Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear
Facilities and Military Forces
December 2004
Scope Note
Congress has directed the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to submit to the Congressional leadership and intelligence committees an annual, unclassified report assessing the safety and security of the nuclear facilities and military forces in Russia. Congress has requested that each report include a discussion of the following:
- The ability of the Russian Government to maintain its nuclear military forces.
- The security arrangements at Russia’s civilian and military nuclear facilities.
- The reliability of controls and safety systems at Russia’s civilian nuclear facilities.
- The reliability of command and control systems and procedures of the nuclear military forces in Russia.
This report is the fourth responding to this Congressional request. The report addresses facilities and forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (formerly the Ministry of Atomic Energy), and other Russian institutes. It updates the February 2002 report to Congress.
This paper has been prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation.
Key Points
The United States continues to work cooperatively with Moscow to increase the safety and security of nuclear-related facilities, infrastructure, and personnel.Russia is upgrading its physical, procedural, and technical measures to secure its nuclear weapons against both external and internal threats.Russia's nuclear security has been slowly improving over the last several years, but risks remain.We remain concerned about vulnerabilities to an insider who attempts unauthorized actions as well as potential terrorist attacks.
- An unauthorized launch or accidental use of a Russian nuclear weapon is highly unlikely as long as current technical and procedural safeguards built into the command and control system remain in place and are effectively enforced. Our concerns about possible circumvention of the system would rise if central political authority broke down.
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, President Putin and other Russian officials have conducted a public campaign to provide assurances that terrorists have not acquired Russian nuclear weapons.Russian officials have reported, however, that terrorists have targeted Russian nuclear weapon storage sites.Security was tightened in 2001 after Russian authorities twice thwarted terrorist efforts to reconnoiter nuclear weapon storage sites.
Russian facilities housing weapons-usable nuclear material vary from small research facilities and fuel cycle facilities to those involved with nuclear weapons research, development, and production.Small research facilities, although typically under-funded, usually have smaller, static inventories of weapons-usable nuclear material and are easier to secure whereas large fuel fabrication facilities have larger, varying inventories that are more difficult to account for and are much harder to secure.
We assess that progress on security enhancements is most advanced at civilian institutes and Russian Navy sites.Progress is impeded at facilities within the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy [1] nuclear weapons complex, which contain most of the material of proliferation interest because Russian security concerns prevent direct US access to sensitive materials.Russia's nuclear material protection, control, and accounting practices have been slowly improving over the last several years, but risks remain.
We find it highly unlikely that Russian authorities would have been able to recover all the material reportedly stolen.We assess that undetected smuggling has occurred, and we are concerned about the total amount of material that could have been diverted or stolen in the last 13 years.
As for security at nuclear power plants, the commander-in-chief of the Interior Ministry Force said in November 2003 that Russia would set up a special-purpose unit tasked to protect nuclear energy industry installations.The unit would be established to counter terrorists and augment existing security.Even with increased security, however, Russian nuclear power plants almost certainly will remain vulnerable to a well-planned and executed terrorist attack.
Discussion
The United States is working cooperatively with Moscow to increase the safety and security of nuclear-related facilities, infrastructure, and personnel. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) is responsible for the nuclear military forces and its nuclear weapon storage system. The Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (Rosatom), formerly known as the Ministry of Atomic Energy, [2] operates the national nuclear weapons complex, conducts weapons-related tests at the MOD nuclear test site, and controls most nuclear-related institutes and industrial facilities.
- Rosatom and Rosenergoatom, a state-owned nuclear power concern, operate Russia's nuclear power reactors. [3]
We are concerned that Russia may not be able to sustain US-provided security upgrades of facilities over the long-term given the cost and technical sophistication of at least some of the equipment involved.
Ministry of Defense
Nuclear Weapons Inventory
Russia is upgrading its physical, procedural, and technical measures to secure its weapons against both external and internal threats, and Russia's nuclear security has been slowlybut unevenly improving over the last several years. Risks remain, however, and we continue to be concerned about vulnerabilities to an insider who attempts unauthorized actions as well as potential terrorist attacks.
- An unauthorized launch or accidental use of a Russian nuclear weapon is highly unlikely as long as current technical and procedural safeguards built into the command and control system remain in place and are effectively enforced. Our concerns about possible circumvention of the system would rise if central political authority broke down.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has consolidated the former Soviet stockpile into storage sites in Russia. Russian officials have stated that thousands of nuclear warheads from the former Soviet stockpile have been dismantled since 1991; reportedly over 10,000 warheads have been eliminated. Moscow relies on nuclear weapons as its primary means of deterrence, however, and will continue to have thousands of nuclear warheads in its inventory for the foreseeable future.
- Moscow maintains roughly 4,000 operational strategic nuclear warheads in its strategic nuclear triad, which is composed of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers carrying nuclear-tipped air-launched cruise missiles. Moscow has agreed under the Moscow Treaty to reduce its strategic forces so that on 31 December 2012 Russia would have no more than 1,700 to 2,200 warheads.
- Although Russia has reduced its nonstrategic nuclear stockpile, it probably will retain several thousand nonstrategic nuclear warheads. In accordance with a 1991 unilateral pledge, Moscow consolidated most of its nonstrategic nuclear warheads in central depots and eliminated a major portion of them as a response to a US presidential initiative.
The Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate (GUMO) is responsible for the physical protection and safety of nuclear weapons. Specialists from the 12th GUMO carry out all maintenance work in close collaboration with the warhead designers. The 12th GUMO also is responsible for nuclear warhead shipments throughout Russia.
- All nuclear weapons storage sites, except those subordinate to the strategic missile troops, fall under the 12th GUMO's responsibility, thus facilitating a uniform policy in matters of operation and physical security.
- In peacetime all nuclear munitions except those on ICBMs and SLBMs on alert status are stored in nuclear weapons storage sites.
- The Russians employ a multi-layered approach that includes physical, procedural, and technical measures to secure their weapons.
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, President Putin and other Russian officials have conducted a public campaign to provide assurances that terrorists have not acquired Russian nuclear weapons.
- In October 2002, former Minister of Atomic Energy Adamov stated, "Neither Bin Ladin nor anyone else could steal a nuclear warhead from anywhere in the former Soviet Union. During my time as minister, I carried out a comprehensive stock-taking of everything we had and had had, and traced the history of all the warheads ever produced. So, everything there was on the territories of the former USSR republics was returned to Russia. .Nothing was stolen from us. So, neither Bin Ladin, nor Iraq nor Iran could make use of these explosive devices."
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said publicly during a visit to Washington in April 2004 that it is impossible for Moscow's stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear fuels to fall into the hands of terrorists.
In September 2002, then First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Baluyevskiy, stated that the security of Russian nuclear weapon storage sites "is important not only for our country but for the whole world. This is why they are heavily guarded. .We have taken all measures to ensure the security of these facilities, from technical to physical ones."
Russian officials, however, have reported that terrorists have targeted Russian nuclear weapon storage sites. According to the chief of the 12th GUMO, Russian authorities twice thwarted terrorist efforts to reconnoiter nuclear weapon storage sites in 2002.
- In addition, two Chechen sabotage and reconnaissance groups reportedly showed a suspicious amount of interest in the transportation of nuclear munitions. The groups were spotted at several major railroad stations in the Moscow region, apparently interested in a special train used for transporting nuclear "bombs."