### Annex 3

#### Export licences for sniper rifles for Ukraine, 2010-2013

Date Licence Granted	Goods Description	Quantity	Total Licensed Value (£)	End-User
28/09/2010	Stock System, Rifle Calibre .300, Rifle Calibre .308, 700 Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	6	15000	Arm Elit
14/01/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338	10	36000	Arm Elit
27/06/2011	Hunting Rifle Calibre .308	5	15000	Arm Elit
30/06/2011	NATO Model Rifle Calibre 7.62 x 51	5	15000	Arm Elit
06/07/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308, Ammunition Calibre .300, Ammunition	15	113400	Arm Elit
19/08/2011	Hunting Rifle Calibre .308	5	15000	Arm Elit
26/09/2011	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	6	18000	Arm Elit
27/10/2011	Semi Automatic Rifle Calibre .308, Spare Magazine, Suppressor.	3	11605	Arm Elit
14/03/2012	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .300	1	2500	Arm Elit
15/08/2012	Repeating Target Rifle (6.5x47mm) with 2 spare barrels.	3	1500	Private Individual
21/12/2012	Bolt Action Rifle. Calibre .338	3	16000	Arm Elit
07/01/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338 with interchangeable spare barrels in calibre .300 & .308	3	30000	Arm Elit
15/04/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308	5	22500	Arm Elit
12/04/2013	Desert Tactical Arms SRS Chassis System with Conversion Kit, Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .308 22” Barrel	6	24000	Arm Elit

<sup>530</sup> Ev w474 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 14 May 2014

23/07/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .338 with Spare Barrel Calibre .338	3	7000	Private Individual
26/07/2013	Bolt Action Rifle .338	1	5300	Private Individual
24/09/2013	Bolt Action Rifle Calibre .22-250, Bolt Action Rifle Calibre 6.5-284	3	36500	Arm Elit

**572. I propose that the Committees conclude that the Government’s concerns about the use of hunting and sporting weapons in the disturbances in the Ukraine including those described as “sniper rifles” are welcome.**

**573. I propose that the Committees recommend that at the Government in its Response provides updated information on UK Government export licence approvals of sniper rifles, and of hunting and sporting weapons, to Ukraine following the Business Secretary’s letter of 14 May 2014.**



# 11 Arms exports to authoritarian regimes and Countries of concern worldwide

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574. The Committees' previous scrutiny of arms exports to authoritarian regimes and Countries of concern worldwide can be found at paragraphs 505–511 in Volume II of the Committees' previous Report (HC 205), and the Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation at paragraphs 123 and 124 of the Report.

575. The Committees' Conclusion and Recommendation on arms exports to authoritarian regimes and Countries of concern worldwide in their 2013 Report (HC 205) and the Government's Response (Cm8707) were as follows:

### **The Committees' Conclusion:**

The Committees conclude that the Government's answer, in response to the Committees' question, that it is satisfied that none of its extant arms export licences to authoritarian regimes and Countries of human rights concern worldwide contravenes the Government's stated policy to the Committees on arms exports and internal repression, or the UK's Consolidated Criteria on arms exports, or the EU's Common Position on arms exports is welcome. However, the Committees further conclude that the Government would have done better to have accepted the Committees' Recommendation in successive Reports that it should extend its arms export policy review from countries in the Middle East and North Africa to authoritarian regimes and Countries of human rights concern worldwide rather than to have disagreed with the Committees' Recommendation and then to have been obliged to extend its review worldwide in order to be able to answer the Committees' subsequent questions.<sup>531</sup>

### **The Government's Response:**

The Government notes the Committees' conclusions. The Government has not conducted a review of all licences to authoritarian regimes and countries of human rights concern worldwide. The Government's consistent policy is to review extant licences for a country when a change in circumstances in that country changes the risks under the Consolidated Criteria, and to revoke extant licences if they cross the risk thresholds in the Criteria. The events of the Arab Spring meant that unusually the Government reviewed extant licences to several countries concurrently during February/March 2011.

The Foreign Secretary announced a review of policy, as opposed to individual licences, on 16 March 2011. Although this review was inspired by events in the Middle East and North Africa, the recommendations were applicable worldwide and have now been implemented.<sup>532</sup>

### **The Committees' Recommendation:**

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<sup>531</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 123

<sup>532</sup> Cm8707, p 59

Given that the Government has now acknowledged that its new arms export suspension mechanism only applies to licence applications that are still being processed and not to military or dual-use goods that have already left the UK, the Committees repeat their previous recommendation that the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes “which might be used to facilitate internal repression” in contravention of the Government’s policy, as stated to the Committees by the Foreign Secretary on 7 February 2012.<sup>533</sup>

### **The Government’s Response:**

The Government does not accept the Committees’ recommendation as it made clear in its reply to the Committees’ 2011 report (Cm 8079 of 2011) and also its reply to the Committees of 7 January 2012 (Annex 11 of HC 419, page 267).

The Government’s statements have always made clear that the suspension mechanism does not apply to goods that have already been shipped - it applies only to licence applications that are still being processed and to any new applications that may subsequently be submitted. Once an item has left the UK suspending or revoking the licence will not result in the return of that item. For extant licences, i.e. those that are wholly or partially unused, we have the option of revocation or suspension should that be deemed necessary.<sup>534</sup>

576. In the Westminster Hall debate on 21 November 2013 the Chairman of the Committees, Sir John Stanley, raised the issue of the Government’s record of arms exports to countries of human rights concern and the introduction of the suspension mechanism. He stressed that the Committees had recommended in their last two Reports that the UK Government should take a more cautious approach in the approval of arms export licences to countries of human rights concern. He pointed out that the Government had had to revoke over 200 arms export licences to countries predominately in the Middle East and North Africa and that this was “the clearest possible indication of the extent to which both this Government and the previous Government misjudged the risks that they were running in approving those exports in the first place.”<sup>535</sup> The BIS Minister responding to the debate, Michael Fallon, said:

The approach of case-by-case assessment [of arms export licence applications] that I have set out remains, I believe, the most effective way of balancing those concerns. There are often difficult decisions to make, but we follow a well-established procedure for each application and make the best possible assessment based on the available evidence at the time. We have a robust, efficient and transparent system that produces rational decisions, but I recognise of course that the world is not static and, when circumstances change in any country, we can and do act.

However, such action—there was one reference to this in the debate—including revoking or suspending licences, is not an admission of failure. On the contrary, the fact that our

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<sup>533</sup> HC (2013–14) 205, para 124

<sup>534</sup> Cm8707, p 59

<sup>535</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 409WH

export licensing system allows us to respond effectively to changing circumstances is, I suggest to the House, a further sign that our system works.<sup>536</sup>

577. When the Committees questioned the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, at the Oral Evidence session on 8 January 2014 about whether the Government should take a more cautious approach to approving arms export licences to authoritarian regimes he replied:

We will apply the consolidated criteria, but we do so with the benefit of experience all the time. There has been quite a lot of experience in this subject over the last couple of years, given the number of suspensions and revocations we have had to make. We apply these things with that in mind, and we are very conscious of what the Committee has said about this. We are always cautious on this subject.<sup>537</sup>

When pressed to explain how this caution was manifested in the Government's approach to arms export licensing, the Foreign Secretary said:

We are very careful about all the licences. It is a rigorous process—a process that has been improved over recent years. It is informed by all FCO information—all our understanding of the world—about what may happen in a country; the risk of internal repression, and the risk of regional or internal conflict. We are able to weigh all those things heavily, so we use all the information available to us.<sup>538</sup>

**578. I propose that the Committees conclude that the fact that in the last 2½ years alone the Government has been obliged by changed circumstances to revoke 209 export licences to 17 countries, and has had to suspend 109 export licences to 3 countries, whilst welcome in itself, indicates that, with regard to those items of military and dual-use goods that might be used for internal repression being exported to authoritarian regimes, the Government's arms export policy is essentially one of reacting to events and not taking sufficient account of the nature of the regimes concerned at the point when the decision is made to approve the export licence or not.**

**579. I propose that the Committees further conclude that whilst the Government's assertion that there is "no evidence of any misuse of controlled military goods exported from the United Kingdom" may be factually correct with regard to a lack of evidence, this is not at all surprising and is of little or no value as an assurance given that for the great majority of the exported goods concerned — ammunition, small arms, light weapons, components, communications equipment, surveillance equipment technology and software, cryptographic equipment, technology and software, and dual-use goods — it will be impossible to identify that they are from the UK once the goods have left the country.**

**580. I propose that the Committee, therefore, repeat their previous Recommendation that the Government should apply significantly more cautious judgements when considering arms export licence applications for goods to authoritarian regimes which might be used for internal repression.**

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<sup>536</sup> HC Deb, 21 November 2013, col 422WH

<sup>537</sup> Q 171

<sup>538</sup> Q 172

## Annex 1: The Committees' quarterly licence questions and the Government's answers (2012 Q4, 2013 Q1, Q2 and Q3)

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Following the quarterly publication of the list of licence approvals, refusals and appeals by the Export Control Organisation (ECO) within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills the Committees have compiled a series of questions to obtain more information about the licences approved, rejected or appealed.

Following discussions between the Committees and Government Departments in 2011 it was agreed that the Committees would publish the Committees' questions and the Government's non-classified answers as from Q3 2010. The Committees' questions and the Government's answers for the period covered by this Report are reproduced below.

Note: The Committees' questions are in normal type and the Government's answers are in bold italic type.

Note:

OIEL: Open Individual Export Licence; SIEL: Standard Individual Export Licence; OITCL: Open Individual Trade Control Export Licence; SITCL: Standard Individual Trade Control Export Licence

### The Committees' 2012 Quarter 4 (October – December) questions and the Government's answers

The Committees would be grateful for more information about why the following licences were granted or refused during the fourth quarter (October–December) of 2012:

**Afghanistan:** Given the current conflict in Afghanistan and that Afghanistan was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, the Committees wish to know why SIELs for body armour, components for body armour, equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography, and an OIEL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection were issued.

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the arms embargo sanctions in place for Afghanistan apply to those individuals designated under UN Security Council Resolution 2082. Some of the SIELs and the OIEL referred to above were for equipment to be used by end users exempt from existing sanctions (e.g. International Security Assistance Force/Diplomatic Missions/United Nations/recognised NGOs). There were no other Criteria concerns about these exports.*

*The SIELs for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography were for equipment destined for civil end use by commercial companies and raised no Criteria concerns.*

*One of the SIELs for body armour was for use by a named civil end user employed in close protection work. There were no Criteria concerns.*

**Argentina:** Given the current political tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina and the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of 26 April 2012, the Committees wish to know why were SIELs issued for small arms ammunition, equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography and OIELs for equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software and technology for equipment employing cryptography issued?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, no licences shall be granted for any military or dual-use goods and technology to be supplied to military end-users in Argentina, except in exceptional circumstances. This decision will not affect licences for items intended for end-users other than the Argentine military.*

*None of the licences under reference were for equipment destined for military end users and there were no other Criteria concerns about these exports.*

**Azerbaijan:** Given the OSCE embargo of 1992 to Azerbaijan, why were SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography issued?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the UK interprets the OSCE arms embargo for Armenia and Azerbaijan as prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology to any person, or to any destination, in Armenia or in Azerbaijan. It has been UK practice occasionally to make an exemption in its interpretation of the embargo by approving exports of non-lethal military goods to humanitarian, media or peacekeeping organisations where it is clear that the embargo was not intended to prevent those exports and there is a strong humanitarian case for them.*

*These SIELs were for the export of equipment destined for civil and commercial end use. The equipment was not military rated and thus not covered by the UK interpretation of the OSCE embargo. We had no other Criteria concerns.*

**Bahrain:** Given the continued concerns regarding recent human rights violations in Bahrain, why were SIELs for components for machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography and technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography issued?

*Three of these SIELs were for the export of equipment, software and technology to enable secure communications for a military end user. Our assessment of these licences was that a secure communications system would assist in more effective command and control. The end user's primary responsibility is external security and therefore we assessed it unlikely that these goods might be used for internal repression.*

*The SIEL for components for machine guns, gun mountings and machine guns was for the export of equipment intended for naval use or coastal defence by a military end user. We assessed that it would be unlikely that this equipment would be deployed in crowd control situations and therefore might be used for internal repression.*

*One SIEL was for the temporary export of equipment employing cryptography so that it could be demonstrated to a government end user. The equipment was CCTV camera surveillance equipment that would remain the responsibility of the UK exporter whilst in Bahrain and was expected to remain there for approximately four weeks before return to the UK. There were no Criteria concerns.*

*One of the SIELs for the export of equipment employing cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography was for use in upgrading mobile telephony systems by a commercial end user. There were no Criteria concerns.*

**Belarus:** Given that the EU adopted restrictions against Belarus on the supply of arms and related material under Council decision 2011/357/CFSP on 20 June 2011 and that Belarus was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why was an OIEL for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography issued?

*This OIEL was for the export of telecommunications repeaters for civil end use. These goods were not covered by the EU arms embargo and we assessed that it was unlikely that they could be used for internal repression.*

**Burma:** Given the ban on the provision of all arms and related material to Burma adopted under CFSP 2006/318 and renewed by EU Council decision 2010/232/CFSP and that Burma was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report the Committees would like to know details of the SIEL for equipment employing cryptography that was issued

*This SIEL was for the export of equipment for civil end use in the oil and gas sector and therefore not covered by the embargo. There were no Criteria concerns.*

**China:** Given the Madrid European Council arms embargo to China and that China was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition and weapon sights, and an OIEL for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography granted?

*As stated in previous responses to the Committees, the UK interpretation of the Arms Embargo on China, given in Parliament on 3 June 1998, is that it applies to:*

- *Lethal weapons, such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles. Specially designed components for these and ammunition.*
- *Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms.*

- *Any equipment which might be used for internal repression.*

*None of the goods and equipment under reference was covered by the UK interpretation of the EU Arms Embargo.*

*The SIELs for the export of weapon sights and military communications equipment were for goods to be returned under warranty to the manufacturers for repair and/or re-working and then return to UK-based users. There were no Criteria concerns.*

*The SIEL for the export of components for ground vehicle military communications equipment was for equipment destined for civil end-use in a satellite base station. There were no Criteria concerns.*

*This OIEL was for the export of telecommunications repeaters for civil end use. These goods were not covered by the EU arms embargo and we assessed that it was unlikely that they could be used for internal repression. There were no other Criteria concerns.*

**Congo, Democratic Republic of:** Given that Arms sanctions against DRC are currently in place under UN Security Council resolution 1807 (amended by UNSCR 1857, 1896, 1952 (2010 and 2021 (2011)) and the DRC was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography issued?

*In all these cases, the SIELs were for the export of equipment intended for civil end use by commercial companies in providing network security and/or connectivity. These dual use goods were not military rated and therefore not covered by the arms embargo and we had no other Criteria concerns.*

**Egypt:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt and the current unrest in the country, why were SIELs for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, ground vehicle military communications equipment, pistols, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapons sights issued?

*Several of the SIELs under reference were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies (PSCs) for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, PSCs are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against the Criteria. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised if the following strict conditions are met: activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State; the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority; equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).*

*A SIEL was issued for the export of ground vehicle military communications equipment. This equipment was to be used as spares for self-propelled howitzers by a military end user. Heavy artillery had not been used during any of the unrest in Egypt which began in February 2011. We assessed that this equipment was unlikely to be used in maintaining public order. We had no information that recent military action in Sinai had been disproportionate and we assessed that this equipment would not aggravate tensions. Therefore, we did not have sufficient Criteria 2 and 3 concerns to refuse. In response to the increasing levels of violence in Egypt, on 21 August all EU Member States agreed to suspend all export licensing for equipment which might be used for internal repression. This SIEL was one of the 48 licences suspended by the Government as a result of this agreement. This suspension will be kept under review until such time as conditions in Egypt indicate that it is appropriate to lift these restrictions.*

*A SIEL was issued for components for military communications equipment. These were high frequency antennae and related kits to be used in repair and maintenance of existing equipment. They were to be used by a military end user who had a credible requirement to be able to transmit radio signals over long distances. Although such equipment would be used for military operations, we assessed that it was unlikely to be used in frontline operations maintaining public order, where handheld radios would have more utility. Therefore, we assessed that such equipment was unlikely to be used for internal repression. We had no information that recent military action in Sinai had been disproportionate and we assessed that this equipment would not aggravate tensions. Therefore, we did not have sufficient Criteria 2 and 3 concerns to refuse.*

*A SIEL for the export of body armour and components for body armour was issued so that a small quantity of equipment could be sent to a government end user for evaluation purposes. There were no Criteria concerns as this was for evaluation only.*

*Three SIELs for the export of components for pistols and pistols were issued. This equipment was for individual sporting end use so did not raise sufficient concerns under the Criteria for refusal.*

*A SIEL was issued for the temporary export of components for ground vehicle military communications equipment and ground vehicle military communications equipment. This equipment was intercom system units and accessories for use in tanks by a military end user. As this equipment was for testing and subsequent return to the UK, we assessed it unlikely that it would see active service and might be used for internal repression or to aggravate tensions. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.*

**Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:** The Committees wish to know what assurances have been received by the British Government that the equipment for the following SIELs that have been granted will not be diverted to China: anti riot/ballistic shields, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of weapon night sights and weapon night sights.



*The Government has not sought such assurances. We take the risk of diversion to China into account when assessing export licence applications for Hong Kong, including the strong controls operated there. In some cases of applications for equipment for civil end use, the exporters openly stated that the equipment may be re-exported to China. We have minimal Criteria concerns with the police, prison, customs, immigration or any other security services that come under the control of the Government of the Hong Kong SAR. Hong Kong also operates a robust export control system. Exports of Wassenaar-controlled and certain military equipment require a licence from the Hong Kong authorities regardless of whether the goods are for mainland China, Macau or other destinations.*

**Iraq:** Given that UNSCR 1546 (2004) continues the embargo on arms and related material against Iraq and that Iraq was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELS approved for body armour, components for body armour, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights and technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights issued

*The licences under reference were for exports exempt under the UK interpretation of the Iraq arms embargo (see Written Ministerial Statement of 11 November 2010).*

*A SIEL was issued for the export of body armour for use by personnel protecting diplomatic staff. There were no Criteria concerns.*

*The other SIELs under reference were all for the export of goods and equipment to be used by government end users or entities authorised by the Iraqi Government.*

*The SIELs for the export of equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment and equipment for the use of military communications equipment were destined for use by security services. This equipment would be placed on armoured vehicles but we assessed there was a credible requirement for the security services to use such equipment and vehicles in the hostile environment in which they operated. Therefore we had no Criteria concerns.*

*The SIEL for the temporary export of components for military communications equipment was so that this equipment could be demonstrated to a potential government customer. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.*

*The SIEL for the export of components for body armour was intended for use in protecting the personnel of a commercial end user operating in the oil and gas sector. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.*

*The SIEL for the export of equipment for the use of weapon sights and technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights was destined for use in marksmanship training by a security company. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.*

**Italy:** Why was an OIEL for components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military parachutes, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military electronic equipment, military parachutes, signalling devices, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats,

technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military parachutes and technology for signalling devices revoked?

*This OIEL was not revoked but Italy was removed as a destination from this licence when dealing with an application for an extension. Italy had been a destination on the original OIEL application but the exporter had not included it as a destination on the extension application and it was therefore removed from the licence. For technical reasons this has shown up as a revocation in the Quarterly Report and the Government is considering how to address this issue in future Quarterly Reports.*

**Kenya:** Given the imminence of the Kenyan election, at the time under consideration, on 4 March 2013 and the possibility of political violence associated with it, why were SIELs for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon night sights, cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography issued? Why was one SIEL for small arms ammunition granted when another SIEL for small arms ammunition was refused?

*A SIEL was issued for the temporary export of military image intensifier equipment, weapon night sights and weapon sights to a military end user for demonstration purposes. We considered that the military had a credible and legitimate need for this equipment given their role in AMISOM, the African Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia, and this was consistent with the stated end use. Although there have been reports of human rights abuses by the armed forces in Kenya, there was a lack of clear and unambiguous evidence that they had been involved in such abuse. We also took into account the armed forces' culture of accountability and the human rights training that they have received. Therefore, we did not have sufficient Criteria concerns for refusal.*

*There were several SIELs for the export of equipment employing cryptography. These were all for civil end use and raised no Criteria concerns.*

*A SIEL was issued for the export of an all-wheel drive vehicle with ballistic protection. This vehicle was destined for civil end use with a commercial company and there were no Criteria concerns.*

*Two of the SIELs under reference were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies (PSCs) for anti-piracy activities. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, PSCs are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against the Criteria. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised if the following strict conditions are met; activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State; the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority; equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms*

*must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).*

*One of the SIELs issued for the export of equipment for use in anti-piracy included small arms ammunition. Another SIEL for the export of small arms ammunition was refused. In the latter case, the goods were destined for resale by a firearms dealer. There have been concerns expressed about the lack of control over small arms from a number of sources including a recent Kenyan Government report. This includes the discovery of illegal stockpiles of ammunition. Therefore, we had Criterion 7 concerns with this application and decided to refuse.*

**Lebanon:** Given that arms trade sanctions against Lebanon were adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 1701, of 11 August 2006, and by European Council Common Position 2006/625/CFSP, why were SIELs issued for the following items: components for military communications equipment, weapon sights, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection?

*Under UNSCR 1701 a ban on the sale, supply, transfer or export of arms related material to Lebanon was put in place.*

*The arms embargo does not apply to:*

- (i) The Government of Lebanon (and entities authorised by the Government of Lebanon)*
- (ii) UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)*

*None of the licences under reference breached the terms of the embargo as all of the equipment was intended for use by UNIFIL or end users authorised by the Government of Lebanon.*

**Libya:** Given the arms trade sanctions adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 1970 in February 2011, that Libya was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, and that the British Government has previously revoked arms export licences to Libya why were SIELs for assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of pistols, pistols, small arms ammunition, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography issued to Libya?

*A SIEL was issued for the export of assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of pistols, pistols and small arms ammunition. This equipment was destined for use by an international security company in protecting diplomatic staff and therefore exempt from the arms embargo. There were no Criteria concerns.*

*There were several SIELs for the export of goods including cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography. All these goods were to enable regular commercially available telephony or broadband services. There were no Criteria concerns.*

**Madagascar:** Given reports of human rights abuses in Madagascar why were SIELs for assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunitions and weapon sights granted?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes the equipment in these SIELs was intended for use in maritime security. Due to the increase in armed piracy covering an area from the Gulf of Aden to the East Coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, PSCs are being asked to provide armed guards by their clients to enable commercial vessels to operate safely in these areas. Licences for weapons, ammunition and protective equipment for anti-piracy applications are considered thoroughly against the Criteria. The supply of such anti-piracy equipment will only be authorised if the following strict conditions are met; activity is limited to vessels which are registered to a Flag State; the PSC must have signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers and operate under stringent Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for the Use of Force (RoE) agreed with the appropriate Licensing Authority; equipment may only be used by personnel of the named PSC; and restrictions on the number and storage of firearms must be observed (i.e. all firearms must be stored in secure designated armouries when not in use).*

**Netherlands:** Why was a SIEL for NBC protective/defensive equipment refused?

*The Government refused this application as we judged that there was a risk that UK classified material/capabilities would not be protected and this would be contrary to Criterion 5d. The activities of the intended recipient were not in direct support of the Dutch Government.*

**Russia:** Given that Russia was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report at the time, why were SIELs for body armour, components for body armour, components for sniper rifles, sniper rifles and weapon sights and OIELs for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography granted?

*Several of these SIELs were for the export of equipment for sporting and hunting use. Sport shooting and hunting are popular activities in Russia and we assessed the stated end use in these applications as credible. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns with these applications.*

*One SIEL was for the export of body armour, components for body armour destined for use by a media company, whose employees operate worldwide. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.*

*Another SIEL was for the export of body armour for personal use. Given that only one vest was covered by this SIEL and the end user had a credible requirement to use it, we assessed there were no Criteria concerns.*

*The OIELs for the export of cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography were for goods destined for civil end use. We had no Criteria concerns.*

Saudi Arabia: Given that Saudi Arabia was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELS for components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, crowd control ammunition, CS hand grenades, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, hand grenades, machine guns, military combat vehicles, military communications equipment, military support vehicles, tear gas/irritant ammunition and weapon night sights granted?

*There are legitimate reasons for the Saudi authorities to have this type of equipment. As stated in the 2012 FCO Annual Report on Human Rights we assess that the policing response to protests and demonstrations in the Eastern Province appears to have been proportionate.*

*Several of the SIELs under reference were for the temporary export of equipment to government end users for demonstration and evaluation purposes. Equipment covered by these SIELs included military combat vehicles, direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights, components for machine guns, components for turrets, equipment for the use of turrets, machine guns, turrets, weapon cleaning equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, imaging cameras, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment and military support vehicles. These applications did not raise any Criteria concerns.*

*A SIEL was issued for the export of CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition and training tear gas/irritant ammunition to a military end user. This end user had not been involved in policing demonstrations and we assessed that they were unlikely to be doing so in the future. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.*

*A SIEL was issued for the export of equipment for the use of military communications equipment to a military end user. This end user had not been involved in policing demonstrations and we assessed that they were unlikely to be doing so in the future. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.*

*A SIEL was issued for the export of crowd control ammunition, hand grenades, illuminators, signalling devices, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition and training crowd control ammunition to a military end user. This equipment was intended for operational and training purposes and is also regularly used in military operations. This end user had not been involved in policing demonstrations and we assessed that they were unlikely to be doing so in the future. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.*

*A SIEL was issued for the export of military communications equipment to a military end user. This end user had not been involved internal security in the past and we assessed that they were unlikely to be doing so in the future. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.*

**Somalia:** Given the arms trade sanctions against Somalia adopted by UN Security Council resolution 733 in 1992 and amended in 2002 by Security Council resolution 1425, resolutions 1356 (2001), 1772 (2007), 1851 (2008), 1907 (2009), 1916 (2010), 2002 (2011) and that Somalia was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and

Democracy Report, why were SIELs for body armour, components for body armour, military support vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography issued?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the sanctions in place for Somalia provide for exemptions for supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, weapons and military equipment for the support or use of AMISOM or the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, or to be used against piracy, supplies and assistance for developing Somali security sector institutions or the Transitional Federal Government. Procedures vary: some exports must be approved in advance by the Sanctions Committee.*

*The SIELs under reference were for the export of goods and equipment either for end users or end uses exempt from the arms embargo, or equipment that is not military rated and therefore not caught by the UN arms embargo for Somalia. Whilst Somalia is listed as a Country of Concern by the FCO, the end users for these SIELs are involved in work attempting to improve the humanitarian and human rights situation there and we had no Criterion 2 concerns about these applications.*

**Sudan:** Given that Sudan was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs with a value in excess of £7.3m for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography issued?

*A SIEL for the export of cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography was issued. The goods formed part of a business telephone system allowing businesses to make and receive telephone calls and utilize various telecoms type applications to improve business efficiency. They were to be held in stock by the end user for resale. The relatively high value of the SIEL was to cover potential sales volumes over the 2 year period of the licence. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*The other SIEL under reference for the export of equipment using cryptography was issued for communications equipment destined for use by UNAMID, the UN Mission in Darfur. We had no Criteria concerns.*

**Syria:** Given the current internal conflict taking place in Syria and that Syria was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why was a SIEL for components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and a SITCL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection granted when an OITCL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection was refused?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes for Syria in Q4 2012, the EU adopted restrictions against Syria on the supply of arms and related materiel under*

*Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP. Although the OITCL application stated that the vehicles covered by this licence would be used by various NGOs and humanitarian organisations, on assessing the application the Government was not satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to grant an exemption to the embargo in place at that time. There were also Criterion 7 concerns. Therefore, the application was rejected.*

*The SIEL and SITCLs were for the export of similar equipment for the use of UN agencies. These applications were exempt from the embargo and there were no other Criteria concerns.*

**Zimbabwe:** Given that Zimbabwe was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for cryptographic software granted?

*All these SIELs were for the export of equipment that was not military rated and with a credible civil end use. We had no Criteria concerns.*

### **The Committees’ 2013 Quarter 1 (January – March) questions and the Government’s answers**

**Afghanistan:** Given the current conflict in Afghanistan and that Afghanistan was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report the Committees wish to know why SIELs for body armour, components for body armour, military helmets and equipment employing cryptography; and a SIEL- Transshipment for components for combat helicopters were approved.

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the arms embargo sanctions in place for Afghanistan apply to those individuals designated under UN Security*

*Council Resolution 2082. Most of the SIELs referred to above were for equipment to be used by end users exempt from existing sanctions (e.g. International Security Assistance Force/Diplomatic Missions/United Nations/recognised NGOs). There were no other Criteria concerns about these exports.*

*Two of the SIELs for equipment employing cryptography were for equipment destined for civil end use by commercial companies and raised no Criteria concerns.*

**Argentina:** Given the current political tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina and the Foreign Secretary’s letter to the Chairman of 26 April 2012, the Committees wish to know why were SIELs issued for small arms ammunition, equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, no licences shall be granted for any military or dual-use goods and technology to be supplied to military end-users in Argentina, except in exceptional circumstances. This decision will not affect licences for items intended for end-users other than the Argentine military.*

*None of the licences under reference were for equipment destined for military end users and there were no other Criteria concerns about these exports.*

**Azerbaijan:** Given the OSCE embargo of 1992 to Azerbaijan why were SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography approved?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the UK interprets the OSCE arms embargo for Armenia and Azerbaijan as prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology to any person, or to any destination, in Armenia or in Azerbaijan. It has been UK practice*

*occasionally to make an exemption in its interpretation of the embargo by approving exports of non-lethal military goods to humanitarian, media or peacekeeping organisations where it is clear that the embargo was not intended to prevent those exports and there is a strong humanitarian case for them.*

*This SIEL was for the export of equipment destined for civil and commercial end use. The equipment was not military rated and thus not covered by the UK interpretation of the OSCE embargo. We had no other Criteria concerns.*

**China:** Given the Madrid European Council arms embargo to China and that China was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment and technology for military electronic equipment and OIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography approved?

*As stated in previous responses to the Committees, the UK interpretation of the Arms Embargo on China, given in Parliament on 3 June 1998, is that it applies to:*

- *Lethal weapons, such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles. Specially designed components for these and ammunition.*
- *Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms.*
- *Any equipment which might be used for internal repression.*

*None of the goods and equipment under reference was covered by the UK interpretation of the EU Arms Embargo.*

*All items not covered by the embargo are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria.*

*One of the SIELs for the export of components for military communications equipment was for equipment destined for civil end use in search and rescue beacons. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*The other SIELs were for the export of technical information and components to be used in equipment and components manufactured in China that would then be returned to the UK for incorporation into the finished product. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*The OIELs were for the export of dual-use equipment destined for civil and commercial end use. We had no Criteria concerns.*

**Colombia:** Given that Colombia was listed as a Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why was a SIEL for anti-riot/ballistic shields approved?

*This SIEL for the export of anti-riot/ballistic shields was destined for use by a law enforcement agency in protecting their personnel during operations. As noted in the FCO’s 2012 report, the Government does have some human right concerns about Colombia, but Colombian police all have a high level of human rights training including anti-riots squads. Furthermore, our assessment noted the improvement in the human rights record of Colombian law enforcement agencies in recent years. Therefore, we assessed that there was*



***no clear risk that this export might be used for internal repression and we had no other Criteria concerns.***

**Comoros:** Please explain the justification for the approval of licences for 800 assault rifles, 150 combat shotguns and 200 rifles to a private maritime security company for anti-piracy purposes.

***As noted in the Quarterly Report footnotes this SIEL was granted for equipment to be used by a private security company (PSC) for anti-piracy activities.***

**Congo, Democratic Republic of:** Given that Arms sanctions against DRC are currently in place under UN Security Council resolution 1807 (amended by UNSCR 1857, 1896, 1952 (2010 and 2021 (2011)) and the DRC was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography approved?

***In all these cases, the SIELs were for the export of equipment intended for civil end use by commercial companies in providing network security and/or connectivity. These dual use goods were not military rated and therefore not covered by the arms embargo and we had no other Criteria concerns.***

**Egypt:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt and the current unrest in the country, why were SIELs for components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military auxiliary/support vehicles, components for military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment and military communications equipment approved?

***A SIEL for the export of this equipment was issued so that a small quantity of equipment could be sent to a government end user for temporary demonstration and evaluation purposes. There were no Criteria concerns as this was for temporary demonstration and evaluation only.***

**France:** Please explain why a SIEL for components for military training aircraft to France was refused.

***This SIEL was for the export of equipment eventually destined for export to several African countries. One of these countries was Ivory Coast and these goods could not be exported the terms of the current embargo. Therefore, the SIEL was refused under Criterion 1.***

**Kenya:** Given the imminence of the Kenyan election, at the time under consideration, on 4 March 2013 and the possibility of political violence associated with it, why were SIELs for acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, components for body armour, small arms ammunition, thunderflashes, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, pistols, rifles, weapon sights and components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection approved?

***Several of the SIELs under reference were granted for equipment to be used by private security companies (PSCs) for anti-piracy activities.***

*Most of the remaining SIELs were for the export of equipment to be used by various UN agencies in Somalia and we had no Criteria concerns.*

*The SIEL for the export of thunderflashes was for goods destined for civil end use by a government end user. This end user had no involvement in policing or security operations and therefore we assessed that there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression.*

**Lebanon:** Given that arms trade sanctions against Lebanon were adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 1701, of 11 August 2006, and by European Council Common Position 2006/625/CFSP, why were SIELs approved for the following items: all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components for body armour, components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights, components for radio jamming equipment, equipment employing cryptography and radio jamming equipment.

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, under UNSCR 1701 a ban on the sale, supply, transfer or export of arms related material to Lebanon was put in place.*

*The arms embargo does not apply to:*

*(i) The Government of Lebanon (and entities authorised by the Government of Lebanon)*

*(ii) UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)*

*None of the licences under reference breached the terms of the embargo as all of the equipment was intended for use by UNIFIL or end users authorised by the Government of Lebanon.*

**Libya:** Given the arms trade sanctions adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 1970 in February 2011, that Libya was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, and that the British Government has previously revoked arms export licences to Libya why were SIELs for anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, body armour, command communications control and intelligence software, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, hand grenades, military communications equipment, pistols, small arms ammunition, software for military communications equipment and gun mountings approved. Why were other SIELs for body armour, components for body armour and military helmets refused when other SIELs for these same goods were approved?

*A SIEL for the export of body armour and components for body armour was issued. A small quantity of equipment was to be exported for demonstration to government end users. We assessed that this equipment met an exemption from the sanctions regime as it would help to meet some of Libya’s security requirements. There were no other Criteria concerns as this equipment was for evaluation only.*

*A SIEL for the export of anti-riot ballistic shields, body armour and components for body armour was issued. This equipment was destined for use by a government end user involved in law enforcement. We assessed that this equipment met an exemption from the sanctions regime as it would help to meet some of Libya's security requirements. Although we had Criterion 2 concerns about the export of this equipment, recent failures in policing/security operations had been due to poor organisation and inadequate equipment rather than systematic abuse. We assessed that there was no clear risk that this equipment might be used for internal repression, and that provision of such equipment would enable a more measured and effective police/army response. Furthermore, we did not assess that there was a sufficient risk of diversion to reach the threshold for Criterion 7.*

*As noted above a SIEL for the export of similar equipment was refused. We assessed that this equipment would probably meet the requirements of an exemption from the sanctions regime as it would help meet some of the Libya's security requirements. However, we had other Criteria concerns. This equipment was intended for export for demonstration purposes and then to be left in-country with a military end user. Our assessment of this particular end user led us to have concerns under Criteria 3 and 7. In particular, the intended end user's location in Libya led to concern that the equipment could be diverted from them to an undesirable end user and aggravate existing tensions in the area. Therefore, we refused this application under Criteria 3 and 7.*

*The other SIELs under reference were for the export of equipment for use by UN and diplomatic personnel and therefore considered exempt from sanctions. There were no Criteria concerns.*

**Madagascar:** What justification was given for the application for SIELs for 550 assault rifles, 50 combat shotguns, 100 pistols, 100 rifles and 200 sniper rifles to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes given that previously SIELs for Madagascar were approved in 2012 for 3100 assault rifles, 550 combat shotguns, 240 pistols and 700 rifles to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes. Given that reports of human rights abuses in Madagascar what assurances has the U.K. Government received that none of these items will not be used for internal repression?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes the equipment in these SIELs was intended for use in maritime security.*

*The Government has not sought any assurances about this equipment being used for internal repression but we have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Madagascar. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.*

**Oman:** What justification was given for the application for SIELs for 1800 assault rifles, 150 combat shotguns, 30 pistols and 200 rifles to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances has the U.K. Government received that these items will not be used for internal repression?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes the equipment in these SIELs was intended for use in maritime security.*

*The Government has not sought any assurances about this equipment being used for internal repression but we have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Oman. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.*

*As the Committees will note from previous responses on Oman, it has embarked on a programme of comprehensive police reform and the government has stated that it expects any response to future demonstrations to be proportionate after isolated incidents of overreaction early on during the 2011 protests.*

**Russia:** Given that Russia was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report at the time, why were SIELs for body armour, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of military communications equipment approved?

*Most of these SIELs were for the export of equipment for sporting and hunting use, including the body armour. Sport shooting and hunting are popular activities in Russia and we assessed the stated end use in these applications as credible. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns with these applications.*

*The SIEL for the export of equipment for the use of military communications equipment was destined for commercial end use in testing civil aircraft. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.*

**Saudi Arabia:** Given that Saudi Arabia was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for command communications control and intelligence software, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for machine guns, CS hand grenades, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, software for ground vehicle military communications equipment tear gas/irritant ammunition and technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment approved?

*There are legitimate reasons for the Saudi authorities to have this type of equipment. As stated in the 2012 FCO Annual Report on Human Rights we assess that the policing response to protests and demonstrations in the Eastern Province appears to have been proportionate.*

*All SIELs were for equipment destined for military and government end users. None of these end users had been previously involved in policing demonstrations and we assessed that they were unlikely to be doing so in the future. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.*

**Singapore:** Why were SIELs for radio jamming equipment and telecommunications software refused?

*This equipment was ultimately destined for export to China for use by provincial law enforcement agencies there. We had Criterion 2 concerns about the export of this equipment to China given its use for surveillance and eavesdropping, and the clear risk that it might be used for internal repression.*

**Somalia:** Given the arms trade sanctions against Somalia adopted by UN Security Council resolution 733 in 1992 and amended in 2002 by Security Council resolution 1425, resolutions 1356 (2001), 1772 (2007), 1851 (2008), 1907 (2009), 1916 (2010), 2002 (2011) and that Somalia was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour and components for body armour approved?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the sanctions in place for Somalia provide for exemptions for supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, weapons and military equipment for the support or use of AMISOM or the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, or to be used against piracy, supplies and assistance for developing Somali security sector institutions or the Transitional Federal Government. Procedures vary: some exports must be approved in advance by the Sanctions Committee.*

*The SIELs under reference were for the export of goods and equipment either for end users or end uses exempt from the arms embargo. Whilst Somalia is listed as a Country of Concern by the FCO, the end users for these SIELs are involved in work attempting to improve the humanitarian and human rights situation there and we had no Criterion 2 concerns about these applications.*

**South Africa:** Why was a SIEL for small arms ammunition refused?

*This SIEL was for the export of small arms ammunition to be held in stock for resale. The end user had been party to a previous export licensing application for similar goods for onward transmission to Zimbabwe. This had been refused under Criterion 1 as the goods were caught by the EU arms embargo. We assessed that there was an unacceptable level of risk that these goods would be diverted to Zimbabwe in breach of the embargo and therefore refused the application under Criterion 7.*

**Sudan:** Given that Sudan was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why was a SIEL for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*The SIEL for the export of equipment using cryptography was issued for communications equipment destined for use by UNAMID, the UN Mission in Darfur. We had no Criteria concerns.*

**Sudan, South:** Why was a SITCL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection refused?

*This SITCL was to cover the brokering of 2 vehicles from a third country to South Sudan where they were to be used as demonstration vehicles until sold. We assessed these vehicles as being covered by the arms embargo currently in place for South Sudan. As there was no way of establishing who the eventual end users of these vehicles would be, it was not possible to establish whether the end user would be exempt under the terms of the embargo. Therefore, we refused this licence under Criterion 1 and also Criterion 7 as there was a risk that the vehicles might be diverted.*

**Turkey:** Why was an incorporated SIEL for components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment refused?

*This SIEL application was for the export of equipment ultimately destined for use by the government of Turkmenistan. The application was refused under Criterion 2.*

**United Arab Emirates:** Why was an OIEL for civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, equipment for the use of NBC protective/defensive equipment and NBC protective/defensive equipment refused?

*There were potential Criterion 2 concerns about several destinations on this OIEL including the UAE. Some of the equipment in this OIEL might be used for internal repression and an open licence would not allow for the necessary degree of scrutiny required i.e. specific end use and end user.*

**Zimbabwe:** Given that Zimbabwe was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography approved?

*All these SIELs were for the export of equipment that was not military rated and with a credible civil end use. We had no Criteria concerns.*

## **The Committees’ 2013 Quarter 2 (April – June) questions and the Government’s answers**

**Israel:** As noted in footnote 4 of the entry for Israel in the Country Pivot Report and with reference to the list of extant licences supplied to the Committee by the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills on 10 May 2013, a licence for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography to the value of £7,765,450,000 was granted. The Committees wish to know what equipment this is, what are the uses of this equipment and who are the recipients of this equipment.

*This licence permits the export of equipment and software for building public mobile phone networks in residential areas and for small businesses. These items are subject to export control because of their encryption (information security) capability. This capability is a standard feature of the mobile phone network. The goods are for purely commercial end use.*

*The value of this licence does appear unusually high and may not represent a realistic goal on the part of the exporter. However the exporter confirmed that this was based on an expectation of a very large number of orders over the two-year validity period of the licence. Given the nature of the goods and the end-use this was not considered to be of concern.*

**Afghanistan:** Given the current conflict in Afghanistan, the arms embargo sanctions under UN Security Council Resolution 2082 and that Afghanistan was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report the Committees wish to know why SIELs for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, machine guns, military helmets, pistols, small arms ammunition, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, imaging cameras and software for equipment employing cryptography and an OIEL for equipment employing cryptography were approved.

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the arms embargo sanctions in place for Afghanistan apply to those individuals designated under UN Security*

*Council Resolution 2082. Most of the SIELs referred to above were for equipment to be used by end users exempt from existing sanctions (e.g. International Security Assistance Force/Diplomatic Missions/United Nations/recognised NGOs). There were no other Criteria concerns about these exports.*

*The SIEL and the OIEL for equipment employing cryptography were for equipment destined for civil end use by commercial companies and raised no Criteria concerns.*

**Argentina:** Given the current political tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina and the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of 26 April 2012, the Committees wish know why was a SIEL for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, no licences shall be granted for any military or dual-use goods and technology to be supplied to military end-users in Argentina, except in exceptional circumstances. This decision will not affect licences for items intended for end-users other than the Argentine military.*

*The licence under reference was not for equipment destined for military end users and there were no other Criteria concerns about this export.*

**Armenia:** Given the OSCE embargo for Armenia prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology to any person, or any destination, in Armenia why was an OIEL for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the UK interprets the OSCE arms embargo for Armenia and Azerbaijan as prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology to any person, or to any destination, in Armenia or in Azerbaijan. It has been UK practice occasionally to make an exemption in its interpretation of the embargo by approving exports of non-lethal military goods to humanitarian, media or peacekeeping organisations where it is clear that the embargo was not intended to prevent those exports and there is a strong humanitarian case for them.*

*This OIEL was for the export of equipment destined for civil and commercial end use. The equipment was not military rated and thus not covered by the UK interpretation of the OSCE embargo. We had no other Criteria concerns.*

**Azerbaijan:** Given the OSCE embargo of 1992 to Azerbaijan why were SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography approved?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, the UK interprets the OSCE arms embargo for Armenia and Azerbaijan as prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology to any person, or to any destination, in Armenia or in Azerbaijan. It has been UK practice occasionally to make an exemption in its interpretation of the embargo by approving exports of non-lethal military goods to humanitarian, media or peacekeeping organisations where it is clear that the embargo was not intended to prevent those exports and there is a strong humanitarian case for them.*

*This SIEL was for the export of equipment destined for civil and commercial end use. The equipment was not military rated and thus not covered by the UK interpretation of the OSCE embargo. We had no other Criteria concerns.*

**Bahrain:** Given the concerns over human rights raised during the protests on-going since 2011 and the FCO's latest update on Human Rights concerns regarding Bahrain why were SIELs for anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles (5,000), components for assault rifles, components for equipment for the use of electronic countermeasures, components for machine guns, components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of assault rifles, ground military vehicle components, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun silencers, machine guns, pistols, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved? Why was an OIEL for small arms ammunition refused?

*The SIEL for the export of anti-riot/ballistic shields was for use by a military end user. This end user's primary responsibility is external security and there was no evidence of this end user being involved in public security despite the continuing demonstrations in Bahrain. Therefore we assessed that there was no clear risk that this equipment might be used for internal repression.*

*Three of these SIELs were for the export of equipment, software and technology to enable secure communications for a military end user. Our assessment of these licences was that a secure communications system would assist in more effective command and control. The end user's primary responsibility is external security and therefore we assessed that there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression.*

*Two SIELs for components for machine guns, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, equipment for the use of assault rifles, training equipment for assault rifles and weapon cleaning equipment were for the export of equipment intended for naval use or coastal defence by a military end user. We assessed that it would be unlikely that this equipment would be deployed in crowd control situations and therefore there was no clear risk that it might be used for internal repression.*

*Three of these SIELs were for the export of small arms ammunition, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, gun silencers, pistols, rifles and gun silencers for personal end use in sport shooting. Therefore, we assessed that there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression.*

*One of the SIELs was for the export of small arms ammunition intended for trial and demonstration purposes by a military end user. The end user's primary responsibility is external security and therefore we assessed that there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression.*

*We have no record of an OIEL for small arms ammunition for Bahrain being refused during Q3 2013. There was a SITCL for small arms ammunition refused during this period. The small arms ammunition was destined for end use by a government end user involved in public security. We had continuing human rights concerns about the policing of demonstrations and therefore we assessed that there was a clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression. Furthermore, we assessed that the export would risk aggravating existing tensions.*



**China:** Given the Madrid European Council arms embargo to China and that China was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, technology for military electronic equipment and technology for the production of military communications equipment approved? Why were SIELs for components for radar equipment, software for the use of radar equipment and technology for the use of radar equipment revoked and why were the Committees not informed of the revocations directly and when they occurred as recommended in the Committees’ latest Report (HC 205)?

*As stated in previous responses to the Committees, the UK interpretation of the Arms Embargo on China, given in Parliament on 3 June 1998, is that it applies to:*

- *Lethal weapons, such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles. Specially designed components for these and ammunition.*
- *Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms.*
- *Any equipment which might be used for internal repression.*

*None of the goods and equipment under reference was covered by the UK interpretation of the EU Arms Embargo.*

*All items not covered by the embargo are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria.*

*Two of the SIELs for the export of components for military communications equipment and military communications equipment were for equipment destined for civil end use in search and rescue beacons. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*Two of the SIELs were for the export of technical information and components to be used in equipment and components manufactured in China that would then be returned to the UK for incorporation into the finished product. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*The two SIELs for the export of small arms ammunition were both intended for sporting use. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*A SIEL for the export of components for radar equipment, software for the use of radar equipment and technology for the use of radar equipment was revoked after the Government received further information which led it to reassess the risk in exporting these goods. Therefore, we revoked these applications as there was risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer that might be used against UK forces or against EU Member States, their allies or other friendly countries. We also assessed there was a risk that the goods would be diverted in country or re-exported under undesirable conditions. This revocation pre-dates the recommendation in HC 205 and as the Committees will be aware from the Government’s Response (Cm 8707) we did not in any event accept that recommendation and would not have informed the Committees directly of this revocation.*

**Colombia:** Given that Colombia was listed as a Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography, radio jamming equipment and software for radio jamming equipment approved?

*The two SIELs for the export of equipment employing cryptography were for equipment intended for use in video conferencing by a commercial end user. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*The SIEL for radio jamming equipment and software for radio jamming equipment was for a temporary export to deliver product demonstrations to potential customers including military and law enforcement end users. This equipment can be used to target mobile phones and could possibly be used for internal repression. As noted in the FCO’s 2012 report, the Government does have some human right concerns about Colombia, but Colombian police all have a high level of human rights training. Furthermore, our assessment noted the improvement in the human rights record of Colombian law enforcement agencies in recent years. Therefore, we assessed that there was no clear risk that this export might be used for internal repression and we had no other Criteria concerns.*

**Comoros:** Why were SIEL licences approved for 500 assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, 50 pistols, 100 rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances have been received that these goods will not be diverted?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes the equipment in these SIELs was intended for use in maritime security.*

*The Government has not sought any assurances about this equipment being used for internal repression but we have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Comoros. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.*

*However, as stated at the Business Secretary’s Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities of weapons approved.*

**Congo, Democratic Republic of:** Given that Arms sanctions against DRC are currently in place under UN Security Council resolution 1807 (amended by UNSCR 1857, 1896, 1952 (2010 and 2021 (2011)) and the DRC was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why was a SIEL for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*There were several SIELs for equipment employing cryptography approved in Q2 2013. All these SIELs were for the export of equipment intended for civil end use by commercial companies. These dual use goods were not military rated and therefore not covered by the arms embargo and we had no other Criteria concerns.*

**Djibouti:** Why were SIEL licences approved for 700 assault rifles, 150 combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, 30 pistols, small arms ammunition, 300 sporting guns and weapon sights to private maritime

securities company for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances have been received that these goods will not be diverted?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes the equipment in these SIELs was intended for use in maritime security.*

*The Government has not sought any assurances about this equipment being used for internal repression but we have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Djibouti. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.*

*However, as stated at the Business Secretary's Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities of weapons approved.*

**Egypt:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country, why were SIELs for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and general military vehicle components approved? Why were SIEL licences approved for 700 assault rifles, 150 combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, 30 pistols, small arms ammunition, 550 sporting guns and weapon sights to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances have been received that these goods will not be diverted?

*The SIEL for the export of general military vehicle components was for regulators for diesel engines for armoured infantry fighting vehicles intended for a military end user. At the time of the assessment, under the Morsi presidency, we considered that there was no clear risk that this equipment might be used for internal repression. In July, we reassessed this application in light of the changing circumstances on the ground in Egypt, and decided to revoke this licence. However, after enquiring with the exporter we received confirmation that this equipment had already been shipped and no further action could be taken.*

*The SIEL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection was for the temporary export of an armoured 4x4 for demonstration to a potential client, who intended to market these vehicles to military end users. We considered there was no clear risk that this vehicle might be used for internal repression.*

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes the equipment in the other SIELs under reference was intended for use in maritime security.*

*The Government has not sought any assurances about this equipment being used for internal repression but we have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Egypt. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.*

*However, as stated at the Business Secretary's Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities of weapons approved.*

**Ethiopia:** Why were SIELs for radio jamming equipment and software for radio jamming equipment refused?

*This SIEL was for the export of radio jamming equipment and software for radio jamming equipment intended for end use in surveillance and security operations by a government end user. As stated in the FCO's 2011 Human Rights Report, the Government has serious concerns about Ethiopia's anti-terrorism legislation and the human rights issues it raises. Therefore, we assessed that there was a clear risk that this equipment might be used for internal repression.*

**France:** Why was a SIEL for components for military training aircraft to France was refused.

*We can find no trace of such a SIEL for France in Q3 2013. A SIEL for Germany for the same equipment was refused. The components covered by this SIEL were destined for use by a military end user in Argentina. In light of our policy towards exports to Argentina, announced by the Business Secretary on 26 April 2012, this licence was refused.*

**Guinea, Republic of:** Given the restriction in force in respect of EU Council Decision 2010/638/CFSP which includes an embargo on, amongst other goods, equipment that might be used for internal repression why were SIELs for acoustic devices for riot control, body armour and components for body armour approved?

*This equipment was for use in protecting PSC employees as they conduct risk mitigation and management services including the protection and escort of merchant vessels involved in legitimate trade and oil and gas exploration against pirate attacks. The end user has signed the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers. As noted in the Quarterly Report, there are exemptions to the embargo for certain protective end uses which applied to this equipment.*

**Israel:** Given that Israel was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report at the time, why were SIELs for anti-riot/ballistic shields, components for military communications equipment, components for military support vehicles, general military vehicle components and military communications equipment approved?

*The SIEL for the export of components for military support vehicles was for the return of parts to the manufacturer after testing conducted in the UK. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.*

*The SIEL for the export of anti/riot ballistic shields was for a small quantity of equipment to be used in a product demonstration. The commercial end user would be using the equipment for marketing purposes. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*There was also a SIEL for the temporary export of anti/riot ballistic shields, bomb suits and components for body armour. This equipment was intended for exhibition at a defence exhibition. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*The SIEL for the export of military communications equipment was for equipment intended for use in testing and evaluation by a commercial end user manufacturing a radio system. We had no Criteria concerns. There was also a SIEL for the temporary export of military communications equipment for the same purpose and again we had no Criteria concerns.*

*The SIEL for the export of general military vehicle components was for the temporary export of a generator for investigation and repair. On repair the generator would be returned to the UK. We had no Criteria concerns.*

**Ivory Coast:** Given the arms trade sanctions adopted by 2004/852/CFSP and UN Security Council Resolution 1572 why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography approved? Given that the value of this equipment and software was £2,388,300 please provide details of what this equipment was and what was it to be used for.

*The SIEL for the export of equipment employing cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography was for secure radios and supporting equipment intended for use by government end users. This equipment was not covered by the embargo which covers arms and related materiel. This is interpreted by the UK as anything on the UK Military list and equipment which might be used in internal repression as listed under Annex I of EU Council Regulation No. 174/2005. This kind of equipment did not feature on either list.*

*Although there were human rights concerns about law enforcement and security forces, the Ivorian Government had been addressing the poor management underlying these. We assessed that the introduction of an effective, high-quality communications system was likely to improve public security management and that there was not a clear risk that this equipment might be used in internal repression.*

**Kenya:** Why were SIEL licences approved for 100 assault rifles, 100 combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for combat shotguns, components for sporting guns, small arms ammunition, 200 sporting guns and weapon sights to private maritime securities company for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances have been received that these goods will not be diverted?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes this equipment was intended for use in maritime security.*

*The Government has not sought any assurances about this equipment being used for internal repression but we have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Kenya. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.*

*However, as stated at the Business Secretary's Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities of weapons approved.*

**Lebanon:** Given that arms trade sanctions against Lebanon were adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 1701, of 11 August 2006, and by European Council Common Position 2006/625/CFSP, why were SIELs approved for small arms ammunition and sporting guns, and OIELs for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for cryptographic software approved?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes, under UNSCR 1701 a ban on the sale, supply, transfer or export of arms related material to Lebanon was put in place.*

*The arms embargo does not apply to:*

*(i) The Government of Lebanon (and entities authorised by the Government of Lebanon)*

*(ii) UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)*

*None of the SIELs under reference breached the terms of the embargo as all of the equipment was intended for use by UNIFIL or end users authorised by the Government of Lebanon.*

*None of the equipment covered by the OIELs is military rated and therefore the arms embargo did not apply in these cases.*

**Libya:** Given the arms trade sanctions adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 1970 in February 2011, that Libya was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, and that the British Government has previously revoked arms export licences to Libya why were SIELs for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, combat shotguns, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, military support vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, anti-riot helmets, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, military image intensifier equipment and projectile launchers approved?

*None of the equipment in the several SIELs under reference for equipment employing cryptography and cryptographic software was covered by the terms of the embargo and in each case was for commercial end use. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns about these licences.*

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes there are various exemptions to UNSCR 1970 and its amendments in place. All the other SIELs under reference were exempt from the embargo.*

*The SIEL for the export of components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection was for equipment intended for use by UN personnel. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*The SIEL for the export of military support vehicles was for vehicles intended for civil end use in the agricultural sector. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*The SIEL for the export of combat shotguns was for equipment intended for use in disposing of explosive ordnance by a government end user. The shotguns were to be mounted on remotely operated vehicles for this purpose. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*A SIEL for the export of anti-riot helmets, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets, military image intensifier equipment and projectile launchers was refused during this quarter. We have no record of such a SIEL being issued.*

**Madagascar:** Why were SIEL licences approved for 1,400 assault rifles, 150 combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, 100 pistols, 200 rifles, small arms ammunition, 150 sporting guns and weapon sights to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes given that previously SIELs for Madagascar had

already been approved for 3200 assault rifles, 600 combat shotguns, 340 pistols, 800 rifles, 204 sniper rifles and 150 sporting guns to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes? Given the reports of human rights abuses in Madagascar what assurances has the U.K. Government received that none of these items will not be used for internal repression?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes this equipment was intended for use in maritime security.*

*The Government has not sought any assurances about this equipment being used for internal repression but we have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Madagascar. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.*

*However, as stated at the Business Secretary's Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities of weapons approved.*

**Maldives:** Why were SIEL licences approved for 700 assault rifles, 250 combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for combat shotguns, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sporting guns, 130 pistols, 200 rifles, small arms ammunition, 200 sporting guns, weapon night sights and weapon sights to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes?. What assurances have been received that these goods will not be diverted?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes this equipment was intended for use in maritime security.*

*The Government has not sought any assurances about this equipment being used for internal repression but we have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Maldives. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.*

*However, as stated at the Business Secretary's Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities of weapons approved.*

**Mauritius:** Why were SIEL licences approved for 700 assault rifles, 150 combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, 80 pistols, 650 rifles, small arms ammunition, 200 sporting guns and weapon sights to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances have been received that these goods will not be diverted?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes this equipment was intended for use in maritime security.*

*The Government has not sought any assurances about this equipment being used for internal repression but we have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Mauritius. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.*

*However, as stated at the Business Secretary's Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities of weapons approved.*

**Morocco:** Why was an OIEL for components for military support aircraft and general military aircraft components refused; and an OIEL for software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment revoked?

*An OIEL for the export of components for military support aircraft and general military components was issued during this quarter. We have no record of such an OIEL being refused.*

*An OIEL for the export of software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment was refused rather than revoked. We have Criteria 2, 3 and 4 concerns about Morocco, particularly regarding reports of human rights abuses by security forces in the disputed territory of Western Sahara. As this was an open licence there were no named end users so the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. We also considered the fact that the licence would be valid for 5 years and whilst there has been a long-established ceasefire in Western Sahara which has not been broken since 1991, we still had concerns about issuing a licence with such a long validity. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Oman:** Why were SIEL licences approved for 600 assault rifles, 150 combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, 30 pistols, 200 rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances has the U.K. Government received that these items will not be used for internal repression?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes this equipment was intended for use in maritime security.*

*The Government has not sought any assurances about this equipment being used for internal repression but we have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Oman. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.*

*However, as stated at the Business Secretary's Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG are planning to review the SIELs issued for PSCs in view of the large quantities of weapons approved.*

**Saudi Arabia:** Given that Saudi Arabia was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, military communications equipment, sniper rifles, weapon night sights and weapon sights approved?



*There are legitimate reasons for the Saudi authorities to have this type of equipment.*

*Saudi Arabia is at the heart of an unstable region and has legitimate defence and security needs which the Government seeks to support. The situation in Syria, turbulence in Egypt, Iraq, its porous border with Yemen, and the threat from international terrorism are legitimate reasons for Saudi Arabia to protect its borders and be able to counter any acts of aggression. As stated in the 2012 FCO Annual Report on Human Rights we assess that the policing response to protests and demonstrations in the Eastern Province appears to have been proportionate.*

*Three SIELs for the export of gun silencers, components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon sights and anti-armour ammunition were destined for a government end user involved in policing demonstrations and public security.*

*In each case these exports were for small quantities of equipment for testing and evaluation – in two cases these were temporary exports meaning the equipment would return to the UK. Therefore, in each case we assessed that there was not a clear risk that the equipment might be used for internal repression.*

*The remaining SIELs were for equipment destined for military and government end users. None of these end users had been previously involved in policing demonstrations and we assessed that they were unlikely to be doing so in the future. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.*

**Singapore:** Why were SIELs for components for NBC protective/defensive equipment and NBC protective/defensive equipment refused?

*This equipment was destined for eventual end use in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao. We refused this application as we judged that there was a risk that UK classified material/capabilities would not be protected and this would be contrary to Criterion 5d.*

**Somalia:** Given the arms trade sanctions against Somalia adopted by UN Security Council resolution 733 in 1992 and amended in 2002 by Security Council resolution 1425, resolutions 1356 (2001), 1772 (2007), 1851 (2008), 1907 (2009), 1916 (2010), 2002 (2011) and that Somalia was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why was an OIEL for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*The sanctions in place for Somalia provide for exemptions for supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, weapons and military equipment for the support or use of AMISOM or the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, or to be used by UN member states against piracy, or supplies and assistance for developing the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia. Procedures vary: some exports must be approved in advance by the Sanctions Committee.*

*This equipment was a router for satellite broadband destined for commercial end use. As the equipment was not military-rated it was not covered by sanctions. Given the credible end use for this equipment, we had no Criteria concerns.*

**South Africa:** Why were SIEL licences approved for 700 assault rifles, 350 combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for combat shotguns, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, 30 pistols, 500 rifles, small arms

ammunition, 200 sniper rifles, 450 sporting guns and weapon sights to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances that these goods will not be diverted have been received? Why was a SIEL for assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights revoked?

*As stated in the Quarterly Report footnotes this equipment was intended for use in maritime security.*

*The Government has not sought any assurances about this equipment being used for internal repression but we have seen no evidence that PSCs have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in South Africa. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.*

*The SIEL that was revoked was for equipment intended for use in maritime security. The refusal of subsequent SIEL for this end user, led a reassessment of the diversion risk with previously issued SIELs. This led to the revocation of the SIEL under reference.*

**South Sudan:** Given the arms trade sanctions against South Sudan adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 1556 in 2004 and extended by Resolution 1591 in 2005, EU Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP and that South Sudan was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*The UK interprets the sanctions to cover all items on the UK military list. These goods are on the EU dual-use list rather than military-rated and are therefore not covered by the sanctions.*

*One of the SIELs under reference was for the export of equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography intended for use by the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). We had no Criteria concerns.*

*The other SIEL was for the export of equipment employing cryptography intended for commercial end use in upgrading network infrastructure. We had no Criteria concerns.*

**Syria:** Given that Syria was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why was a SITCL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and an OITCL for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection approved?

*These vehicles were intended for the use of UN and diplomatic personnel. Therefore, we had no Criteria concerns.*

**Tunisia:** Why was an OIEL for software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment and technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment revoked?

*An OIEL for the export of software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment was refused rather than revoked. Recent events meant that we had human rights concerns for Tunisia, in particular with exports to some government and law enforcement end users. The export of*

*communications equipment can cause us concerns under Criterion 2 when they are destined for certain end-users, as we view them to be of utility in some instances of internal repression. As this was an open licence there were no named end users so the equipment might be exported to specific end users about whom we have concerns. In this case, it was considered that applications for SIELs would be more appropriate to allow more scrutiny, in particular of specific end users.*

**Turkey:** Why was a SIEL for armoured plate refused?

*This SIEL was for the export of armoured plate to be fitted on armoured personnel carriers (APCs). The APCs were destined for eventual end use by a military end user in Bahrain. We had Criteria 2 and 3 concerns following the use of APCs by the Bahraini authorities during the demonstrations during 2011. We assessed that this military end user might be deployed to reinforce the police during public order situations. We assessed that there was a clear risk that this equipment might be used for internal repression and that the export would risk aggravating existing tensions.*

**United Arab Emirates:** Why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography, military communications equipment and naval communications equipment revoked?

*This was in fact one SIEL. It was not revoked but has shown up as being revoked in the Quarterly Report, which is generated by SPIRE, the Government's export licensing database. This was technical issue resulting from the processing of an amended licence which did not contain all the goods lines in the original licence. When the amendment is processed on to the system it finds goods lines that were on the previous version of the licence but do not exist on the new version of the licence. It determines that as they no longer exist on the licence they must have been revoked, and so creates revoke entries for them on the database. We are addressing this issue with the help of our suppliers in order to prevent these misleading entries appearing in the Quarterly Report.*

**Zimbabwe:** Given that Zimbabwe was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography approved? The Committees wish to know what equipment this is, what are the uses of this equipment and who are the recipients of this equipment.

*One of these SIELs was for the export of HF and VHF radio equipment to be used by an international humanitarian organisation involved in mine clearance. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*The other SIEL was for the export of routers to upgrade existing network infrastructure for a commercial end user. We had no Criteria concerns.*

## **The Committees' 2013 Quarter 3 (July – September) questions and the Government's answers**

**Afghanistan:** Given the current conflict in Afghanistan, the arms embargo sanctions under UN Security Council Resolution 2082 and that Afghanistan was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report the Committees wish to know why SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography were

approved?

***The SIEL was approved because the export was equipment for an international organisation for communication purposes. We had no Criteria concerns.***

**Argentina:** Given the current political tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina and the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Chairman of 26 April 2012, the Committees wish know why was an OIEL including artillery ammunition, components for artillery, components for combat naval vessels, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, signalling devices, smoke canisters, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, technology for artillery, technology for combat naval vessels, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval engines, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for signalling devices, technology for smoke canisters, technology for weapon control equipment, training artillery ammunition and weapon control equipment approved?

***The OIEL was approved because all items in the licence are for the sole use of a non-Argentinean naval mission and are not to be re-exported or sold for export to a Third Party. We had no Criteria concerns.***

**Azerbaijan:** Given the OSCE embargo of 1992 to Azerbaijan why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography approved?

***The UK interprets the OSCE arms embargo for Azerbaijan as prohibiting the export of any military goods or technology to any person, or to any destination, in Azerbaijan. It has been UK practice occasionally to make an exemption in its interpretation of the embargo by approving exports of non-lethal military goods to humanitarian, media or peacekeeping organisations where it is clear that the embargo was not intended to prevent those exports and there is a strong humanitarian case for them.***

***These SIELs were for the export of equipment destined for civil and commercial end use.***

*The equipment was not military rated and thus not covered by the UK interpretation of the OSCE embargo. We had no other Criteria concerns.*

**Bahrain:** Given the concerns over human rights raised during the protests on-going since 2011 and the FCO's latest update on Human Rights concerns regarding Bahrain why were SIELs for machine guns, sniper rifles and weapon night sights approved?

*We approved a SIEL for sniper rifles and weapon sights because we assessed that there were no clear risk that these goods would be used for internal repression.*

**China:** Given the Madrid European Council arms embargo to China and that China was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for components for artillery ammunition and military communications equipment approved?

Why was an OIEL for components for equipment employing cryptography and equipment employing cryptography approved?

*The UK interpretation of the Arms Embargo on China, given in Parliament on 3 June 1998, is that it applies to:*

- *Lethal weapons, such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles. Specially designed components for these and ammunition.*
- *Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms.*
- *Any equipment which might be used for internal repression.*

*None of the goods and equipment under reference was covered by the UK interpretation of the EU Arms Embargo.*

*All items not covered by the embargo are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria.*

*The SIEL for the export of components for artillery ammunition was for equipment to be incorporated into detecting heads of mining drilling bits for civil end use. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*The SIEL for the export of military communications equipment was for equipment destined for end use in search and rescue missions. We had no Criteria concerns.*

*The OIEL was for the export of components for mobile phones for civil end use. We had no Criteria concerns.*

**Colombia:** Given that Colombia was listed as a 'Country of Concern' in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts and weapon sights approved?

*The SIELs were for a temporary export for product demonstration, trial and evaluation purposes to potential customers including military and law enforcement end users. As noted in both the FCO's 2012 and 2013 reports, the Government does have some human right concerns about Colombia, but Colombian police all have a high level of human*

*rights training. Furthermore, our assessment noted the improvement in the human rights record of Colombian law enforcement agencies in recent years and that there was no evidence to support a clear risk of this sort of equipment being deployed in human rights violations, or that it had been used in internal repression to date. Therefore, we assessed that there was no clear risk that this export might be used for internal repression. We attached a note to the company explaining that approval of this temporary export did not fetter our discretion in considering future applications for permanent export of this equipment.*

**Congo, Democratic Republic of:** Given that Arms sanctions against DRC are currently in place under UN Security Council resolution 1807 (amended by UNSCR 1857, 1896, 1952 (2010 and 2021 (2011)) and the DRC was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for military support vehicles, equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography and an OIEL for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and technology for equipment employing cryptography approved?

*The SIEL for military support vehicles: whilst military-rated the equipment is intended solely for humanitarian use and therefore exempt from the arms embargo. The SIEL was granted following notification in advance of the export by the UK to the UN Sanctions Committee.*

*There were several SIELs for equipment employing cryptography approved in Q3 2013. All these SIELs were for the export of equipment intended for civil end use by commercial companies. These dual use goods were not military rated and therefore not covered by the arms embargo and we had no other Criteria concerns.*

*The OIEL was for the export of equipment intended for civil end use by commercial companies. These dual use goods were not military rated and therefore not covered by the arms embargo and we had no other Criteria concerns.*

**Egypt:** Given that the Government previously revoked arms exports licences to Egypt immediately following the Arab Spring and further revocations as listed in the letter to the Chairman of the Committees dated 30 July 2013 from the Business Secretary, and the current unrest in the country, why was a SIEL for military support vehicles approved?

*The SIEL was for a temporary export to deliver a product for demonstration to a potential client who intended to market these vehicles to military end users. We did not assess that temporary demonstration of one vehicle to a company in Egypt met the threshold for refusal. We recommended approval with a note to the company, highlighting the ongoing concerns in Egypt, and that approval of demonstration products did not guarantee future approval of exports.*

**Ghana:** Why were OITCLs approved which included acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights when the destination countries included Egypt?

*The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company*

*for anti-piracy activities.*

**Greenland:** Why were OITCLs for gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights refused?

*The OITCL was rejected for Greenland because the exporter did not have an established distributor in place for that country.*

**Israel:** Why was a SIEL for equipment employing cryptography refused?

*We refused this SIEL under Criterion 2 because the exporter did not provide sufficient information or assurances over potential ultimate recipients and end use. We therefore assessed there was a clear risk that the export might be used for internal repression.*

**Kenya:** Why was a SIEL for pistols refused?

*We refused this SIEL under Criterion 7 because of concerns over potential recipients and end use. We assessed there was a risk that the goods might be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.*

**Lebanon:** Given that arms trade sanctions against Lebanon were adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 1701, of 11 August 2006, and by European Council Common Position 2006/625/CFSP, why were SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography to the value of £9.8m approved?

*Under UNSCR 1701, a ban on the sale, supply, transfer or export of arms related material to Lebanon was put in place.*

*However none of the equipment covered by the SIELs is military rated and it is for commercial end use. Therefore the arms embargo did not apply in this case.*

**Mauritius:** Why were SIEL licences approved for 475 assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, 50 pistols, 100 rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved when goods of this type had previously been revoked due to “risk of diversion” (see letter from William Hague to CAEC Chairman dated 16 May 2013)?

*The SIELs were granted for equipment intended for use in maritime security.*

*We have seen no evidence that private security companies have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Mauritius.*

*However, as stated at the Business Secretary’s Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG is reviewing the SIELs issued for private security companies.*

*To qualify for a licence, private security companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based*

**Mozambique:** Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small

arms ammunition and weapon sights approved?

***The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.***

**Nigeria:** Why were SIELs for components for tanks, military field generators, military support vehicles, radio jamming equipment and software for radio jamming equipment refused?

Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights approved?

***The SIELs for components for tanks, military field generators, military support vehicles were refused under Criterion 7 because the exporters did not provide sufficient information or assurances over potential ultimate recipients and end use. We therefore assessed there was a risk that the goods will be diverted within the buyer country or re exported under undesirable conditions.***

***The SIEL for radio jamming equipment was refused under Criterion 2 because we assessed that there was a clear risk the export might be used for internal repression and might impact on human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination.***

***The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.***

**Oman:** Given the large number of arms previously approved for maritime security companies why were SIEL licences approved for 300 assault rifles, 150 combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, 200 rifles, small arms ammunition, 100 sporting guns, weapon night sights and weapon sights to private maritime security companies for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances has the U.K. Government received that these items will not be used for internal repression?

Why were SIEL licences approved for assault rifles, components for rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition and weapon sights approved when goods of this type had previously been revoked due to “risk of diversion” (see letter from William Hague to CAEC Chairman dated 16 May 2013)?

Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

***The SIELS were granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.***

***The Government has not sought any assurances about the equipment not being used for internal repression as we have seen no evidence that private security companies have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other***



*entities in Oman. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.*

*However, as stated at the Business Secretary's Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG is reviewing the SIELs issued for private security companies.*

*To qualify for a licence, Private Security Companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.*

*The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.*

**Russia:** Given that Russia was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why was a SIEL for civil riot control agent protection equipment approved?

Why was an OITCL with a destination including China for goods including gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved when similar licence applications for South Africa and Thailand were refused?

*The SIEL was approved with a proviso. The equipment is to be used for product demonstration at a showroom. We do have Criterion 2 (human rights) concerns with some end users in Russia so, should an order be won, future applications will be assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, taking into account full end user details, specific end use, quantities and prevailing circumstances at that time.*

*We could find no trace of an OITCL for those components for China in Q3 2013. There was such a licence with a destination of Taiwan and this was approved as we had no Criteria concerns.*

*The OITCL was refused for South Africa and Thailand because of concerns over the legitimacy of unspecified end-users and/or because the exporter did not have an established distributor in place.*

**Saudi Arabia:** Given that Saudi Arabia was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for components for components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, military communications equipment and military electronic equipment approved?

Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for combat shotguns, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved?

*There are legitimate reasons for the Saudi authorities to have this type of equipment.*

*Saudi Arabia is at the heart of an unstable region and has legitimate defence and security needs. The situation in Syria, turbulence in Egypt, Iraq, its porous border with Yemen, and the threat from international terrorism are legitimate reasons for Saudi Arabia to protect its borders and be able to counter any acts of aggression. As stated in the 2012 FCO Annual Report on Human Rights, we assess that the policing response to protests and demonstrations in the Eastern Province appears to have been proportionate.*

*The SIEL for the export of guns was for sporting purposes.*

*The SIELs for the export of military electronic equipment & military communications equipment were for re-charging military radio batteries*

*The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.*

**Seychelles:** Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

*The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.*

**Singapore:** Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved?

*The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.*

*The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.*

**Slovakia:** Why was an OITCL with a destination including China for goods including gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved when similar licence applications for South Africa and Thailand were refused?

*We could find no trace of an OITCL for those components for China in Q3 2013. There was such a licence with a destination of Taiwan and this was approved as we had no Criteria concerns.*

*The OITCL was refused for South Africa and Thailand because of concerns over the legitimacy of unspecified end-users and/or because the exporter did not have an established distributor in place.*

**Somalia:** Given the arms trade sanctions against Somalia adopted by UN Security Council

resolution 733 in 1992 and amended in 2002 by Security Council resolution 1425, resolutions 1356 (2001), 1772 (2007), 1851 (2008), 1907 (2009), 1916 (2010), 2002 (2011) and that Somalia was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography approved?

*The sanctions in place for Somalia provide for exemptions for supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, weapons and military equipment for the support or use of AMISOM or the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, or to be used by UN member states against piracy, or supplies and assistance for developing the security forces of the Federal Government of Somalia. Procedures vary: some exports must be approved in advance by the Sanctions Committee.*

*The equipment to be exported will be used for communication purposes by international organisations in Somalia only. Given the credible end use for this equipment, we had no Criteria concerns.*

**South Africa:** Why were SIELs for body armour and general military aircraft components refused?

Why were SIEL licences approved for assault rifles, components for assault rifles, pistols, components for pistols, military helmets, body armour, small arms ammunition and weapon sights approved when goods of this type had previously been revoked due to “risk of diversion” (see letter from William Hague to CAEC Chairman dated 16 May 2013)?

Why were OITCLs with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

Why was an OITCL with a destination including China for gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights refused when similar OITCLs to Russia, Slovakia, Taiwan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay were approved?

*We refused the SIEL for general military aircraft components under Criteria 1 and 7 because the final end user was in Azerbaijan and the OSCE arms embargo prohibits the supply of such components.*

*We refused the other SIELs under reference under Criterion 7 because the exporter did not provide sufficient information to establish the ultimate end user(s). We therefore assessed there was a risk that the goods might be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.*

*The OITCLs with a destination including Egypt were granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.*

*We can find no trace of such an OITCL for China in Q3 2013. Such a licence was approved for the other destinations as we had no Criteria concerns.*

**Sri Lanka:** Given the large number of arms previously approved for maritime security

companies why were SIEL licences approved for 1760 assault rifles, 450 combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, 80 pistols, 360 rifles, small arms ammunition, 200 sniper rifles and weapon sights to private maritime securities company for anti-piracy purposes? What assurances have been received that these goods will not be diverted?

***The equipment in these SIELs was intended for anti-piracy purposes in maritime security by civilian/commercial end users.***

***The Government has not sought any assurances about the equipment not being used for internal repression as we have seen no evidence that private security companies have been diverting equipment intended for their end use to government agencies or any other entities in Sri Lanka. Nor has there been any evidence of UK supplied equipment being used for internal repression.***

***However, as stated at the Business Secretary's Oral Evidence Session with the CAEC on 18 December, HMG is reviewing the SIELs issued for private security companies.***

***To qualify for a licence, Private Security Companies must meet strict conditions. They must keep detailed records, provide training for staff and have clear lines of accountability. Their UK based offices are subject to regular inspection visits by BIS. They must be signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. The equipment must remain under the companies' control at all times and it must be stored securely when not in use.***

**Sudan:** Given the arms trade sanctions against Sudan adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 1556 in 2004 and extended by Resolution 1591 in 2005, EU Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP and that Sudan was listed as a "Country of Concern" in the FCO's 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for equipment employing cryptography and software for equipment employing cryptography approved?

Why was an OITCL for acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for sporting guns, military helmets, military image intensifier equipment, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon cleaning equipment and weapon sights to India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand and United Arab Emirates refused?

***The UK interprets the sanctions to cover all items on the UK military list. These goods are on the EU dual-use list rather than military-rated and are therefore not covered by the sanctions.***

***The SIELs under reference were equipment for communication purposes for use by an international organisation. We had no Criteria concerns.***

**Taiwan:** Why was a SIEL for components for NBC protective/defensive equipment and NBC protect/defensive equipment refused?

Why was an OITCL with a destination including China for goods including gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved when similar licence applications for South Africa and Thailand were refused?

*We refused the SIEL under Criterion 5d: the need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities.*

*We could find no trace of an OITCL for those components for China in Q3 2013. There was such a licence with a destination of Taiwan and this was approved as we had no Criteria concerns.*

*The licence was refused to South Africa & Thailand because of concerns over the legitimacy of unspecified end-users and/or because the exporter did not have an established distributor in place.*

**Tanzania:** Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

*The OITCL was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.*

**Thailand:** Why was an OITCL with a destination including China for gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights refused when similar OITCLs to Russia, Slovakia, Taiwan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay were approved?

*We could find no trace of an OITCL for those components for China in Q3 2013. The OITCL for the other destinations were approved because we had no Criteria concerns.*

**Turkey:** Why were SIELs for CS hand grenades and tear gas/irritant ammunition refused?

Why was an incorporated SIEL for components for military combat vehicles to Bahrain refused?

*We refused the SIELs for CS hand grenades and tear gas/irritant ammunition under Criterion 2 because we assessed there was a clear risk that this export might be used for internal repression, given the previous and ongoing indiscriminate use of CS gas by the stated end user.*

*We refused the SIEL for components for military combat vehicles under Criteria 2 and 3 because the export was destined for ultimate end use by a government user in Bahrain involved in public security. We had continuing human rights concerns about the policing of demonstrations in Bahrain. We assessed that there was a clear risk that this equipment might be used with existing equipment for internal repression and that the export would risk aggravating existing tensions.*

**Ukraine:** Why was an OITCL with a destination including China for goods including gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights

approved when similar licence applications for South Africa and Thailand were refused?

*We could find no trace of an OITCL for those components for China in Q3 2013. There was such a licence with a destination of Taiwan and this was approved as we had no Criteria concerns.*

*The licence was refused to South Africa & Thailand because of concerns over the legitimacy of unspecified end-users and/or because the exporter did not have an established distributor in place.*

**United Arab Emirates:** Why was a SIEL for chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research refused?

*We refused the SIEL under Criterion 7 because we assessed there was a risk that the goods might be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.*

**United States of America:** Why was an incorporated SIEL to Brazil for components for military training aircraft refused?

Why was an OIEL for components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aircraft, ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military helicopters, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, signalling devices, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for military communications equipment, software for military electronic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment and technology for signalling devices refused?

*We refused the SIEL under Criterion 7 because we assessed there was a risk that the goods might be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.*

*We refused the OIEL because it was for incorporation of military goods in the USA for ultimate end use in Egypt. We refused this application and requested SIEL applications instead as we are able to maintain oversight of exports to the Egyptian military on a case-by-case basis through SIEL applications.*

**Uruguay:** Why was an OITCL with a destination including China for goods including gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns and weapon sights approved when similar licence applications for South Africa and Thailand were refused?

*We could find no trace of an OITCL for those components for China in Q3 2013. There*

*was such a licence with a destination of Taiwan and this was approved as we had no Criteria concerns.*

*The licence was refused to South Africa & Thailand because of concerns over the legitimacy of unspecified end-users and/or because the exporter did not have an established distributor in place.*

**Vessel, Platform in International Waters:** Why was an OITCL with a destination including Egypt for goods including acoustic devices for riot control, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for acoustic devices for riot control, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles and weapon sights approved?

Why was an OITCL for acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, combat shotguns, components for body armour, components for combat shotguns, components for sporting guns, military helmets, military image intensifier equipment, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon cleaning equipment and weapon sights to India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand and United Arab Emirates refused?

*The first OITCL under reference was granted for equipment to be used by a private maritime security company for anti-piracy activities.*

*The second OITCL under reference was approved for India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand and United Arab Emirates but refused for Vessel, Platform in International Waters after this destination was removed from the licence application at the exporters request.*

**Zimbabwe:** Given that Zimbabwe was listed as a “Country of Concern” in the FCO’s 2012 Human Rights and Democracy Report, why were SIELs for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography approved? The Committees wish to know what equipment this is, what are the uses of this equipment and who are the recipients of this equipment.

*The SIELs were for the export of equipment to commercial end users to upgrade existing network infrastructure. We had no Criteria concerns.*

**REQUESTS FOR WRITTEN INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE COMMITTEES ON ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS ARISING FROM THE GOVERNMENT’S PIVOT REPORTS FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 2010 – DECEMBER 2012 AND THE GOVERNMENT’S REPORTED EXPORTS IN THE UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS FOR 2012**

**Ghana:** The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot reports for the number of sniper rifles approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 – Q4 2012 and the Government’s return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 30 sniper rifles approved during this period, however the figure given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 4080 sniper rifles exported to Ghana from the UK in that year.

*Both the Government's pivot reports and the returns to UNROCA are based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods. The reported quantities should therefore be consistent in both reports. However the two reports are compiled using different procedures and we have identified a technical error which has led to errors in a small number of cases, as explained below.*

*The figure of 20 sniper rifles in the Government's pivot reports is correct (under "Mil" 20 x 1 licence). The figure in the UNROCA report is incorrect. We have informed UNROCA of the discrepancy and they confirmed they will correct the Report.*

**Madagascar:** The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles and assault rifles approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 – Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 750 (+ one unspecified quantity) combat shotguns, 1100 rifles and 3850 assault rifles approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1300 combat shotguns, 1500 rifles and 5850 assault rifles exported to Madagascar from the UK in that year.

*Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.*

*We have reviewed the data and found the following:*

*For combat shotguns the correct figure is 1500 units. Under "Mil" the unspecified licence has been amended to 200 and this will show up in our next quarterly pivot release. Other licences to tally in the pivot report under "Mil" include 150 x 8 licences and 100 x 1 licence. We have amended our records and informed UNROCA of the discrepancy;*

*For rifles, both reports are correct and show a figure of 1500 units (tally under "Mil" 200 x 6 licences and 100 x 1 licence; under "Mil & Other" 100 x 2 licences);*

*For assault rifles, both reports are correct and show a figure of 5850 units (tally under "Mil" 150 x 1 licence, 200 x 3 licences; 300 x 2 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 450 x 1 licence, 600 x 5 licences; under "Mil and Other" 200 x 2 licences and 300 x 1 licence).*

**Maldives:** The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 – Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 360 combat shotguns, 1570 rifles, 4850 assault rifles and 380 pistols approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1350 combat shotguns, 4390 rifles, 10500 assault rifles and 1230 pistols exported to the Maldives from the UK in that year.

*Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.*

*We reviewed the data and found the figures in both the Government's pivot reports and*



*the UNROCA Report to be correct, as follows:*

*For combat shotguns, both reports show a figure of 1350 units (tally under "Mil" 150 x 8 licences, 100 x 1 licence, 50 x 1 licence)*

*For rifles, both reports show a figure of 4390 units (tally under "Mil" 40 x 1 licence, 100 x 5 licences, 150 x 3 licences, 200 x 6 licences, 300 x 2 licences; under "Mil and Other" 100 x 16 licences)*

*For assault rifles, both reports show a figure of 10,500 units (tally under "Mil" 100 x 2 licences, 150 x 2 licences; 200 x 1 licences, 300 x 1 licences, 350 x 2 licences, 400 x 1 licence, 450 x 3 licences, 600 x 4 licences, 700 x 1 licence, 750 x 1 licence; under "Mil and Other" 200 x 16 licences)*

*For pistols, both reports show a figure of 1230 units (tally under "Mil" 30 x 6 licences, 50 x 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil & Other" 50 x 16 licences)*

**Mauritius:** The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 – Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 560 combat shotguns, 3434 rifles, 6743 assault rifles and 565 pistols approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1354 combat shotguns, 5408 rifles, 10978 assault rifles and 1560 pistols exported to Mauritius from the UK in that year.

*Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.*

*We reviewed the data and found the figures in both the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA Report to be correct, as follows:*

*For combat shotguns, both reports show a figure of 1354 units (tally under "Mil" 50 X 1 licence, 150 x 6 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 4 x 1 licence for smoothbore weapon. Please note UNROCA do not have a smoothbore weapon category and it was therefore added as a combat shotgun to ensure it was reported);*

*For rifles, both reports show a figure of 5408 units (tally under "Mil" 3 x 1 licence, 5 x 1 licence, 6 x 1 licence, 40 x 1 licence, 100 x 3 licences, 150 x 1 licence, 200 x 5 licence, 204 x 1 licence, 300 x 2 licences, 800 x 1 licence; under "Mil and Other" 100 x 23 licences);*

*For assault rifles, both reports show a figure of 10978 units (tally under "Mil" 9 x 1 licence, 100 x 3 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 300 x 3 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 569 x 1 licence, 600 x 4 licences, 700 x 1 licence, 800 x 1 licence; under "Mil and Other" section 175 x 2 licences, 200 x 19 licences, 400 x 1 licence);*

*For pistols, both reports show a figure of 1560 units (tally under "Mil" 30 x 6 licences, 50 x 1 licence, 80 x 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil and Other" 50 x 21 licences).*

**Oman:** The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot reports for the number of combat shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 – Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot

reports indicate that there were SIELs for 1320 combat shotguns, 3575 rifles, 6441 assault rifles and 1151 pistols (+one unspecified quantity) approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 1600 combat shotguns, 6270 rifles, 12957 assault rifles and 2245 pistols exported to Oman from the UK in that year.

*Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.*

*We have reviewed the data and found the following:*

*For combat shotguns, the figures in the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA report are correct. Both reports show a figure of 1600 units (tally under "Mil" 50 X 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences, 150 x 5 licences, and 200 x 3 licences);*

*For rifles, the figure of 6420 in the Government's pivot reports is correct (tally under "Mil" 40 x 1 licence, 50 x 1 licence, 100 x 7 licences, 150 x 3 licences, 200 x 8 licences; under "Mil & Other" 80 x 1 licence, 100 x 35 licences). The figure in the UNROCA report is incorrect. We have informed UNROCA of the discrepancy and they confirmed they will make the necessary corrections;*

*For assault rifles, the figure of 13107 in the Government's pivot reports is correct (tally under "Mil" 7 x 1 licence, 100 x 5 licences, 150 x 4 licences, 200 x 3 licences, 300 x 3 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 400 x 1 licence, 600 x 4 licences; under "Mil & Other" 100 x 1 licence, 175 x 2 licences, 200 x 33 licences, 300 x 1 licence). The figure in the UNROCA report is incorrect. We have informed UNROCA of the discrepancy and they confirmed they will make the necessary corrections;*

*For pistols, both reports show a figure of 2245 units (tally under "Mil" 2 X 1 licence, 4 x 1 licence, 19 x 1 licence, 30 x 3 licences, 50 x 1 licence, 80 x 1 licence and 100 x 2 licences; under "Mil & Other" 50 x 36 licences).*

**South Africa:** The Committees would like an explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the pivot reports for the number of shotguns, rifles, assault rifles and pistols approved for export in the Pivot reports for the Q1 2010 – Q4 2012 and the Government's return to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UNROCA) for 2012. The pivot reports indicate that there were SIELs for 487 shotguns, 3700 rifles, 6545 assault rifles and 810 pistols approved during this period, however the figures given in the UNROCA report for 2012 lists a total of 950 shotguns, 5501 rifles, 10319 assault rifles and 1352 pistols exported to South Africa from the UK in that year.

*Please see the Government's response to your question for Ghana on the type of data we report to UNROCA being based on the quantities of small arms licensed in the specified periods.*

*We reviewed the data and found the figures in both the Government's pivot reports and the UNROCA Report to be correct, as follows:*

*For shotguns, both reports have a figure of 950 units (tally under "Mil" 50 X 1 licence and 150 x 6 licences);*

*For rifles, both reports have a figure of 5501 units (tally under "Mil" 1 X 1 licence, 100 x 6 licences, 150 x 2 licences, 200 x 6 licences, 350 x 2 licences, 1000 x 1 licence; under "Mil &*

*Other” 100 x 17 licences);*

*For assault rifles, both reports have a figure of 10319 units (tally under “Mil” 2 X 1 licence, 10 x 1 licence, 12 x 1 licence, 20 x 1 licence, 100 x 3 licences, 150 x 6 licences, 200 x 2 licences, 300 x 2 licences, 350 x 1 licence, 400x 1 licence, 450 x 1 licence, 500 x 1 licence, 800 x 1 licence and 600 x 3 licences; under “Mil & Other” 175 x 1 licence, 200 x 12 licences and 300 x 4 licences);*

*For pistols, both reports have a figure of 1352 units (tally under “Mil” 1 X 1 licence, 4 x 1 licence, 23 x 1 licence, 30 x 4 licences, 44 x 1 licence, 50 x 2 licences, 55 x 1 licence, 100 x 2 licences; under “Mil & Other” 5 x 1 licence and 50 x 16 licences).*

## Annex 2: The Committees' questions on the Government's Strategic Export Controls Annual Report (HC 561) published in July 2013 and the Government's answers

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The text of the letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Chairman of the Committees dated 29 October 2013 reproducing the Committees' questions on the Government's *United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Report 2011* (HC 337) and providing the Government's answers was as follows:

Thank you for your letter of 12 September enclosing questions on the Government's *Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2012*. It is my pleasure to forward to the Committees the attached response, agreed with other relevant Departments, which addresses the questions in the Annex to your letter.

The Government remains committed to addressing the Committees' concerns in a transparent and timely fashion. We welcome the rigorous scrutiny by the Committees and their vital work on strategic export controls. I look forward to giving Oral Evidence before the Committees again in January.

Note: The Committees' questions are in normal type and the Government's answers are in bold italic type.

The paragraph numbers follow those in the Government's Report

### **Ministerial Foreword**

- a) What were each of the six occasions in 2012 when the use of the export licence suspension mechanism was considered, and why in each case was it decided not to invoke it?

***The use of the suspension mechanism was readied on several occasions in response to a change in circumstances in Mali, Ethiopia, Syria, Maldives, Egypt and Israel. However in each case it was not necessary to use the suspension mechanism as, within a short time of the initial crisis, the Government was able to gather sufficient information to make valid risk assessments against the Consolidated Criteria.***

- b) Please provide the Committees with the country risk categorisations used in assessing export licence applications.

***The Government's position remains as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 12 November, that it would not be in the national interest for the Government to provide the information requested by the Committees. Officials would however be available to brief the Committees orally on the risk categorisation process.***

- c) Please state, on a classified basis if necessary, which countries are placed in each risk category.

***The Government's position remains as stated in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 12 November 2012, that it would not be in the national interest for the Government to provide the information requested by the Committees.***

- d) How many open licence applications were processed in 2012?  
***A full breakdown of applications processed for both Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) and Open Individual Trade Control Licences (OITCLs) is provided in Tables 4.3 (OIELs) and Table 4.5 (OITCLs) of the 2012 Annual Report. 318 OIELs were processed and 25 OITCLs.***
- e) How many MoD Form 680 applications were processed in 2012?  
***The Government processed 3098 MOD Form 680 applications in 2012.***
- f) Do the Secretaries of State accept that though their statement: "There was no evidence of any UK-supplied equipment being used for internal repression" may be factually correct, it is also profoundly misleading given that for many of the goods for which Government export licence approval has been given and which could be used for internal repression it is totally or virtually impossible to obtain evidence about their use once exported — even in the unlikely case there are independent personnel on the ground in a position to provide such evidence? Such exported goods, non-identifiable as British once exported, that could be used for internal repression include components for military equipment, software for military use, military technology, cryptographic equipment, components and technology, dual-use chemicals, ammunition and most sniper rifles and automatic weapons?  
***The Government has acknowledged in previous correspondence that we cannot prove conclusively that UK exports have not been diverted from the legitimate end use stated in the licence application and been used for internal repression. But we do not accept that it is misleading to state that there is no evidence of such misuse. Exports of all UK controlled goods are only permitted if, after a thorough assessment, there is no clear risk that they might be used for internal repression. Any evidence of the misuse of similar non-UK supplied goods in the end user destination is factored into this assessment. The UK does not implement a US-style system of end-use monitoring since we do not claim the same extra-territorial rights and we focus on rigorous pre-licence checks and, for open licences, compliance audits carried out at the exporters' premises in the UK.***
- g) At the end of the Secretaries of State's statement that: "There was no evidence of any UK-supplied equipment being used for internal repression or in any other way which would contravene the export licensing Criteria" why were the words "or which might be used to facilitate internal repression" omitted, in accordance with the Foreign Secretary's policy statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012?  
***Please refer to the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 October which clarifies this point.***
- h) How is the Secretaries of State's statement that "43 licences for Argentina were subsequently revoked but the licensing of exports for purely commercial or private use has continued" to be reconciled with the Government's approval after the 43 licence revocations in 2012 of export licences to Argentina for SIELs for small arms

ammunition, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography and OIELs for cryptographic equipment.

*All licences for Argentina issued after 26 April 2012 took into account the policy announced by the Business Secretary on that date as well as the Consolidated Criteria. This is addressed in detail on pages 7 and 17 of the Annual Report. Licences for the equipment quoted above were for commercial and private end use.*

- i) Please list each new set of EU sanctions on Iran being referred to, and the specific licensing changes made by the present Government, or its predecessor, following each new set of sanctions.

*A list of the amendments to EU sanctions on Iran that were implemented in 2012 is given below. More details of the specifics of these amendments can be found at [http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf). The relevant UK legislation is the The Export Control (Iran Sanctions) Order 2012 as referred to in the Annual Report*

*(<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/1243/article/4/made>). Detailed information on how export licensing applications are assessed is provided in Annex A of the Annual Report. Our international obligations under EU sanctions regimes are considered as part of the assessment under Criterion 1 of the Consolidated Criteria.*

**COUNCIL REGULATION (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 amended by:**

**Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 350/2012 of 23 April 2012**

**Council Regulation (EU) No 708/2012 of 2 August 2012**

**Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 709/2012 of 2 August 2012**

**Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 945/2012 of 15 October 2012**

**Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1016/2012 of 6 November 2012**

**Council Regulation (EU) No 1067/2012 of 14 November 2012**

**Council Regulation (EU) No 1263/2012 of 21 December 2012**

**Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1264/2012 of 21 December 2012**

**COUNCIL DECISION 2010/413/CFSP of 26 July 2010 amended by:**

**Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP of 23 January 2012**

**Council Decision 2012/152/CFSP of 15 March 2012**

**Council Decision 2012/169/CFSP of 23 March 2012**

**Council Decision 2012/205/CFSP of 23 April 2012**

**Council Decision 2012/457/CFSP of 2 August 2012**

***Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP of 15 October 2012***

***Council Decision 2012/687/CFSP of 6 November 2012***

**Section 1 UK and EU Policy Developments in 2012**

**Paragraph 1.1 Legislation**

- a) What UK and/or EU export controls are currently in place over the export of pancuronium bromide to the USA for the use in executions by lethal injection?

***As stated in both the Government's response to the Committees' questions on the Government's Annual Report for 2011 (Section 1, paragraph 1.3 (a)), and in the Annual Report for 2012, the UK control on the export to the United States of the drug pancuronium bromide was made permanent on 16 April 2012. There are no EU controls on the export of this drug to the USA.***

- b) Has the EU's analysis of the responses to the consultation on the EU Commission's Green Paper, "The dual-use export control system of the European Union: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world", been published? If so, please provide the link to the analysis and inform the Committees of any responses the Government made to it.

***A link was provided in the Government's response to the Committees' Annual Report for 2012 (Cm 8707). The Government does not intend to make any formal response to this document.***

- c) When does the Government now expect the EU Commission's Report on Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 (the so-called "Dual-use Regulation") to be made to the EU Council and the European Parliament? Please inform the Committees of any response the Government makes to that Report when published.

***We expect the report to be submitted before the end of the year. Should we make a formal response to that report we will of course provide a copy to the Committees.***

- d) Has the EU Commission now commenced its review of Council Regulation (EC) 1236/2005 (the so-called "Torture Regulation)? Please inform the Committees of any response the Government makes to this review.

***Please see the Government's response to Recommendation 43 of the Committees' Annual Report for 2012 (Cm 8707).***

**Paragraph 1.2 Policy Developments**

- a) Why is the Department for International Development, unlike the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, not asked for its advice before the final decision to suspend export licences is taken by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills?

***The Department for International Development is asked for its advice when the suspension mechanism is being considered and should have been referred to in the Annual Report.***

- b) What current risks, in addition to “WMD, political, security and human rights”, are included in the Government’s new risk categorisation of countries to whom military goods may be exported?  
***The Government considers all relevant risks in particular those highlighted in the Consolidated Criteria.***
- c) Please provide the Committees with a copy of the revised Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Human Rights Guidance as soon as this is published.  
***The Government will do so when the revised Guidance is finalised, as stated in Cm 8707, its Response to the Committees’ Annual Report.***
- d) The Government’s Report states that all proposals from Government sponsors to gift controlled goods are assessed against the Consolidated Criteria in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour. Please confirm therefore that all proposals to gift controlled goods are assessed not only against the UK’s Consolidated Criteria but also against the Foreign Secretary’s policy statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012 that the export would not be permitted of controlled goods “which might be used to facilitate internal repression”.  
***Please refer to the Foreign Secretary’s letter of 6 October. The statement in the Annual Report is correct.***
- e) Why are companies who are being assessed for counter-piracy Open General Trade Licences or Individual Trade Control Licences not being assessed against the Foreign Secretary’s policy statement to the Committees on 7 February 2012 that the export would not be permitted of controlled goods “which might be used to facilitate internal repression”, as well as against the UK’s Consolidated Criteria?  
***Please refer to the Foreign Secretary’s letter of 6 October, which confirms that our policy is to assess against the Consolidated Criteria.***

### Paragraph 1.3 Transparency and Accountability

- a) The Government’s Report, published on 12 July 2013, states: “It is intended that the first reports of open licence usage would be published, in line with standard practice, 3 months after the end of the Quarter to which they relate, i.e., October 2013.” However, on 18 July the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, Vince Cable, stated in the House: “I have none the less established that we should dispense with some procedures relating to quarterly reporting, and we will do so.” This was followed by a Notice to Exporters issued by ECO on 31 July 2013 stating that: “the Secretary of State announced to Parliament on Thursday 18 July 2013 that reporting requirements on the use of Open Licences under the Transparency Initiative would be scaled back significantly”. Why did the Government announce in the House of Commons on 18 July a less transparent policy on open licence usage than that set out in its Annual Report published 6 days previously?

***Plans are reviewed regularly to ensure that we have the right balance between the benefits of greater transparency and minimising the burdens on business. In making the final preparations for the launch of the Transparency Initiative we reviewed its scope and the potential for it to impose unacceptable burdens on business. The***



*original proposals did not strike that balance and, as soon as this was established, a statement was made in the House on 18 July. This statement superseded any previous statements made.*

*Although the annual report was published in July 2013 it is intended to be a report of the Government's strategic export control policy and practice during the 2012 calendar year. Occasionally it will be appropriate to make reference to events in 2013, such as the adoption by the UN of the Arms Trade Treaty; however these references will always be the exception rather than the rule. The statements in the 2012 Annual Report regarding the Transparency Initiative are a true reflection of the Government's actions and intent during 2012. In any event, the final version of the annual report was cleared by Ministers at the end of June and submitted to the publishers on 4 July 2013. This was the cut off point for making changes to the report and still ensuring we laid it in Parliament before summer recess.*

- a) Will the Government make public the same information relating to standard licence usage as it now going to do for open licence usage?

*We have no plans at this time to extend reporting to actual usage of standard licences.*

#### Paragraph 1.4 Awareness

- a) Will the Government be publishing on the Export Control Organisation's website entities of potential WMD concern in countries in addition to Iran, for instance Syria?

*The Government has no immediate plans to publish any additional information about entities of potential WMD concern in countries in addition to Iran. We will continue to publish the information for Iran.*

- b) With regard to the Government's updated website, what are the specific usability improvements that have been put in place, what are the ones in the pipeline in addition to better navigation, and when will the additional facility to identify which Open General Trade Control Licences may be applicable be in place?

*The Government Digital Service (GDS) within the Cabinet Office is responsible for transforming government digital services including the design and development of GOV.UK. Further information about the projects involved is available on the Cabinet Office website <http://digital.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/projects/>*

*The Export Control Organisation (ECO) is working closely with GDS to refine and condense the amount of export control policy and licence application information to further improve search results. ECO has recently launched: <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/export-control-organisation> to enable exporters to readily establish whether a licence is required and how to apply. This ECO Landing Page web address will feature on all future ECO promotional material.*

*ECO plans to make further improvements to the OGEL Checker tool to better enable exporters to identify appropriate OGTLs and OGELs. Technical and budget issues have prevented further work at this time but we will revisit this in the New Year.*

## **Section 2 International Policy in 2012**

Why are there no sub-sections on:

1. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
2. The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
3. The Chemical Weapons Convention
4. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
5. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
6. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
7. Sub-Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons
8. A Middle-East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone
9. The National Counter-Proliferation Strategy for 2012–2015

all of which raise proliferation issues?

Will the Government include its policies on all the above in their 2013 Annual Report?

*The Annual Report is intended to highlight the Government's work on export controls, not the whole range of its work on proliferation issues. The Government does not intend to include contributions on all these issues in its 2013 Annual Report although it may do so on a case-by-case basis where there have been significant developments relevant to export controls. The Government regularly provides public information on proliferation issues. The subjects listed above have been covered in some depth in the Government's Response to the Committees' Annual Report published on 8 October and most, if not all, of these issues have been the subject of previous correspondence with the Committees which is readily (and freely) available in the public domain to parliamentarians, media and other interested parties.*

### **Paragraph 2.2 Small Arms and Light Weapons**

- a) What progress has been made in enhancing the implementation of the International Tracing Instrument to promote international co-operation in marking and tracing illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons?

*The UN Programme of Action Review Conference held in August 2012 agreed an Implementation Plan for the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) for the period 2012-2018. At the Review Conference, States resolved to increase their efforts to achieve full and effective implementation of the ITI. More details about the Implementation Plan can be found at <http://www.poa-iss.org/RevCon2/Documents/RevCon-DOC/CRP3-ITI-IP.pdf>*

- b) Has a voluntary sponsorship fund to boost assistance to less developed states in dealing with illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons been established? If so, what is the size of the fund and what amount has the British Government contributed to it?

*A voluntary fund to boost assistance to less developed states in dealing with illicit small arms and light weapons has been established. The UK has pledged to donate £100,000 to the United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR) and has allocated a further £250,000 to fund projects devoted*

***to supporting ATT implementation. The EU will also provide considerable funding to support ATT implementation.***

#### Paragraph 2.3 Cluster Munitions

Is the UK Government still on track to destroy the remainder of its cluster munitions by the end of 2013?

***Yes, as stated at the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Lusaka in September.***

#### Paragraph 2.4 Ottawa Treaty/Landmines

What is the area of land in the Falkland Islands that is still to be cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance and then released?

***There are around 20,000 landmines remaining, covering an area of approximately 20km<sup>2</sup>.***

#### Paragraph 2.6 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

What were the Government's policy objectives at the meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons held in November 2012 and how far have these objectives been achieved? Does the Government consider that any additions should be made to the existing five protocols which are as follows:

- Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments
- Protocol II on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices
- Protocol III on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons
- Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons
- Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War

***The UK's main objective at the November 2012 meeting was to support Australia in maintaining dialogue on practical measures to combat the unlawful manufacture and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) under Protocol II. The UK delivered an expert presentation on its Counter-IED approach at the conference. Our work with Australia is continuing in advance of this year's meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention in November.***

***More broadly, the UK's main objective remains to encourage the universalisation of the Convention and to achieve adherence to the existing protocols. The Government is not currently considering any additions to these protocols.***

#### Paragraph 2.10 The Wassenaar Arrangement

What are the specific issues relating to the future membership of the Wassenaar Arrangement at which participating states will be looking at in 2013?

***The Government's Response to the Committees' Annual Report (Cm 8707) and the Foreign Secretary's letter of 8 April provided an update on membership issues. The***

***General Working Group is being held on 21-24 October and the Plenary will be held in December. We will update the Committees in 2014.***

### **Section 3 Export Licensing Case Studies**

#### **Argentina**

Why was the value of arms export licences to Argentina in 2012 nearly 5 times greater than it was in 2011, notwithstanding the fact that in April 2012 the Business Secretary announced that the Government would no longer grant licences for any military or dual-use goods and technology for military end-users in Argentina, other than in exceptional circumstances?

***The value of export licences issued for military list goods was several times smaller in 2012 than in 2011 as a result of the policy specifically directed at military end users. The export of dual-use and military list goods to civil and commercial end users was unaffected by the policy.***

#### **Libya**

In deciding whether or not to approve arms export licence applications to Libya what account is the Government taking of the Report of Experts to the UN on 9 March 2013 of what has happened to the Gaddafi arms stockpiles, to which the UK was a contributor? The Experts' Report stated: "The proliferation of weapons from Libya has continued at a worrying rate and has spread into new territory: West Africa, the Levant and, potentially, even the Horn of Africa. Since the uprising and the resulting collapse of the security apparatus, including the loss of national control over weapons stockpiles and the absence of any border controls, Libya has over the past two years become a significant and attractive source of weaponry in the region. Illicit flows from the country are fuelling existing conflicts in Africa and the Levant and enriching the arsenals of a range of non-State actors, including terrorist groups."

***The Government takes into account reports from a wide variety of sources including the UN when assessing export licensing applications. Criterion 7 of the Consolidated Criteria requires the Government to assess the risk of diversion and this is something we take account of for Libya, as with all destinations worldwide.***

### **Section 4 Export Licensing Data and Performance Against Targets During 2012**

#### **Paragraph 4.6 Open General Export Licences (OGELs)**

If a UK exporter's application satisfies the terms of an EU General Export Authorisation, is it the Government's policy that it must also satisfy the terms of the UK's Consolidated Criteria and the Foreign Secretary's arms export policy statement to the Committees on Arms Export Controls on 7 February 2012 before being approved?

***The EU General Export Authorisations (EU GEA) are the EU equivalent of UK OGELs and are available for use by any exporter in the EU provided they can meet the terms of that Authorisation. UK exporters do not make an "application" for an EU GEA and we do not "approve" their use of it. Instead, any UK exporter wishing to use an EU GEA must register with the Export Control Organisation and will be subject to our compliance procedures. The scope of the EU GEAs was agreed by all Member States including the UK: EU GEAs do not cover any export that the Government would not***

*have been content to cover under an OGEL. Please also refer to the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 October.*

Table 4.7 List of Open General Export Licences

Which is the country or countries of export destination for the OGELs named:

- Chemicals
- Cryptographic Development
- International Non-Proliferation Regime De-controls: Dual-Use Items
- Low Value Shipments
- Technology for Dual-Use Items
- Specified Dual-Use Items (X) (and what is the meaning of (X)?)
- Access Overseas to Software and Technology for Military Goods: Individual Use Only
- Military Components
- Military Goods
- Software and Source Code for Military Goods
- Military Surplus Vehicles
- Technology for Military Goods
- Open General Transshipment Licence
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Trade and Transportation: Small Arms and Light Weapons)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Certified Companies)
- Open General Trade Control Licence (Exports Under The US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty)

*All Open General Licences, including the permitted destination lists, are available to view and download on the gov.uk website (<https://www.gov.uk/dual-use-open-general-export-licences-explained>, <https://www.gov.uk/military-goods-ogels>, <https://www.gov.uk/open-general-trade-control-licences> and <https://www.gov.uk/transshipment-licences>). In reviewing these licences it is important that each Open General Licence is considered in its entirety taking into account the items that may be exported and the specific terms and conditions of that licence, including any limitations on end-use or end-user, rather than looking at the permitted country lists in isolation.*

*The Committees may also wish to note that the Open Licence for Certified Companies is an OGEL, not an OGTCL as stated.*

*The title of the 12th OGEL in Table 4.7 is 'OGEL (X)'. The additional description 'specified dual-use items' is intended to be self-explanatory. This particular OGEL was introduced to allow the export of the least sensitive dual-use items.*

Paragraph 4.7 Performance in processing licence applications

- a) Why do performance targets not apply to applications for licences to export goods that are subject to control solely because of United Nations Sanctions or to appeals in relation to such applications?

*Licence applications and appeals relating to sanctions are often particularly complex and therefore difficult to assess, especially where it is necessary to determine whether the proposed export is subject to an exemption in the sanctions. In addition, in many cases it is necessary to seek prior approval from the relevant UN sanctions committee before granting the licence and this adds to the time required to process the licence application or appeal.*

- b) In Table 4.10 what are the reasons for the deterioration of appeals finalised within both 20 working days and 60 working days over the period 2010–2012?

*Appeals performance in 2012 was affected by the same factors that led to the reduction in performance from 2010 to 2011 and described in the Government's response to the Committees' questions on the Government's Annual Report for 2011.*

- c) What actions are being taken to achieve the target of processing 60% of appeals within 20 working days (currently 23%) and 95% of appeals within 60 working days (currently 60%)?

*We are working to improve response times to appeals against a backdrop of increasing numbers of export licence applications and finite resources. We have recently refocused resources to bring about an improvement.*

## **Section 5 Compliance and Performance**

### **Paragraph 5.1 Compliance**

What are the reasons why the number of warning letters where breaches of licence conditions were found during visits rose from 45 in 2011 to 101 on 2012?

*There are a number of reasons why the number of warning letters will vary from year to year, not least the complex nature of compliance audits themselves. It is too early to tell whether the increase is due to a trend of increasing non-compliance. We continue to explore ways of improving our compliance procedures to support businesses that have been found to be non-compliant.*

### **Paragraph 5.2 Enforcement activity undertaken by HM Revenue and Customs, Border Force and the Crown Prosecution Service**

Is the increase in the number of seizures of strategic goods in breach of licensing requirements or sanctions and embargoes from 141 in 2011–12 to 280 in 2012–13 due to increased effectiveness of the authorities or to increased attempts to breach the licensing requirements or both?

*The Government believes this increase is the result of a combination of factors.*

- *The range of goods in scope has increased steadily over the last few years as a result of the introduction of new sanctions, for example those directed against Iran and Syria, and other new strategic export regulations and restrictions. These developments increase the potential for greater non-compliance through accident (lack of awareness of the new rules) or design. This appears to be supported by the general increase in the number of voluntary disclosures, 'no further action' and*

*warning letters we have issued in recent years, and also a general increase in the number of ‘technical’ offences we have encountered.*

- *The increase in results has also been achieved by good strategic analysis by HMRC which has considerably improved the national picture of the most sensitive commodities and ports of highest risk. Expanded training and development of Border Force front line staff has also resulted in heightened awareness of strategic export control risks and increased front-line activity.*

*The Government, in line with previous answers to the Committees, attributes the majority of seizures to administrative errors on the part of exporters. The Government has no reason to believe there has been an increase in wilful non-compliance by exporters.*

### **Section 6 Gifted Equipment**

The Government’s Report states: “As a matter of policy, all proposals to gift controlled military equipment are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria by relevant Government departments in the same way as commercial applications and to the same degree of rigour.” Why are Government gifts of military equipment not also being assessed against the Foreign Secretary’s policy statement to the Committees on Arms Export Controls on 7 February 2012 that exports would not be permitted of goods “which might be used to facilitate internal repression”?

*Please refer to the Foreign Secretary’s letter of 6 October which clarifies this point.*

### **Section 7 Government to Government**

What is the policy followed in deciding whether or not to approve UK export licensing coverage for either industry or the customer in Government to Government exports?

*The consideration of Export Licence Applications for exports under government-to-government arrangements is the same as for any other application. An Export Licence Application must be submitted to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, which is assessed in the usual manner against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria by advisory Departments, including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence.*

### **Annex D UK Return to EU Annual Report 2012**

- a) In future UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports will the Government include in this Annex a description of each of the numbered EU Common Military List categories?

*The numbered categories of the EU Common Military List are essentially the same as the categories of the UK Military List. The current version of the EU Common Military List can be found here <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:090:0001:0037:EN:PDF>*

- b) Does the government make a UK Return to the EU Annual Report in respect of items on the EU Dual-Use List? If so, will the Government include its Return in this Annex?  
*No such return is required for the EU Annual Report.*

## **Annex E International Commitments and Sanctions Regimes**

### **E.1 Export Control Commitments in 2012**

Will the Government in its subsequent Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports include the year in which each Commitment was concluded?

*Yes.*



## Annex 3: The Committees' letters to and from Ministers

The letters listed below can be read in full in Volume III of this Report at the evidence references shown, and constitutes the CAEC's correspondence with Ministers since the last Report (HC 205) published on 10 May 2013 until 30 June 2014.

Date	From	To	Subject	Evidence reference
19/06/2013	Chairman	David Cameron	Arms for Syrian opposition	EV w138
02/07/2013	William Hague	Chairman	Illegal arms shipments	EV w139
02/07/2013	Vince Cable	Chairman	Extant licences - validation of figures	EV w139
07/07/2013	Michael Fallon	Chairman	Arms for anti-piracy	EV w140
11/07/2013	William Hague	Chairman	Arms for Syrian opposition	EV w141
15/07/2013	William Hague	Chair of Public Accounts Committee	Gifting equipment to Syria	EV w142
30/07/2013	Vince Cable	Chairman	Pre-Government response - Egypt revocations, Transparency initiative, OGEL licences, Register of brokers	EV w145
22/08/2013	Chairman	William Hague	Balance of Competencies Review	EV w148
09/09/2013	Chairman	Vince Cable	Syria dual-use chemical exports	EV w148
10/09/2013	Vince Cable	Chairman	Syria, Egypt and DSEi update	EV w153
11/09/2013	Chairman	Vince Cable	Syria dual-use chemical exports	EV w155
12/09/2013	Chairman	William Hague	CAEC questions on Government Annual Report on Strategic Exports	EV w155
17/09/2013	William Hague	Chairman	Balance of Competencies Review	EV w162
04/10/2013	Vince Cable	Chairman	Syria dual-use chemical exports	EV w162
06/10/2013	William Hague	Chairman	Consolidated Criteria for arms exports	EV w172
11/10/2013	Vince Cable	Chairman	Syria dual-use chemical exports	EV w173
14/10/2013	Chairman	William Hague	CAEC not included in letter regarding arms exports to Syria	EV w173
21/10/2013	William Hague	Chairman	CAEC not included in letter regarding arms exports to Syria	EV w175
23/10/2013	Chairman	Vince Cable	Syria dual-use chemical exports - company names	EV w176
25/10/2013	Vince Cable	Chairman	Syria dual-use chemical	EV w177

Date	From	To	Subject	Evidence reference
			exports - company names	
29/10/2013	William Hague	Chairman	CAEC questions on Government Annual Report	EV w177
25/11/2013	Chairman	Clerk of the House	Freedom of Information application	EV w191
28/11/2013	Clerk of the House	Chairman	Freedom of Information application	EV w191
02/12/2013	Michael Fallon	Chairman	CAEC Westminster Hall debate follow-up	EV w192
16/12/2013	Michael Fallon	Chairman	CAEC Westminster Hall debate follow-up	EV w194
06/01/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Prior to evidence session	EV w194
06/01/2014	William Hague & Vince Cable	Chairman	Government policy on internal repression and arms exports	EV w197
06/01/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Government policy on internal repression and arms exports	EV w197
20/01/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Syria dual-use chemical exports - company names	EV w199
03/02/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Syria dual-use chemical exports - company names	EV w199
13/02/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Balance of Competences report	EV w201
26/02/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Overseas Security and Justice Assistance and arms exports	EV w201
27/02/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Iran – Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	EV w202
06/03/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Syria dual-use chemical exports - company names	EV w203
11/03/2014	Hugh Robertson	Chairman	Evidence session	EV w204
11/03/2014	Chairman	Hugh Robertson	Evidence session	EV w205
20/03/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Iran – Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	EV w205
25/03/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Arms Trade Treaty	EV w206
26/03/2014	Hugh Robertson	Chairman	Evidence session	EV w206
02/04/2014	Chairman	Hugh Robertson	Evidence session	EV w207
03/04/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Arms Trade Treaty	EV w208
10/04/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Extant licences information request	EV w209
16/04/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Trade fair legal proceedings	EV w210
17/04/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Request for list of revoked licences	EV w211
17/04/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Priority Markets List	EV w211
17/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Balance of Competencies letter	EV w213
17/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Gifting equipment letter	EV w214
17/04/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty	EV w214

Date	From	To	Subject	Evidence reference
24/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	OECD & G4S	EV w215
24/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Government policy on internal repression and arms exports	EV w215
24/04/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Ukraine - suspended licences	EV w216
24/04/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Egypt - suspended licences	EV w216
24/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Russia - suspended licences	EV w217
24/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Syrian dual-use chemicals Declaration	EV w217
24/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Ukraine - sniper rifles	EV w220
24/04/2014	Chairman	Justine Greening	DFID and arms export controls	EV w221
27/04/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Balance of competencies and Syrian gifting letters	EV w222
28/04/2014	Chairman	William Hague	Barrel bombs	EV w222
28/04/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Consolidated Criteria for arms exports	EV w222
29/04/2014	Hugh Robertson	Chairman	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Report	EV w223
08/05/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Syrian dual-use chemicals Declaration	EV w235
08/05/2014	Alan Duncan	Chairman	DFID and arms export controls	EV w236
09/05/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Government policy on internal repression and arms exports	EV w236
09/05/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Kurdistan end-user licences	EV w237
12/05/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Extant licences information request	EV w239
12/05/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	UAVs	EV w474
12/05/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Counter-piracy licences	EV w474
14/05/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Egypt, Ukraine and Russia suspended licences, Ukraine sniper rifles, OECD & G4S, Consolidated Criteria for arms exports	EV w474
19/05/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Barrel Bombs	EV w490
20/05/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Missing letters	EV w491
20/05/2014	Chairman	Justine Greening	Report response follow-up	EV w492
04/06/2014	William Hague	Chairman	Syrian dual-use chemicals Declaration	EV w492
06/06/2014	Alan Duncan	Chairman	DFID and arms export controls	EV w494
06/06/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	UAVs, anti-piracy, DSEi, revocations, UK-US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty	EV w499
12/6/2014	Chairman	Vince Cable	Revocations discrepancy	EV w505
19/6/2014	Michael Fallon	Chairman	ECO processing	EV w506
27/6/2014	Michael Fallon	Chairman	ECO processing	EV w507
30/06/2014	Vince Cable	Chairman	Revocations discrepancy	EV w508



## Annex 4: EU Council Common Position (2008/944/CFSP)

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### COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008

defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty of the European Union, and in particular Article 15 thereof,

Whereas:

(1) Member States intend to build on the Common Criteria agreed at the Luxembourg and Lisbon European Councils in 1991 and 1992, and on the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council in 1998.

(2) Member States recognise the special responsibility of military technology and equipment exporting States.

(3) Member States are determined to set high common standards which shall be regarded as the minimum for the management of, and restraint in, transfers of military technology and equipment by all Member States, and to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater transparency.

(4) Member States are determined to prevent the export of military technology and equipment which might be used for internal repression or international aggression or contribute to regional instability.

(5) Member States intend to reinforce cooperation and to promote convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

(6) Complementary measures have been taken against illicit transfers, in the form of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms.

(7) The Council adopted on 12 July 2002 Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP on the European Union's contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons.

(8) The Council adopted on 23 June 2003 Common Position 2003/468/CFSP (2) on the control of arms brokering.

(9) The European Council adopted in December 2003 a strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in December 2005 a strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, which

imply an increased common interest of Member States of the European Union in a coordinated approach to the control of exports of military technology and equipment.

(10) The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was adopted in 2001.

(11) The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was established in 1992.

(12) States have a right to transfer the means of self-defence, consistent with the right of self-defence recognised by the UN Charter.

(13) The wish of Member States to maintain a defence industry as part of their industrial base as well as their defence effort is acknowledged.

(14) The strengthening of a European defence technological and industrial base, which contributes to the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in particular the Common European Security and Defence Policy, should be accompanied by cooperation and convergence in the field of military technology and equipment.

(15) Member States intend to strengthen the European Union's export control policy for military technology and equipment through the adoption of this Common Position, which updates and replaces the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council on 8 June 1998.

(16) On 13 June 2000, the Council adopted the Common Military List of the European Union, which is regularly reviewed, taking into account, where appropriate, similar national and international lists.

(17) The Union must ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, in accordance with Article 3, second paragraph of the Treaty; in this respect the Council takes note of the Commission proposal to amend Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual use items and technology,

HAS ADOPTED THIS COMMON POSITION:

*Article 1*

1. Each Member State shall assess the export licence applications made to it for items on the EU Common Military List mentioned in Article 12 on a case-by-case basis against the criteria of Article 2.

2. The export licence applications as mentioned in paragraph 1 shall include:

- applications for licences for physical exports, including those for the purpose of licensed production of military equipment in third countries,
- applications for brokering licences,
- applications for 'transit' or 'transshipment' licences,

— applications for licences for any intangible transfers of software and technology by means such as electronic media, fax or telephone.

Member States' legislation shall indicate in which case an export licence is required with respect to these applications.

## *Article 2*

### **Criteria**

1. Criterion One: Respect for the international obligations and commitments of Member States, in particular the sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.

An export licence shall be denied if approval would be inconsistent with, *inter alia*:

(a) the international obligations of Member States and their commitments to enforce United Nations, European Union and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe arms embargoes;

(b) the international obligations of Member States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;

(c) the commitment of Member States not to export any form of anti-personnel landmine;

(d) the commitments of Member States in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

2. Criterion Two: Respect for human rights in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country of international humanitarian law.

— Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, Member States shall:

(a) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used for internal repression;

(b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the military technology or equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the United Nations, by the European Union or by the Council of Europe;

For these purposes, technology or equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, *inter alia*, technology or equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar technology or equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the technology or equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. In line with Article 1 of this Common Position, the nature of the technology or equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, *inter alia*, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary

detentions and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

— Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by instruments of international humanitarian law, Member States shall:

(c) deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military technology or equipment to be exported might be used in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law.

3. Criterion Three: Internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.

Member States shall deny an export licence for military technology or equipment which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.

4. Criterion Four: Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.

Member States shall deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the military technology or equipment to be exported aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.

When considering these risks, Member States shall take into account *inter alia*:

(a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;

(b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;

(c) the likelihood of the military technology or equipment being used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient;

(d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way.

5. Criterion Five: National security of the Member States and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.

Member States shall take into account:

(a) the potential effect of the military technology or equipment to be exported on their defence and security interests as well as those of Member State and those of friendly and allied countries, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect for human rights and on regional peace, security and stability;

(b) the risk of use of the military technology or equipment concerned against their forces or those of Member States and those of friendly and allied countries.

6. Criterion Six: Behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.



Member States shall take into account, *inter alia*, the record of the buyer country with regard to:

- (a) its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
- (b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, and with international humanitarian law;
- (c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in point (b) of Criterion One.

7. Criterion Seven: Existence of a risk that the military technology or equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.

In assessing the impact of the military technology or equipment to be exported on the recipient country and the risk that such technology or equipment might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end use, the following shall be considered:

- (a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any participation in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity;
- (b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use such technology or equipment;
- (c) the capability of the recipient country to apply effective export controls;
- (d) the risk of such technology or equipment being re-exported to undesirable destinations, and the record of the recipient country in respecting any re-export provision or consent prior to re-export which the exporting Member State considers appropriate to impose;
- (e) the risk of such technology or equipment being diverted to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists;
- (f) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.

8. Criterion Eight: Compatibility of the exports of the military technology or equipment with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should meet their legitimate security and defence needs with the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments.

Member States shall take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the proposed export would seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. They shall consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid.

#### *Article 3*

This Common Position shall not affect the right of Member States to operate more restrictive national policies.

#### *Article 4*

1. Member States shall circulate details of applications for export licences which have been denied in accordance with the criteria of this Common Position together with an

explanation of why the licence has been denied. Before any Member State grants a licence which has been denied by another Member State or States for an essentially identical transaction within the last three years, it shall first consult the Member State or States which issued the denial(s). If following consultations, the Member State nevertheless decides to grant a licence, it shall notify the Member State or States issuing the denial(s), giving a detailed explanation of its reasoning.

2. The decision to transfer or deny the transfer of any military technology or equipment shall remain at the national discretion of each Member State. A denial of a licence is understood to take place when the Member State has refused to authorise the actual sale or export of the military technology or equipment concerned, where a sale would otherwise have come about, or the conclusion of the relevant contract. For these purposes, a notifiable denial may, in accordance with national procedures, include denial of permission to start negotiations or a negative response to a formal initial enquiry about a specific order.

3. Member States shall keep such denials and consultations confidential and not use them for commercial advantage.

#### *Article 5*

Export licences shall be granted only on the basis of reliable prior knowledge of end use in the country of final destination. This will generally require a thoroughly checked end-user certificate or appropriate documentation and/or some form of official authorisation issued by the country of final destination.

When assessing applications for licences to export military technology or equipment for the purposes of production in third countries, Member States shall in particular take account of the potential use of the finished product in the country of production and of the risk that the finished product might be diverted or exported to an undesirable end user.

#### *Article 6*

Without prejudice to Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000, the criteria in Article 2 of this Common Position and the consultation procedure provided for in Article 4 are also to apply to Member States in respect of dual-use goods and technology as specified in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 where there are serious grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods and technology will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country.

References in this Common Position to military technology or equipment shall be understood to include such goods and technology.

#### *Article 7*

In order to maximise the effectiveness of this Common Position, Member States shall work within the framework of the CFSP to reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of exports of military technology and equipment.

*Article 8*

1. Each Member State shall circulate to other Member States in confidence an annual report on its exports of military technology and equipment and on its implementation of this Common Position.

2. An EU Annual Report, based on contributions from all Member States, shall be submitted to the Council and published in the 'C' series of the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

3. In addition, each Member State which exports technology or equipment on the EU Common Military List shall publish a national report on its exports of military technology and equipment, the contents of which will be in accordance with national legislation, as applicable, and will provide information for the EU Annual Report on the implementation of this Common Position as stipulated in the User's Guide.

*Article 9*

Member States shall, as appropriate, assess jointly through the CFSP framework the situation of potential or actual recipients of exports of military technology and equipment from Member States, in the light of the principles and criteria of this Common Position.

*Article 10*

While Member States, where appropriate, may also take into account the effect of proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, these factors shall not affect the application of the above criteria.

*Article 11*

Member States shall use their best endeavours to encourage other States which export military technology or equipment to apply the criteria of this Common Position. They shall regularly exchange experiences with those third states applying the criteria on their military technology and equipment export control policies and on the application of the criteria.

*Article 12*

Member States shall ensure that their national legislation enables them to control the export of the technology and equipment on the EU Common Military List. The EU Common Military List shall act as a reference point for Member States' national military technology and equipment lists, but shall not directly replace them.

*Article 13*

The User's Guide to the European Code of Conduct on Exports of Military Equipment, which is regularly reviewed, shall serve as guidance for the implementation of this Common Position.

*Article 14*

This Common Position shall take effect on the date of its adoption.

*Article 15*

This Common Position shall be reviewed three years after its adoption.

*Article 16*

This Common Position shall be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

Done at Brussels, 8 December 2008.<sup>539</sup>

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<sup>539</sup> European Council, EU COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, December 2008

## Annex 5: The UK Consolidated Criteria (2000–2014)

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The Consolidated Criteria are the consolidation of the UK's national criteria and the 1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

In a Written Answer (dated 26 October 2000, cols 199–203W) Peter Hain, the then Minister of State in the FCO, announced the establishment of the Consolidated Criteria:

**Laura Moffatt:** To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps the Government have taken to consolidate the UK's national criteria against which the Government assess licence applications to export arms and dual-use equipment with those of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; and if he will make a statement.

**Mr. Hain:** Licences to export arms and other goods controlled for strategic reasons are issued by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, acting through the Export Control Organisation of the DTI. All relevant individual licence applications are circulated by DTI to other Government Departments with an interest, as determined by those Departments in line with their own policy responsibilities. These include the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development.

In the Foreign Secretary's reply to my hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Mr. Timms) on 28 July 1997, Official Report, column 27, he set out the criteria which would be used in considering advance approvals for promotion prior to formal application for an export licence, applications for licences to export military equipment, and dual-use goods where there are grounds for believing that the end-user will be the armed forces or internal security forces of the recipient country. As my right hon. Friend said then, the Government are committed to the maintenance of a strong defence industry as part of our industrial base as well as of our defence effort, and recognise that defence exports can also contribute to international stability by strengthening collective defence relationships; but believe that arms transfers must be managed responsibly. We have since taken a range of measures designed to ensure the highest standards of responsibility in our export control policies. These include the adoption during the UK's Presidency of the EU of a Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; the publication of Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls which are among the most transparent of those of any arms exporting country; the ban on the export of equipment used for torture; the ratification of the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel landmines and the passage of the Land Mines Act; and our many efforts to combat illicit trafficking in and destabilising accumulations of small arms.

Since the Council of the European Union adopted the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports on 8 June 1998, all relevant licence applications have been assessed against the UK's national criteria and those in the Code of Conduct, which represent minimum standards that all member states have agreed to apply. The criteria in the EU Code of Conduct are compatible with those which I announced in July 1997. At the same time there is a large degree of overlap between the two. It is clearly in the interests of Government Departments involved in assessing licence applications, British exporters and

other interested parties that the criteria which are used should be set out as clearly and unambiguously as possible.

With immediate effect, therefore, the following consolidated criteria will be used in considering all individual applications for licences to export goods on the Military List, which forms Part III of Schedule 1 to the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994; advance approvals for promotion prior to formal application for an export licence; and licence applications for the export of dual-use goods as specified in Annex 1 of Council Decision 94/942/CFSP when there are grounds for believing that the end-user of such goods will be the armed forces or internal security forces or similar entities in the recipient country, or that the goods will be used to produce arms or other goods on the Military List for such end-users. The criteria are based on those in the EU Code of Conduct, incorporating elements from the UK's national criteria where appropriate. As before, they will not be applied mechanistically but on a case-by-case basis, using judgment and commonsense. Neither the fact of this consolidation, nor any minor additions or amendments to the wording of the two sets of criteria used before, should be taken to imply any change in policy or in its application.

An export licence will not be issued if the arguments for doing so are outweighed by the need to comply with the UK's international obligations and commitments, by concern that the goods might be used for internal repression or international aggression, by the risks to regional stability or by other considerations as described in these criteria.

#### **CRITERION ONE**

*Respect for the UK's international commitments, in particular sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the European Community, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.*

The Government will not issue an export licence if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia:

- a. The UK's international obligations and its commitments to enforce UN, OSCE and EU arms embargoes, as well as national embargoes observed by the UK and other commitments regarding the application of strategic export controls;
- b. The UK's international obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- c. The UK's commitments in the frameworks of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement;
- d. The Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfers agreed by the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council, and the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers and the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports;
- e. The UK's obligations under the Ottawa Convention and the 1998 Land Mines Act;

f. The UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

## CRITERION TWO

*The respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination.*

Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, the Government will:

- a. Not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression;
- b. Exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the EU.

For these purposes equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression.

The nature of the equipment will be considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; summary, arbitrary or extra-judicial executions; disappearances; arbitrary detentions; and other major suppression or violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The Government considers that in some cases, the use of force by a government within its own borders, for example to preserve law and order against terrorists or other criminals is legitimate and does not constitute internal repression, as long as force is used in accordance with the international human rights standards described above.

## CRITERION THREE

*The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.*

The Government will not issue licences for export which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.

## CRITERION FOUR

*Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.*

The Government will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country, or to assert by force a territorial claim. However, a purely theoretical possibility that the items concerned might be used in the future against another state will not of itself lead to a licence being refused.

When considering these risks, the Government will take into account inter alia:

- a. The existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
- b. A claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
- c. Whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient.

The need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way, taking into account the balance of forces between the states of the region concerned, their relative expenditure on defence, the potential for the equipment significantly to enhance the effectiveness of existing capabilities or to improve force projection, and the need not to introduce into the region new capabilities which would be likely to lead to increased tension.

#### **CRITERION FIVE**

*The national security of the UK, or territories whose external relations are the UK's responsibility, and of allies, EU Member States and other friendly countries.*

The Government will take into account:

- a. The potential effect of the proposed export on the UK's defence and security interests or on those of other territories and countries as described above, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and stability;
- b. The risk of the goods concerned being used against UK forces or on those of other territories and countries as described above;
- c. The risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer;
- d. The need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities.

#### **CRITERION SIX**

*The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law*



The Government will take into account inter alia the record of the buyer country with regard to :

- a. its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
- b. its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts;
- c. its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament conventions referred to in sub-para b) of Criterion One.

### **CRITERION SEVEN**

*The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.*

In assessing the impact of the proposed export on the importing country and the risk that exported goods might be diverted to an undesirable end-user, the following will be considered:

- a. the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in UN or peace-keeping activity;
- b. the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment;
- c. the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls.

The Government will pay particular attention to the need to avoid diversion of UK exports to terrorist organisations. Proposed exports of anti-terrorist equipment will be given particularly careful consideration in this context.

### **CRITERION EIGHT**

*The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources*

The Government will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, IMF and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the proposed export would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country.

The Government will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid, and its

public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF- or World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme.

### **OTHER FACTORS**

Operative Provision 10 of the EU Code of Conduct specifies that Member States may where appropriate also take into account the effect of proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, but that these factors will not affect the application of the criteria in the Code.

The Government will thus continue when considering export licence applications to give full weight to the UK's national interest, including:

- a. the potential effect on the UK's economic, financial and commercial interests, including our long-term interests in having stable, democratic trading partners;
- b. the potential effect on the UK's relations with the recipient country;
- c. the potential effect on any collaborative defence production or procurement project with allies or EU partners;
- d. the protection of the UK's essential strategic industrial base.

In the application of the above criteria, account will be taken of reliable evidence, including for example, reporting from diplomatic posts, relevant reports by international bodies, intelligence and information from open sources and non-governmental organisations.

## Annex 6: The revised UK Consolidated Criteria (2014)

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On 25 March 2014 the Business Secretary, Vince Cable made the following Written Ministerial Statement revising the UK's Consolidated Criteria.<sup>540</sup>

**RT HON DR VINCE CABLE, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS; DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION AND SKILLS**

### **THE CONSOLIDATED EU AND NATIONAL ARMS EXPORT LICENSING CRITERIA**

**25 MARCH 2014**

The UK's defence industry can make an important contribution to international security, as well as provide economic benefit to the UK. The legitimate international trade in arms enables governments to protect ordinary citizens against terrorists and criminals, and to defend against external threats. The Government remains committed to supporting the UK's defence industry and legitimate trade in items controlled for strategic reasons. But we recognise that in the wrong hands, arms can fuel conflict and instability and facilitate terrorism and organised crime. For this reason it is vital that we have robust and transparent controls which are efficient and impose the minimum administrative burdens in order to enable the defence industry to operate responsibly and confidently.

The Government's policy for assessing applications for licences to export strategic goods and advance approvals for promotion prior to formal application for an export licence was set out on behalf of the then Foreign Secretary on 26 October 2000, *Official Report*, Column 200W. Since then there have been a number of significant developments, including:

- the entry into force of the Export Control Act 2002
- the application of controls to electronic transfers of software and technology and to trade (brokering) in military goods between overseas destinations
- the adoption by the EU of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment
- further development of EU export control law, including: the adoption of Council Regulation (EC) 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; Directive 2009/43/EC of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community; and the re-cast Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items
- the adoption by the UN General Assembly on 2 April 2013 of an international Arms Trade Treaty, which the UK signed on 3 June 2013.

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<sup>540</sup> HC Deb, 25 March 2014, cols 9–14WS

The Government believes that the procedures for assessing licence applications and our decision-making processes are robust and have stood the test of time. We also believe that the eight Criteria continue to adequately address the risks of irresponsible arms transfers and are fully compliant with our obligations under the EU Common Position and the Arms Trade Treaty. Nevertheless it is appropriate to update these Criteria in light of developments over the last 13 years. In particular: the list of international obligations and commitments in Criterion 1 has been updated; there is explicit reference to international humanitarian law in Criterion 2; and the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer is now addressed under Criterion 7 rather than Criterion 5. There are also minor changes to improve the clarity and consistency of the language used throughout the text. None of these amendments should be taken to mean that there has been any substantive change in policy.

These Criteria will be applied to all licence applications for export, transfer, trade (brokering) and transit/transshipment of goods, software and technology subject to control for strategic reasons (referred to collectively as “items”); and to the extent that the following activities are subject to control, the provision of technical assistance or other services related to those items. They will also be applied to MOD Form 680 applications and assessment of proposals to gift controlled equipment.

As before, they will not be applied mechanistically but on a case-by-case basis taking into account all relevant information available at the time the licence application is assessed. While the Government recognises that there are situations where transfers must not take place, as set out in the following criteria, we will not refuse a licence on the grounds of a purely theoretical risk of a breach of one or more of those Criteria. In making licensing decisions I will continue to take into account advice received from FCO, MOD, DFID, and Other Government Departments and agencies as appropriate. The Government’s Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports will continue to provide further detailed information regarding policy and practice in strategic export controls.

The application of these Criteria will be without prejudice to the application to specific cases of specific criteria as may be announced to Parliament from time to time; and will be without prejudice to the application of specific criteria contained in relevant EU instruments.

This statement of the Criteria is guidance given under section 9 of the Export Control Act. It replaces the consolidated criteria announced to Parliament on 26 October 2000.

#### **CRITERION ONE**

*Respect for the UK's international obligations and commitments, in particular sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council or the European Union, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.*

The Government will not grant a licence if to do so would be inconsistent with, *inter alia*:

- a. The UK's obligations and its commitments to enforce United Nations, European

Union and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) arms embargoes, as well as national embargoes observed by the UK and other commitments regarding the application of strategic export controls;

- b. The UK's obligations under the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty;
- c. The UK's obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- d. The UK's obligations under the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions (the Oslo Convention), the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the Ottawa Convention) and the Land Mines Act 1998;
- e. The UK's commitments in the framework of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation;
- f. The OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers and the European Union Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.

## **CRITERION TWO**

*The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country of final destination as well as respect by that country for international humanitarian law.*

Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by international human rights instruments, the Government will:

- a. Not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used for internal repression;
- b. Exercise special caution and vigilance in granting licences, on a case-by-case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the European Union;
- c. Not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the items might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law.

For these purposes items which might be used for internal repression will include, inter alia, items where there is evidence of the use of these or similar items for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the items will be diverted from their stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression.

The nature of the items to be transferred will be considered carefully, particularly if they are intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression includes, inter

alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; summary or arbitrary executions; disappearances; arbitrary detentions; and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

In considering the risk that items might be used for internal repression or in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law, the Government will also take account of the risk that the items might be used to commit gender-based violence or serious violence against women or children.

### **CRITERION THREE**

*The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.*

The Government will not grant a licence for items which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.

### **CRITERION FOUR**

*Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.*

The Government will not grant a licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the items aggressively against another country, or to assert by force a territorial claim.

When considering these risks, the Government will take into account, *inter alia*:

- a. The existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
- b. A claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
- c. The likelihood of the items being used other than for the legitimate national security and defence of the recipient;
- d. The need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way, taking into account the balance of forces between the states of the region concerned, their relative expenditure on defence, the potential for the equipment significantly to enhance the effectiveness of existing capabilities or to improve force projection, and the need not to introduce into the region new capabilities which would be likely to lead to increased tension.

### **CRITERION FIVE**

*The national security of the UK and territories whose external relations are the UK's responsibility, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.*

The Government will take into account:

- a. The potential effect of the proposed transfer on the UK's defence and security interests or on those of other territories and countries as described above, while recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and stability;
- b. The risk of the items being used against UK forces or against those of other territories and countries as described above;
- c. The need to protect UK military classified information and capabilities.

## **CRITERION SIX**

*The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law.*

The Government will take into account, *inter alia*, the record of the buyer country with regard to:

- a. Its support for or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
- b. Its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international conflicts;
- c. Its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and disarmament instruments referred to in criterion one.

## **CRITERION SEVEN**

*The existence of a risk that the items will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.*

In assessing the impact of the proposed transfer on the recipient country and the risk that the items might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end-use, the Government will consider:

- a. The legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including any involvement in United Nations or other peace-keeping activity;
- b. The technical capability of the recipient country to use the items;
- c. The capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls;
- d. The risk of re-export to undesirable destinations and, as appropriate, the record of the recipient country in respecting re-export provisions or consent prior to re-export;
- e. The risk of diversion to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists;

f. The risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.

## **CRITERION EIGHT**

*The compatibility of the transfer with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources*

The Government will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such as United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, IMF and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, whether the proposed transfer would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country.

The Government will consider in this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking into account also any EU or bilateral aid, and its public finances, balance of payments, external debt, economic and social development and any IMF- or World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme.

## **OTHER FACTORS**

Article 10 of the EU Common Position specifies that Member States may, where appropriate, also take into account the effect of proposed exports on their economic, social, commercial and industrial interests, but that these factors will not affect the application of the criteria in the Common Position.

The Government will thus continue when considering licence applications to give full weight to the UK's national interest, including:

- a. The potential effect on the UK's economic, financial and commercial interests, including our long-term interests in having stable, democratic trading partners;
- b. The potential effect on the UK's international relations;
- c. The potential effect on any collaborative defence production or procurement project with allies or EU partners;
- d. The protection of the UK's essential strategic industrial base.

In the application of the above criteria, account will be taken of reliable evidence, including for example, reporting from diplomatic posts, relevant reports by international bodies, intelligence and information from open sources and non-governmental organisations.



## Annex 7: Extra-territoriality (Offences)

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The following is a list of offences committed overseas for which a British citizen could be prosecuted in this country. The list is based on *Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2013*:

- i. Sexual offences committed against children and young people under the age of 16 (Sexual Offences (Conspiracy and Incitement) Act 1996 and Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.72 and Schedule 2);
- ii. Trafficking for sexual exploitation under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss.59A;
- iii. Offences of dishonesty and blackmail where property is despatched from, or received at, a place in England and Wales; or where there is a communication of information etc. sent by any means from a place in England and Wales to a place elsewhere, or from a place elsewhere to a place in England and Wales (Criminal Justice Act 1993 ss.1–6);
- iv. Offences connected with aircraft (Civil Aviation Act 1982 s.92);
- v. Homicide (Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s.9–10);
- vi. Offences in connection with taxation etc. within the European Community (Criminal Justice Act 1993, s.71);
- vii. Offences by servants of the Crown (Criminal Justice Act 1948 s.31(1));
- viii. Offences in connection with the slave trade (Slave Trade Act 1873);
- ix. Offences under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (Merchant Shipping Act 1995 ss.279–281) offences committed by British seamen (Merchant Shipping Act 1995 s.282) and offences in the Admiralty jurisdiction;
- x. Offences on offshore installations (Petroleum Act 1998 s.10);
- xi. Bribery and corruption committed outside the UK (Bribery Act 2010, s.12)
- xii. Torture (Criminal Justice Act 1988, ss.134–135);
- xiii. International Criminal Offences (International Criminal Court Act 2001);
- xiv. Offences against the Geneva Convention (Geneva Convention Act 1957);
- xv. Explosives offences (Explosive Substances Act 1883 ss.2–3);
- xvi. Treason
- xvii. Offences under the Terrorism Act 2000:
  - Membership of a proscribed organisation (Terrorism Act 2000 s.11)
  - Weapons training (Terrorism Act 2000 s.54)

Directing a terrorist organisation (Terrorism Act 2000 s.56)

Collecting information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism (Terrorism Act 2000 s.58)

Inciting terrorism overseas (Terrorism Act 2000 s.59)

Terrorist bombing (Terrorism Act 2000 s.62)

xviii. Offences under the Terrorism Act 2006:

Encouragement of terrorism and dissemination of terrorist publications (Terrorism Act 2006 ss1–2)

Preparation of terrorist acts (Terrorism Act 2006 s.5)

Terrorist training and attendance at a place used for terrorist training (Terrorism Act 2006 ss.6, 8)

xix. Offences against United Nations personnel (United Nations Personnel Act 1997)

xx. Offences against the safety of Channel Tunnel trains and the tunnel system (Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 [S.I.1994/570])

xxi. Offences against the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870

xxii. Offences against the Official Secrets Acts 1920 and 1989

xxiii. Fraudulent evasion of duty etc. (Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 s.170(2) (b))

xxiv. Bigamy (Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.57)

xxv. Offences covered by the War Crimes Act 1991

xxvi. Offences involving the supply or delivery of restricted goods without a licence from the Secretary of State (Trade in Goods (Control) Order 2003 SI 2003/2765)

xxvii. Corporate manslaughter (Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s28)

xxviii. Trafficking or labour and other exploitation under the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004, s.4; and

xxix. Hijacking or endangering the safety of aircraft under the Aviation Security Act 1982, ss 1–3.

The report of the Home Office Steering Committee's Review of Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction includes the following list of criteria used by the Government in deciding whether or not to take extra-territorial jurisdiction in respect of particular offences:

Against this background, it is suggested that consideration should be given to taking extra-territorial jurisdiction only where at least one of the following tests was satisfied:

Where the offence is serious (this might be defined, in respect of existing offences, by reference to the length of sentence currently available);

Where, by virtue of the nature of the offence, the witnesses and evidence necessary for the prosecution are likely to be available in UK territory, even though the offence was committed outside the jurisdiction;

Where there is international consensus that certain conduct is reprehensible and that concerted action is needed involving the taking of extra-territorial jurisdiction;

Where the vulnerability of the victim makes it particularly important to be able to tackle instances of the offence;

Where it appears to be in the interests of the standing and reputation of the UK in the international community;

Where there is a danger that the offences would otherwise not be justiciable.

The fact that an offence satisfied one or more of the above guidelines would not positively determine the extension of jurisdiction. But it would suggest that action might be justified, particularly if the practical enforcement issues did not appear to be insurmountable.

*Source: This Note is supplied by the House of Commons Library*

## Annex 8: UK national report to the 2014 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Commission

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On 29 April 2014, Hugh Robertson, Minister of State at the FCO, wrote to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls providing details of the UK national report to the 2014 Nuclear Non-Proliferations Treaty Preparatory Commission.<sup>541</sup> The text of the report follows:

### **The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s National Report Pursuant to Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the NPT Review Conference Final Document**

As provided in the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference Action Plan, the Governments of the five NPT nuclear-weapon states, or “P5”, are working to implement Action 5 to “further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence” and to make national reports on our Action 5 and other undertakings to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee under a common framework, consistent with Actions 20 and 21.

Action 21 states “As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security.” The framework we use for our national reports includes common categories of topics under which relevant information is reported, and it addresses all three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

We encourage all States Parties, consistent with Action 20, to make similar reports.

#### **Section I: Reporting on National Measures Relating to Disarmament**

The UK considers the NPT to be the cornerstone of global efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and we are committed to the step-by-step process agreed by consensus at the 2000 RevCon and reaffirmed at the 2010 RevCon.

##### **i. National Security Policies, Doctrine, and Activities Associated with Nuclear Weapons**

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<sup>541</sup> <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/prepcom14/national-reports/UK.pdf>

### Nuclear Doctrine

The 2006 white paper “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent”,<sup>542</sup> as amended by the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR),<sup>543</sup> provides our current policy on nuclear deterrence, our capability and force structure. It makes clear that we will maintain only the minimum credible nuclear deterrent, under full political control, in the form of continuous-at-sea patrols of a Vanguard-class submarine carrying Trident ballistic missiles with the fewest warheads since the introduction of our SSBN capability in the 1960s.

We believe we already have the smallest stockpile of nuclear warheads among the recognised nuclear weapons states, and are the only one to have reduced to a single deterrent system since the withdrawal of our air component in the late 1990s.

### Operational Policy

The UK has long been clear that we would only consider using our nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies. While we remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate their use, we have provided some parameters.

In the 2010 SDSR, the UK strengthened its negative security assurance to state that the UK will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT. In giving this assurance, we emphasised the need for universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT, and noted that this assurance would not apply to any state in material breach of those non-proliferation obligations. We also noted that while there is currently no direct threat to the UK or its vital interests from states developing capabilities in other weapons of mass destruction, for example chemical and biological, we reserve the right to review this assurance if the future threat, development and proliferation of these weapons make it necessary.

In the interests of international security and stability, the UK has taken steps to lower the operational status of our deterrent system. UK nuclear weapons are not on high alert, nor are they on “launch on warning” status. The patrol submarine operates routinely at a “notice to fire” measured in days rather than minutes as it did throughout the Cold War. The missiles are no longer targeted at any country (they have been de-targeted since 1994). This position was considered and re-affirmed during the work in the 2006 White Paper. We believe that a nuclear attack on the UK's vital interests is deterred by demonstrating our capability to respond under any circumstances, rather than just by an ability for a rapid response. There is no immediacy of launch in our normal operating posture.

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<sup>542</sup><http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-of-the-united-kingdoms-nuclear-deterrent-defence-white-paper-2006-cm-6994>

<sup>543</sup><http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-strategic-defence-and-security-review-securing-britain-in-an-age-of-uncertainty>

The security and safety of our nuclear weapons is given the very highest priority and is entirely consistent with our obligations under non-proliferation agreements. Robust arrangements are in place for the political control of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent. There are a number of technological and procedural safeguards built into the UK's nuclear deterrent to prevent an unauthorised launch of its Trident missiles.

Finally, the UK has maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions since 1991.

ii. Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Arms Control (including Nuclear Disarmament) and Verification

Stockpile Size

The UK has achieved substantial reductions in its nuclear weapon stockpile. In the late 1970s, when the UK's stockpile was at its highest, the UK had more than 400 warheads in-service across 5 types. Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference the UK has unilaterally decided to cut our stockpile of nuclear warheads, as outlined in the SDSR. Today we have fewer than 225 warheads, all of a single type. We have committed to reducing this maximum stockpile to no more than 180 by the mid 2020s, with the requirement for operationally available warheads at no more than 120, a target that the UK is steadily working towards. All nuclear material no longer deemed necessary for military purposes has been placed under international safeguards. We have also committed to reduce the number of deployed warheads from 48 down to 40 per SSBN. In conjunction, each submarine will then field eight operational Trident ballistic missiles.

Verification

Developing and agreeing effective measures for verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads will be an important precondition for fulfilling the goals of Article VI of the NPT. The UK-Norway Initiative (UKNI) is an example of the world-leading research the UK is undertaking to address some of the technical and procedural challenges posed by effective verification of warhead dismantlement. In 2012, the UK hosted a P5 expert-level meeting on verification to discuss lessons learned from UKNI to date.

We are in our second decade of an active partnership with the United States in monitoring and verification research. Our joint technical cooperation programme allows us to apply policy, technology and programme expertise to develop and evaluate targeted approaches for transparent reductions and monitoring of nuclear warheads, fissile material and associated facilities for potential disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives. Technical experts conduct activities and share information to explore and address essential and difficult monitoring and verification challenges, working to integrate potential approaches for arms control monitoring and transparency.

Additionally, the UK and China have conducted two technical exchange visits and will continue to explore collaborative exchanges into arms control and verification research.

iii. Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures

Through the SDSR and other documents, the UK has voluntarily declared its maximum warhead stockpile numbers and operational warhead numbers.

We have also expressed our unconditional support for the 2010 Action Plan at numerous fora. In line with this support, the UK actively participates in regular working level meetings of the P5 Nuclear-Weapon States that advance our collective dialogue on disarmament and review progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The UK held the first P5 Conference in 2009, and looks forward to starting the second cycle of Conferences before the NPT Review Conference in 2015.

The UK actively promotes its work on UKNI to non-nuclear weapon states. This has included hosting a joint UK-Norway workshop for 12 non-nuclear weapon states in December 2011 and side events at the 2010 NPT Review Conferences and the 2012 and 2013 Preparatory Committees. Another side event will be held at the 2014 Preparatory Committee.

Nuclear Glossary

The P5 are, under China's leadership, developing a glossary of nuclear terms to aid understanding between states in discussing related matters. The UK has strongly supported the authoring of this glossary and looks forward to using this multilingual handbook in future work.

iv. Other Related Issues

Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

The UK recognises the CTBT as a key element of the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, and provides extensive technical and political support to the CTBT Organisation's (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission. The UK maintains the UK National Data Centre, Eskdalemuir Seismometer Array, a number of other International Monitoring Systems (IMS) stations throughout UK territories and one of 16 global radionuclide laboratories that provide analytical support to the IMS. These facilities are backed up by enduring research in a number of areas, notably through the Atomic Weapons Establishment's Forensic Seismology Team. In addition, the UK is heavily involved in preparations for Integrated Field Exercise 2014 which will evaluate the CTBTO's On-Site Inspection capability.

The UK is active in the CTBTO's Working Groups in Vienna and provides funding for Sir Michael Weston to chair the finance-focused Advisory Group. Our work ensures that the CTBTO has the necessary funding and working time to build and maintain an effective monitoring regime.

#### Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

Since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the UK has upheld a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Since then, all enrichment and reprocessing in the UK has been conducted under international safeguards. We are committed to the pursuit of an international treaty that would put an end to the future production of fissile material for such purposes. We made a commitment in the 2010 NPT Action Plan to begin negotiation within the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The UK supported the resolution at the UN General Assembly First Committee in 2012 to create an FMCT Group of Government Experts (GGE). We hope that the FMCT GGE, in which we are pleased to have a UK Expert participating, will complement existing efforts to find a positive way forward on the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the first session of the GGE, held 31 March-11 April, made a strong and constructive start to the process.

## **Section II: Reporting on National Measures Relating to Non-proliferation**

### i. Safeguards

All civil nuclear material in the UK is subject to Euratom safeguards and to the terms of the UK/Euratom/IAEA tripartite safeguards agreement under the NPT. Euratom safeguards obligations stem from Chapter VII (Articles 77-85) of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, which requires the European Commission, inter alia, to satisfy itself that nuclear materials are not diverted from their intended uses as declared by users. This is achieved through:

- a requirement that all operators of nuclear installations provide the Commission with Basic Technical Characteristics (BTCs) describing the location and intended activities of their installation;
- a requirement that operators keep and report nuclear material accountancy records;
- provision for the Commission to inspect installations and records;
- provision for the imposition of sanctions by the Commission in the event of infringement of the Treaty safeguards obligations. These sanctions can range from a published written warning to withdrawal of the nuclear material concerned.



The various reporting requirements are amplified in Commission Regulation (Euratom) 302/05. Euratom safeguards do not apply to nuclear material intended to meet defence requirements.

#### Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement

The UK Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and Euratom came into force in 1978. The agreement allows for the application of safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in facilities or parts thereof within the UK, subject to exclusions for national security reasons only. Nuclear materials accountancy reports on all civil nuclear material in facilities is provided to the IAEA by Euratom, and the IAEA may “designate” any facility, or part thereof, for inspection. Currently, some of the plutonium stores at Sellafield and the gas centrifuge enrichment facilities at Capenhurst are designated for IAEA inspection. The agreement gives the UK the right to remove facilities and/or withdraw nuclear material from the scope of the agreement for reasons of national security. However, as part of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the UK agreed that any future withdrawals from safeguards would “be limited to small quantities of nuclear materials not suitable for explosive purposes” and undertook to publish information on any such withdrawals.<sup>544</sup>

#### Additional Protocol

The UK Additional Protocol to the voluntary offer safeguards agreement is based on the model agreement (INFCIRC/540 corr.), and contains measures aimed at the primary objectives of Additional Protocols – to increase the IAEA’s capability to detect any undeclared nuclear material and activities in Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) or to increase the efficiency of IAEA safeguards. Information, and associated access, is therefore provided on all Protocol-relevant activities that are done in collaboration with or are otherwise relevant to a NNWS, or where the information would improve the effectiveness or efficiency of IAEA safeguards in the UK.

#### ii. Export Controls

##### United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540

The UK has worked hard to fully implement UNSCR 1540 since its unanimous adoption in 2004. As one of the vice-chairs of the 1540 Committee, the UK works with UN Member States to strengthen efforts to promote universal implementation of the resolution. We work with and through International Organisations and initiatives, including the IAEA and the G8 Global Partnership, to provide technical and financial support to deliver concrete improvements in the security of materials, knowledge and know-how in partner countries; facilitate debate and deliver training to help build partners’ engagement and capacities; and maintain domestic technical and scientific expertise in counter proliferation, arms control and chemical, biological and nuclear

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<sup>544</sup> <http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/safeguards/withdrawals.htm>

security. UK export controls and enforcement capability enable us to maintain a robust and effective national export control regime, and to strengthen international export controls.

#### Nuclear Suppliers Group

By fulfilling its obligations under the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee (ZC), the UK contributes to minimizing nuclear proliferation while ensuring that eligible states are able to access nuclear technology for peaceful uses. The UK implements effective strategic export controls in regards to its nuclear transfers in line with the NSG and ZC control lists. Relevant exports are assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria and stated UK Government export control policies. A robust enforcement system, underpinned by the Export Control Order 2008, operates to deter attempts to breach the controls and help facilitate legitimate transfers.

The UK also actively supports the work of the NSG and ZC. The UK contributed extensive technical expertise to the NSG's recent three-years-long fundamental review of its control lists, and continues this through the newly established Technical Experts Group, ensuring that the NSG's control lists reflect changing proliferation threats. We also share licensing and enforcement information with fellow Participating Governments, both ad hoc and at the Licensing and Enforcement and Information Exchange Meetings.

In 2013 the UK authored a paper entitled "Good practices for corporate standards to support the efforts of the International Community in the non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction". It was agreed at the 31<sup>st</sup> Consultative Group meeting and posted on the NSG public website shortly thereafter. The paper recognises the important role that the diverse commercial sector can play in assisting multilateral efforts in non-proliferation of WMD. The UK has supported NSG outreach activities with emerging technology holders.

#### iii. Nuclear Security

The UK's security regime for the civil nuclear industry is robust and effective and fully meets international standards. Security arrangements are based on the principles of the graded approach and defence in depth and are kept under constant review.

In 2010 the UK deposited its instruments of ratification of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Although the 2005 amendment has not yet entered into force the UK has in place legislation which implements it.

In 2013 the UK extended the scope of its security regulation to cover civil nuclear sites under construction in order to take account of the UK's new nuclear build programme. The legislation had previously regulated operating civil nuclear sites. Revised guidance was issued to the industry by the UK's nuclear regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation, in October 2012, which is a key step towards an increasingly more outcome-focused regulatory regime for security in the Civil Nuclear Industry. By the end of January 2014 all nuclear premises regulated by ONR Civil Nuclear Security now have National Objectives Requirements Model Standards (NORMS) compliant approved Nuclear Site Security Plans.

#### Nuclear Information Security

The UK has promoted the need to secure sensitive nuclear information within the framework of the Nuclear Security Summit, the Global Partnership and the IAEA.

#### Key Attributes of an Excellent Nuclear Security Culture

In 2012 a tripartite sub-group was established (with representatives from the regulator, industry and government) to develop a better understanding of the attributes of an excellent security culture, and for this to be captured and codified. The output of this work is a guidance document<sup>545</sup> which was published in June 2013. The guide sets out key attributes deemed necessary for an excellent security culture and then sets out for each one what is required to achieve this. The implementation of the recommendations in the guide is not compulsory, but is intended to inform and enhance understanding of how all parties (regulator, industry and government) can deliver to meet the objective.

#### International Physical Protection Advisory Service

The UK was the first Nuclear-Weapon State to welcome an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission. A Mission Team visited the Sellafield civil nuclear site and Barrow port in October 2011, and concluded that the state of civil nuclear security is robust. The team identified many examples of good practice within the civil nuclear security regime and made a number of valuable recommendations. In March 2014 the UK Government invited the IAEA to send a follow up IPPAS Mission to the UK. The UK provides security experts who participate in a number of outward IPPAS Missions.

#### iv. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

The United Kingdom continues to support the principle of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. As previously stated in 1995 and 2010, we recognise the role that negative security assurances can play in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and enhancing regional and international security.

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<sup>545</sup><https://www.nuclear.nscademy.co.uk/system/files/0034%20Spooner%20Security%20Culture%20Leaflet.pdf>

### Existing Zones

To date, the United Kingdom has signed and ratified Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean), the Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific), and the Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa): 74 states, therefore, already have in place protocols that provide legally-binding negative security assurances from the United Kingdom. We also support the parallel political declarations adopted by the Nuclear Weapon States and Mongolia concerning that country's nuclear weapon free status.

### Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

We will continue to pursue signing protocols to existing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones as a practical way of strengthening our existing negative security assurances. The United Kingdom therefore welcomes the forthcoming signature by the Nuclear Weapon States of a Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ). Under this Protocol, the Nuclear Weapon States will extend legally binding assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any CANWFZ Treaty Party and not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the CANWFZ Treaty or its Protocol. The United Kingdom hopes to ratify the Protocol by the end of 2014.

### South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

In conjunction with other Nuclear-Weapon States, the United Kingdom will continue to engage with the State Parties to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty in order to allow signature of a Protocol to that Treaty in the near future.

### MEWMDFZ

The United Kingdom remains committed to the implementation of the 1995 NPT Resolution on the Middle East and, as one of the co-sponsors of that Resolution, is working hard to deliver against the practical steps agreed in 2010. We look forward to convening an inclusive conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction (MEWMDFZ) as soon as the practical arrangements for that conference are agreed by the states of the region. We will continue to work with all the states of the region, our fellow Co-conveners and the Facilitator, Ambassador Laajava, to encourage progress towards this common goal.

## v. Compliance and Other Related Issues/Concerns

### Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The UK has been fully supportive of all UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the Presidential Statement of 16 April 2012, made in the wake of the satellite launch of 13 April 2012. We continue to support the UN DPRK Panel of Experts in their work, and have reported

violations of DPRK sanctions to the Panel. Our work to raise awareness of existing DPRK sanctions and to encourage implementation is ongoing. The UK has funded the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) to run workshops in partnership with the Panel of Experts to raise awareness of DPRK sanctions and encourage implementation in both the public and private sector. In 2013 workshops were held in Sub Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Hong Kong. We plan to continue this work.

The UK is not a member of the Six Party Talks, nor are we seeking involvement in discussions. However, given the risk of the DPRK's nuclear programme to international security, we are maintaining close contact with all sides. We have made clear to the DPRK that if it carries out any further provocations the international community will respond robustly. However, we have also been clear that if the DPRK takes concrete steps to resolve the nuclear issue there will be a positive response.

vi. Other contributions to Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation

Iran

The UK remains concerned about the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. However, we are committed to finding a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The UK has adopted a dual track strategy of pressure and engagement. We have supported six UNSCRs which prohibit Iran from all reprocessing, heavy water and enrichment related activity, most recently UNSCR 1929, adopted in June 2010. We continue to call on Iran to fully comply with its obligations under UNSCRs, and to call on all UN member states to implement UNSCRs fully. We actively support the work of the UN Iran Panel of Experts. We have also implemented EU sanctions on Iran which go beyond these measures. In addition, the UK has played an active role in P5+1 negotiations with Iran and we welcome the agreement of the Joint Plan of Action between the E3+3 and Iran in November 2013, as well as Iran's substantive engagement in talks to reach a Comprehensive Agreement.

The UK shares the IAEA's "serious concerns" about the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme due to the credible information available to it which indicates that Iran had carried out activities "relevant to the development of a nuclear device." As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, the UK has supported two IAEA Board Resolutions in 2011 and 2012 which stress that it is essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue to resolve all outstanding substantive issues. We continue to support the IAEA in its tireless efforts to address these issues. We welcome the agreement of a Joint Statement on a Framework for cooperation between Iran and the Agency in November 2013, in which Iran has agreed to resolve all outstanding issues with the Agency. We continue to call on Iran to address fully the substance of all of the Agency's outstanding concerns including by granting access to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested.

Global Partnership

The UK makes a major contribution to the G8 Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction and, as part of the UK's G8 Presidency in 2013, held the Chair of the GP. Under the UK Presidency, the GP established mechanisms to better match GP partners' funds and expertise with specific security requirements, and improve project coordination and implementation. We also held an outreach event with 1540 Committee experts to encourage universal reporting by States (in line with resolution obligations). From 2002-2012, the UK committed over £350m of funding to GP projects.

The UK's largest contribution to the GP is through the Global Threat Reduction Programme (GTRP). We are working on GTRP programmes that aim to:

- improve the security of fissile materials;
- reduce the number of sites containing sensitive nuclear and radiological material and improve security of remaining sites;
- reduce the risks in the proliferation of biological expertise and materials; and
- prevent terrorists acquiring proliferation-relevant information and expertise.

#### Academic Technology Approval Scheme

In the UK the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS) is responsible for stopping the spread of knowledge and skills from academic programmes that could be used in the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery.

Academic institutions have a mandatory obligation to comply with UK visa requirements. Obtaining a certificate under the scheme is a requirement for all students applying for student visas and intending to enter or remain in the UK for more than six months to undertake post-graduate studies or research in certain designated subjects.

### **Section III: Reporting on National Measures Relating to the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy**

#### i. Promoting Peaceful Uses

The UK fully supports the inalienable right of all state parties to the peaceful uses of civil nuclear energy under the NPT in a culture of openness, transparency and confidence and believes in the responsible, safe and secure access to civil nuclear energy worldwide, subject to the State being in conformity with the non-proliferation requirements of the NPT.

We note the increasing demand for civil nuclear energy and stress its potential in addressing climate change and in providing energy security. Furthermore, we support the work of the IAEA in facilitating achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and sustainable development and in addressing vital non-power applications such as nuclear medicine, agriculture and industry.

### Developments in Civil Nuclear Energy

The UK recognises the importance of civil nuclear energy, not least as civil nuclear power facilities need to sit alongside other low carbon forms of electricity generation. The UK has been clear that civil nuclear energy will be a key part of our future low carbon energy mix. It also offers us a cost-effective pathway to meet our legally binding carbon targets. The UK's commitment to civil nuclear power is evident in the steps which have been taken in the last year in relation to the new build programme in the UK. This is being done without subsidy from the Government, but work is being done to secure the long-term commercial investment needed.

### Nuclear Industrial Strategy

The UK has taken several steps over the past year to continue our efforts in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We published the Nuclear Industrial Strategy in March 2013, which identified priorities for Government and industry to work together in a long-term partnership. It aims to provide more opportunities for economic growth and create jobs through an increased share of all aspects of the civil nuclear market. One of the main points in the strategy was the creation of the Nuclear Industry Council, which brings together all the key players across the civil nuclear supply chain. The Council will be looking at a number of issues essential to the success of our civil nuclear sector in the future: skills, trade & investment, business capability and how the public perceives the civil nuclear industry.

### The Energy Act

The UK Government also recognises the importance of an independent and robust regulatory regime and is committed to creating the highest standards of civil nuclear regulation. To that end, it has embarked on steps to enhance the UK's civil nuclear regulatory framework, to ensure it remains world class and has the flexibility to be able to address future challenges. The Energy Act, which gained Royal Assent in December 2013, includes provisions to establish the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR, created in 2011) as a statutory, independent regulator. The ONR brings together the functions of civil nuclear safety, security, safeguards implementation, radioactive materials transport, and health and safety on civil nuclear sites. The ONR began operating as a statutory body on 1 April 2014.

### Memoranda of Understanding

The UK Government is keen to enhance the links between the UK and other countries around the world with the view of enhancing civil nuclear energy cooperation. We made several high profile announcements in this regard last year. These include the signing of Memoranda of Understanding with various countries focusing on, inter alia, setting the strategic framework for collaboration on investment, technology, construction and expertise in civil nuclear energy, and exploring bilateral cooperation opportunities.

The UK Government has several mechanisms through which civil nuclear energy cooperation is enabled, including Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding. In addition to bilateral agreements, we are also party to Euratom cooperation agreements. Our activities in this area indicate a clear intent for the UK to work with various countries across a range of relevant civil nuclear energy related activities, and we are in discussion with several other States regarding how civil nuclear energy cooperation can be enhanced bilaterally.

#### Nuclear Fuel Assurance

The UK fully supports moves to create a menu of viable and credible assurances of fuel supply, which would enable a new nuclear state to avoid the need to develop expensive and complex indigenous Enrichment technologies. The United Kingdom's Nuclear Fuel Assurance proposal, a response to the IAEA's request for Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNAs), was adopted at the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2011. This is one practical approach ensures that NPT States Parties have access to the peaceful uses of civil nuclear energy, while upholding high standards of safety, security and non-proliferation. The UK views all MNA proposals as complementary, and hopes that states are able to select proposals which contribute best to their energy mix.

#### ii. Technical Assistance through the IAEA to its Member States

The UK is committed to supporting the IAEA's Technical Cooperation (TC) Programme and demonstrates this by paying our contributions to the TC fund promptly and in full on an annual basis. We are involved in the ongoing discussions regarding the TC Programme and are keen to ensure that it continues to improve, fulfil its potential and provide the vital work that it undertakes.

The UK is very supportive of the contribution that the TC Programme makes towards the Millennium Development Goals. The good work that the TC Programme can achieve should not be underestimated and it has made numerous, positive contributions to the peaceful uses of nuclear-related technologies in many countries around the world.

The UK is encouraging the IAEA to continue to ensure Results-Based Management and "sustainable" outcomes, accountability, transparency and synergies in the TC Programme.

#### iii. Nuclear Safety and Civil Nuclear Liability

The UK is a strong supporter of co-ordinated international efforts towards the continuous improvement of nuclear safety across the globe. As part of our commitment to achieving high nuclear safety standards the UK aims to show a leadership role in meeting its obligations as a Contracting Party to relevant international nuclear safety instruments such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safe Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste. In particular we are playing a



leading role in proposing possible measures to strengthen the Convention on Nuclear Safety peer review processes.

Additionally, the UK has been a Contracting Party to the Paris Convention on nuclear third party liability and the Brussels Supplementary Convention since the 1960s. The Paris and Brussels Conventions were revised by amending Protocols in 2004. The UK is committed to implementing the changes and plans to lay legislation in 2014.

The UK actively encourages all States with civil nuclear programmes, or those thinking about developing one, to join a nuclear liability regime and to become Contracting Parties to the relevant international instruments and in particular the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention.

iv. Other Related Issues

No additional material.

ANY OTHER ACTIONS TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT AND/OR STRENGTHEN THE  
NPT

No additional material.

## Annex 9: Extant arms export licences to Countries of concern

The Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls wrote to the BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, on 10 April 2014 requesting details of extant UK strategic export licences to each of the 27 countries listed as the FCO's Countries of human rights concern. The BIS Secretary replied on 12 May 2014.<sup>546</sup>

N.B. Only values for SIELs are shown. The Government does not provide values for OIELs because of their open nature.

### The FCO's Countries of Human Rights concern—extant licences

#### *Afghanistan*

Application Type	Goods (Afghanistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	military equipment for initiating explosives	491,941
SIEL (Permanent)	electrical connectors	2,725
SIEL (Permanent)	military support vehicles, technology for military support vehicles	1,497,581
SIEL (Permanent)	components for pistols, pistols (8)	3,100
SIEL (Permanent)	military airborne equipment	7,539
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	402,300
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	146,400
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	287,300
SIEL (Permanent)	components for pistols	2,350
SIEL (Permanent)	military support aircraft	1
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment, electronic warfare equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment	550,195
SIEL (Permanent)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	12,848
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	231
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device	285,000

<sup>546</sup> Ev w239 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 12 May 2014

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Afghanistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
	decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	65,250
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	16,278
SIEL (Permanent)	aircraft military communications equipment	15,225
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	200
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	3,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	350
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	34,643
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device detection equipment	80,742
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	26,498
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	26,655
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	27,809
SIEL (Transshipment)	components for combat helicopters	451,637
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment	550,195
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	73,200
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	5,086
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	1,360
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	81,180
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (32), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, pistols (17)	56,223

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Afghanistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	178,568
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	119,962
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	83,934
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	125,603
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	23,693
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	5,912,739
SIEL (Permanent)	military support vehicles	57,389
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military bridges/pontoons/ferries	104,525
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	16,053
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	755,212
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment	308,078
SIEL (Permanent)	components for body armour, military helmets	44,253
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	7,850
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	101,790
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	10,269
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	621,698
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine guns, components for pistols, machine guns (25), pistols (25)	38,275
SIEL (Permanent)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	209
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	1,427,443
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers	620
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	23
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (13), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, pistols (38), small arms ammunition	81,736
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	16,000

Application Type	Goods (Afghanistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, components for test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, software for the use of military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, software for the use of test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, technology for the use of military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, technology for the use of test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment, test equipment for military improvised explosive device jamming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for mine clearance vehicles, technology for the use of mine clearance vehicles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military support aircraft, military guidance/navigation equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MN; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed of modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for military communications equipment	

Application Type	Goods (Afghanistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes, components for military training aircraft, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military distress signalling equipment, military parachutes, technology for the development of ejector seats, technology for the development of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the development of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the development of military parachutes, technology for the development of military training aircraft, technology for the production of ejector seats, technology for the production of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the production of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the production of military parachutes, technology for the production of military training aircraft, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>19,222,964</b>

### Belarus

Application Type	Goods (Belarus)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	7,300
SIEL (Permanent)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	9,988
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment employing cryptography	120,000
SIEL	imaging cameras	8,500

(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray accelerators	1,692,012
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators	1,550,742
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators	1,692,012
SIEL (Permanent)	laser optical components	2,700
SIEL (Temporary)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	375,500
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>5,458,753</b>

### Burma

Application Type	Goods (Burma)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits, components for bomb suits, components for devices for initiating explosives, non-military firing sets	60,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,632
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	3,200,000
SIEL (Permanent)	general laboratory equipment	9,194
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	acoustic seabed survey equipment, equipment employing cryptography, guidance/navigation equipment, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles, underwater sonar navigation systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>3,273,826</b>

**China**

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	software for nuclear reactors	42,935
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	21,800
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, civil NBC detection systems, components for NBC detection equipment, components for civil NBC detection systems, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for civil NBC detection systems, technology for NBC detection equipment	4,882,097
SIEL (Permanent)	software for the use of nuclear reactors	15,001
SIEL (Permanent)	high speed pulse generators	16,450
SIEL (Permanent)	radar equipment	1,550,000
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	21,800
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	106,000
SIEL (Permanent)	electronic measurement equipment	10,750
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,309
SIEL (Permanent)	toxic gas monitoring equipment	557
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	344,000
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	180,820
SIEL (Permanent)	materials analysis equipment	20,025
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1,600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	130,000
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for the development of space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for the production of space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for the use of space qualified focal plane arrays	601,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment	104,101
SIEL (Permanent)	components for NBC detection equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	69,699
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	606,250
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for the development of advanced telecommunications equipment, technology for the production of advanced telecommunications equipment	2,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	3,316



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	157,500
SIEL (Permanent)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	283,470
SIEL (Permanent)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	523,028
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,578
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	5,820
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	400
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	32,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	110,050
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	18,900
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	358,013
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	2,606
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	156,050
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	123,370
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	77,920
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	123,290
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	668,850
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	95,440
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	156,420
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	410,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,862
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	587,370
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	615,380
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,300
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	124,110
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	836,825
SIEL	imaging cameras	18,900

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	86,879
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment employing cryptography	62,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for instrumentation cameras	24,250
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened TV cameras	194,600
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened TV cameras	282,450
SIEL (Permanent)	electronic test equipment	22,601
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	27,773
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	237,078
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging camera software	210,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,400
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for the development of advanced telecommunications equipment, technology for the production of advanced telecommunications equipment	1,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	6,251
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	309
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military image intensifier equipment	26
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	295,025
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	37,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,675,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	3,487,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,850,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	3,575,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	668,750
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,850,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	3,550,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	8,587,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,262,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,587,500

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	6,251
SIEL (Permanent)	radar equipment	262,015
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	uranium isotope separation equipment	1,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools, numerical control software	961,008
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	78,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	394
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,928
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	650,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	66,960
SIEL (Permanent)	fibre prepregs	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging camera software, technology for the production of imaging cameras	210,100
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	154,275
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	2,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened TV camera lenses, radiation hardened TV cameras	71,500
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	25,023
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	3,408
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	33,370
SIEL (Permanent)	millimetric wave components	14,760
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	79,870
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	4,405
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	21,800

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy materials	8,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	3,895,900
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	183,890
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	25,500
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	149,790
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	630,200
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	123,500
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	106,010
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	3,029,150
SIEL (Permanent)	numerical control software	1,572,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	126,020
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	183,630
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	575,750
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	123,300
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	174,050
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for submersible equipment	2
SIEL (Permanent)	image intensifier tubes, imaging cameras	132,754
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	21,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	89,385
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	15,250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	22,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	167,500
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	25,250
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	accelerometers	10
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	72,480
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	30,000
SIEL	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	306,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	542,739
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified focal plane arrays	104,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	28,400
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	16,800
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	25,788
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	315,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	210,024
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	187,270
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	2
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	164,460
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	133,840
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	109,700
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military communications equipment	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	24,600
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	37,800
SIEL (Permanent)	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	3,056
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	23,330
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for advanced telecommunications equipment	4,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	software for nuclear reactors, technology for nuclear reactors	42,936
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment, technology for equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment	42,936
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	140,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military communications equipment	20
SIEL (Permanent)	mass spectrometers	558,220
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment,	185,218

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
	military parametric technical databases, technology for NBC detection equipment	
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	274
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	280,024
SIEL (Permanent)	components for periscopes	1
SIEL (Permanent)	software for nuclear reactors	14,999
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	22,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,587,500
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	30,400
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for civil explosive detection/identification equipment	0
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	33,000
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	160,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	2,980
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	1,100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	1,700,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	870,428
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	786,278
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	880,000
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	2,166
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	127,590
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	520
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	1,950
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	121,250
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,687,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,106,875
SIEL (Permanent)	software for nuclear reactors	3
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	817
SIEL	instrumentation cameras	19,625

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	96,135
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,092,400
SIEL (Permanent)	numerical control software	278,500
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	394
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,710
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	28,500
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,075
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	26,150
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	721,110
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	721,110
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	3,428
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	147,900
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	241,875
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	10,537,500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment, military electronic equipment	4,914
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	182,773
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	40,000
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	360,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,130
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for combat aircraft	300
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	140,000
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	18,239
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,877
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	22,812

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,740
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	13,891,440
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	842,758
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	5,427,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	52,900
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	705,000
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection clothing	1
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,261
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	263,494
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	128,470
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	126,040
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	126,040
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	441,140
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	39,290
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,550,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	336,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	197,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	333,750
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	35,750
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection clothing	3
SIEL (Permanent)	energetic materials additives	360
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	766,950
SIEL (Permanent)	software for NBC detection equipment	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	nickel powders	4,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	nickel powders	9,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	8,170
SIEL	software for nuclear reactors	73,108



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,988
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools, numerical control software, software for machine tools	351,880
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection clothing	593
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	505
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	138
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,043,750
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	9,812,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	15,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	8,350,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	725,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	3,662,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	8,812,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	38,562,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,272
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	86,405
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	mass spectrometers	526,856
SIEL (Permanent)	mass spectrometers	479,685
SIEL (Permanent)	mass spectrometers	393,082
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	104,280
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	162,030
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,027
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	567,107
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection clothing	1
SIEL (Permanent)	numerical control software	1,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection clothing	13,100
SIEL (Permanent)	vibration test equipment	120,602
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	30,579

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	193,783
SIEL (Permanent)	components for instrumentation cameras	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for instrumentation cameras	8,140
SIEL (Permanent)	components for instrumentation cameras	12,810
SIEL (Permanent)	unfinished products for military aero-engines	123,878
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,238
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	1,238
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,600
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,816
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for military helicopters	0
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for nuclear reactors	1
SIEL (Permanent)	nickel powders	4,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,850,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	37,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	14,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	laser optical components	4,280
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	129,785
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection clothing	92,709
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	15,612
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	56,745
SIEL (Permanent)	mass spectrometers	344,099
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	1,605
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	970,110
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	970,110
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	69,127
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	504

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	520,625
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	10,950,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	1,476,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	637,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,725,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,687,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	460,000
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection clothing	746
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	451,600
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	2,776,150
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	970,110
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment	3,300
SIEL (Permanent)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, magnetometers	3,333
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	12,582
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	16,800
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	2,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	42,600
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for the production of civil aero-engines	1
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment employing cryptography	12,850,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	high speed pulse generators	17,793
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for imaging cameras	100
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	4,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	5,174
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	4,535
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	29,600
SIEL (Permanent)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, magnetometers	7,038

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for digital computers, accessories for vibration test equipment, components for vibration test equipment, digital computers, software for vibration test equipment	45,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	114,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	55,302
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military electronic equipment	10
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	43,411
SIEL (Permanent)	laser optical components	8,560
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	970,110
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for NBC detection equipment	500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for chemical agent detection equipment, software for chemical agent detection equipment, technology for chemical agent detection equipment	471,150
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	25,001
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible vehicles	1,736,777
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	20,900
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,095,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	881,250
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	21,750,000
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,139
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,400
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	41,888
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	3,430
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	3,430
SIEL	cryptographic software	3,430

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	3,430
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	9,972
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	139,740
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	200,000
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	625,000
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	19,625
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	37,455
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	46,183
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	423,088
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	253,176
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy tubes	14,996
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	92,575
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	528,150
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	137,170
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	165,435
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	12,105
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	19,917
SIEL (Permanent)	RF direction finding equipment	25,188
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	1,868
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	1,368
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional inspection equipment	120,000
SIEL (Permanent)	rebreathing swimming equipment	25,043
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	3,442
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	19,625
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	28,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	74,050
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for the development of space qualified focal plane arrays	10,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment, marine position fixing equipment	264,325
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	127,740
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	30,400
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,888,100
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	192,800
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,955,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	606,250
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,043,750
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	1,705,142
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	74,050
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	522
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	25,001
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	173,900
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	40,622
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	32,710
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,394
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	601
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	418,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	12,903
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	516,384
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	5,148
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	39,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	41,025
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	355,525
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	12,782
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	10,223
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	37,300
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	46,100
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	68,400
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	96,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	2,615
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	6,815
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	503
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	476,250
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	606,250
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,325,000
SIEL (Temporary)	civil NBC detection systems	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	thorium	743
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	19,625
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	27,539
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,846,350
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	59,850,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,824,400
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for the production of military communications equipment	500
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	47,600
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	55,200
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,195,400
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	7,959
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military communications equipment	190
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment	3,000,720

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)	employing cryptography	
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	2,762,548
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	6,758
SIEL (Permanent)	military electronic equipment	2,510
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	9,972
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	74,929,600
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	15,830
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	3,982
SIEL (Permanent)	components for chemical agent detection equipment, equipment for the use of chemical agent detection equipment, software for chemical agent detection equipment, technology for chemical agent detection equipment	50,602,435
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	153,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	80,000
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	94,195
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	146
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	25,600
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified focal plane arrays	230,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	24,645
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	18,589
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	107,120
SIEL (Permanent)	nuclear grade graphite	10,300
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,636
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	14,600
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military helicopters	1
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	1



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	170,000
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	565,000
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	53,040
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	530,900
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,607,450
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	618,900
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	0
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	418,250
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,132
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	24,411
SIEL (Permanent)	components for instrumentation cameras	46,000
SIEL (Permanent)	guidance/navigation equipment	26,250
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	320,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	19,719
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	1,852
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	60,684
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military communications equipment	5,276
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	31,658
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	3,381
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	40,045
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5,400,720
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	27,295
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,925,000
SIEL (Temporary)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	226,545

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	128,000
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	19,845
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	321
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,508
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,500
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	3,366
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	960,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	143,040
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	900,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	45,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	226,840
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	181,618
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	51,250
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,650,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,867,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,062
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,345,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	299,200
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,968,750
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,050,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	970,110
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	410,900
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	262,500
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	2,100
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,525,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,254
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military electronic equipment	0
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	36,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	213,250
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	44,654
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	690,550
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,184,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,529
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	11,850
SIEL (Permanent)	software for computer analogue to digital equipment, technology for computer analogue to digital equipment	2
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	118,539
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	76,344
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	239,540
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for civil aero-engines	1
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	35,448
SIEL (Permanent)	electronics cooling fluids	55,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,311,535
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	72,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	11,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,943
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	27,200
SIEL (Permanent)	laser optical components	24,234
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	190
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,229
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	31,600

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	3,792
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	169
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	21,500
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	24,411
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	24,900
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	280,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	175,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	187,590
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	519,700
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	437,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,310
SIEL (Permanent)	laser optical components, lasers	456,504
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	24,688
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,755
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	1,354
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	225,000
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	3,986
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,062
SIEL (Permanent)	mass spectrometers	470,625
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	350,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	99,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	44,930
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	72,255
SIEL	lasers	203,050

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	249,030
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,016,200
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	33,156
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	91,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	28,400
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	22,263
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	730,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for chemical/materials production	27,634
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	100,024
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,308,575
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	65,772
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,869,800
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,625
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,087,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,043,750
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	35,600
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	22,400
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	22,848
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,396
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	110,000
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	25,620
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,850
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	38,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,211
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	12,964,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,062
SIEL (Permanent)	military aircraft ground equipment	14,040
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,265
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military patrol/assault craft	72,100
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	18,900
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	639,600
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	4,380
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	107,120
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,424
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	28,943
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	24,900
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	2,460,659
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	128
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	44,295
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,169
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	975,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	61,958
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	mass spectrometers	330,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	441,580
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	195,493
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,164
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	72,970
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	71,250
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,687,500
SIEL	ballistic test equipment	161,902

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military helicopters	1
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	10,325
SIEL (Permanent)	military aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays	27,854
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	310,000
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	185,077
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	84,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	44,430
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	9,900
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	97,650
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	99,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	15,995
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for periscopes	17
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	2,527
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	66,095
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	7,725
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	97,650
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	120,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	11,976
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	14,121
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,462,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	4,575,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	737,500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,256
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	28,307
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,559
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers, technology for semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,610,000
SIEL	technology for semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	10,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Temporary)	NBC detection equipment, civil NBC detection systems, civil explosive detection/identification equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, components for civil NBC detection systems, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment, technology for civil NBC detection systems	394,809
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,749
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,247
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	852,562
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	35,600
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	180,070
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	12,228
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	79,864
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	760,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	44,735
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,462,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	737,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	7,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	318,806
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	55,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	27,177
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	26,413
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	802,894
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	4,010
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,480
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	327,883
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,955
SIEL (Temporary)	civil NBC detection software, civil NBC detection systems, components for civil NBC detection systems	511,324
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for metal alloy materials	200



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	1,095,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	105,000
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	11,048
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	276,895
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	36,309
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	11,002
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,496
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	4,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,925,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,231,250
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,475,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	455,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	8,937,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,462,500
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,256,111
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	37,200
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	22,520
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	27,300
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	140,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for weapon cleaning equipment, weapon cleaning equipment	1,934,200
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,514
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	17,607
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military electronic equipment	50
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	992
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,608
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	479

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	53,727
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment for the production of gas turbines, technology for military aero-engines	0
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment for the production of gas turbines, technology for military aero-engines	0
SIEL (Permanent)	calibration equipment for guidance/navigation equipment	5,300
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	2,635
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	15,540
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	132,960
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	32,300
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	38,400
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	957,024
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	21,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	382
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,738
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment	281,269
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,933
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	342,671
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	304
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,104
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	5,430
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	11,767
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	260,000
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC detection software, civil NBC detection systems, components for civil NBC detection systems	1,012,717
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	208,014
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	516,250

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	294
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,558
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	118,052
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	32,761
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	24,580
SIEL (Permanent)	electronics cooling fluids	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,270,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,847
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	84,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	17,607
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	896
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures	2
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,411
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6,686
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,955
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	22,665
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,462,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	12,787,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	392,500
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	2,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	392,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	392,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	893,750
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	893,750
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,644
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,140
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	67,294
SIEL	instrumentation cameras	19,400

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	6,900,996
SIEL (Permanent)	pyrotechnics/fuels and related substances	562,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,925,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	13,162,500
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for imaging cameras	1,000
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	30,151
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	2
SIEL (Permanent)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	5,790
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	185,000
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	135,530
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	15,601,440
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	71,160
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	468,040
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,570
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,003
SIEL (Temporary)	lasers	120,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	1,240,986
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	23,625
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	23,625
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for lasers	1
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	27,468
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	9,974
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	84,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	27,356
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	25,482
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	25,482

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	20
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,040,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment employing cryptography	1,315
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,834
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	120,000
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	10,275
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	2,398,682
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	3,006
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	39,970
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	388,044
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	970,110
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,294,871
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	37,662
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	292,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	4,708
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	7,279
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	225
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	12,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,790
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	336,250
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	16,875,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	13,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	1,680
SIEL (Temporary)	military communications equipment	2,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	84,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	61,690
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	16,604
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	126,390
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7,380
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicle control systems, submersible vehicles	2,350,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for mass spectrometers, mass spectrometers	342,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	70,221
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	22,390
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,175
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	65,650
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	9,525,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	242,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	61,875
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,725,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	11,425,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	12,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,925,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,010,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military patrol/assault craft, unfinished products for military patrol/assault craft	755,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	6,200,480
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	21,645
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	3
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,430
SIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	797,562

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	19,354
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	26,860
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	932,608
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	24,100
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	932,608
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	932,608
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	857,999
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	895,303
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	820,695
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	932,608
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	857,999
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	857,999
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	932,608
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	919,872
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,065
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	41,846
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	311,407
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	200,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,339
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	26,860
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	11,110
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,860
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	1,600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	33,887,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,900,000
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	760,000
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified focal plane arrays, technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	260,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	30,380
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,803
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	7,435
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	145,000
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	290,000
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for chemical/materials production	124,623
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,281
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,861
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	28,976
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	16,764
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	9,775
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9,528
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	37,500
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	84,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,280
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,702
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	2,398,682
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	52,360
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,320
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	18,297
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	15,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	60,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	68,650
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,465
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	40,000
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	40,000
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloys in powder form	2,232
SIEL	machine tools	51,448



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,949
SIEL (Permanent)	high speed pulse generators, instrumentation cameras	30,760
SIEL (Permanent)	high speed pulse generators	19,050
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	40,261
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	9,425,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,043,750
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, general naval vessel components, military guidance/navigation equipment, radar equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	93,778
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	100
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	1,462,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	14,625,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	5,850,000
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	21,417
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	25,412,500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,320
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	23,750
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,425
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	24,139
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	4,177
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	92,395
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	62,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	299,200
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	30,610
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	26,000
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	1,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	63,000
SIEL (Permanent)	software for cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	8,500

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, military training equipment	20,610
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	1,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	6,000,480
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	22,622
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, general naval vessel components, military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	93,778
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	721,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	11,000,480
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	8,190
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	836,600
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment employing cryptography	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	2,166,865
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	467,300
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,597,317
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,597,317
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,190,600
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	1,214,600
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	9,112
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	2,748
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional inspection equipment, dimensional measuring equipment, machine tools	5,052,410
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,811
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	29,645
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,125
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	29,060
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	760,424
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloys in powder form	7,317
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	2,895,398
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	2,895,398
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	28,437

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	22,162,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	3,172,712
SIEL (Permanent)	components for lasers	3,172,712
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	47,250
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submersible equipment, submersible equipment	472,860
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	118,579
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	363,677
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	18,942
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened TV camera lenses, radiation hardened TV cameras	22,660
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened TV cameras	22,660
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	44,430
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9,480
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	784,848
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	392,424
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	62,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	12,300
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	44,956
SIEL (Permanent)	calibration equipment for guidance/navigation equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, magnetometers	26,947
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	30,937
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	44,430
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	9,006
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	50,280
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,978,791
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	gravity gradiometers	2,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	1,160,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,450,048

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	44,208
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	26,181
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	257,584
SIEL (Permanent)	guidance/navigation equipment	66,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5,800,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	21,110
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	1,830,863
SIEL (Permanent)	aromatic polyamide-imides	600
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,210
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,210
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	174,000
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	48,300
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	3,975
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	2,760,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,140,000
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	820,192
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	1,561
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,812
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	145,500
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	9,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,625
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	582,612
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	36
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	21,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,877
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	23,229
SIEL	components for military aero-engines	174,370

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	28,226
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	30,030
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	9,362
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	15,524
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	900,002
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	29,312,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	27,912,500
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	108,680
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	27,325,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	33,887,500
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	2,925,000
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	2,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	588,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	582,612
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	1,680
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,482
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	15,056
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,280
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	15,056
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,074
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	12,560
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, radar equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	90,275
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	4,610
SIEL (Permanent)	components for lasers	5,053
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	19,800
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	30,500

Application Type	Goods (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	17,812
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	37,037
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	146,113
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	68
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,760
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	8,510
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	40,980
SIEL (Permanent)	electronics cooling fluids	40,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	60,000
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of cryptographic software, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the production of cryptographic software, technology for the production of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	biological agent detection equipment, software for the use of biological agent detection equipment, technology for the use of biological agent detection equipment, technology for the use of software for the use of biological agent detection equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for the use of biological agent detection equipment, technology for the use of biological agent detection equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for the production of military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, frequency synthesisers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
Dual Use)		
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for periscopes, components for weapon night sights, periscopes, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for weapon night sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, technology for cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for semiconductor process equipment, components for semiconductor process equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for NBC detection equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of digital cellular radio system, technology for the development of frequency agility techniques, technology for the development of spread spectrum techniques	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of digital cellular radio system, technology for the development of frequency agility techniques, technology for the development of spread spectrum techniques	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment for the use of military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military communications	

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (China)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
	equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	fibrous/filamentary materials	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, equipment for the use of military radars, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for marine position fixing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for semiconductor process equipment, components for semiconductor process equipment, software for the use of semiconductor process equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	



Application Type	Goods (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military utility helicopters, equipment for the production of military utility helicopters, equipment for the use of military utility helicopters, technology for the development of military utility helicopters, technology for the production of military utility helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, test equipment for military utility helicopters, unfinished products for military utility helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	diver location sonars, software for diver location sonars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for body armour, components for military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the production of body armour, equipment for the production of goods treated for signature suppression for military use, equipment for the production of military aircrew protective equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for body armour, technology for goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for civil aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	

Application Type	Goods (China)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military utility vehicles	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1,688,716,748</b>

### Colombia

Application Type	Goods (Colombia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,859
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	1,235,358
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	13,106,924
SIEL (Permanent)	telecommunications software	18,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	32,000
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	244
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	3,750,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	1,476
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	371
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	military guidance/navigation equipment	974,628
SIEL (Permanent)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment	8,637
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,738
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,738
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,516
SIEL (Temporary)	military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	191,540
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	2,450

Application Type	Goods (Colombia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	40,676
SIEL (Permanent)	military patrol/assault craft	11,200,637
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, civil body armour	20,150
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	40,000
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	324,405
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	51,275
SIEL (Temporary)	military aircraft ground equipment	10,600
SIEL (Permanent)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	578,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	2,950
SIEL (Permanent)	components for assault rifles, components for machine guns, components for pistols, equipment for the use of machine guns, training small arms ammunition	430,263
SIEL (Permanent)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	161,000
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	56,423
SIEL (Permanent)	components for artillery	10,737
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	93,764
SIEL (Permanent)	high performance air traffic control software	80
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	56,423
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	14,570
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	24,349
SIEL (Temporary)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	15,000
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the production of ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for signalling devices, components for test models for ejector seats, components for test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for test models for military aircrew protective equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the production of ejector seats, equipment for the production of military aircrew protective equipment, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for ejector seats, test models for	

Application Type	Goods (Colombia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	military guidance/navigation equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology	

Application Type	Goods (Colombia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military electronic equipment, components for military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of artillery, components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of artillery, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	

Application Type	Goods (Colombia)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for	

Application Type	Goods (Colombia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>32,494,783</b>

### **Cuba**

Application Type	Goods (Cuba)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>

### **Democratic Republic of Congo**

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Democratic Republic of Congo)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	9,566
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	40,315
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas	1,036,738
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	79,631
SIEL (Temporary)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	751,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	987
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,653
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	3,472
SIEL (Permanent)	military support vehicles	32,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,239
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	900
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	53,571
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,291
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	59,538
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	17,859
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,474
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	339
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	54,514
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives	12,200
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	underwater television cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	



Application Type	Goods (Democratic Republic of Congo)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>2,173,287</b>

### Democratic Republic of Korea

Application Type	Goods (Democratic Republic of Korea)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Temporary)	components for electronic measurement equipment, <b>electronic measurement equipment</b>	8,340
	<b>Total</b>	<b>8,340</b>

### Eritrea

Application Type	Goods (Eritrea)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	960,000
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, military helmets	8,640
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>968,640</b>

### Fiji

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Fiji)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	devices for initiating explosives	37,720
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
	Total	37,720

### Iran

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Iran)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,608
SIEL (Permanent)	components for general industrial production equipment, lubricants, valves	310
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic measurement equipment	34,859
SIEL (Permanent)	components for industrial gas turbines	542,068
SIEL (Permanent)	gas detection equipment	17,386
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	940
SIEL (Permanent)	electronic measurement equipment	500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for industrial gas turbines, industrial gas turbines	12,565,000
SIEL (Permanent)	electrical test equipment	1,037
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic measurement equipment	24,546
SIEL (Permanent)	components for welding equipment	133,203
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	64,779
SIEL	general laboratory equipment, seals	15,725

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Iran)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for pressure monitoring equipment, pressure monitoring equipment, technology for pressure monitoring equipment	65,911
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	55,036
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	32,134
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	7,770,350
SIEL (Permanent)	components for petrochemical plant, components for pneumatic systems, seals	4,604
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for transducers, transducers	810
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	59,390
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	30,894
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	85,576
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	41,970
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	205,514
SIEL (Permanent)	surface coating equipment	1,035,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	79,930
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	299,588
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	534,161
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	793,901
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	38,835
SIEL (Permanent)	components for industrial gas turbines	473,708
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,395
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	5,077
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment	402,518
SIEL (Permanent)	general laboratory equipment	8,092
SIEL (Permanent)	materials analysis equipment	49,382
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	862,000
SIEL (Permanent)	biochemicals	11,300
SIEL (Permanent)	biochemicals	1,100
SIEL (Permanent)	biochemicals, general laboratory equipment	8,669
SIEL (Permanent)	biochemicals, general laboratory equipment	4,026

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Iran)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals	677,952
SIEL (Permanent)	biochemicals	991
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals, components for biotechnology equipment, components for filtration equipment, general laboratory equipment	20,510
SIEL (Permanent)	biochemicals	428
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	611,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	1,632,000
SIEL (Permanent)	civil aero-engines	10,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	1,244,500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil aircraft	625,500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment for the use of industrial gas turbines, equipment for the use of industrial gas turbines	40,178
SIEL (Permanent)	valves	571,038
SIEL (Permanent)	steam systems	34,965
	<b>Total</b>	<b>41,826,894</b>

### *Iraq*

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Iraq)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	710,000
SIEL (Permanent)	radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment	175,560
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	212,480
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft missile protection systems	26,203
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights	23,790
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	155,635
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	30,099
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment	28,400
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military communications equipment	39,300
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,226
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	577,835
SIEL (Permanent)	components for body armour, military helmets	125,416
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	26,498

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Iraq)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	22,500
SIEL (Permanent)	blank/inert ammunition, components for blank/inert ammunition, components for naval guns, equipment for the use of naval guns, technology for equipment for the use of naval guns, technology for naval guns	1,181,290
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	296,905
SIEL (Permanent)	software for spectrophotometers, spectrophotometers	5,076
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	294,784
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	35,040
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,800
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,602
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray accelerators	3,986,200
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military training aircraft	100
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,455,500
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	1,373,505
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,485
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	11,451
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment for the use of naval guns	1
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval gun installations/mountings, inertial equipment	3,746,981
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings	3,466,981
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,100
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	42,514
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, civil body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	45,520
SIEL (Permanent)	components for body armour	320
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,329
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, imaging cameras, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	431,560
SIEL (Temporary)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment, military communications equipment	15,390

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Iraq)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators	5,321,590
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	24,983
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for anti-riot/ballistic shields, technology for body armour, technology for military helmets	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators	1,435,270
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of military helmets	369,500
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	426,600
SIEL (Permanent)	ballistic test equipment	107,800
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	80,948
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,308,725
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators	2,168,101
SIEL (Permanent)	components for body armour	292,800
SIEL (Temporary)	bomb suits, components for demolition charges, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	9,055
SIEL (Temporary)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, military communications equipment, military laser protection equipment	15,790
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	100,848
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for body armour	597,800
SIEL (Temporary)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	28,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, high performance air traffic control software	667,900
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support vehicles	4,500
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits, military helmets	469,907
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	33,384
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	51,378
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military /	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography,	

Application Type	Goods (Iraq)	Total Goods Value (£)
Dual Use)	software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	goods specified by the following entries of "the Main Order" - ML1 ML2 ML3 ML4 ML5 ML6 ML7 ML8 ML9 ML10 ML11 ML12 ML13 ML14 ML15 ML16 ML17 ML18 ML19 ML20 ML21 ML22 PL5017 except for those listed in the additional conditions to the licence	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment, radio controlled improvised explosive device jamming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	devices for initiating explosives, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military transport aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes, components for military training aircraft, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military distress signalling equipment, military parachutes, technology for the development of ejector seats, technology for the development of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the development of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the development of military parachutes, technology for the development of military training aircraft, technology for the production of ejector seats, technology for the production of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the production of military distress signalling equipment, technology for	

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Iraq)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
	the production of military parachutes, technology for the production of military training aircraft, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>32,458,255</b>

### *Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories*

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for air-to-surface missiles	17,927
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	6,525
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of military aero-engines	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ballistic test equipment, software for ballistic test equipment, technology for ballistic test equipment	23,069
SIEL (Permanent)	military cameras/photographic equipment	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	216,534
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	361,620
SIEL (Permanent)	electronics cooling fluids	84,646
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	10,100
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	6,600
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	2,040
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,320
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	35,000
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	1,400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	nuclear grade graphite	19,331
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	32,889
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	22,700



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	military training equipment	28,800
SIEL (Permanent)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment	404,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	98,559
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	70,013
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	12,950,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	5,500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	9,300
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	22,500
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	329,293
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	420,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	262,809
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	62
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	106,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	15,192
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	36,060
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	10,063
SIEL (Permanent)	components for unmanned air vehicles	73,070
SIEL (Permanent)	nickel powders	21,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	42,500
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	107,785
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	333,402
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	133,496
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	11,028,324
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	21,308
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for the use of composite structures	2
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	14,684

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	232,146
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	2,765
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	609,559
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	8,135
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	14,968
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	120,000
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	870,000
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	110,000
SIEL (Permanent)	fibre prepregs	69,860
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	constituents of propellants	1,140
SIEL (Permanent)	nickel powders	92,000
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	8,081,269
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	3,524
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	210,000
SIEL (Permanent)	rangefinding equipment	5,161
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	4,200
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for advanced telecommunications equipment	264,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	9,000
SIEL (Permanent)	triggered spark gaps	116,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	21,646
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	273
SIEL (Permanent)	military electronic equipment	3,891
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	66,000
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	130,000
SIEL (Permanent)	electronics cooling fluids	1,600
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	210,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	99,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	80,000
SIEL (Permanent)	nuclear grade graphite	97,385
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	47,000
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	1,967
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft missile protection systems	69,700
SIEL (Permanent)	armoured plate, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	145,007
SIEL (Permanent)	components for unmanned air vehicles, launching/ground support equipment for unmanned air vehicles	98,566
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	3,530
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	391
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	1,576
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	7,666
SIEL (Transshipment)	components for small arms ammunition	2,395
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	664
SIEL (Permanent)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	37,200
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	16,212
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	electronic countermeasure equipment	10,906,100
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	24,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	1,550
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	36,900
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	13,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,200,025
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	150,000
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	270,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	13,755,692
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	11,500
SIEL (Permanent)	gyroscopes	14,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	4,500
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for global positioning satellite receivers	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	aircraft military communications equipment	17,796
SIEL (Permanent)	diver location sonars, software for diver location sonars	418,824
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	28,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	650,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for civil aero-engines	1,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	113,295
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	200,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,875
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	7,765,450,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,225
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,015
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	47,276
SIEL (Permanent)	electronics cooling fluids	81,101
SIEL (Permanent)	unfinished products for military support aircraft	11,926
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	11,164
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,648
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	22,300
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft missile protection systems	9,906
SIEL (Permanent)	gyroscopes	460,000
SIEL (Permanent)	nickel powders	3,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,750,200
SIEL (Permanent)	constituents of propellants	51

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	4,593
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	600,500
SIEL (Permanent)	gyroscopes	37,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,425,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	120,939
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	190,000
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	43,245
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	80,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	23,546
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	22,500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for surface-to-surface missiles	21,133
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloys in powder form	200
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	8,360
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,026
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	25,200
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,263
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	130,997
SIEL (Permanent)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	2,677
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for surface launched rockets, test models for surface launched rockets	34,797
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	628
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, pressure transducers	505,292
SIEL	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, electronics	987,140

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)	cooling fluids, pressure transducers	
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	nickel powders	9,662
SIEL (Permanent)	nuclear grade graphite	9,300
SIEL (Permanent)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	420,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	755,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	110,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support vehicles	34,800
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	106,778
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,264
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, pressure transducers	738,370
SIEL (Temporary)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	26,880
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	596
SIEL (Temporary)	general military vehicle components	21,035
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	5,500
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	3,400
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, pressure transducers	344,443
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment employing cryptography	14,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,314
SIEL (Temporary)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	6,720
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	8,459
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	92,456
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	550,000
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	19,315
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	1,450

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	53,600
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	8,987
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000
SIEL (Temporary)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, bomb suits, components for body armour	5,600
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	132,573
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,198
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	505,100
SIEL (Permanent)	military electronic equipment	266,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	9,064
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	80,000
SIEL (Permanent)	accelerometers	2,886
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	3,188
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	83,200
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	3,015
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	765,000
SIEL (Temporary)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	131,581
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	679
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,177,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	133,323
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	2,250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for unmanned air vehicles	65,393
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	266,663
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	18,119
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	300,100

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	21,336
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	12,500
SIEL (Permanent)	rebreathing swimming equipment	17,760
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	4,254
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	80,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloys in particulate form	1,316
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military electronic equipment	17,602
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	163,485
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	5,600
SIEL (Temporary)	components for targeting equipment	11,979
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of decoying/countermeasure equipment	45,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	16,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of weapon sights	8,170
SIEL (Temporary)	military electronic equipment	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	8,889
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	1,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	11,250
SIEL (Permanent)	military parametric technical databases, software for equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	2,400
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military airborne equipment	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	19,006
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	210
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for body armour, components for military support vehicles	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	200,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for small arms ammunition	0
SIEL	components for military radars	7,500



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloys in powder form	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	24,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for air-to-surface missiles, test models for air-to-surface missiles	45,100
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	2,080
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	34,591
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	42,100
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	17,500
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	33,990
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	13,974
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	525,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	26,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	973,013
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	4,645
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	330,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	3,318
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	11,600
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic countermeasure equipment	11,800
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	13,000
SIEL (Temporary)	NBC detection equipment, civil NBC detection systems, components for NBC detection equipment, components for civil NBC detection systems, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of chemical agent detection equipment	89,546
SIEL (Permanent)	triggered spark gaps	360,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,851
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	55,000
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	500
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	1,850
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	14,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	108,675
SIEL (Permanent)	targeting equipment	9,699
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,660
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	33,750
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	20,040
SIEL (Permanent)	beryllium alloys, beryllium manufactures	3,066
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,931,805
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	78,140
SIEL (Permanent)	gyroscopes	13,200
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	3,468
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	23,270
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	15,500
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloys in powder form	11,347
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for civil aero-engines	40
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	9,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	324,950
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	19,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	9,800
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	31,014
SIEL (Temporary)	general military vehicle components	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	25,808
SIEL (Permanent)	components for unmanned air vehicles	58,125
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	8,755
SIEL	components for combat aircraft	55,357

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	45,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	15,098
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for small arms ammunition	0
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,800
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	197,550
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	22,350
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	180,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	180,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,060,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	74,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	2,497
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	35,750
SIEL (Temporary)	laser radar equipment	3,200,000
SIEL (Permanent)	armoured plate	11,000
SIEL (Temporary)	high power RF weapon systems	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	188,825
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,900,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment, military electronic equipment	38,242
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	35,000
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	740
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	53,644
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	102,626
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	350,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	350,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	118,600
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	21,000
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-friction bearings	42,025
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	117,766
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	325,000
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-armour ammunition	8,600
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,105
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	378
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	7,105
SIEL (Permanent)	aircraft military communications equipment	67,328
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	18,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	65,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	9,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	547,537
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	62,125
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	125,475
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	54,000
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	6,250
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	6,261
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	10,310
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, military electronic equipment	235,838
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	5,196
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	155,015
SIEL (Temporary)	focal plane arrays	10,000
SIEL	general naval vessel components	8,764

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	12,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	18,200
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,600
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles	793
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	415,895
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	109,416
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	948
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	218,334
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	20,739
SIEL (Temporary)	components for targeting equipment	8,274
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	52,700
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	10,957
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment employing cryptography	3,300
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	28,114
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	22,350
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	11,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	19,760
SIEL (Permanent)	water cannons	67,188
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	105,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for decoying/countermeasure equipment	154,077
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	26,000
SIEL (Permanent)	training small arms ammunition	1,990
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	8,650,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft head-up/down displays	219,000
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	306,250

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	25,824
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,878
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	27,738
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	20,086
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	7,105
SIEL (Permanent)	components for civil NBC protection equipment	40,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras, weapon night sights	1,913,407
SIEL (Permanent)	military equipment for initiating explosives	400
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	46,017
SIEL (Permanent)	components for unmanned air vehicles	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	520
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	2,400
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	74,610
SIEL (Permanent)	software for military aero-engines	11,878
SIEL (Temporary)	general military vehicle components	32,000
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	255,000
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	4,002,167
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	1,305,970
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	165,000
SIEL (Permanent)	targeting equipment, technology for targeting equipment	8,759
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	288,270
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	234,500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	3,796
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	9,550
SIEL	components for military helicopters	7,481

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Temporary)		
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	aircraft military communications equipment	3,750
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	900
SIEL (Permanent)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	4,495
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	25,600
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	224,250
SIEL (Permanent)	direct view imaging equipment	8,000
SIEL (Temporary)	signal generators	18,000
SIEL (Permanent) (OPT)	equipment employing cryptography	5,539
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of cryptographic software, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	biotechnology equipment, components for biotechnology equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for the development of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for the production of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for the use of corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the production of ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the production of ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for equipment for the production of ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military parachutes	

Application Type	Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)	Total Goods Value (£)
	and equipment, components for military training equipment, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, general military aircraft components, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military parachutes and equipment, military training equipment, software for combat aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for production installations for combat aircraft, test models for combat aircraft, unfinished products for combat aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, software for aerial target equipment, technology for aerial target equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for naval communications equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of naval communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, naval communications equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for naval communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military training aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	imaging cameras	
OIEL (Military /	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography,	



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
Dual Use)	software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	artillery ammunition, components for NBC detection equipment, components for artillery, components for combat naval vessels, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, signalling devices, smoke canisters, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, technology for NBC detection equipment, technology for artillery, technology for combat naval vessels, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval engines, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for signalling devices,	

Application Type	Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)	Total Goods Value (£)
	technology for smoke canisters, technology for weapon control equipment, training artillery ammunition, weapon control equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for semiconductor process equipment, components for semiconductor process equipment, software for the use of semiconductor process equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military support aircraft	

Application Type	Goods (Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories)	Total Goods Value (£)
Dual Use)		
	<b>Total</b>	<b>7,912,244,052</b>

## Libya

Application Type	Goods (Libya)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	638
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	7,460
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (30), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of pistols, pistols (30), small arms ammunition	103,000
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	5,220
SIEL (Permanent)	military combat vehicles, military support vehicles	145,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	52,866
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour	1,528,800
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	2,600
SIEL (Permanent)	targeting equipment	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	971,500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6,952
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	3,390,000
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for improvised explosive device disposal remotely operated vehicles, bomb suits, civil explosive detection/identification equipment, gun mountings, improvised explosive device disposal remotely operated vehicles, military helmets, sporting guns (9)	1,833,981
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,090
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	472
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy cylindrical forms	501,771
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	38,875
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (35), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, hand grenades, pistols (21), small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment	72,647
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	400,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Libya)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	9,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	military support vehicles	11,000
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	17,940
SIEL (Permanent)	combat shotguns (5)	4,601
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device jamming equipment	255,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,764
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,873
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment	78,460
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	11,822
SIEL (Permanent)	pistols, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition	38,850
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	962
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000
SIEL (Temporary)	military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	2,330,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	232,954
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	693
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,389
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,460
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,367
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray accelerators	1,994,757
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	21,080
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	57,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	25,013
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives	24,304
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	13,813

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Libya)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	civil body armour, components for body armour	1,138
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray accelerators, technology for X-ray accelerators	13,341,333
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray accelerators, components for X-ray accelerators, software for X-ray accelerators, technology for X-ray accelerators	5,012,667
SIEL (Temporary)	cryptographic software	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits, improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, military helmets	67,534
SIEL (Temporary)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	10,400
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	27
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	20,000
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	underwater television cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>44,308,072</b>

### **Pakistan**

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Pakistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (4), weapon sights	42,600
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,029

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Pakistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic measurement equipment, electronic measurement equipment	11,298
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, software for equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military airborne equipment	4,408,971
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military airborne equipment	6,123
SIEL (Permanent)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	24,100
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	1,577
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat helicopters	375
SIEL (Permanent)	components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles	2,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of artillery ammunition	8,143,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military airborne equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military support aircraft, military communications equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	761,553
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	173
SIEL (Permanent)	workshop tools	6,272
SIEL (Permanent)	components for general laboratory equipment, general laboratory equipment	1,210
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	119
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,705
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat helicopters	1,600
SIEL (Permanent)	electronic warfare equipment	8,874
SIEL (Permanent)	naval electrical/electronic equipment	31,464
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	306
SIEL (Permanent)	components for small arms ammunition, rifles (2), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (3)	4,831
SIEL (Permanent)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	215,145
SIEL (Permanent)	radio jamming equipment	236,158
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training equipment, components for training equipment for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, military training equipment, technology for military training equipment	74,346
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	276
SIEL	electronic measurement equipment, software for electronic	585

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Pakistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)	measurement equipment	
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	6,450
SIEL (Permanent)	electrical test equipment	41,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	78,750
SIEL (Permanent)	pyrotechnics/fuels and related substances	160,000
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	250
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	131,801
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	9,600
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	17,100
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	89,960
SIEL (Permanent)	ballistic test equipment, components for ballistic test equipment, software for ballistic test equipment	52,766
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC decontamination chemical mixtures	1,568
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for materials analysis equipment, components for materials analysis equipment, materials analysis equipment, technology for materials analysis equipment	17,277
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	342,540
SIEL (Permanent)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	55,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, sniper rifles (5), technology for sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	45,201
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	2,628
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for combat aircraft	214,250
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	250
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,890,078
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	49,100
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	397
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	2,080
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	32,966
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sporting guns, sporting guns (1)	500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	67
SIEL	pistols (1)	750

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Pakistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	pistols (1)	750
SIEL (Permanent)	components for gas processing equipment	42,866
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	930
SIEL (Permanent)	components for general industrial production equipment	217
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	26,639
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	13,133
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	11,829
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	14,494
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	750
SIEL (Permanent)	components for general industrial production equipment	202
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	103,428
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for materials processing equipment	1,550
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	1,157
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	2,472,333
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	400
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	2,080
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	32,966
SIEL (Permanent)	components for pumps	3,293
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	2,014
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	197
SIEL (Permanent)	valves	261
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (8), weapon sights	6,313
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,435,040
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars, equipment for the use of military radars, technology for equipment for the use of military radars, technology for military radars	2,967,465
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	1,390
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon night sights	24,034
SIEL	military improvised explosive device	2,689



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Pakistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)	decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	4,164
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	3,651
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	13,558
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	662
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	3,916
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	96,333
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	1,300
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	6,488
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-armour ammunition	2,500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	2,342
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	568,292
SIEL (Temporary)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	145,500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	19,752
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military airborne equipment	1,142
SIEL (Permanent)	military radars	929,727
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat helicopters	4,227
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	500
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,184
SIEL (Permanent)	general military aircraft components	1,450
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	1,565
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	530
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval electrical/electronic equipment	34,000
SIEL (Permanent)	unfinished products for assault rifles	41,825
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	417
SIEL (Permanent)	military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars	5,939,219
SIEL (Temporary)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (1), technology for sniper rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	10,308

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Pakistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	310,286
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of pressure monitoring equipment	4,125
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	2,642
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	31,977
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	600
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	9,450
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	9,670
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	10,644
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	7,446
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	113
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	551
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	22,280
SIEL (Permanent)	military guidance/navigation equipment	5,400
SIEL (Temporary)	military communications equipment	60,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval guns	43
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircrew breathing equipment	15,291
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	354
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	59,655
SIEL (Temporary)	components for sniper rifles, direct view imaging equipment, gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (3), weapon sights	45,000
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	1,250
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	128
SIEL (Permanent)	components for unmanned air vehicles	3,626
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	13,110
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	99
SIEL (Permanent)	general laboratory equipment	1,632
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	610,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine tools, machine tools	1,701,938
SIEL (Temporary)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, sniper rifles (1), weapon sights	9,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Pakistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	2,532
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	7,888
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	4,665
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of artillery ammunition	3,100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	25,485
SIEL (Permanent)	materials testing equipment	3,489
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	10,750
SIEL (Permanent)	general laboratory equipment	5,035
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	2,287
SIEL (Permanent)	aircraft military communications equipment	7,152
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat helicopters	1,879
SIEL (Permanent)	lubricants, non-ferrous metals	8,061
SIEL (Permanent)	software for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment	215
SIEL (Permanent)	military aircraft ground equipment	68,098
SIEL (Transshipment)	exploding grenade ammunition	24,000
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	389,510
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for spectrometers, components for spectrometers, lasers, spectrometers	24,671
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	1,609
SIEL (Permanent)	decoying/countermeasure equipment	235,500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	52
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment	180,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	10,165
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-armour ammunition	3,477
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	1,560
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	7,216
SIEL (Permanent)	naval engines	420,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	188

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Pakistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	731
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	1,625
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	442
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	8,755
SIEL (Permanent)	military support aircraft	342,177
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,078,920
SIEL (Permanent)	general military aircraft components	1,829
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	25,615
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	general military aircraft components	4,074
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	539
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	14,378
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment	80,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	442
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	power supplies	68,960
SIEL (Permanent)	power supplies	68,960
SIEL (Permanent)	industrial generators	34,480
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	60,000
SIEL (Permanent)	aircraft military communications equipment	12,893
SIEL (Permanent)	animal pathogens	1,288
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	32,441
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	9,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submarines	10,584
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	41,580
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	170,952
SIEL (Permanent)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	152,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of pistols, equipment for the production of rifles	1,067
SIEL	equipment for the production of rifles	7,124

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Pakistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of rifles	18,717
SIEL (Permanent)	components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment	135,869
SIEL (Temporary)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, improvised explosive device disruptors, non-military firing sets	17,501
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military electronic equipment, technology for military electronic equipment	5,194
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military parachutes and equipment, military parachutes and equipment	140,699
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	5,820
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	882
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	79
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	6,525
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	37,017
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for frigates, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for naval engines, equipment for the use of naval engines, naval engines, software for the use of naval engines, technology for the use of naval engines, test equipment for naval engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat helicopters, devices containing military pyrotechnic materials, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, pyrotechnic signalling devices, software for the use of combat helicopters, software for the use of equipment for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of devices containing military pyrotechnic materials, technology for the use of equipment for the use of combat helicopters, technology for the use of pyrotechnic signalling devices, unfinished products for combat helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	general naval vessel components, technology for the use of general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, general naval vessel components, technology for the use of equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, technology for the use of general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military electronic equipment, components for naval navigation equipment, components for naval radars, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment, naval navigation equipment, naval radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, technology for the production of military aero-engines, technology for the use of military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats,	

Application Type	Goods (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
Dual Use)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military parachutes, ejector seats, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military distress signalling equipment, military parachutes, technology for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of general military aircraft components, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for artillery, components for mortars, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for turrets, components for weapon control equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	anti-aircraft guns, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, components for counter-countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for fire location equipment, components for general naval vessel components, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military imaging radar sensor equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for naval hull penetrators/connectors, components for periscopes, components for projectile launchers, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, counter-countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, counter-countermeasure	

Application Type	Goods (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>equipment for military image intensifier equipment, counter-countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, counter-countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, countermeasure equipment for military imaging radar sensor equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of fire location equipment, equipment for the use of general naval vessel components, equipment for the use of military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military imaging radar sensor equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of naval communications equipment, equipment for the use of naval electrical/electronic equipment, equipment for the use of naval gun installations/mountings, equipment for the use of naval hull penetrators/connectors, equipment for the use of periscopes, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of sensor integration equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, fire location equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military cameras/photographic equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military imaging radar sensor equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, naval gun installations/mountings, naval guns, naval hull penetrators/connectors, periscopes, projectile launchers, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, sensor integration equipment, targeting equipment, technology for anti-aircraft guns, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for fire location equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military communications equipment,</p>	

Application Type	Goods (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military imaging radar sensor equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for naval hull penetrators/connectors, technology for periscopes, technology for projectile launchers, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment, technology for sensor integration equipment, technology for targeting equipment, technology for weapon control equipment, technology for weapon night sights, technology for weapon sights, weapon control equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military electronic equipment, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the production of ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for signalling devices, ejector seats, equipment for the production of ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for equipment for the production of ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, test models for ejector seats, test models for military aircrew breathing equipment, test models for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, ejector seats, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, signalling devices, technology for combat aircraft, technology for devices containing military pyrotechnic materials, technology for ejector seats, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military /	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography,	



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Pakistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
Dual Use)	software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military combat vehicles, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military support aircraft, components for military support vehicles, components for military training aircraft, components for military underwater remotely operated vehicles, components for naval engines, components for submarines, components for tanks, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat naval vessels, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military electronic equipment, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for submarines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	general naval vessel components, technology for general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for air defence systems, components for aircraft carriers, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for military communications equipment, components for military radars, components for military support vehicles, components for military trailers, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for submarines, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of air defence systems, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, components for signalling devices, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	

Application Type	Goods (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military electronic equipment, components for military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MN; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed of modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military utility vehicles	

Application Type	Goods (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for missile scoring equipment, decoy flares, missile scoring equipment, software for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat naval vessels, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military patrol/assault craft, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military utility helicopters, equipment for the production of military utility helicopters, equipment for the use of military utility helicopters, technology for the development of military utility helicopters, technology for the production of military utility helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, test equipment for military utility helicopters, unfinished products for military utility helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for launching equipment for torpedoes, components for mine countermeasures equipment, components for mine sweeping equipment, components for naval mines, components for torpedoes, components for training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, equipment for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, equipment for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of mine sweeping equipment, equipment for the use of naval mines, equipment for the use of torpedoes, equipment for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping	

Application Type	Goods (Pakistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	equipment, launching equipment for torpedoes, mine countermeasures equipment, mine sweeping equipment, software for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, software for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, software for the use of mine sweeping equipment, software for the use of naval mines, software for the use of torpedoes, software for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, technology for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, technology for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of mine sweeping equipment, technology for the use of naval mines, technology for the use of torpedoes, technology for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, test equipment for launching equipment for torpedoes, test equipment for mine countermeasures equipment, test equipment for mine sweeping equipment, test equipment for naval mines, test equipment for torpedoes, test equipment for training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, torpedoes, training equipment for mine sweeping equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>49,745,940</b>

### Russia

Application Type	Goods (Russia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	2,760
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	17,026
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	48,000
SIEL (Permanent)	military helicopters	195,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	helium-3	32,567

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Russia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for assault rifles	630
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	150
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	3
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	103
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits	14,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	550,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	1,600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	12,300,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6,152
SIEL (Permanent)	unmanned air vehicles	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	100
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for space qualified focal plane arrays	1,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	10,797
SIEL (Permanent)	military guidance/navigation equipment	330,000
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	191
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	3
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite structures	3
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	3,665,885
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	380,000
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	16,432
SIEL (Permanent)	magnetometers	2,277
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	241,773
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	226
SIEL	machine tools	290,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Russia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	21,102
SIEL (Permanent)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	1,650,000
SIEL (Permanent)	animal pathogens	10
SIEL (Permanent)	unmanned air vehicles	17,000
SIEL (Permanent)	unmanned air vehicles	17,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for biotechnology equipment	4,500
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	3,500
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	2,231,236
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	7,336
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	121,080
SIEL (Permanent)	high acceleration centrifuges	214,410
SIEL (Permanent)	tungsten in particulate form	181,500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	23,100
SIEL (Permanent)	military helicopters	195,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, sniper rifles (6)	27,650
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened integrated circuits	208,000
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	33,550
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12,741
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for general military aircraft components	0
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	19,188
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (1)	3,145
SIEL (Permanent)	sniper rifles (1)	3,145
SIEL (Permanent)	unmanned air vehicles	17,900
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	1,250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	10,010
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	21,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	68,400

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Russia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	8,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	2,022,463
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	63
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	263
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	64,350
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	382,539
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	150
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	9,972
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,962
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	23,100
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	385,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military communications equipment	27,320
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	122
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	144
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	15,351
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, sniper rifles (30), weapon cleaning equipment	136,500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	24,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	3,000,000
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	8,000
SIEL (Permanent)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	1,784,000
SIEL (Permanent)	zirconium alloys	2,670
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	400
SIEL (Permanent)	components for body armour	220
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	79,868
SIEL (Permanent)	extended temperature range integrated circuits	375
SIEL (Permanent)	space qualified solar devices	75,800
SIEL	components for small arms ammunition	210,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Russia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	162,500
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	137,270
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	13,344
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	144
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	140,445
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	23,100
SIEL (Permanent)	rebreathing swimming equipment	6,261
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	300
SIEL (Permanent)	general purpose integrated circuits	317
SIEL (Permanent)	millimetric wave components, signal analysers	93,390
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	2,540,132
SIEL (Permanent)	military aircraft ground equipment	13,660
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	1,539,683
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	60,600
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	5,295
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	42,000
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	165
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	hydrophones	14,200,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	3,500
SIEL (Permanent)	semiconductor process equipment	450,000
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	175,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	4,500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools, numerical control software, software for machine tools	662,728



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Russia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	238
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,245
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	1,500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	9,972
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	1,760,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	15,351
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	149
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sporting guns	3,435
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition, sporting guns (1), weapon sights	24,200
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (5)	5,700
SIEL (Permanent)	hydrophones	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	980,666
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for combat helicopters	10
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,693,150
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	44,028
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	8,155
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sniper rifles, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun mountings, sniper rifles (42), weapon cleaning equipment	155,989
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	157,500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6,900
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	4,500
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (6)	4,724
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	79
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	13,536
SIEL	imaging cameras	6,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Russia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Temporary)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment	14,890
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	9,063
SIEL (Permanent)	global positioning satellite receivers	1,095,660
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	79
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	135
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	450,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	450,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	zirconium alloys	200,650
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	16,355,000
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	165
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	35,822
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	58,481
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	26,852
SIEL (Permanent)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment	15,600
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment	13
SIEL (Permanent)	computer analogue-to-digital equipment, software for computer analogue-to-digital equipment	20,400
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	26,975
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	17,969,636
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	software for semiconductor device manufacturing processes	4,150
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	51,961
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened integrated circuits	456,000
SIEL (Permanent)	general naval vessel components	455
SIEL (Permanent)	animal pathogens	10

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Russia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras, weapon night sights	39,265
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	22,126
SIEL (Permanent)	focal plane arrays	96,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	115,000
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium solutions	104
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	11,242
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	448
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon night sights, weapon sights	103,213
SIEL (Permanent)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	420,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	581,980
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	22,500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	573,228
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	1,885
SIEL (Permanent)	accelerometers	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	controlled atmosphere furnaces	830,000
SIEL (Permanent)	guidance/navigation equipment, inertial equipment	49,550
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	71,005
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	309,840
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	430,500
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	61
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,235,920
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	23,100
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened TV camera lenses	3,550
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	3,520,000
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	5,765
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	15,351
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	480
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment	1,534,181

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Russia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)	employing cryptography	
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,269,650
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	218,521
SIEL (Permanent)	gyro-astro compasses	333,000
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	38,750
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	400
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6,815
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (66)	24,124
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	8,359,450
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters	937,695
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	microwave components	44,039
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,707
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	18,900
SIEL (Permanent)	dimensional measuring equipment	12,000
SIEL (Permanent)	rotary position encoders	4,600
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	925,000
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	63
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	200,000
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicle control systems, submersible vehicles	1,211,454
SIEL (Permanent)	beryllium manufactures	2,750
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (5)	3,600
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of gas turbines	47,758
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sporting guns	1,517
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	4,500
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	168,490
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	63,807
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	65

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Russia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	3
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,534,181
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	160,476
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	biotechnology equipment, components for biotechnology equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of cryptographic software, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for the production of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for rifles, components for sporting guns, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	biotechnology equipment, components for biotechnology equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for inertial equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	non-military detonators	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	air guns	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	imaging cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	

Application Type	Goods (Russia)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	animal pathogens	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	acoustic seabed survey equipment, equipment employing cryptography, guidance/navigation equipment, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles, underwater sonar navigation systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography,	

Application Type	Goods (Russia)	Total Goods Value (£)
Dual Use)	software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	fibrous/filamentary materials	

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Russia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
Dual Use)		
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>131,542,677</b>

### **Saudi Arabia**

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	5,476
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,601,668
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, components for body armour, military helmets	15,900
SIEL (Permanent)	radio jamming equipment	29,750
SIEL (Permanent)	CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition	970,001
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	2,276
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	6,189
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	13,815
SIEL (Permanent)	software enabling equipment to function as military training equipment	1
SIEL (Permanent)	software for the simulation of military operation scenarios	1
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for air-to-surface missiles	61,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,658
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	21,000



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	170
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	128
SIEL (Permanent)	military training equipment	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training equipment	19,185
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	2,202
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	126
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,068
SIEL (Permanent)	direct view imaging equipment	18,954
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	6,621
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	49,447
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	1,995
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft, technology for combat aircraft	2,475,100
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	890
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	131,448
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,331
SIEL (Permanent)	military airborne equipment	746,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	39,490
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	39,490
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	39,490
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	46,150
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	52,650
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	39,490
SIEL (Permanent)	crowd control ammunition, hand grenades, illuminators, signalling devices, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training crowd control ammunition	3,809,075
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	284,308

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	532
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment	2,732,397
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	30,086
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	30,086
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for production installations for decoying/countermeasure equipment	14,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for production installations for decoying/countermeasure equipment	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for production installations for decoying/countermeasure equipment	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for production installations for decoying/countermeasure equipment	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for production installations for decoying/countermeasure equipment	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	6,753
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	297
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for production installations for decoying/countermeasure equipment	258,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for turrets, turrets	3,941,291
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment for the production of decoying/countermeasure equipment, equipment for the production of decoying/countermeasure equipment	974,000
SIEL (Permanent)	decoying/countermeasure equipment, inert decoying/countermeasure equipment	276,950
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment	6,429
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	20,317
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	12,890
SIEL (Permanent)	components for turrets	2,790
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	18,950
SIEL (Permanent)	aircraft military communications equipment	2,945

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for turrets	44,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment	21,633
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	39,550
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,512
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	103,358
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	330
SIEL (Permanent)	electronics cooling fluids	81
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for unmanned air vehicles	1
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,232
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	command communications control and intelligence software	120,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for air-to-surface missiles	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	143
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	366
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	196
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	224
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	880
SIEL (Permanent)	components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions	65,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	3,622
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	1,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	40
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	94
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	914
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	447
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	1,133

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	military aircraft ground equipment	2,752
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	16,400
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	243,605
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	41,500
SIEL (Permanent)	software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment	13,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,650
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	978
SIEL (Permanent)	illuminators	74,371
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval communications equipment	51,444
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,200
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat aircraft	2,930
SIEL (Permanent)	pressure transducers	9,690
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	85,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9,742
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	9,415
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,500
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	78,583
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	524,235
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	2,526
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,261
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	476,957
SIEL (Permanent)	graphite materials, nuclear grade graphite	18,497
SIEL (Permanent)	components for machine guns	21,744

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	tear gas/irritant ammunition	215,712
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	140,200
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,375
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	370,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,817
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	1,964
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,980
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	441,376
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,272,892
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	4,123
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	471,460
SIEL (Permanent)	components for turrets	3,750
SIEL (Permanent)	components for turrets	1,250
SIEL (Permanent)	components for electronic warfare equipment	537,767
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,675
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	315
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	223
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers	600
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,060
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,037
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	49,168
SIEL (Permanent)	software for semiconductor process equipment	0
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium solutions	111

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,052
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	68,964
SIEL (Permanent)	combat aircraft, military airborne equipment	1,582,666,650
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	695,830
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	79,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,248
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	51,820
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,919
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	1,234,972
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits, components for military equipment for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of improvised explosive device disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disruptors, military equipment for initiating explosives, military helmets, night vision goggles	1,152,383
SIEL (Temporary)	weapon night sights	25,800
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	47,700
SIEL (Permanent)	blank/inert ammunition	196,500
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	932
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns	5,400
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	1,248
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	675,973
SIEL (Permanent)	direct view imaging equipment	9,000
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for body armour	774
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	11,465
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	247,541
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,600
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,115

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	42,893
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	18,752
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,415
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,435
SIEL (Temporary)	inertial equipment	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	ballistic test equipment	26,381
SIEL (Permanent)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	136,584
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	56,382
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	52,682
SIEL (Temporary)	weapon cleaning equipment	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	12,976
SIEL (Temporary)	components for targeting equipment	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	160,663
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	4,726
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	215
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	4,726
SIEL (Permanent)	non-military firing sets	6,620,757
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,717
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	1
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	8,500
SIEL (Permanent)	materials analysis equipment	10,950
SIEL (Temporary)	components for sniper rifles, gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (2), weapon sights	23,250
SIEL (Temporary)	weapon night sights	64,500
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	94,809
SIEL (Permanent)	CS hand grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition	970,001

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers	400
SIEL (Permanent)	toxic gas monitoring equipment	344
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	26,921
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for civil unmanned air vehicles	0
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	205,509
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	417,742
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	96
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	189
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	60
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	119
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	286,838
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	201
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	73
SIEL (Permanent)	components for combat naval vessels	7,022
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	19,115
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	509,057
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	239,719
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	781
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	11,277
SIEL (Permanent)	software for military aero-engines	200
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	18,872
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	105,000
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits, military helmets	96,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval communications equipment	10,000



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	2
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	100,006
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	33,020
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the production of machine guns	12,760
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	576
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval guns, equipment for the use of naval guns, naval guns, weapon mountings	319,990
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers, sporting guns (20)	10,360
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	175,299
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	1,046
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	502
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-armour ammunition, blank/inert ammunition, crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition	20,510
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	580,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	59,121
SIEL (Permanent)	components for weapon sight mounts, equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts	27,923
SIEL (Permanent)	composite materials production equipment	76,590
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits, civil NBC detection systems, components for improvised explosive device disposal remotely operated vehicles, equipment for the use of civil NBC detection systems, equipment for the use of military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, improvised explosive device detection equipment, military communications equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military support vehicles	2,652,357
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	227
SIEL (Permanent)	toxins	87,840
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	4,743
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	7,575
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	758
SIEL (Temporary)	military communications equipment	31,711

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Transshipment)	anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition	6,550,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	137,200
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12,179
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	880
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	122,004
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	33,842
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	26,000
SIEL (Temporary)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	13,800
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	4,460
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	1,293
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	969
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	892
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	2,327
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	1,406
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft military communications equipment	1,309
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval communications equipment	18,890
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval communications equipment	80,167
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	667
SIEL (Permanent)	frequency changers	321
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment, targeting equipment	261,372
SIEL (Temporary)	targeting equipment	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	54,174
SIEL (Temporary)	military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, targeting equipment	41,000
SIEL (Permanent)	compound semiconductor precursor chemicals	552

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	20,940
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,221
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	891
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon night sights	6,178,373
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,219
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	18,401
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	11,575
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,338
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12,038
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon night sights	161,280
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submersible equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	342,854
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	32,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, technology for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	4,645
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, technology for improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	93,852
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	130,773
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	580
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	381
SIEL (Permanent)	military equipment for initiating explosives	4,221,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for improvised explosive device disruptors	42,286
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,476
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	66,343
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	309,677
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	569,900
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition	1,349,840
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	36,469

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	software for software for military guidance/navigation equipment	50
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	778,682
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	13,422
SIEL (Permanent)	acoustic seabed survey equipment	90,000
SIEL (Permanent)	bellows sealed valves	5,591
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,422
SIEL (Permanent)	components for recognition/identification equipment	262,664
SIEL (Temporary)	military electronic equipment	7,700
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	31,145
SIEL (Permanent)	electronics cooling fluids	31,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	96,058
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	138,012
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	2,120
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	70
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	29,955
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	570,524
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	162
SIEL (Permanent)	components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	545,284
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	9,861,331
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	9,600
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment	32,074
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	18,300
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12,536
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	138,100

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	24,097
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	1,785
SIEL (Permanent)	Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating military operation scenarios, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	566,960
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367,560
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,009
SIEL (Permanent)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, technology for improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	295,294
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment for the use of weapon night sights, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights	367,560
SIEL (Permanent)	non-military firing sets	20,955
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,989
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	379
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	106,920
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	1,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	21,000
SIEL (Permanent)	aircraft military communications equipment	3,698
SIEL (Permanent)	deuterium compounds	141
SIEL (Temporary)	fire location equipment, recognition/identification equipment, software for fire location equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment	19,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for bombs	8,254,258
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	12,476
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	615,001
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	17,742
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,027

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, military laser protection equipment	1,530
SIEL (Temporary)	radio jamming equipment	45,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	16,314
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon night sights, weapon sights	17,553
SIEL (Permanent)	radio jamming equipment	104,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,560
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,640
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	1,066,560
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military combat vehicles	76
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,142
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,397
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,800
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	750
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	83,771
SIEL (Permanent)	instrumentation cameras	69,000
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,013,879
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	23,550
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,808
SIEL (Temporary)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil NBC protection equipment, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment, military communications equipment, rebreathing swimming equipment, technology for military communications equipment	11,750
SIEL (Permanent)	military airborne equipment	1,927
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aircraft ground equipment	6,551
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	8,529
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	17,058

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	5,640
SIEL (Temporary)	military image intensifier equipment, weapon night sights	85,500
SIEL (Temporary)	weapon night sights	85,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,520,061
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,776
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	51,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	322
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	1,516
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	874
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives	7,737
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	18,491
SIEL (Permanent)	civil unmanned air vehicles	50,143
SIEL (Permanent)	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	1,639
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	2,158
SIEL (Permanent)	general military aircraft components	21,675
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,012
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne surveillance equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft cannons, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft missile protection systems, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, chaff, chaff equipment, components for airborne surveillance equipment, components for airborne targeting equipment, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft missile protection systems, components for aircraft radars, components for chaff equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for laser rangefinders, components for liquid oxygen converters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft head-up displays, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military video processing equipment, components for military video recording equipment, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for weapon control	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>systems, components for weapon sights, decoy flares, ejector seats, environmental test facilities for combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, imaging countermeasures equipment, laser rangefinders, launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, launching equipment for bombs, liquid oxygen converters, military aero-engines, military aircraft flight data recorders, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up displays, military aircraft navigation equipment, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, military video processing equipment, military video recording equipment, optical target acquisition equipment, recognition/identification equipment, software for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, software for the use of airborne surveillance equipment, software for the use of airborne targeting equipment, software for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, software for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for the use of aircraft radars, software for the use of combat aircraft, software for the use of ejector seats, software for the use of environmental test facilities for combat aircraft, software for the use of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, software for the use of imaging countermeasures equipment, software for the use of laser rangefinders, software for the use of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, software for the use of launching equipment for bombs, software for the use of liquid oxygen converters, software for the use of military aero-engines, software for the use of military aircraft flight data recorders, software for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, software for the use of military aircraft head-up displays, software for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, software for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, software for the use of military image intensifier equipment, software for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for the use of military video processing equipment, software for the use of military video recording equipment, software for the use of optical target acquisition equipment, software for the use of optical target tracking equipment, software for the use of test equipment for combat aircraft, software for the use of test equipment for military aero-engines, software for the use of training equipment for combat aircraft, software for the use of weapon control systems, software for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of airborne surveillance equipment, technology for the use of airborne targeting equipment, technology for the use of aircraft cannons, technology for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, technology for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, technology for the use of aircraft radars, technology for the use of aircrew protective masks, technology for the use of anti-g/pressure suits, technology for the use of chaff, technology for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of decoy flares, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of environmental test facilities for combat aircraft, technology for the use of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for the use of imaging countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of laser rangefinders, technology for the use of launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, technology for the use of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, technology for the use of launching equipment for bombs,</p>	



Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>technology for the use of liquid oxygen converters, technology for the use of military aero-engines, technology for the use of military aircraft flight data recorders, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aircraft head-up displays, technology for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military video processing equipment, technology for the use of military video recording equipment, technology for the use of optical target acquisition equipment, technology for the use of optical target tracking equipment, technology for the use of test equipment for combat aircraft, technology for the use of test equipment for military aero-engines, technology for the use of training equipment for combat aircraft, technology for the use of weapon control systems, technology for the use of weapon sights, test equipment for combat aircraft, test equipment for military aero-engines, training equipment for combat aircraft, weapon control systems, weapon sights</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	<p>technology for the development of air-to-surface missiles, technology for the use of air-to-surface missiles</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	<p>general military aircraft components</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	<p>components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aero-engines</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	<p>airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne surveillance equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft cannons, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft missile protection systems, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warning equipment, chaff, chaff equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for airborne surveillance equipment, components for airborne targeting equipment, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft missile protection systems, components for aircraft radars, components for aircrew protective masks, components for anti-g/pressure suits, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for chaff equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for electronic countermeasures equipment, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the use of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the use of ejector seats, components for guided missile decoying equipment, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for laser rangefinders, components for laser warning detectors, components for liquid oxygen converters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft head-up displays, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military flying helmets, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military imaging radar equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military video processing equipment, components for military video recording equipment, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for</p>	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor data recorders, components for test equipment for combat aircraft, components for weapon control systems, components for weapon sights, decoy flares, ejector seats, electronic countermeasures equipment, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of ejector seats, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, guided missile decoying equipment, guided missile detection equipment, imaging countermeasures equipment, laser rangefinders, laser warning detectors, launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, launching equipment for bombs, liquid oxygen converters, materials for reduced electromagnetic reflectivity for military use, military aero-engines, military aircraft flight data recorders, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up displays, military aircraft navigation equipment, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military containers, military field generators, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military imaging radar equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, military parametric technical databases, military video processing equipment, military video recording equipment, optical target acquisition equipment, production technology for combat aircraft, recognition/identification equipment, sensor data recorders, signature suppression coatings for military use, signature suppression fittings for military use, signature suppression treatments for military use, software for the production of airborne electronic warfare equipment, software for the production of airborne surveillance equipment, software for the production of airborne targeting equipment, software for the production of aircraft cannons, software for the production of aircraft missile protection systems, software for the production of aircraft radars, software for the production of aircrew protective masks, software for the production of anti-g/pressure suits, software for the production of chaff, software for the production of chaff equipment, software for the production of combat aircraft, software for the production of decoy flares, software for the production of ejector seats, software for the production of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, software for the production of equipment for the use of combat aircraft, software for the production of equipment for the use of ejector seats, software for the production of guided missile decoying equipment, software for the production of guided missile detection equipment, software for the production of imaging countermeasures equipment, software for the production of laser rangefinders, software for the production of launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, software for the production of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, software for the production of launching equipment for bombs, software for the production of liquid oxygen converters, software for the production of military aero-engines, software for the production of military aircraft flight data recorders, software for the production of military aircraft ground equipment, software for the production of military aircraft head-up displays, software for the production of military aircraft navigation equipment, software for the production of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, software for the production of military containers, software for the production of military field generators, software for the production of military flying helmets, software for the production of military image intensifier equipment, software for the production of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for the production of military</p>	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>parachutes, software for the production of military parametric technical databases, software for the production of military video processing equipment, software for the production of military video recording equipment, software for the production of optical target acquisition equipment, software for the production of recognition/identification equipment, software for the production of signature suppression fittings for military use, software for the production of signature suppression treatments for military use, software for the production of test equipment for combat aircraft, software for the production of test equipment for military aero-engines, software for the production of unfinished products for combat aircraft, software for the production of weapon control systems, software for the production of weapon sights, software for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, software for the use of airborne surveillance equipment, software for the use of airborne targeting equipment, software for the use of aircraft cannons, software for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for the use of aircraft radars, software for the use of anti-g/pressure suits, software for the use of chaff equipment, software for the use of combat aircraft, software for the use of ejector seats, software for the use of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, software for the use of equipment for the use of combat aircraft, software for the use of equipment for the use of ejector seats, software for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, software for the use of guided missile detection equipment, software for the use of imaging countermeasures equipment, software for the use of laser rangefinders, software for the use of launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, software for the use of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, software for the use of launching equipment for bombs, software for the use of liquid oxygen converters, software for the use of military aero-engines, software for the use of military aircraft flight data recorders, software for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, software for the use of military aircraft head-up displays, software for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, software for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, software for the use of military field generators, software for the use of military image intensifier equipment, software for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for the use of military parachutes, software for the use of military parametric technical databases, software for the use of military video processing equipment, software for the use of military video recording equipment, software for the use of optical target acquisition equipment, software for the use of recognition/identification equipment, software for the use of test equipment for combat aircraft, software for the use of test equipment for military aero-engines, software for the use of weapon control systems, software for the use of weapon sights, technology for the production of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the production of airborne targeting equipment, technology for the production of aircraft cannons, technology for the production of aircraft military communications equipment, technology for the production of aircraft missile protection systems, technology for the production of aircraft radars, technology for the production of aircrew protective masks, technology for the production of anti-g/pressure suits, technology for the production of chaff, technology for the production of chaff equipment, technology for the production of combat aircraft, technology for the production of decoy flares, technology for the production of ejector seats, technology for the</p>	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>production of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for the production of equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the production of equipment for the use of ejector seats, technology for the production of goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for the production of guided missile decoying equipment, technology for the production of guided missile detection equipment, technology for the production of imaging countermeasures equipment, technology for the production of laser rangefinders, technology for the production of launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, technology for the production of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, technology for the production of launching equipment for bombs, technology for the production of liquid oxygen converters, technology for the production of materials for reduced electromagnetic reflectivity for military use, technology for the production of military aero-engines, technology for the production of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the production of military aircraft head-up displays, technology for the production of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the production of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the production of military containers, technology for the production of military field generators, technology for the production of military flying helmets, technology for the production of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for the production of military parachutes, technology for the production of military parametric technical databases, technology for the production of military video processing equipment, technology for the production of military video recording equipment, technology for the production of optical target acquisition equipment, technology for the production of recognition/identification equipment, technology for the production of signature suppression coatings for military use, technology for the production of signature suppression fittings for military use, technology for the production of signature suppression treatments for military use, technology for the production of test equipment for combat aircraft, technology for the production of test equipment for military aero-engines, technology for the production of weapon control systems, technology for the production of weapon sights, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of airborne targeting equipment, technology for the use of aircraft cannons, technology for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, technology for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, technology for the use of aircraft radars, technology for the use of aircrew protective masks, technology for the use of anti-g/pressure suits, technology for the use of chaff, technology for the use of chaff equipment, technology for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of decoy flares, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for the use of equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technology for the use of equipment for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, technology for the use of guided missile detection equipment, technology for the use of imaging countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of laser rangefinders, technology for the use of launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, technology for the use of launching equipment for air-to-surface missiles, technology for the use of launching equipment for bombs, technology for the use of liquid oxygen converters,</p>	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	technology for the use of materials for reduced electromagnetic reflectivity for military use, technology for the use of military aero-engines, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aircraft head-up displays, technology for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military containers, technology for the use of military field generators, technology for the use of military flying helmets, technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military parametric technical databases, technology for the use of military video processing equipment, technology for the use of military video recording equipment, technology for the use of optical target acquisition equipment, technology for the use of recognition/identification equipment, technology for the use of signature suppression coatings for military use, technology for the use of signature suppression fittings for military use, technology for the use of signature suppression treatments for military use, technology for the use of test equipment for combat aircraft, technology for the use of test equipment for military aero-engines, technology for the use of weapon control systems, technology for the use of weapon sights, test equipment for combat aircraft, test equipment for military aero-engines, unfinished products for combat aircraft, weapon control systems, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for landing craft, components for military search and rescue aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, equipment for the production of airborne refuelling equipment, equipment for the production of landing craft, equipment for the production of military search and rescue aircraft, equipment for the production of military transport aircraft, equipment for the production of military utility aircraft, equipment for the use of airborne refuelling equipment, equipment for the use of landing craft, equipment for the use of military search and rescue aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, equipment for the use of military utility aircraft, technology for the use of airborne refuelling equipment, technology for the use of landing craft, technology for the use of military search and rescue aircraft, technology for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military utility aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	airborne refuelling equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for ground based radars, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft head-down displays, components for military aircraft head-up displays, components for military aircraft navigation	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	equipment, components for military cameras, components for military communications equipment, components for military transport aircraft, components for tanker aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft navigation equipment, military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military communications equipment, simulators for military communications equipment, software for the use of equipment for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of simulators for military communications equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of simulators for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	ballistic test equipment, components for ballistic test equipment, software for the use of ballistic test equipment, technology for the use of ballistic test equipment, test equipment for armoured plate, test equipment for body armour, test equipment for constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, test equipment for military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	command and control vehicles, command communications control and intelligence equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, software for the use of command and control vehicles, technology for the use of command and control vehicles, technology for the use of command communications control and intelligence equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	assault rifles, blank ammunition, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, training small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for the development of civil unmanned air vehicle engines, technology for the development of civil unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of control equipment for unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of guidance equipment for unmanned air vehicles, technology for the development of remote control equipment for unmanned air vehicles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for test equipment for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technology	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	for the use of combat aircraft, test equipment for combat aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for the development of air-to-surface missiles, technology for the production of air-to-surface missiles, technology for the use of air-to-surface missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military combat vehicles, equipment for the production of military combat vehicles, equipment for the use of military combat vehicles, military combat vehicles, technology for military combat vehicles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military radars, components for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes and equipment, components for military training aircraft, military parachutes and equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for the use of military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, aerial target equipment, aircraft cannon ammunition, aircraft cannons, aircraft military communications equipment, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for aircraft cannon ammunition, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, components for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for ejector seats, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for fire location equipment, components for fuze setting devices, components for general military aircraft	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>components, components for global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military containers, components for military field generators, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, components for weapon sights, countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, ejector seats, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft cannon ammunition, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons, equipment for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of decoying/countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of fire location equipment, equipment for the use of fuze setting devices, equipment for the use of global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft head-up/down displays, equipment for the use of military aircraft pressure refuellers, equipment for the use of military aircrew</p>	



Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of military containers, equipment for the use of military field generators, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of military mobile repair shops and related equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of sensor integration equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of test models for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of test models for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of test models for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of weapon mountings, equipment for the use of weapon sights, fire location equipment, fuze setting devices, general military aircraft components, global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up/down displays, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military cameras/photographic equipment, military containers, military field generators, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, military training equipment, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, sensor integration equipment, signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, software for aerial target equipment, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for combat aircraft, software for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, software for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for decoying/countermeasure equipment, software for determining the effects of weapons, software for electronic countermeasure equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, software for fire location equipment, software for fuze setting devices, software for global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, software for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, software for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, software for military aero-engines, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military</p>	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military image intensifier equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, software for military radars, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, software for military training equipment, software for rangefinding equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment, software for sensor integration equipment, software for targeting equipment, software for weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, technology for aircraft cannon ammunition, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for countermeasure equipment for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military image intensifier equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for ejector seats, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for fire location equipment, technology for fuze setting devices, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military field generators, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment, technology for sensor integration equipment, technology for software for determining the effects of weapons, technology for targeting equipment, technology for test models for combat aircraft, technology for test models for military support aircraft, technology for test models for military training aircraft, technology for weapon control equipment, technology for weapon mountings, technology for weapon sights, test models for combat aircraft, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft, unfinished products for combat aircraft, unfinished products for military support aircraft, unfinished products for military training aircraft, weapon control	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	equipment, weapon mountings, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military support aircraft, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	military aircrew breathing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, aerial target equipment, components for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military radars, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, military aero-engines, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military radars, military training aircraft, military training equipment, technology for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military parachutes and equipment, signalling devices, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for equipment for the use of military helicopters,	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>software for military aero-engines, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military helicopters, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military helicopters, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for signalling devices, technology for software for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for software for equipment for the use of military helicopters, technology for software for military aero-engines, technology for software for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for software for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for software for military helicopters</p>	
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating military operation scenarios, Software for modelling/simulating/evaluating weapon systems, armoured plate, artillery ammunition, attack alerting/warning equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for fire location equipment, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military containers, components for military field generators, components for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, components for military radars, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, components for naval guns, components for pistols, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, environmental test facilities for military auxiliary/support vessels, equipment for the production of military auxiliary/support vessels, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of fire location equipment, equipment for the use of military auxiliary/support vessels, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of sensor integration equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, explosives, fire location equipment, general naval vessel components, global navigation satellite systems jamming equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military auxiliary/support vessels, military communications equipment, military containers, military diving apparatus, military electronic equipment, military field generators, military guidance/navigation equipment, military imaging radar sensor equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, military scenario simulation equipment, military software, military training equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, naval engines, naval gun installations/mountings, naval guns, pistols, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, sensor integration equipment,</p>	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, small arms ammunition, small arms training equipment, software for determining the effects of weapons, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for military communications equipment, targeting equipment, tear gas/riot control agents, technology for military auxiliary/support vessels, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for production installations for military auxiliary/support vessels, test models for military auxiliary/support vessels, weapon control equipment, weapon mountings, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for software for air-to-surface missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	air-to-surface missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for equipment for the use of air-to-surface missiles, components for inert air-to-surface missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military training equipment, components for test equipment for air-to-surface missiles, equipment for the use of air-to-surface missiles, inert air-to-surface missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military training equipment, software for air-to-surface missiles, software for inert air-to-surface missiles, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, software for military communications equipment, software for military electronic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military training equipment, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for inert air-to-surface missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military training equipment, technology for replica air-to-surface missiles, test equipment for air-to-surface missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft military communications equipment, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military containers, components for military field generators, components for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, electronic warfare equipment, environmental test facilities for combat aircraft, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, general military aircraft components, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military cameras/photographic equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military field generators, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military imaging radar sensor equipment, military	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military mobile repair shops and related equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for combat aircraft, software for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, software for general military aircraft components, software for goods treated for signature suppression for military use, software for military aero-engines, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military containers, software for military field generators, software for military image intensifier equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military imaging radar sensor equipment, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, software for military parametric technical databases, software for military radars, software for rangefinding equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment, software for signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, software for targeting equipment, software for test models for combat aircraft, software for weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military imaging radar sensor equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military mobile repair shops and related equipment, technology for military parametric technical databases, technology for military radars, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment, technology for signature suppression fittings/coatings/treatments for military use, technology for targeting equipment, technology for test models for combat aircraft, technology for weapon control equipment, test models for combat aircraft, weapon control equipment</p>	
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft missile protection systems, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft missile protection systems, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic</p>	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for sensor integration equipment, components for targeting equipment, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military airborne equipment, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up/down displays, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military cameras/photographic equipment, military communications equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image intensifier equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parametric technical databases, military radars, sensor integration equipment, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for aircraft missile protection systems, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for decoying/countermeasure equipment, software for electronic countermeasure equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military communications equipment, software for military electronic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military image intensifier equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military radars, software for sensor integration equipment, software for targeting equipment, software for weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for aircraft missile protection systems, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image intensifier equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military radars, technology for sensor integration equipment, technology for targeting equipment, technology for weapon control equipment, weapon control equipment</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, aerial target equipment, components for accessories for military	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	image recording/processing equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military radars, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, military aero-engines, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military radars, military training aircraft, military training equipment, technology for accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for aerial target equipment, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military electronic equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military containers, components for military training equipment, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, military parametric technical databases, military training equipment, software for air-to-air missiles, software for combat aircraft, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for combat aircraft, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military training equipment, technology for training air-to-air missiles	



Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment for the production of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for military aero-engines, components for test equipment for military aero-engines, environmental test facilities for military aero-engines, equipment for the production of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military containers, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines, technology for software for military aero-engines, test equipment for military aero-engines, unfinished products for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	airborne refuelling equipment, aircraft cannons, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warning equipment, chaff equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for fire control equipment, components for military aero-engines, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, fire control equipment, guided missile decoying equipment, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military containers, military electronic equipment, military flying helmets, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes and equipment, software for airborne refuelling equipment, software for aircraft cannons, software for aircrew protective masks, software for anti-g/pressure suits, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for chaff equipment, software for combat aircraft, software for ejector seats, software for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, software for fire control equipment, software for guided missile decoying equipment, software for military aero-engines, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military containers, software for military flying helmets, software for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, software for military parachutes and equipment,	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	technology for airborne refuelling equipment, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for aircrew protective masks, technology for anti-g/pressure suits, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for chaff equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology for ejector seats, technology for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, technology for fire control equipment, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military containers, technology for military flying helmets, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military parachutes and equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military training aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for military training equipment, components for military training equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, equipment for the use of munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, software for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bombs, components for bombs, components for military containers, equipment for the use of bombs, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, military containers, military parametric technical databases, military software, military training equipment, software for bombs, technology for bombs, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the use of bombs	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	mixtures containing chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military radars, military software, technology for military radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for naval engines, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military helicopters, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of naval engines, general military aircraft components, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for naval engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft,	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew protective equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MNs; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed of modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	sporting guns	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment,	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for the use of test equipment for inertial equipment, test equipment for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, components for equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for test equipment for aerial target equipment, components for test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for training airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military training aircraft, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of training	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, training airborne electronic warfare equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, aircraft radars, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video recording equipment, components for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, components for weapons simulators, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft radars, equipment for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military video recording equipment, equipment for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of weapons simulators, military aircraft navigation equipment, military training aircraft, military video recording equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of aircraft radars, technology for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military video recording equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of weapons simulators, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aircraft radars, test equipment for military aircraft navigation equipment, test equipment for military video recording equipment, test equipment for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, test equipment for weapons simulators, training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, weapons simulators	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for airborne targeting equipment, accessories for bombing computers, accessories for film processing equipment, accessories for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasures equipment, accessories for military cameras, accessories for military image intensifier equipment, accessories for military imaging radar equipment, accessories for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, accessories for military photographic equipment, accessories for military video processing equipment, accessories for military video recording equipment, accessories for night vision goggles, accessories for optical target acquisition equipment, accessories for optical target designator equipment, accessories for optical target surveillance equipment, accessories for optical target tracking equipment, accessories for sensor data recorders, accessories for sensor integration equipment, accessories for simulators for military training aircraft, accessories for training equipment for military training aircraft, accessories for weapon control systems, airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne refuelling equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, bomb handling equipment, bombing computers, chaff equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for airborne targeting equipment, components for	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>aircraft radars, components for aircrew protective masks, components for anti-g/pressure suits, components for automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, components for bombing computers, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for film processing equipment, components for helmet mounted display equipment, components for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for liquid oxygen converters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military cameras, components for military containers, components for military flying helmets, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military imaging radar equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military parachutes, components for military parachutist equipment, components for military photographic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video processing equipment, components for military video recording equipment, components for night vision goggles, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for optical target designator equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment, components for optical target tracking equipment, components for sensor data recorders, components for sensor integration equipment, components for simulators for military training aircraft, components for training equipment for military training aircraft, components for weapon control systems, control equipment for air-to-air missiles, control equipment for bombs, control equipment for decoy flares, control equipment for fragmentation rockets, control equipment for practice bombs, ejector seats, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, film processing equipment, handling equipment for air-to-air missiles, handling equipment for bombs, handling equipment for decoy flares, handling equipment for fragmentation rockets, handling equipment for practice bombs, helmet mounted display equipment, imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasures equipment, launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, launching equipment for bombs, launching equipment for decoy flares, launching equipment for fragmentation rockets, launching equipment for practice bombs, liquid oxygen converters, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft navigation equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military cameras, military containers, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military imaging radar equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, military parametric technical databases, military photographic equipment, military video processing equipment, military video recording equipment, night vision goggles, optical target acquisition equipment, optical target designator</p>	

Application Type	Goods (Saudi Arabia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	equipment, optical target surveillance equipment, optical target tracking equipment, sensor data recorders, sensor integration equipment, simulators for military training aircraft, software enabling equipment to function as military training aircraft, software for military training aircraft, software for the evaluation of weapon systems, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the modelling of weapon systems, software for the simulation of military operation scenarios, software for the simulation of weapon systems, software for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military training aircraft, test equipment for military training aircraft, test models for the development of military training aircraft, training equipment for military training aircraft, weapon control systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for aircraft cannons, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons, software for aircraft cannons, technology for aircraft cannons	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	acoustic seabed survey equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	diver location sonars, software for diver location sonars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of artillery, components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of artillery, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of	



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Saudi Arabia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
	military transport aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	fibrous/filamentary materials	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for aircraft missile protection systems, technology for aircraft missile protection systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	imaging cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military transport aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, components for signalling devices, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for signalling devices, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military electronic equipment, components for military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1,677,486,389</b>

**Somalia**

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Somalia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits, components for body armour, components for bomb suits, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military helmets, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	63,330
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	41,000
SIEL (Permanent)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits, explosive ordnance disposal equipment	114,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (25), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, pistols (25), small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment	57,925
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (25), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, pistols (25), small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment	57,925
SIEL (Permanent)	bomb suits	7,200
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	84,041
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support vehicles, military support vehicles, military trailers	359,750
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	27,810
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	712
SIEL (Permanent)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	158,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	14,859
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	4,304
SIEL (Permanent)	decoying/countermeasure equipment	122,700
SIEL (Permanent)	military equipment for initiating explosives, non-military firing sets	950
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour	19,800
SIEL (Permanent)	military support vehicles	45,800
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, military helmets	6,440
SIEL (Permanent)	military support vehicles	245,000
SIEL (Permanent)	military support vehicles	464,750
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	11,959
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support vehicles, military support vehicles	1,218,850
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	338,835
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	415,316

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Somalia)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	108,665
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, improvised explosive device disruptors	21,100
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>4,261,022</b>

### **South Sudan**

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (South Sudan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	142,500
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	33,750
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	38,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	2,008
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	30
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	45
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	22,883
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	25,650
SIEL (Permanent)	military support vehicles, military trailers	1,530,215
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bomb suits, components for bomb suits, components for devices for initiating explosives, components for improvised explosive device disposal equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military helmets, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, non-military firing	

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (South Sudan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
	sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	body armour, components for body armour, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military helmets, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1,795,580</b>

### **Sri Lanka**

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Sri Lanka)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	1,400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (100), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, military helmets, rifles (100), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (100), weapon sights	699,000
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets	23,640
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military patrol/assault craft	59,968
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (150), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, military helmets, rifles (150), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	578,000
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	333,000
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	32
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	308,700
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, components for rifles, military helmets, rifles (300), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	505,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (350), body armour, combat shotguns (50), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (100), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,166,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,346
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military training aircraft	150
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, military helmets	3,228
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets,	2,006,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Sri Lanka)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
	pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (100), weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (160), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for rifles, military helmets, rifles (160), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	788,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (300), body armour, components for assault rifles (100), components for pistols, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,713,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (300), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for pistols, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Sri Lanka)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (750), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,707,500
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (250), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,309,500
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military airborne equipment	20
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon night sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,428
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	207,000
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	950,500
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (200), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	fibrous/filamentary materials	214,500
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), weapon sights	1,788,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), weapon sights	1,788,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Sri Lanka)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,788,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (175), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), rifles (100), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	987,225
SIEL (Permanent)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	190,750
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), combat shotguns (300), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), weapon sights	1,779,000
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (300), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets, pistols (50), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,125,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for pistols, pistols (100), small arms ammunition	135,000
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, military helmets	12,250
SIEL (Permanent)	combat shotguns (97), components for combat shotguns, components for rifles, rifles (247), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	430,598
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	2,775
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	4,311
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	3,500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for assault rifles	3,600
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), rifles (200), small arms ammunition, weapon sights	1,797,000
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	65
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	4,200
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,315,969
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military airborne cargo handling equipment, military airborne cargo handling equipment, technology for the production of military airborne cargo handling equipment, unfinished products for military airborne cargo handling equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	body armour, components for body armour, equipment employing cryptography, military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bomb suits, civil body armour, components for bomb suits, components for civil body armour, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, demolition devices, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military helmets, mine detection equipment, non-military firing	

Application Type	Goods (Sri Lanka)	Total Goods Value (£)
	sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for	



Application Type	Goods (Sri Lanka)	Total Goods Value (£)
	equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for body armour, components for military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the production of body armour, equipment for the production of goods treated for signature suppression for military use, equipment for the production of military aircrew protective equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for body armour, technology for goods treated for signature suppression for military use, technology for military aircrew protective equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, components for sporting guns, military helmets, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	body armour, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	mixtures containing chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>49,645,755</b>

## Sudan

Application Type	Goods (Sudan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	138,500
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	604
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	7,382,500
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,558
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for industrial/commercial processes	2,700,000
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bomb suits, components for bomb suits, components for devices for initiating explosives, components for improvised explosive device	

Application Type	Goods (Sudan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	disposal equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military helmets, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>10,225,162</b>

### Syria

Application Type	Goods (Syria)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	6,130
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, military helmets	126,000
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	47,500
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	38,162
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>217,792</b>

### Turkmenistan)

Application Type	Goods (Turkmenistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	14,500
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray accelerators	960,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	9,326
SIEL (Permanent)	diver location sonars, software for diver location sonars	1,228,000
SIEL (Temporary)	civil NBC detection systems	34,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,216
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	57,300
SIEL (Permanent)	high performance air traffic control software	32,880
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators	905,198
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators	905,198

Application Type	Goods (Turkmenistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray generators	905,198
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,636
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	3,616
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,846
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	83,739
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, inertial equipment, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military parachutes and equipment, signalling devices, software for equipment for the use of military helicopters, software for military aero-engines, software for military helicopters, software for the use of inertial equipment, technology for equipment for the use of military helicopters, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military helicopters, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for signalling devices, technology for the use of inertial equipment, unfinished products for military helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MN; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed of modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	

Application Type	Goods (Turkmenistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	non-military detonators	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew protective equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>5,154,652</b>

### Uzbekistan

Application Type	Goods (Uzbekistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	X-ray accelerators	3,141,190
SIEL (Temporary)	body armour, components for body armour	1,443
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	28,500
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and	

Application Type	Goods (Uzbekistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MN; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed of modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	

Application Type	Goods (Uzbekistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<b>Total</b>	<b>3,171,133</b>

### Vietnam

Application Type	Goods (Vietnam)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	human pathogens	25
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,841
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	3,500
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment	194,508
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military diving apparatus, equipment for the use of military diving apparatus, military diving apparatus	595,316
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	21,989
SIEL (Permanent)	human pathogens	25
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for fibre preforms, technology for fibre prepregs, technology for fibrous/filamentary materials	2
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment, equipment for the use of NBC detection equipment, software for NBC detection equipment	152,750
SIEL (Permanent)	radio jamming equipment	28,950
SIEL (Permanent)	biotechnology equipment	99
SIEL (Permanent)	human pathogens	25
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection clothing	48,750
SIEL (Permanent)	radio jamming equipment	28,950
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms training equipment, software enabling equipment to function as small arms training equipment	336,223
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms training equipment, software enabling equipment to function as small arms training equipment	665,767
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	796,850
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels, technology for military auxiliary/support vessels	1,080,000
SIEL (Temporary)	equipment employing cryptography	8,678
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military equipment for initiating explosives	30,302
SIEL (Permanent)	zirconium	200
SIEL	towed hydrophone arrays	22,400,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Vietnam)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment	400
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon night sights	173,973
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	89,250
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment	100
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, technology for NBC detection equipment	75,000
SIEL (Permanent)	marine position fixing equipment	20,850
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	4,218
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	11,367
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, imaging cameras, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts	1,355,013
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC clothing, NBC protective/defensive equipment	2,625
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection clothing	10,618
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	131,258
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas	90,500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	70,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for military patrol/assault craft	2,500
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	5,000
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, radio jamming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, radio jamming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	goods treated for signature suppression for military use	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, radio jamming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for generating	

Application Type	Goods (Vietnam)	Total Goods Value (£)
	hopping codes, equipment for generating spreading codes, equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, impulse radio equipment, non-cryptographic information security equipment, software for cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment for generating hopping codes, software for equipment for generating spreading codes, software for equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, software for impulse radio equipment, software for non-cryptographic information security equipment, technology for cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, technology for cryptographic software, technology for digital cellular radio system, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment for generating hopping codes, technology for equipment for generating spreading codes, technology for equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, technology for impulse radio equipment, technology for non-cryptographic information security equipment, technology for software for cable systems sensitive to eavesdropping, technology for software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for software for equipment for generating hopping codes, technology for software for equipment for generating spreading codes, technology for software for equipment with reduced electromagnetic emanations, technology for software for impulse radio equipment, technology for software for non-cryptographic information security equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military diving apparatus, military diving apparatus, rebreathing swimming equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	acoustic seabed survey equipment, equipment employing cryptography, guidance/navigation equipment, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, submersible vehicles, underwater sonar navigation systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Vietnam)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military utility helicopters, equipment for the production of military utility helicopters, equipment for the use of military utility helicopters, technology for the development of military utility helicopters, technology for the production of military utility helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, test equipment for military utility helicopters, unfinished products for military utility helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for civil aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military electronic equipment, components for military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military electronic equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bomb suits, civil body armour, components for bomb suits, components for civil body armour, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, demolition devices, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military helmets, mine detection equipment, non-military firing sets	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>28,447,422</b>

## Yemen

Application Type	Goods (Yemen)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Transshipment)	assault rifles (400), components for assault rifles, weapon cleaning equipment	570,125
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	20,408
SIEL (Permanent)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	987,225
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, military helmets	18,650
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1,596,408</b>

## Zimbabwe

Application Type	Goods (Zimbabwe)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	12,187
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,596

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Zimbabwe)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	26,603
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,025
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	32,541
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	22,511
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	11,384
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,530
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	27,052
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	567
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	473,531
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	35,953
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	487,617
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	42,325
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	45,200
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for cryptographic software	6,710
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	148,703
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	54,026
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	904
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	27,809
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,452
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	10,073
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	6,265
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	13,242
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,834
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	85,239
SIEL	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	10,961

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Zimbabwe)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,124
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	300,400
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,876
SIEL (Permanent)	devices for initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disruptors	19,200
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,885
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,230
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,362
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,699
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	732
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	33,836
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for equipment employing cryptography	200
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,593
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,535
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,325
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,755
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	1,080
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	990
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	4,200
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,166
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,821
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,143
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	300
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography,	

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Zimbabwe)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
Dual Use)	software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>2,636,291</b>

## Countries of concern to the Committees—extant licences

The Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls wrote to the BIS Secretary of State, Vince Cable, on 24 April 2013 requesting details of extant UK strategic export licences to each of the 28 countries listed as the FCO's Countries of human rights concern. The BIS Secretary replied on 12 May 2013.<sup>547</sup>

N.B. Only values for SIELs are shown. The Government does not provide values for OIELs because of their open nature.

### Argentina

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Afghanistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	6,230
SIEL (Permanent)	animal pathogens	259
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for the production of biotechnology equipment	3,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	4,401,430
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	31,520
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	1,232,871
SIEL (Permanent)	radiation hardened TV cameras	26,708
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	109,210
SIEL (Permanent)	human pathogens	300
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (15)	12,992
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	50,700
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	754
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (2)	14,000
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (1)	7,000

<sup>547</sup> Ev w239 – Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 12 May 2014

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Afghanistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	9,750
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (1)	4,500
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (2)	3,500
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (600)	210,000
SIEL (Temporary)	components for sporting guns, sporting guns (1)	4,000
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (1)	16,000
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (2)	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	31,578
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (3)	1,500
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (1)	3,000
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (2)	4,000
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (2)	6,000
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (2)	5,500
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (1)	4,000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (2)	1,277
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	9,861,331
SIEL (Permanent)	metal alloy powder production equipment	437,385
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (1)	13,250
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	9,861,331
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	1,493
SIEL (Temporary)	components for sporting guns, sporting guns (2)	9,800
SIEL (Permanent)	civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment	38,346
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (1)	10,000
SIEL (Temporary)	sporting guns (1)	7,000
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Afghanistan)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	triggered spark gaps	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the development of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the development of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	artillery ammunition, components for NBC detection equipment, components for artillery, components for combat naval vessels, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, signalling devices, smoke canisters, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, technology for NBC detection equipment, technology for artillery, technology for combat	

Application Type	Goods (Afghanistan)	Total Goods Value (£)
	naval vessels, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval engines, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for signalling devices, technology for smoke canisters, technology for weapon control equipment, training artillery ammunition, weapon control equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	animal pathogens	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	sporting guns	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>26,586,517</b>

### Bahrain

Application Type	Goods (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	1,270
SIEL (Permanent)	software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	1,580
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (4), components for assault rifles, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, pistols (3), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (4)	15,498
SIEL (Temporary)	gun silencers, sniper rifles (1), weapon sights	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	anti-riot/ballistic shields	67,500
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	3,765
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,870,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for pistols	1,434
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	2,428
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,846
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (2)	3,000
SIEL (Temporary)	components for machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns (6), weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights	68,331
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	1,763
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	2,846



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Bahrain)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	48,979
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	1,230
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,902
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sporting guns, sporting guns (3), weapon sights	3,657
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	11,487
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	40,429
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	321,830
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	24,806
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC detection equipment, components for NBC detection equipment	24,620
SIEL (Permanent)	accessories for materials analysis equipment	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (2)	3,345
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	595
SIEL (Permanent)	gun silencers, sporting guns (1), weapon sights	4,735
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment	370
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	31,990
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval guns, components for weapon mountings, equipment for the use of naval guns, naval guns, technology for naval guns, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts	1,517,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	3,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment	370
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,895
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	4,600
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	616
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (5000), components for assault rifles, equipment for the use of assault rifles, weapon cleaning equipment	5,668,374
SIEL (Permanent)	components for sporting guns, gun silencers, pistols (1), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (4)	35,837
SIEL (Temporary)	inertial equipment	15,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	250,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military bridges/pontoons/ferries	3,230,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Bahrain)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	38,407
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	2,280,500
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights	20,000
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	8,500
SIEL (Temporary)	inertial equipment	15,000
SIEL (Temporary)	machine guns (1), sniper rifles (1)	13,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	246,719
SIEL (Temporary)	components for combat aircraft	1,741,155
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	185,700
SIEL (Permanent)	military helmets	400,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	7,231,100
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5,875,950
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	153,483
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	52,804
SIEL (Temporary)	combat aircraft	2,500,000
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	425
SIEL (Permanent)	general military aircraft components	6,358
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	4,037
SIEL (Permanent)	components for gun mountings, components for machine guns, equipment for the use of machine guns, gun mountings, machine guns (50)	484,875
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	7,715,745
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	11,662
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5,875,950
SIEL (Temporary)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment, improvised explosive device jamming equipment	70,000
SIEL (Temporary)	turrets, weapon mountings	11,950
SIEL (Permanent)	hand grenades, training devices containing military pyrotechnic materials	335,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	8,642
SIEL (Temporary)	software for telecommunications jamming equipment, telecommunications jamming equipment	51,273

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Bahrain)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military aero-engines	13,058
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	2,926
SIEL (Permanent)	sporting guns (1)	5,800
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft cannons, components for aircraft cannons	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for recognition/identification equipment, software for recognition/identification equipment, technology for recognition/identification equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for small arms ammunition, small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft military communications equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military training aircraft, military guidance/navigation equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for military cameras/photographic equipment, accessories for military image recording/processing equipment, aircraft military communications equipment, attack alerting/warning equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for ejector seats, components for electronic countermeasure equipment, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for military aero-engines, components for military airborne equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft head-up/down displays, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military cameras/photographic equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military containers, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military image recording/processing equipment, components for military parachutes and equipment, components for military radars, components for military scenario simulation equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military training equipment, components for rangefinding equipment, components for recognition/identification equipment, components for targeting	

Application Type	Goods (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>equipment, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, ejector seats, electronic countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft military communications equipment, equipment for the use of attack alerting/warning equipment, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of electronic countermeasure equipment, equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military airborne equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircraft head-up/down displays, equipment for the use of military aircraft pressure refuellers, equipment for the use of military aircrew breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military cameras/photographic equipment, equipment for the use of military containers, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military image recording/processing equipment, equipment for the use of military parachutes and equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of military scenario simulation equipment, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training equipment, equipment for the use of rangefinding equipment, equipment for the use of recognition/identification equipment, equipment for the use of targeting equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, general military aircraft components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, military aero-engines, military airborne equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft head-up/down displays, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military cameras/photographic equipment, military communications equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military image recording/processing equipment, military parachutes and equipment, military radars, military scenario simulation equipment, military training equipment, rangefinding equipment, recognition/identification equipment, software for aircraft military communications equipment, software for attack alerting/warning equipment, software for ejector seats, software for electronic countermeasure equipment, software for electronic warfare equipment, software for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, software for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, software for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, software for military aero-engines, software for military airborne equipment, software for military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aircraft head-up/down displays, software for military aircraft pressure refuellers, software for military aircrew breathing equipment, software for military aircrew protective equipment, software for military cameras/photographic equipment, software for military containers, software for military electronic equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military image recording/processing equipment, software for military parachutes and equipment, software for military radars, software for military scenario simulation equipment, software for military</p>	

Application Type	Goods (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
	training aircraft, software for military training equipment, software for rangefinding equipment, software for targeting equipment, software for weapon control equipment, targeting equipment, technology for aircraft military communications equipment, technology for attack alerting/warning equipment, technology for ejector seats, technology for electronic countermeasure equipment, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military airborne equipment, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircraft head-up/down displays, technology for military aircraft pressure refuellers, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military cameras/photographic equipment, technology for military containers, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military image recording/processing equipment, technology for military parachutes and equipment, technology for military radars, technology for military scenario simulation equipment, technology for military training aircraft, technology for military training equipment, technology for rangefinding equipment, technology for targeting equipment, technology for weapon control equipment, weapon control equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for inertial equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military utility vehicles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	

Application Type	Goods (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military radars, components for weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, software for military radars, software for weapon control equipment, technology for military radars, technology for weapon control equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	

Application Type	Goods (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for missile scoring equipment, decoy flares, missile scoring equipment, software for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat naval vessels, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military patrol/assault craft, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for the use of test equipment for inertial equipment, test equipment for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military devices for initiating explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, components for equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for test equipment for aerial target equipment, components for test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for training airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, military training aircraft, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of training airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, training airborne electronic warfare equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, aircraft radars, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video recording	

Application Type	Goods (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>equipment, components for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, components for weapons simulators, equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft radars, equipment for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, equipment for the use of military video recording equipment, equipment for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of weapons simulators, military aircraft navigation equipment, military training aircraft, military video recording equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, technology for the use of aircraft radars, technology for the use of military aircraft navigation equipment, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military video recording equipment, technology for the use of training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of weapons simulators, test equipment for aerial target equipment, test equipment for airborne electronic warfare equipment, test equipment for aircraft radars, test equipment for military aircraft navigation equipment, test equipment for military video recording equipment, test equipment for training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, test equipment for weapons simulators, training equipment for electronic countermeasures equipment, weapons simulators</p>	
<p>OIEL (Military / Dual Use)</p>	<p>accessories for airborne targeting equipment, accessories for bombing computers, accessories for film processing equipment, accessories for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, accessories for imaging countermeasures equipment, accessories for military cameras, accessories for military image intensifier equipment, accessories for military imaging radar equipment, accessories for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, accessories for military photographic equipment, accessories for military video processing equipment, accessories for military video recording equipment, accessories for night vision goggles, accessories for optical target acquisition equipment, accessories for optical target designator equipment, accessories for optical target surveillance equipment, accessories for optical target tracking equipment, accessories for sensor data recorders, accessories for sensor integration equipment, accessories for simulators for military training aircraft, accessories for training equipment for military training aircraft, accessories for weapon control systems, airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne refuelling equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, bomb handling equipment, bombing computers, chaff equipment, components for airborne electronic warfare equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for airborne targeting equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for aircrew protective masks, components for anti-g/pressure suits, components for automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, components for bombing computers, components for ejector seats, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of military aero-engines, components for equipment for the use of military training aircraft, components for film processing equipment, components for helmet mounted display equipment, components for imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, components for imaging countermeasures equipment, components for liquid oxygen</p>	



Application Type	Goods (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
	<p>converters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military cameras, components for military containers, components for military flying helmets, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for military imaging radar equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military parachutes, components for military parachutist equipment, components for military photographic equipment, components for military training aircraft, components for military video processing equipment, components for military video recording equipment, components for night vision goggles, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for optical target designator equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment, components for optical target tracking equipment, components for sensor data recorders, components for sensor integration equipment, components for simulators for military training aircraft, components for training equipment for military training aircraft, components for weapon control systems, control equipment for air-to-air missiles, control equipment for bombs, control equipment for decoy flares, control equipment for fragmentation rockets, control equipment for practice bombs, ejector seats, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, film processing equipment, handling equipment for air-to-air missiles, handling equipment for bombs, handling equipment for decoy flares, handling equipment for fragmentation rockets, handling equipment for practice bombs, helmet mounted display equipment, imaging counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasure/counter-countermeasures equipment, imaging countermeasures equipment, launching equipment for air-to-air missiles, launching equipment for bombs, launching equipment for decoy flares, launching equipment for fragmentation rockets, launching equipment for practice bombs, liquid oxygen converters, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft navigation equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military cameras, military containers, military flying helmets, military image intensifier equipment, military imaging radar equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, military parametric technical databases, military photographic equipment, military video processing equipment, military video recording equipment, night vision goggles, optical target acquisition equipment, optical target designator equipment, optical target surveillance equipment, optical target tracking equipment, sensor data recorders, sensor integration equipment, simulators for military training aircraft, software enabling equipment to function as military training aircraft, software for military training aircraft, software for the evaluation of weapon systems, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the modelling of weapon systems, software for the simulation of military operation scenarios, software for the simulation of weapon systems, software for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military training aircraft, test equipment for military training aircraft, test models for the development of military training aircraft, training equipment for military training aircraft, weapon control systems</p>	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	<p>components for aircraft cannons, equipment for the use of aircraft cannons, software for aircraft cannons, technology for aircraft cannons</p>	

Application Type	Goods (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, software for military aero-engines, technology for military aero-engines	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for military image intensifier equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew protective equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military communications equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	acoustic seabed survey equipment, guidance/navigation equipment, imaging cameras, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MNs; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed or modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 and all goods related to landmines; [3] Man Portable Air Defence Systems MANPADS and test equipment/production equipment/software/technology therefor [4] RDX or HMX explosive material or explosive material containing RDX or HMX; [5] Chemicals specified in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention and specified by ML7a or ML7b and associated technology; [6] Complete rocket systems including Ballistic Missile Systems/Space Launch Vehicles/Sounding Rockets and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle systems including Cruise Missile Systems/Remote Piloted Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance Drones capable of at least a 300km range; [7] Complete subsystems designed or modified for the rocket systems specified in 6 above as follows: [i] individual rocket stages; [ii] re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modified therefor and electronics	

Application Type	Goods (Bahrain)	Total Goods Value (£)
	equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles; [iii] solid or liquid propellant rocket engines having a total impulse capacity of 1.1MN; [iv] guidance sets capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33% or less of the range; [v] thrust vectors control systems; [vi] weapon or warhead safing/arming/fuzing/firing mechanisms; [8] Specially designed production facilities or production equipment for the goods specified in 6/7 above; [9] Software specially designed of modified for the use of goods specified in 6/7/8 above	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>49,663,146</b>

### Egypt

Application Type	Goods (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	528,921
SIEL (Permanent)	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, military helmets	1,162,225
SIEL (Permanent)	components for pistols, pistols (1)	386
SIEL (Permanent)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	32,955
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,602
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour, components for body armour, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets	23,640
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	15,612
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	15,612
SIEL (Permanent)	components for pistols, pistols (1)	483
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	545,542
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military equipment for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of depth charges, military equipment for initiating explosives	5,920
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	400
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	56,390
SIEL (Permanent)	toxins	11,367
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	21,208
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	7
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sniper rifles (200), sporting guns (150), weapon sights	1,758,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,400
SIEL	acoustic devices for riot control, body armour, components for body	1,162,225

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Egypt)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)	armour, military helmets	
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military auxiliary/support vessels	33,150
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	463
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, combat shotguns (150), components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (200), weapon sights	1,771,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	3,762
SIEL (Permanent)	components for submersible vehicles	1,744
SIEL (Permanent)	military aero-engines	50,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	9,115
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters, military guidance/navigation equipment	43,428,430
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	21,979
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	1,761,871
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	39,212
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	10,168
SIEL (Permanent)	general military vehicle components	12,657
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (100), components for assault rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sights	230,500
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	8,000
SIEL (Permanent)	software for equipment employing cryptography	99,711
SIEL (Permanent)	assault rifles (600), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, components for sporting guns, military helmets, pistols (30), small arms ammunition, sporting guns (350), weapon sights	1,713,000
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production	30,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military training aircraft	860
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,937
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military radars	7,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	35,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	16,337
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment	32,785
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	6,089
SIEL	general military aircraft components	1,535

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Egypt)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
(Permanent)		
SIEL (Permanent)	training small arms ammunition	7,704
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	12,750
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	543
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	540
SIEL (Temporary)	components for radio jamming equipment, electronic warfare equipment, radio jamming equipment	960,500
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	2,239
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	3,636
SIEL (Permanent)	components for ballistic test equipment	1
SIEL (Temporary)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	3,000
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	324,000
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	324,000
SIEL (Temporary)	civil NBC detection systems	21,250
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	2,152
SIEL (Temporary)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	294,000
SIEL (Temporary)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	168,000
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	1,172,633
SIEL (Permanent)	components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment	49,999
SIEL (Temporary)	weapon cleaning equipment	19,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military guidance/navigation equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, software for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment	1,483,602
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,235,920
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	8,520
SIEL (Permanent)	materials testing equipment	2,133
SIEL (Permanent)	chemicals used for general laboratory work/scientific research	26
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,000
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment	694,890
SIEL (Temporary)	direct view imaging equipment, imaging cameras	4,600
SIEL (Permanent)	corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	60,000

Application Type	Goods (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,625
SIEL (Temporary)	improvised explosive device activation/jamming equipment	40,000
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	72,250
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	71,706
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	0
SIEL (Permanent)	military communications equipment	60,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment	30
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,625
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	17,528
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	NBC filters, chaff, chaff equipment, command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for chaff equipment, components for command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for corvettes, components for defensive systems against NBC agents, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for fast attack craft, components for frigates, components for heavy machine guns, components for military distress signalling equipment, components for military inflatable craft, components for military navigation equipment, components for naval acoustic equipment, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun mountings, components for naval radars, components for naval sonar equipment, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for surface-to-air missiles, components for surface-to-surface missiles, control equipment for surface-to-air missiles, control equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, defensive systems against NBC agents, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the use of corvettes, equipment for the use of fast attack craft, equipment for the use of frigates, equipment for the use of naval radars, equipment for the use of surface-to-air missiles, general naval vessel components, handling equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, heavy machine guns, launching equipment for surface-to-air missiles, launching equipment for surface-to-surface missiles, military distress signalling equipment, military inflatable craft, military navigation equipment, naval acoustic equipment, naval communications equipment, naval electrical equipment, naval electronic equipment, naval engines, naval gun mountings, naval radars, naval sonar equipment, semi-automatic pistols, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, test equipment for military communications equipment, test equipment for naval radars, test equipment for surface-to-air missiles	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for guided missile decoying equipment, components for weapon control systems, decoy flares, equipment for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, equipment for the use of weapon control systems, software for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, software for the use of weapon control systems, technology for the use of guided missile decoying equipment, technology for the use of weapon control systems, test equipment for guided missile decoying equipment, test equipment for weapon control systems	

Application Type	Goods (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for ground based radars, accessories for naval radars, components for ground based radars, components for naval radars, equipment for the use of ground based radars, equipment for the use of naval radars, software for ground based radars, software for naval radars, technology for ground based radars, technology for naval radars, test equipment for ground based radars, test equipment for naval radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for military electronic equipment, ejector seats, equipment for the use of ejector seats, equipment for the use of general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, technology for ejector seats, technology for general military aircraft components, test models for ejector seats, test models for general military aircraft components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	imaging cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	underwater television cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for launching equipment for torpedoes, components for mine countermeasures equipment, components for mine sweeping equipment, components for naval mines, components for torpedoes, components for training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, equipment for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, equipment for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of mine sweeping equipment, equipment for the use of naval mines, equipment for the use of torpedoes, equipment for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, launching equipment for torpedoes, mine countermeasures equipment, mine sweeping equipment, software for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, software for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, software for the use of mine sweeping equipment, software for the use of naval mines, software for the use of torpedoes, software for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, technology for the use of launching equipment for torpedoes, technology for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of mine sweeping equipment, technology for the use of naval mines, technology for the use of torpedoes, technology for the use of training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, test equipment for launching equipment for torpedoes, test equipment for mine countermeasures equipment, test equipment for mine sweeping equipment, test equipment for naval mines, test equipment for torpedoes, test equipment for training equipment for mine sweeping equipment, torpedoes, training equipment for mine sweeping equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft cannons, components for air launched rockets, components for air-to-air missiles, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for aircraft cannons, components for aircraft carriers, components for anti-aircraft guns, components for combat aircraft, components for	

Application Type	Goods (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
	combat helicopters, components for combat naval vessels, components for command communications control and intelligence software, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for depth charges, components for electronic warfare equipment, components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, components for machine guns, components for military aero-engines, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military patrol/assault craft, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval guns, components for naval mines, components for periscopes, components for sensor integration equipment, components for submarines, components for surface launched rockets, components for surface-to-surface missiles, components for targeting equipment, components for torpedoes, components for weapon control equipment, components for weapon mountings, decoying/countermeasure equipment, electronic warfare equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, general military aircraft components, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, machine guns, military aero-engines, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval engines, naval guns, technology for air launched rockets, technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-surface missiles, technology for aircraft cannons, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for depth charges, technology for electronic warfare equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for rockets, technology for machine guns, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military radars, technology for torpedoes, torpedoes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	fibrous/filamentary materials	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, software for aircraft missile protection systems, technology for aircraft missile protection systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	imaging cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, components for sporting guns, military helmets, rifles, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	



Application Type	Goods (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	body armour, direct view imaging equipment, military helmets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for military devices for initiating explosives, components for military firing sets, components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military radars, components for weapon control equipment, equipment for the use of military radars, equipment for the use of weapon control equipment, software for military radars, software for weapon control equipment, technology for military radars, technology for weapon control equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the	

Application Type	Goods (Egypt)	Total Goods Value (£)
	use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for missile scoring equipment, decoy flares, missile scoring equipment, software for the use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for aircraft carriers, components for combat naval vessels, components for military auxiliary/support vessels, components for military patrol/assault craft, general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software for the use of test equipment for inertial equipment, test equipment for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for tanker aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, technology for the use of cryptographic software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for marine position fixing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, military equipment for initiating explosives, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accessories for underwater telecommunications systems, components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, components for equipment for the use of artillery, components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the operation of military aircraft in confined areas, equipment for the use of artillery, general naval vessel components, military electronic equipment	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>65,825,601</b>

## Tunisia

Application Type	Goods (Tunisia)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	3,486
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,911
SIEL (Transshipment)	anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition	272,233
SIEL (Permanent)	components for NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment	72,065
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	6,850
SIEL (Temporary)	components for military support vehicles	399,332
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	600,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	31,819
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	5,472
SIEL (Permanent)	cryptographic software	5,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	570,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment	26,643
SIEL (Permanent)	military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment	7,077
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	general naval vessel components, technology for general naval vessel components	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military helicopters, military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military training aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	small arms ammunition	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	

Application Type	Goods (Tunisia)	Total Goods Value (£)
Dual Use)		
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military helicopters, components for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, components for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, components for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, components for military aircrew protective equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the development of combat aircraft, equipment for the development of combat helicopters, equipment for the development of military helicopters, equipment for the development of military support aircraft, equipment for the development of military training aircraft, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, equipment for the production of combat helicopters, equipment for the production of military support aircraft, equipment for the production of military training aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircrew breathing equipment, military aircrew protective equipment, military electronic equipment, signalling devices, software for combat aircraft, software for military support aircraft, software for military training aircraft, technology for combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military helicopters, technology for equipment for the development of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the development of military training aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of combat helicopters, technology for equipment for the production of military support aircraft, technology for equipment for the production of military training aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military aircrew protective equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for signalling devices, test models for combat aircraft, test models for combat helicopters, test models for military helicopters, test models for military support aircraft, test models for military training aircraft	

Application Type	Goods (Tunisia)	Total Goods Value (£)
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for submersible vehicles, composite structures, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, imaging cameras, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment, syntactic foam, underwater electronic imaging systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military utility helicopters, equipment for the production of military utility helicopters, equipment for the use of military utility helicopters, technology for the development of military utility helicopters, technology for the production of military utility helicopters, technology for the use of military utility helicopters, test equipment for military utility helicopters, unfinished products for military utility helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	underwater television cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	fibrous/filamentary materials	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military transport aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military radars, military software, technology for military radars	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military support aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for	

Application Type	Goods (Tunisia)	Total Goods Value (£)
	naval engines, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat helicopters, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, equipment for the use of military aircrew breathing equipment, equipment for the use of military helicopters, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, equipment for the use of naval engines, general military aircraft components, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for military aero-engines, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military aircrew breathing equipment, technology for military helicopters, technology for military support aircraft, technology for military training aircraft, technology for naval engines	
	Total	2,005,887

## Ukraine

Application Type	Goods (Ukraine)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	16,000
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	854,106
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	8,240
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for composite laminates, technology for composite structures, technology for the development of composite laminates, technology for the development of composite structures, technology for the production of composite laminates, technology for the production of composite structures, technology for the use of composite laminates, technology for the use of composite structures	3
SIEL (Permanent)	components for targeting equipment	9,732
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	4,675
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for targeting equipment	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for targeting equipment	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for targeting equipment	22,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of weapon sights	25,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for biotechnology equipment	8,800
SIEL (Permanent)	components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection	4,222
SIEL (Permanent)	non-military firing sets	8,100
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	69,773
SIEL (Permanent)	lasers	31,000
SIEL (Permanent)	components for air-to-air missiles, technology for air-to-air missiles	714,000

<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Ukraine)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	547,700
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	4,267
SIEL (Permanent)	machine tools	104,450
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	80,000
SIEL (Permanent)	rebreathing swimming equipment	3,507
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	10,000
SIEL (Permanent)	NBC protective/defensive equipment, civil NBC protection equipment, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment	625
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military helicopters	397,700
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	938
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	imaging cameras	20,000
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	7,500
SIEL (Temporary)	imaging cameras	59,000
SIEL (Permanent)	technology for imaging cameras	600
SIEL (Permanent)	small arms ammunition	150,000
SIEL (Permanent)	weapon sights	218
SIEL (Permanent)	submersible equipment, submersible vehicles	391,338
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	98,833
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	17,969,636
SIEL (Permanent)	body armour	7,000
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	18,750
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights	100,000
SIEL (Permanent)	civil explosive detection/identification equipment	15,053
SIEL (Permanent)	rebreathing swimming equipment	3,507
SIEL (Temporary)	military training equipment	25,030
SIEL (Permanent)	equipment employing cryptography	1,300
SIEL (Permanent)	inertial equipment	2,850

Application Type	Goods (Ukraine)	Total Goods Value (£)
SIEL (Permanent)	components for military support aircraft	22,828
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones, linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers, radioactive sources, technology for the use of devices for initiating explosives, technology for the use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology for the use of non-military detonators, technology for the use of non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	technology for military communications equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	lasers	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for marine position fixing equipment, components for underwater telecommunications systems, marine position fixing equipment, underwater telecommunications systems	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	command communications control and intelligence software, technology for command communications control and intelligence software	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	aircraft seals, components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment	



<b>Application Type</b>	<b>Goods (Ukraine)</b>	<b>Total Goods Value (£)</b>
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	non-military detonators	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	inertial equipment, technology for inertial equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	bathymetric survey systems, components for bathymetric survey systems, components for inertial equipment, components for magnetometers, components for sonar log equipment, components for submersible equipment, inertial equipment, magnetometers, marine position fixing equipment, sonar log equipment, submersible equipment	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	air guns	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military electronic equipment, components for military helicopters, equipment for the use of military helicopters, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military helicopters	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	imaging cameras	
OIEL (Military / Dual Use)	small arms ammunition	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>21,902,281</b>

## Annex 10: The text of the Arms Trade Treaty

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The text of the Arms Trade Treaty adopted by The Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty on 28 March 2013 was as follows:

### **The Arms Trade Treaty**

#### *Preamble*

*The States Parties to this Treaty,*

*Guided* by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Recalling* Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations which seeks to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

*Underlining* the need to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and to prevent their diversion to the illicit market, or for unauthorized end use and end users, including in the commission of terrorist acts,

*Recognizing* the legitimate political, security, economic and commercial interests of States in the international trade in conventional arms,

*Reaffirming* the sovereign right of any State to regulate and control conventional arms exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional system,

*Acknowledging* that peace and security, development and human rights are pillars of the United Nations system and foundations for collective security and recognizing that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing,

*Recalling* the United Nations Disarmament Commission Guidelines for international arms transfers in the context of General Assembly resolution 46/36H of 6 December 1991,

*Noting* the contribution made by the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, as well as the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons,

*Recognizing* the security, social, economic and humanitarian consequences of the illicit and unregulated trade in conventional arms,

*Bearing in mind* that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict and armed violence,

*Recognizing* also the challenges faced by victims of armed conflict and their need for adequate care, rehabilitation and social and economic inclusion,

*Emphasizing* that nothing in this Treaty prevents States from maintaining and adopting additional effective measures to further the object and purpose of this Treaty,

*Mindful* of the legitimate trade and lawful ownership, and use of certain conventional arms for recreational, cultural, historical, and sporting activities, where such trade, ownership and use are permitted or protected by law,

*Mindful also* of the role regional organizations can play in assisting States Parties, upon request, in implementing this Treaty,

*Recognizing* the voluntary and active role that civil society, including non-governmental organizations, and industry, can play in raising awareness of the object and purpose of this Treaty, and in supporting its implementation,

*Acknowledging* that regulation of the international trade in conventional arms and preventing their diversion should not hamper international cooperation and legitimate trade in materiel, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes,

*Emphasizing* the desirability of achieving universal adherence to this Treaty,

*Determined* to act in accordance with the following principles;

*Principles*

- The inherent right of all States to individual or collective self-defence as recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;
- The settlement of international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered in accordance with Article 2 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations;
- Refraining in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations;

- Non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State in accordance with Article 2 (7) of the Charter of the United Nations;
- Respecting and ensuring respect for international humanitarian law in accordance with, inter alia, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and respecting and ensuring respect for human rights in accordance with, inter alia, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- The responsibility of all States, in accordance with their respective international obligations, to effectively regulate the international trade in conventional arms, and to prevent their diversion, as well as the primary responsibility of all States in establishing and implementing their respective national control systems;
- The respect for the legitimate interests of States to acquire conventional arms to exercise their right to self-defence and for peacekeeping operations; and to produce, export, import and transfer conventional arms;
- Implementing this Treaty in a consistent, objective and non-discriminatory manner,

*Have agreed as follows:*

## **Article 1**

### **Object and Purpose**

The object of this Treaty is to:

- Establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms;
- Prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion;

for the purpose of:

- Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability;
- Reducing human suffering;
- Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence among States Parties.

## **Article 2**

### **Scope**

1. This Treaty shall apply to all conventional arms within the following categories:

- (a) Battle tanks;
- (b) Armoured combat vehicles;
- (c) Large-calibre artillery systems;
- (d) Combat aircraft;
- (e) Attack helicopters;
- (f) Warships;
- (g) Missiles and missile launchers; and
- (h) Small arms and light weapons.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the activities of the international trade comprise export, import, transit, trans-shipment and brokering, hereafter referred to as “transfer”.

3. This Treaty shall not apply to the international movement of conventional arms by, or on behalf of, a State Party for its use provided that the conventional arms remain under that State Party’s ownership.

### **Article 3**

#### **Ammunition/Munitions**

Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to authorizing the export of such ammunition/munitions.

### **Article 4**

#### **Parts and Components**

Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system to regulate the export of parts and components where the export is in a form that provides the capability to assemble the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) and shall apply the provisions of Article 6 and Article 7 prior to authorizing the export of such parts and components.

### **Article 5**

#### **General Implementation**

1. Each State Party shall implement this Treaty in a consistent, objective and non-discriminatory manner, bearing in mind the principles referred to in this Treaty.

2. Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system, including a national control list, in order to implement the provisions of this Treaty.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to apply the provisions of this Treaty to the broadest range of conventional arms. National definitions of any of the categories covered under Article 2 (1) (a)-(g) shall not cover less than the descriptions used in the United Nations

Register of Conventional Arms at the time of entry into force of this Treaty. For the category covered under Article 2 (1) (h), national definitions shall not cover less than the descriptions used in relevant United Nations instruments at the time of entry into force of this Treaty.

4. Each State Party, pursuant to its national laws, shall provide its national control list to the Secretariat, which shall make it available to other States Parties. States Parties are encouraged to make their control lists publicly available.

5. Each State Party shall take measures necessary to implement the provisions of this Treaty and shall designate competent national authorities in order to have an effective and transparent national control system regulating the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) and of items covered under Article 3 and Article 4.

6. Each State Party shall designate one or more national points of contact to exchange information on matters related to the implementation of this Treaty. Each State Party shall notify the Secretariat, established under Article 18, of its national point(s) of contact and keep the information updated.

## **Article 6**

### **Prohibitions**

1. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the transfer would violate its obligations under measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular arms embargoes.

2. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if the transfer would violate its relevant international obligations under international agreements to which it is a Party, in particular those relating to the transfer of, or illicit trafficking in, conventional arms.

3. A State Party shall not authorize any transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, if it has knowledge at the time of authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which it is a Party.

## **Article 7**

### **Export and Export Assessment**

1. If the export is not prohibited under Article 6, each exporting State Party, prior to authorization of the export of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4, under its jurisdiction and pursuant to its national

control system, shall, in an objective and non-discriminatory manner, taking into account relevant factors, including information provided by the importing State in accordance with Article 8 (1), assess the potential that the conventional arms or items:

- (a) would contribute to or undermine peace and security;
- (b) could be used to:
  - (i) commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law;
  - (ii) commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law;
  - (iii) commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism to which the exporting State is a Party; or
  - (iv) commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence under international conventions or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to which the exporting State is a Party.

2. The exporting State Party shall also consider whether there are measures that could be undertaken to mitigate risks identified in (a) or (b) in paragraph 1, such as confidence-building measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and importing States.

3. If, after conducting this assessment and considering available mitigating measures, the exporting State Party determines that there is an overriding risk of any of the negative consequences in paragraph 1, the exporting State Party shall not authorize the export.

4. The exporting State Party, in making this assessment, shall take into account the risk of the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of the items covered under Article 3 or Article 4 being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children.

5. Each exporting State Party shall take measures to ensure that all authorizations for the export of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) or of items covered under Article 3 or Article 4 are detailed and issued prior to the export.

6. Each exporting State Party shall make available appropriate information about the authorization in question, upon request, to the importing State Party and to the transit or trans-shipment States Parties, subject to its national laws, practices or policies.

7. If, after an authorization has been granted, an exporting State Party becomes aware of new relevant information, it is encouraged to reassess the authorization after consultations, if appropriate, with the importing State.

## **Article 8**

### **Import**

1. Each importing State Party shall take measures to ensure that appropriate and relevant information is provided, upon request, pursuant to its national laws, to the

exporting State Party, to assist the exporting State Party in conducting its national export assessment under Article 7. Such measures may include end use or end user documentation.

2. Each importing State Party shall take measures that will allow it to regulate, where necessary, imports under its jurisdiction of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Such measures may include import systems.

3. Each importing State Party may request information from the exporting State Party concerning any pending or actual export authorizations where the importing State Party is the country of final destination.

## **Article 9**

### **Transit or trans-shipment**

Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to regulate, where necessary and feasible, the transit or trans-shipment under its jurisdiction of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) through its territory in accordance with relevant international law.

## **Article 10**

### **Brokering**

Each State Party shall take measures, pursuant to its national laws, to regulate brokering taking place under its jurisdiction for conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Such measures may include requiring brokers to register or obtain written authorization before engaging in brokering.

## **Article 11**

### **Diversions**

1. Each State Party involved in the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) shall take measures to prevent their diversion.

2. The exporting State Party shall seek to prevent the diversion of the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) through its national control system, established in accordance with Article 5 (2), by assessing the risk of diversion of the export and considering the establishment of mitigation measures such as confidence-building measures or jointly developed and agreed programmes by the exporting and importing States. Other prevention measures may include, where appropriate: examining parties involved in the export, requiring additional documentation, certificates, assurances, not authorizing the export or other appropriate measures.

3. Importing, transit, trans-shipment and exporting States Parties shall cooperate and exchange information, pursuant to their national laws, where appropriate and feasible,



in order to mitigate the risk of diversion of the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

4. If a State Party detects a diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), the State Party shall take appropriate measures, pursuant to its national laws and in accordance with international law, to address such diversion. Such measures may include alerting potentially affected States Parties, examining diverted shipments of such conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and taking follow-up measures through investigation and law enforcement.

5. In order to better comprehend and prevent the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), States Parties are encouraged to share relevant information with one another on effective measures to address diversion. Such information may include information on illicit activities including corruption, international trafficking routes, illicit brokers, sources of illicit supply, methods of concealment, common points of dispatch, or destinations used by organized groups engaged in diversion.

6. States Parties are encouraged to report to other States Parties, through the Secretariat, on measures taken in addressing the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

## **Article 12**

### **Record keeping**

1. Each State Party shall maintain national records, pursuant to its national laws and regulations, of its issuance of export authorizations or its actual exports of the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

2. Each State Party is encouraged to maintain records of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) that are transferred to its territory as the final destination or that are authorized to transit or trans-ship territory under its jurisdiction.

3. Each State Party is encouraged to include in those records: the quantity, value, model/type, authorized international transfers of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), conventional arms actually transferred, details of exporting State(s), importing State(s), transit and trans-shipment State(s), and end users, as appropriate.

4. Records shall be kept for a minimum of ten years.

## **Article 13**

### **Reporting**

1. Each State Party shall, within the first year after entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, in accordance with Article 22, provide an initial report to the Secretariat of

measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, including national laws, national control lists and other regulations and administrative measures. Each State Party shall report to the Secretariat on any new measures undertaken in order to implement this Treaty, when appropriate. Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat.

2. States Parties are encouraged to report to other States Parties, through the Secretariat, information on measures taken that have been proven effective in addressing the diversion of transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

3. Each State Party shall submit annually to the Secretariat by 31 May a report for the preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1). Reports shall be made available, and distributed to States Parties by the Secretariat. The report submitted to the Secretariat may contain the same information submitted by the State Party to relevant United Nations frameworks, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Reports may exclude commercially sensitive or national security information.

#### **Article 14** **Enforcement**

Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to enforce national laws and regulations that implement the provisions of this Treaty.

#### **Article 15** **International Cooperation**

1. States Parties shall cooperate with each other, consistent with their respective security interests and national laws, to effectively implement this Treaty.

2. States Parties are encouraged to facilitate international cooperation, including exchanging information on matters of mutual interest regarding the implementation and application of this Treaty pursuant to their respective security interests and national laws.

3. States Parties are encouraged to consult on matters of mutual interest and to share information, as appropriate, to support the implementation of this Treaty.

4. States Parties are encouraged to cooperate, pursuant to their national laws, in order to assist national implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, including through sharing information regarding illicit activities and actors and in order to prevent and eradicate diversion of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1).

5. States Parties shall, where jointly agreed and consistent with their national laws, afford one another the widest measure of assistance in investigations, prosecutions and

judicial proceedings in relation to violations of national measures established pursuant to this Treaty.

6. States Parties are encouraged to take national measures and to cooperate with each other to prevent the transfer of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1) becoming subject to corrupt practices.

7. States Parties are encouraged to exchange experience and information on lessons learned in relation to any aspect of this Treaty.

## **Article 16**

### **International Assistance**

1. In implementing this Treaty, each State Party may seek assistance including legal or legislative assistance, institutional capacity-building, and technical, material or financial assistance. Such assistance may include stockpile management, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, model legislation, and effective practices for implementation. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide such assistance, upon request.

2. Each State Party may request, offer or receive assistance through, inter alia, the United Nations, international, regional, subregional or national organizations, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

3. A voluntary trust fund shall be established by States Parties to assist requesting States Parties requiring international assistance to implement this Treaty. Each State Party is encouraged to contribute resources to the fund.

## **Article 17**

### **Conference of States Parties**

1. A Conference of States Parties shall be convened by the provisional Secretariat, established under Article 18, no later than one year following the entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter at such other times as may be decided by the Conference of States Parties.

2. The Conference of States Parties shall adopt by consensus its rules of procedure at its first session.

3. The Conference of States Parties shall adopt financial rules for itself as well as governing the funding of any subsidiary bodies it may establish as well as financial provisions governing the functioning of the Secretariat. At each ordinary session, it shall adopt a budget for the financial period until the next ordinary session.

4. The Conference of States Parties shall:

- (a) Review the implementation of this Treaty, including developments in the field of conventional arms;
- (b) Consider and adopt recommendations regarding the implementation and operation of this Treaty, in particular the promotion of its universality;
- (c) Consider amendments to this Treaty in accordance with Article 20;
- (d) Consider issues arising from the interpretation of this Treaty;
- (e) Consider and decide the tasks and budget of the Secretariat;
- (f) Consider the establishment of any subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to improve the functioning of this Treaty; and
- (g) Perform any other function consistent with this Treaty.

5. Extraordinary meetings of the Conference of States Parties shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference of States Parties, or at the written request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least two-thirds of the States Parties.

#### **Article 18**

##### **Secretariat**

1. This Treaty hereby establishes a Secretariat to assist States Parties in the effective implementation of this Treaty. Pending the first meeting of the Conference of States Parties, a provisional Secretariat will be responsible for the administrative functions covered under this Treaty.
2. The Secretariat shall be adequately staffed. Staff shall have the necessary expertise to ensure that the Secretariat can effectively undertake the responsibilities described in paragraph 3.
3. The Secretariat shall be responsible to States Parties. Within a minimized structure, the Secretariat shall undertake the following responsibilities:
  - (a) Receive, make available and distribute the reports as mandated by this Treaty;
  - (b) Maintain and make available to States Parties the list of national points of contact;
  - (c) Facilitate the matching of offers of and requests for assistance for Treaty implementation and promote international cooperation as requested;
  - (d) Facilitate the work of the Conference of States Parties, including making arrangements and providing the necessary services for meetings under this Treaty; and
  - (e) Perform other duties as decided by the Conferences of States Parties.

#### **Article 19**

##### **Dispute Settlement**

1. States Parties shall consult and, by mutual consent, cooperate to pursue settlement of any dispute that may arise between them with regard to the interpretation or application

of this Treaty including through negotiations, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement or other peaceful means.

2. States Parties may pursue, by mutual consent, arbitration to settle any dispute between them, regarding issues concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty.

## **Article 20**

### **Amendments**

1. Six years after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose an amendment to this Treaty. Thereafter, proposed amendments may only be considered by the Conference of States Parties every three years.

2. Any proposal to amend this Treaty shall be submitted in writing to the Secretariat, which shall circulate the proposal to all States Parties, not less than 180 days before the next meeting of the Conference of States Parties at which amendments may be considered pursuant to paragraph 1. The amendment shall be considered at the next Conference of States Parties at which amendments may be considered pursuant to paragraph 1 if, no later than 120 days after its circulation by the Secretariat, a majority of States Parties notify the Secretariat that they support consideration of the proposal.

3. The States Parties shall make every effort to achieve consensus on each amendment. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall, as a last resort, be adopted by a three-quarters majority vote of the States Parties present and voting at the meeting of the Conference of States Parties. For the purposes of this Article, States Parties present and voting means States Parties present and casting an affirmative or negative vote. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment to all States Parties.

4. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 shall enter into force for each State Party that has deposited its instrument of acceptance for that amendment, ninety days following the date of deposit with the Depositary of the instruments of acceptance by a majority of the number of States Parties at the time of the adoption of the amendment. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance for that amendment.

## **Article 21**

### **Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession**

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York by all States from 3 June 2013 until its entry into force.

2. This Treaty is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by each signatory State.

3. Following its entry into force, this Treaty shall be open for accession by any State that has not signed the Treaty.

4. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

## **Article 22**

### **Entry into Force**

1. This Treaty shall enter into force ninety days following the date of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval with the Depositary.

2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, this Treaty shall enter into force for that State ninety days following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

## **Article 23**

### **Provisional Application**

Any State may at the time of signature or the deposit of instrument of its of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally Article 6 and Article 7 pending the entry into force of this Treaty for that State.

## **Article 24**

### **Duration and Withdrawal**

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty. It shall give notification of such withdrawal to the Depositary, which shall notify all other States Parties. The notice of withdrawal shall take effect ninety days after the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary, unless the notification of withdrawal specifies a later date.

3. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Treaty while it was a Party to this Treaty, including any financial obligations that it may have accrued.

## **Article 25**

### **Reservations**

1. At the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, each State may formulate reservations, unless the reservations are incompatible with the object and purpose of this Treaty.

2. A State Party may withdraw its reservation at any time by notification to this effect addressed to the Depositary.

**Article 26**

**Relationship with other international agreements**

1. The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing or future international agreements, to which they are parties, where those obligations are consistent with this Treaty.

2. This Treaty shall not be cited as grounds for voiding defence cooperation agreements concluded between States Parties to this Treaty.

**Article 27**

**Depositary**

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Treaty.

**Article 28**

**Authentic Texts**

The original text of this Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

DONE AT NEW YORK, this twenty-eighth day of March, two thousand and thirteen.

## Annex 11: Arms export licence revocations

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The Government conducted a review of arms exports following the “Arab Spring” in 2011. The Government provided details in Annex 1 of its Response (Cm8079) to the Committees’ 2011 Report (HC 686) of 158 arms export licence revocations it had made between January and July 2011, which is reproduced below. The reason for each of these 158 revocations was given as: “Increasing tension in (the respective country) resulted in re-assessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 and 3”. The Government provided the Committees with further licence revocations in two letters from the Foreign Secretary to the Chairman of the Committees dated 6 December 2012 and 13 May 2013. The total number of revocations for each of the countries concerned from 1 January 2011 to 6 June 2014 were as follows:

Country	Number of revocations
Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar	2
Argentina	37
Bahrain	39
Bahrain/Egypt	4
Belarus	1
China	3
Egypt	48
Germany	1
Iraq	1
Libya	72
Mauritius	1
Nigeria	2
Oman	2
Russia	8
South Africa	1
Syria	1
Tunisia	1
Ukraine	6
United States	1
Venezuela	2



Country	Number of revocations
Zambia	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>234</b>

Source: Government response to CAEC, First Joint Report of Session 2010–12, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): *UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009*, *Quarterly reports for 2010*, *licensing policy and review of export control legislation*, Cm8079, Annex 1; *Letter from the Foreign Secretary to the CAEC Chairman dated 6 December 2012*, Annex B; and *Letter from Foreign Secretary to CAEC Chairman dated 16 May 2013* (See HC (2013-14) 205 Ev w263); *Letter from the Business Secretary to CAEC Chairman dated 6 June 2014*, Annex B (Ev w499)

Details of all the arms export licence revocations from 1 January 2011 to 6 June 2014 are detailed below:

### **Arms export licence revocations January–July 2011**

#### *Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs)*

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar	Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar	Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights,	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Assault rifles (2), components for assault rifles, sporting rifles (2), semi automatic pistols (3), components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns (2), semi-automatic pistols (3), small arms ammunition, weapon sights, weapon cleaning equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Bahrain	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
<b>Bahrain</b>	Non-sporting shotgun ammunition, small arms ammunition, training ammunition for wall and door breaching projectile launchers.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Crowd control ammunition, non-sporting shotgun ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, wall and door breaching projectiles.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Cryptographic software, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Artillery, components for artillery, equipment for the use of artillery, technology for artillery, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon mountings.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Small arms ammunition.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Anti-armour ammunition, small arms ammunition.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	NBC protective/defensive equipment, components for NBC protective/defensive equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for assault rifles, components for machine guns.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Equipment for the use of sniper rifles.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Blank/inert ammunition.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Components for military training aircraft.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Components for military training aircraft.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Components for armoured personnel carriers.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3



<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Cryptographic software.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Cryptographic software.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Direct view imaging equipment, weapon night sights, direct view imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, goods treated for signature suppression for military use, test equipment for weapon sights, technology for the use of test equipment for weapon sights, imaging cameras, weapon sights, weapon sight mounts.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Tear gas/irritant ammunition	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Weapon cleaning equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Ammunition for wall and door breaching projectile launchers, crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for semi-automatic pistols, training small arms ammunition.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
		that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Ammunition for wall and door breaching projectile launchers, crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Ammunition for wall and door breaching projectile launchers, crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, training tear gas/irritant ammunition.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for combat aircraft.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Weapon cleaning equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Artillery computers, command communications control and intelligence equipment, command communications control and intelligence software, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the use of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Military helmets.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
		contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Equipment employing cryptography, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military containers, military electronic equipment, military field generators, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Direct view imaging equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, command and control vehicles, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, test equipment for military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Cryptographic software.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Military cargo vehicles, military communications equipment, military containers, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military cargo vehicles, technology for the use of military containers.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for multi-role missiles, components for surface-to-air missiles.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Optical target surveillance equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment,	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and



<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
	equipment for the use of optical target surveillance equipment, laser rangefinders, military cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment.	that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Imaging cameras.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for combat aircraft.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Body armour.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Weapon cleaning equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for anti-armour missiles.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for anti-armour missiles.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Software for the use of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for military transport aircraft.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Components for anti-armour missiles.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Libya</b>	Technology for the use of naval communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
Libya	Radio jamming equipment, software for the use of radio jamming equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Spacecraft.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	NBC respirators.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Laser radar equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Laser radar equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for optical target surveillance equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Technology for the use of optical target surveillance equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Optical target surveillance equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Unfinished products for optical target acquisition equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for airborne radars.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for military aircraft navigation equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for airborne radars.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
Libya	Components for optical target surveillance equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for military aircraft navigation equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for military cargo vehicles, military cargo vehicles.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, components for military parachutes, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Inert illuminators, inert signal flares, inert smoke canisters, inert smoke hand grenades, inert stun grenades, inter thunderflashes.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Components for military communications equipment, equipment employing cryptography, imaging cameras, military cameras, military communications equipment, military video recording equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Imaging cameras.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Imaging cameras.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Anti-riot/ballistic shields.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Inert chaff, inert decoy flares.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
<b>Tunisia</b>	Components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for semi-automatic pistols, training small arms ammunition.	Increasing tension in Tunisia resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

Source: Government response to CAEC, *First Joint Report of Session 2010–12*, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm8079, Annex 1

### *Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs)*

<b>End User Country</b>	<b>Annual Report Summary</b>	<b>Reason for Revocation</b>
<b>Bahrain</b>	Body armour.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, military helmets.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Rifles, shotguns, small arms ammunition, sporting gun ammunition, sporting rifles, weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for military utility vehicles, military utility vehicles, technology for the production of military utility vehicles,	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for gun laying equipment, components for military image equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military helmets, software for the use of military communications	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
	equipment, technology for the development of military communications equipment, technology for the development of military helmets, technology for the development of military communications equipment, technology for the production of military helmets, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military helmets, test equipment for military communications equipment.	
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for military utility vehicles, military utility vehicles, technology for the production of military utility vehicles, technology for the use of military utility vehicles.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Components for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military helmets, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the development of military communications equipment, technology for the development of military helmets, technology for the production of military communications equipment, technology for the production of military helmets, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military helmets, test equipment for military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Software for military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices,	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
	fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades.	that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain</b>	Ballistic shield, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets.	Increasing tension in Bahrain resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain/Egypt</b>	Technology for the development of software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the production of software for the use of military communications equipment, Technology for the use of software for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of command communications control and intelligence software, technology for the production of command communications control and intelligence software, command communications control and intelligence software.	Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain/Egypt</b>	Test equipment for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communications equipment, technology for the use of test equipment for military communications equipment, technology for the use of components for test equipment for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of components of military communications equipment, military helmets, components for military helmets, technology for the use of military helmets, technology for the use of components for military helmets.	Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain/Egypt</b>	Military distress signalling equipment, equipment for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military distress signalling equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Bahrain/Egypt</b>	Components for military distress signalling equipment, military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment.	Increasing tension in Bahrain/Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Components for inertial equipment, inertial	Increasing tension in Egypt

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
	equipment.	resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Components for military aero-engines, general military aircraft components, general military vehicle components, general naval vessel components.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, components for military electronic equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military communications equipment, technology for the use of military electronic equipment, military flying helmets.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Components for military training aircraft, ejector seats, components for ejector seats, military parachutes, components for military parachutes, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of ejector seats, technology for the use of military parachutes, technology for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, technology for the use of military parachutes.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Military flying helmets, aircrew protective masks, components for aircrew protective masks, components for military flying helmets, military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military flying helmets, components for equipment for the use of military flying helmets, equipment for the use of aircrew protective masks, military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military flying helmets, technology for the use of aircrew protective masks, technology for the use of military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, technology for the use of military communication equipment.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
<b>Egypt</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Egypt resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
Libya	Components for military aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft, software for the use of military transport aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Artillery computers, bombing computers, command and control vehicles, command communications control and intelligence equipment. Command communications control and intelligence software, components for military electronic equipment, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of artillery computers, equipment for the use of command communications control and intelligence equipment, equipment for the use of fire control equipment, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of laser rangefinders, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military electronic equipment, fire control equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun laying equipment, laser rangefinders, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, military navigation equipment, software for the modelling of military operation scenarios, software for the simulation of military operations scenarios, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, software for the use of military communications equipment, communications equipment, military containers, military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3



End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
Libya	Mine clearing equipment, components for mine clearing equipment, mine countermeasures equipment, components for mine countermeasures equipment, equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, components for equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, technology for the use of mine clearing equipment, technology for the use of mine countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of general military vehicle components, technology for the use of equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment, military field engineer equipment, components for military field engineer equipment, general military vehicle components, minefield breaching vehicles.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Technology for the use of military communications equipment.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Tunisia	Laser range finders, components for laser range finders, aiming devices, components for aiming devices, weapon sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of laser range finders, military image intensifier equipment, components for military intensifier equipment, night vision goggles, components for night vision goggles, weapon sights, equipment for the use of laser range finders.	Increasing tension in Tunisia resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

Source: Government response to CAEC, *First Joint Report of Session 2010–12*, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm8079, Annex 1

### Standard Individual Trade Control Licences (SITCLs)

End User Country	Annual Report Summary	Reason for Revocation
Libya	Pepper sprays for self protection, tear gas for self protection.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3
Libya	Military utility vehicles.	Increasing tension in Libya resulted in reassessment and that this licence now contravenes Criteria 2 & 3

Source: Government response to CAEC, *First Joint Report of Session 2010–12*, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation, Cm8079, Annex 1

**Arms export licence revocations July 2011– December 2012**

Following analysis of the Government’s Response (Cm8441) to the Committees 2012 Report (HC 419) the Committees put the following question to the Government on arms export revocations. The Committees question, with the Government’s answer were as follows:

**The Committees’ question:**

What arms export licence revocations has the Government made worldwide since those listed in Cm 8079, and will the Government list those revocations under the same headings as in Cm 8079?

The Government provided the following table in answer to the Committees’ question

**Annex B—Export licence revocations since Cm 8079 (published July 2011)**

End Use Countries	Annual Report Summary	Rating	Reason for Revocation
Argentina	components for combat aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for combat aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military transport aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012

End Use Countries	Annual Report Summary	Rating	Reason for Revocation
Argentina	components for military support aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military training aircraft	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military utility helicopters	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aero-engines	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aero-engines	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aero-engines	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aero-engines	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aero-engines	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aero-engines	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aero-engines	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft ground equipment	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for ejector seats	ML10	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military guidance/navigation equipment	ML11	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for body armour	ML13	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012

End Use Countries	Annual Report Summary	Rating	Reason for Revocation
Argentina	components for military radars	ML5	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military radars	ML5	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	military radars	ML5	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military radars	ML5	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military radars	ML5	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military radars	ML5	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for military radars	ML5	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for naval engines	ML9	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for naval engines	ML9	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for combat naval vessels	ML9	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for combat naval vessels	ML9	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Argentina	components for destroyers	ML9	No longer consistent with the more restrictive policy on Argentina announced on 26 April 2012
Belarus	weapon sights	ML1	Introduction of EU arms embargo
China	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	3C001	unacceptable risk of diversion to a WMD programme
China	semiconductor wafers with epitaxial layers	3C001	unacceptable risk of diversion to a WMD programme
Iraq	components for general purpose machine guns, equipment for the use of general purpose machine guns	ML1, PL5017	Notification received from the Official Receiver that the exporting company has been liquidated.
Syria	small arms ammunition	ML3	Introduction of EU arms embargo

End Use Countries	Annual Report Summary	Rating	Reason for Revocation
Zambia	components for military support vehicles, military support vehicles	ML6	Discrepancies between the licence and shipping documents presented to HMRC

Source: Letter from the Foreign Secretary to the CAEC Chairman dated 6 December 2012, Annex B (See HC (2013-14) 205, Ev w130)

### Arms export licence revocations January–May 2013

On 7 May 2013 the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls wrote to the Foreign Secretary requesting details of all worldwide arms export licence revocations subsequent to those listed in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 6 December 2012 (in table above).<sup>548</sup> The Foreign Secretary responded to the Chairman's letter by providing the following table. He pointed out in the letter that the majority of these licence applications were for equipment intended for use in maritime security, specifically anti-piracy activities.

End User Country	Item	Rating	Reason for Revocation
Oman	Assault rifles (100), components for assault rifles, rifles (100), components for rifles, pistols (50), components for pistols, small arms ammunition, military helmets, body armour, weapon sights, direct view imaging equipment	ML1a, ML3a, ML13c, ML13d, ML1d, 6A002c1	Criterion 7: risk of diversion
Oman	Assault rifles (75), components for assault rifles, rifles (100), components for rifles, assault rifles (100), pistols (50), components for pistols, small arms ammunition, military helmets, body armour, components for body armour, weapon sights, direct view imaging equipment	ML1a, ML3a, ML13c, ML13d, ML1d, 6A002c1	Criterion 7: risk of diversion
Mauritius	Assault rifles (75), components for assault rifles, rifles (100), components for rifles, assault rifles (100), pistols (50), components for pistols, small arms ammunition, military helmets, body armour, components for body armour, weapon sights, direct view imaging equipment	ML1a, ML3a, ML13c, ML13d, ML1d, 6A002c1	Criterion 7: risk of diversion
South Africa	Assault rifles (75), components for assault rifles, rifles (100), components for rifles, assault rifles (100), pistols (50), components for pistols, small arms ammunition, military helmets, body armour, weapon sights, direct view imaging equipment	ML1a, ML3a, ML13c, ML13d, ML1d, 6A002c1	Criterion 7: risk of diversion
China	Components for radar equipment, technology for the use of radar equipment, software for the use of radar equipment	6A008k1, 6E101, 6D002	Criterion 5c: risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer, Criterion 7: risk

548 See HC (2013-14) 205, Ev w170—Letter from Committees on Arms Export Controls Chairman to William Hague dated 7 May 2013

			of diversion
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Source: See HC (2013-14) 205, Ev w263, Letter from Foreign Secretary to CAEC Chairman dated 16 May 2013

### **Arms export licence revocations June 2013–6 June 2014**

On 17 April 2014 the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls wrote to the Business Secretary requesting details of all worldwide arms export licence revocations subsequent to those listed in the Foreign Secretary's letter of 16 May 2013 (in table above).<sup>549</sup> The Business Secretary responded to the Chairman's letter on 6 June 2014 by providing the following table:

<b>LICENCES REVOKED</b>					
<b>Licence Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary</b>	<b>Goods Rating</b>	<b>End User Countries</b>	<b>Revoke Date</b>	<b>Refusal Reason</b>
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a	Venezuela	28/05/2014	2,7
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Venezuela	28/05/2014	2,7
SIEL	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	Russia	12/05/2014	4
OIEL	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	technology for air-to-air missiles, technology for anti-armour missiles, technology for anti-ship missiles, technology for combat aircraft, technology for combat helicopters, technology for countermeasure equipment for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for fire control equipment, technology for general military aircraft components, technology for general military vehicle components, technology for guided missile decoying equipment, technology for laser rangefinders, technology for laser warning detectors, technology for military combat vehicles, technology for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for optical target acquisition equipment, technology for optical target surveillance equipment, technology for periscopes, technology for tanks, technology for turrets, technology for weapon night sights, technology for weapon sights	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	technology for the production of unfinished products for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment	ML22a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
SIEL	body armour, components for body armour	ML13d	Ukraine	04/02/2014	2
SIEL	software replicating controlled telecommunications equipment, radio	5D001c, 5A001f2	Nigeria	15/11/2013	2

549 Ev w211—Letter from the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls to Vince Cable dated 17 April 2014

	jamming equipment				
SIEL	radio jamming equipment	5A001f2	Nigeria	15/11/2013	2
SIEL	components for combat helicopters	ML10a	United States	25/10/2013	2
SIEL	equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography	5A002a1a, 5D002a	Egypt	25/10/2013	2
SIEL	equipment for the use of military helicopters, components for military helicopters	PL5017, ML10b	Russia	25/10/2013	2
SIEL	components for ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Germany	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	ground vehicle military communications equipment	ML6a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	components for machine guns	ML1a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
SIEL	components for machine guns	ML1a	Egypt	19/07/2013	2
	<b>COUNTRIES REMOVED FROM EXTANT LICENCES</b>				
<b>Licence Type</b>	<b>Goods Summary</b>	<b>Goods Rating</b>	<b>End User Countries</b>	<b>Revoke Date</b>	<b>Refusal Reason</b>
OIEL	imaging cameras	6A003b4b	Russia	24/03/2013	4
OIEL	components for military field engineer equipment, components for military support vehicles, components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, military electronic equipment, military field engineer equipment, military support vehicles, munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military support vehicles, technology for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for the use of military field engineer equipment	ML11a, ML17d, ML22a, ML4b1, ML6a	Russia	24/03/2014	4
OIEL	components for submersible equipment, components for submersible vehicles, heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, high energy capacitors, metal alloy cylindrical forms, metal alloy tubes, submersible equipment	1C202a, 3A201a1, 6A001a2d, 8A002a2, 8A002a3, 8A002a4, 8A002c, 8A002i2	Russia	19/03/2014	4
OIEL	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21c, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OIEL	software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, technology for software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment	ML21c, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OIEL	sporting guns	ML1a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2

OIEL	components for military communications equipment, equipment for the production of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment	ML11a, ML18a, ML21a, ML22a	Ukraine	26/02/2014	2
OITCL	gun mountings, gun silencers, small arms ammunition, sporting guns, weapon sights	ML1a, ML1d, ML3a	Ukraine	25/02/2014	2

Source: Ev w499 - Letter from Vince Cable to the Chairman of the Committees on Arms Export Controls dated 6 June 2014



## Annex 12: Companies registered with Export Control Organisation to use the Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy)

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This list is compiled and published by the Export Control Organisation (ECO). It lists companies who are registered to use the Open General Trade Control Licence (Maritime Anti-Piracy) via the ECO's export licensing database, SPIRE—

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-general-trade-control-licence-maritime-anti-piracy-list-of-registered-companies>.

Companies registered to use the licence need to meet all the terms and conditions of the licence. They are also subject to compliance audits conducted by the ECO's Compliance Unit.

As of 30 September 2013, the following 83 companies are registered to use the licence (an increase of 28 companies since 22 August 2012).

### **Name of Entity, Company or Organisation**

ACUITAS (LONDON) LTD  
 AEGIS DEFENCE SERVICES LIMITED  
 AMBREY RISK LTD  
 APPDS MARITIME SECURITY LTD  
 ARCH SHIPPING FZ LLC  
 ARGONAUT SECURITY LTD  
 ASPIDA MARITIME SECURITY (UK) LTD  
 ASSET MARITIME SECURITY SERVICES LIMITED  
 ATLAS INC LIMITED  
 AURORA ASSOCIATES MARITIME LTD  
 BOWLINE DEFENCE LTD  
 BRITANNIA MARITIME SECURITY LTD  
 CASTOR VALI MARITIME LIMITED  
 CITADEL MARITIME LIMITED  
 CLAYMORE SECURITY SOLUTIONS LTD  
 COMMERCIAL MARITIME PROTECTION LIMITED  
 CONTROL RISKS GROUP LIMITED  
 CORINTHIAN PROTECTION INTERNATIONAL LTD  
 DC RMS LTD  
 EOS RISK MANAGEMENT LIMITED  
 ERUS MARITIME SECURITY SERVICES LIMITED  
 GALENE GLOBAL MARITIME SECURITY LIMITED  
 GEMINI MARITIME LIMITED

GEOS INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING LIMITED  
GLOBAL SPRINT SECURITY LTD  
GROSVENOR GLOBAL RISK LTD  
GRUNTS SECURITY PARTNERSHIP LTD  
GUARDIAN GLOBAL RESOURCES LIMITED  
GULF OF ADEN GROUP TRANSITS LTD  
HADCON LIMITED  
HAYMARKET RISK MANAGEMENT LTD  
HR MARITIME CONSULTANTS LTD  
INFINITE SECURITY SOLUTIONS LTD  
ISC GROUP GULF WLL  
MARCUS LAWLER CONSULTING LTD  
MARITIME ASSET SECURITY AND TRAINING (MAST) LTD  
MARITIME DEFENCE INTERNATIONAL LTD  
MARITIME INTEGRATED SERVICES LTD  
MARITIME RESPONSE SERVICE MRS LTD  
MARITIME RISK INTERNATIONAL  
MARITIME SECURITY CONSULTANCY LTD  
MARSEC INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS LIMITED  
MIRIS INTERNATIONAL LTD  
NEPTUNE MARITIME SECURITY LTD  
OCEANBLUE RISK MANAGEMENT LTD  
OCEAN PROTECTION SERVICES LIMITED  
OFFSHORE MARINE SECURITY LTD  
OPSEC LTD  
OPTIMAL RISK MANAGEMENT LTD  
ORCHID MARITIME LTD  
ORION NAUTICAL RISK SOLUTIONS FZ LLC  
PGS MARITIME SECURITY LTD  
PHOENIX MARITIME PROTECTION LIMITED  
PLEXUS CONSULTANCY LTD  
PORT 2 PORT MARITIME SECURITY LTD  
PRORISK INTERNATIONAL  
PROTEUS MARITIME SECURITY LIMITED  
P S L MARITIME LIMITED  
QUINSEC LIMITED  
REDFOUR MSS (MARITIME SECURITY SOLUTIONS) LTD  
REGAL DEFENSE SOLUTIONS LTD  
SALAMANCA RISK MANAGEMENT LIMITED  
SANS PEUR MARITIME SECURITY LIMITED  
SEA HAWK MARITIME LIMITED  
SEA MARSHALS LTD  
SECURE A SHIP LIMITED  
SECUREWEST INTERNATIONAL LIMITED  
SECURITY SERVICES MARITIME LTD

SHIP SECURITY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED  
SOLACE GLOBAL MARITIME LTD  
SPEARFISH MARITIME  
SPECIAL PROJECTS AND SERVICES LIMITED  
SPIRIT SECURITY SERVICES LTD  
STENT (INTERNATIONAL) LIMITED  
TRANSAFE MARITIME (UK) LIMITED  
TRISKEL SERVICES LIMITED  
TUNDRA STRATEGIES INC (MARITIME)  
UNDERWATER SECURITY CONSULTANTS LIMITED  
UNITY SPS LIMITED  
VERITAS INTERNATIONAL LTD  
V SECURITY GROUP (UK) LTD  
WATCHWOOD RESOURCES LIMITED  
ZEAL GLOBAL MARITIME SOLUTIONS LTD<sup>550</sup>

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550 <http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/eco/docs/eco-ogtcl-maritime-anti-piracy-registrations-list.pdf>

## Annex 13: Selected arms export licence approvals of arms or components of arms which might be used to facilitate internal repression in the period 1 October 2012 to 30 September 2013

In its 2013 Human Rights and Democracy Report,<sup>551</sup> published in April 2014, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office identified 28 Countries of concern where the FCO had the most serious human rights concerns. The Countries of concern were: Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Fiji, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Libya, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe. The Committees on Arms Export Controls has identified an additional 5 countries that are of concern to it: these are Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia and Ukraine. The following table provides details of licences authorised by the Government in the period 1 October 2012 to 30 September 2013 for equipment that might be used to facilitate internal repression for the FCO's Countries of concern and 4 of the Committees' additional countries of concern (Argentina is dealt with separately in Annex 14). The Committees' questions on certain of the arms export licence approvals listed below and the Government's answers are in Annex 1 above.

Country	Examples of approved arms exports from 1 October 2012 until 31 December 2013
<b>Afghanistan</b>	Assault rifles, body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, gun mountings, machine guns, pistols, small arms ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Bahrain</b>	Anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for machine guns, components for sniper rifles, components for weapon mountings, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, general military vehicle components, gun mountings, gun silencers, machine guns, military communications equipment, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights.
<b>Belarus</b>	Components for equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Central African Republic (CAR)</b>	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection.
<b>China</b>	Components for equipment employing cryptography, components for ground

<sup>551</sup> Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Human Rights and Democracy: The 2013 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report*, Cm 8342, April 2014

Country	Examples of approved arms exports from 1 October 2012 until 31 December 2013
	vehicle military communications equipment, components for military communications equipment, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military communications equipment, small arms ammunition, software for cryptographic software, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for military communications equipment, technology for the production of military communications equipment, weapon sights.
<b>Colombia</b>	Anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, radio jamming equipment, software for radio jamming equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo (check)</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military support vehicles, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Egypt</b>	Acoustic devices for riot control, all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for machine guns, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for sniper rifles, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, general military vehicle components, ground vehicle military communications equipment, military communications equipment, military support vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, weapon sights.
<b>Eritrea</b>	Body armour.
<b>Iran</b>	Equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Iraq</b>	Anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for body armour, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for pistols, components for weapon mountings, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, ground vehicle military communications equipment, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sights.
<b>Israel and the OPTs</b>	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for body armour, components for civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for military support vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of weapon sights, general military vehicle components, military communications equipment, military communications software, military support vehicles, small arms ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for military communications software, technology for small arms ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sights.
<b>Libya</b>	All-wheel drive vehicle with ballistic protection, anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault

Country	Examples of approved arms exports from 1 October 2012 until 31 December 2013
	rifles, combat shotguns, command communications control and intelligence software, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for pistols, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of assault rifles, equipment for the use of pistols, hand grenades, military communications equipment, military support vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for military communications equipment, technology for equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Pakistan</b>	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for military communications equipment, components for mortar bombs, components for sniper rifles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, equipment for the production of assault rifles, equipment for the use of weapon sights, general military vehicle components, gun mountings, gun silencers, military communications equipment, pistols, radio jamming equipment, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography, technology for sniper rifles, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights.
<b>Russia</b>	Body armour, components for body armour, civil riot control agent protection equipment, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, general military vehicle components, gun mountings, gun silencers, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software for equipment employing cryptography, weapon sights.
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	Anti-riot/ballistic shields, body armour, command communications control and intelligence software, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for body armour, components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components for machine guns, components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for sniper rifles, components for water cannons, components for weapon sight mounts, crowd control ammunition, cryptographic software, CS hand grenades, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, general military vehicle components, ground vehicle military communications equipment, gun mountings, gun silencers, hand grenades, machine guns, military combat vehicles, military communications equipment, military support vehicles, night vision goggles, radio jamming equipment, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, software enabling equipment to function as military communications equipment, software for equipment employing cryptography, software for ground vehicle military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, software for radio jamming equipment, tear gas/irritant ammunition, technology for ground vehicle military communications equipment, technology for military communications equipment, wall/door breaching projectiles/ammunition, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights.
<b>Somalia</b>	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, body armour, components for body armour, components for military support vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military support vehicles, software for equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	Assault rifles, body armour, combat shotguns, components for assault rifles,

Country	Examples of approved arms exports from 1 October 2012 until 31 December 2013
	components for body armour, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for small arms ammunition, components for sniper rifles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, weapon night sights, weapon sights.
<b>Sudan</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Sudan, South</b>	Components for military support vehicles, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, military support vehicles, software for equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Syria</b>	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection.
<b>Tunisia</b>	Components for military support vehicles, equipment employing cryptography, military support vehicles, weapon night sights.
<b>Ukraine</b>	All-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for rifles, components for sniper rifles, components for sporting guns, equipment employing cryptography, gun silencers, rifles, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, sporting guns, weapon sights.
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	Body armour, components for body armour, equipment employing cryptography.
<b>Vietnam</b>	Components for military communications equipment, equipment employing cryptography, equipment for the use of weapon sights, military communications equipment, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights,
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	Cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography, technology for cryptographic software,

Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1 October 2012–31 December 2012*, *Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1 January 2013–31 March 2013*; *Country Pivot Report 1 April 2013–30 June 2013*; and *Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1 July 2013–30 September 2013*

## Annex 14: Export licences to Argentina in the period 1 October 2012 to 30 September 2013

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In the period 1 January to 30 September 2012 the Government approved, refused and revoked the following export licences to Argentina. The currently 57 extant arms export licences to Argentina are listed at Annex 9 above.

### **1 October 2012–31 December 2012**

#### SIELs

##### Approved

- Military (total value £29,863)
  - Small arms ammunition
  - Sporting guns (9)
- Other (total value £4,428,138)
  - equipment employing cryptography
  - radiation hardened TV cameras
  - software for equipment employing cryptography

#### OIELs

##### Approved

- accelerometers, components for accelerometers, components for guidance/navigation equipment, components for gyroscopes, guidance/navigation equipment, gyroscopes
- equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment employing cryptography
- cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for equipment, employing cryptography, technology for equipment employing cryptography

##### Refused

- aircraft bladders, aircraft diaphragms, aircraft gaskets, aircraft military communications equipment, aircraft seals, aircraft valve seats, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for equipment for the use of military support aircraft, components for military aero-engines, components for military aircraft ground equipment, components for military aircraft pressure refuellers, components for military aircrew breathing equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, components for military radars, components for military support aircraft, equipment for the use of military support aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aero-engines, military aircraft ground equipment, military aircraft pressure refuellers, military



aircrew breathing equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, technology for military support aircraft

**1 January 2013–31 March 2013**

SIELs

Approved

Military (total value £56,082)  
Military improvised explosive device  
decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment  
Small arms ammunition  
Sporting guns (2)  
Sporting guns (15)  
Other (total value £1,342,381)  
equipment employing cryptography  
human pathogens  
software for equipment employing cryptography  
submersible equipment

Refused

Military  
components for military training aircraft  
Other  
equipment employing cryptography

OIELs

Approved

lasers  
triggered spark gaps

**1 April 2013–30 June 2013**

SIELs

Approved

Military (total value £14,000)  
sporting guns (2)  
Other (total value £51,454)  
equipment employing cryptography

SIELS - incorporated

Refused

Space qualified solar devices

**1 July 2013–30 September 2013**

SIELs

Approved

Military (total value £285,700)  
components for sporting guns  
sporting guns (1) (6 licences)  
sporting guns (2)  
sporting guns (2) (5 licences)  
sporting guns (3)  
sporting guns (600)  
weapon sights  
Other (total value £41,328)  
imaging cameras

OIELs

Approved

artillery ammunition, components for artillery, components for combat naval vessels, components for decoying/countermeasure equipment, components for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military electronic equipment, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military radars, components for naval communications equipment, components for naval electrical/electronic equipment, components for naval engines, components for naval gun installations/mountings, components for naval guns, components for NBC detection equipment, components for weapon control equipment, decoying/countermeasure equipment, general naval vessel components, launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, military communications equipment, military electronic equipment, military guidance/navigation equipment, military radars, naval communications equipment, naval electrical/electronic equipment, signalling devices, smoke canisters, smoke/pyrotechnic ammunition, technology for artillery, technology for combat naval vessels, technology for decoying/countermeasure equipment, technology for general naval vessel components, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for missiles, technology for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, technology for military communications equipment, technology for military electronic equipment, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military radars, technology for naval communications equipment, technology for naval electrical/electronic equipment, technology for naval engines, technology for naval gun installations/mountings, technology for naval guns, technology for NBC detection equipment, technology for signalling devices, technology for smoke canisters, technology for weapon control equipment, training artillery ammunition, weapon control equipment

*Source: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1 October 2012–31 December 2012, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1 January 2013–31 March 2013; Country Pivot Report 1 April 2013–30 June 2013, Strategic Export Controls: Country Pivot Report 1 July 2013–30 September 2013; and Country Pivot Report 1 October 2013–31 December 2013*

## Annex 15: National Counter Proliferation Strategy 2012–2015

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The text of the letter and the attachment from the FCO Minister Alistair Burt to the Chairman of the Committees' dated 21 March 2012 relating to the National Counter Proliferation Strategy for 2012–2015 was as follows:

I write to inform you that the Government has agreed a National Counter Proliferation Strategy for 2012–2015. It flows from key risks identified in the National Security Strategy and formulates three overarching objectives:

- To deny access to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials and expertise to terrorists;
- To prevent acquisition by states of capabilities and their means of delivery (whether conventional or CBRN) which would threaten stability and UK vital interests, including our armed forces overseas; and
- To support, strengthen and extend the rules-based international system of counter proliferation treaties, regimes and organizations that underpins global security and prosperity.

It describes the actors on whom we focus our activities, the tools and resources we deploy, and our internal governance arrangements under the National Security Council. I attach to this letter the public version of the strategy, which will be released in the next few days.

We are already using it to drive forward more coherent and focused work across government departments and with our international partners. In the last few months, we have:

- continued work alongside the United States in Libya to locate and secure stockpiles of advanced conventional weapons, including MANPADs;
- played a key role in the final preparatory conference on an Arms Trade Treaty held in February, which achieved consensus on the process for the negotiations in July, and the adoption of the Chairman's paper as a basis for these negotiations;
- as part of implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review Conference outcomes, and along with the US and Russia, supported closely the Finnish facilitator for the Middle East WMD Free Zone, as he prepares his strategy for a conference;
- kept up the pressure on Iran over its nuclear programme by securing a strong EU sanctions package at January's Foreign Affairs Council, and a good E3+3 statement at the March meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.

The next key event will be the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul on 26–27 March, at which the deputy prime Minister will be leading the UK delegation. President Obama convened the first such summit in Washington in 2010, as part of his drive to secure vulnerable fissile material around the world within four years. The second summit will assemble 53 countries, and the UN, the EU, the IAEA and Interpol, to assess progress and reinvigorate commitment.

The Deputy Prime Minister will be able to report significant achievements against our commitments from Washington, including helping to secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union (not least, 775 bombs' worth in Kazakhstan); hosting a successful IAEA security advisory mission to Sellafield and Barrow; and leading efforts to secure last year's renewal of the G8-based Global partnership against the spread of WMD.

I expect him to make new commitments for the two years up to the next summit in 2014, including further close partnership with the IAEA, the US, the EU and others on risk reduction programmes overseas; further development of plans for the future management of our inventory of separated civil plutonium; and implementation of the new UK/France framework for cooperation on civil nuclear security and emergency response.

Our key contribution, and the summit's most innovative element, will be our ground-breaking work on the security of nuclear information. Over the past year we have built consensus on the need for greater focus on protecting not just nuclear material but also the information that a terrorist would need to obtain the material, build it in to an improvised explosive device, and mount an attack. Such information ranges from maps of nuclear installations, to how to construct a bomb, to how to beat border security and emergency response plans. At the summit, I expect our work to be reflected in a dedicated paragraph in the communiqué, and an additional UK-led statement, in which at least 20 countries will join us, committing to specific national actions to improve the practice of information security.

I look forward to engaging with you and your committee further on these and other matters in due course.

## **NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION STRATEGY 2012–2015**

### **WHY DO WE NEED A NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION STRATEGY?**

1. The proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and their delivery systems is a huge challenge which poses several serious risks to the UK's national security. These include a CBRN attack on the UK by terrorists or a threatening state, or an international military crisis. Conventional weapon systems also present the clearest threat to the UK's Armed Forces deployed on operations. Reducing these risks requires a comprehensive approach to counter proliferation.

2. The National Counter Proliferation Strategy sets the framework for this activity. Much of our approach is internationally focussed; in priority countries, with partners, or through the rules-based international system. Ensuring that we have the right controls and security in place domestically is also a key element.

### **A risk-based approach**

3. The National Security Strategy takes a risk-based approach to prioritise the Government's national security response. Counter proliferation work is critical to reducing several of the most serious national security risks identified:

#### **RISK 1: A terrorist chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attack on the UK or its interests, including UK Armed Forces.**

4. Al Qaeda has a long-held desire to obtain and use CBRN devices. Without continued global efforts to reduce vulnerabilities in the security of material and information, there is a significant likelihood that terrorists will at some point acquire CBRN capability.

#### **RISK 2: An international military crisis**

5. The proliferation of CBRN and conventional military technologies to countries, and the enhancement by countries of their existing capabilities, have the potential to increase instability and precipitate an international military crisis, or exacerbate the consequences of such a crisis, including for UK deployed forces.

#### **RISK 3: A state (or proxy) CBRN attack on the UK or its overseas territories**

6. While there is currently a low threat of CBRN attack on the UK, it is still important that we retain our ability to monitor—and where possible prevent—CBRN weapons advancements by other countries, maintain our defences against attack, and lead global efforts to strengthen the rules-based international system that has helped to limit the number of CBRN possessor states thus far.

### **Our objectives**

7. We are working to reduce proliferation risks by:

1. Denying access to CBRN materials and expertise by terrorists;
2. Preventing acquisition by states of capabilities and their means of delivery (whether conventional or CBRN) which would threaten stability and UK vital interests, including our armed forces overseas; and
3. Supporting, strengthening and extending the rules-based international system of counter proliferation treaties, regimes and organisations that underpins global security and prosperity.

### **WHERE WE SEEK TO FOCUS**

8. We are focusing activity on four broad groups of actors:

- states which may have **vulnerabilities** in the security of their CBRN information and materials;

- states which may have the **capability or intent** to develop CBRN or advanced conventional weapons;
- states which may actively or inadvertently **supply or transit** CBRN weapons, delivery systems and conventional weapons, or related technologies, to actors of concern; and
- partners and multilateral organisations with whom we can **effect change**, including the UN, G8, NATO and the EU.

#### **States with CBRN security vulnerabilities**

9. Many countries possess significant quantities of CBRN material or expertise, or have a significant CBRN technological base; some countries have CBRN weapons. In several of these we assess that security weaknesses could make such capabilities easier for non-state groups to acquire or exploit for malicious purposes.

#### **States with the capability or intent to develop CBRN or advanced conventional weapons**

10. A number of states have active CBRN and advanced conventional weapons and delivery system programmes—either to acquire a new capability or to improve an existing one. The existence of either can be destabilising for a region and can lead to an arms race or a military response by a regional or global power. This would increase the risk of a state threat to the UK and its overseas interests.

11. Despite Iran's claims that its nuclear programme is peaceful, serious concerns about a military dimension remain as a result of Iran's actions over recent years. We continue to follow the dual track strategy of engagement and sanctions. We also have continuing concerns about North Korea's proliferation activities. We continue to urge North Korea to refrain from further provocative actions and to re-engage in dialogue with the international community.

12. Alongside our commitment to prevent the spread of such weapons, we are promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the right to which is enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

#### **States which may supply or transit material and technologies which threaten security**

13. Where states admit to, or are judged to, have a nuclear weapons capability, or chemical or biological technologies and materials, controls are essential to prevent more states from acquiring CBRN weapons. We want all states with these dual use technologies to have the will and ability to prevent leakage.

14. Globalisation has increased the flow of trade and knowledge making it harder to identify cargoes and technologies destined for weapons programmes of concern. We cannot stop this trade on our own, so we need to work with trading hubs to improve policing.

#### **Partners and multilateral organisations with whom we can effect change**

15. We are working with our closest international partners and in the multilateral environment, including in the UN, G8, NATO and the EU, to effect change in both specific countries and the rules-based international system.

## WHAT WE SEEK TO CHANGE

16. The rules-based international system is a network of organisations, ad hoc groups, treaties and regimes that has been built up over the last 80 years and has over that period successfully limited, and even helped to reduce, the number of states with—or looking to acquire—WMD or their delivery systems, or advanced conventional capabilities. In developing the rules-based international system, we seek to:

- Strengthen international commitments to non-proliferation treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- Lead in groups such as the Nuclear Security Summit or G8 Global Partnership which are delivering CBRN security improvements on the ground;
- Provide financial, technical and diplomatic support to the international bodies that monitor and verify compliance against these commitments, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
- Strengthen enforcement of existing obligations and export control regimes, and adoption of non-obligatory guidelines, while developing and implementing new ones such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an Arms Trade Treaty, and a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty;
- Lead by example internationally in terms of our own domestic security practices and export controls;
- Identify, and seek consensus to mitigate, any gaps in the international architecture.

17. To complement this, we are:

- Working to encourage states to **improve nuclear and biological security**, and ensure that **sensitive science** is not misused for hostile intent;
- Aiming to **disrupt proliferation networks**, through helping others to enforce sanctions and export regimes more rigorously;
- Supporting the international community in **tackling proliferation finance** by working with banks to identify front companies and freeze assets;
- Tackling the supply of **delivery systems**;
- Promoting the **peaceful use of nuclear energy**.

## HOW WE ARE EFFECTING CHANGE

18. We are using the **diplomatic network** to increase our understanding of and influence on the drivers of policy in priority countries including government, industry and civil society.

Our missions to international institutions and organisations—especially in Vienna, New



York, Geneva and the Hague—are playing a crucial role in developing, strengthening and upholding the rules-based international system.

19. Our **export controls and enforcement capability** enable us to reduce the risks of material getting into the wrong hands. We are acting to maintain a robust and effective national export control regime, and to improve international export controls. We are at the forefront of efforts to gather international support for a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty to regulate the global trade in conventional weapons.

20. We have prioritised our objectives to ensure that we make best use of available resources. We are providing **technical and financial support** to deliver concrete improvements in the security of materials and know-how in partner countries; **facilitating debate and delivering training** to help build partners' engagement and capacities; and **maintaining our own technical and scientific expertise** in counter proliferation, arms control and CBRN security.

21. The National Security Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, ultimately oversees implementation of this strategy. We will **measure, evaluate and report progress** on its delivery at regular intervals, including through reports to Parliament on implementation of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.<sup>552</sup>

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552 "National Counter Proliferation Strategy 2012–2015", Foreign and Commonwealth Office website, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/>

## Annex 16: Department Minutes for the gifting of equipment to the Syrian Opposition May 2013–June 2014

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15 July 2013

### **Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Minute dated 15th July 2013 on gifting of chemical weapons protective equipment to the Syrian Opposition**

*It is the normal practice when a Government department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £250,000, for the department concerned to present to the House of Commons a Minute giving particulars of the gift and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from making the gift until fourteen Parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the Minute, except in cases of special urgency. This is a case of special urgency because of the need to provide the Syrian Opposition with protection against chemical weapons at the earliest possible opportunity. As a result, the notification period will be 14 working days beginning on the date on which this Minute was laid.*

As the Foreign Secretary told the House on 10th July, we are faced with a growing and protracted crisis in Syria. There is evidence of attacks using chemical weapons in Syria - including sarin. We believe that the use of chemical weapons is sanctioned and ordered by the Assad regime. The Foreign Secretary explained on 10th July that we are exploring the possibility of supplying the Syrian Opposition protective equipment against chemical and biological weapons use. This minute provides more detail on these plans.

The proposal is to gift:

- 5,000 commercial escape hoods;
- Medical pre-treatment against nerve agents (“NAPs” tablets) sufficient to treat 5,000 people for 6 months, from MOD excess stocks; and
- Three colour chemical weapons „detector paper“, also from MOD excess stocks.

The gift will be offered to the Supreme Military Council of the Syrian National Coalition, which the UK recognises as the sole legitimate representatives of the Syrian people.

Escape hoods protect against sarin gas for approximately 20 minutes, allowing a person to move away from an affected area but not enabling them to continue to fight. They do not require fitting or extensive training to be effective. Pre-treatment with NAPs gives a person who is exposed to a nerve agent (including sarin) a greater chance of reaching a place where atropine can be administered under medical supervision. Chemical weapons detector paper enables the basic detection of chemical weapons agents. The

capability to detect quickly whether chemical weapons agents are present will inform decisions on whether or not to remain in an area and so potentially save lives.

A train-the-trainer package is also proposed. This will provide a number of trainers with the ability to deliver further training within Syria on the appropriate way to use the gifted material. Instructions will be provided in Arabic. The final delivery mechanism is yet to be decided but the gift may be delivered in tranches in order to minimise the risk of diversion.

The approximate total cost of the equipment in the proposed gift is £656,800 which will be met by the Government's Conflict Pool Fund. There will be an additional cost for transportation and training which is not yet confirmed but which will also be funded by Conflict Pool. The cost of this will be limited as far as possible but we are not able to give an accurate estimate until we discuss the proposal with the Opposition.

The use of Conflict Pool funds to cover the costs of this gift has been approved by the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for International Development. FCO and MOD officials have also assessed the gift against the Consolidated Criteria and the gift does not cross the risk thresholds in the consolidated criteria provided adequate measures are put in place to mitigate the risk of diversion. In assessing the risks of providing these materials, the FCO's Counter Terrorism Department and the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) have been consulted and agree the recommendation to provide the gift. This gift is also consistent with HMG's agreed policy on Syria.

*18 November 2013*

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Minute dated 18 November 2013  
on gifting of non-lethal equipment to the Supreme Military Council of the Syrian  
National Coalition**

*It is normal practice when a government department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £300,000, for the department concerned to present to the House of Commons a Minute giving particulars of the gift and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from making the gift until fourteen Parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the Minute, except in cases of special urgency.*

It is now over two years since the Syrian conflict began and the situation remains catastrophic. Our estimates are that over 100,000 people have been killed, with over 2 million refugees now in neighbouring countries. The UK is committed to doing all it can to alleviate the humanitarian suffering and to promote a political settlement to end the conflict. For such a political settlement to be legitimate and long-lasting, it must include the moderate opposition lead by the Syrian National Coalition for Revolutionary and Opposition forces, which the UK recognises as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people. There can be no peaceful settlement to the conflict

in Syria if the legitimate, moderate opposition is allowed to be crushed. We welcome the decision taken by the National Coalition on 10 November to attend the Geneva II conference, which aims to find a negotiated political solution to the conflict. We also welcome the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army's support for the Geneva II process.

The Foreign Secretary's 11 November statement to the House outlined the intensive political and practical support we are providing to the National Coalition to help it prepare for the conference and alleviate suffering inside Syria. This includes support to General Idris' Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army, which is closely aligned to the Syrian National Coalition.

This Minute sets out in more detail our plans to gift non-lethal equipment to the Supreme Military Council. This gift will be: commercially available communications equipment, such as laptops with satellite internet connection, mobile telephones and push-to-talk radios; commercially available vehicles, such as pick-up trucks; fuel; portable generators less than 3MW in power; logistics supplies such as clothing, rations and tents; and individual medical kits. The total cost of the proposed gift is £1 million, which will be met by the Government's Conflict Pool Fund.

The equipment will bolster the Supreme Military Council against brutal attacks from Assad and threats from extremists; help them to co-ordinate within Syria; and assist them in saving the lives of those injured and alleviating humanitarian suffering. It will also underline the UK's continued support to the moderate opposition.

This is the UK's second gift to the Supreme Military Council; in August 2013 we sent them escape hoods, detector paper and nerve-agent pre-treatment tablets to protect them from chemical weapons attack.

The use of Conflict Pool funds to cover the costs of the gift has been approved by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for International Development. The gift has been scrutinised to ensure that the provision of this equipment is consistent with export controls and complies with our international obligations. Recipients have been carefully selected to prevent equipment being given to those involved in extremist activities or human rights violations. All our assistance is carefully calibrated and legal, is aimed at alleviating human suffering and supporting moderate groups and is regularly monitored and evaluated.

*23 January 2014*

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Minute dated 23 January 2014 on gifting of search and rescue equipment to Syrian civil defence teams**

*It is the normal practice when a government department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £300,000, for the department concerned to present to the House of Commons a minute giving particulars of the gift and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from making the gift until fourteen Parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the minute, except in cases of special urgency.*

It is now over two years since the Syrian conflict began and the situation remains catastrophic. Our estimates are that over 100,000 people have been killed, with more than half of the Syrian population now in need of humanitarian assistance. The UK is committed to doing all it can to promote a political settlement to the conflict and to alleviate the humanitarian suffering.

The Foreign Secretary's statements to the House on 11 November 2013 and 13 January 2014 outlined the intensive political and practical support we are providing to the National Coalition to alleviate suffering inside Syria. As a part of this work, the UK is supporting emerging moderate local governance structures in opposition-held areas to improve the delivery of services to local communities. We plan to expand a UK-funded pilot project to train and equip local council civil defence teams in northern Syria, enabling them to provide search and rescue, fire-fighting and first aid services in areas under attack. This project is carried out in cooperation with the National Coalition's Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) and builds on earlier deliveries of civil resilience equipment to local councils through the ACU.

This Minute sets out in detail our plans to gift further civil defence equipment to local council teams in Syria as part of the expanded project. This gift will consist of sets of equipment for nine 25-man teams, including commercially available personal radios, cutting and rescue tools, uniforms and protective gear such as fire helmets and goggles, fire extinguishers, stretchers and individual medical kits. The total cost of the proposed gift is approximately £700,000, which will be met by the Government's Conflict Pool Fund. The overall value of the uplift to the project is £2.1m, which includes training for nine teams of approximately 25 people, a communications campaign, support for mechanics to repair and restore fire-fighting vehicles, and crisis management training for governorate level council, police and civil defence leaders.

The equipment will help local communities deal with the aftermath of attacks, improve the service delivery capability and legitimacy of local councils and assist them in saving the lives of those injured and in alleviating humanitarian suffering. It will also underline the UK's continued support to the moderate opposition.

The use of Conflict Pool funds to cover the costs of the gift has been approved by members of the Conflict Pool Strategic Programme Board from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development and Ministry of Defence. The gift has been scrutinised to ensure that the provision of this equipment is consistent with export controls and complies with our international obligations. Recipients have been carefully selected to prevent equipment being given to those

involved in extremist activities or human rights violations. All our assistance is carefully calibrated and legal, is aimed at alleviating human suffering and supporting moderate groups and is regularly monitored and evaluated.

*6 February 2014*

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Minute dated 6 February 2014 on gifting of equipment to the Free Syrian Police**

*It is the normal practice when a government department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £300,000, for the department concerned to present to the House of Commons a minute giving particulars of the gift and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from making the gift until fourteen parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the minute, except in cases of special urgency.*

The conflict in Syria remains catastrophic, with over 125,000 people killed and more than half the Syrian population in need of humanitarian assistance. The UK will continue to do all it can to end the conflict through a political settlement, while also alleviating humanitarian suffering and protecting UK national security.

The UK is committed to working with the moderate opposition to help develop their capacity to meet needs on the ground and to reduce suffering and to save lives, thereby also helping reduce the space for extremists to operate. In line with this approach, on 23 January, I laid before Parliament a departmental Minute which set out our plans to expand a UK-funded pilot project to train and equip local council civil defence teams, enabling them to provide search and rescue, fire-fighting and first aid services in areas under attack. I am pleased to present a further UK contribution of practical support to the moderate opposition, aimed at improving community policing.

The UK intends to work with international donors to provide training, technical assistance, maintenance funds, and basic equipment to the Free Syrian Police operating in opposition-controlled areas of Syria. The UK also intends to support the development of greater community oversight and monitoring of the police to help ensure that police are responsive to local needs. Through this support the UK is aiming to help improve humanitarian conditions, meet basic needs and build community resilience to counter the threat from extremist groups. If this initial phase is successful, developing the capacity of community policing could become a core aspect of the UK's ongoing support to the opposition.

This departmental Minute sets out in more detail our plans to gift office and communications equipment, uniforms, and non-armoured vehicles to the Free Syrian Police. The goods will be procured, distributed and delivered by a carefully selected implementing partner. The total cost of the proposed gift is £910,000, which will be met by the Government's Syria Conflict Prevention Programme. Other donors, including the United States of America and Denmark, are also contributing on a similar scale and

the UK's assistance forms part of a coordinated approach that will help deliver the best value for money.

The gift forms part of a comprehensive UK programme of training and technical assistance worth approximately £2million, which will be delivered by implementing partners. The training aims to build the capacity of the Free Syrian Police including through developing their strategy, planning and management mechanisms and enhancing coordination between Free Syrian Police units, as well as strengthening the relationship between police actors and local communities.

There is a strong need to support the Free Syrian Police, who are responsible for providing basic civilian policing in large areas of opposition-controlled territory. Police actors, local administrative councils and the National Coalition's Interim Ministers have all underlined to us the need to improve policing and security, and we have worked closely with Syrian partners and other donors to design a comprehensive programme of support.

The gift has been scrutinised to ensure that the provision of this equipment is consistent with export controls and complies with our international obligations. Recipients have been carefully selected to prevent equipment being given to those involved in extremist activities or human rights violations. All our assistance is carefully calibrated and legal, is aimed at alleviating human suffering and supporting moderate groups and is regularly monitored and evaluated. We have assessed the project for human rights risks, using the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance guidelines established by the Foreign Secretary in 2011 as part of ensuring these risks are effectively mitigated.

**9 June 2014**

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office Departmental Minute dated 9 June 2014 on gifting of search and rescue equipment to Syrian civil defence teams**

*It is the normal practice when a government department proposes to make a gift of a value exceeding £300,000, for the department concerned to present to the House of Commons a minute giving particulars of the gift and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from making the gift until fourteen Parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the minute, except in cases of special urgency.*

The situation in Syria remains dire. Innocent civilians have faced the brunt of the increasingly brutal war with an estimated 140,000 people killed since the conflict began over three years ago. The Assad regime continues to use the most barbaric military methods and tactics available, including the use of indiscriminate artillery fire and barrel bombs. The UK is also concerned by recent reports that the regime continues to use chemical weapons against its own people. The UK remains committed to doing all it can to promote a political settlement to end the conflict, to alleviate the humanitarian suffering and protect UK security.

On 23 January 2014, I laid a departmental Minute before the House and issued a Written Ministerial Statement setting out our plans to gift civil defence equipment to nine 25-man teams operating in opposition-controlled areas of Syria. No objections were raised to the gift and the UK distributed the equipment to civil defence teams alongside a comprehensive training package. The civil defence teams have saved lives by rescuing civilians trapped in damaged buildings and by providing emergency first aid. Our assistance has helped increase the legitimacy and capacity of opposition local councils and supported communities in dealing with the aftermath of attacks.

The Government intends to expand the scale and scope of this programme by additionally training incident commanders, offering courses to a larger number of rapid response teams and by providing further specialist training on fire-fighting and medical emergency response. This departmental Minute sets out in detail our plans to gift £1.6million in equipment to Syrian beneficiaries providing civil defence. The proposed list of equipment includes cutting and rescue tools, personal protective gear including helmets and goggles, stretchers, medicines and medical supplies, and office and communications equipment. The programme will also raise awareness amongst local communities on how to prepare for, respond to and recover from regime attacks through community awareness training and the circulation of print and online material. Finally, the programme will increase coordination between the Syrian Interim Government and civil defence teams. The programme is part of a range of support the UK is providing to help bolster the moderate Syrian opposition, including by enabling them to deliver essential services to the Syrian people inside opposition-held areas of the country. It is expected to cost up to £4million and will be funded through the Government's Conflict Pool.

The use of Conflict Pool funds to cover the costs of the gift has been approved by members of the Conflict Pool Strategic Programme Board from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development and Ministry of Defence. The gift has been scrutinised to ensure that the provision of this equipment is consistent with export controls and complies with our international obligations. Recipients have been carefully selected to prevent equipment being given to those involved in extremist activities or human rights violations. All our assistance is carefully calibrated and legal, is aimed at alleviating human suffering and supporting moderate groups and is regularly monitored and evaluated.